Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

AT THE FIRST SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Friday,
the third day of January, two thousand and twenty five
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. Short title.
This Act may be cited as the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026”.
SEC. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.
(a) Divisions.—This Act is organized into 8 divisions as follows:
(1) Division A—Department of Defense Authorizations.
(2) Division B—Military Construction Authorizations.
(3) Division C—Department of Energy National Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations.
(4) Division D—Funding Tables.
(5) Division E—Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026.
(6) Division F—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026.
(7) Division G—Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025.
(8) Division H—Other Matters.
(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Budgetary effects of this Act.
Sec. 5. Joint explanatory statement.
……..
DIVISION F—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
SEC. 6001. Short title; table of contents.
(a) Short title.—This division may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026”.
(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this division is as follows:
Sec. 6001. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 6002. Definitions.
Sec. 6003. Explanatory statement.
TITLE LXI—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE LXII—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE LXIII—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 6301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 6302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 6303. Notice of impact of diplomatic and consular post closings on intelligence community.
Sec. 6304. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property.
Sec. 6305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 6306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic standards.
Sec. 6307. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community.
Sec. 6308. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705.
Sec. 6309. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities.
Sec. 6310. Reforms relating to inactive security clearances.
TITLE LXIV—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
Sec. 6401. Short title.
Sec. 6402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 6403. Plan for optimized staffing of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 6404. National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
Sec. 6405. Termination of Office of Engagement.
TITLE LXV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A—Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 6501. Guidance on novel and significant expenditures for purposes of notification under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Sec. 6502. Improvements to security of Central Intelligence Agency installations.
Sec. 6503. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate assessment.
Sec. 6504. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6505. Technical amendment to procurement authorities of Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle B—Elements of Department of Defense
Sec. 6511. Counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces.
Subtitle C—Federal Bureau of Investigation
Sec. 6521. Notice of counterintelligence assessments and investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of candidates for or holders of Federal office.
Sec. 6522. Notification of material changes to policies or procedures governing terrorist watchlist and transnational organized crime watchlist.
Sec. 6523. Annual report on United States persons on the terrorist watch list.
Sec. 6524. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data.
TITLE LXVI—ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Subtitle A—Artificial Intelligence
Sec. 6601. Artificial Intelligence security guidance.
Sec. 6602. Artificial intelligence development and usage by intelligence community.
Sec. 6603. Application of artificial intelligence policies of the intelligence community to publicly available models hosted in classified environments.
Sec. 6604. Prohibition on use of DeepSeek on intelligence community systems.
Subtitle B—Biotechnology
Sec. 6611. Senior officials for biotechnology.
Sec. 6612. Plan on enhanced intelligence sharing relating to foreign adversary biotechnological threats.
Sec. 6613. Enhancing biotechnology talent within the intelligence community.
Sec. 6614. Enhanced intelligence community support to secure United States biological data.
Sec. 6615. Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA.
Sec. 6616. Strategy for addressing intelligence gaps relating to China’s investment in United States-origin biotechnology.
Subtitle C—Other matters
Sec. 6621. Enhancing intelligence community technology adoption metrics.
Sec. 6622. Report on identification of intelligence community sites for advanced nuclear technologies.
Sec. 6623. Strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing relating to critical and emerging technologies.
TITLE LXVII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A—Matters Relating to China
Sec. 6701. Modification of annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party.
Sec. 6702. Intelligence sharing with allies on Chinese Communist Party efforts in Europe.
Sec. 6703. Prohibition on intelligence community contracting with Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing.
Sec. 6704. Report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
Sec. 6705. Assessment and report on investments by the People’s Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil.
Sec. 6706. Identification of entities that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army.
Sec. 6707. Mission manager for the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 6708. National Intelligence Estimate of advancements in biotechnology by the People’s Republic of China.
Subtitle B—Other Matters
Sec. 6711. Improvements to requirement for monitoring of Iranian enrichment of uranium-235.
Sec. 6712. Policy toward certain agents of foreign governments.
Sec. 6713. Extension of intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability.
Sec. 6714. Plan to enhance intelligence support to counter foreign influence intended to continue or expand the conflict in Sudan.
Sec. 6715. Review of information relating to actions by foreign governments to assist persons evading justice.
Sec. 6716. National Intelligence Estimate on the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 6717. Plan to enhance counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico.
Sec. 6718. Requirements with respect to duty to warn former senior officials and other United States persons.
TITLE LXVIII—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 6801. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.
Sec. 6802. Revisions to congressional notification of intelligence collection adjustments.
Sec. 6803. Declassification of intelligence and additional transparency measures relating to the COVID–19 pandemic.
Sec. 6804. Classified intelligence budget justification materials and submission of intelligence community drug control resource summary.
Sec. 6805. Requiring penetration testing as part of the testing and certification of voting systems.
Sec. 6806. Standard guidelines for intelligence community to report and document anomalous health incidents.
(c) Automatic execution of clerical changes.—Except as otherwise expressly provided, when an amendment made by this division amends an Act to add a section or larger organizational unit to that Act, repeals or transfers a section or larger organizational unit in that Act, or amends the designation or heading of a section or larger organizational unit in that Act, that amendment also shall have the effect of amending any table of contents of that Act to alter the table to conform to the changes made by the amendment.
SEC. 6002. Definitions.
In this division:
(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
SEC. 6003. Explanatory statement.
The explanatory statement regarding this division, printed in the House section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and in the Senate section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.
TITLE LXI—Intelligence Activities
SEC. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2026 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.
SEC. 6102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
(a) Specifications of amounts.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 6101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
(b) Availability of classified schedule of authorizations.—
(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.
(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2026 the sum of $678,853,000.
(b) Classified authorization of appropriations.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2026 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 6102(a).
TITLE LXII—Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
SEC. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
TITLE LXIII—Intelligence Community Matters
SEC. 6301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 6302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 6303. Notice of impact of diplomatic and consular post closings on intelligence community.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
“SEC. 517. Notice of impact of diplomatic and consular post closings on intelligence community.
“(a) Notice to Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense.—The Secretary of State shall provide notice to the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense of any covered closure of a diplomatic or consular post. To the maximum extent practicable, the notice shall be provided at least 30 days before the date on which the covered closure occurs.
“(b) Notice to congressional committees.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the other appropriate elements of the intelligence community as determined by the Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notice describing the impact of the closure on the intelligence community. The notice shall be submitted within 30 days after the date on which the Director receives the notice under subsection (a) and, to the maximum extent practicable, shall be submitted before the date on which the covered closure occurs. Such notice shall include a description of whether, and the extent to which, the Director and the heads of the other appropriate elements of the intelligence community were consulted in the decision-making process with respect to such closure and registered any concerns with or objections to such closure.
“(c) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
“(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
“(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
“(C) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and
“(D) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
“(2) COVERED CLOSURE OF A DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR POST DEFINED.—The term ‘covered closure of a diplomatic or consular post’ means the closure of a United States diplomatic or consular post abroad that is anticipated to last for 60 days or more.”.
SEC. 6304. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property.
Chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 798A the following:
Ҥ 798B. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property
“(a) Prohibited activity.—It shall be unlawful, within the jurisdiction of the United States, without authorization to willfully go upon any property—
“(1) with intent to gather intelligence or information to the detriment of the United States; and
“(2) while knowing that such property is—
“(A) under the jurisdiction of an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)); and
“(B) closed or restricted.
“(b) Penalties.—Any person who violates subsection (a) shall—
“(1) in the case of the first offense, be fined under section 3571 of this title, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both;
“(2) in the case of a second offense after a prior conviction under subsection (a) has become final, be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both; and
“(3) in the case of a third or subsequent offense after a prior conviction under subsection (a) has become final, be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”.
SEC. 6305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community.
(a) In general.—Section 1019(b) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108–458; 50 U.S.C. 3364(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(4) (A) The individual or entity assigned responsibility under subsection (a) shall annually conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the intelligence community.
“(B) The head of each element of the intelligence community shall take all practical actions to encourage maximum participation by officers and employees of such element with respect to the survey conducted under subparagraph (A).”.
(b) Elements of the intelligence community.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once each year for two years, each head of an element of the intelligence community specified in paragraph (4) shall conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of such element who are involved in the production of intelligence products.
(2) ELEMENTS.—Each survey conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) for an element of the intelligence community shall cover the following:
(A) Perceptions of the officers and employees regarding the presence of bias or politicization affecting the intelligence cycle.
(B) Types of intelligence products perceived by the officers and employees as most prone to objectivity concerns.
(C) Whether responders to the survey raised identified analytic objectivity concerns with an analytic ombudsman or appropriate entity.
(3) COORDINATION.—The head of each element of the intelligence community specified in paragraph (4) shall, to the extent practicable, coordinate with the individual or entity assigned responsibility under section 1019(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108–458; 50 U.S.C. 3364(a)) and the appropriate ombudsman for analytic objectivity with respect to the design and execution of the survey required by paragraph (1) to maximize the utility and efficiency of the survey.
(4) ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SPECIFIED.—The elements of the intelligence community specified in this paragraph are the following:
(A) The National Security Agency.
(B) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(D) The Directorate of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(E) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 6306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic standards.
Section 6312 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note; Public Law 117–263) is amended—
(1) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
“(b) Conduct of training.—Training required pursuant to the policy required by subsection (a) shall—
“(1) be a dedicated, stand-alone training; and
“(2) include instruction on how to report concerns regarding lack of objectivity, bias, politicization, or other issues relating to the standards set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic Standards (or any successor directive).”; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)—
(A) by striking “number and themes of”; and
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting “, including the number and themes of such incidents and a list of each intelligence product reported during the preceding 1-year period to the Analytic Ombudsman of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or other designated official specified in law or policy to receive complaints related to, or review compliance with, analytic standards.”.
SEC. 6307. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community.
