Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, as reported on May 20, 2026

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[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]

[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[S. 4615 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

Calendar No. 420

119th CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 4615

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and

intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the

Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence

Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 20, 2026

Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, reported the

following original bill; which was read twice and placed on the

calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and

intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the

Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence

Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.–This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027”.

(b) Table of Contents.–The table of contents for this Act is as

follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I–INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by

law.

TITLE II–CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III–MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 301. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and

Assistant Directors of National

Intelligence.

Sec. 302. Repeal of National Intelligence Management Council.

Sec. 303. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and

offices.

Sec. 304. Transfer of National Intelligence University.

Sec. 305. Limitation on domestic activities at the National

Counterterrorism Center.

Sec. 306. Timely provision of security direction to intelligence

community whistleblowers.

Sec. 307. Notification of certain declassifications.

Sec. 308. No police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal

security functions for Director of National

Intelligence.

TITLE IV–MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency authority regarding

unmanned aircraft systems.

Sec. 402. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule.

Sec. 403. Modification relating to security personnel at certain

installations.

TITLE V–MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Sec. 501. Authority of National Security Agency to correlate, evaluate,

and disseminate certain intelligence.

Sec. 502. Prohibition on availability of funds for relocation of Office

of Intelligence and Analysis to certain

facilities.

Sec. 503. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and

by the National Reconnaissance Office.

Sec. 504. Modification of annual report on Federal Bureau of

Investigation case data.

Sec. 505. Establishment of Office of Counterintelligence.

Sec. 506. Modification of responsibilities of Office of Intelligence

and Analysis.

Sec. 507. Role of National Security Agency in collection and analysis

of signals intelligence.

TITLE VI–GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 601. Amendments to presidential appointments for intelligence

community positions.

Sec. 602. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available

information concerning United States

persons.

Sec. 603. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products.

Sec. 604. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management

Account funds for certain entities.

Sec. 605. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship

Program.

Sec. 606. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the

Department of Commerce.

Sec. 607. Countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national

intelligence priority.

Sec. 608. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or

former intelligence community employees.

Sec. 609. Modification of definitions in National Security Act of 1947

and scope of intelligence sharing

responsibilities of Director of National

Intelligence.

Sec. 610. Prohibition on intelligence community use of adversary

unmanned ground vehicles.

Sec. 611. China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force.

Sec. 612. Limitations relating to Chinese products and services.

Sec. 613. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive

cyber operations conducted by

nongovernmental entities.

Sec. 614. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence

community.

Sec. 615. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.

Sec. 616. Repeal of certain report and briefing requirements.

Sec. 617. Intelligence community personnel travel, allowances, and

related expenses regulations.

Sec. 618. Prohibition on sending and receiving objects using entities

owned or controlled by persons or

governments of certain countries.

Sec. 619. Enhancing intelligence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

region.

Sec. 620. Intelligence activities related to Ukraine.

Sec. 621. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing with countries

of significant concern to the United

States.

Sec. 622. United States-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.

TITLE VII–ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Sec. 701. Artificial intelligence exploitation guard and intelligence

sharing.

Sec. 702. Director of National Intelligence review of intelligence

community use of artificial intelligence to

support targeting.

Sec. 703. Improvements for artificial intelligence policies, standards,

and guidance for intelligence community.

Sec. 704. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial

Intelligence Security Center.

Sec. 705. Reports on novel uses of artificial intelligence technology.

Sec. 706. Clear labeling of artificial intelligence outputs for

targeting workflows.

Sec. 707. Research on use of artificial intelligence relating to

inadvertent escalation.

Sec. 708. Research on interaction of adversarial artificial

intelligence systems with intelligence

community systems.

Sec. 709. Proliferation assessments regarding the export of artificial

intelligence-related technologies.

Sec. 710. Review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities

under Vulnerabilities Equities Process.

Sec. 711. Prohibition on certain artificial intelligence models on

intelligence community systems.

TITLE VIII–OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 801. Modification to notification requirements for authorized and

ordered departures.

Sec. 802. Identification of reallocable frequencies.

Sec. 803. Protection of classified information relating to budget

functions.

Sec. 804. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United

States of transactions in real estate near

intelligence community facilities.

Sec. 805. Intelligence support to the U.S. International Development

Finance Corporation.

Sec. 806. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting Federal

Reserve information.

Sec. 807. Amendments to prohibit payments to obtain national security

information or approvals.

Sec. 808. Offenses involving espionage.

Sec. 809. Parental bereavement leave.

Sec. 810. Definition of foreign instrumentality for purposes of

economic espionage prohibition.

Sec. 811. Protection of trade secrets.

Sec. 812. Technical amendments.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) Congressional intelligence committees.–The term

“congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given

such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3003).

(2) Intelligence community.–The term “intelligence

community” has the meaning given such term in such section.

TITLE I–INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2027

for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities

of the Federal Government.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts.–The amounts authorized to be

appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence

activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the

classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.–

(1) Availability.–The classified Schedule of

Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made

available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the

Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives,

and to the President.

(2) Distribution by the president.–Subject to paragraph

(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of

the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in

subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,

within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

(3) Limits on disclosure.–The President shall not publicly

disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any

portion of such Schedule except–

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act

of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the

budget; or

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.–There is authorized to be

appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the

Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2027 the sum of

$568,000,000.

(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.–In addition to

amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community

Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be

appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for

fiscal year 2027 such additional amounts as are specified in the

classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY

LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,

and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such

additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in

such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

TITLE II–CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence

Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year

2027.

TITLE III–MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

SEC. 301. APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND

ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Redesignation of Principal Deputy Director of National

Intelligence as Deputy Director of National Intelligence.–

(1) In general.–Subsection (a) of section 103A of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended–

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking

“Principal”; and

(B) by striking “Principal” each place it

appears.

(2) Conforming amendments.–Subsection (c) of such section

is amended–

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking

“Principal”; and

(B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking “Principal”.

(3) Additional conforming amendment.–

(A) National security act of 1947.–Such Act is

further amended–

(i) in section 103(c)(2) (50 U.S.C.

3025(c)(2)), by striking “Principal”;

(ii) in section 103I(b)(1) (50 U.S.C.

3034(b)(1)), by striking “Principal”;

(iii) in section 106(a)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C.

3041(a)(2)(A)), by striking “Principal”; and

(iv) in section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 3053(b)),

by striking “Principal”.

(B) Damon Paul nelson and matthew young pollard

intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018,

2019, and 2020.–Section 6310 of the Damon Paul Nelson

and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization

Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.

3351b) is amended by striking “Principal” each place

it appears.

year 2022.–Section 1683(b)(3) of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C.

3373(b)(3)) is amended by striking “Principal” both

places it appears.

(b) Elimination of Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and

Establishment of Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.–

(1) In general.–Section 103A(b) of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended–

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking

“Deputy” and inserting “Assistant”;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking “may” and all

that follows through the period at the end and

inserting the following: “is an Assistant Director of

National Intelligence for Mission Integration and an

Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Policy

and Capabilities, who shall be appointed by the

Director of National Intelligence.”; and

inserting “Assistant”.

(2) Conforming amendments.–The National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended–

(A) in section 102A(l)(4)(F) (50 U.S.C.

3024(l)(4)(F)), as redesignated by section

402(g)(1)(B), by striking “a Deputy” and inserting

“an Assistant”; and

(B) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by

striking paragraph (3).

Intelligence in Law.–Any reference in law to the Principal Deputy

Director of National Intelligence shall be treated as a reference to

the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

(d) Clerical Amendments.–

(1) Section heading.–Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C.

3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking

“deputy directors of national intelligence” and inserting

“deputy director of national intelligence and assistant

directors of national intelligence”.

(2) Table of contents.–The table of contents for such Act,

in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by

striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the

following:

“Sec. 103A. Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant

Directors of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 302. REPEAL OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.

(a) In General.–Section 103M of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3034d) is repealed.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of such Act is

amended by striking the item relating to section 103M.

SEC. 303. REPEAL OF VARIOUS POSITIONS, UNITS, CENTERS, COUNCILS, AND

OFFICES.

(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.–

(1) Repeal.–Title I of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K

(50 U.S.C. 3034b).

(2) Conforming amendment.–Section 103G of such Act (50

U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).

(3) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents for such Act

in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by

striking the item relating to section 103K.

(b) Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.–

(1) Termination.–The Director of National Intelligence

shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and

wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community

Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).

(2) Repeal.–

(A) In general.–Title I of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended

by striking section 103L (50 U.S.C. 3034c).

(B) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents for

such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such

Act, is further amended by striking the item relating

to section 103L.

(3) Effective date.–The amendments made by this subsection

shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act.

Council.–

(1) Repeal.–Title I of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section

120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).

(2) Conforming amendment.–Section 331 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-

81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2)

and inserting the following:

“(2) The term `climate security’ means the effects of

climate change on the following:

“(A) The national security of the United States,

including national security infrastructure.

“(B) Subnational, national, and regional political

stability.

“(C) The security of allies and partners of the

United States.

“(D) Ongoing or potential political violence,

including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare,

insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil

war, and interstate war.”.

(3) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents for such

Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further

amended by striking the item relating to section 120.

(d) Framework for Cross-Disciplinary Education and Training.–

(1) Repeal.–Subtitle A of title X of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking

section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).

(2) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents for such

Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further

amended by striking the item relating to section 1002.

(e) Foreign Languages Program.–

(1) Termination.–The Director of National Intelligence

shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and

wind down the operations of the Foreign Languages Program

before the date specified in paragraph (5).

(2) Repeals.–Subtitle B of such title (50 U.S.C. 3201 et

seq.) is amended by striking sections 1011 (50 U.S.C. 3201,

relating to program on advancement of foreign languages

critical to the intelligence community), 1012 (50 U.S.C. 3202,

relating to education partnerships), and 1013 (50 U.S.C. 3203,

relating to voluntary services).

(3) Conforming amendments.–Such subtitle is further

amended by striking sections 1014 (50 U.S.C. 3204, relating to

regulations) and 1015 (50 U.S.C. 3205, relating to

definitions).

(4) Clerical amendments.–The table of contents for such

Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further

amended by striking the items relating to subtitle B of title

(5) Effective date.–The amendments made by this subsection

shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act.

(f) Joint Intelligence Community Council.–

(1) Termination.–The Joint Intelligence Community Council

is terminated.

(2) Conforming amendment.–Title I of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking

section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).

(3) Repeal of requirement to consult with joint

intelligence community council for national intelligence

program budget.–Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking

“, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint

Intelligence Community Council,”.

(4) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents for such Act

in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by

striking the item relating to section 101A.

SEC. 304. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.

(a) Transfer.–The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer

the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National

Defense University described in section 2165 of title 10, United States

Code.

(b) Repeal.–Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking subtitle D (50 U.S.C. 3227

et seq.).

(1) Title 10.–Section 2151(b) of title 10, United States

Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3).

(2) Title 17.–Section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States

Code, is amended–

(A) by striking subparagraph (M); and

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as

subparagraph (M).

(3) Damon Paul nelson and matthew young pollard

intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and

2020.–The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and

2020 (division E of Public Law 116-92) is amended by striking

section 5324 (50 U.S.C. 3334a).

(d) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents for the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is amended, in the matter

preceding section 2 of such Act, by striking the items relating to

subtitle D of title X.

SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES AT THE NATIONAL

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

(a) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.–Subsection (e) of

section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056) is

amended to read as follows:

“(e) Limitation on Domestic Activities.–The Center may,

consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the

guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive and retain

intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism (as defined in section

2331 of title 18, United States Code) to enable the Center to collect,

retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining only to international

terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States

Code).”.

SEC. 306. TIMELY PROVISION OF SECURITY DIRECTION TO INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWERS.

(a) Intelligence Community Employees.–Section

103H(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

3033(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting “, unless the Director

does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days after

the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required by

subclause (I)” after “practices”.

(b) Central Intelligence Agency Employees.–Section

17(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50

U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting “, unless the

Director does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days

after the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required

by subclause (I)” after “practices”.

SEC. 307. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DECLASSIFICATIONS.

(a) In General.–Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 806. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DECLASSIFICATIONS.

“(a) Notification to Congress by Director of National

Intelligence.–

“(1) In general.–Immediately upon declassifying,

downgrading, or directing the declassification or downgrading

of information or intelligence relating to intelligence

sources, methods, or activities pursuant to section 3.1(c) of

Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to

classified national security information), or any successor

order, the Director of National Intelligence, or the Principal

Deputy Director of National Intelligence, as delegated by the

Director of National Intelligence, shall notify the

congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the

United States in writing of such declassification, downgrading,

or direction.

“(2) Contents.–Each notification required by paragraph

(1) shall include a copy of the information that has been, or

has been directed to be, declassified or downgraded.

“(b) Notification to Congress by Agency Head.–

“(1) In general.–Immediately upon the declassification of

information pursuant to section 3.1(d) of Executive Order

13526, or any successor order, the head, or senior official, of

a relevant element of the intelligence community shall notify

the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of

Representatives, and the Archivist of the United States in

writing of such declassification.

“(2) Contents.–Each notification required by paragraph

(1) shall include a copy of the information that has been

declassified.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting

after the item relating to section 805 the following:

“Sec. 806. Notification of certain declassifications.”.

SEC. 308. NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OR INTERNAL

SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024)

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(z) No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or Internal

Security Functions.–The Director of National Intelligence shall have

no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security

functions.”.

TITLE IV–MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUTHORITY REGARDING

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

Section 15A(m) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50

U.S.C. 3515a(m)) is amended by striking “December 31, 2027” and

inserting “the date set forth in section 210G(j)(1) of the Homeland

Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n(j)(1))”.

SEC. 402. HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965 SPECIAL RULE.

Section 135 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d)

is amended–

(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections

(d) and (e), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) Special Rule.–With respect to a member of a qualifying

Federal service who is an officer or employee of an element of the

intelligence community, the term `permanent duty station’, as used in

this section, shall exclude a permanent duty station that is within 50

miles of the headquarters facility of such element.”.

SEC. 403. MODIFICATION RELATING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AT CERTAIN

INSTALLATIONS.

Section 15(a)(1)(D) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949

(50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)(D)) is amended by inserting “or the National

Reconnaissance Office” after “Office of the Director of National

Intelligence”.

TITLE V–MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE,

AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.)

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 23. AUTHORITY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN

INTELLIGENCE.

