PrintCalendar No. 420
119th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 119-133
=======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027
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August 5, 2026.--Ordered to be printed
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Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 4615]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 4615) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2027 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account (ICMA), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on April 21,
2026, that the request for the National Intelligence Program
(NIP) for Fiscal Year 2027 was $81.9 billion. Other than for
limited unclassified appropriations, the classified nature of
United States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee prepared
a classified annex to this report that contains a classified
Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of
Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 and has the legal status
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976), as amended,
and the Rules of Procedure for the Committee.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2027 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year
2027.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2027 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the ICMA of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for
Fiscal Year 2027.
Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2027.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Section 301. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence
and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence
Section 301 redesignates the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence as the Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, and the current Deputy Directors of National
Intelligence as Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.
Section 302. Repeal of National Intelligence Management Council
Section 302 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
repeal the statute codifying establishment of the National
Intelligence Management Council.
Section 303. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and
offices
Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
repeal the office of IC Chief Data Officer, the Intelligence
Community Innovation Unit, the Framework for Cross-Disciplinary
Education and Training, the Foreign Languages Program, and the
Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Section 304. Transfer of National Intelligence University
Section 304 transfers the statutory functions of the
National Intelligence University (NIU) to the National Defense
University (NDU).
Section 305. Limitation on domestic activities at the National
Counterterrorism Center
Section 305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
permit the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to receive
and retain intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism to
enable NCTC to collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence
pertaining only to international terrorism.
Section 306. Timely provision of security direction to intelligence
community whistleblowers
Section 306 requires the relevant Inspectors General to
provide security guidance to whistleblowers within seven
calendar days of notification that the whistleblower intends to
contact the intelligence committees.
Section 307. Notification of certain declassifications
Section 307 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
mandate that the DNI notify the congressional intelligence
committees and the Archivist if the DNI exercises her authority
under section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 to declassify or
downgrade properly classified information. Section 307 also
requires each IC element to notify the congressional
intelligence committees and the Archivist if the element
exercises the authority under section 3.1(d) of Executive Order
13526 to declassify information where the need to protect such
information is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure.
Section 308. No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or Internal
Security Functions for Director of National Intelligence
Section 308 establishes that the DNI has no police,
subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security
functions.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency authority
regarding unmanned aircraft systems
Section 401 extends the CIA's authority to allow authorized
CIA personnel to better detect and respond to threats posed to
CIA facilities and assets by unmanned aircraft, to align with
other Federal agencies' similar authorities.
Section 402. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule
Section 402 makes a technical correction to the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended by Section 7316 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, with
respect to officers or employees of elements of the IC.
Section 403. Modification relating to security personnel at certain
installations
Section 403 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to authorize the CIA to exercise law enforcement
jurisdiction over certain National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
facilities.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Section 501. Authority of National Security Agency to correlate,
evaluate, and disseminate certain intelligence
Section 501 permits the Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA) to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate
intelligence related to national security.
Section 502. Prohibition on availability of funds for relocation of
Office of Intelligence and Analysis to certain facilities
Section 502 prohibits NIP funds from being used to move or
relocate the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) to any facility other than
a facility owned by DHS.
Section 503. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with
and by the National Reconnaissance Office
Section 503 permits the NRO to use appropriated funds for
intelligence and communications purposes to pay for the
arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence activities
conducted by the NRO. Section 503 further permits the NRO to
use funds other than appropriated funds for such arrangements
in certain limited circumstances.
Section 504. Modification of annual report on Federal Bureau of
Investigation case data
Section 504 clarifies a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) reporting requirement regarding terrorist organizations.
Section 505. Establishment of Office of Counterintelligence
Section 505 establishes an Office of Counterintelligence
within the Department of Treasury's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.
Section 506. Modification of responsibilities of Office of Intelligence
and Analysis
Section 506 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to
require that the activities of the DHS I&A have a foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence nexus, prohibits collection
of intelligence or information on U.S. persons, and changes the
scope of I&A's responsibilities from terrorism to foreign
threats to the homeland.
Section 507. Role of National Security Agency in collection and
analysis of signals intelligence
Section 507 establishes that the Director of the NSA will
provide direction for and coordination of signals intelligence
activities across the IC, and will coordinate with other
departments, agencies, and elements of the United States
Government authorized to undertake signals intelligence
activities to ensure effective use of resources and risk
assessment for such activities.
TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 601. Amendments to presidential appointments for intelligence
community positions
Section 601 amends the requirements for Presidential
appointments and Senate confirmation of certain IC positions.
Section 602. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly
available information concerning United States persons
Section 602 codifies IC Policy Guidance 107.1, which
requires each IC element to develop procedures for responding
to unmasking requests.
Section 603. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products
Section 603 codifies IC Directive 203, which establishes
analytic tradecraft requirements for all-source intelligence
products.
Section 604. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management
Account funds for certain entities
Section 604 prohibits ICMA funds from being used to support
analytic collaboration efforts by non-profit entities that
receive funds from foreign governments (with the exception of
the Five Eyes), or by certain research or advocacy
organizations that receive funds from foreign adversaries.
Section 605. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship
Program
Section 605 creates a fellowship named after Senator Ben
Sasse for IC employees to gain experience at technology
companies and bring that experience back to their home
agencies.
Section 606. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the
Department of Commerce
Section 606 directs the establishment of the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office within the Department of
Commerce.
Section 607. Countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national
intelligence priority
Section 607 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to
prepare a report on hostile foreign cyber actors, including
foreign scam centers.
Section 608. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or
former intelligence community employees
Section 608 requires the General Counsel of an element of
the IC to notify the congressional intelligence committees if
that element makes a criminal referral of a current or former
IC employee to the Department of Justice.
Section 609. Modification of definitions in National Security Act of
1947 and scope of intelligence sharing responsibilities of
Director of National Intelligence
Section 609 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
limit the definition of ``intelligence'' to foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence. Section 609 also limits
the definition of ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence
related to national security'' to intelligence involving
foreign threats to the United States. Section 609 further
amends the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify that the
DNI can share intelligence with other Federal agencies.
Section 610. Prohibition on intelligence community use of adversary
unmanned ground vehicles
Section 610 prohibits the IC from procuring or operating
autonomous ground vehicles from the People's Republic of China
(PRC or China), the Russian Federation (Russia), the Islamic
Republic of Iran (Iran), or the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DRPK), with limited exemptions.
Section 611. China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force
Section 611 requires the DNI and Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence and Security to establish a task force to
coordinate efforts to provide indications and warning of any
military aggression by the PRC against Taiwan.
Section 612. Limitations relating to Chinese products and services
Section 612 amends Section 6604 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fisal Year 2026 to expand the scope of
covered applications that are required to be removed from
national security systems to include any product or service
from any entity of the PRC that is included on the Entity List
maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the
Department of Commerce, the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial
Complex Companies List, or the list of Chinese military
companies required under Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021. Section 612 further amends Section 414 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to prohibit
all IC elements from procuring certain information or
communication technology products manufactured in China, Hong
Kong, or Macau, or a product or service provided by an entity
that is fully or partially owned or controlled by, or otherwise
connected to, the government of China, without first completing
a security assessment.
Section 613. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive
cyber operations conducted by nongovernmental entities
Section 613 prohibits the IC from providing intelligence or
support for offensive cyber operations by nongovernmental
entities not operating under IC or presidential authorities.
Section 614. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence
community
Section 614 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, to determine which elements of the IC
would benefit by receiving anonymized biological data and
intelligence regarding foreign biological threats and to
disseminate such data and intelligence to those agencies.
Section 614 further requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, to ensure standards regarding anonymized
biological data and information collection are consistent with
other Federal agencies and to facilitate access to relevant IC
databases.
Section 615. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets
Section 615 prohibits IC employees, contractors, and former
employees and contractors who hold a security clearance from
participating in prediction markets relating to any nonpublic
information to which they had access by virtue of their
employment and clearance status. Section 615 further provides
that such prohibition extends two years after the individual
leaves their employment or contract with the IC.
Section 616. Repeal of certain report and briefing requirements
Section 616 repeals unnecessary, outdated, or duplicative
reporting and briefing requirements.
Section 617. Intelligence community personnel travel, allowances, and
related expenses regulations
Section 617 directs the Director of the CIA to review its
travel regulations and report to the congressional intelligence
committees with recommended changes. Section 617 further
instructs the DNI to biennially review travel procedures and
submit reports to the congressional intelligence committees
with recommendations for changes necessary to carry out
intelligence functions.