(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall revise all regulations, policies, procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance in the intelligence community such that all such materials are in compliance with and consistent with this section.
(b) Prohibition.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by any law for the National Intelligence Program shall be used for the purposes of implementing covered practices in the intelligence community.
(c) Covered practice defined.—In this section, the term “covered practice” means any practice that discriminates for or against any person in a manner prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq.), or any other Federal law.
SEC. 6308. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705.
(a) Estimate required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall—
(1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an estimate of the amount of obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government after the date of the enactment of this Act to ensure that the sensitive compartmented information facilities of the element are compliant with Intelligence Community Directive 705; and
(2) submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives an estimate of such amount of obligations expected to be incurred by an element of the Department of Defense.
(b) Contents.—Each estimate submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) The estimate.
(2) An implementation plan to ensure compliance described in such subsection.
(3) Identification of the administrative actions or legislative actions that may be necessary to ensure such compliance.
SEC. 6309. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities.
(a) Plan required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall—
(1) develop a plan to implement an integrated tracking system that resides on an appropriately secure or classified system and spans the intelligence community for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities to increase transparency, track the status of accreditation, and to reduce and minimize duplication of effort; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the plan developed under paragraph (1).
(b) Elements.—The plan under subsection (a)(1) shall include the following:
(1) An estimated cost of implementing the plan.
(2) A description for how applicants and cleared industry could monitor the status of the accreditation of the sensitive compartmented information facilities of the applicants and cleared industry.
(3) Guidelines for minimizing duplication of effort across the intelligence community and the Department of Defense in the accreditation process for sensitive compartmented information facilities.
(4) Creation of a mechanism to track compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705 (relating to sensitive compartmented information facilities), or successor directive.
(5) Proposed measures for increasing security against adversary threats.
(6) A list of any administrative and legislative actions that may be necessary to carry out the plan.
SEC. 6310. Reforms relating to inactive security clearances.
(a) Extension of period of inactive security clearances.—
(1) REVIEW AND EVALUATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall review and evaluate the feasibility and advisability of updating personnel security standards and procedures governing eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information and other controlled access program information and security adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information and other controlled access program information to determine whether individuals described in paragraph (2), could, as a matter of policy, be granted eligibility by the Director to access classified information if—
(A) there is no indication the individual no longer satisfies the standards established for access to classified information;
(B) the individual certifies in writing to an appropriate security professional that there has been no change in the relevant information provided for the last background investigation of the individual; and
(C) an appropriate record check reveals no unfavorable information.
(2) INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED.—The individuals described in this paragraph are individuals who—
(A) have been retired or otherwise separated from employment with an element of the intelligence community for a period of not more than 5 years; and
(B) were eligible to access classified information on the day before the individual retired or otherwise separated from such element.
(b) Feasibility and advisability of continuous vetting of inactive security clearances.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall conduct an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of subjecting inactive security clearances to continuous vetting and due diligence, including with respect to any effects on policies developed in conjunction with the continued development of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.
(2) FINDINGS.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives the findings from the assessment conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).
TITLE LXIV—Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness
SEC. 6401. Short title.
This title may be cited as the “Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025”.
SEC. 6402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
(a) Repeal of sunsetted requirement for semi-annual report.—Subsection (c)(7) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by striking “(A) The Director” and all that follows through “(B) The Director” and inserting “The Director”.
(b) Repeal of authorities relating to new national intelligence centers.—
(1) TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL.—Such section is amended by striking subsection (e).
(2) REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH.—Subsection (f)(2) of such section is amended by striking “and may” and all that follows through “determines necessary”.
(c) Conforming amendments.—
(1) SECTION 102A.—Such section is further amended—
(A) by redesignating subsections (f) through (z) as subsections (e) through (y), respectively;
(B) in subsection (e), as redesignated by subparagraph (A), in paragraph (7), by striking “under subsection (m)” and inserting “under subsection (l)”; and
(C) in subsection (w)(3), as redesignated by subparagraph (A), by striking “under subsection (f)(8)” and inserting “under subsection (e)(8)”.
(2) OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.—
(A) NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—
(i) in section 103(c)(15) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)(15)), by striking “, including national intelligence centers”;
(ii) in section 112(c)(1), by striking “section 102A(i)” and inserting “section 102A(h)”;
(iii) in section 313(1) (50 U.S.C. 3079(1)), by striking “with section 102A(f)(8)” and inserting “with section 102A(e)(8)”.
(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.—Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3507) is amended by striking “section 102A(i)” and inserting “section 102A(h)”.
(C) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.—Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking “section 102A(i)” and inserting “section 102A(h)”.
(D) REDUCING OVER-CLASSIFICATION ACT.—Section 7(a)(1)(A) of the Reducing Over-Classification Act (50 U.S.C. 3344(a)(1)(A)) is amended by striking “of section 102A(g)(1)” and inserting “of section 102A(f)(1)”.
(E) PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION ACT.—Section 705(c) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355c(c)) is amended by striking “section 102A(i)” and inserting “102A(h)”.
(F) INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.—Section 1019(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(a)) is amended by striking “section 102A(h)” and inserting “section 102A(g)”.
(G) INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003.—Section 343(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–306; 50 U.S.C. 3363) is amended by striking “Subject to” and all that follows through “, relating” and inserting “Subject to section 102A(h) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(h), relating”.
(H) INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014.—Section 604(d)(1)(B) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–126; 50 U.S.C. 3234 note) is amended by striking “section 102A(m)” and inserting “section 102A(l)”.
(I) HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002.—Section 210D(f)(2)(B) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124k(f)(2)(B)) is amended by striking “sections 102A(f)(1)(B)(iii)” and inserting “sections 102A(e)(1)(B)(iii)”.
(J) ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007.—Section 934(k)(2) of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17373(k)(2)) is amended by striking “section 102A(i)” and inserting “section 102A(h)”.
SEC. 6403. Plan for optimized staffing of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(a) Requirement.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a target end-state for the appropriate staffing level of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Contents.—The plan under subsection (a) shall include a plan for achieving the targeted end-state for staffing at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to the number of full-time equivalent employees, detailees, and individuals under contract with the Office that the Director requires for the optimized execution of the statutory authorities of the Director.
SEC. 6404. National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
(a) Termination.—
(1) TERMINATION OF CENTER.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall terminate the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, including such missions, objectives, staff, and resources of the Center, as is consistent with the provisions of this section and the amendments made by this section.
(2) TERMINATION OF DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall terminate the position of the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, as is consistent with the provisions of this section.
(b) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the status of the implementation of this section, including—
(1) the status of the counterproliferation and biosecurity missions and functions within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
(2) a staffing profile of the officers, employees, and detailees currently assigned, as of the date of the report, to the counterproliferation, biosecurity, and related missions and functions at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(3) a description of the employment status of the officers, employees, and detailees who were assigned to the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center as of August 1, 2025, including those who have remained at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accepted (or, as to detailees, maintained) employment at another element of the intelligence community, or have separated from the intelligence community.
(c) Conforming amendments.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c))—
(A) by striking paragraph (13); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (14) and (15) as paragraphs (13) and (14), respectively; and
(2) in section 119A (50 U.S.C. 3057)—
(A) in the heading, by striking “National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center” and inserting “Counterproliferation and Biosecurity”;
(B) in subsection (a)—
(i) in the heading, by striking “Establishment” and inserting “Organization”;
(ii) in paragraph (1)—
(I) by striking “The President shall establish a National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to” and inserting “The Director of National Intelligence shall”; and
(II) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “support efforts to” before “prevent and halt”;
(iii) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
“(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall appoint an appropriate official within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee the efforts and activities undertaken pursuant to this section.”; and
(iv) by striking paragraphs (3) and (4); and
(C) in subsection (b)—
(i) in paragraph (1)—
(I) by striking “establishing the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President” and inserting “carrying out this section, the Director”; and
(II) in subparagraph (A), by striking “Establishing a primary organization within the United States Government for integrating” and inserting “Integrating”; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking “In establishing the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President shall address the following missions and objectives to ensure that the Center serves as the lead for the intelligence community for” and inserting “In carrying out this section, the Director shall address the following missions and objectives to ensure”.
(d) Repeal of national security waiver authority, report requirement, and sense of Congress.—Such section 119A is further amended by striking subsections (c), (d), and (e).
(g) Effective date.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(h) References in law.—On and after the date that is 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, any reference to the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center in law shall be treated as a reference to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and any reference to the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center in law shall be treated as a reference to the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 6405. Termination of Office of Engagement.
(a) Termination.—The Director of National Intelligence shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Office of Engagement before the date specified in subsection (c).
(b) Repeal.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 122 (50 U.S.C. 3062).
(c) Effective date.—The amendment made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE LXV—Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community
subtitle A—Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 6501. Guidance on novel and significant expenditures for purposes of notification under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
(a) In general.—Section 8(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510(c)) is amended—
(1) by striking “Not later than” and inserting “(1) Not later than”; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(2) (A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, the Director shall issue written guidance to ensure the timely identification and reporting of novel and significant expenditures in accordance with this subsection. Such guidance shall—
“(i) establish a definition of a novel and significant expenditure for purposes of this subsection;
“(ii) define internal procedures to evaluate expenditures to determine if such expenditures are novel and significant using the definition established pursuant to clause (i); and
“(iii) require timely congressional notification in accordance with this subsection.
“(B) The Director shall regularly review and update the guidance issued under this paragraph as appropriate.
“(C) Not later than 60 days after the date on which the initial guidance is issued under this paragraph, and not later than 60 days after the date on which any material revisions to such guidance take effect, the Director shall provide to the committees specified in paragraph (1) a briefing with respect to such guidance or such material revisions.”.
(b) Conforming amendment.—Section 102A(m)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(m)(5)) (as redesignated by section 6402(c) of this Act) is amended in the first sentence by striking “of such section” and inserting “of such section, including the guidance issued under paragraph (2) of such subsection (c)”.