“The Director of the National Security Agency may–

“(1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to

national security; and

“(2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and

executive branch customers as the Director considers

appropriate.”.

SEC. 502. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RELOCATION OF OFFICE

OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS TO CERTAIN FACILITIES.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or

otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for the National

Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3 of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), may be obligated or expended to move or

relocate the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of

Homeland Security to any facility other than a facility owned by the

Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 503. FUNDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED WITH AND

BY THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) In General.–Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United

States Code, is amended by inserting after section 421 the following:

“Sec. 421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with

and by the National Reconnaissance Office

“(a) Use of Appropriated Funds.–The Director of the National

Reconnaissance Office may use appropriated funds available to the

National Reconnaissance Office for intelligence and communications

purposes to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries

for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National

Reconnaissance Office.

“(b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.–The Director of

the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds other than

appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign

countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the

National Reconnaissance Office without regard for the provisions of law

relating to the expenditure of United States Government funds, except

that–

“(1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part,

by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a

purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds;

“(2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be

used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items

that are sold; and

“(3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be

used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit of

the United States.

“(c) Reports.–

“(1) Use of appropriated funds.–Any funds expended under

the authority of subsection (a) shall be reported, pursuant to

the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), to–

“(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the

Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on

Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the

Senate; and

“(B) the Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the

Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

“(2) Use of funds other than appropriated funds.–Funds

expended under the authority of subsection (b) shall be

reported to the committees described in paragraph (1) pursuant

to procedures jointly agreed upon by such committees and the

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of sections at the beginning of

such subchapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to

section 421 the following:

“421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by

the National Reconnaissance Office.”.

SEC. 504. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION CASE DATA.

Section 512A(b)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

3111a(b)(6)) is amended by striking “country affiliation” and

inserting “terrorist organization”.

SEC. 505. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended–

(1) in subsection (a)–

(A) in paragraph (2), by striking “; and” and

inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph

(4); and

new paragraph (3):

“(3) identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to

the Department of the Treasury; and”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c) Office of Counterintelligence.–There is established, within

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of

Counterintelligence, which shall be responsible for implementing the

policies and procedures across the bureaus of the Department of the

Treasury required to carry out the counterintelligence responsibilities

described in subsection (a).”.

SEC. 506. MODIFICATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE

AND ANALYSIS.

Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is

amended–

(1) in subsection (d)–

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “in support”

and all that follows through “of the homeland.” and

inserting “pertaining to foreign threats to the

homeland, as determined by the Secretary.”;

(B) in paragraph (2)–

(i) by striking “terrorist attacks

within” and inserting “foreign threats to”;

and

(ii) by striking “attacks” each place it

appears and inserting “threats”;

and other” and inserting “foreign”;

(D) in paragraph (6), by striking “terrorist

attacks against” and inserting “foreign threats to”;

(E) by striking paragraphs (7), (17), and (23), and

redesignating paragraphs (8), (9), (10), (11), (12),

(13), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20), (21), and

(22) as paragraphs (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12),

(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), and (20),

respectively;

(F) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by

striking “threats of terrorism” and inserting

“foreign threats”;

(G) in paragraph (9), as so redesignated, by

striking “threats of terrorism in” and inserting

“foreign threats to”; and

(H) in paragraph (12), as so redesignated, by

striking “, other agencies” and all that follows

through “by the Department,”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:

“(h) Collection of Intelligence and Information.–In carrying out

the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary pursuant to this

section, the personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall

liaise and share intelligence and other information between federal

agencies (including the components of the Department), State, local, or

tribal governments, and the private sector.

“(i) Prohibition.–

“(1) United states person defined.–In this subsection,

the term `United States person’ means–

“(A) a United States citizen;

“(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence

and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;

“(C) an unincorporated association substantially

composed of United States citizens or permanent

resident aliens; or

“(D) a corporation incorporated in the United

States, except for a corporation directed and

controlled by 1 or more foreign governments.

“(2) In general.–Notwithstanding any other provision of

law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage in

the collection of information or intelligence targeting any

United States person, or any clandestine collection.

“(j) Intelligence Defined.–In this section, the term

`intelligence’ has the meaning given the terms foreign intelligence and

counterintelligence, as defined paragraphs (2) and (3) of the National

Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003(2),(3)).”.

SEC. 507. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.)

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 23. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

“The Director of the National Security Agency shall–

“(1) provide overall direction for and coordination of the

collection and analysis of signals intelligence by elements of

the intelligence community authorized to undertake such

collection and analysis; and

“(2) in coordination with other departments, agencies, and

elements of the United States Government that are authorized to

undertake such collection, ensure that–

“(A) the most effective use is made of resources;

and

“(B) appropriate account is taken of the risks to

the United States and those involved in such

collection.”.

TITLE VI–GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 601. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY POSITIONS.

(a) Appointment of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency.–Section 104B(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by inserting “, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate” after “President”.

(b) Appointment of Deputy Director of the National Security

Agency.–Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50

U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security Agency,

who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate.”.

Counterintelligence.–

(1) In general.–Section 215(c) of the Department of Energy

Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b(c)) is amended to read as

follows:

“(c) Director.–

“(1) Appointment.–The head of the Office shall be the

Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,

who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate. The Director of the Office shall

report directly to the Secretary.

“(2) Term.–

“(A) In general.–The Director shall serve for a

term of 6 years.

“(B) Reappointment.–The Director shall be

eligible for reappointment for 1 or more terms.

“(3) Qualifications.–The Director shall–

“(A) be an employee in the Senior Executive

Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior

National Intelligence Service, or any other Service

that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director

of National Intelligence, considers appropriate; and

“(B) have substantial expertise in matters

relating to the intelligence community, including

foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.”.

(2) Effective date.–The amendment made by this section

shall take effect on January 21, 2029.

(d) Appointment of Director of the National Counterterrorism

Center.–Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by striking “President, by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate” and inserting “Director of National

Intelligence”.

(e) Appointment of Director the National Counterintelligence and

Security Center.–Section 902(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 3382(a)) is amended by striking

“President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate” and

inserting “Director of National Intelligence”.

(f) Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence.–Section 103C(a) of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3028(a)) is amended by striking “by the President, by

and with the advice and consent of the Senate” and inserting “by the

Director of National Intelligence”.

(g) Appointment of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence

Agency.–Section 20(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949

(50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is amended by striking “by the President, by and

with the advice and consent of the Senate” and inserting “by the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency”.

SEC. 602. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF NONPUBLICLY AVAILABLE

INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS.

(a) Procedures.–

(1) In general.–Title V of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end

the following new section:

“SEC. 519. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF NONPUBLICLY AVAILABLE

INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS.

“(a) Procedures.–The head of each element of the intelligence

community, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,

shall develop and maintain procedures for that element to respond to

unmasking requests.

“(b) Requirements.–The procedures required by subsection (a)

shall ensure, at a minimum, the following:

“(1) Each unmasking request submitted to a disseminating

element shall include, in writing–

“(A) information that identifies the disseminated

intelligence report containing the United States person

identifying information requested;

“(B) the date the unmasking request was submitted

to the disseminating element;

“(C) the name, title, and organization of the

individual who submitted the unmasking request in an

official capacity;

“(D) the name, title, and organization of each

individual who will receive the United States person

identifying information sought by the unmasking

request; and

“(E) a fact-based justification describing why

such United States person identifying information is

required by each individual who will receive the

information to carry out the duties of the individual.

“(2) An unmasking request may only be approved by the head

of the disseminating element or by officers or employees of

such element to whom the head has specifically delegated such

authority. When the disseminating element is not the

originating element of the United States person identifying

information, the head of the disseminating element shall obtain

the concurrence of the head or designee of the originating

element before approving the unmasking request.

“(3) The head of the disseminating element shall retain

records on all unmasking requests, including the disposition of

such requests, for not less than 10 years.

“(4) The records described in paragraph (3) shall include,

with respect to each approved unmasking request–

“(A) the name and title of the individual of the

disseminating element who approved the request; and

“(B) the fact-based justification for the request.

“(5) The procedures shall include an exception that–

“(A) allows for the immediate disclosure of United

States person identifying information in the event of

exigent circumstances or when a delay would likely

result in the significant loss of intelligence; and

“(B) requires that promptly after such disclosure,

the recipient of the United States person identifying

information make a written unmasking request with

respect to such information.

“(6) If an unmasking request is made during a period

beginning on the date of a general election for President and

ending on the date on which such President is inaugurated–

“(A) the documentation required by paragraph (1)

shall include whether–

“(i) the requesting entity knows or

reasonably believes that any United States

person identifying information sought is of an

individual who is a member of the transition

team as identified by an apparent successful

candidate for the office of President or Vice

President; or

“(ii) based on the intelligence report to

which the unmasking request pertains, the

disseminating element or the originating

element knows or reasonably believes that any

United States person identifying information

sought is of an individual who is a member of

the transition team as identified by an

apparent successful candidate for the office of

President or Vice President;

“(B) the approval made pursuant to paragraph (2)

of an unmasking request that contains United States

person identifying information described in

subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the concurrence of

the general counsel of the disseminating element (or,

in the absence of the general counsel, the principal

deputy general counsel, or, as applicable, the senior

Departmental legal officer supporting the disseminating

element) that the dissemination of such United States

person identifying information is in accordance with

the procedures required by subsection (a); and

“(C) consistent with due regard for the protection

from unauthorized disclosure of classified information

relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods

or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of

the disseminating element shall notify the chairmen and

ranking minority members of the congressional

intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority

leader of the House of Representatives, and the

majority leader and minority leader of the Senate of an

approval described in subparagraph (B) not later than

14 days after the date of such approval.

“(7) If an unmasking request concerns a nominee for or the

holder of a Federal office, a member of a transition team as

identified by an eligible candidate for the office of the

President, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,

or an individual nominated by the President to be a Justice of

the Supreme Court of the United States, and such unmasking

request is approved, the head of the disseminating element

shall submit the documentation for the request to the

congressional intelligence committees not later than 14 days

after the date of such approval.

“(c) Annual Reports.–Not later than March 1 of each year, the

head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a report documenting, with

respect to the year covered by the report–

“(1) the total number of unmasking requests received by

that element;

“(2) of such total number, the number of requests

approved;

“(3) of such total number, the number of requests denied;

and

“(4) for each number calculated under paragraphs (1)

through (3), the number disaggregated by requesting entity.

“(d) Certain Procedures Regarding Congressional Identity

Information.–With respect to the dissemination of congressional

identity information, the head of each element of the intelligence

community shall carry out this section in accordance with annex A of

Intelligence Community Directive 112, or successor annex or directive.

“(e) Effect on Minimization Procedures.–The requirements of this

section are in addition to–

“(1) any minimization procedures established under the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801

et seq.);

“(2) any procedures governing the collection, retention,

or dissemination of information concerning United States

persons established under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001

note; relating to United States intelligence activities) or

successor order; and

“(3) any other provision of statute or Executive order the

Director of National Intelligence considers relevant.

“(f) Definitions .–In this section:

“(1) Apparent successful candidate.–The term `apparent

successful candidate’ means any apparent successful candidate

for the office of President or Vice President as determined

pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C.

102 note).

“(2) Candidate; federal office.–The terms `candidate’ and

`Federal office’ have the meanings given those terms in section

301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C.

30101).

“(3) Congressional identity information.–The term

`congressional identity information’ means information that

identifies, by name or by individually identifying titles or

characteristics–

“(A) any current Member of the Senate or the House

of Representatives;

“(B) any current staff officer for any Senator or

Representative, whether paid or unpaid; or

“(C) any current staff officer of any committee of

the Senate or the House of Representatives, whether

paid or unpaid.

“(4) Disseminating element.–The term `disseminating

element’ means an element of the intelligence community that

disseminated an intelligence report subject to an unmasking

request.

“(5) Eligible candidate.–The term `eligible candidate’

has the meaning given that term in section 3(h)(4) of the

Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).

“(6) Originating element.–The term `originating element’

means an element of the intelligence community that originated

information in a disseminated intelligence report subject to an

unmasking request.

“(7) Requesting entity.–The term `requesting entity’

means an entity of–

“(A) the United State Government; or

“(B) a State, local, Tribal, or territorial

government.

“(8) United states person.–The term `United States

person’ means a United States person as defined in section 101

of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.

1801) or section 3.5 of Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001

note; relating to United States intelligence activities).

“(9) United states person identifying information.–

“(A) In general.–The term `United States person

identifying information’ (commonly referred to as

`United States Person Information’)–

“(i) means information that is reasonably

likely to identify one or more specific United

States persons; and

“(ii) includes a single item of

information and information that, when combined

with other information, is reasonably likely to

identify one or more specific United States

persons.

“(B) Determination.–The determination of whether

information is reasonably likely to identify one or

more specific United States persons may require

assessment by a trained intelligence professional on a

case-by-case basis.

“(10) Unmasking request.–The term `unmasking request’

means a request to gain access to nonpublic United States

person identifying information concerning a known unconsenting

United States person that was omitted from a disseminated

intelligence report by the originating element.”.

(2) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents preceding

section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item

relating to section 518 the following new item:

“Sec. 519. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available

information concerning United States

persons.”.

(b) Development of Procedures.–The head of each element of the

intelligence community shall develop the procedures required by section

519(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection

(a)(1), by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of

this Act.

enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall make

publicly available the procedures for each element of the intelligence

community required by section 519(a) of the National Security Act of

1947, as added by subsection (a)(1).

SEC. 603. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.

(a) In General.–The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001

et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 1115. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.

“(a) Definitions.–In this section:

“(1) All-source intelligence product.–The term `all-

source intelligence product’–

“(A) means any intelligence product published by

an element of the intelligence community using multiple

types of intelligence for purposes of providing an

analytic assessment or situational update; and

“(B) does not include a product containing purely

law enforcement information.

“(2) Assumption.–The term `assumption’ means a

supposition used to frame or support an argument.

“(3) Judgment.–The term `judgment’ means a conclusion

based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and

assumptions.

“(b) Establishment.–

“(1) In general.–The production of any all-source

intelligence product shall adhere to–

“(A) the analytic standards described in

subsection (c); and

“(B) any guidance or policy issued under paragraph

(2).

“(2) Guidance and policy.–The Director of National

Intelligence or any other head of an element of the

intelligence community may issue guidance or policy that

expands upon the standards described in subsection (c) as such

head considers appropriate, except that any such guidance or

policy shall not contradict or otherwise circumvent such

standards.

