Print[Senate Report 118-5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
118th Congress} { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 118-5
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R E P O R T
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COVERING THE PERIOD
JANUARY 3, 2021
TO
JANUARY 3, 2023
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
March 28, 2023.--Ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2023
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York M. MICHAEL ROUNDS, South Dakota
JON OSSOFF, Georgia
Charles Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
Roger F. Wicker, Mississippi, Ex Officio Member
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Brian W. Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Charles Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
James Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Brian W. Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
PREFACE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
this report on its activities from January 3, 2021, to January
3, 2023. This report also includes references to activities
underway at the conclusion of the 117th Congress that the
Committee expects to continue into the future.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the
Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be
discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods.
Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has
submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to
provide the American public with information about its
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the
Senate, in observance of this practice.
We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members
of the Committee in the 117th Congress. In particular, we take
special note of colleagues who completed their service on the
Committee. Senator Burr served on the Committee from the 110th
Congress until he retired from the U.S. Senate on January 3,
2023. Senator Blunt served on the Committee from the 112th
Congress until he retired from the Senate on January 3, 2023.
Senator Sasse served on the Committee from the 116th Congress
until he retired from the Senate on January 3, 2023. Their
commitment to the important work of the Committee has helped to
ensure a strong IC and a secure nation. We are grateful for
their contributions.
We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all
Committee staff during the 117th Congress. Their vigilance,
professionalism, and perseverance in the face of unprecedented
public health challenges were essential to the Committee's
fulfillment of its oversight obligations.
Mark R. Warner,
Chairman.
Marco Rubio,
Vice Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Preface.......................................................... III
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. Legislation......................................................2
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022..... 2
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023..... 3
III. Oversight Activities.............................................5
A. Worldwide Threats Hearing............................... 5
B. China................................................... 5
C. Russia.................................................. 6
D. Afghanistan............................................. 7
E. Iran.................................................... 7
F. North Korea............................................. 7
G. Western Hemisphere/Latin America........................ 8
H. Africa.................................................. 8
I. Middle East............................................. 8
J. Covert Action........................................... 9
K. Counterterrorism........................................ 9
L. Counterintelligence..................................... 10
M. Cyber................................................... 10
N. Telecommunications...................................... 11
O. Emerging Technologies................................... 11
P. Artificial Intelligence................................. 12
Q. Anomalous Health Incidents.............................. 12
R. Personnel Vetting Reform................................ 12
S. Government Security Policy.............................. 13
T. Foreign Malign Influence................................ 13
U. Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena........................ 13
V. Space................................................... 14
W. Audits and Projects..................................... 15
X. Whistleblowers and Other Complainants................... 16
Y. Inspectors General...................................... 16
Z. Review of Analytic Ombudsman Report on Allegations of
Politicization........................................... 16
IV. Nominations.....................................................16
A. Avril Haines............................................ 18
B. William Burns........................................... 18
C. Christopher C. Fonzone.................................. 18
D. Brett M. Holmgren....................................... 18
E. Christine Abizaid....................................... 18
F. Robin Ashton............................................ 18
G. Thomas A. Monheim....................................... 18
H. Stacey A. Dixon......................................... 18
I. Matthew G. Olsen........................................ 18
J. Shannon Corless......................................... 18
K. Kenneth Wainstein....................................... 19
L. Kate Heinzelman......................................... 19
M. Terrence Edwards........................................ 19
V. Support to the Senate...........................................19
VI. Summary of Committee Actions....................................19
A. Number of meetings...................................... 19
B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee....... 20
C. Bills referred to the Committee......................... 20
D. Committee publications.................................. 20
118th Congress} { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 118-5
======================================================================
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
_______
March 28, 2023.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Committee during the 117th Congress
included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation
of appointees to key IC leadership posts, and inquiries on the
performance and activities of the IC.
As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee's
paramount legislative priority and achievement in the 117th
Congress was the successful enactment of Intelligence
Authorization Acts for both Fiscal Year 2022 and Fiscal Year
2023.
Throughout the 117th Congress, the Committee's oversight
activities focused on the national security threats posed by
The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian
Federation (Russia), including China's military, economic, and
political activities around the world, and Russia's unjustified
and illegal invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the Committee
devoted considerable attention to events leading up to and
following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The
Committee maintained continued focus on the malign activities
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), as well as
strategically significant political, military, and economic
developments in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South
America. The Committee also conducted vigorous oversight of
covert action, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence
programs carried out by the IC during the 117th Congress.
Finally, the Committee sustained its emphasis on overseeing the
national security implications of certain technological
advancements, including in telecommunications, as well as
emerging technologies, such as next-generation energy storage,
generation, and distribution.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
In the 117th Congress, the Committee focused its efforts on
enacting annual intelligence authorization acts as its primary
means of carrying out its oversight responsibility. In early
2021, the Committee began consideration of the President's
request for funding levels and legislative authority for Fiscal
Year 2022. The Committee's budget monitors and counsel
evaluated the funding and legislative requests submitted by the
Executive Branch. The Committee conducted numerous topical and
regional briefings and hearings, including classified budget
hearings.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022 (S. 2610) on August 4, 2021, and
subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 117-37) on
August 10, 2021.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022 (H.R. 5412) on September 30, 2021, and then reported
the bill to the full House and filed an accompanying report (H.
Rpt. 117-156) on October 28, 2021. The Committee proceeded to
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and other congressional committees on a final version of the
legislation.