SEC. 6502. Improvements to security of Central Intelligence Agency installations.
(a) Agency Headquarters Installation.—Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515) is amended by striking “Compound” each place it appears and inserting “Installation”.
(b) Unmanned aircraft.—Such Act is further amended by inserting after section 15 the following:
“SEC. 15A. Authority regarding unmanned aircraft systems.
“(a) Authority to intercept.—Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code, the Director may take, and may authorize personnel of the Agency with assigned duties under section 15 that include the security or protection of people, facilities, or assets within the United States to take, the actions described in subsection (b)(1) that are necessary to mitigate a credible threat (as defined by the Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation) to safety or security in any specially designated area posed by an unmanned aircraft system.
“(b) Authorized actions.—
“(1) ACTIONS DESCRIBED TO ENSURE SAFETY AND SECURITY.—The actions described in this paragraph are the following:
“(A) During the operation of the unmanned aircraft system, detect, identify, monitor, and track the unmanned aircraft system, without prior consent, including by means of intercept or other access of a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication, used to control the unmanned aircraft system.
“(B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system, including by passive or active, and by direct or indirect, physical, electronic, radio, and electromagnetic means.
“(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system, without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system.
“(D) Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft system.
“(E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system.
“(F) Use reasonable force, if necessary, to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system.
“(2) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS.—
“(A) DURATION.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director may take an action described in subparagraphs (B) through (F) of paragraph (1) only for the period necessary to mitigate a credible threat to safety or security identified in subsection (a).
“(B) COMPLIANCE.—In carrying out this section, the Director shall comply with the guidance developed under subsection (c).
“(c) Guidance.—
“(1) COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION.—
“(A) COORDINATION.—The Director shall develop guidance for carrying out subsection (a) and for conducting research, testing, training, and evaluation under subsection (e) in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure that any such actions or research, testing, training, and evaluation do not adversely affect or interfere with the safety and efficiency of the national airspace system.
“(B) CONSULTATION.—In developing guidance for carrying out subsection (a) and for conducting research, testing, training, and evaluation under subsection (e), the Director shall request consultation by the Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. The Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman may each provide such consultation during the 180-day period beginning on the date of the request by the Director.
“(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The guidance under paragraph (1) shall include requirements that—
“(A) the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration advise on the types of activities covered by subsection (b)(1);
“(B) the Director contact the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration through the appropriate channel if practicable before, or otherwise as soon as practicable after (but not later than 24 hours after), carrying out an action described in subparagraphs (B) through (F) of subsection (b)(1);
“(C) the Director contact the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration through the appropriate channel before conducting research, testing, training, and evaluation under subsection (e); and
“(D) when taking an action described in subsection (b)(1), all due consideration is given to—
“(i) mitigating effects on privacy and civil liberties under the first and fourth amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
“(ii) mitigating damage to, or loss of, real and personal property; and
“(iii) mitigating any risk of personal injury or death.
“(3) UPDATES.—On an annual basis, the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, shall review the guidance developed under paragraph (1) and make any necessary updates.
“(d) Specially designated areas.—
“(1) LIST.—The Director shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees and the recipients specified in paragraph (5) a list, which may be in classified form, of each area that the Director—
“(A) determines meets the criteria described in paragraph (4); and
“(B) designates as a specially designated area for purposes of this section.
“(2) ANNUAL UPDATE.—Not later than March 31 each year, the Director shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees and the recipients specified in paragraph (5) an updated list of specially designated areas under paragraph (1).
“(3) EMERGENCY UPDATES.—If the Director determines that adding an area that meets the criteria described in paragraph (4) to the list under paragraph (1) is necessary to mitigate a credible threat to safety or security, the Director may update the list to include that area as a specially designated area covered by this section if the Director makes available to the congressional intelligence committees and the recipients specified in paragraph (5) information regarding that area by not later than 7 days after making such determination.
“(4) CRITERIA DESCRIBED.—The criteria described in this paragraph are the following:
“(A) The area is identified by the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based assessment, as high-risk and a potential target for unlawful unmanned aircraft system-related activity.
“(B) The area consists of—
“(i) premises that—
“(I) are owned, leased, or controlled by the Agency or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
“(II) are not eligible for protection from threats from unmanned aircraft systems by another department or agency of the Federal Government that has authority to mitigate the threat of unmanned aircraft systems, including pursuant to section 130i of title 10, United States Code; and
“(III) directly relate to one or more functions authorized to be performed by the Agency or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under this Act or the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.);
“(ii) one or more perimeters adjacent to such premises, as designated by the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, based on the specific type of action described in subsection (b)(1); and
“(iii) the airspace above the premises and perimeters covered by clauses (i) and (ii).
“(C) The airspace specified in subparagraph (B)(iii) is restricted by a temporary flight restriction or covered by a determination under section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (49 U.S.C. 44802 note) or any other similar restriction applicable to unmanned aircraft system overflights determined appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation.
“(5) SPECIFIED RECIPIENTS OF LIST.—The designated recipients for purposes of this subsection are each of the following:
“(A) The chairs and ranking minority members of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
“(B) The chairs and ranking minority members of the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
“(C) The chairs and ranking minority members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
“(D) The chairs and ranking minority members of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
“(E) For each committee specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D)—
“(i) two staff members of the committee who have the required security clearances and are designated by the chair; and
“(ii) two staff members of the committee who have the required security clearances and are designated by the ranking minority member.
“(e) Research, testing, training, and evaluation.—The Director may, consistent with section 105(g) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(g)), other Federal laws, and Presidential directives, conduct research, testing, training on, and evaluation of any equipment, including any electronic equipment, to determine the capability and utility of the equipment prior to the use of the equipment for any action carried out under subsection (a).
“(f) Privacy protections.—
“(1) REQUIREMENT.—Any interception or acquisition of, or access to, or maintenance or use of, information or communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system under this section shall be conducted—
“(A) in a manner consistent with the first and fourth amendments to the Constitution of the United States and applicable provisions of Federal law; and
“(B) only to the extent necessary to support an action described in subsection (b)(1) taken to carry out the authority provided in subsection (a).
“(2) LIMIT.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director may maintain records containing or regarding the content and dialing, signaling, routing, and addressing information associated with wire communications, oral communications, electronic communications, and radio communications, and may maintain parts or the whole of an unmanned aircraft system, only if—
“(A) such maintenance is for the purpose of mitigating a credible threat, as described in subsection (a), to safety or security of persons in a specially designated area; and
“(B) such maintenance does not exceed a period of 180 days unless—
“(i) the Director or the Attorney General determines a longer period—
“(I) is necessary to directly support an ongoing security operation of the Agency pursuant to subsection (a); or
“(II) is required to be maintained by the Agency under Federal law;
“(ii) the Director or the Attorney General has created a record before the end of such 180-day period providing the specific factual basis to support the determination based on the matters specified in either or both subclauses (I) and (II) of clause (i); and
“(iii) the Director is in compliance with the reporting requirements under subsection (g)(2)(B).
“(3) DESTRUCTION.—The Director shall destroy any records or materials maintained under paragraph (2) at the end of the period specified in such paragraph.
“(4) TRANSFER.—
“(A) AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.—Records or materials maintained under paragraph (2) may not be disclosed outside of the Agency or Department of Justice unless the Director or Attorney General determine that the disclosure of such records or materials—
“(i) is necessary to investigate or prosecute a violation of Federal law;
“(ii) is necessary to support the counter unmanned aircraft systems activities of another department or agency of the Federal Government with authority to mitigate the threat of unmanned aircraft systems;
“(iii) is necessary to comply with another provision of Federal law; or
“(iv) is necessary to comply with an obligation to preserve materials during the course of litigation.
“(B) REQUIREMENT FOR RECIPIENT AGENCY.—The recipient of records or materials pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall—
“(i) maintain the records or materials only for the purpose authorized under such subparagraph;
“(ii) disclose the records or materials only for a purpose authorized under such subparagraph; and
“(iii) destroy the records or parts or materials once such purpose no longer applies.
“(5) CERTIFICATION.—
“(A) AGENCY.—Each time the Director carries out subsection (a) by taking an action described in subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (b)(1), the Director shall certify that the Director is in compliance with paragraphs (1) through (4) of this subsection. The Director may only delegate the authority to make such certification to—
“(i) the General Counsel or the Principal Deputy General Counsel; or
“(ii) the Director of Operations or the Deputy Director of Operations.
“(B) RETENTION.—Each certification made under subparagraph (A) shall be retained by the Director for a period of at least seven years.
“(g) Notifications and reports.—
“(1) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director carries out subsection (a) by taking an action described in subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (b)(1), the Director shall notify the Attorney General of such action.
“(2) CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 90 days thereafter, the Director shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees and the recipients specified in paragraph (3) a report that includes the following:
“(A) With respect to each action described in subparagraphs (B) through (F) of subsection (b)(1) taken to carry out subsection (a) during the period covered by the report, a description of—
“(i) the action taken;
“(ii) options considered by the Director to mitigate any identified effects to the national airspace system relating to such action, including the minimization of the use of any technology that disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic signals; and
“(iii) whether any harm, damage, or loss to a person or to private property resulted from such action.
“(B) A description of all records or materials that, as of the date of the report, are being maintained for a period exceeding 180 days pursuant to subsection (f)(2)(B), and a copy of each record created pursuant to clause (ii) of such subsection relating to such maintenance.
“(C) A copy of the guidance, policies, and procedures established by the Director in effect during the period covered by the report to address privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties issues implicated by actions taken by the Director in carrying out subsection (a).
“(D) Information on any violation of, or failure to comply with, this section during the period covered by the report, including a description of any such violation or failure.