“(c) Analytic Standards.–The standards described in this

subsection are the following:

“(1) Objectivity.–In producing any all-source

intelligence product, an analyst–

“(A) shall–

“(i) perform the analyst’s functions with

objectivity and with awareness of their own

assumptions and reasoning;

“(ii) employ reasoning techniques and

practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate

bias;

“(iii) be alert to influence by existing

analytic positions or judgments; and

“(iv) consider alternative perspectives

and contrary information; and

“(B) shall not be unduly constrained by previous

judgments when new developments indicate a modification

is necessary.

“(2) Independent of political consideration.–Any all-

source intelligence product shall not be–

“(A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a

particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or

“(B) influenced by the force of preference for a

particular policy.

“(3) Timely.–Any all-source intelligence product shall be

disseminated in time for the product to be actionable by

customers.

“(4) Based on all relevant information available.–Any

all-source intelligence product shall be informed by all

relevant information available.

“(5) Analytic tradecraft standards.–Any all-source

intelligence product shall adhere to the following analytic

tradecraft standards:

“(A) Sourcing.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall–

“(i) identify and properly describe the

quality and credibility of underlying sources,

data, and methodologies upon which judgments

are based; and

“(ii) use source descriptors in accordance

with sourcing guidance prescribed by the

Director of National Intelligence.

“(B) Uncertainty.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall–

“(i) indicate and explain the basis for

the uncertainties associated with major

analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood

of occurrence of an event or development, and

the analyst’s confidence in the basis for the

judgment;

“(ii) note causes of uncertainty,

including assumptions and gaps, and explain how

uncertainties affect analysis; and

“(iii) for expressions of likelihood or

probability, use one of the sets of terms

defined in Intelligence Community Directive

203.

“(C) Distinguishing.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall–

“(i) clearly distinguish statements that

convey underlying intelligence information used

in analysis from statements that convey

assumptions or judgments;

“(ii) state an assumption explicitly when

the assumption serves as the linchpin of an

argument or when the assumption bridges key

information gaps;

“(iii) explain the implications for

judgments if assumptions prove to be incorrect;

and

“(iv) as appropriate, identify indicators

that, if detected, would alter judgments.

“(D) Incorporate analysis of alternatives.–Any

all-source intelligence product shall–

“(i) identify and assess plausible

alternative hypotheses;

“(ii) in discussing alternatives, address

factors such as associated assumptions,

likelihood, or implications related to United

States interests; and

“(iii) identify indicators that, if

detected, would affect the likelihood of

identified alternatives.

“(E) Relevance.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall provide information and insight on United

States national security issues.

“(F) Argumentation.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall–

“(i) present a clear main analytic message

up front;

“(ii) in the case of a product containing

multiple judgments, have a main analytic

message that is drawn collectively from those

judgments; and

“(iii) be effectively supported by

relevant intelligence information and coherent

reasoning.

“(G) Analytic line.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall–

“(i) state how its major judgments on a

topic are consistent with or represent a change

from major judgments in previously published

analysis, or that it represent initial coverage

of a topic; and

“(ii) fully consider and bring to the

attention of customers significant differences

in analytic judgment, such as between two

analytic elements of the intelligence

community.

“(H) Accuracy.–Any all-source intelligence

product shall–

“(i) apply expertise and logic to make the

most accurate judgments and assessments

possible, based on the information available

and known information gaps; and

“(ii) express judgments as clearly and

precisely as possible, reducing ambiguity by

addressing the likelihood, timing, and nature

of the outcome or development.

“(I) Visuals.–Any all-source intelligence product

shall incorporate effective visual information as

appropriate. Any content of any all-source intelligence

product depicted visually shall adhere to the analytic

standards described in this subsection.

“(d) Required Information.–

“(1) In general.–Except as provided in paragraph (2), any

all-source intelligence product shall include a section

dedicated to explaining the tradecraft related to the analytic

tradecraft standards described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C),

(D), and (G) of subsection (c)(5).

“(2) Exceptions.–The requirement of paragraph (1) shall

not apply to–

“(A) any all source-intelligence product less than

300 words; or

“(B) any all-source intelligence product produced

for the President’s Daily Brief.

“(e) Tracking Adherence to Analytic Standards.–The Director of

National Intelligence and each other head of an element of the

intelligence community shall–

“(1) develop metrics for evaluating the performance of

their respective element in adhering to the analytic standards

described in subsection (c); and

“(2) use such metrics to evaluate individual performance,

develop analytic workforce training, and inform Congress on

matters related to analytic performance.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of such Act is

amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 1115. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence

products.”.

SEC. 604. LIMITATION ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT

ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ENTITIES.

(a) In General.–Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 314. LIMITATION ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT

ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ENTITIES.

“Amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management

Account may not be obligated or expended to provide financial or in-

kind support for the purposes of analytic collaboration, including for

any study, research, or assessment, to–

“(1) an entity that is described in section 501(c)(3) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation

under section 501(a) of such Code, or otherwise describes

itself as a think tank in any public document, that has

received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support

from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that

is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance; or

“(2) an entity that is organized for research or for

engaging in advocacy in areas such as public policy or

political strategy that has received or expects to receive any

financial or in-kind support from a government, or an entity

affiliated with the military or intelligence services, of–

“(A) the People’s Republic of China;

“(B) the Russian Federation;

“(C) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

“(D) the Islamic Republic of Iran;

“(E) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; or

“(F) the Republic of Cuba.”.

(b) Conforming Amendment.–Section 103B(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C.

3027(e)) is amended by inserting “and subject to section 314” after

“control of the Director of National Intelligence”.

matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by inserting after

the item relating to section 313 the following:

“Sec. 314. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management

Account funds for certain entities.”.

SEC. 605. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP

PROGRAM.

(a) In General.–Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1002 the

following:

“SEC. 1003. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP

PROGRAM.

“(a) In General.–There is established a program (in this section

referred to as the `Program’) under which selected employees of the

intelligence community may train at certain nongovernmental entities as

technology fellows.

“(b) Designation.–The program shall be known as the `Ben Sasse

Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program’.

“(c) Agreements.–

“(1) Nongovernmental entities.–Each head of an element of

the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) shall

seek to enter into agreements with nongovernmental entities

with experience in cutting-edge technology under which such

entities may host technology fellows under the Program.

“(2) Selected employees.–For each employee of an element

of the intelligence community selected for participation in the

Program in accordance with subsection (e), the head of the

element of the intelligence community that selected the

employee shall provide for a written agreement among that

element of the intelligence community, the nongovernmental

entity concerned, and the employee. The agreement shall–

“(A) require that the employee of the element of

the intelligence community, upon completion of the

fellowship, serve in that element, or elsewhere in the

intelligence community if approved by the head of the

element that selected the employee, for a period equal

to twice the length of the fellowship;

“(B) provide that if the employee of the element

of the intelligence community fails to carry out the

agreement, the employee shall be liable to the United

States for payment of all expenses of the fellowship,

unless that failure was for good and sufficient reason,

as determined by the head of the element that selected

the employee; and

“(C) contain language ensuring that the employee

of the element of the intelligence community does not

improperly use information that the employee knows

relates to an acquisition or procurement of the element

of the intelligence community for the benefit or

advantage of the nongovernmental entity.

“(3) Elements described.–The elements of the intelligence

community described in this paragraph are the following:

“(A) The Central Intelligence Agency.

“(B) The National Security Agency.

“(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

“(D) The National Reconnaissance Office.

“(E) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

“(d) Board.–

“(1) In general.–There is established a board for the

Program (in this section referred to as the `Board’).

“(2) Membership.–The Board shall be composed of the

directors of science and technology, or equivalents, of the

elements of the intelligence community described in subsection

(c)(3).

“(3) Co-chairs.–The members of the Board shall serve as

co-chairs of the Board.

“(4) Selection criteria.–The Board shall establish

selection criteria for the participation of employees in the

Program.

“(e) Selection.–Each year, each head of an element of the

intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3) shall select two

employees of such element to participate in the Program.

“(f) Term.–An employee selected for participation in the Program

may serve for one year as a technology fellow at a nongovernmental

entity that has entered into an agreement under subsection (c)(1) with

the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of such Act is

amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1002 the

following:

“Sec. 1003. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship

Program.”.

SEC. 606. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICE AT THE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

(a) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Department.–The term “Department” means the

Department of Commerce.

(2) Secretary.–The term “Secretary” means the Secretary

of Commerce.

(b) Establishment of Intelligence Community Counterintelligence

Office.–

(1) Agreement with secretary of commerce.–The Director of

National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the

National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall seek to

enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the

Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary shall

establish within the Department, within the Office of

Secretary, an office, which shall be known as the

“Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office”, in

accordance with this section.

(2) Location.–The Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office established pursuant to this section

shall be physically located within the headquarters of the

Department and within reasonable proximity to the offices of

the leadership of the Department.

(3) Security.–The Director of the National

Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be responsible

for the protection of classified information and for the

establishment and enforcement of all security-related controls

within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(1) Director.–

(A) Appointment.–There shall be at the head of the

Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a

Director who is appointed by the Director of National

Intelligence. The Director of the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office shall–

(i) be supervised and subject to

performance evaluations by the Director of the

National Counterintelligence and Security

Center, in consultation with the Secretary;

(ii) be an employee of the intelligence

community with significant counterintelligence

experience; and

(iii) serve for a period of 3 years.

(B) Responsibilities.–The Director of the

Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall

carry out the following responsibilities:

(i) Serving as the head of the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office, with

supervisory responsibility for the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office and any

other personnel assigned to the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office.

(ii) Advising the Secretary on

counterintelligence and intelligence

information.

(iii) Ensuring that counterintelligence

threat information and, as appropriate,

finished intelligence on topics related to the

functions of the Department, are provided to

appropriate personnel of the department or

agency without delay.

(iv) Ensuring critical intelligence

relevant to the Secretary is requested and

disseminated in a timely manner.

(v) Establishing, as appropriate,

mechanisms for collaboration through which

Department subject matter experts, including

those without security clearances, can share

information and expertise with the intelligence

community.

(vi) Correlating and evaluating

counterintelligence threats identified within

intelligence community reporting, in

coordination with the National

Counterintelligence and Security Center, and

providing appropriate dissemination of such

intelligence to officials of the Department

with a need-to-know.

(vii) Advising the Secretary on methods to

improve the counterintelligence posture of the

Department.

(viii) Where appropriate, supporting the

Department’s leadership in engaging with the

National Security Council.

(ix) In coordination with the National

Counterintelligence and Security Center,

establishing counterintelligence partnerships

to improve the counterintelligence defense of

the Department.

(2) Deputy director.–There shall be within the

Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy

Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination

with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director

shall–

(A) be supervised and subject to performance

evaluations by the Secretary, in consultation with the

Director of the National Counterintelligence and

Security Center;

(B) be a current or former employee of the

Department with significant experience within the

Department; and

(3) Other employees.–

(A) Joint duty assignment.–There shall be within

the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office

such other employees as the Director of National

Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary,

determines appropriate. Employment at the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office is an intelligence

community joint duty assignment. A permanent change of

station to the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office shall be for a period of not

less than 2 years.

(B) Supervision.–The Director of the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office shall be

responsible for the supervision and management of

employees assigned to the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office, including employees

assigned by program elements of the intelligence

community and other Federal departments and agencies,

as appropriate.

reimbursement.–The Director of National Intelligence

shall reimburse a program element of the intelligence

community or a Federal department or agency for any

permanent change of station employee assigned to the

Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office from

amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Office of

the Director of National Intelligence.

(D) Operation under authority of director of

national intelligence.–Employees assigned to the

Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office under

this paragraph shall operate under the authorities of

the Director of National Intelligence for the duration

of their assignment or period of employment within the

Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office,

except for temporary duty assignment employees.

(E) Incentive pay.–

(i) In general.–An employee who accepts

employment at the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office during the 120-day

period after the date of the establishment of

the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence

Office shall receive an incentive payment,

which shall be payable by the Director of

National Intelligence, in an amount equal to 10

percent of the base annual pay of the employee.

Such an employee who completes 2 years of

service in the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office may receive an

incentive payment in an amount equal to 10

percent of the base annual pay of the employee

if the Director of the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office determines the

performance of the employee is exceptional.

(ii) Eligibility.–An employee is only

eligible for an incentive payment under clause

(i) if the employee enters into an agreement

with the Director of National Intelligence to

serve in the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office for a period of at

least 2 years.

(d) Funding.–To the extent and in such amounts as specifically

provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in

this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may expend such

sums as are authorized within the National Intelligence Program of the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence for–

(1) the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal

building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational

requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence

Office;

(2) the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings,

secure audio and video communications, and collaboration

between employees of the Department and the intelligence

community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;

(3) the provision of other information technology systems

and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use

by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence

Office;

(4) the assignment of employees of the intelligence

community to support the operation of the Intelligence

Community Counterintelligence Office; and

(5) the provision of other personal services necessary for

the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence

Office.

(e) Deadline for Establishment of the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office.–

(1) Establishment.–Not later than January 1, 2028, the

Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in

accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office within the Department.

(2) Report.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence

shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the

Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the

plan to establish the Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1). Such

report shall include the costs and schedule associated with

establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence

Office.

SEC. 607. COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS AS A NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.

(a) Findings.–Congress finds the following:

(1) In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations,

such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated

investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and

impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from

Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s

Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that

these estimates are conservative and only includes losses

reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(2) According to the Consumer Federation of America,

Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year to

online scams.

(3) Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and

sanctions designations issued by the Department of the Treasury

have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious

cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign

governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia groups

whose activities present a threat to the economic and national

security of the United States.

(4) Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely

extensively on communications and financial services of United

States companies, enabling the organizations’ targeting of

vulnerable Americans.

(5) Financial insecurity generated by foreign malicious

cybercriminal organizations presents a counterintelligence

threat to the United States intelligence community.

(b) Sense of Congress.–

(1) In general.–It is the sense of Congress that–

(A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations,

and foreign affiliates associated with those

organizations, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors

and are valid targets for intelligence operations under

existing intelligence authorities; and

(B) the Director of National Intelligence should

treat collection, analysis, and disruption toward

hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence

priority as part of the National Intelligence

Priorities Framework.

(2) Hostile foreign cyber actors.–The hostile foreign

cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a minimum,

the following:

(A) Prince Group.