The product of the committees' efforts, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, was incorporated as
Division X of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 2022 (P.L. 117-103). The Consolidated Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 2022 passed the House on March 9, 2022, in two
separate measures by votes of 361-69 and 260-171, and passed
the Senate on March 10, 2022, as a consolidated measure by a
vote of 68-31. The President signed the consolidated bill into
law on March 15, 2022.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a
classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex.
The Act, as incorporated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 2022, ensures accountability and integrity from
IC agencies, which undertake the Nation's most sensitive
intelligence programs and activities, and included significant
legislative provisions to strengthen national security by:
Increasing oversight and investments to
address the growing national security threats posed by
China, including its technology advancements, military
base and infrastructure expansion, influence
operations, global investments, and digital currencies;
Improving the IC's response to anomalous
health incidents, also known as ``Havana Syndrome,'' by
establishing an independent medical advisory board at
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ensuring
benefits, eligibility, and access to expert medical
advice and facilities, and requiring protocols on
testing, information safeguards, and reporting
mechanisms;
Improving the IC's ability to adopt and
integrate artificial intelligence tools and other
emerging technologies;
Bolstering investments in commercial imagery
and analytic services to provide more unclassified
collection and analysis to policymakers and warfighters
in a timely manner;
Continuing the Committee's commitment to
reform and improve the security clearance process,
including mandating a performance management framework
to assess the adoption and effectiveness of the
Executive Branch's ``Trusted Workforce 2.0''
initiative, more accurately measuring how long it takes
to transfer clearances between Federal agencies so
timelines can be shortened, and creating IC-wide
policies to share information on cleared contractors to
enhance the effectiveness of insider threat programs;
Ensuring strong congressional oversight of
and protections for IC whistleblowers who come forward
to report waste, fraud, or abuse;
Addressing intelligence requirements in key
locations worldwide, including in Latin America,
Africa, and Afghanistan, to confront foreign
adversaries' efforts to undermine the U.S. abroad;
Strengthening the IC's ability to conduct
financial intelligence activities; and
Supporting the IC's efforts to assess
unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP), further
building upon the work of the UAP Task Force.
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023
In early 2022, the Committee began consideration of the
President's request for funding levels and legislative
authority for Fiscal Year 2023. The Committee's budget monitors
and counsel evaluated the funding and legislative requests
submitted by the Executive Branch. The Committee conducted
numerous topical and regional briefings and hearings, including
classified budget hearings.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (S. 4503) on July 12, 2022, and
subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 117-132) on
July 20, 2022.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (H.R. 8367) on July 20, 2022, and then reported the
bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H.
Rpt. 117-546) on October 31, 2022. The Committee proceeded to
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and other congressional committees on a final version of the
legislation.
The product of the committees' efforts, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, was incorporated as
Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263). The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 passed the House on December 8, 2022,
by a vote of 350-80, and passed the Senate on December 15,
2022, by a vote of 83-11. The President signed the consolidated
bill into law on December 23, 2022.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a
classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex.
The Act, as incorporated in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2023, ensures accountability and integrity
from IC agencies and contained a number of legislative
provisions, including:
Confronting the growing national security
threat posed by the PRC by increasing hard target
intelligence collection and analysis, as well as by
identifying and exposing the PRC's leadership
corruption, forced labor camps, and malign economic
investments, including in telecommunications, emerging
technologies, and semiconductors;
Bolstering intelligence support for Ukraine
as it fights to defend its territorial integrity and
sovereignty since Russia's second unprovoked invasion,
including by assessing the effects of sanctions on
Russia and its allies and opportunities to mitigate
threats to food security at home and abroad;
Driving improvements to the IC's hiring and
security clearance processes by holding the IC
accountable for improving the timeliness of bringing
cleared personnel on-board, ensuring that key
management and contract oversight personnel in industry
can obtain clearances, and establishing personnel
vetting performance measures;
Establishing counterintelligence protections
for IC grant funding against foreign-based risks of
misappropriation, theft, and other threats to U.S.
innovation;
Accelerating and improving procurement,
adoption, and integration of emerging technologies
across the IC;
Establishing measures to mitigate
counterintelligence threats from foreign commercial
spyware;
Strengthening oversight of national security
threats associated with the regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Venezuela;
Ensuring continued support to the victims of
anomalous health incidents and maintaining continued
oversight over the IC's investigations into the causes
of such incidents;
Promoting cybersecurity enhancements and
establishing cybersecurity minimum standards across the
IC, including for classified systems;
Enhancing oversight of IC and Department of
Defense collection and reporting on UAP;
Establishing IC coordinators to account for
Russian atrocities and for countering proliferation of
Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems;
Promoting establishment of an Office of
Global Competition Analysis to conduct analysis
relevant to U.S. leadership in science, technology, and
innovation sectors critical to national security and
economic prosperity;
Enhancing intelligence support to export
controls and investment screening and emphasizing the
importance of open source intelligence capabilities in
the IC; and
Continuing the Committee's efforts to
modernize the Government's declassification system by
directing the Director of National Intelligence and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security to report on declassification policies,
proposals to promote best practices across the federal
government, and spend plans for technological reforms.
III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. Worldwide Threats Hearings
Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to
review the IC's assessment of the current and projected
national security threats to the United States. There have only
been two years (1999 and 2019) when the Committee did not hold
a ``Worldwide Threats'' hearing. It is one of the few open
hearings that the Committee has regularly conducted to share
the work of the IC with the public. These Worldwide Threats
hearings cover national security assessments pertaining to all
geographic regions, as well as transnational threats such as
terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass
destruction.
