Open Hearing: Nominations of Matthew G. Olsen to be Assistant Attorney General, Stacey A. Dixon to be Principal Deputy DNI, and Thomas A. Monheim to be Inspector General of the IC

[Senate Hearing 117-83] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 117-83 OPEN HEARING: NOMINATIONS OF STACEY A. DIXON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; THOMAS A. MONHEIM TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; AND MATTHEW G. OLSEN TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 45-490 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine ANGUS KING, Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas BOB CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio ---------- Michael Casey, Staff Director Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- JULY 20, 2021 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia............... 1 Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida................... 3 WITNESSES Gordon, Sue, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence................................................... 4 Dixon, Stacey A., Nominated to be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.......................................... 6 Prepared statement........................................... 9 Monheim, Thomas A., Nominated to be Inspector General of the Intelligence Community......................................... 11 Prepared statement........................................... 13 Olsen, Matthew G., Nominated to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security.............................................. 15 Prepared statement........................................... 17 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Nomination material for Stacey A. Dixon Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 38 Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 55 Post-Hearing Questions....................................... 82 Nomination material for Thomas A. Monheim Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 85 Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 101 Nomination material for Matthew G. Olsen Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 125 Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 158 Post-Hearing Questions....................................... 193 OPEN HEARING: NOMINATIONS OF STACEY A. DIXON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; THOMAS A. MONHEIM TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; AND MATTHEW G. OLSEN TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ---------- TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:46 p.m., in Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R. Warner (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Bennet, Gillibrand, Burr, and Blunt. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Chairman Warner. I'd like to call this hearing to order and welcome to our nominees: Dr. Stacey Dixon, Thomas Monheim, and Matt Olsen. Congratulations on your nominations to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or PPDNI; the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, IC IG; and Matt, just the Assistant Attorney General for National Security. You don't have an acronym yet. Welcome to your families and those who are both here and watching from home. Dr. Dixon, I had a brief moment to meet your parents, Herbert and Phoebe Dixon. Mr. and Mrs. Dixon, I know you must be very proud of your daughter's accomplished record. Tom, I understand your family is watching remotely so want to welcome your wife Cathy, your children, Zach and Kristen, as well as your parents and sister. Matt, it's great to see you again and welcome to your family, who are also joining remotely, although I understand your son from UVA is here. So that is some home points with me. I may even vote for you now. I also want to welcome back to this Committee, someone who has been a good friend, the Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence--as well as positions at NGA, CIA, and a host of other wonderful positions--Sue Gordon. Sue will be making an introduction in a few minutes. Thank you for your service to our country and as I indicated, I always sing Sue Gordon's praises--with the one exception that she did not finish security clearance reform. Dr. Dixon that will now fall to your plate, unfortunately. All three of you have been nominated to key positions in the Intelligence Community. Obviously, when we face enormous challenges, I think you are all incredibly accomplished and I look forward to supporting all three. Dr. Dixon, you've obviously been nominated to be the number two at ODNI, and as I previously said to Director Haines, we have to make sure that our Intelligence Community continues that top imperative, which is always to speak truth to power without fear of political retribution. And I know in our meeting you have made that clear, and it's something that is terribly important. And as we also talked, as we discussed with your capable predecessors, not just Sue Gordon, but Stephanie O'Sullivan, I will look to you to provide leadership across a range of critical issues that sometimes don't get appropriate attention. Security clearance reform, we've already talked about. We talked about overhead space architecture. Another area that we were trying, and we made some progress, is IT reform and bringing some greater efficiencies to the various IC's 18 different components. And obviously, your previous roles at the ODNI, CIA, NRO, director of IARPA, and Deputy Director of NGA will serve you well, and I know you'll hit the ground running. Mr. Monheim, as we saw over the last few years, the job of IC IG is critical. Should you be confirmed, you will hold one of the most vital roles in the Intelligence Community because independent and impartial Inspectors General help to ensure that there's appropriate oversight of the IC. We want to again make sure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. We want to make sure that the IC is conducting their activities within the rule and spirit of the law. And I know that Senator Heinrich, and if Senator Wyden joins us, this Committee strongly stands behind, and my colleagues on the minority side as well, protecting whistleblowers. So, all terribly important and again you have brought enormous experience, General Counsel of NGA, the Deputy General Counsel of the ODNI, and your other roles throughout the IC and military. Finally, Matt, it's always good to see you and it's good to reconnect. I do think many of us probably have asked questions in private which we may not ask in public. You know you had a great career at Uber and a series of other private sector firms. We're glad you're willing to come back to the public sector as Assistant A.G. for the National Security Division. You're going to be a key link between DOJ and the Intelligence Community. Your role will be not only to oversee counterterrorism, including domestic violent extremists, but as we discussed yesterday, one of the challenges of this Committee, FISA 702, which will come back up in a couple of years--how we maintain that tool but appropriately protect Americans' privacy. How we're going to make sure we continue to monitor China's malign activity, whether it's IP theft, traditional espionage, or strategic investments in critical technology. And I do think as we discussed yesterday, it's terribly important--and I'll ask you about this--when we talk about China, we make clear that our beef is with the Communist Party of China and Xi Jinping's leadership. It is not about the Chinese people in China or Chinese-Americans, Asian-Americans, and I think some of that bias will obviously potentially fall into the DVE category. Again, you are very familiar to this Committee from your previous service at DOJ, General Counsel of NSA, and as NCTC Director. So I commend all of you. The Vice Chairman will now make a statement, followed by an introduction by Deputy Director Gordon, and then the Members' questions will be for five minutes in order of seniority. I now recognize the Vice Chairman. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here and willing to do this. You all have previous service, you know what you're getting into, and we're glad you're coming back--and we're grateful to you for your willingness to do it. You know, it strikes me--and I'll be very brief--one of the things that we don't often say enough is it's hard for democracies and open societies to conduct intelligence activities. It's hard for them to conduct espionage, because we are open societies and yet the nature of the work that we do in order to protect our country requires secrecy and not because you're trying to keep things from people, but because you don't want our adversaries to learn about how we learn things and what we know--for obvious reasons. And all three of you play a very important role in that. The American people have very little insight, for obvious reasons--they have insight into almost every other agency of government except those charged with our National Security and Intelligence. And so, they trust two things. One, obviously the oversight of Congress to play its proper role; and the other is the people we put in many of the positions you're about to fill. Dr. Dixon, you know to ensure that, as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, that as I guess the deputy leader of the orchestra, that all the instruments are playing the right music--that we're focused on the right targets, that we're not wasting resources. That people have confidence that we have the right target and the right focus because they don't know: they have to trust you and the oversight we conduct. On the Inspector General side, obviously both our workforce and our country needs to know that intelligence is not being abused. And that the employees within these agencies are not being mistreated. It hurts morale, it hurts our ability to recruit people and keep them, but it also allows wrongdoing to go on. And so, the independence of that office is critical for that sort of trust. And Mr. Olsen, at the National Security Division of the Attorney General's office is twofold. The first obviously is they have to know that we have a robust effort to keep our country safe from threats that come from abroad and that exist from within. But they also need to know that our intelligence capabilities are not being weaponized against our own people. We