“(3) SPECIFIED RECIPIENTS OF REPORT.—The designated recipients for purposes of paragraph (2) are each of the following:
“(A) Each member of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
“(B) Each member of the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
“(C) Each member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
“(D) Each member of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
“(E) For each committee specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D)—
“(i) five staff members of the committee who have the required security clearances and are designated by the chair; and
“(ii) five staff members of the committee who have the required security clearances and are designated by the ranking minority member.
“(h) Forfeiture and tort claims.—
“(1) FORFEITURE.—
“(A) SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE.—Any unmanned aircraft system described in subsection (a) that is seized by the Director is subject to forfeiture to the United States.
“(B) APPLICATION.—The requirements for civil, criminal, or administrative forfeiture under applicable law or regulation shall apply to any forfeiture conducted under subparagraph (A).
“(2) TORT CLAIMS.—Chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, shall apply to any claims for loss of property, injury, or death pursuant to actions taken pursuant to this section.
“(i) Rules of construction.—Nothing in this section may be construed as—
“(1) affecting the restrictions in section 105(g) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(g));
“(2) vesting in the Director any authority of the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Defense, or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration;
“(3) vesting in the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Defense, or the Administrator any authority of the Director;
“(4) creating a new cause of action or any new rights, or waiving any defenses, that do not otherwise exist in law as of the date of the enactment of this section;
“(5) authorizing any official of a department or agency of the Federal Government to conduct any search or seizure in a manner that violates the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States; or
“(6) authorizing any actions that violate any provision of the Constitution of the United States, including the first and fourth amendments.
“(j) Budget.—Together with the budget requests of the Agency for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2026, or not later than 7 days after the date on which such a request is submitted to Congress, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a consolidated funding display that identifies the funding source for actions to carry out subsection (a). The funding display shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
“(k) Commencement of authority.—The Director may not carry out subsection (a) by taking an action described in subsection (b)(1) until the date on which the Director has made available the first list under subsection (d)(1).
“(l) Suspension of authority.—If the Director fails to make available the updated list by the date required under subsection (d)(2), the Director may not carry out subsection (a) by taking an action described in subsection (b)(1) until the date on which the Director makes available such updated list.
“(m) Termination.—The authority to carry out this section shall terminate on December 31, 2027.
“(n) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term ‘congressional intelligence committees’ means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
“(2) RADIO COMMUNICATION.—The term ‘radio communication’ has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153).
“(3) SPECIALLY DESIGNATED AREA.—The term ‘specially designated area’ means an area designated by the Director as a specially designated area for purposes of this section pursuant to subsection (d).
“(4) TITLE 18 TERMS.—The terms ‘electronic communication’, ‘intercept’, ‘oral communication’, and ‘wire communication’ have the meanings given those terms in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.
“(5) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘United States’ has the meaning given that term in section 5 of title 18, United States Code.
“(6) UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM.—The term ‘unmanned aircraft system’ has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.”.
SEC. 6503. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate assessment.
Section 30 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3531) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(d) Annual Agency climate assessment.—
“(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not less frequently than once every 365 days, the Director shall—
“(A) complete an Agency climate assessment—
“(i) that does not request any information that would make an Agency employee or the position of an Agency employee identifiable;
“(ii) for the purposes of—
“(I) preventing and responding to sexual assault and sexual harassment; and
“(II) examining the prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment occurring among the Agency’s workforce; and
“(iii) that includes an opportunity for Agency employees to express the opinions of the employees regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual harassment, and the effectiveness of such response; and
“(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees the findings of the Director with respect to the climate assessment completed pursuant to subparagraph (A).
“(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
“(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
“(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.”.
SEC. 6504. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(a) In general.—Section 26 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3527) is amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 26. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains.
“(a) Establishment of Chaplain Corps.—There is in the Agency a Chaplain Corps, which shall provide spiritual and religious pastoral services and care across all components of the Agency for employees of all faiths and non-faiths.
“(b) Chief of Chaplains.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Chaplain Corps shall be the Chief of Chaplains, who shall be appointed by the Director.
“(2) REPORTING.— The Chief of Chaplains shall report directly to the Director.
“(3) DUTIES.—The Chief of Chaplains shall—
“(A) oversee the Chaplain Corps; and
“(B) be the proponent for, and consult with the Director on—
“(i) all guidance pertaining to chaplains’ care;
“(ii) programming and instruction; and
“(iii) any policy or guidance pertaining to religion or religious accommodation.
“(4) CONSULTATION.—All appropriate offices of the Agency shall consult with the Chief of Chaplains on best practices to implement guidance or policy pertaining to religion or religious accommodation.
“(c) Services.—Chaplains of the Chaplain Corps shall—
“(1) be located at the headquarters building of the Agency; and
“(2) travel as necessary to provide services to personnel of the Agency.
“(d) Staff.—
“(1) MINIMUM STAFFING LEVEL.—The Chaplain Corps shall be composed of not less than 6 chaplains, of which—
“(A) not less than 3 shall be full-time staff employees of the Agency; and
“(B) not less than 3 shall be government contractors.
“(2) VACANCIES.—The Director shall expeditiously fill any vacancies.
“(3) EXCLUSIVE ROLE.—A chaplain of the Chaplain Corps shall serve exclusively in the chaplain’s role in the Chaplain Corps.
“(4) APPOINTMENT; COMPENSATION.—The Director may appoint and fix the compensation of such chaplains of the Chaplain Corps as the Director considers appropriate, except that the Director may not provide basic pay to any chaplain of the Chaplain Corps at an annual rate of basic pay in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay for grade GS–15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
“(e) Administration.—The Director shall—
“(1) provide security clearances, including one-time read-ins, to chaplains of the Chaplain Corps to ensure that personnel of the Agency can seek unrestricted chaplaincy counseling; and
“(2) furnish physical workspace for the Chaplain Corps at the headquarters building of the Agency.
“(f) Privacy.—The Director shall implement privacy standards with respect to the physical workspaces of the Chaplain Corps to ensure privacy for individuals visiting such spaces.
“(g) Protection of Chaplain Corps.—The Director may not require a chaplain of the Chaplain Corps to perform any rite, ritual, or ceremony that is contrary to the conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs of the chaplain or of the ecclesiastical organization that ordains the chaplain.
“(h) Certifications to Congress.—Not less frequently than annually, the Director shall certify to Congress whether implementation of this section meets the requirements of this section.”.
(b) Applicability of Minimum Staffing Requirement.—The minimum staffing level required by subsection (d)(1) of section 26 (as amended by subsection (a)) shall apply on and after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6505. Technical amendment to procurement authorities of Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 3(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3503(a)) is amended by striking “3069” and inserting “3066”.
subtitle B—Elements of Department of Defense
SEC. 6511. Counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) COVERED INDIVIDUAL.—The term “covered individual” has the meaning given such term in section 989(h) of title 10, United States Code.
(2) GOVERNMENT OF CONCERN; COMPANY OF CONCERN.—The terms “government of concern” and “company of concern” mean, respectively, a government described in subparagraph (A) of section 989(h)(2) of title 10, United States Code, and a company, entity, or other person described in subparagraph (B) of such section.
(b) In general.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall issue appropriate policy to require the military departments to conduct counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces as part of the process required by section 989(c) of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Elements.—Each briefing provided under subsection (b) shall provide members of the Armed Forces with—
(1) awareness of methods commonly used by governments and companies of concern to solicit and learn from covered individuals sensitive military techniques, tactics, and procedures of the Armed Forces;
(2) recommended practices for covered individuals to avoid an activity that could subject such individuals to civil or criminal penalties;
(3) the contact information for the counterintelligence authorities to whom covered individuals should report attempted recruitment or a related suspicious contact; and
(4) an overview of the prohibition and penalties under subsections (a) and (c) of section 989 of title 10, United States Code.
(d) Provision of briefings at certain trainings.—The Under Secretary may mandate the briefings required by subsection (b) during the trainings required by Department of Defense Directive 5240.06 (relating to counterintelligence awareness and reporting), or successor document.
subtitle C—Federal Bureau of Investigation
SEC. 6521. Notice of counterintelligence assessments and investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of candidates for or holders of Federal office.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 6303 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
“SEC. 518. Notice of counterintelligence assessments and investigations of Federal candidates or officeholders.
“(a) Notice.—
“(1) NOTICE REQUIRED.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify the chairmen and ranking minority members of the appropriate congressional committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate of each counterintelligence assessment or investigation of an individual who is—
“(A) a candidate for Federal office; or
“(B) a holder of Federal office.
“(2) CONTENTS.—The notice required under paragraph (1) shall include—
“(A) a summary of the relevant facts associated with the counterintelligence assessment or investigation; and
“(B) the identity of such individual.
“(3) EXCEPTION.—The Director may refrain from providing a notice under paragraph (1) to an individual who is otherwise a recipient of notices under such paragraph if that individual is a target of the counterintelligence assessment or investigation covered by the notice.
“(b) Timing.—The Director shall provide each notice under subsection (a) not later than 15 days after the date of the commencement of the counterintelligence assessment or investigation that is the subject of such notice. With respect to counterintelligence assessments or investigations that commenced before the date of the enactment of this section and are ongoing as of such date of enactment, the Director shall provide each notice under subsection (a) not later than 15 days after such date of enactment.
“(c) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
“(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
“(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
“(2) The terms ‘candidate’ and ‘Federal office’ have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).”.
SEC. 6522. Notification of material changes to policies or procedures governing terrorist watchlist and transnational organized crime watchlist.
(a) Notification of Material Changes.—
(1) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees notice of any material change to a policy or procedure relating to the terrorist watchlist or the transnational organized crime watchlist, including any change to the policy or procedure for adding or removing a person from either watchlist. Each notification under this subsection shall include a summary of the material changes to such policy or procedure.
(2) TIMING OF NOTIFICATION.—Each notification required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date on which a material change described in paragraph (1) takes effect.