On April 14, 2021 and March 10, 2022, the Committee held
open Worldwide Threats hearings on the current and projected
threats to the United States. The lead witness before the
Committee at both hearings was Director of National
Intelligence Avril Haines. She was joined at the witness table
during both hearings by the Honorable William J. Burns,
Director of the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); General Paul
Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); and
Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both hearings were followed by
closed, classified sessions. Video recordings of the open
hearings are available on the Committee's website, along with
Director Haines's unclassified statements for the record.
B. China
The Committee prioritized the PRC as the top national and
economic security threat throughout the 117th Congress. The
Committee dedicated a significant number of classified hearings
and briefings to China and Taiwan. In addition, the Committee
held two open hearings on the PRC in order to raise greater
public awareness on the threats to our national and economic
security posed by the PRC.
Through briefings and hearings, the Committee continued to
evaluate the IC's budget and programs to ensure its
capabilities, collection posture, and analysis relating to the
PRC were sufficient to defend our national security, economic
prosperity, and values. In addition, the Committee paid close
attention to the PRC's military, economic, and political
activities around the world, including its illicit tactics to
obtain technology, economic coercion, military plans and
modernization, malign influence efforts in the United States
and abroad, cyber operations, and intelligence efforts.
Staff and Members of the Committee traveled to the Indo-
Pacific region, as well as to other regions--including Latin
America, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe--to better
understand the threats posed by the PRC's malign activities and
the U.S. efforts to counter those threats. The Committee also
received numerous briefings regarding the PRC, including from
the IC, other departments and agencies, and outside experts.
The Committee convened a series of engagements between the
IC and private sector entities, academics, and local
governments in order to raise awareness of strategic economic
and technological threats emanating from China.
C. Russia
During the 117th Congress, the Committee focused
extensively on the threat to U.S. national security from
Russia, including during the run-up to, and start of, Russia's
unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine on February 24,
2022. The Committee conducted at least 16 formal hearings and
briefings on issues relating to the threat from Russia,
including its war against Ukraine.
Prior to Russia's invasion, the IC issued warnings about
Russia's buildup of military forces on Ukraine's borders, and
accurately predicted that Putin was preparing to invade. The
Committee was briefed on these developments and oversaw the
operations of U.S. intelligence agencies prior to, and during,
the invasion. Prior to the invasion, on February 9, 2022, all
16 Members of the Committee, on a bipartisan basis, wrote to
the President, urging him to ensure that the United States was
sharing as much intelligence as possible with Ukraine, noting
that ``Russia's threats to Ukraine are a threat to democracies
around the world, and we urge you to do as much as possible to
support Ukraine at this critical moment.''
In addition to the Committee's focus on the threat from
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it also examined the threat posed
by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These
include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage, including the
2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion perpetrated by the Russian
external intelligence agency, the SVR, which resulted in the
compromise of hundreds of federal agencies and private
companies, and the May 2021 ransomware attack by a Russian
cybercrime group on the Colonial Pipeline, which halted
pipeline operations temporarily and resulted in fuel shortages
along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States.
The Committee took a strong stand on ensuring U.S.
diplomats at our Embassy in Moscow be afforded the same
privileges, including comparable numbers of visas, as Russia's
diplomats in the United States. All 16 Members, as well as
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez, sent
a letter to the President on October 4, 2021, expressing
concern about ongoing actions inhibiting the work of U.S.
diplomats in Moscow that resulted in disproportionately more
Russian diplomats in the U.S. than vice versa, and undermining
the ability of the Embassy to function in a safe and secure
manner. The Committee urged the President to expel Russian
diplomats if Russia was unwilling to provide the number of
visas necessary to ensure parity between the two sides.
The Committee further held hearings and briefings on
Russia's continued reliance on misinformation and
disinformation to target global audiences and interfere with
elections and democratic processes in the United States and
around the world; the buildup of its conventional, strategic,
and asymmetric arsenals; its increasingly assertive military
deployments on its periphery and to wider regions, including
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; its use of
mercenary groups and private military and security corporations
such as the Vagner Group; its support of like-minded
authoritarian regimes; and its use of corruption and criminal
networks to further its strategic goals. The Committee's
activities regarding these issues were designed to provide
oversight and assess the IC's capabilities to collect against,
analyze, provide warning, and counter these and other malign
activities of Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
D. Afghanistan
The Committee's efforts in the 117th Congress regarding
Afghanistan largely focused on the collapse of the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), with the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Prior to the
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the
Committee held multiple hearings and weekly briefings with the
IC to monitor intelligence operations, as well as implications
for long-term U.S. policy goals following the U.S. decision to
fully withdraw from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021.
Following the collapse of GIROA, and the complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, the
Committee held multiple hearings to better understand IC
methodology in determining the strength of Taliban forces, the
forces of the GIROA, and the impact of the U.S. withdrawal.
Committee staff reviewed intelligence products from the signing
of the Doha Agreement in 2020 through the withdrawal of U.S.
forces in 2021 in order to provide Committee Members with an
accurate picture of IC work during and leading up to the
withdrawal.
The Committee continues the important work of oversight
through hearings, briefings, roundtables, and congressional
delegations to the region to review the role of the IC in
supporting and implementing U.S. policy in Afghanistan from
outside of the country.