have had in our history, unfortunately, bipartisan examples of abuses of our intelligence agencies in the past; that's when they've been at their worst. These are really important jobs. The world has changed a little bit since some of you have been in government service. But the basics of what it takes to maintain the confidence of the American people and our system of intelligence gathering and analysis, the bar remains as high and the environment is more challenging. So, we welcome your willingness to serve once again. And we look forward to your testimony here today. Thank you. Chairman Warner. I'd now like to call on former Principal Deputy Director Sue Gordon to make an introduction. STATEMENT OF SUE GORDON, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Deputy Director Gordon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your too kind words earlier. Thank you to Vice Chairman Rubio and to the distinguished Members of the Committee. It is so wonderful to see you and it is an honor for me to be here today to introduce my colleague and friend, Dr. Stacey Dixon, as President Biden's nominee for the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I also note that you will be considering for confirmation two other outstanding former colleagues of mine: Tom Monheim and Matt Olsen. This is indeed a great day for America. Now I remember my great honor sitting before you four years and one day ago at my confirmation hearing for the same position for which you're considering Stacey. I remember hoping that I would be worthy--worthy of the President's nomination and your confidence in me; worthy of the moment; worthy of the position; worthy of the standard set by my predecessor; and mostly worthy of the women and men who I would be graced to lead. I sit before you today knowing--knowing--that the woman I get to introduce to you to is worthy of all those things. Stacey is remarkable. Her biography from an education that could only be better if she had managed to fit in a degree from a really prestigious university, like Duke, to the range of positions she has held, demonstrates excellence and experience relevant for a dynamic, disproportionately technical world. And as you've had a chance to meet with her, you have surely noticed that she is special in the combination of intellect, drive, thoughtfulness, humor, and humanity that she exudes simply by entering a room. And I can feel her family nodding their agreement with me as I sit here. But Stacey is far more than potential energy. Because I've had the wonderful opportunity to know her, to be her boss on several occasions, and to get to watch her perform in a position I've held, I know the impact, her accomplishments, and who she is as a leader. I can assure you she will both do things and do things right. She has been responsible for identifying and delivering technology that made a difference to mission outcome. She has forged the type of partnerships both within and without government that were the cornerstone of lasting accomplishment. She's been the catalyst for disparate groups with disparate agendas coming together for shared quests. She has had the range of leadership opportunities from creation to transformation and from leading tens to tens of thousands. And perhaps most importantly, she has been a quiet, present beacon of hope for those who want to believe in their leaders and who need someone to aspire to be. Now you all know that these are remarkable times where the challenges seem daunting, where the opportunities hang in the air, and where new solutions must be found. We need an Intelligence Community that is true to the unique role it plays in national security, that is underpinned by sound tradecraft, that is relevant in a digital connected world of new threats, that honors the trust the American people place in us, and that inspires its own women and men to accomplish great heights. Stacey is designed for this. Her ability, wisdom, courage, integrity and devotion will certainly carry the day. Now, I need no crystal ball nor keen analytic abilities to tell you that should she be confirmed, Stacey will be a great substantive leader for all 18 agencies and organizations of the IC, a fantastic partner for Director Avril Haines--another remarkable leader and human, and that you will find no better ally in performing your vital oversight functions. I have seen her in action. I know the extent of the job she will be stepping into, and it makes me smile to think of how lucky we will all be to have her in place. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to introduce this exceptional nominee for the exceptional position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Ms. Gordon, and again I speak on behalf of all of our Members, thank you for your service and it's great to see you again and please don't be a stranger. I now ask for unanimous consent that letters of support from the nominees received by the Committee will be entered into the record. With that, we will proceed to administering of the oath. Will the witnesses please stand and raise your right hand. [Witnesses stand and raise their right hand.] Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God? [Chorus of I Do.] Please be seated. Before we move to your opening statements, I'll ask you each to answer the five standard questions the Committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a simple yes or no for the record. First, do you agree to appear before the Committee, here or in other venues, when invited? [Chorus of Yes.] If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? [Chorus of Yes.] Do you agree to provide documents, or any other materials requested by the Committee, in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? [Chorus of Yes.] Will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the Committee when requested? [Chorus of Yes.] Chairman Warner. Matt, you are saying yes on this as well, aren't you? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Chairman Warner. Okay. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman? [Chorus of Yes.] Chairman Warner. Again, we'll have the witnesses' testimony and then we'll recognize Members by seniority up to five minutes each. We're trying to do that at the time of the gavel. Dr. Dixon, are you going to go first, please? STATEMENT OF STACEY A. DIXON, NOMINEE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Dr. Dixon. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today as the nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I am grateful to President Biden for the nomination and to Director Haines for her recommendation. I would also like to thank Sue Gordon for her kind words and support. To borrow a geospatial term, Sue has been a North Star for many of us in the Intelligence Community, and I appreciate her leadership and her mentorship. There's also no way that I would be here before you today without the encouragement and support of my family and friends. I would like to recognize and thank my parents--my father, a retired judge, and my mother, a retired telecommunications vice president; my brother and sister-in-law, an engineer and scientist respectively; my Intelligence Community colleagues; and members of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority. Family, friends, colleagues and classmates are the village that lifts me up, grounds me, prays for me regularly. And I am grateful for their constant presence and support. I'm a testament to the fact that encouragement matters. My parents taught me not to limit myself or constrain what I thought I could accomplish. My teachers had high expectations of me and challenged me to excel; my bosses gave me opportunities to learn, to take risks, and to grow; and my peers, they give me regular feedback that inspires me to grow as a leader. To give you some insight into my journey, I joined the Intelligence Community during the recession of 2002. What I needed most at the time was a job. My post-doctoral fellowship ended at a time when employment offers were scarce, even for a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering. What I received is a nearly 20-year career full of opportunity, excitement, and service. I learned early on that being an intelligence officer is more than a job. I value the opportunity to serve my country, support national security, and work with some of the most talented women and men in government, industry, and academia. My colleagues, the intelligence officers who serve our country, embody the IC core values of excellence, courage, respect, and integrity. During my career, I've had the privilege of serving in both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. Within the Legislative Branch, I worked for the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as a professional staff member, and then was budget director. There, in partnership with this Committee, I learned the importance of oversight, of authorization and appropriation, and of taking and considering the Community as a whole rather than just individual agencies. Within the Executive Branch, I gained direct experience working for four of the 18 elements of the Intelligence Community: CIA, NRO, NGA, and ODNI. I learned how to turn mission needs into technical specifications, and then validate the results. I learned the importance of communicating at all levels, especially during a crisis. I saw how research and development solves hard technical challenges, and in my current role as NGA's Deputy Director, I see daily that it is the people and our partners that allow us to succeed in today's mission while preparing for tomorrow's mission. I am so proud to help lead the women and men of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. I know there are equally talented women and men in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as well as in all the other departments and agencies in the IC. The challenges and threats that Director Haines discussed during the annual threat assessment hearing require more than ever an integrated Community approach. The IC's mission is to collect, process, analyze, exploit, and disseminate information. To do that well as a Community, we will have to embrace new approaches to enable our mission, while also protecting privacy and civil liberties. The IC will have to further harness accelerating technological change, from wherever it originates, to keep pace and evolve. There are increasingly sophisticated threats and the nature of our conflicts continue to shift. We must identify those gaps in our understanding and bring to bear all of the Intelligence Community's expertise against the current threats, while also being mindful of the emerging disruptive trends and posturing the Nation to be competitive against them in the future. During her confirmation hearing, Director Haines outlined three priorities: strengthen the institution, align work and resources to the major threats, and build partnerships. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Director Haines and this Committee to implement those priorities. And to that end, I will leverage my background and experience to help integrate the IC's efforts and drive collaboration, innovation, agility, and diversity and inclusion. The PDDNI's role is more than a manager and more than a leader: it is a bridge builder and a problem solver. There's great strength in the intelligence disciplines coming together to solve enduring problems and encounter the threats we face. And if confirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve with the women and men of the Intelligence Community--and the larger national security enterprise, which includes academia, industry, international partners, the American public, and Congress. I look forward to focusing our efforts on protecting and preserving our Nation's prosperity, influence, and those universal values articulated in our Constitution. I am confident that my experiences have prepared me to assist the Director in leading the Intelligence Community; and if confirmed, I will gratefully continue serving my country. It is truly an honor to appear before you today. I appreciate your consideration of my nomination and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Dr. Dixon follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Dixon. Mr. Monheim? STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. MONHEIM, NOMINEE TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Mr. Monheim. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to be the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. I feel privileged to appear before the Senate, especially alongside my distinguished co-panelists Dr. Stacey Dixon and Hon. Matt Olsen. I'm honored to have been nominated by President Biden and grateful for the endorsement of Director of National Intelligence Haines. I also appreciate the various letters of support submitted by career government officials and political appointees from both parties. I believe this nonpartisan and bipartisan support is especially important for apolitical positions such as Inspectors General. I want to thank the IC IG team and others who supported me while I was the Acting Inspector General during the current and former Administrations. I also want to thank the many colleagues and friends who have helped me during this nomination and confirmation process and throughout my career. Most importantly, I want to express my profound gratitude for the unconditional love and support of my family, including my wife Cathy, my daughter Kristin, my son Zachary, my father Tom, my mother Cathy, and my sister Melissa. I hope my qualifications are evident from my performance in this position for more than a year, my answers to prehearing questions, and the letters of support. In the interest of time, I will not repeat that information here. I would, however, like to briefly highlight three key themes I believe will give you a better sense of who I am as a person and a professional. Those are values, people, and partnerships. The first and foundational theme is values. My parents taught me by their words and their actions the importance of treating everyone with respect, working hard, choosing right over wrong, being accountable, having integrity, and selflessly serving others. After following in my father's footsteps and joining the Air Force, I spent 27 years striving to model the Air Force core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do. During my civilian service, I've associated myself with organizations whose values align with my own. The IC IG core values of integrity, independence, transparency, accountability, and diversity resonate with me, inspire me, and if confirmed, will continue to guide me and the IC IG team. The second key theme is people. People are an organization's greatest asset and leaders must take good care of the people we're entrusted to lead so that together we can better accomplish the mission. My highest priority during the pandemic was to protect the health and safety of the IC IG team while accomplishing our mission as soon as we reasonably and responsibly could do so. The team was resilient and I'm proud of how well they responded to the challenges we faced. Another top leadership priority was to recruit, develop, and retain a premier workforce. I'm pleased we made progress in several areas despite the pandemic, and I believe IC IG is on a positive trajectory. Throughout my career, I've been willing to tell the people I lead and the people we served what I believe they needed to hear and not just what they wanted to hear. The third key theme is partnerships. I have long believed that working closely and collaboratively with others can enhance efficiency and effectiveness. And I've frequently done so with interagency, intergovernmental, international, and other partners to achieve better results and promote the greater good. Inspectors General and Congressional Oversight Committees have a particularly important partnership. Congress and IGs have a shared responsibility to help promote good government and be the eyes and ears of the American people, because full transparency is not possible given the often- secret nature of the Intelligence Community's work. During my time as Acting Inspector General, I demonstrated my understanding of the importance of congressional oversight by actively engaging with congressional committees on multiple occasions on a range of important topics. I have close, collaborative, and productive partnerships with other members of the IC IG Forum, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, the Department of Justice, the Government Accountability Office, and Five Eyes intelligence oversight counterparts. If confirmed, I look forward to further fostering and strengthening all these partnerships. In sum, I'm a values-based, people-focused, collaborative partner, and dedicated patriot. I first solemnly swore the Constitutional oath when I was commissioned as an Air Force officer more than 30 years ago. And I have renewed that oath many times during my military and civilian career spanning seven different Presidents. If privileged to be confirmed as the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, I would proudly take that oath again and do my level best to ensure that Congress and the American people have the trust and confidence that their Intelligence Community operates efficiently, effectively, and lawfully in service to our great Nation. Thank you again for your consideration and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Monheim follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Thank you. Mr. Olsen? STATEMENT OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Mr. Olsen. Thank you, Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, Members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you today as the nominee to be the Assistant Attorney General for National Security. I'm grateful to the President for his confidence in nominating me to this important position. I'm joined today by Members of my family: my son Nate, my sisters Jennifer and Susan, and my three nephews Sam, Charlie, and Henry. I'd also like to just take a moment to remember my parents, Van and Myrna. I was born in North Dakota. My father and my family, we moved here when I was a young boy so that my dad could take a job with a Member of Congress from North Dakota. My mom was a school nurse. In my family, public service was always the highest ideal. Ten years ago, just about to the day, I sat before this Committee as the nominee to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Today, as we approach the twentieth anniversary of 9/11, the work of protecting the Nation remains as demanding and as urgent as ever. We now face a dynamic landscape of threats and adversaries that poses new challenges and complexities combating domestic and international terrorism, countering malicious cyber-activity by foreign adversaries, including China and Russia, and ensuring the confidence of the American people in the use of our intelligence tools. Congress created the National Security Division to take on these challenges, to lead the Justice Department's highest priority protecting our national security. I believe that my experience has prepared me for this responsibility, and if confirmed, I look forward to leading the National Security Division's extraordinary workforce, its career public servants. They are dedicated to securing our Nation with fidelity to our founding values. I began my career almost 30 years ago at the Justice Department in the Civil Rights Division as a trial attorney. I then served for about a decade as a Federal prosecutor here in Washington, DC. The terrorist attacks on September 11th changed the course of my career. I became a special counsel to Director Mueller at the FBI and helped support the transformation of the FBI. In 2006, I returned to main Justice at the beginning of the National Security Division as the Senior Deputy Assistant Attorney General. My job was to oversee the intelligence activities of the division and in part I was responsible for implementing the landmark changes that Congress passed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I served as the General Counsel of the National Security Agency. And then from 2011 to 2014, I was the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. And since leaving government, then I have served in the private sector working on cybersecurity issues. I know from all of this experience that the National Security Division works on a number of fronts to help protect the Nation. I'll touch on a few. First, terrorism. We know that the threat of terrorism from domestic violent extremists is on the rise. Combating this threat, domestic terrorism threat, as well as international terrorist threat is a top priority for the Department of Justice. And if confirmed, I will remain vigilant against all terrorism threats regardless of ideology. Next, the National Security Division plays a crucial role in safeguarding our critical infrastructure and data networks against cyberattacks from our adversaries, especially nation- states like China and Russia. And if confirmed, I will work alongside my partners in government as well as with the private sector to deter, disrupt, and prosecute those responsible for these types of attacks. The Division has also played an important responsibility in preserving our national security tools. It is imperative that the government maintain the trust of the Congress, the FISA court, and the American people in the integrity of how these tools are used, particularly the FISA process. And if confirmed, I will work to ensure that our intelligence activities are carried out on behalf of the American public and that they are carried out in a manner that's consistent with our Constitution, our laws, and our values. Chairman, this Committee plays a critical role in intelligence oversight, in preserving the trust of the American people, and in advancing the security of our Nation. If confirmed, I pledge to be a true partner to Congress and to this Committee. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Well, thank you all and for planning purposes, any Members of the Committee who wish to submit questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by 5 p.m. this Thursday, July 23. Let me also note, I think all three of the witnesses are extraordinarily qualified and I look forward to supporting them. I'm going to ask a brief line of questions and then I will move to Vice Chair Rubio and he will take over the hearing. I apologize to the nominees and their families. There is some of the stuff that's popping in the news that requires my attention in about 20 minutes. Dr. Dixon, you know we've raised this. Given that the DNI is the government security executive agent, how do you see your role in leading the trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, ensuring that transformative security clearance reform remains a top priority for the IC and Administration? We discussed this, but I want to get you on the record. Dr. Dixon. Thank you for that question. Certainly, how we bring the new employees into the Community is extremely important, making sure that there is not a long delay before we can bring in this new talent, because we know they have many other opportunities that they're also considering. We have seen some progress in reducing the backlogs for some of the returned background investigations for our current employees. We've also seen decreases in the timelines for new employees coming in. If I'm confirmed, I certainly look forward to further reducing the timelines, but also committing to the larger government-wide efforts that you mentioned: Trusted Workforce 2.0. We've seen some great examples of being able to do continuous vetting. So, letting the technology help us move our investigations more quickly and I look forward to continuing to further that into the next levels of maturing those particular programs. Chairman Warner. Well the next level--and this is something that we were hoping to get done--is reciprocity. We still have enormous challenges where somebody goes through a security clearance process in one part of the IC; that clearance is not honored by another part. Matter of fact, we saw even within DHS where people couldn't move from one project inside DHS to another project, sometimes with up to a 100-day delay. It's inefficient for the workforce, it costs more money for the taxpayer, and we are not attracting and maintaining that best and brightest diverse workforce if young people have to wait a year or two before they get clearance. So, I look forward to working with you on that. Mr. Monheim. Listen, again a topic we touched on, we've got to make sure that--we discussed this in our private session-- but please explain how you'd come to Congress to inform us of an important issue in your purview? And how do you see your obligations to keep the Congress and specifically SSCI currently informed? Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time we were able to spend in your office. And as I indicated there, I do believe that keeping Congress and the DNI fully and currently informed are among my most important legal responsibilities. And I take those very seriously. I think in my year as the Acting Inspector General, I demonstrated not only a commitment to provide this Committee with everything required to do so by law, but exercising my discretion to provide information about problems, deficiencies, corrective actions beyond what was legally required because I thought it was important that you know that information in order to do your important oversight role. And if confirmed, I commit to take that same approach, and as I indicated, be a trusted partner to ensure that you have the trust and confidence, and the American people have the trust and confidence, that the IG is doing this important job. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Sir. Mr. Olsen, two quick questions for you. One, we touched on briefly yesterday. Every Senator on this dais and most of the Members of this Committee--almost everyone--with the exception, I think, of one or two--are working together in a broad bipartisan way and introducing the legislation today that would have some level of mandatory incident reporting of cyber- incidents to some public-private panel, with appropriate immunity protections and confidentiality protections for those entities that report. Do you believe that this type of legislation would be useful as we try to deal with the enormous threat that cyber poses, that suddenly the American public, I think, has come to realize? Mr. Olsen. Chairman, I certainly have seen firsthand the challenge that we face in cyber, both from my work at the National Security Agency and the Department of Justice now 10 years ago, when the threat was not as great as it is today. And in the private sector, I've seen firsthand, in particular, the threat that we face from the most sophisticated adversaries, which are nation-states, particularly China and Russia, and you can see this in the news on a daily basis. I don't know the precise terms of the legislation that is being proposed. I certainly think that whatever we can do to work together to improve the ecosystem that companies face and that the government faces--because really, we're all in this together, we need to take steps to improve the ecosystem, and I do believe that there's an opportunity for the public sector and the private sector to work together--and potentially with new laws and new authorities--to improve our ability to defend ourselves. Chairman Warner. I appreciate that. We look forward to working with you. I thank Senator Rubio and all the Members of the Committee for putting together what I think is a very, very good first product. And finally, I just want to come back to the topic I raised in our meeting yesterday and in my opening comments. I think the threat of our time is China: it poses a strategic threat and economic threat, a technology threat. But I think it's really important as we and China vie in so many ways that we make clear that our beef is with the Communist Party of China and their policies, not with the Chinese people. And that is not by any means a license for the unfortunate kind of anti- Chinese-American, anti-Asian-American rhetoric that we see too often. We've heard reports in the past, frankly, not even under the Trump Administration, under the Obama Administration, where there was a failure of the Justice Department to even meet with the Chinese-American community on a regular basis. And this needs to be rectified. These American citizens need to have their rights protected, but they need to be part of this. They realize the challenges in a more visceral way many times and we need to make sure that we know who the opponent is, which is the Communist Party of China; and we talked about that. I'd like you to speak to that for a few seconds. Mr. Olsen. Absolutely, and thank you for the opportunity to address that issue and to meet with you yesterday. No doubt about it, China presents the greatest strategic threat to the United States of any country in the world, from economic espionage to theft of trade secrets, human rights violations, competition, and technology. It is the case, and I learned this when I was at the National Counterterrorism Center, that we need to speak precisely and carefully when we talk about the nature of that threat. And I agree completely with you that that threat emanates from the Chinese government, from the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership, not from the Chinese people, not certainly from Chinese-Americans. And we need to be very careful when we talk about this threat because we all have been horrified to see the rise of anti-Asian-American violence. I began my career in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. I care deeply about discrimination and fairness. I think we just need to be very careful in how we talk about this threat. So, we have our eyes on where that threat emanates from and that's the Chinese government. Chairman Warner. Thank you all very much. Again, appreciate that Vice Chairman Rubio, continuing to chair that hearing. Senator Rubio. Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Let me just start, Mr. Olsen, by giving you an opportunity to address something that came up. I'm sure you're aware during the questionnaire, the initial questionnaire, you said you had never represented in any capacity, a foreign government and you also answered no when asked if you'd ever received any compensation from or had been involved in any financial or business transactions with a foreign government, or any entity controlled by foreign government. Then in additional prehearing questions that asked specifically about consulting work, you noted that you were a part-time consultant for two firms, Fairfax National Security Solutions and Booz Allen Hamilton, and worked on matters involving advice for or to the Saudi Arabian government. So I just want to give you an opportunity to address why you answered about your work for Saudi Arabia through these consulting firms in the follow-up prehearing questions but did not address in the initial questionnaire. I want to give you an opportunity to address it. Mr. Olsen. I appreciate that very much Vice Chairman. I interpreted the questions about representing foreign governments, I suppose as a lawyer, strictly. Did I represent those governments? The answer to that is no. I did disclose in the other form that I did a limited amount of work for two firms, Booz Allen and Fairfax National Security Solutions, that was in support of two initiatives involving the Saudi government. One was their interest in building a national counterterrorism center of their own and the other was defensive cyber protections. So, if I misunderstood, I apologize. My goal was to answer the question as directly as possible. Vice Chairman Rubio. The nature of your work was advice. You provided them advice and insight as to how to set up the counterterrorism center and the defensive cyber? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Vice Chairman Rubio. Through these agents, through these entities? Mr. Olsen. Through Booz Allen Hamilton and Fairfax National Security Solutions. It was very limited. Vice Chairman Rubio. I think that the follow-up question that I think bears asking is have you provided any other advice like that to any other foreign governments? Mr. Olsen. No. Vice Chairman Rubio. Mr. Monheim, let me ask you how you would handle--I think I brought this up when we spoke--an instance in which your legal analysis and conclusion as the IC IG would differ from the CIA's Inspector General or from the ODNI's legal counsel. The Committee confronted that at one point either last year or late the year before. How would you handle those instances in which your legal analysis and conclusion are different from what the IG at the Agency or at CIA or the legal counsel at the ODNI? Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Vice Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you yesterday and I appreciate this question on this important matter. I think it raises very good questions of the respective roles and responsibilities and authorities of a variety of senior leaders in the Agency and the Community. I think that the overall shared objective of all of those positions is to ensure that Congress is fully and currently informed, and I'm confident that you would get the information that you needed to do your job. I think part of the independence that is built into the Inspector General system is that I have my own counsel to the Inspector General that does not go through the Office of General Counsel. So, in terms of being provided legal advice, I have my own counsel to have that independent legal advice. I will say in my time as Acting IG, I worked very closely and collaboratively with the ODNI Office of General Counsel and never had an issue where we disagreed such that it mattered in terms of the DNI's performance of their duties or Congress. But if that did arise, and if confirmed, in the future if that arose, I would work closely and collaboratively to try to address those issues. But at the end of the day, I think I have an independent duty to ensure Congress is fully and currently informed, and I would commit to do that. Vice Chairman Rubio. Dr. Dixon, finally. With the exception--putting aside the FBI for a moment and its law enforcement role and its domestic obligations--and this is not a trick question. It's more of something that's really important and it's important for people as part of the whole confidence building in our Intelligence Community. But would you agree that there has to be a foreign threat nexus for our intelligence agencies to collect and analyze on the activities of a U.S. person, separate from a law enforcement function, which is looking at crimes that someone may or may not be committing. But when it comes to the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government, or even the intelligence roles of individual agencies, for us to unleash the power of the Intelligence Community to be used to collect and analyze on what an American is doing--a U.S. citizen, U.S. person is doing, do you agree that there has to be a foreign threat nexus? Dr. Dixon. Vice Chairman Rubio, yes. I do agree that there has to be a foreign nexus. Vice Chairman Rubio. OK, thank you. Senator Feinstein. Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. This Committee has been working to push the IC to get to the bottom of the traumatic brain injuries known as Havana Syndrome, which apparently have been sustained by some State Department and Intelligence Community personnel around the world. And I'm concerned that these attacks appear to be increasing. Just this morning, NBC reported, and I quote, that as many as 200 Americans have come forward to describe possible symptoms of directed-energy attacks. Additionally, ``The New Yorker'' also reported last week that roughly two dozen possible new cases have been reported in Vienna. So, my question--and perhaps I could start with Dr. Dixon--is what would you plan to do about this, and what have you found thus far? Dr. Dixon. Senator Feinstein, thank you for that question and I really appreciate this Committee's leadership on this issue. The impact to the employees in the Intelligence Community makes this the number one priority for the agencies. What we are doing now is literally coming together, both the State Department, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community to one, make sure that we are taking care of individuals who are afflicted by whatever it is that's causing this. Second, that we're also looking to figure out where it's happening, why it's happening, and who is responsible for it so that we can bring to bear all of the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect on it so that we can actually better answer the question. Because right now, directed-energy is a theory. We do not know what's causing this. Senator Feinstein. Well, let me ask one quick follow-up. Are the people that have come to you from one area or are they from a mix of areas, and if so, what are the areas? Dr. Dixon. Ma'am, I can't say the areas beyond what's already been reported. So right now, you know Cuba of course, as well as Vienna that you mentioned in the news report. Senator Feinstein. How many people have come to you or have come to the Agency? Dr. Dixon. I can only speak on behalf of NGA, and we're actually still holding that. That is sensitive information with respect to my own workforce. I cannot speak to how many have come forward for the entire Community. Senator Feinstein. You are saying that that information is classified? Dr. Dixon. I'm saying at this point in time, because we are still going through the process of identifying whether individuals actually have been debriefed and we've gotten the information from them, it's not complete. Senator Feinstein. Let me ask another question. Is what is being reported in the press correct and sustained by what you're finding? Dr. Dixon. I can't speak specifically about the numbers that the press was reporting, but the symptoms that the press is reporting are correct. The locations that they've released, those two locations they've mentioned, are correct as well. Senator Feinstein. Can you tell us how many cases? Dr. Dixon. Ma'am, I cannot at this point in time, but if I'm confirmed, and I have access to all of the information across the Community, I certainly would have a better understanding and be able to bring that back to the Committee. Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, this is the second time I've mentioned it and it really bothers me that something like this is going on. I would just like to ask that the Committee get involved and seek some information. I understand it will be classified, but I think it's very important and I think we should know if something serious is going on. Vice Chairman Rubio. I agree. I'm going to scream at Mark Warner about it tonight. I agree 100 percent, you know. That's an issue that I think everyone on this Committee has expressed a deep interest in this. Senator Burr. Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sue Gordon. Good to see you. Welcome to our three nominees. I'm not sure I can remember a panel of nominees more qualified for the jobs that they've been nominated for than what I see before us today. And I echo the Chairman's comments. I hope we will expeditiously go through the confirmation process. Having said that, I've got a question for each one of you. Stacey, my question for you is how do you plan to assess whether or not the ODNI itself has in fact gotten too large to function effectively current company excepted? Tom, how do you plan to recruit and retain the best talent you can to ensure your Office can fulfill its vital mission to keep the IC free from waste, fraud, and abuse, given that you're not going to be the most popular guy in the organization? And Matt, do you have a plan to work with Director Wray to address the compliance issues FBI has had with their vital authorities? I'll start with Stacey. Dr. Dixon. Senator Burr, thank you very much. I enjoyed our conversation on this very topic. I am a firm believer that the ODNI plays a huge role in helping to bring the Community together; that it also has a number of duties that have been assigned to it through legislation. I don't currently believe that that I have information to suggest that it is too large. I believe that we will take a look at it, and if I'm confirmed, I would certainly be interested in looking from the inside--and I know that Director Haines has been looking at the organization--but to make sure that we are resourced to actually do all the things Congress is expecting us to do. It's something that we have to continue to look at because the situations change, the threats change, and the organization has to change. And I look forward to being part of the review of what size it needs to be to be able to accomplish those things that you're expecting us to be able to accomplish. Senator Burr. Thank you. Tom? Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator, and I appreciate the time we had in your office to discuss a variety of matters, including the importance of getting talent in an office to help ensure we can perform our vital functions. To the point about popularity, I certainly understand that popularity is not a good metric for success for an Inspector General. I would also note that was also true during my time as a lawyer and as a leader generally. Fortunately, I think that the Intelligence Community broadly, and the Inspector General community, currently has and will continue to attract people who are drawn to the mission. The mission matters. It's a great team of people. We have the opportunity to strengthen the Intelligence Community, and in turn, strengthen the Nation. And so, for our part, you know, we go and recruit. We have people who model the type of service that one could be drawn to, and for the variety of certain matter expertise and a variety of experiences to come. And although we've had some staffing challenges at points, as I mentioned, I believe IC IG is on a positive trajectory and especially post pandemic. I think we will continue to be able to aggressively address some of those staffing challenges and continue to retain and develop and recruit a premier workforce to ensure our job gets done. Senator Burr. Thank you. Matt? Mr. Olsen. Senator, thanks for that question. Restoring and maintaining trust in the FISA process is an absolutely critical priority for me. And I know it is for the Department of Justice, the National Security Division, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General, as well as the leadership of the FBI. I was very concerned by the information in the Inspector General's report on the FISA process, identifying a number of critical errors. I was at the National Security Division at its founding in 2006 and the oversight of the FISA process was one of the reasons the National Security Division was formed. And I know that there are a number of committed, dedicated lawyers at the Justice Department, as well as at the FBI, who've already started to work to implement the changes that flow from the IG's report. So, my plan in response to your question would be to meet with Director Wray, with the general counsel of the FBI, my colleagues at the Justice Department, if I'm confirmed, and to ensure that we continue on the path to maintaining and restoring the confidence that's necessary in the integrity of that process. Senator Burr. Thank you, Matt. Based on my back-of-the-envelope calculation, I think between the three of you collectively there's been service in 90 percent of the IC just from the three of you and that's great to have that experience and knowledge concentrated here. Stacey, you've attended more universities in America than most people. Let me assure you, not having Duke on your list is not a disqualifier, but we would like to see a North Carolina school in there at some point. But I think on your bucket list, since you didn't have one, I'll add that just one degree from a school in North Carolina would be perfect. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Heinrich. Senator Heinrich. Moving on from our IC continuing education requirements. Dr. Dixon, you spent the last eight years at NGA, culminating in your service as Deputy Director. What did you learn from your time at NGA that you intend to take with you to ODNI? Dr. Dixon. Thank you for that question, Senator. I learned about the importance of not only having great people with the talents that are needed to move us forward, but really providing that supportive environment and being leaders that they can trust and look up to. It's really important for them to understand their mission and to have the resources necessary to get that mission done. It's also important for them to reach across, outside of their agency, and work with the other agencies and other elements of the Intelligence Community. And all of that, I would bring if I'm confirmed to this next position. I think the strength really is in having each of us come forward with those particular authorities and expertise to try to solve those really hard problems that we've attempted to solve on our own, but we really are unable to do so. So, I look forward to strengthening the support of all the people across the entire Intelligence Community and making sure that we're working together to solve those really hard problems. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Dixon, you wrote that the IC needs to be more flexible and agile to ensure state-of-the-art breakthroughs are actually fielded expeditiously, and that that may require different approaches, especially to acquisition and contracting. Talk to me a little bit about what specifically you may have in mind, and then try to touch on the balance between buying things and building things that exist within the IC. Dr. Dixon. Certainly, Sir, two things. One is the ability to move things from say, research and development or from acquisition straight into operations. That has been something that's challenged many in the Community. Having worked in R&D, I see it acutely. There are things that we know are ready to go out there, but there's extra testing and then there's the budget cycle, which isn't always aligned. So, making sure that we can align the budgets so that we can actually have less time between something being proven and something actually being put in operations. With respect to building and buying--it really is. So, things are built within the Intelligence Community, within the agencies, but those also do rely on having great contractors on staff that are helping us do that. I think increasingly because there are so many great small, and even large companies, out there willing to provide capabilities to help us solve our mission, to satisfy our mission, we need to be able to bring them in more quickly. Some of them are not as used to working with large government agencies and there's a way to work with government agencies. So, figuring out how to reduce some of the bureaucracy so some of the smaller companies who are on that sort of faster cycle who, really, if they don't get that contract, they're probably going to go away in a year. Figuring out how to decrease the timeline so that we can work with them more successfully. Senator Heinrich. Do you see cultural challenges to moving some of those things from R&D--that things become fieldable-- but then you have to explain to people that they are ready for prime time and getting through that time cycle as well and get it out to the people who need it the most. Dr. Dixon. What I've seen work really well is being able to bring the partners, the future partners, in from the beginning--letting them know what you're trying to develop and deliver and having them see along the way as you press past those hurdles, as you pass those tests. That way, they also know when you're attempting to have it complete, and hopefully they can then budget that in. So, there are ways to do it better than I think we've done it historically. But those partnerships between the end user and the developers need to be really, really strong from the beginning of a project. Senator Heinrich. Kind of building in the buy-in from the start. Dr. Dixon. Exactly. Mr. Monheim, you became Acting IC IG in April 2020, and you became acting under relatively difficult circumstances after your predecessor, Michael Atkinson, was unceremoniously fired for doing his job to protect a key whistleblower and to get information to Congress. What's your general view of the IC IG's role with regard to whistleblowers? And are there any steps that you would take should you be confirmed to ensure that IC employees are protected from reprisal for disclosing information to the IC IG? Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator. With respect to the removal of my predecessor, I was not involved in that other than to simply answer the call to serve my country as I've done many times before. With respect to whistleblower programs, I completely agree with and appreciate the support of this Committee about the importance of the whistleblower program that goes back, of course, to the Continental Congress passing a law that it's the duty of all people in public service to report allegations of wrongdoing. For my part, during the time I was the Acting Inspector General, during that year I issued a message of support to reiterate my commitment to protecting whistleblowers and their rights and the importance of that program. I asked Director of National Intelligence Haines when she was confirmed to issue a similar report and she did very soon in her tenure. I issued an instruction about external review panels to update and codify the processes by which IGs would review allegations of reprisal against whistleblowers. We submitted a report to this Committee to talk about possible efforts and made six recommendations to harmonize some of the laws and policies to further strengthen the program. I appreciate this Committee's staff working with the IC IG team to consider specific proposals. And I established an intake action committee to ensure that our hotline program analysts are working closely with our counsel and our investigators to give each matter the serious attention it deserves. I dedicated additional resources to the program and, if confirmed, I would do everything that I can do to continue the positive trajectory that I believe that important program is on. Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Blunt. Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman, and again let me join everybody else in welcoming this panel. You are so well- prepared. I look forward to not just what happens after today, but the relationship we have working with you after today. Dr. Dixon, one of the challenges the Intelligence Community faces is making all the investments we have out there work: artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, cyber. If confirmed, what's your vision of how we maximize the moment we're in and make those things work together in the most effective way? Dr. Dixon. Thank you, Senator Blunt. And you've named many, many of the challenges that we are all in the Community facing and focusing on. I think one of the things that I've seen work well within the Community is when we talk about and we expose to each other's agencies, the types of things we're working on. We can come up with a shared plan for how to go forward together. That is more efficient and more effective, I think, than each individual agency going forward by itself. So, I look forward to harnessing the same experiences that I've had when I was in research and development organizations and we were trying to do that but doing that on a global scale. So, it's both R&D as well as operational systems. We need better insight into how each other is approaching the hard challenges that, I think, we will need to come together to face. And I look forward to, if I'm confirmed, helping the Community come together when those discussions. Senator Blunt. Well, I think we're not going to have less information to deal with all the time. We're going to have more information to deal with and how we get that narrowed down to where a set of human eyes ought to get on it is going to be really important, and I think you're well prepared for that. Mr. Olsen, you've had great private sector experience, great experience in counterterrorism as well. From your counterterrorism experience, can you comment on the value of things like FISA and the danger of what happens if we don't treat the FISA process in the right way? Mr. Olsen. Yes, Senator. FISA, along with other intelligence tools, but in particular FISA, has proven to be an indispensable tool for the collection of foreign intelligence in the counterterrorism context. Going back to my experience at the FBI and then at the Department of Justice over 10 years ago, FISA led to a number of operational successes for the government. And it is imperative that we maintain that tool. The Inspector General's report recently that disclosed a number of failings on the part of the Justice Department, including the FBI, in preserving the integrity of that process to ensure that the applications were complete and accurate is a significant concern. One, it wasn't consistent with the expectations of the FISA court, wasn't consistent with the expectations of this Committee and Congress, and it certainly wasn't consistent with the expectations and trust that the American people have placed in the FBI and the Justice Department. So, it would be a priority for me, if confirmed, to work with the FBI and to ensure that the steps that I understand are currently underway to improve that process are carried through. And to see if there are other steps that we need to take in working with this Committee to ensure that that process is one that the American people can have full confidence in. Senator Blunt. Well, I think if we see any inconsistency there, as you pointed out, that puts the whole program at great risk and it's the kind of thing if we do it right, has great value. And if we do it wrong, we could easily, easily lose it. Mr. Monheim, we had a chance yesterday to talk a little bit about whistleblowers and the role they play in the government. Give me an idea of how the IG best relates to whistleblowers and what the proper role for the IG is in insisting that the right processes be followed there. Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator and I appreciated the time you took yesterday to discuss this and other matters with me. With respect to the Inspector General's role in the current legal framework that Congress provided is that an Intelligence Community employee can come to the Inspector General to provide evidence of wrongdoing and other concerns. And there's a structure in place by which we determine a number of things. Is it credible? Is it urgent? Does the whistleblower intend to communicate this information to Congress? And such things. And then we have specific responsibilities to forward that information to the Director of National Intelligence, and to the Congress in certain circumstances. And we take that program very seriously. We dedicate a number of resources to it. And as I indicated in a prior answer, I remain committed to that program. With respect to the roles and responsibilities of others involved, the Office of General Counsel at ODNI has a role, the Director of National Intelligence has a role. But again, for the Inspector General's part, we are committed to do that again, not just for what is legally required, but as was the case when I was the Acting Inspector General, I exercised my discretion to forward some complaints even if I did not find them credible and to state an urgent concern as legally required, simply because I thought it would be important for this Committee to have the benefit of information and to do your important job Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Chairman Rubio. And first of all, it's great to see Ms. Sue Gordon. Sue Gordon always gives public service a good name and it is just very good to see you, Ms. Gordon. My first question for our nominees is: last year the Committee directed the IC to report on what can be done to protect our country from commercial spyware, the kind of threat that is now being reported at the top of the news across the Nation. So, my question to you, Ms. Dixon and Mr. Olsen, is how seriously do you take this threat and what should the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice be doing about it? Let me start with you, Mr. Olsen, and then you, Ms. Dixon. Mr. Olsen. Senator, I believe I share your concern from the headlines of the past couple of days on this issue. One initial thought is to emphasize the point that when it comes to the United States and its collection activities, the Intelligence Community must adhere to the Constitution, the laws, the regulations, the court orders that apply to those activities regardless of the tools that may be available. So that is an imperative that would be partly my responsibility to enforce, if I'm confirmed as the head of the National Security Division. I think the threat that you mentioned from these tools goes outside of this country to where the concern is that other countries can use these tools in a way that would have human rights concerns or violations. And that's an area where I think we have work to do, myself at the Justice Department along with the Intelligence Community and this Committee. Senator Wyden. Ms. Dixon. Dr. Dixon. Thank you, Senator Wyden, and I also share your concern. I think, in addition to what Mr. Olsen said, I think it's a good reminder of the larger cybersecurity challenge that we face, right? Spyware, malware. These are all things that can infiltrate not only our cell phones, but computer networks more broadly. We need to have a better whole of government approach to dealing with things like this. I think the challenge that we face, of course, is that we've got industry, we have government, we have academia, we have all sorts of different rules and regulations that are keeping us from having the conversations that--well not necessarily rules and regulations. We're not having all the conversations that we need to be having. I would like to see us be more forthcoming in terms of who is experiencing attacks from other places and how we can better provide and secure their networks as well as the cell phones that we have. Senator Wyden. We're going to have more conversations about it, but I'll just let you all know that I think there's got to be some accountability for spies for hire and that is going to be a central part of this discussion. Let me go now to the whistleblower issue. I want to make sure that our nominees agree that the law is clear: that a whistleblower complaint that an Inspector General determines is an urgent concern has to be submitted to the Congress. And this is a yes or no for our three nominees. Mr. Olsen? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Senator Wyden. Ms. Dixon? Dr. Dixon. Yes. Senator Wyden. Mr. Monheim? Mr. Monheim. Yes. Senator Wyden. Good. With respect to the previous Administration, we were finally able to extract from them some commitments about civil liberties and transparency. And I want to make sure that there's no backsliding. Last November, Director Ratcliffe informed me that the IC considered Internet searches to be content, meaning that they would not collect them under the warrantless authorities of the Patriot Act. Do you agree with that, Mr. Olsen? Mr. Olsen. Senator, I will repeat an answer I gave earlier, which is to say that it is imperative that all of these activities take place consistent with the Constitution and statutes. The precise letter of Director Ratcliffe, I'm not familiar with the context of that statement. Certainly, I appreciate that the collection of search terms or browser history raises serious privacy concerns. And I would certainly look to understand better how that information may be collected under various authorities, if I'm confirmed. Senator Wyden. I would like a written answer to that one, Mr. Olsen, because, look, through no fault of their own because of the virus, millions of Americans were home. And Senator Daines and I, on a bipartisan basis, tried to get protection for browser content. We failed just because a couple of Senators were absent. So, I would like a written response to that question. All right, can you get that to us quickly? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Senator Wyden. Okay. The previous Administration also stated that in light of the Supreme Court's ``Carpenter'' case, it would not collect cell site or GPS information under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which didn't require a warrant. Mr. Olsen, if you're confirmed, and Section 215 were to be reauthorized, would you continue this position? Mr. Olsen. Senator, I am not in government now. I need to understand how ``Carpenter'' is being interpreted. It's certainly a significant decision on the Fourth Amendment in the context of the collection of digital information. It applies to cell site location information, the breadth of that decision, how it's being interpreted--I know that prosecutors and investigators need guidance on that question. If I'm confirmed, I'll have the opportunity to engage in understanding how it's being interpreted and to support the guidance that's given to folks in the field. Senator Wyden. I'm over my time and Chairman Rubio is being gracious. One last question. Mr. Olsen, do you agree that the public deserves to know whether and to what extent the various entities of the IC believe ``Carpenter'' applies to them? Mr. Olsen. I believe that the public deserves to know the frameworks around which or upon which we collect information on behalf of the Intelligence Community or in the law enforcement context. I think it's important that to the extent we can, we disclose the legal framework that supports the collection of this type of information. Senator Wyden. I think the response to that one has got to be a yes and you got pretty close. So, we will continue the discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A general comment about the issue that Senator Wyden raised about the spyware is certainly concerning and I'm sure we're