(b) Requests by Appropriate Committees.—Not later than 30 days after receiving a request from an appropriate congressional committee, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to such committee all guidance in effect as of the date of the request that applies to or governs the use of the terrorist watchlist or the transnational organized crime watchlist.
(c) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives;
(C) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2) TERRORIST WATCHLIST.—The term “terrorist watchlist” means the Terrorist Screening Dataset or any successor or similar watchlist.
(3) TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME WATCHLIST.—The term “transnational organized crime watchlist” means the watchlist maintained under the Transnational Organized Crime Actor Detection Program or any successor or similar watchlist.
SEC. 6523. Annual report on United States persons on the terrorist watch list.
(a) Report.—Not later than January 31, 2026, and annually thereafter for two years, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on known or presumed United States persons who are included on the terrorist watchlist.
(b) Contents.—Each report required under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the preceding calendar year, the following information:
(1) The total number of persons who were included on the terrorist watchlist as of January 1 and the total number of such persons included as of December 31.
(2) The total number of known or presumed United States persons who were included on the terrorist watchlist as of January 1 and the total number of such persons included as of December 31, including with respect to each of those dates—
(A) the number of known or presumed United States persons who were included on a no fly list;
(B) the number of known or presumed United States persons who were included on a selectee list for additional screening;
(C) the number of known or presumed United States persons who were included on the terrorist watchlist as an exception to a reasonable suspicion standard and who are not subject to additional screening, but who are included on the list to support specific screening functions of the Federal Government;
(D) the name of each terrorist organization with which the known or presumed United States persons are suspected of being affiliated and the number of such persons who are suspected of affiliating with each such terrorist organization; and
(E) an identification of each Federal agency that nominated the United States persons to the terrorist watchlist and the number of such persons nominated by each Federal agency.
(c) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives;
(C) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2) TERRORIST WATCHLIST.—The term “terrorist watchlist” means the Terrorist Screening Dataset or any successor or similar watchlist.
(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” has the meaning given the term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
SEC. 6524. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 512 the following:
“SEC. 512A. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data.
“(a) Annual report.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report containing data on cases of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.
“(b) Elements.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall include, for the fiscal year covered by the report, the number of active cases, the number of unique cases, and the number of cases opened, for each of the following:
“(1) Russia counterintelligence cases.
“(2) China counterintelligence cases.
“(3) Espionage or leak cases.
“(4) All other counterintelligence cases, disaggregated by country affiliation.
“(5) Cartel and other transnational criminal organization counterterrorism cases.
“(6) All other international counterterrorism cases, disaggregated by country affiliation.
“(7) Russia cyber national security cases.
“(8) China cyber national security cases.
“(9) All other cyber national security cases, disaggregated by country affiliation.
“(c) Form.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”.
TITLE LXVI—Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Technologies
subtitle A—Artificial Intelligence
SEC. 6601. Artificial Intelligence security guidance.
Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159) is amended—
(1) in subsection (c)—
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):
“(3) In accordance with subsection (d), developing security guidance to defend artificial intelligence technologies from technology theft by nation-state adversaries.”;
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
“(d) Artificial Intelligence security guidance.—
“(1) ELEMENTS.—In developing the guidance pursuant to subsection (c)(3), the Director of the National Security Agency shall—
“(A) identify vulnerabilities in advanced artificial intelligence technologies, with a focus on cybersecurity risks and security challenges unique to protecting such technologies from theft or sabotage by nation-state adversaries;
“(B) identify elements of the artificial intelligence supply chain or development or product lifecycle that, if accessed by nation-state adversaries, would contribute to progress made by nation-state adversaries on advanced artificial intelligence or would provide opportunities to adversaries to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems or associated supply chains; and
“(C) identify strategies for artificial intelligence technologies to identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover from nation-state adversary cyber threats.
“(2) EXTERNAL COLLABORATION.—In developing the guidance pursuant to subsection (c)(3), the Director of the National Security Agency may collaborate, on a voluntary basis, with other departments and agencies of the United States Government, research entities, and private sector entities, as determined appropriate by the Director, on artificial intelligence model safety and security, including through the provision of any computing resources the Director determines appropriate.
“(3) SECURITY GUIDANCE FORM.—The Director of the National Security Agency shall publish, and may update from time to time, the security guidance developed under subsection (c)(3) to share with departments and agencies of the United States Government, research entities, and private sector entities, as determined appropriate by the Director, at unclassified or classified levels.”.
SEC. 6602. Artificial intelligence development and usage by intelligence community.
(a) Chief artificial intelligence officers for elements of the intelligence community.—Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking “the officials” and inserting “the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers”; and
(2) in subsection (c)—
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “leads” and inserting “Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers”;
(B) by striking “the designated element lead responsible” and inserting “the designated Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer, with lead responsibility”; and
(C) by striking “designated element leads” and inserting “designated Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers”.
(b) Identification of commonly used artificial intelligence systems and functions that can be re-used by other elements.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, identify commonly used artificial intelligence systems or functions that have the greatest potential for re-use without significant modification by other intelligence community elements.
(c) Sharing of identified applications and functions.—To the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, for any artificial intelligence system or function identified pursuant to subsection (b), each Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of an element of the intelligence community shall adopt a policy to promote the sharing, to the extent practical, of any custom-developed code and other key technical components, including models and model weights, whether agency-developed or procured, with other elements of the intelligence community that rely on common artificial intelligence systems or functions.
(d) Model contract terms.—The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall provide the elements of the intelligence community with model contractual terms for consideration by the heads of those elements to appropriately address technical data rights and rights related to artificial intelligence dataset requirements, minimize dependency on proprietary information, and promote the adoption of procurement practices that encourage competition to sustain a robust marketplace for artificial intelligence products and services, including through contractual preferences for interoperable artificial intelligence products and services.
(e) Tracking and evaluating performance.—Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall track and evaluate performance of procured and element-developed artificial intelligence, including efficacy, safety, fairness, transparency, accountability, appropriateness, lawfulness, and trustworthiness.
SEC. 6603. Application of artificial intelligence policies of the intelligence community to publicly available models hosted in classified environments.
(a) In general.—Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m), as amended by section 6602 of this Act, is further amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking “subsection (c)” and inserting “subsection (e)”;
(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
“(c) Application of policies to publicly available models hosted in classified environments.—In carrying out subsections (a) and (b), the Director shall ensure that the policies established under such subsections apply to the greatest extent possible to artificial intelligence models generally available to the public and hosted in classified environments.
“(d) Testing standards and benchmarks.—
“(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, or any officer designated by the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish standards for testing of artificial intelligence models in proportion to risk, including benchmarks and methodologies for the performance, efficacy, safety, fairness, transparency, accountability, appropriateness, lawfulness, and trustworthiness of artificial intelligence models across common use cases, including machine translation, object detection, and object recognition.
“(2) IDENTIFICATION OF COMPUTING MODEL.—The Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community, shall set standards for an appropriate secure computing environment, at a level (or multiple levels) of classification deemed appropriate, for elements of the intelligence community to engage in testing and evaluation of models prior to acquisition.”.
(b) Rule of construction.—Nothing in subsection (c) or (d) of section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m), as added by subsection (a)(3) of this section, shall be construed—
(1) to authorize an officer or employee of the intelligence community to direct a vendor or prospective vendor to alter a model to favor a particular viewpoint; or
(2) to apply to, limit, restrict, or otherwise affect any department, agency, or division or function of a department or agency outside of the intelligence community.
(c) Updates.—The Director shall make such revisions to the policies issued under subsections (a) and (b) of section 6702 of such Act as the Director considers necessary.
SEC. 6604. Prohibition on use of DeepSeek on intelligence community systems.
(a) Prohibition.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the other heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall develop standards and guidelines for elements of the intelligence community that require the removal of any covered application from national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community, a contractor to an element of the intelligence community, or another entity on behalf of an element of the intelligence community.
(b) Applicability of Information Security Requirements.—The standards and guidelines developed under subsection (a) shall be consistent with the information security requirements under subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code.
(c) National Security and Research Exceptions.—The standards and guidelines developed under subsection (a) shall include—
(1) exceptions for national security purposes and research activities; and
(2) risk mitigation standards and guidelines that shall apply in the case of an exception described in paragraph (1).
(d) Initial standards and guidelines.—The Director of National Intelligence shall develop the initial standards and guidelines under subsection (a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(e) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) COVERED APPLICATION.—The term “covered application” means the DeepSeek application or any successor application or service.
(2) NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.—The term “national security system” has the meaning given the term in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code.
subtitle B—Biotechnology
SEC. 6611. Senior officials for biotechnology.
(a) Designation required.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
“SEC. 123. Designation of senior officials for biotechnology.
“(a) Designation.—The head of each element of the intelligence community specified in subsection (b) shall designate a senior official of such element to serve as the official responsible for coordinating the activities of such element relating to biotechnology, as those activities are determined and directed by the head of such element.
“(b) Specified elements.—The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subsection are the following:
“(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
“(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
“(3) The National Security Agency.
“(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
“(5) The intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
“(6) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
“(c) Notice to Congress.—Not later than 15 days after designating a senior official under this section, the head of the element of the intelligence community designating such official shall submit notice of the designation to—
“(1) the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and
“(2) in the case of a designation relating to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.”.
(b) Initial designation.—The head of each element of the intelligence community required to designate a senior official of such element under section 123 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall designate such senior official not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6612. Plan on enhanced intelligence sharing relating to foreign adversary biotechnological threats.
(a) Plan.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall—
(1) develop and commence carrying out a plan, consistent with Executive Order 13526 and with adequate protections for sources and methods, for streamlining the declassification or downgrading and sharing of intelligence information relating to biotechnological developments and threats in order to counter efforts by foreign adversaries to weaponize biotechnologies and biological weapons, including threats relating to military, industrial, agricultural, and health applications of biotechnology; and
(2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees such plan.