E. Iran
The Committee conducted travel, and held hearings,
briefings, and roundtables focused on Iranian malign influence,
support to proxies in regional conflict zones, Iran's nuclear
program, and, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
Iranian support to Russian forces. Through travel to the
region, staff obtained valuable insight on Iranian threats and
efforts to mitigate them, the alignment of Gulf Arab states
following the end of the rift with Qatar, the alignment of Gulf
Arab states with Israel after the signing of the Abraham
Accords, and energy and security dynamics. The Committee
conducted hearings and briefings on U.S. intelligence
activities and partnerships related to Iranian plans,
intentions, and capabilities.
F. North Korea
During the 117th Congress, the Committee held two hearings
and conducted multiple engagements with the IC on North Korea.
In particular, the Committee's efforts focused on political,
military, and technical issues related to weapons programs that
could threaten the United States and its allies. Staff traveled
to the region to conduct oversight and also received IC
briefings and reports on counterintelligence issues, North
Korea's illicit cyber activity, and sanctions violations.
G. Western Hemisphere/Latin America
The Committee focused its efforts, through travel,
briefings, and hearings, on monitoring key elections across the
region in Colombia, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Honduras, and Ecuador,
as well as tracking developments in the authoritarian regimes
in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Members and staff, during
travel and other engagements, also met with allies in the
region to deepen bilateral engagement.
The Committee continued to monitor the supply chain,
production, and trafficking of illicit narcotics, with
increased focus on synthetic opioids; the threat posed by
violent transnational criminal organizations to the United
States and the stability of the region; and the military and
intelligence activities of U.S. adversaries in Latin America,
including escalation in PRC and Russian activity.
H. Africa
During the 117th Congress, the Committee renewed focus on
North Africa, the Sahel, and the Sub-Saharan region. Committee
staff conducted oversight through a series of briefings,
hearings, and foreign visits, ensuring that authorized and
appropriated programs coalesced with realities on the ground
and U.S. diplomatic and intelligence interests on the
continent. The increased presence and investments by the PRC
and Russia in the region represent an elevated threat to the
security of the U.S. and our allies and partners.
Throughout the Sahel, Russia and its military and political
proxy, private military company Vagner, continue to parlay
Russian influence in the fragile post-coup landscape--more
often than not granting Russia access to politically vulnerable
juntas under the auspices of counterterrorism assistance.
Russia has intensified its disinformation efforts on the
continent, in particular to secure support for its barbaric war
in Ukraine and turn African nations against the west.
The PRC continues to leverage its economic footholds in the
region to exploit and influence African nations. The Committee
focused in particular on the PRC's exploitative attempts to
control precious metals, minerals, and rare-earth metals on the
continent, as part of the PRC's ongoing effort to dominate
supply chains for emerging energy technologies critical to U.S.
national security. The Committee remains focused on countering
these PRC and Russian threats in the region, and continuing to
strengthen U.S.-African relations.
During the 117th Congress, parties advanced peace talks in
the conflict between Ethiopia and Tigray--a conflict with far-
reaching implications throughout the Horn of Africa and North
Africa. Terrorism remains a pointed threat, especially as
emanating from al Qa'eda affiliate al Shabaab in East Africa--
to that end, Committee staff remained focused U.S.
counterterrorism efforts in the region, and on the return of
U.S. forces to Somalia and the implications thereof to the IC.
I. Middle East
The Committee conducted briefings, roundtables, and
extensive overseas travel to the Middle East to conduct
oversight and gain a better understanding of the changing
dynamics of a strategically important region. With changing
dynamics following the signing of the Abraham Accords,
increased strategic competition with China and Russia, the
ongoing war in Syria, the ever present threat of terrorism, and
the continued realignment of the U.S. security posture in the
region with resulting fear of U.S. disengagement, staff travel
was essential to providing Committee members with key insights
and observations only evident through site visits and direct
engagement with U.S. officials and foreign partners. Additional
important themes explored include the impact of the war in
Yemen on the security and intelligence arrangements with key
U.S. partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, the continued importance of counterterrorism and
intelligence relationships with our partners in the region, the
essential role diplomacy plays in furthering U.S. intelligence
and security partnerships, and the ongoing threat posed to
regional stability by Iranian malign influence. Finally,
oversight focused on ensuring the U.S. intelligence footprint
in the region was commensurate to U.S. national security
priorities.
J. Covert Action
The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action
programs throughout the 117th Congress. The Committee's rules
require the Committee's Staff Director to ``ensure that covert
action programs of the United States government receive
appropriate consideration once a quarter.'' In accordance with
this rule, the Committee receives a written report every
quarter on each covert action program that is being carried out
under a presidential finding. Committee staff review these
reports and meet with IC personnel to discuss their substance
and pose additional questions. The Committee also holds
periodic hearings and briefings on covert action programs, and
receives written reviews of covert actions from the CIA
Inspector General, which are often the basis for additional
staff inquiries.
Further, under section 503 of the National Security Act,
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and entities of the United States
Government involved in a covert action are required to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of,
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any
department or agency of the United States. Upon receiving such
notifications, the Committee reviews the details of each and
receives briefings to fully understand the issues.
The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs
are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.
K. Counterterrorism
In the 117th Congress, the Committee conducted oversight of
the IC's counterterrorism programs and activities, through
hearings, briefings, roundtables, and overseas travel. The
Committee reviewed the IC's response to the threat posed to the
United States from foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, and its activities
related to domestic violent extremism. Specifically, the
Committee focused on examining the role of the IC in combatting
domestic violent extremism, ensuring the proper use of
intelligence resources and protection of Americans' civil
liberties, and clarifying the respective responsibilities of
the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and
the FBI. Committee staff traveled overseas, reviewing on-the-
ground IC counterterrorism activities, as well as liaison
relationships with foreign partners.