(B) Huione Group.

(D) Jin Bei Group.

(E) Funnull Technology Inc.

(F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand

Company Limited.

(G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.

(H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC.

(1) In general.–Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director of National

Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a report on

hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam centers.

(2) Contents.–The report required by paragraph (1) shall

include the following:

(A) An identification of the individuals and

entities operating as hostile foreign cyber actors,

including foreign scam centers, that pose the most

significant threat.

(B) An identification of the locations from which

the individuals and entities identified under

subparagraph (A) operate.

and techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including

foreign scam centers, commonly use, including reliance

on any products or services subject to the jurisdiction

of the United States.

(D) A description of any relationships between the

individuals and entities that operate as hostile

foreign cyber actors, including foreign scam centers,

and their governments or countries of origin that could

impede the ability to counter threats from such

centers.

(E) An identification of communications and

financial services providers subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States that provide enabling

services to individuals and entities identified under

subparagraph (A).

(F) A description of any relationships that the

individuals and entities identified under subparagraph

(A) have with transnational organized crime groups.

(3) Form; public availability.–The report required by

paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may

include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the report

shall be made available to the public.

SEC. 608. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR

FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.

(a) In General.–Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50

U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 519. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR

FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.

“If an element of the intelligence community makes a criminal

referral to the Department of Justice regarding a current or former

employee of any element of the intelligence community, the general

counsel of the element of the intelligence community that made the

referral shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the

referral on the date such referral is made and provide to the

congressional intelligence committees a summary of the referral.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting

after the item relating to section 518 the following:

“Sec. 519. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or

former intelligence community employees.”.

SEC. 609. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES OF

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Definitions.–Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3003) is amended–

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “includes” and

inserting “means”; and

(2) in paragraph (5)–

(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by

striking “refer to all” and inserting “means”;

(B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows:

“(B) involves foreign threats to the United

States, its people, property, or interests.”.

(b) Scope of Intelligence Sharing Responsibilities.–Section

102A(f)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is amended, in the first

sentence, by inserting “, and other Federal agencies as the Director

considers appropriate,” after “community”.

SEC. 610. PROHIBITION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ADVERSARY

UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES.

(a) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Covered foreign country.–The term “covered foreign

country” means any of the following:

(A) The People’s Republic of China.

(B) The Russian Federation.

(D) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(2) Covered foreign entity.–The term “covered foreign

entity” means an entity that is domiciled in a covered foreign

country, or subject to influence or control by the government

of a covered foreign country as determined by the Secretary of

Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense, and any

subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.

(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system.–The term

“covered unmanned ground vehicle system”–

(A) means a mechanical device that–

(i) is capable of locomotion, navigation,

or movement on the ground; and

(ii) operates at a distance from one or

more operators or supervisors based on commands

or in response to sensor data, or through any

combination thereof; and

(B) includes–

(i) remote surveillance vehicles,

autonomous patrol technologies, mobile

robotics, and humanoid robots; and

(ii) the vehicle, its payload, and any

external device used to control the vehicle.

(b) Prohibition on Procurement of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle

Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.–

(1) In general.–Except as provided under paragraph (2),

the head of an element of the intelligence community may not

procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is

manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.

(2) Exemption.–The heads of elements of the intelligence

community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1)

if the procurement is required in the national interest of the

United States and–

(A) is for the sole purposes of research,

evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for

electronic warfare, information warfare operations,

cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground

vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle

system technology;

(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting

counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities,

protective missions, or Federal criminal or national

security investigations, including forensic

examinations, or for electronic warfare, information

warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an

unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned

ground vehicle technology; or

procured or as modified after procurement but before

operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download

data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses

no national security cybersecurity risks as determined

by the exempting official.

Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.–

(1) Prohibition.–

(A) In general.–Beginning on the date that is one

year after the date of the enactment of this Act and

except as provided in paragraph (2), no element of the

intelligence community may operate a covered unmanned

ground vehicle system manufactured or assembled by a

covered foreign entity.

(B) Applicability to contracted services.–The

prohibition under subparagraph (A) applies to any

covered unmanned ground vehicle systems that are being

used by any element of the intelligence community

through the method of contracting for the services of

covered unmanned ground vehicle systems.

(2) Exemption.–The heads of the elements of the

intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under

paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national

interest of the United States and–

(A) is for the sole purposes of research,

evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for

electronic warfare, information warfare operations,

cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground

vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle

system technology;

(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting

counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities,

protective missions, or Federal criminal or national

security investigations, including forensic

examinations, or for electronic warfare, information

warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an

unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned

ground vehicle system technology; or

procured or as modified after procurement but before

operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download

data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses

no national security cybersecurity risks as determined

by the exempting official.

(d) Prohibition on Use of Federal Funds for Procurement and

Operation Within the Intelligence Community of Covered Unmanned Ground

Vehicle Systems Manufactured by Certain Foreign Entities.–

(1) In general.–Beginning on the date that is one year

after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as

provided in paragraph (2), no Federal funds awarded to an

element of the intelligence community through a contract,

grant, or cooperative agreement, or otherwise made available

may be used–

(A) to procure a covered unmanned ground vehicle

system that is manufactured or assembled by a covered

foreign entity; or

(B) in connection with the operation of such a

robot or unmanned ground vehicle system.

(2) Exemption.–The heads of elements of the intelligence

community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1)

if the procurement or operation is required in the national

interest of the United States and–

(A) is for the sole purposes of research,

evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for

electronic warfare, information warfare operations,

cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground

vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle

system technology;

(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting

counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities,

protective missions, or Federal criminal or national

security investigations, including forensic

examinations, or for electronic warfare, information

warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an

unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned

ground vehicle system technology; or

procured or as modified after procurement but before

operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download

data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses

no national security cybersecurity risks as determined

by the exempting official.

SEC. 611. CHINA-TAIWAN STRATEGIC WARNING TASK FORCE.

(a) Establishment.–Not later than 60 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall establish

a task force to be known as the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task

Force (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”) to lead the

efforts of the intelligence community with respect to providing

indications and warning of any military aggression by the People’s

Republic of China against Taiwan.

(b) Objectives.–The objectives of the Task Force are the

following:

(1) The synchronization of all intelligence community

efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning,

including the generation of indicators and development of

collection requirements related to such indicators.

(2) The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan

indications and warning and the development of analytic

methodologies for use across the intelligence community in

conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and

warning.

(3) The development and implementation of information

technology solutions to synchronize the access of the

intelligence community to information relating to indications

and warning.

members (or their designees):

(1) The Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and

Security.

(3) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(5) The Director for Intelligence for the United States

Indo-Pacific Command.

(6) The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence

Agency.

(7) The Director of the National Security Agency.

(8) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for

Intelligence and Analysis.

(9) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and

Research.

(10) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence

community that the Director of National Intelligence and the

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

determine appropriate.

(d) Leadership; Organization; Meetings.–

(1) Co-chairs.–The Director of National Intelligence (or a

designee of the Director) and the Undersecretary of Defense for

Intelligence and Security (or a designee of the Undersecretary)

shall be co-chairs of the Task Force.

(2) Working groups.–The Task Force may create subordinate

working groups as determined by the co-chairs.

(3) Meeting frequency.–The Task Force shall meet regularly

but not less than quarterly.

(e) Staffing.–

(1) In general.–The Task Force may hire staff and create

joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task

Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.

(2) Agency liaison.–Each member listed in subsection (b)

shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency

concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such liaison

shall be responsible for coordinating the participation and

support of the agency concerned to the Task Force.

(f) Initial Reports.–. Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense

committees a report on the status of the Task Force, including–

(1) a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community

with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning;

(2) a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a

common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by the

intelligence community against such indicators;

(3) a description of the resources provided by each Task

Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan

indications and warning, disaggregated by–

(A) dollars spent or planned to be spent during

fiscal year 2027 ; and

(B) total full-time equivalent personnel; and

(4) recommendations to improve the collection and analysis

of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan

indications and warning.

(g) Sunset.–The provisions of this section shall terminate on the

date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 612. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CHINESE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES.

(a) Prohibition on Use by Intelligence Community.–

(1) In general.–Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section

6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

(50 U.S.C. 3334m note; division F of Public Law 119-60) is

amended to read as follows:

“(1) Covered application.–The term `covered application’

means–

“(A) the DeepSeek application or any successor

application or service; or

“(B) any product or service from any entity of the

People’s Republic of China that is included on–

“(i) the Entity List maintained by the

Bureau of Industry and Security of the

Department of Commerce;

“(ii) the list (sometimes known as the

`Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex

Companies List’) maintained by the Office of

Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the

Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as

amended by Executive Order 14032 (50 U.S.C.

1701 note; relating to addressing the threat

from securities investments that finance

certain companies of the People’s Republic of

China), or any successor order; or

“(iii) the list of Chinese military

companies required under section 1260H of the

William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10

U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283) and

maintained by the Department of Defense.”.

(2) Conforming amendment.–The heading for such section is

amended by striking “deepseek” and inserting “products and

services from people’s republic of China”.

(b) Limitation on Procurement by Intelligence Community.–Section

414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (28

U.S.C. 532 note; division X of Public Law 117-103) is amended–

(1) in the section heading, by striking “by federal bureau

of investigation”;

(2) in subsection (a)–

(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking

“Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” and

inserting “head of an element of the intelligence

community”;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking “Federal Bureau

of Investigation” and inserting “element”; and

designee of the Director)” and inserting “head”;

(3) in subsection (b), by striking “the Director (or a

designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a

recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director

shall” and inserting “the head of an element of the

intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to

subsection (a)(3), the head shall”;

(4) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as

follows:

“(2) People’s republic of China product or service.–The

term `People’s Republic of China product or service’ means–

“(A) an information or communication technology

product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and

designed, developed, or maintained by a firm that is

domiciled in China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or

“(B) an information or communication technology

product or service provided or manufactured by–

“(i) an entity that is fully or partially

owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected

to, the government of China; or

“(ii) an entity included on the list

submitted by the Director of National

Intelligence under section 6706(c) of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2026 (division F of Public Law 119-60; 139

Stat. 1648).”.

SEC. 613. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OFFENSIVE

CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

(a) In General.–The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001

et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 1115. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OFFENSIVE

CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

“(a) In General.–An element of the intelligence community may not

provide intelligence or support for an offensive cyber operation

conducted by a nongovernmental entity, unless such an entity–

“(1) is conducting the offensive cyber operation on behalf

of such element and is operating under the authorities and

supervision of such element; or

“(2) is otherwise authorized by the President of the

United States to conduct the offensive cyber operation.

“(b) Definitions.–In this section:

“(1) Nongovernmental entity.–The term `nongovernmental

entity’ means any entity that is not an entity of the United

States Government.

“(2) Offensive cyber operation.–The term `offensive cyber

operation’ means any activity carried out in cyberspace, or any

associated preparatory action, that affects an information

system, network, or any other computer infrastructure that is

not owned or lawfully operated by the entity carrying out the

activity or action.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of such Act is

amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 1115. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive

cyber operations conducted by

nongovernmental entities.”.

SEC. 614. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.–Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 124. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY.

“(a) Definitions.–In this section:

“(1) Biological data.–The term `biological data’ means

multiomic information and other relevant information, including

associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function,

or process of a biological system, that is measured, collected,

or aggregated for analysis, including information from humans,

animals, plants, or microbes.

“(2) Biological intelligence.–The term `biological

intelligence’ includes the information collected or

disseminated by the intelligence community concerning

biological threats through genomic surveillance, immunological

monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic analysis, and

other scientific methodologies.

“(3) Biological threat.–The term `biological threat’

includes any naturally occurring infectious disease, engineered

pathogen, toxin, or other biological agent that poses a risk to

human, animal, or plant health or to the national security of

the United States.

“(b) Determination; Dissemination.–The Director of National

Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the

Director considers appropriate, shall, consistent with applicable

Federal law and Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to

United States intelligence activities)–

“(1) determine which United States agencies would benefit

from receiving anonymized biological data and biological

intelligence in support of detection, characterization, and

attribution of foreign biological threats; and

“(2) disseminate such anonymized biological data and

biological intelligence to agencies identified under paragraph

(1).

“(c) Standards; Databases.–Not later than 1 year after the date

of the enactment of this section, the Director of National

Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the

Director considers appropriate, shall–

“(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats

of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence are,

to the extent possible, consistent with standards used by other

United States agencies, including by–

“(A) providing for standardized data

categorization and tagging of biological data;

“(B) considering standardized scientific and

laboratory equipment and data collection methodologies;

and

“(C) minimizing collection of any biological data

that is likely to contain biological or genomic

information specific to any United States person,

including any derived data that is specific to any

United States person; and

“(2) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of

streamlined and unified accesses to databases of biological

intelligence collected by the intelligence community or the

Department of Defense.

“(d) Priority.–In carrying out subsections (b) and (c), the

Director of National Intelligence shall prioritize supporting

capabilities, including the development of technical tools, that enable

the early detection, characterization, and attribution of naturally

occurring, novel, or engineered pathogens that could threaten the

United States.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of such Act is

amended by inserting after the item relating to section 123 the

following:

“Sec. 124. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence

community.”.

SEC. 615. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.

(a) In General.–Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 304 the

following:

“SEC. 304A. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.

“(a) In General.–Except as may be necessary to conduct authorized

intelligence activities, a covered individual may not participate in a

prediction market on any topic relating to nonpublic information to

which the covered individual has access by virtue of being a covered

individual, during–

“(1) the period during which the covered individual is

employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence

community; or

“(2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which

the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by

such an element.

“(b) Policy.–Not later than 45 days after the date of the

enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall

issue a policy implementing the prohibition in subsection (a),

including–

“(1) establishing appropriate penalties for violating the

prohibition; and

“(2) providing notice to all covered individuals.

“(c) Definitions.–In this section:

“(1) Covered individual.–The term `covered individual’

means an employee or contractor, or a former employee or

contractor, of an element of the intelligence community who

holds a security clearance.

“(2) Prediction market.–The term `prediction market’

means a platform, company, or service that allows agreements,

contracts, transactions, or swaps between users over the

outcome of non-financial future events, such as sports,

military actions, and elections.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of contents of such Act is

amended by inserting after the item relating to section 304 the

following:

“Sec. 304A. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.”.

SEC. 616. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Oversight of Foreign Influence in Academia.–Section 5713 of

the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.