(b) Recipients.—The plan under subsection (a) shall include mechanisms for sharing the intelligence information described in such subsection—
(1) with allies and partners of the United States;
(2) with private sector partners of the United States; and
(3) across the Federal Government.
(c) Reports.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 2 years, the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the progress made by the intelligence community with respect to sharing intelligence information relating to biotechnological developments and threats with recipients specified in subsection (b).
(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(3) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 6613. Enhancing biotechnology talent within the intelligence community.
(a) Plan.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to use existing and future funding and resources of the intelligence community to ensure the intelligence community has sufficient personnel with appropriate security clearances, including private-sector experts, to identify and respond to biotechnology threats.
(b) Elements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the exact number of personnel dedicated to biotechnology threats other than biological weapons in each element of the intelligence community as of the date on which such plan is completed, including personnel breakdowns by position function.
(2) An identification of the exact number of personnel dedicated to biological weapons issues in each element of the intelligence community as of such date, including personnel breakdowns by position function.
(3) An identification of areas within the intelligence community with respect to which the addition of full-time employees or detailees may be appropriate to address biotechnology expertise gaps.
(4) Strategies for increasing partnerships with the National Laboratories (as defined in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801)) and other government and private-sector entities, including strategies for using existing funding and resources of the intelligence community to secure expertise on biotechnology issues and provide appropriate security clearances to personnel who can provide such expertise.
(5) Strategies to make use of special hiring authorities to ensure the intelligence community has sufficient personnel to inform analysis and provide independent recommendations to address emerging biotechnology threats.
(6) Strategies to increase recruitment and retention of persons with biotechnology expertise.
(c) Implementation.—Not later than 180 days after the completion of the plan required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall direct the funding and resources described in subsection (b)(4) towards securing sufficient expertise to identify and respond to biotechnology threats.
SEC. 6614. Enhanced intelligence community support to secure United States biological data.
(a) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall provide support to and consult with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and other Federal agencies as appropriate when reviewing transactions relating to the acquisition of covered entities by foreign entities of concern, including attempts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China—
(1) to leverage and acquire biological data in the United States; and
(2) to leverage and acquire biological data outside the United States, including by providing economic support to the military, industrial, agricultural, or health care infrastructure of foreign countries.
(b) Briefing.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on—
(1) a formal process for ensuring intelligence community support to Federal agencies relating to adversary acquisition of biological data, in compliance with Executive Order 14117 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to preventing access to Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data and United States Government-related data by countries of concern), or any successor order; and
(2) any additional resources or authorities needed to provide intelligence community support under subsection (b)(1).
(c) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the congressional defense committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code);
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(2) BIOLOGICAL DATA.—The term “biological data” means multiomic information and other relevant information, including associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function, or process of a biological system, that is either measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis, including information from humans, animals, plants, or microbes.
(3) COVERED ENTITY.—The term “covered entity” means a private entity involved in biological data (including biological data equipment, technologies, sequencing, or synthesis), including a biobank or other private entity that holds large amounts of biological data.
(4) FOREIGN ENTITY OF CONCERN.—The term “foreign entity of concern” has the meaning given that term in section 10612(a) of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (division B of Public Law 117–167; 42 U.S.C. 19221(a)).
SEC. 6615. Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA.
(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a policy to ensure that elements of the intelligence community that procure products made using synthetic DNA or RNA from domestic sources do not contract with Chinese biotechnology suppliers or Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediaries that are determined by the Director to pose a security or supply chain threat to the United States.
(b) Elements.—The policy required by subsection (a) shall provide that an element of the intelligence community may not—
(1) procure or obtain any product made using synthetic DNA or RNA unless—
(A) the final assembly or processing of the product occurs in the United States;
(B) all significant processing of the product occurs in the United States; and
(C) all or nearly all ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the United States or an allied nation; or
(2) contract with any Chinese biotechnology supplier or Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary that is determined by the Director to pose a security or supply chain threat to the United States.
(c) Waiver.—As part of the policy required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may establish a waiver process for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community under which the head of the relevant element may waive the prohibition under subsection (b). A waiver may be made under the process only if the head of the relevant element complies with any conditions the Director may establish for the waiver process.
(d) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) BIOTECHNOLOGY.—The term ‘‘biotechnology’’ means the use of biological processes, organisms, or systems for manufacturing, research, or medical purposes, including genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and bioinformatics.
(2) CHINESE BIOTECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER.—The term “Chinese biotechnology supplier” means a supplier of biotechnology that is organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the People’s Republic of China.
(3) CHINESE BIOTECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN INTERMEDIARY.—The term “Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary” means a United States domestic supplier of biotechnology where a controlling interest in the United States domestic supplier is owned by the People’s Republic of China.
(4) SYNTHETIC DNA OR RNA.—The term “synthetic DNA or RNA” means any nucleic acid sequence that is produced de novo through chemical or enzymatic synthesis.
SEC. 6616. Strategy for addressing intelligence gaps relating to China’s investment in United States-origin biotechnology.
(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the officials specified in subsection (b), shall submit to the President, the congressional intelligence committees, and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) a strategy for addressing intelligence gaps relating to (1) investment activity by the People’s Republic of China in the biotechnology sector of the United States; and (2) acquisition by entities of the People’s Republic of China of intellectual property relating to United States-origin biotechnology. The strategy shall include any authorities or resources needed to address these gaps.
(b) Officials specified.—The officials specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis.
(3) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
(5) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.
(6) The heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
subtitle C—Other matters
SEC. 6621. Enhancing intelligence community technology adoption metrics.
(a) Metric Development and Implementation.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall each develop and implement a process (which may be different from the processes of the other elements) that makes use of a single set of metrics to assess, on an agency-wide, aggregate basis, the success of the agency’s efforts regarding the adoption, integration, and operational impact of the most relevant emerging technologies within the respective agencies of those Directors.
(b) Briefing.—Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the head of each agency described in subsection (a) shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a briefing on the implementation of this section, including—
(1) the metrics established under subsection (a);
(2) the success of the element toward meeting such metrics; and
(3) any recommendations of the head of such agency for legislative or regulatory reforms to improve technology adoption.
(c) Definitions.—In this section, the term “emerging technology” has the meaning given such term in section 6701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117–263; 50 U.S.C. 3024 note).
SEC. 6622. Report on identification of intelligence community sites for advanced nuclear technologies.
(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives;
(3) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate; and
(4) the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report on identification of sites.—Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers necessary, and in coordination with efforts of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying 1 or more sites which could benefit from secure, resilient energy through the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies, which deployment would be to serve in whole or in part the facility, structure, infrastructure, or part thereof for which a head of an element of the intelligence community has financial or maintenance responsibility.
(c) Plans.—The report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall include plans to ensure—
(1) prioritizing early site preparation and licensing activities for deployment of advanced nuclear technologies with a goal of beginning advanced nuclear technology deployment at any identified site not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) the ability to authorize an identified site to interconnect with the commercial electric grid, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), if the head of the element responsible for the reactor deployment determines that such interconnection enhances national security; and
(3) fuel for the advanced nuclear technologies operated at identified sites is not subject to obligations (as defined in section 110.2 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations).
SEC. 6623. Strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing relating to critical and emerging technologies.
(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Strategy.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop a strategy for—
(1) coordinating the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence relating to critical and emerging technologies across the intelligence community; and
(2) the appropriate sharing of such intelligence with other Federal departments and agencies with responsibilities for regulation, innovation and research, science, public health, export control and screenings, and Federal financial tools.
(c) Report.—Not later than 30 days after the development of the strategy required by subsection (b), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a copy of the strategy.
TITLE LXVII—Matters Relating to Foreign Countries
subtitle A—Matters Relating to China
SEC. 6701. Modification of annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party.
Section 1107 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by inserting after “Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center” the following: “, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community,”; and
(B) by inserting after “congressional intelligence committees,” the following: “the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,”;
(2) in subsection (b)—
(A) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (12); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
“(10) A listing of provincial, municipal, or other law enforcement institutions, including police departments, in the People’s Republic of China associated with establishing or maintaining a Chinese police presence in the United States.
“(11) A listing of colleges and universities in the People’s Republic of China that conduct military research or host dedicated military initiatives or laboratories.”;
(3) by striking subsection (c); and
(4) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
SEC. 6702. Intelligence sharing with allies on Chinese Communist Party efforts in Europe.
It is the sense of the Congress that malign influence efforts by the Chinese Communist Party have increased in Europe, as they have in the United States homeland, and that the intelligence community should seek every opportunity to coordinate with European partners, including through the sharing of intelligence, as appropriate, to both illuminate and disrupt such malign influence efforts.
SEC. 6703. Prohibition on intelligence community contracting with Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) 1260H LIST.—The term “1260H list” means the list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States most recently submitted under section 1260H(b)(1) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).
(2) AFFILIATE.—The term “affiliate” means an entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another entity.
(3) BIOTECHNOLOGY.—The term “biotechnology” means the use of biological processes, organisms, or systems for manufacturing, research, or medical purposes, including genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and bioinformatics.
(b) Prohibition.—Subject to subsections (d) and (e), a head of an element of the intelligence community may not enter into, renew, or extend any contract for a product or service with—
(1) any entity listed on the 1260H list that is engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing activities;
(2) any entity that is a known or assessed affiliate of any entity described in paragraph (1);
(3) any entity that has a known or assessed joint venture, partnership, or contractual relationship with any entity described in paragraph (1), if the Director of National Intelligence determines that the relationship presents a risk to the national security of the United States; or
(4) any other entity that is engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing activities, if the Director of National Intelligence determines that the activities present a risk to the national security of the United States.