L. Counterintelligence
During the 117th Congress, the Committee emphasized the
important role of counterintelligence as a functional specialty
in confronting U.S. adversaries, including the PRC. To that
end, the Committee held an open hearing on ``Beijing's Long
Arm: Threats to U.S. National Security'' to explore the risks
posed by PRC intelligence collection to the United States. The
Committee's non-partisan Audits and Projects team undertook a
comprehensive 18-month study on the role of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), a mission
center of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), and its integration into the greater
counterintelligence enterprise. The team's work resulted in a
publicly-available report that included recommendations to
improve NCSC and strengthen integration. Following publication,
the Committee hosted an open hearing to discuss the issues
raised with three of the investigation's key participants.
Further, staff held recurring interagency meetings with NCSC,
ODNI, and the FBI to ensure development of coordinated
legislative measures aimed at optimizing FBI-NCSC integration
and collaboration.
M. Cyber
During the 117th Congress, Committee staff continued to
monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber
actors that pose significant threats to the United States and
its allies. The Committee's public hearing on the cyber
intrusion into SolarWinds and the subsequent intrusions into
downstream customers led to the creation and passage of the
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of
2022. The Committee also continued to perform oversight of the
Cybersecurity Directorate within the National Security Agency.
Leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, the Committee conducted vigorous oversight of the IC's
collection and analysis of Russian cyber capabilities. The
Committee also continued to engage with private sector entities
offering cyber defense support to Ukraine. The Committee
believes increased scrutiny should be placed on how cyber
capabilities will be used in advance of and during periods of
hostilities between nations.
The Committee also conducted oversight of the IC's
activities to identify and track foreign cyber actors. However,
the Committee continues to be hampered in conducting effective
oversight of joint cyber activities involving U.S. Cyber
Command and the IC.
N. Telecommunications
The Committee continued with efforts initiated in the 116th
Congress to investigate and respond to the national security
implications posed by 5G telecommunications technology. The
Committee engaged closely with the Senate and House Committees
on Appropriations to ensure that authorizations previously
contained in the Committee-reported Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021--and ultimately enacted through the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021--
received full appropriations. This effort ultimately culminated
in the provision of $1.5 billion towards the Public Wireless
Supply Chain Innovation Fund, as well as $500 towards the
Multilateral Telecommunications Security fund (administered
through a new International Technology Security Innovation
Fund).
As part of these continuing efforts, the Committee also
convened a number of federal agencies--spanning the IC,
domestic regulatory agencies, and foreign development
agencies--for an update on efforts by the federal government to
promote secure and trusted digital infrastructure, including
through the promotion of trusted technical standards. Committee
staff supplemented these efforts in the Committee's overseas
travel, engaging both foreign allies and State Department
personnel on the status of efforts to promote adoption of
secure and trusted digital infrastructure.
O. Emerging Technologies
During the 117th Congress, the Committee expanded its
oversight of foundational and emerging technologies that have
significant implications for national security and national
competitiveness. The Committee met with a range of private
sector technology experts, as well as IC personnel (to include
both leadership and subject-matter experts), to identify a
series of priority emerging and disruptive technologies.
Committee staff worked to determine the set of federal agencies
responsible for monitoring and countering efforts related to
those technologies, and formulate strategies to promote U.S.
and allied alternatives to counter adversary efforts.
The Committee focused on identifying technologies that may
confer military, political, and economic leverage for foreign
adversaries, including enhancing the ability of foreign
adversaries to shape wider technology ecosystems for strategic
objectives and geopolitical influence. Based on these efforts,
the Committee identified and is focused on three critical
technologies: semiconductors, biotechnology, and next-
generation energy storage, generation, and distribution.
The Committee engaged closely with private sector experts,
the IC, and other departments and agencies to understand the
unique needs of national security customers with respect to
these technologies, as well as critical supply chain
dependencies and other impacts of global, strategic
competition, that could have implications for U.S. national
security.
The Committee intends to continue these efforts into the
118th Congress.
P. Artificial Intelligence
The Committee continued its efforts to conduct oversight on
the national security implications of artificial intelligence.
Committee staff engaged closely with private sector and
academic experts to understand research development and
commercial trends, as well as examine opportunities for
adversarial use of artificial intelligence and machine
learning-based technologies. The Committee also passed a series
of enhancements to the authorities and governance of the IC
with respect to emerging technology, and in particular,
artificial intelligence, as part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. The Committee provided
the Director of National Intelligence the ability to enter into
other transactions to increase the speed and agility with which
the IC can acquire emerging technologies. The Committee also
directed the IC to reduce the barriers to entry for adopting
new technologies and harmonize the authorizations to operate
for information technology systems between the Department of
Defense and IC.
Q. Anamolous Health Incidents
The Committee conducted oversight of the CIA's use of
authorities provided by Section 6412 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 and initiated a review,
by the Audits and Projects team, of CIA's response to anomalous
health incidents, with a focus on the medical care,
compensation, and other workplace provisions provided to CIA
affiliates affected by these incidents. The Committee also
continued to oversee a range of investigations into the causes
of anomalous health incidents experienced by U.S. Government
personnel in Havana, Cuba, and elsewhere. Members of the
Committee remain committed to supporting the victims of these
health incidents and overseeing the IC's investigations into
their causes.