3369b) is repealed.

(b) Report on Efforts to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and Related

Items.–Section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note; Public Law 112-239) is amended

by striking subsection (e).

of the People’s Republic of China.–Section 7003 of the Energy Act of

2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is amended by striking subsection (d).

(d) Briefing on Protocols for Certain Intelligence Community

Employees and Dependents.–Section 605(g) of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3334k(g)) is amended

by striking paragraph (3).

(e) Program on Use of Intelligence Resources in Efforts to Sanction

Foreign Opioid Traffickers.–Section 7231 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act

(21 U.S.C. 2331) is amended–

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(f) Periodic Report on Positions in the Intelligence Community That

Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified Information, Networks, or

Facilities.–Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young

Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and

2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352e) is repealed.

(g) Review of Shared Information Technology Services for Personnel

Vetting.–Section 7701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1100) is

repealed.

(h) Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task

Force.–Section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020

(50 U.S.C. 3370) is amended by striking subsection (e).

(i) Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties,

and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.–Section 620 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.

(j) Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National Security

Systems; Report on Exemptions.–Section 6309(f) of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (44 U.S.C. 3557 note; division F

of Public Law 117-263) is amended by striking paragraph (3).

(k) Report on Collaboration Between Intelligence Community and

Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial Threats.–Section

6514(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50

U.S.C. 3370b(b)) is amended by striking paragraph (6).

(l) Timeliness Standard for Rendering Determinations of Trust for

Personnel Vetting; Reviews.–Section 7702(a) of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h(a)) is amended

by striking paragraph (2).

(m) Briefings on Status of Intelligence Community Innovation

Unit.–Subsections (c) and (d) of section 7502 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat.

1082) are repealed.

(n) Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic

Standards.–Section 6312 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note; Public Law 117-263) is amended–

(1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and

(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections

(o) Annual Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Public-private

Talent Exchanges.–Section 6506 of the Intelligence Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2497) is amended by

striking subsection (e).

(p) Software Licensing.–Section 109 of the National Security Act

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended–

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(q) Review and Update of Position Designation Guidance.–Section 7

of the SECRET Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-173; 132 Stat. 1294) is

amended–

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(r) Report on Independent Study on Economic Impact of Military

Invasion of Taiwan by People’s Republic of China.–Section 7407 of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2024 (Public Law 118-31;

137 Stat. 1075) is amended–

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

SEC. 617. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL TRAVEL, ALLOWANCES, AND

RELATED EXPENSES REGULATIONS.

(a) Central Intelligence Agency.–Section 4 of the Central

Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3505) is amended by adding at the

end the following new subsection:

“(c) Biennial Reviews and Reports.–Not later than September 30,

2027, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the

Director shall–

“(1) review the regulations covered by this section; and

“(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review

under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence

committees the findings of the Director with respect to the

review, including identification of any changes to the

regulations or personnel coverage thereof that the Director

determines to be necessary for the performance of intelligence

functions.”.

(b) Office of Director of National Intelligence.–Section 102A of

the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding

at the end the following new subsection:

“(z) Biennial Reviews and Reports Regarding Intelligence Community

Personnel Travel, Allowances, and Related Expenses Regulations.–Not

later than September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every

2 years thereafter, in order to reflect the requirements of the Office

of the Director of National Intelligence not taken into account in the

formulation of Government-wide travel procedures covered by this

section, the Director shall–

“(1) review such requirements; and

“(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review

under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence

committees the findings of the Director with respect to the

review, including any regulations that the Director determines

to be necessary for the performance of intelligence

functions.”.

SEC. 618. PROHIBITION ON SENDING AND RECEIVING OBJECTS USING ENTITIES

OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OR GOVERNMENTS OF CERTAIN

COUNTRIES.

(a) Definition of Covered Nation.–In this section, the term

“covered nation” has the meaning given such term in section 4872(f)

of title 10, United States Code.

(b) In General.–

(1) List required.–Not later than 90 days after the date

of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of products,

intellectual property, technology, and any other objects that

the Directors determine–

(A) affect the national security of the United

States; and

(B) if acquired by a covered nation, would pose a

threat to the national security of the United States.

(2) Form.–The list required by paragraph (1) may be in

classified form.

of the intelligence community may send or receive any product,

intellectual property, technology, or other object as identified

pursuant to subsection (b) within the United States using an entity,

including any shipping company, that is owned or substantially

controlled by a person or a governmental entity domiciled in a covered

nation.

(d) Waiver.–The head of an element of the intelligence community–

(1) may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the

element on a case by case basis if the head determines that in

the particular case, sending or receiving any product,

intellectual property, technology, or other object by an entity

identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for the

national security of the United States; and

(2) not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall

notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.

(e) Notification.–Not later than 30 days after the head of an

element of the intelligence community issues a waiver described in

subsection (d), such head shall submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a written notice of the waiver, which shall

include–

(1) a justification for the waiver, including the product,

intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to

the waiver; and

(2) a description of the national security threat

mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity

that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c).

SEC. 619. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

REGION.

(a) Definition of Intelligence Cooperation.–In this section, the

term “intelligence cooperation” means activities authorized under the

provisions of law administered by the heads of the elements of the

intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production,

and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.

(b) Statement of Policy.–It is the policy of the United States to

consider intelligence cooperation with allies and partners of the

United States in the Indo-Pacific region a priority national security

investment that will help deter aggression, reinforce regional

stability, and reduce the risk of miscalculation, all of which will

advance the national security and economic prosperity of the United

States by helping to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

(1) In general.–The Director of National Intelligence

shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of elements

of the intelligence community as the Director considers

relevant and the members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing

alliance, undertake efforts to bolster and improve–

(A) the intelligence foundations of alliances

between the United States and Australia, Japan, New

Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and

Thailand; and

(B) intelligence cooperation between the United

States and other regional partners, such as India and

Vietnam.

(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation.–Efforts

undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts–

(A) to address the speed and complexity of

potential strategic and operational contingencies in

the Indo-Pacific region, including any scenarios

involving adversarial efforts to limit the freedom of

navigation through critical maritime chokepoints

threaten supply chain security;

(B) relatedly, to ensure shared situational

awareness across the full spectrum of potential

contingencies, including military indications and

warnings;

awareness, with the goal of providing decision

advantage;

(D) to inform collective defense planning and

response by further integrating intelligence

cooperation into joint and combined operational

planning activities, exercises, and wargames focused on

regional contingencies, including the Rim of the

Pacific;

(E) to encourage intelligence cooperation with

Taiwan, consistent with United States law and policy;

and

(F) to promote multilateral intelligence sharing

and collaboration among allies and partners of the

United States, such as through the United States-Japan-

Republic of Korea trilateral mechanism and the United

States-Japan-Philippines trilateral mechanism.

SEC. 620. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE.

(a) Statement of Policy.–

(1) In general.–Section 3 of the Support for the

Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of

Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended–

(A) in paragraph (16), by striking “; and” and

inserting a semicolon;

(B) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at

the end and inserting “; and”; and

“(18) to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense

and deterrence capability, including through the provision of

intelligence support, as a means of advancing the national

security of the United States, regional stability, and the

protection of United States interests in Europe.”.

(2) Definition.–Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8901) is

amended–

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as

paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) Credible defense and deterrence capability.–The term

`credible defense and deterrence capability’ means the ability

to defend against and deter any credible conventional military

threat from the Russian Federation acting unilaterally or in

concert with partners, through the use of conventional military

means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons

platforms and munitions, and command, control, communication,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

“(4) Intelligence support.–The term `intelligence

support’ means activities authorized under the provisions of

law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence

community, including the collection, analysis, production, and

dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.”.

(b) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support Absent an

Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.–Until Ukraine and the

Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or

comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, the Director of

National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,

and the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence

community, shall continue to ensure the provision of intelligence

support to the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United

States policy goals in Ukraine.

(1) In general.–Intelligence support to Ukraine required

under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless the

Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of

the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a specific and

identifiable national security concern.

(2) Notification.–Not later than 15 days after making the

decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise materially

downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the Director of

National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the

elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a notification that

includes–

(A) a detailed description of the reason for the

pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade

of intelligence support;

(B) the expected duration of the pause,

termination, restriction, or material downgrade; and

ability of Ukraine to conduct effective military

operations.

(3) Form.–A notification submitted under paragraph (2)

shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified

annex.

(d) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of

Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.–

(1) In general.–If Ukraine and the Russian Federation

voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a

comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other

relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust

the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation

of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement and,

consistent with the national security interests of the United

States, support building and sustaining the capacity of Ukraine

to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against

the territory of Ukraine.

(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence

support.–Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a

comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination

with the heads of the other relevant elements of the

intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security

Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report that includes–

(A) a description of the details of the armistice

or the comprehensive political settlement of the

conflict in Ukraine, including a description of the

role of the intelligence community in monitoring the

adherence by the parties to specific elements of the

agreement;

(B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that

Ukraine will face under the terms of the agreement and

potential measures that the intelligence community or

other parties could take to help mitigate such

vulnerabilities;

intelligence support the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency has authorized in light of the

changed situation on the ground in Ukraine in order to

help build and sustain the capacity of Ukraine to

detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack

against the territory of Ukraine;

(D) an assessment of the implications of the

armistice or comprehensive political settlement for the

national security interests of the United States in

Europe, including the capacity of the United States and

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter future

aggression by the Russian Federation; and

(E) a description and assessment of any cooperative

arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries,

including member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, that the intelligence community assesses

would contribute to deterring a future attack or act of

aggression by the Russian Federation aimed at occupying

or seizing the territory of Ukraine.

(3) Form.–The report required by paragraph (2) shall be

submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified

annex.

(4) Early warning.–The Director of National Intelligence,

in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements

of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and

member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate and

timely response with respect to any potential attack or act of

aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(5) Notification.–

(A) In general.–The Director of National

Intelligence shall promptly notify each Member of the

congressional intelligence committees not later than 5

days after any intelligence element provides Ukraine

any intelligence pursuant to paragraph (4).

(B) Contents.–A notification submitted pursuant to

subparagraph (A) shall include–

(i) a description of the specific

threatened attack or act of aggression shared

with Ukraine;

(ii) the date on which the intelligence was

provided to Ukraine;

(iii) details of the channel through which

the intelligence was shared, including the

names and titles of the relevant intelligence

community officers and Ukrainian government

officials;

(iv) the response of the Government of

Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence;

(v) an assessment produced by the Defense

Intelligence Agency, in coordination with other

relevant elements of intelligence community, as

to what support Ukraine might require in order

to deter or repel the threatened attack or act

of aggression; and

(vi) a summary of subsequent actions that

the Director of National Intelligence, in

coordination with the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, the Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency, and other heads of

relevant elements of the intelligence

community, directed be taken to support Ukraine

in defending against or otherwise responding to

the threatened attack or act of aggression.

subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may

include a classified annex.

(e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of an

Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an Armistice or Comprehensive

Political Settlement.–

(1) In general.–In the event of an armed attack by the

Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a

comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence

Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements of the

intelligence community, shall immediately resume the provision

of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine at a level

the Directors deem necessary to support military operations of

the Government of Ukraine that are intended, or reasonably

expected, to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine defend or

liberate the territory of Ukraine and prevent such territory of

Ukraine from being occupied or attacked by the Russian

Federation.

(2) Notification.–

(A) In general.–The Director of National

Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional

intelligence committees not later than 5 days after

resuming intelligence support pursuant to paragraph

(1).

(B) Contents.–A notification submitted pursuant to

subparagraph (A) shall include–

(i) a description of the specific attack or

act of aggression against Ukraine;

(ii) a description of any intelligence

support that Ukraine requested from the United

States;

(iii) an assessment of the support that

Ukraine might require in order to deter or

repel the attack or act of aggression;

(iv) a description of any intelligence

support that the Director has authorized to be

provided to Ukraine; and

(v) a description of the response of the

Government of Ukraine upon receiving the

intelligence support.

subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may

include a classified annex.

(3) Sunset.–

(A) In general.–The provision of intelligence

support for Ukraine under this subsection shall cease

on the date that is 120 days after the date on which

the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the

Russian Federation agree to reinstate the armistice or

comprehensive political settlement that was violated or

a new armistice or comprehensive political settlement

is entered into force.

(B) Recommencement.–Upon the cessation of the

provision of intelligence support under subparagraph

(A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,

in coordination with the heads of any other relevant

elements of the intelligence community, shall resume

the provision of intelligence support to Ukraine

pursuant to subsection (d).

(f) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.–The

terms “armistice” and “comprehensive political settlement”

mean a formal written agreement between the Government of

Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation that has

the effect of permanently ending the armed conflict between

both nations.

(2) Intelligence support.–The term “intelligence

support” means activities authorized under the provisions of

law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence

community, including the collection, analysis, production, and

dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.

(3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.–

The term “specific and identifiable national security

concern” includes the following:

(A) Credible intelligence that an element of the

Government of Ukraine has been compromised by the

Russian Federation or another foreign adversary.

(B) Protection of sources and methods.

Ukraine to pause intelligence support.

(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the

Government of Ukraine receiving United States

intelligence support engaged in a pattern of human

rights violations, atrocities, or violations of the law

of armed conflict.

(4) Territory of Ukraine.–The term “territory of

Ukraine” means all territory internationally recognized to be

the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014,

including Crimea and the territory that the Russian Federation

claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.

SEC. 621. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH COUNTRIES

OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.

Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

3024(j)) is amended–

(1) by striking “Under the direction” and inserting the

following:

“(1) In general.–Under the direction”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) Notification required.–

“(A) In general.–Not later than 48 hours after a

decision to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or

materially downgrade intelligence support or

intelligence activities (as defined in section 501(f)),

including information, intelligence, and imagery

collection authorized under Executive Order 12333 (50

U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States

intelligence activities), to the government of a

country of significant concern to the United States,

the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to

the congressional intelligence committees a

notification of such decision.

“(B) Elements.–The notification required in

subsection (a) shall include–

“(i) a detailed description of the reason

for the pause, termination, restriction, or

material downgrade of intelligence support;

“(ii) a description of the change in

intelligence sharing;

“(iii) the categories of information

affected;

“(iv) the expected duration of the pause,

termination, restriction, or material

downgrade; and

“(v) the anticipated impact of such

decision on regional security and the national

security objectives of the United States.