(c) Implementation and compliance.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community—
(1) establish guidelines for the implementation of this section;
(2) maintain both a publicly available and classified list of entities covered by the prohibition in subsection (b);
(3) require that each head of an element of the intelligence community ensure that any contractor engaged by the element certify that neither it nor any of its subcontractors are engaged in a contract for a product or service with an entity covered by the prohibition in subsection (b); and
(4) otherwise ensure compliance with subsection (b).
(d) Waiver process.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence may establish a waiver process for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community under which the head of the relevant element may waive the prohibition under subsection (b) for a procurement on a case-by-case basis. A waiver may be made under the process only if the head of the relevant element—
(A) complies with any conditions the Director may establish for the process; and
(B) determines, in writing, that—
(i) the procurement is essential for national security and no reasonable alternative source exists; and
(ii) appropriate measures are in place to mitigate risks associated with the procurement.
(2) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—For each waiver for a procurement issued under subsection (b), the Director and the relevant head of the element of the intelligence community shall, not later than 30 days after issuing the waiver, submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a notice of the waiver, which shall include a justification for the waiver and a description of the risk mitigation measures implemented for the procurement.
(e) Exceptions.—The prohibition in subsection (b) shall not apply to—
(1) the acquisition or provision of health care services overseas for—
(A) employees of the United States, including members of the uniformed services (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code), whose official duty stations are located overseas or who are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or
(B) employees of contractors or subcontractors of the United States—
(i) who are performing under a contract that directly supports the missions or activities of individuals described in subparagraph (A); and
(ii) whose primary duty stations are located overseas or who are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or
(2) the acquisition, use, or distribution of human multiomic data, lawfully compiled, that is commercially or publicly available.
(f) Effective date.—This section shall take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and apply to any contract entered into, renewed, or extended on or after such effective date.
(g) Sunset.—The provisions of this section shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(h) Rule of construction.—This section shall only be construed to apply to activities of an element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 6704. Report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall post on a publicly available website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
(b) Elements.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the personal wealth, financial holdings, and business interests of the following foreign persons:
(A) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.
(B) Members of the Politburo Standing Committee.
(C) Members of the full Politburo.
(2) Evidence of physical and financial assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such foreign persons, including—
(A) real estate holdings inside and outside the People’s Republic of China, including the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau;
(B) any high-value personal assets; and
(C) business holdings, investments, and financial accounts held in jurisdictions outside mainland China.
(3) Identification of financial proxies, business associates, or other entities used to obscure the ownership of such wealth and assets, including as a baseline those referenced in the March 2025 report issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence entitled, “Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”.
(4) Nonpublic information related to the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to the extent possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(c) Form.—The report posted and submitted under subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form, but the version submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives may include a classified annex as necessary.
SEC. 6705. Assessment and report on investments by the People’s Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) AGRICULTURE SECTOR.—The term “agriculture sector” means any physical infrastructure, energy production, land, or other inputs associated with the production of agricultural commodities (as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602)).
(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Assessment required.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall assess the extent of investment by the People’s Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil.
(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—The assessment shall consider the following:
(A) The extent to which President Xi Jinping has engaged in or directed engagement with Brazilian leadership with regard to the agriculture sector of Brazil.
(B) The extent of engagement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the agriculture sector of Brazil.
(C) The strategic intentions of the engagement or direction of President Xi, if any, to invest in the agriculture sector of Brazil.
(D) The number of entities based in or owned by the People’s Republic of China invested in the agriculture sector of Brazil, including joint ventures with Brazilian-owned companies.
(E) The impacts to the supply chain, global market, and food security of investment in or control of the agriculture sector in Brazil by the People’s Republic of China.
(c) Report required.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing the assessment required by subsection (b).
(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6706. Identification of entities that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army.
(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code);
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence shall identify the businesses, academic and research institutions, and other entities in the People’s Republic of China that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army, including—
(1) for national defense or military modernization, including the development, application, or integration of civilian capabilities for military, paramilitary, or security purposes;
(2) for the development, production, testing, or proliferation of weapons systems, critical technologies, or dual-use items, as defined under applicable United States law (including regulations); or
(3) academic, scientific, or technical collaboration that materially contributes to or supports any of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
(c) Submission of list to Congress.—Not later than the date that is 180 days after the enactment of this Act, and not later than the anniversary of that date for each of two years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of each entity identified under subsection (b).
SEC. 6707. Mission manager for the People’s Republic of China.
(a) Establishment of position.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There shall be a mission manager for all intelligence collection matters relating to the People’s Republic of China. The mission manager shall be designated or appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the mission manager designated or appointed under paragraph (1) may be an individual serving in a position within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Applicability.—The first mission manager under subsection (a) shall be designated or appointed not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Termination.—This section shall terminate on December 31, 2030.
SEC. 6708. National Intelligence Estimate of advancements in biotechnology by the People’s Republic of China.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall—
(1) produce a National Intelligence Estimate with respect to advancements by the People’s Republic of China in biotechnology and any other significant technology or science sector the Director considers related; and
(2) submit such National Intelligence Estimate to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
subtitle B—Other Matters
SEC. 6711. Improvements to requirement for monitoring of Iranian enrichment of uranium-235.
Section 7413(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31; 22 U.S.C. 8701 note) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “assesses that the Islamic Republic of Iran has produced or possesses any amount of uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity or has engaged in significant enrichment activity,” and inserting “makes a finding described in paragraph (2) pursuant to an assessment,”; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
“(2) FINDING DESCRIBED.—A finding described in this paragraph is a finding that the Islamic Republic of Iran has—
“(A) produced or possesses any amount of uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60-percent purity;
“(B) engaged in significant enrichment activity; or
“(C) made the decision to produce a nuclear weapon from highly enriched uranium.”.
SEC. 6712. Policy toward certain agents of foreign governments.
Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985 (Public Law 98–618; 98 Stat. 3303) is amended—
(1) by striking subsection (b);
(2) by redesignating subsections (c) (relating to an amendment to the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4303)) and (d) (22 U.S.C. 4303 note) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) (22 U.S.C. 254c–1) the following new subsections:
“(b) The Secretary of State, in negotiating agreements with foreign governments regarding reciprocal privileges and immunities of United States diplomatic personnel, shall consult with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence in achieving the sense of Congress in subsection (a).
“(c) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on each foreign government that—
“(1) engages in intelligence activities within the United States harmful to the national security of the United States; and
“(2) possesses numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel accommodations, or facilities within the United States of official representatives to the United States that exceed the respective numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel accommodations, or facilities within such country of official representatives of the United States to such country.”; and
(4) in subsection (e), as redesignated by this section, by striking “subsection (c)” and inserting “subsection (d)”.
SEC. 6713. Extension of intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability.
Section 6512 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117–263; 136 Stat. 3543; 50 U.S.C. 3025 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (b)—
(A) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting before the period the following: “, including with respect to the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children”; and
(B) in paragraph (4)(A), by striking “2026” and inserting “2028”; and
(2) in subsection (c), by striking “the date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.” and inserting “December 31, 2028. The Director and Coordinator shall carry out this section before such date regardless of any ceasefire or cessation of armed hostilities by Russia in Ukraine occurring before such date.”.
SEC. 6714. Plan to enhance intelligence support to counter foreign influence intended to continue or expand the conflict in Sudan.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall develop a plan—
(1) to share relevant intelligence, if any, relating to foreign efforts to continue or expand the conflict in Sudan, with regional allies and partners of the United States, including to downgrade or declassify such intelligence as needed; and
(2) to collect and analyze intelligence to enable the United States Government to counter foreign efforts to continue or expand the conflict in Sudan in order to protect national and regional security.
SEC. 6715. Review of information relating to actions by foreign governments to assist persons evading justice.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, complete a review for declassification of any information in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation collected on or after January 1, 2020, relating to whether any foreign government official has assisted or facilitated any citizen or national of their country in departing the United States while the citizen or national was under investigation or awaiting trial or sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United States to determine what information, if any, can be appropriately declassified and made available to the public. Upon completion of the review, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make such information, if any, available to the public in a manner consistent with provisions of Federal law related to privacy.
SEC. 6716. National Intelligence Estimate on the Western Hemisphere.
(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the Western Hemisphere.
(b) Elements.—The National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a) shall cover the 10-year period beginning on the date on which the Estimate is produced and include an assessment of—
(1) the major threats to United States national security interests in the Western Hemisphere;
(2) the attitudes of other nations in the Western Hemisphere toward partnership with the United States, China, and Russia, including the willingness of Western Hemisphere nations to support United States national security priorities and the likely trajectory of Western Hemisphere nations’ relationships with the United States;
(3) the extent to which expanded economic, energy, law enforcement, intelligence, counternarcotics, or security cooperation between nations in the Western Hemisphere and the United States could help mitigate the threats identified in paragraph (1); and
(4) the extent to which expanded economic, energy, law enforcement, intelligence, counternarcotics, and security cooperation between and among other nations in the Western Hemisphere (excluding the United States) could help mitigate the threats identified in paragraph (1).
(c) Availability to public.—At the same time the Director produces the Estimate under subsection (a), the Director shall make available to the public, on the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, an unclassified summary of the key findings of the Estimate.
SEC. 6717. Plan to enhance counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence the following:
(1) A description and assessment of the intelligence community element’s direct relationship, if any, with any element of the Government of Mexico.
(2) A strategy to enhance counternarcotics cooperation and appropriate coordination with each element of the Government of Mexico with which the intelligence community element has a direct relationship.
(3) Recommendations and a description of the resources required to efficiently and effectively implement the strategy required by paragraph (2) in furtherance of the national interest of the United States.