R. Personnel Vetting Reform
During the 117th Congress, the Committee continued its
rigorous oversight of the Executive Branch's efforts to reform
a personnel vetting model that has remained largely unchanged
for more than 70 years. Since 2016, Committee staff have
sponsored quarterly briefings from the Performance
Accountability Council, led by the Office of Management and
Budget, to keep all congressional committees in the House and
Senate apprised of reforms to address problems surfaced by the
Navy Yard shooting in 2013, the government's public admission
in 2015 of China's breach of personnel data held by the Office
of Personnel Management, and the introduction of the new
Trusted Workforce 2.0 paradigm. The Director of National
Intelligence bears particular responsibility in leading these
reforms as the government's statutory Security Executive Agent.
The Committee has taken specific interest in efforts to vet
government and contract personnel employed in the IC. Following
a longstanding tradition of legislating in this area, both the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 and the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 contained
multiple provisions on personnel vetting. These Acts
established governance and performance management frameworks
for personnel vetting, and required analyses on the efficient
administration of polygraphs, among other things. The
Committee's sustained, bipartisan pressure has yielded results:
the elimination of a backlog in background investigations that
once topped 725,000, a return of timelines for adjudications of
clearances to levels established in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the Executive Branch's
adoption of Trusted Workforce 2.0.
S. Government Security Policy
The Committee continued its focus on security policies and
practices through regular meetings with the ODNI, the National
Archives and Records Administration's Information Security
Oversight Office, and public advocates. The Committee sought to
ensure proper use of classification and handling markings to
safeguard America's security, while ensuring appropriate
sharing with allies, partners, and the public. In addition, the
Committee sought greater flexibility in the use of sensitive
compartmented information facilities by multiple agencies and
companies. The Committee also held briefings on modernizing the
national industrial security policy to address growing
challenges from China and others and protect the range of
technologies critical to America's long-term success.
T. Foreign Malign Influence
During the 117th Congress, the Committee built on its
efforts in the 116th Congress to evaluate the IC's response to
foreign malign influence activity. In 2022, the Committee
authorized initial funding through the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to enable the formation
of the Foreign Malign Influence Center, first established in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. In
an effort to ensure the Center does not undertake efforts that
are duplicative of those already being executed by other IC
elements, the Committee also required the Director of National
Intelligence to provide a report explaining the structure,
responsibilities, and organizational placement of the Center,
as well as assessing the efficacy of alternative organizational
structures. The Director of National Intelligence provided the
Committee with a response in September 2022, outlining the
assessed needs and functions of the Center and expressing
support for the Center's current organizational structure.
The Committee also continued its practice of conducting
oversight on the posture of the IC to identify, disrupt, and
counter foreign malign influence activity directed at U.S.
elections. As the Committee had in the lead-up to the 2018 and
2020 elections, the Committee held briefings with IC agencies
leading those efforts, including a post-election briefing to
evaluate the IC's effectiveness and the role of the Foreign
Malign Influence Center in coordinating those efforts for the
first time. Committee staff also conducted weekly briefings
with IC ahead of the election to monitor analytical and
operational activity.
U. Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena
During the 117th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of the UAP issue, specifically working to ensure that
the Department of Defense's efforts to report and respond to
UAP are coordinated with those of the IC. In 2021, members on
the armed services and intelligence committees spearheaded
legislation standing up an office to replace the U.S. Navy-led
UAP Task Force and broadening its efforts to improve data-
sharing between agencies on UAP sightings and address national
security concerns. In 2022, the Committee directed further
changes to the office in the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023, establishing the All-Domain Anomaly
Resolution Office (AARO) under the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the Principle Deputy Director for National Intelligence to
provide comprehensive management of the UAP issue across the
Department of Defense and the IC. Importantly, associated
legislation mandates a secure authorized disclosure reporting
process allowing witnesses to report to AARO any relevant
information at any security level. Finally, the legislation
directs the AARO to conduct a historical study going back to
1945 to document U.S. historical efforts to address UAP.
The Committee also focused efforts on gaining additional
insights into the increasing numbers of UAP sightings over or
near U.S. national security assets. At a time when near-peer
adversaries are fielding advanced all-domain technologies at a
rapid pace, the Committee worked to ensure the IC allocates
sufficient resources and attention on UAP to avoid technology
surprise from a potential adversary.
V. Space
During the 117th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of the IC's role in the space domain, which is
evolving in light of adversary advances in counterspace
capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites. The
Committee continued its efforts to ensure the IC has reliable
and resilient access to, and operation in, space to provide
intelligence support. In 2021, the National Reconnaissance
Office's (NRO) focus on, and investments in, resiliency were
formalized through the Protect and Defend Strategic Framework,
signed by the NRO, U.S. Space Force, and the U.S. Space
Command, which helped define and deconflict roles and sharpen
the Committee's oversight efforts.
The Committee continues to advocate for effective
collaboration and unity of effort between NRO and the range of
stakeholders in the Department of Defense, which is critical to
improve speed and quality of data delivered to the warfighter
and other government customers.
The Committee held hearings and briefings on NRO's evolving
approach to a ``hybrid'' space architecture, the expanding role
of commercial space within the IC, and adversary threats to
U.S. space capabilities. The Committee also examined key budget
and cross-cutting technology issues, such as artificial
intelligence and cloud computing, and continued to encourage
the NRO and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
to capitalize on the ongoing revolution in the commercial space
sector, which has yielded reductions in the cost of launch, new
sensor technologies, smaller satellites, and sophisticated data
analytics and services. Importantly, the committee recognizes
the critical symbiotic contribution of the ground architecture
to space and continues to provide focused oversight on this
architecture.