going to have discussions about that subject. On the other hand, my first thought was that we all have to be careful about what we put on these devices. One of the 10 points in my high school graduation speech is: Don't write anything into cyberspace you don't want your grandmother to read on the front page of the ``Bangor Daily News.'' And I think we all need to think about that, that there's no such thing as perfect security. That doesn't mean we don't have to deal with this issue that's arisen. But cyber protection starts at the device level. Dr. Dixon, I just want to underline a point that the Chairman started with. This security clearance problem is a serious problem. It's a national security issue because in my view the biggest problem is lost opportunity. People we lose because they can't wait. So, I hope you will continue to follow the good example of Sue Gordon and others who have made such progress on this and not--. I'm afraid if it's not attended to aggressively, we will backslide and we'll end up back with 700,000 or 800,000 people in a backlog. So, I hope you will commit to continuing that project. Dr. Dixon. I will, Sir. Senator King. Thank you. One of the unusual things about the history that we're in right now is that we have to reimagine conflict. We've all thought of conflict over a thousand years as armies against armies, navies against navies. But now with the advent of cyber warfare, the private sector is the front line. They're the target and so I believe one of your missions has to be--and this also goes for the national cyber director, for you, for Avril Haines, for others to form new kinds of relationships with the private sector. We can't have this arm's length. We don't--you know, we don't trust the government. We're not going to share information and successfully meet the cyber challenge. Do you agree with that proposition? Dr. Dixon. I absolutely agree with the proposition. Without having that trust between the two of us, we're not going to be able to deal with the threats that we're facing effectively. I look forward to forging those partnerships if I'm confirmed. Senator King. Thank you. And one other thing and I'm loading tasks on you. But from the point of view of the Director of National Intelligence, it's got to be concerning to us as representatives of the taxpayers and the public that we have 17 agencies. And the specter of duplication and excessive cost is always there. So, it seems to me that one of the roles of the DNI should be to constantly be on the alert to how do we do these things more efficiently. And we just can't have duplicated cyber agencies, for example, within each. I mean they have to be cyber protection within each agency, but there's also a role to be had for some kind of central, efficient administration. Dr. Dixon. Sir, I would agree with you completely. I think that avoiding duplication is number one, but finding efficiencies and sharing the way that we're approaching things and just coming up with better solutions by working together is the priority that I will put in place if I'm confirmed. Senator King. Thank you and you're going to work with and for an outstanding leader. I think the team that the President has put in place at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is outstanding. Mr. Monheim, you and I have talked about the role of IG as an incredibly important role, a very unusual role when we essentially hire people within the government to report on the malfeasance of the government. As you point out, it goes back to 1778, prior to the actual adoption of the Constitution with the Colonial Congress, Continental Congress, but particularly important in the Intelligence Community because it's a secret agency. So, I understand your commitment and I hope--. I guess my question is would you be willing to be fired if the executive didn't like the fact that you released what you thought was a valid and urgent whistleblower's report? Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator. I've repeatedly risked my life for this country and I am certainly willing to be risking my job for it. Senator King. There could not possibly be better answer. Thank you. I said that once about one of my state troopers. I said, I trust my life to this guy and then I said, as a matter of fact, I did. Mr. Olsen, one of the issues that I think has been brought to the fore by the SolarWinds attack is the fact that our very powerful intelligence agencies like the NSA and the CIA stop at the water's edge. They're not allowed to work within the United States. So, the SolarWinds hacker, they're based in Russia. They go through a server in New Jersey and all of a sudden, we have a gap in our coverage, if you will. I don't expect you to provide an answer to this, but do you believe that this is something that needs to be addressed? Bearing in mind that we don't really want to be spying on Americans, but we've also got to protect Americans. That's the tension inherent in the system. Mr. Olsen. Yes, Senator. And I agree that your question really goes to the heart of one of the great challenges that we face when it comes to defending the country against cyberattacks. I would commend you and your colleagues for the work on the Solarium Commission report on cyber security. I think the recommendations in that report are excellent. And I do think you have individuals who are in office now, a really strong team who understands the challenge that your question raises. We have a great deal of authority and information through the work of the Intelligence Community on threats we face in cyber. But the private sector inside the United States is the primary victim of these attacks. And we need to bridge that divide between what the government knows and what the private sector faces when it comes to cyberattacks. I think the Justice Department and the National Security Division, particularly over the past few years, has really upped its game in supporting the work of the Intelligence Community and working with industry to help to bridge that divide. But there's certainly more work to do. Senator King. Thank you very much. Thanks to all of you for your willingness to serve in these important positions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Bennet. Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll echo my colleague from Maine's observation about how grateful all of us are for your willingness to serve in these positions. I only have one question today. And Dr. Dixon, it won't surprise you to know that it's about space. Maintaining our superiority in space and protecting space as a peaceful and secure domain is critical to our competition with China. In its annual threat assessment from earlier this year, the Intelligence Community wrote, quote, Beijing is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that Washington has accrued from space leadership. The Intelligence Committee also wrote that, quote, China has counter-space weapons capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites. With respect to Russia, the U.S. Space Command said in December that it concluded that Russia conducted a test of a direct ascent anti-satellite missile which if tested on an actual satellite or used operationally could cause a large debris field that could endanger commercial satellites and pollute the space domain. You spent time at NGA, which is responsible for developing the requirements for geospatial intelligence space capabilities, including commercial imagery. Do you believe our processes for acquisition are keeping pace with the threat and with innovation and the innovation that's occurring in the private sector? How can we improve the requirements process for things like commercial imagery so we're effectively capturing advancements in innovation? Dr. Dixon. Senator Bennett, thank you for that question. Space has definitely been something that I've been spending much of my career on from the very beginning. A couple of things. I'll start at the end of your question with respect to working with commercial industry. We do need to be able to move faster than we have in the past. I think working with the NGA and the NRO working together, we have a very good understanding of both the current space capabilities that are out there by U.S. companies as well as what's coming in the future. I'm looking forward to seeing the role that commercial space will continue to play as we try to satisfy our missions. But we do need to figure out how to bring to bear the new capabilities that they're developing more efficiently and more effectively than we have in the past. It's not about big, large contracts of one particular vendor. It's about really being able to take advantage of all the capabilities and the diversity there. With respect to the other side of it, the protections in space also are extremely important and you mentioned some of the threats that we're facing now, and we do have strategic competitors that are trying to be better than we are in space. We feel that very acutely at NGA. We need to maintain that sort of superiority, not only in the underlying understanding of the science behind getting things to move around in space, but the capabilities that are out there and what we need to keep the society going We have so many dependencies on space that it will take all of us working together--defense, Intelligence Community, and really society writ large--to really be able to protect the capabilities and continue to leverage space in the way that it's in fact impacting our world in a very positive way. Senator Bennet. I think the only thing I would add is I think this Committee stands ready to be helpful if we can. So, to the extent that you detect barriers or ways in which existing law is compromising our ability to come together in a unified way, intelligence and defense, I think people here are going to want to hear about that so that we can try to improve the ecosystem and keep that edge that we need to keep. So, thank you again for your willingness to serve and everybody else. I'm very grateful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. All right, anything else? Thank you for your time, and with that, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 4:07 p.m.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]

Committee Leadership

Tom Cotton

Mark Warner

All Committee Members

Recent Legislation Activity

Hearings & Meetings

Reports & Publications

Committee Resources