“(C) Country of significant concern to the united

states defined.–In this subsection, the term `country

of significant concern to the United States’ means–

“(i) Israel;

“(ii) Ukraine;

“(iii) Taiwan; and

“(iv) any other country designated as such

by the President.”.

SEC. 622. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING ENHANCEMENT.

(a) Statement of Policy.–It is the policy of the United States–

(1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security

partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national

defense of the United States, regional stability, and the

protection of United States personnel and interests in the

Middle East;

(2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust

intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to

counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats, state

and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions evasion,

and other transnational security challenges that threaten both

Israel and the United States;

(3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the

Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors

that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional

partners;

(4) to ensure that security assistance and defense

cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its

qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law

and broader regional security considerations;

(5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional

security architectures that include Israel and willing regional

partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile defense,

maritime security, early warning systems, and intelligence-

sharing frameworks; and

(6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to

enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response

capabilities for United States military and diplomatic

personnel in the region.

(b) Sense of Congress.–It is the sense of Congress that–

(1) Israel remains a critical United States security

partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a

strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational

effectiveness and technological superiority;

(2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the

United States and Israel has saved United States personnel and

property in the region and should remain a central pillar of

the bilateral security relationship;

(3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East–

including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber

operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare–requires

sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States

and Israel;

(4) the United States-Israel security partnership has

historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which

strengthens the partnership’s credibility, durability, and

deterrent value; and

(5) expanding normalization and practical security

cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a

force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated

defense.

(1) In general.–Title XI of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end

the following:

“SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

“(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.–

“(1) In general.–The President, acting through the

Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the

Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and the

protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and

enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.

“(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.–Intelligence sharing

carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing of

information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism,

sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate

actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile threats,

unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,

air and space domain awareness, and other aerial threats

relevant to the defense of Israel, United States forces and

interests in the region, and regional security partners.

“(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.–

“(A) In general.–Intelligence sharing and related

security information exchanges with the Government of

Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise

materially limited except on the basis of a specific

and identifiable national security concern determined

by the President, such as the protection of

intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence

risk, or another significant security consideration.

“(B) Documentation requirement.–The President

shall document any determination to suspend, reduce, or

otherwise materially limit intelligence sharing or

related security information exchanges with the

Government of Israel, including a description of the

national security rationale supporting the change.

“(4) Congressional notification.–

“(A) In general.–Not later than 15 days after the

date of any decision to materially increase, suspend,

reduce, or otherwise alter intelligence sharing or

related security information exchanges with the

Government of Israel, the President shall notify the

congressional intelligence committees of such decision.

“(B) Elements.–Each notification required by

subparagraph (A) shall include the following:

“(i) A description of the change in

intelligence sharing or security information

exchange.

“(ii) The categories of information

affected.

“(iii) The national security objectives

served by the change.

“(iv) In the case of a suspension or

reduction, the specific national security

concern supporting the change.

“(v) An assessment of the anticipated

impact on regional security, United States

forces, and integrated air and missile defense

cooperation.

“(b) Intelligence Sharing and Analytic Cooperation With Abraham

Accords Countries.–

“(1) In general.–The President, acting through the

Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the

Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law and

security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence sharing

and analytic cooperation with countries that have normalized

relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords (as

defined in section 64(k) of the State Department Basic

Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order to

strengthen regional security integration.

“(2) Priority areas.–In carrying out paragraph (1), the

President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate

intelligence and information relating to–

“(A) counterterrorism threats and networks,

including state and nonstate aggressors, and terror

financing;

“(B) cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and

defensive best practices;

“(C) air and missile defense early warning and

threat tracking;

“(D) geospatial, overhead, and other imaging

intelligence relevant to shared security concerns; and

“(E) maritime security threats, including threats

to freedom of navigation, commercial shipping,

sanctions evasion, and regional maritime stability.

“(3) Safeguards.–

“(A) Adoption of guidelines.–The Director of

National Intelligence, in coordination with the

Secretary of Defense, shall adopt guidelines for

intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation carried

out under this subsection that ensure appropriate

safeguards–

“(i) to protect intelligence sources and

methods; and

“(ii) to ensure that recipients maintain

adequate security protections consistent with

United States requirements.

“(B) Restrictions on access.–If the Director of

National Intelligence determines that a recipient of

intelligence sharing or analytic cooperation carried

out under this subsection has any intelligence,

defense, or technological information sharing

relationship with an adversarial nation, the Director

shall restrict all access of such recipient to such

intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.

“(c) Report Required.–

“(1) In general.–Not later than 180 days after the date

of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5

years, the President shall submit to the appropriate

congressional committees a report on the status of United

States intelligence sharing with the Government Israel and, as

appropriate, regional partners.

“(2) Matters to be included.–Each report required by

paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with the

protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following:

“(A) A description of the categories of

intelligence and security information shared by the

United States Government with the Government of Israel.

“(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly

integrating Israel into regional air and missile

defense and early warning architectures with partner

countries, including those that have normalized

relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords.

“(C) A description of how such intelligence

sharing has contributed, if at all, to–

“(i) improved detection, tracking,

warning, interception, or deterrence of aerial

threats, including missiles and unmanned

systems, for Israel, United States forces, or

regional partners; and

“(ii) the overall stability and

coordination of security in the region.

“(D) An assessment of progress in improving

interoperability among technology networks of the

United States, Israel, and partner countries.

“(E) A description of efforts to secure technology

networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized

access.

“(F) An identification of any legal, policy,

technical, counterintelligence, or security barriers

limiting deeper intelligence integration, including

risks to intelligence sources and methods.

“(G) A summary of any significant increases or

reductions in intelligence sharing during the reporting

period and the national security rationale for such

changes.

“(3) Form.–Each report required by paragraph (1) report

shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a

classified annex.

“(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.–In

this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional

committees’ means–

“(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

and

“(B) to the extent Department of Defense

information is implicated, the congressional defense

committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10,

United States Code).”.

(2) Clerical amendment.–The table of contents for such Act

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.”.

TITLE VII–ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND INTELLIGENCE

SHARING.

(a) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Artificial intelligence model.–The term “artificial

intelligence model” means a capability or series of

capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives,

generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or

decisions without human intervention or input.

(2) Center.–The term “Center” means the Artificial

Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency.

(3) Classified information.–The term “classified

information” has the meaning given such term in section 805 of

the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).

(4) Cleared industry personnel.–The term “cleared

industry personnel” means employees or representatives of a

covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and

have a demonstrated need to know.

(5) Congressional intelligence committees.–The term

“congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given

such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (

50 U.S.C. 3003).

(6) Covered person.–The term “covered person” means a

non-Federal person who–

(A) is a United States citizen;

(B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial

intelligence models or critical enabling

infrastructure; and

(B) to an element of the intelligence community or

Department of Defense.

(7) Director.–The term “Director” means the Director of

the National Security Agency.

(8) Intelligence.–The term “intelligence” has the

meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security

Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(9) Intelligence community.–The term “intelligence

community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the

National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(10) Security clearance.–The term “security clearance”

means an authorization to access classified information.

(11) Threat information.–The term “threat information”

means information on–

(A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use

products or research of covered persons or other

entities or individuals to generate synthetic media for

foreign-directed influence campaigns, develop and

manage computer network exploitation campaigns, design

or develop weapons systems, or enhance surveillance

capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy or

threaten the security of citizens of the United States;

(B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries,

including indications of compromise to networks

associated with covered persons and other entities and

individuals, or other technical indicators, indicating

a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or

availability of an artificial intelligence system, or

to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence

system, including training or test data, frameworks or

software libraries, training or inference computing

environments, or other components necessary for the

training, management, or maintenance of an artificial

intelligence system;

clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously

access the systems of covered persons for purposes of

illicit technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair

economic advantage, including through techniques to

extract a model’s technical capabilities to replicate,

develop, or improve a foreign artificial intelligence

model without authorization by the covered person;

(D) activity of foreign entities of concern to

sabotage or otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial

intelligence systems or the supply chain of an

artificial intelligence system, including training or

test data, frameworks or software libraries, training

or inference computing environments, or other

components necessary for the training, management, or

maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; and

(E) observations, emerging concerns, or other

inputs from vendors or researchers regarding relevant

malicious or clandestine activity of foreign entities

of concern toward an artificial intelligence system,

its supply chain, or other necessary components.

(b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of Intelligence and

Threat Information With Covered Persons.–

(1) In general.–Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through

the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility

and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with

covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane

to the exploitation of access to United States artificial

intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in

intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other

malicious activities.

(2) Participation.–The Director may not select covered

persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides a

competitive advantage or procurement preference to any covered

person, to the detriment of another covered person.

(3) Duration.–The Director shall carry out the pilot

program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3-year

period beginning on the date of the establishment of the pilot

program.

(1) Criteria.–The Director shall establish criteria

governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot

program required by subsection (b), which may include criteria

relating to the following:

(A) Relevance to national security.

(B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive

intelligence information.

maturity.

(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling,

use, and nondisclosure requirements.

(E) The availability of cleared personnel of

covered persons or willingness of covered persons to

increase the number of cleared personnel.

(2) Nature of participation.–Participation in the pilot

program shall not be construed as a certification, endorsement,

or regulatory approval by the United States Government of any

artificial intelligence system or commercial activity and the

Director may not exclude a covered person from participating on

the basis of political or ideological viewpoints of the covered

person or its employees.

(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.–

(1) Authorized modes.–Under the pilot program required by

subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center,

authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as

described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through–

(A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the

intelligence community and a covered person;

(B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons,

as determined appropriate by the Director; or

mechanism operated or overseen by the Director.

(2) Limitation.–Any mechanism established under this

section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence

and threat information and shall not establish standards,

requirements, or best practices governing artificial

intelligence development or deployment.

(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.–

(1) Procedures required.–The Director shall, acting

through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or

downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared under

the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure

usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods.

(2) Examples of procedures.–The procedures developed under

paragraph (1) may include the following:

(A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries.

(B) The preparation of classified annexes where

necessary.

shared intelligence.

(D) The appropriate use of cleared industry

personnel.

(3) Handling requirements.–The Director shall, acting

through the Center, codify policies governing the handling,

storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the

pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and

compliance mechanisms.

(f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.–

(1) Permissible use.–Intelligence shared under the pilot

program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for

detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign activity

exploiting access to United States artificial intelligence

systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence

collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious

activities.

(2) Nondisclosure.–A covered person may not disclose to

any person who is not a covered person or an element of the

intelligence community any intelligence shared with the covered

person under the pilot program required by subsection (b),

except as expressly authorized by the Director acting through

the Center.

(g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.–In planning and coordinating the

pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director shall, acting

through the Center, consult with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer

of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(h) Evaluation and Reporting.–

(1) Evaluation.–The Director shall, acting through the

Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of

the pilot program established under subsection (b).

(2) Report.–

(A) In general.–Not later than 90 days before the

date on which the pilot program required by paragraph

(1) of subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph

(2) of such subsection, the Director shall, acting

through the Center, submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report assessing–

(i) the effectiveness of intelligence

sharing under the pilot program;

(ii) the adequacy of safeguards for

sources, methods, and privacy;

(iii) the scope of participation; and

(iv) whether the program should be

modified, extended, or terminated.

(B) Form.–The report submitted pursuant to

subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified

form, but may include a classified annex.

(i) Rule of Construction.–Nothing in this section shall be

construed–

(1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United

States persons not authorized by another provision of law;

(2) to require the disclosure of classified information to

unauthorized persons; or

(3) to establish commercial, competition, or technology

policy outside the purview of the intelligence community.

(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.–Any information shared

by a covered person or other entity or individual with the United

States Government pursuant to this section–

(1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without

discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B)

of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of

United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or

agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or

records; and

(2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable

privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.

SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT

TARGETING.

(a) Definitions.–In this subsection:

(1) Director.–The term “Director” means the Director of

National Intelligence.

(2) Intelligence.–The term “Intelligence” has the

meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of Artificial

Intelligence to Support Targeting.–

(1) Policy and procedure reviews.–

(A) In general.–Not later than 60 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall

review and assess the policies and procedures that

govern the use by the intelligence community of

artificial intelligence technologies in the production,

or review, of intelligence used by the United States to

inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.

(B) Elements.–In carrying out the review and

assessment required by subparagraph (A), the Director

shall–

(i) assess whether policies and procedures

of the intelligence community that were in

effect on the day before the date of the

enactment of this Act adequately address risks

posed by the use of artificial intelligence

technologies in the targeting analysis and

development and civilian harm mitigation

processes; and

(ii) ensure the review covers all policies

of the intelligence community that regard the

production or review of intelligence,

regardless of which element first produced the

intelligence.

(2) Workflow reviews.–Not later than 90 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review

and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that

incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States

to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.

carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the Director shall

direct the National Intelligence Council to conduct a structured,

exploratory analysis that–

(1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence

models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine

intelligence or other information provided by the intelligence

community that informs targeting accuracy;

(2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and

(3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and

correct such mistakes.

(d) Consultation.–In carrying out the review and assessments

required by subsection (b), the Director shall consult with the heads

of the elements of the intelligence community whose intelligence is

commonly consulted to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects,

such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense

Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central

Intelligence Agency, to solicit input on potential negative

consequences resulting from artificial intelligence supported analysis,

and possible ways to mitigate such consequences.

(e) Policies and Directives.–The Director shall issue or adjust

such policies and directives to the intelligence community as the

Director considers appropriate to improve risk mitigation in light of

the review carried out under subsection (b).

(f) Report.–

(1) In general.–Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews

and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a

summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to

subsection (e).

(2) Contents.–The report required by paragraph (1) shall

include the following:

(A) A description of contributions of the

intelligence community to targeting workflows, such as

identification of points of interest, pattern of life

analysis, review of proposed targets, target selection,

and civilian impact reviews, as well as the

understanding of the intelligence community of the

delineation of roles and responsibilities with the

Armed Forces where applicable.

(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence

tools utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are

used.

and whether human review of artificial intelligence

system outputs is required to be conducted prior to

dissemination of materials.

(D) The scope of individuals expected to have

access to the materials described in subparagraph (C).

(E) An explanation of whether and how the

capability limitations of artificial intelligence tools

available to personnel of the intelligence community

are communicated to users, including the cutoff date

for the tool’s training data, databases to which it

does or does not have access rights, and the tasks the

model has been trained for or approved for use.