In addition to hearings, since February 2022, the Committee
has been particularly active in ensuring NRO and NGA have
worked to expedite the flow of geospatial intelligence and data
to the Ukrainian government and to our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization allies in the context of the Ukraine-Russia
crisis. The Committee and its staff also engaged frequently on
overhead architecture topics with the NRO, NGA, ODNI, and other
IC and government officials, and conducted site visits to
government facilities and commercial companies to meet with
government officials and industry leaders. The Committee also
continued to monitor the establishment of the U.S. Space Force
as the 18th and newest element of the IC to ensure it meets the
standards set for all IC elements.
W. Audits and Projects
The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing
standards.'' This capability resides within the Committee's
``Audits and Projects Team.'' The Committee charges the Audits
and Projects Team to conduct in-depth reviews of IC-related
matters and assist the Committee with its oversight
obligations. The Committee has also assigned the Audits and
Projects Team responsibility for managing the Committee's
relationship with the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
to include overseeing the development and execution of reviews
that the Committee assigns to GAO, and for managing the
Committee relationship with IC inspectors general. In addition,
the Audits and Projects Team tracks IC compliance with
direction contained in the annual Intelligence Authorization
Acts and manages the complainant and whistleblower intake and
review process.
The Audits and Projects Team completed three Committee-
authorized projects during the 117th Congress. The first
project was a lessons-learned review of a compartmented IC
acquisition program culminating in a classified report that
offered 18 recommendations to improve IC acquisition and
contracting processes.
The second project was an organizational assessment of the
NCSC within the context of a changing threat landscape. The
review culminated in a classified report that offered 17
recommendations to address challenges facing the
counterintelligence enterprise in general and the NCSC in
particular; an unclassified (redacted) version of the report
that is available on the Committee website; and an open hearing
on how the IC, industry, and academia are postured against
foreign adversary threats to American innovation identified in
the report.
The third project examined how commercial satellite imagery
was or could be used to support certain national security
missions. This project culminated in a final classified report
that offered three recommendations, and which will inform the
Committee's continued oversight of the IC's efforts to
integrate commercial satellite imagery into intelligence
collection and analysis efforts.
Finally, at the conclusion of the 117th Congress, the
Audits and Projects Team initiated a review of the CIA's
response to anomalous health incidents, with a focus on the
medical care, compensation, and other workplace provisions
provided to CIA affiliates affected by these incidents. This
work will inform the Committee's broader and continued
oversight of this important topic. This work is continuing into
the 118th Congress.
X. Whistleblowers and Other Complainants
The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls,
facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified
whistleblowers and other complainants on matters they believe
constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross
mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a
substantial danger to public health and safety. Committee staff
reviewed and, where warranted, investigated those complaints,
often working closely with the inspectors general of agencies
in the IC.
Y. Inspectors General
The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and
oversight of, the inspectors general of agencies in the IC.
Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency semiannual
reports and annual work plans, as well as specific audits and
reviews. On November 21, 2021, the Committee also held a closed
roundtable with the four Senate-confirmed inspectors general
within the IC--the IC Inspector General, the CIA Inspector
General, the NSA Inspector General, and the NRO Inspector
General--as well as a representative of the GAO.
Z. Review of Analytc Ombudsman Report on Allegations of Poliiticization
Committee staff conducted a year-long review of ODNI's
election security analysis that was prompted by an unclassified
report published on January 6, 2021, by the ODNI's Analytic
Ombudsman concerning allegations of politicization. Staff
produced a classified report that contained eight
recommendations for improvements in election security analysis.
IV. NOMINATIONS
During the 117th Congress, the Committee received 13
nominations from President Joe Biden.
Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended)
and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of
nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended S.
Res. 400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the
IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent be reported by the
Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions
within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of
other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the
given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on
the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the
resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security be reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, but
referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence. In the wake
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,
which made the directors and inspectors general of the NRO and
the NSA Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res.
470 on July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the
nominee were a civilian, the Select Committee on Intelligence
would report the nomination and refer it to the Committee on
Armed Services, and if the nominee were a member of the Armed
Forces on active duty, the reverse.
A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers
all nominations for inspectors general to the committees of
primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under
this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA
Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this
consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which
is considered exclusively by the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
During the 117th Congress, the Committee neither received
nor considered a nomination for the Director of NCSC. The
Committee has been disheartened by this lack of a nomination,
particularly in light of its critical organizational assessment
of NCSC, a redacted version of which was publicly released in
September 2022, and the importance of the executive branch's
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative to transform the government's
personnel vetting model.
The following nominations were referred to the Committee
during the 117th Congress:
A. Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence
On November 23, 2020, President-elect Biden announced his
intent to nominate Avril Haines to be the Director of National
Intelligence. The Committee held a hearing on January 19, 2021,
and President Biden formally nominated her on January 20, 2021.
The Committee reported the nomination favorably on January 20,
2021, and the Senate confirmed Director Haines by a vote of 84-
10 on the same day. Director Haines is the first woman to serve
as the Director of National Intelligence.
B. William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
On January 11, 2021, President-elect Biden announced his
intent to nominate William Burns to be the Director of the CIA.
President Biden formally nominated him on February 3, 2021. The
Committee held a hearing on February 24, 2021, and reported the
nomination favorably on March 2, 2021. The Senate confirmed
Director Burns by voice vote on March 18, 2021.