SEC. 6718. Requirements with respect to duty to warn former senior officials and other United States persons.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that Congress is gravely concerned about the ongoing threat of lethal plotting against United States persons from adversary nations, including those against numerous former senior United States officials, principally from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Information collected regarding plots against United States persons requires expeditious fulfilment of the duty to warn process of the intelligence community, including close consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Notice of warning.—
(1) NOTICE REQUIRED.—If an element of the intelligence community determines pursuant to procedures established in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive 191 (or any successor directive) that such element has a duty to warn a United States person inside the United States of an impending threat and, after consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation when required, notifies such person or facilitates notification of such person by another party, the head of such element shall also immediately provide notice of the warning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, if such person is under the protection of an element of the Federal Government, a person responsible for the protection of such United States person.
(2) PROCESS FOR NOTIFICATION.—If notice is required under paragraph (1) to a person responsible for the protection of a United States person, such notice may be made in any appropriate and expeditious manner, including through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(c) Federal Bureau of Investigation records of warnings.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish a process for documenting and maintaining records of each notice of a warning provided to the Director in accordance with subsection (b).
(d) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any duty to warn already in effect, including under Intelligence Community Directive 191 (relating to duty to warn) and any policies or procedures issued in accordance with such directive.
(e) United States person defined.—In this section, the term “United States person” has the meaning given the term in section 105A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
TITLE LXVIII—Reports and Other Matters
SEC. 6801. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.
(a) National Security Act of 1947.—
(1) FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.—
(A) REPEAL.—Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3055) is repealed.
(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 507(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)) is amended—
(i) by striking paragraph (5); and
(ii) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).
(C) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall take effect on December 31, 2026.
(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY PROTECTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GRANT FUNDING.—Section 121 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3061) is amended by striking subsection (c).
(3) PERSONNEL-LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—Section 506B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3098) is repealed.
(4) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.—Subtitle D of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3327 et seq.) is amended—
(A) by striking section 1033; and
(B) by redesignating sections 1034 and 1035 as sections 1033 and 1034, respectively.
(5) MEASURES TO MITIGATE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS FROM PROLIFERATION AND USE OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SPYWARE.—Section 1102A(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3232a) is amended by inserting “for seven years” after “annually thereafter”.
(b) Intelligence Authorization Acts.—
(1) BRIEFINGS ON PROGRAMS FOR NEXT-GENERATION MICROELECTRONICS IN SUPPORT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.—Section 7507 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3334s) is amended by striking subsection (e).
(2) EXPANSION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CERTAIN CONTRACTORS.—Section 6715 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117–263; 136 Stat. 3572) is amended—
(A) by striking subsection (c); and
(B) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively.
(3) TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGIES OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES.—Section 833 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (division X of Public Law 117–103; 136 Stat. 1035) is repealed.
(4) BRIEFINGS ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.—Section 6705 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) is amended—
(A) in the section heading, by striking “and annual briefing”; and
(B) by striking subsection (b).
(5) NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.—Section 6722 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92; 50 U.S.C. 3024 note) is repealed.
(6) COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES BY RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN, NORTH KOREA, OR OTHER NATION STATE TO EXERT COVERT INFLUENCE.—Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115–31; 50 U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended by striking subsection (h).
(7) NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT OR TRANSFER OF CONTAINERIZED MISSILE SYSTEM BY RUSSIA OR CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES.—Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (division M of Public Law 114–113) is repealed.
(c) Other provisions of law.—
(1) PROPOSAL TO MODIFY OR INTRODUCE NEW AIRCRAFT OR SENSORS FOR FLIGHT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDER OPEN SKIES TREATY.—Section 1242 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3563) is repealed.
(2) BRIEFINGS ON ANALYTIC INTEGRITY REVIEWS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is amended by striking subsections (c) and (d).
(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 6312(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117–263; 50 U.S.C. 3364 note) is amended by striking “In conjunction with each briefing provided under section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c))” and inserting “Not later than February 1 each year”.
(3) COMMERCE WITH, AND ASSISTANCE TO, CUBA FROM OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Section 108 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–114; 22 U.S.C. 6038) is repealed.
SEC. 6802. Revisions to congressional notification of intelligence collection adjustments.
Section 22 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3620) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking “the occurrence of an intelligence collection adjustment” and inserting “that a covered intelligence collection or sharing adjustment has occurred”; and
(B) by striking “notification of the intelligence collection adjustment” and inserting “summary of such adjustment and the cause of such adjustment”; and
(2) in subsection (b), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
“(2) COVERED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OR SHARING ADJUSTMENT.—The term ‘covered intelligence collection or sharing adjustment’ means an action or inaction by the National Security Agency that results in a significant change to—
“(A) the quantity of intelligence collected by the National Security Agency with respect to a foreign country, foreign organization, or senior leader of a foreign country or foreign organization; or
“(B) policies or practices of the National Security Agency with respect to the sharing of intelligence with a foreign country, organization of foreign countries, or organization of countries of which the United States is a member.”.
SEC. 6803. Declassification of intelligence and additional transparency measures relating to the COVID–19 pandemic.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, jointly with the head of each element of the intelligence community—
(1) perform a declassification review of intelligence relating to the origins of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19), including—
(A) research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other medical or scientific research center within the People’s Republic of China;
(B) information relating to Gain of Function research and the intention of this research;
(C) information relating to sources of funding or direction for research on coronaviruses, including both sources within the People’s Republic of China and foreign sources; and
(D) the possibility of zoonotic origins of COVID–19;
(2) perform a declassification review of intelligence relating to efforts by government officials of entities of the People’s Republic of China—
(A) to disrupt or obstruct information sharing or investigations into the origins of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic;
(B) to disrupt the sharing of medically significant information relating to the transmissibility and potential harm of SARS–CoV–2 to humans, including—
(i) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United States Government;
(ii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the governments of allies and partners of the United States; and
(iii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United Nations and World Health Organization;
(C) to obstruct or otherwise limit the sharing of information between national, provincial, and city governments within the People’s Republic of China and between subnational entities within the People’s Republic of China and external researchers;
(D) to deny the sharing of information with the United States, allies and partners of the United States, or multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization;
(E) to pressure or lobby foreign governments, journalists, medical researchers, officials of the United States Government, or officials of multilateral organizations (including the United Nations and the World Health Organization) with respect to the source, scientific origins, transmissibility, or other attributes of the SARS–CoV–2 virus or the COVID–19 pandemic;
(F) to disrupt government or private-sector efforts to conduct research and development of medical interventions or countermeasures for the COVID–19 pandemic, including vaccines; and
(G) to promote alternative narratives regarding the origins of COVID–19 as well as the domestic Chinese and international response to the COVID–19 pandemic;
(3) release publicly the intelligence products described in paragraphs (1) and (2) including such redactions as the Director, with the concurrence of the head of the originating intelligence community element, determines necessary to protect sources and methods and information concerning United States persons; and
(4) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an unredacted version of the declassified intelligence products described in paragraph (3).
SEC. 6804. Classified intelligence budget justification materials and submission of intelligence community drug control resource summary.
(a) Classified intelligence budget justification materials.—Section 506J(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a(b)) is amended by inserting “and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives” after “congressional intelligence committees”.
(b) Intelligence community drug control resource summary.—
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a summary of intelligence community drug control resources for each of fiscal years 2027 and 2028.
(2) SUBMISSION.—
(A) SUMMARY.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees the classified intelligence budget justification materials under section 506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a) for a fiscal year covered by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a consolidated summary of the drug control resources of the intelligence community for that fiscal year. To the extent practicable and applicable, the Director shall organize such summary in a similar manner as the National Drug Control Program budget under section 704(c) of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
(B) MATTERS INCLUDED.—Each summary under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(i) A certification by the Director stating that the drug control resources of the intelligence community are designed to implement the responsibilities of the intelligence community in support of the counter-drug efforts of the United States, as reflected in the National Drug Control Strategy under section 706 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1705) and the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan under section 711(a)(4) of such Act (21 U.S.C. 1710(a)(4)).
(ii) A description of the key accomplishments of the intelligence community with respect to counternarcotics during the fiscal year in which the summary is submitted and the previous fiscal year.
(iii) The total amounts requested for the National Intelligence Program for counternarcotics for the fiscal year covered by the summary and for the previous fiscal year.
(iv) Each of the total amounts under subparagraph (C), disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community at the expenditure center, project, and subproject levels.
(v) Any other information the Director determines appropriate to provide the congressional intelligence committees with a consolidated, comprehensive, and detailed understanding of the amounts, activities, and purposes of the amounts requested for the National Intelligence Program for counternarcotics for the fiscal year covered by the summary.
(C) PROVISION OF INFORMATION.—Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall timely provide to the Director of National Intelligence the information the Director requires to develop each summary under paragraph (1).
(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 7320(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31; 50 U.S.C. 3096 note) is amended by striking “2027” and inserting “2026”.
SEC. 6805. Requiring penetration testing as part of the testing and certification of voting systems.
Section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(e) Required penetration testing.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by the Commission based on accredited laboratories under this section.
“(2) ACCREDITATION.—The Commission shall develop a program for the acceptance of the results of penetration testing on election systems. The penetration testing required by this subsection shall be required for Commission certification. The Commission shall vote on the selection of any entity identified. The requirements for such selection shall be based on consideration of an entity’s competence to conduct penetration testing under this subsection. The Commission may consult with the National Institute of Standards and Technology or any other appropriate Federal agency on lab selection criteria and other aspects of this program.”.
SEC. 6806. Standard guidelines for intelligence community to report and document anomalous health incidents.
(a) Standard guidelines.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, develop and issue standard guidelines for personnel of the intelligence community to report and properly document anomalous health incidents.
(b) Conformity with Department of Defense guidelines.—In developing the standard guidelines required by subsection (a), the Director shall ensure that such standard guidelines are as similar as practicable to guidelines issued by the Secretary of Defense for personnel of the Department of Defense to report and properly document anomalous health incidents.
(c) Submission.—Not later than 10 days after the date on which the Director issues the standard guidelines required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the standard guidelines, including a statement describing the implementation of such standard guidelines, how the standard guidelines differ from those issued by the Secretary, and the justifications for such differences.