(3) Form.–The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)

shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a

classified annex.

SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, STANDARDS,

AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.–Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended–

(1) in subsection (b)–

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph

(4); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an

artificial intelligence system.–The Chief Artificial

Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of

each element of the intelligence community, shall examine

whether the intelligence community should identify intelligence

information generated or materially modified by an artificial

intelligence system, including determining what methods are

necessary to preserve such information throughout the

intelligence lifecycle.”;

(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:

“(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing

methodologies and benchmarks.–Consistent with applicable

classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial

Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of

each element of the intelligence community, shall–

“(A) establish a process to review artificial

intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks

employed within each element; and

“(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks

remain commensurate with the capabilities and impacts

of systems being evaluated.”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate Incidents.–Not

later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection,

the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, in coordination with the National Manager for National

Security Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track and

evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the confidentiality,

integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems within

each element of the intelligence community.

“(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems and

Processes.–

“(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system

or process.–In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial

intelligence system or process’–

“(A) means an artificial intelligence system or

process that, given an objective or instruction–

“(i) determines the action or sequence of

actions to be taken to accomplish that

objective; and

“(ii) is capable of executing such actions

directly on information systems, data, or

external services; and

“(B) does not include a system or process that

solely generates informational or advisory output for a

human operator to act upon.

“(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity,

credential, and access management systems for information

within the intelligence community.–

“(A) In general.–Consistent with authority under

section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3024(g)), the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the National Manager

for National Security Systems, shall–

“(i) not later than 1 year after the date

of the enactment of this paragraph, complete a

review of the adequacy of existing identity,

credential, and access management systems for

information within the intelligence community

used by agentic artificial intelligence systems

and processes; and

“(ii) not permit access to any information

within the intelligence community by an

external department or agency for use in an

agentic artificial intelligence system or

process until the review required by clause (i)

is completed.

“(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for

agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes

to authenticate as non-human actors.–The review

required by subparagraph (A)(i) shall include an

evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for

agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes

to authenticate as non-human actors, including the

appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and

the traceability of any action taken by an agentic

artificial intelligence system or process to a cleared

individual on whose behalf the agentic artificial

intelligence system or process is acting.

“(3) Policy guidance.–Upon completion of the review

required by paragraph (2), the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National

Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance

Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate policy guidance

on–

“(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence

systems and processes within the intelligence

community; and

“(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence

systems and processes to information within the

intelligence community.

“(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial

intelligence systems and processes.–In carrying out paragraph

(3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a minimum and to

the extent such requirements are not already replicated in

existing processes or policies, consider–

“(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and

security risks associated with agentic artificial

intelligence systems and processes that operate on, or

have the possibility of accessing, information within

the intelligence community; and

“(B) establishing technical controls, processes,

and other mitigation measures to address the risks

identified under subparagraph (A), including, at a

minimum–

“(i) requirements that any element of the

intelligence community or external department

or agency incorporating information from an

intelligence community element as part of an

agentic artificial intelligence system or

process provide the relevant element of the

intelligence community controlling such

information with documentation of–

“(I) the properties of the agentic

artificial intelligence system or

process, including the range of

additional systems or data sources it

may access (whether as a system or

process input or as an agent action),

the permissions and classification

entitlements associated with such

access, as well as any relevant model

or system documentation, such as model

and system cards;

“(II) anticipated mission use

cases for any access to information

within the intelligence community in

the context of an agentic artificial

intelligence system or process,

including whether any use case

constitutes a high-impact artificial

intelligence use as those terms are

defined under existing Federal

policies;

“(III) procedures to notify

relevant intelligence community

elements controlling such information

of any changes to the properties of the

agentic artificial intelligence system

or process, to permissions and

classification entitlements, or to

anticipated use cases of such system or

process, that might significantly limit

the utility, confidentiality,

integrity, or availability of such

information; and

“(IV) procedures for intelligence

community elements to promptly notify

external intelligence community

elements or departments or agencies of

any material changes to upstream

classified data or systems that might

significantly limit or impair the

utility, confidentiality, integrity, or

availability of any downstream agentic

artificial intelligence system or

process maintained by that external

intelligence community element or

department or agency;

“(ii) policies and procedures to log any

actions, as well as associated inputs, taken by

an agentic artificial intelligence system or

process to information within the intelligence

community, including mechanisms to reverse or

negate unauthorized actions or actions that

pose a risk to the user intent or

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of

such information;

“(iii) policies and procedures for

safeguards, continuous monitoring, and the

detection of security incidents or other

unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial

intelligence system or process, or failures of

associated safeguards, that may pose a threat

to the confidentiality, availability, or

integrity of information within the

intelligence community;

“(iv) policies and procedures for system-

level controls of agentic artificial

intelligence systems and processes, tailored to

address each system or process component; and

“(v) criteria for the selection of

interoperability standards for agentic

artificial intelligence systems and processes,

with preference, to the extent practicable, for

standards that are openly specified, governed

in a vendor-neutral manner, supported by

multiple model providers, extensible to future

requirements, and subject to ongoing

independent security review.”.

SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.

Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is amended–

(1) in subsection (c)–

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph

(4); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following

new paragraph (3):

“(3) Making available a research test-bed to private

sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to

engage in artificial intelligence security research, including

through the secure provision of access in a secure environment

for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models

with the consent of the vendors of the models.”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) Test-bed Requirements.–

“(1) Access and terms of usage.–

“(A) Researcher access.–The Director shall

establish terms of usage governing researcher access to

the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3),

with limitations on researcher publication only to the

extent necessary to protect classified information or

proprietary information concerning third-party models

provided through the consent of model vendors.

“(B) Availability to federal agencies.–The

Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available

under subsection (c)(3) is also made available to other

Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis.

“(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.–

In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall leverage,

to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other

resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive Order 14110

(88 Fed. Reg. 75191; relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy

development and use of artificial intelligence).

“(3) Voluntary security guidance.–In order to incentivize

participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to

promote the national security of the United States, the

Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre-

deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment

identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor

actions to mitigate against potential security threats to such

models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such models

for computer network exploitation campaigns, the design or

development of weapons systems, or to further foreign

surveillance capabilities.”.

SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.

(a) Definition.–In this section, the term “novel use of

artificial intelligence technology” means–

(1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of

capabilities combined that has not previously been included in

an intelligence community element’s inventory of artificial

intelligence use cases consistent with guidance issued pursuant

to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b));

(2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that

contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial intelligence

contained in such an inventory; or

(3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that

constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that

term is defined under policies of the executive branch.

(b) In General.–Not later than 90 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Director of

National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other

elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a consolidated report detailing

any novel use of artificial intelligence technology that any element of

the intelligence community is considering employing within the one-year

period following submission of such report.

shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial intelligence

technology, including–

(1) hardware and software requirements;

(2) the proposed application of the technology;

(3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the

proposed novel use;

(4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated,

including measures specific to the proposed novel use;

(5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in

conjunction with the proposed novel use;

(6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is

still needed, and whether the intelligence community has

resources to conduct and fund such activity; and

(7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection

with the proposed novel use.

(d) Form.–Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall

be submitted in classified form.

(e) Sunset.–This section shall expire on October 1, 2032.

SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS FOR

TARGETING WORKFLOWS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,

the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the

intelligence community, establish a policy that applies to elements of

the intelligence community, which generate intelligence that could

reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal

effects, and that requires–

(1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence

system used in the development of such intelligence are clearly

marked to indicate–

(A) that artificial intelligence was used;

(B) the artificial intelligence system or model

used;

artificial intelligence was used; and

(D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief

Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address

questions about data inputs, system access, or

artificial intelligence system performance; and

(2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to

paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work product

in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any person

who subsequently interacts with that data on a system of the

intelligence community, regardless of organizational

affiliation of the person or the role of the person in

developing the data.

SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO

INADVERTENT ESCALATION.

(a) Requirement.–Not later than 90 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of

appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research

Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial

Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a

research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence

community with respect to specific ways in which the use of artificial

intelligence systems by the intelligence community could contribute to

inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.

(b) Elements.–The research campaign required by subsection (a)

shall include–

(1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial

intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent

escalation with foreign nations or actors, including–

(A) analytic judgments that fail to properly

consider or weigh alternative explanations;

(B) automation of imagery classification or signals

intelligence;

targets;

(D) operational uses of artificial intelligence,

such as time-constrained uses that do not allow for

independent verification; and

(E) such other scenarios as identified by the

Director or participating subject matter experts;

(2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where

miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of

occurrence; and

(3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for

vulnerabilities discovered; or

(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification

of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the

intelligence community.

(1) Congress.–Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of

completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a),

whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence

Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence

committees on the findings and recommendations of the research

campaign.

(2) Intelligence community.–The Director of the

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of

the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief

Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the

intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of

the research campaign required by subsection (a), as

appropriate.

SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.

(a) Requirement.–Not later than 90 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of

appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research

Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial

Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a

research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence

community with respect to novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may

arise when an adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts

directly with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community

that include artificial intelligence components.

(b) Elements.–The research campaign required by subsection (a)

shall–

(1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial

intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to

uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems,

infrastructure, or personnel that may result from–

(A) the accelerated development of artificial

intelligence capabilities by foreign nations;

(B) the increasing access that non-state and

criminal actors have to commercial artificial

intelligence tools that can identify vulnerabilities

and propose or orchestrate attacks; and

systems to interact directly with each other during an

attack; and

(2) pursue findings, including–

(A) an identification of potential mitigations for

unique vulnerabilities discovered; or

(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an

identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-

up action by the intelligence community.

(1) Congress.–Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of

completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a),

whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence

Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence

committees on the findings and recommendations of the research

campaign.

(2) Intelligence community.–The Director of the

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of

the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief

Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the

intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of

the research campaign required by subsection (a), as

appropriate.

SEC. 709. PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE EXPORT OF ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Artificial intelligence technology.–The term

“artificial intelligence technology” means–

(A) any United States-origin model weights;

(B) semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and

(i) Export Control Classification Number

3A090 or 4A090 of the Commerce Control List or

corresponding entries in the Export

Administration Regulations, as in effect on the

date of the enactment of this Act; or

(ii) any subsequent revisions to the

Commerce Control List as amended by the Bureau

of Industry and Security to impose more

restrictive parameters.

(2) Commerce control list.–The term “Commerce Control

List” means the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement

No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations.

(3) United states artificial intelligence stack.–The term

“United States artificial intelligence stack” means the

United States artificial intelligence integrated circuits,

cloud infrastructure, and models.

(4) Export control terms.–The terms “export”, “Export

Administration Regulations”, “in-country transfer”,

“reexport”, and “United States person” have the meanings

given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform

Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(b) Statement of Policy.–It shall be the policy of the United

States to restrict access to the most sophisticated artificial

intelligence integrated circuits and models that United States

adversaries may seek to use against the United States, while also

exporting the full United States artificial intelligence stack to

allies and partners who adhere to stringent national security

standards.

Commerce grants a license for the export, reexport, or in-country

transfer of artificial intelligence technology, or before the United

States joins an agreement on artificial intelligence with a foreign

government, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the

National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for

Intelligence and Research, the Director of the National Security

Agency, and the heads of other appropriate elements of the intelligence

community, shall provide to the President and the congressional

intelligence committees a written assessment containing a comprehensive

analysis regarding the risks associated with such action.

(d) Substance.–Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall

include the assessment of the intelligence community of the

consequences of the action concerned for United States national

security, including assessment of–

(1) the recipient country’s export control system with

respect to artificial intelligence technology, including

integrated circuits, integrated circuit design software, tools,

and manufacturing equipment;

(2) information on any past, present, or expected

interactions, including commercial ties and cooperation,

between commercial entities or government entities in the

recipient country and other countries of proliferation concern,

including the People’s Republic of China and the Russian

Federation;

(3) actual or suspected transfers of artificial

intelligence technology to such countries, including the

People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

(4) the consequences that onward proliferation of United

States artificial intelligence technology from the recipient

would have for United States efforts to both deny adversaries

access to advanced artificial intelligence technology and

maintain a significant competitive advantage in frontier

artificial intelligence development, integrated design, and

integrated manufacturing, especially relative to the progress

of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

(5) the capacity of the intelligence community and United

States commercial entities to have near real-time awareness of

the any potential technology leakage or export violations by

the recipient country;

(6) potential measures that the intelligence community

assesses could reasonably be taken by the recipient country to

mitigate both the proliferation concerns identified by the

intelligence community and the consequences of any potential

onward proliferation as detailed in paragraph (4);

(7) in the case of the grant of a license, specific

measures that the intelligence community will take to evaluate

compliance with any associated restrictions or compliance

requirements;

(8) whether export of artificial intelligence technology

would reinforce United States artificial intelligence

dominance;

(9) the intended and likely end-uses, including military,

intelligence, and domestic surveillance applications, and

whether such uses are consistent with United States national

security interests; and

(10) current and planned agreements and arrangements

between the United States and the government of the recipient

country.

(e) Form.–Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall be

submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 710. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.

(a) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.–The

term “artificial intelligence security vulnerability” means a

weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be

exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization,

the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial

intelligence system, including through techniques such as–

(A) evasion attacks;

(B) poisoning attacks;

(D) model theft or extraction attacks; and

(E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the

safety, alignment, or access control mechanisms of an

artificial intelligence system.

(2) Artificial intelligence system.–The term “artificial

intelligence system” means a capability or series of

capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives,

generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or

decisions without human intervention or input.

(3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.–

The term “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process

document” means the executive branch document entitled

“Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United

States Government” dated November 15, 2017.

(4) Vulnerabilities equities process.–The term

“Vulnerabilities Equities Process” means the interagency

review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the

Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any

successor document.

(b) Evaluation; Report.–Not later than 90 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency

shall–

(1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities

Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review of

artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a

report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities

Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether the

submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the

Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly

large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so,

an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such

notifications.

the National Security Agency determines that the existing

Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not sufficiently accommodate the

submission and review of artificial intelligence security

vulnerabilities identified by elements of the intelligence community,

and that such vulnerabilities present public interest considerations

meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, the

Director shall establish a process for the submission and review of

such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process not

later than 30 days after the date of such determination.

(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial

Intelligence Systems.–Not later than 90 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency

shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a briefing

on–

(1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems

identified by artificial intelligence systems;

(2) the impact of any change in such volume on the

functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and

exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors

using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the

equity of disclosure.