C. Christopher C. Fonzone
On March 16, 2021, President Biden nominated Christopher
Fonzone to be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. The Committee held a hearing on May 18,
2021, and reported the nomination favorably on May 26, 2021.
The Senate confirmed Mr. Fonzone by a vote of 55-45 on June 22,
2021.
D. Brett M. Holmgren
On April 12, 2021, President Biden nominated Brett Holmgren
to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research. The Committee held a hearing on May 18, 2021, and
reported the nomination favorably on May 26, 2021. The Senate
confirmed Assistant Secretary Holmgren by voice vote on
September 13, 2021.
E. Christine Abizaid
On April 15, 2021, President Biden nominated Christine
Abizaid to be the Director of National Counterterrorism Center.
The Committee held a hearing on June 9, 2021, and reported the
nomination favorably on June 22, 2021. The Senate confirmed
Director Abizaid by voice vote on June 24, 2021.
F. Robin Ashton
On April 19, 2021, President Biden nominated Robin Ashton
to be Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Committee held a hearing on June 9, 2021, and reported the
nomination favorably on June 16, 2021. The Senate confirmed Ms.
Ashton by voice vote on June 24, 2021.
G. Thomas A. Monheim
On May 10, 2021, President Biden nominated Thomas Monheim
to be Inspector General of the IC. Upon primary referral, the
Committee held a hearing on July 20, 2021, and reported the
nomination favorably on July 28, 2021. The nomination was
sequentially referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs the same day. Upon sequential
referral to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs for 20 calendar days pursuant to an order
of January 7, 2009 (S05120), the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs discharged the nomination on
September 20, 2021. The Senate confirmed Mr. Monheim by voice
vote on September 30, 2021.
H. Stacey A. Dixon
On April 27, 2021, President Biden nominated Stacey Dixon
to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
The Committee held a hearing on July 20, 2021, and reported the
nomination favorably on July 28, 2021. The Senate confirmed Ms.
Dixon by voice vote on August 3, 2021.
I. Matthew G. Olsen
On May 27, 2021, President Biden nominated Matthew Olsen to
be Assistant Attorney General for National Security. Upon
sequential referral to the Committee following primary referral
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee held a
hearing on July 20, 2021, and reported the nomination favorably
on August 10, 2021. The Senate confirmed Mr. Olsen by a vote of
53-45.
J. Shannon Corless
On September 27, 2021, President Biden nominated Shannon
Corless to be Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
at the Department of the Treasury. The Committee held a hearing
on November 30, 2021, and reported the nomination favorably on
December 15, 2021. The Senate confirmed Ms. Corless by voice
vote on December 16, 2021.
K. Kenneth Wainstein
On November 17, 2021, President Biden nominated Kenneth
Wainstein to be Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
at the Department of Homeland Security. The Committee held a
hearing on January 12, 2022, and reported the nomination
favorably on March 8, 2022. The Senate confirmed Mr. Wainstein
by a vote of 63-35 on June 7, 2022.
L. Kate Heinzelman
On March 8, 2022, President Biden nominated Kate Heinzelman
to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Committee held a hearing on April 6, 2022, and reported the
nomination favorably on May 10, 2022. The Senate confirmed Ms.
Heinzelman by a vote of 50-41 on July 14, 2022.
M. Terrence Edwards
On June 7, 2021, President Biden nominated Terrence Edwards
to be Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Upon primary referral to the Committee, the Committee held a
hearing on August 2, 2022 and reported the nomination favorably
on September 14, 2022. The nomination was sequentially referred
to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which discharged the
nominee on November 28, 2022. The nomination was sequentially
referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, which discharged the nominee on December
18, 2022. The Senate confirmed Mr. Edwards by unanimous consent
on December 22, 2022.
V. SUPPORT TO SENATE
Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this
responsibility by providing access to IC information and
officials to the U.S. Senate.
The Committee facilitated access to IC information for
members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to
participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided
intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members
outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues
with intelligence agencies.
VI. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS
A. Number of Meetings
During the 117th Congress, the Committee held a total of
132 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and
hearings, as well as numerous off-the-record briefings. There
were 39 oversight hearings, including 13 hearings on the IC
budget. Of these 39 hearings, 14 were open to the public,
including open confirmation hearings for 13 administration
nominees, while the remainder were closed to protect classified
information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held
10 business meetings including mark-ups of legislation.
B. Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee
S. Res. 53--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 2610--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022.
S. 4503--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023.
C. Bills Referred to the Committee
S. 849--Supply Chain Vulnerability Assessment Act of 2021.
S. 1348--COVID-19 Origin Act of 2021.
S. 2345--Preventing Terrorism from Hitting America's
Streets Act.
S. 2590--Directed Energy Threat Emergency Response Act.
S. 2654--September 11 Transparency Act of 2021.
S. 3657--A bill to require the Director of National
Intelligence to provide notification to Congress of abandoned
United States military equipment used in terrorist attacks.
S. 3759--Afghanistan Vetting and Accountability Act of
2022.
S. 4456--A bill to prohibit certain former employees of the
Intelligence Community from providing certain services to
governments of countries that are state sponsors of terrorism,
the People's Republic of Chain, and the Russian Federation, and
for other purposes.
S. 5250--A bill to modify requirements for certain
employment activities by former intelligence officers and
employees of the Intelligence Community, and of other purposes.
D. Committee Publications
Report 117-2--Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence covering the period January 4, 2019-January 3,
2021.
Report 117-37--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.
Report 117-132--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023.
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Senate Intelligence Committee Releases Bipartisan Report Detailing Foreign Intelligence Threats
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