(e) Consultation Required.–The Director of the National Security

Agency shall carry out subsections (b), (c), and (d) in consultation

with–

(1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

and

(3) other entities as the Director of the National Security

Agency considers appropriate.

SEC. 711. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODELS ON

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.

(a) Definitions.–In this section:

(1) Artificial intelligence model.–The term “artificial

intelligence model” means a capability or series of

capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives,

generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or

decisions without human intervention or input.

(2) Child pornography.–The term “child pornography” has

the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18, United

States Code.

(3) Covered application.–The term “covered application”

means any specific artificial intelligence model that has been

confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence

community, or their designee, as–

(A) failing to comply with the National Institute

of Standard and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk

Management Framework: Generative Artificial

Intelligence Profile with respect to “obscene,

degrading, and/or abusive content”, or a successor

standard or framework, to the extent the framework

applies to synthetic child sexual abuse material or

non-consensual intimate images of adults;

(B) subject to a Federal court determination that

such artificial intelligence model has generated

content depicting child pornography; or

such artificial intelligence model has generated non-

consensual intimate visual depictions of an

identifiable adult or a minor.

(4) Intimate visual depiction.–The term “intimate visual

depiction” has the meaning given that term in section 1309 of

the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 (15

U.S.C. 6851).

(b) Prohibition.–

(1) In general.–The acquisition or use of any covered

application on national security systems operated by an element

of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such

element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards

described in subsection (c) can be implemented.

(2) Implementation.–

(A) Initial removal.–Not later than 180 days after

the date of the enactment of this Act, any covered

application shall be required to be removed from

national security systems operated by an element of the

intelligence community or a contractor of such element.

(B) Subsequent removals.–Beginning after the 180-

day period described in subparagraph (A), any

artificial intelligence model that becomes a covered

application shall be required to be removed from

national security systems operated by an element of the

intelligence community or a contractor of such element

not later than 180 days after the date that the model

is confirmed by the head of an element of the

intelligence community, or their designee, to be a

covered application.

(1) In general.–The head of an element of the intelligence

community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit the

generation of child pornography or non-consensual intimate

visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.

(2) Certification required.–The head of an element of the

intelligence community shall certify to the Director of

National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under

paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered

applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual

depictions of a minor.

(3) Congressional notification.–The head of an element of

the intelligence community that issues a certification pursuant

to paragraph (2) shall notify the congressional intelligence

committees of such certification not later than 7 days after

issuing such certification. Such a notification shall identify

the safeguards implemented pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) National Security and Research Waiver.–

(1) In general.–The head of an element of the intelligence

community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence

model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under

subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or

research justification for such artificial intelligence model

that benefits the intelligence community.

(2) Congressional notification.–Not later than 7 days

after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of

the element of the intelligence community that issues such

waiver shall submit to the congressional intelligence

committees a notification that includes–

(A) an identification of the national security or

research justification for such usage;

(B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such

usage; and

as to allow for continued usage consistent with the

general prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and

(c)(1).

(e) Cure.–If a covered application is identified for removal or is

disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant to this section, the head

of an element of the intelligence community may offer the provider of

the covered application an opportunity to cure performance to avoid

removal pursuant to subsection (b)(2).

TITLE VIII–OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED AND

ORDERED DEPARTURES.

Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C. 4865 note; division E of Public Law 119-60)

is amended–

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, the Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,”

after “Foreign Affairs”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting “, the Select Committee

on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,” after

“Foreign Relations”.

SEC. 802. IDENTIFICATION OF REALLOCABLE FREQUENCIES.

Section 113 of the National Telecommunications and Information

Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923) is amended–

(1) in subsection (h)(7)(A)–

(A) in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I)

and (II) as items (aa) and (bb), respectively, and

adjusting the margins accordingly;

(B) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as

subclauses (I) and (II), respectively, and adjusting

the margins accordingly;

inserting the following:

“(i) In general.–If a portion of the

information”; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) Full classification.–

Notwithstanding paragraphs (5) and (6), if the

classification of information required to be

included in the transition plan of a Federal

entity prohibits even the public release of a

redacted transition plan, as determined by the

head of the Federal entity, the Federal entity

shall–

“(I) notify the NTIA that the

entire transition plan must be

classified and that even a redacted

version cannot be made public; and

“(II) classify the transition plan

in accordance with the levels of

materials contained in the transition

plan.”; and

(2) in subsection (l)–

(A) by striking “For purposes of” and inserting

the following:

“(1) In general.–For purposes of”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) Elements of the intelligence community.–

Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of this

part, each element of the intelligence community (as defined in

section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

3003)) shall be considered a Federal entity and shall be

eligible to receive payment from the Spectrum Relocation Fund

for any auction-related relocation or sharing costs incurred by

the element regardless of the existence of a Government station

license.”.

SEC. 803. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RELATING TO BUDGET

FUNCTIONS.

(a) Requirement.–

(1) In general.–Chapter 11 of title 31, United States

Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

section:

“Sec. 1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget

functions

“(a) Protection of Classified Information.–Notwithstanding any

other provision of law, not later than September 30, 2028, each covered

official shall ensure that the department or agency of the official

uses secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified

information, including with respect to the location at which the system

is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities of

the department or agency:

“(1) Formulating, developing, and submitting the budget of

the department or agency (including the budget justification

materials submitted to Congress) under the National

Intelligence Program.

“(2) Apportioning, allotting, issuing warrants for the

disbursement of, and obligating and expending funds under the

National Intelligence Program.

“(3) Carrying out Federal financial management service

functions or related activities of the intelligence community.

“(b) Waiver.–The Director of National Intelligence, in

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the

Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may

issue a waiver to a head of an element of the intelligence community

with respect to a requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of

National Intelligence certifies to the congressional intelligence

committees that–

“(1) one or more of the Federal financial management

service functions or related activities of the element under

the National Intelligence Program–

“(A) are appropriately carried out using a system

that does not meet the requirements to protect

classified information; and

“(B) such use does not represent a significant

counterintelligence risk; or

“(2) complying with a specified requirement under

subsection (a) would result in an increased counterintelligence

threat to a classified program or activity.

“(c) Display of Information in Public Reports.–Notwithstanding

any other provision of law, in making public a report or other

information relating to expenditures by an element of the intelligence

community, a covered official may modify or omit information relating

to such expenditures in a manner necessary to ensure the protection of

classified information.

“(d) Definitions.–In this section:

“(1) Covered official.–The term `covered official’ means

the following:

“(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.

“(B) The Director of the Office of Management and

Budget.

“(C) Each head of an element of the intelligence

community.

“(D) Any other head of a department or agency of

the Federal Government carrying out a function

specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection

(a).

“(2) Federal financial management service functions.–In

this section, the term `Federal financial management service

functions’ means standard functions, as determined by the

Secretary of the Treasury, that departments and agencies of the

Federal Government perform relating to Federal financial

management, including budget execution, financial asset

information management, payable management, revenue management,

reimbursable management, receivable management, delinquent debt

management, cost management, general ledger management,

financial reconciliation, and financial and performance

reporting.

“(3) Intelligence community terms.–The terms

`congressional intelligence committees’, `intelligence

community’, and `National Intelligence Program’ have the

meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”.

(2) Clerical amendment.–The table of sections at the

beginning of chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is

amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1126

the following new item:

“1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget

functions.”.

(b) Funding Needed To Implement Specified Requirements.–

(1) Reimbursement.–Notwithstanding any other provision of

law, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise

made available to the Director of National Intelligence under

the Intelligence Community Management Account that are

available until September 30, 2028, the Director may reimburse

a covered official for amounts that the official incurred to

implement section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as

added by subsection (a).

(2) Report.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,

the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of the elements of

the intelligence community shall jointly submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a detailed cost estimate

associated with the implementation of the requirements under

section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by

subsection (a).

(3) Covered official defined.–In this subsection, the term

“covered official” has the meaning given that term in section

1127(d) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection

(a).

Section 7 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of

2006 (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) is amended–

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and

inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) information that the Director of National

Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office

of Management and Budget, determines would result in the

exposure of classified programs or activities, including such

information that could, when combined with other publicly

available information, reveal classified programs or

activities.”.

SEC. 804. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED

STATES OF TRANSACTIONS IN REAL ESTATE NEAR INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY FACILITIES.

(a) In General.–Section 721(a)(4) of the Defense Production Act of

1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(4)) is amended–

(1) in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA), by inserting “,

facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence

community,” after “military installation”; and

(2) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by inserting “, facility

owned or operated by an element of the intelligence

community,” after “military installation”.

(b) Applicability.–The amendments made by subsection (a) apply

with respect to transactions proposed or pending on or after the date

of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 805. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FINANCE CORPORATION.

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the

heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, shall

provide intelligence and analytic support to the U.S. International

Development Finance Corporation to ensure all projects of the

Corporation are appropriately informed and strategically executed in

accordance with the purpose of the Corporation as described in section

1412(b) of the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)).

SEC. 806. ESTABLISHING PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING FEDERAL

RESERVE INFORMATION.

(a) In General.–The Director of National Intelligence, in

coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

and in consultation with the relevant heads of the elements of the

intelligence community, as determined by the Directors, shall–

(1) brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System; and

(2) work with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System to create and implement standardized

security and classification measures for protecting information

collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.

(b) Report.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chair of the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall jointly submit

to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the

status of implementing the security measures described in subsection

(a).

the term “appropriate congressional committees” means–

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on

Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 807. AMENDMENTS TO PROHIBIT PAYMENTS TO OBTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY

INFORMATION OR APPROVALS.

(a) Export Control Reform Act of 2018.–Section 1756(c) of the

Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4815(c)) is amended–

(1) by inserting “, collected, or paid” after

“charged”; and

(2) by inserting “or for the award of such license or

other authorization” after “this part”.

(b) Protecting Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled

Applications Act.–Section 2(c) of the Protecting Americans from

Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (15 U.S.C. 9901 note;

Public Law 118-50) is amended–

(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting “;

Prohibition” after “Exemptions”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) Prohibition.–No fee may be charged, collected, or

paid in connection with the execution of a qualified

divestiture.”.

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161) is amended by adding at the end

the following new subsection:

“(c) No fee may be charged, collected, or paid in connection

access to classified information.”.

SEC. 808. OFFENSES INVOLVING ESPIONAGE.

(a) In General.–Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is

amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 3302. Espionage offenses

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment may be

found or an information may be instituted at any time without

limitation for a violation of section 794 or a conspiracy to violate

such section.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.–The table of sections for chapter 213 of

title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“3302. Espionage offenses.”.

of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note; 64 Stat. 1005) is amended by striking “,

793, or 794” and inserting “or 793”.

SEC. 809. PARENTAL BEREAVEMENT LEAVE.

Section 6329d(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by

inserting “, including any instance of the natural or spontaneous loss

of an unborn child (as defined in section 1841(d) of title 18), such as

through miscarriage, stillbirth, or a loss that occurs due to a medical

intervention for a pregnancy emergency, such as the treatment of an

ectopic pregnancy” after “of the employee”.

SEC. 810. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR PURPOSES OF

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PROHIBITION.

Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended–

(1) by striking “that is substantially owned” and

inserting the following: “that is–

“(A) substantially owned”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following: “or

“(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in

section 4872 of title 10;”.

SEC. 811. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS.

(a) Requiring Advantage to Foreign Entity or Injury to United

States Under Economic Espionage Statute.–Section 1831(a) of title 18,

United States Code, is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1),

by striking “benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality,

or foreign agent” and inserting “provide any advantage to a foreign

government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, or injure or

disadvantage in any way the United States, an instrumentality of the

United States, or an agent of the United States”.

(b) Extending Jurisdiction Over Economic Espionage and Trade Secret

Offenses.–Section 1837 of title 18, United States Code, is amended–

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and

inserting a semicolon; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) the victim is–

“(A) a natural person who is a citizen or

permanent resident alien of the United States; or

“(B) a person, including an organization,

headquartered or incorporated in the United States; or

“(4) an act committed in furtherance of the offense used

or took place through–

“(A) communications in interstate or foreign

commerce; or

“(B) financial infrastructure in the United

States.”.

Outside the United States.–Section 1832 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(c) Transmission of Trade Secrets Outside the United States.–

“(1) Offense.–It shall be unlawful for a person to,

without authorization, knowingly–

“(A) transmit a trade secret outside the United

States;

“(B) attempt to commit an offense described in

subparagraph (A); or

“(C) conspire with one or more other persons to

commit an offense described in subparagraph (A).

“(2) Penalties.–

“(A) In general.–Except as provided in

subparagraph (B), any person who violates paragraph (1)

shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, imprisoned not

more than 5 years, or both.

“(B) Organizations.–Any organization that commits

an offense described in paragraph (1) shall be fined

not less than 3 times the value of the stolen trade

secret to the victim, including expenses for research

and design and other costs of reproducing the trade

secret that the organization has thus avoided.”.

(d) Criminalizing Inciting Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade

Secrets.–Chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, is amended–

(1) in section 1831, by adding at the end the following:

“(c) Incitement or Solicitation of Economic Espionage.–

“(1) In general.–It shall be unlawful for a person to

solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade

another person to engage in an offense described in subsection

(a).

“(2) Penalties.–Any person who violates paragraph (1)

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10

years, or both.”; and

(2) in section 1832, as amended by subsection (c), by

adding at the end the following:

“(d) Incitement or Solicitation of Theft of Trade Secrets.–

“(1) In general.–It shall be unlawful for a person to

solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade

another person to engage in an offense described in subsection

(a) or (c).

“(2) Penalties.–Any person who violates paragraph (1)

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10

years, or both.”.

(e) Definition of Foreign Instrumentality for Purposes of Economic

Espionage Prohibition.–Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States

Code, is amended–

(1) by striking “that is substantially owned” and

inserting the following: “that is–

“(A) substantially owned”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following: “or

“(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in

section 4872 of title 10;”.

SEC. 812. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of 1947.–

Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(8))

is amended by inserting “Space Force,” after “Marine Corps,”.

(b) National Intelligence University.–Section 6801(a)(4) of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60)

is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking

“3327” and inserting “3227”.

Calendar No. 420

119th CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 4615

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and

intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the

Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence

Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

May 20, 2026

Read twice and placed on the calendar

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Tom Cotton

Mark Warner

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Mark Warner

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