Section 618. Prohibition on sending and receiving objects using
entities owned or controlled by persons or governments of
certain countries
Section 618 instructs the DNI to develop a list of products
and technologies that affect American national security and
prohibits the IC from sending or receiving these items using
shipping companies that are controlled or owned by persons or
government entities domiciled in the PRC, Russia, Iran, or the
DPRK.
Section 619. Enhancing intelligence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
region
Section 619 directs the DNI, in coordination with Five Eyes
nations, to improve intelligence cooperation with regional
partners and allies.
Section 620. Intelligence activities related to Ukraine
Section 620 directs the DNI, in coordination with the heads
of the IC elements, to ensure intelligence support to Ukraine
through the duration of the conflict with Russia and to notify
the congressional intelligence committees if the DNI decides to
materially reduce intelligence support. Section 620 provides
that, if Russia and Ukraine agree to end the conflict, the DNI
must adjust intelligence sharing to support implementation of
that agreement and to maintain and build Ukrainian defense
capability. Section 620 further requires reporting on the
resolution and Ukraine's status. Section 620 also directs the
DNI to provide Ukraine and members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) early warning of potential Russian
aggression against Ukraine.
Section 621. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing with
countries of significant concern to the United States
Section 621 directs the DNI to notify the congressional
intelligence committees if intelligence support is restricted
or materially downgraded regarding Israel, Ukraine, Taiwan, or
other countries designated by the President.
Section 622. United States-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement
Section 622 directs the President to expand and enhance
intelligence sharing with Israel, limits reductions in
intelligence sharing, and requires notice to the congressional
intelligence committees of any material changes to intelligence
sharing. Section 622 further directs the President to expand
intelligence sharing with Abraham Accord countries. Finally,
Section 622 requires the President to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees annually for five years
describing these intelligence sharing relationships.
TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATED TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Section 701. Artificial intelligence exploitation guard and
intelligence sharing
Section 701 establishes a three-year pilot program run by
the NSA's Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC) to
facilitate sharing intelligence and threat information with
frontier artificial intelligence (AI) developers.
Section 702. Director of National Intelligence review of intelligence
community use of artificial intelligence to support targeting
Section 702 directs the DNI to conduct a review and submit
a report to the congressional intelligence committees
identifying and describing the IC's use of AI tools in the
lethal targeting cycle and to issue policies to mitigate
identified risks.
Section 703. Improvements for artificial intelligence policies,
standards, and guidance for intelligence community
Section 703 directs the Chief Artificial Intelligence
Officer of the IC to review the IC's policies for labeling
intelligence information generated or modified by AI and the
adequacy of access-management systems for information used by
agentic AI systems. Section 703 further directs the DNI to
issue policy guidance on the use of agentic AI systems.
Section 704. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial
Intelligence Security Center
Section 704 directs the AISC to make available a research
test-bed to private sector and academic researchers to engage
in AI security research, including pre-deployment testing of AI
models.
Section 705. Reports on novel uses of artificial intelligence
technology
Section 705 requires the DNI to submit recurring reports to
the congressional intelligence committees detailing any novel
use of AI technology in advance of that technology's deployment
within the IC.
Section 706. Clear labeling of artificial intelligence outputs for
targeting workflows
Section 706 requires the DNI to establish a policy that
requires labeling of outputs from AI systems that are used to
develop or inform lethal targeting.
Section 707. Research on use of artificial intelligence relating to
inadvertent escalation
Section 707 requires Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity (IARPA) to research the specific ways in
which the IC's use of AI could contribute to inadvertent
escalation and report the findings to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Section 708. Research on interaction of adversarial artificial
intelligence systems with intelligence community systems
Section 708 requires IARPA to research novel dynamics and
vulnerabilities that may arise from the interaction of
adversarial AI systems with the IC's AI systems and report the
findings to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 709. Proliferation assessments regarding the export of
artificial intelligence-related technologies
Section 709 requires the DNI to provide to the President
and the congressional intelligence committees an analysis of
the risks associated with granting a license for the export of
AI technology at least 90 days before the Secretary of Commerce
grants such a license.
Section 710. Review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities
under Vulnerabilities Equities Process
Section 710 directs the Director of the NSA to evaluate the
sufficiency of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) in
identifying AI vulnerabilities. Section 710 further directs the
Director to provide reports and a briefing to Congress
regarding its evaluation of the VEP as it relates to AI.
Section 711. Prohibition on certain artificial intelligence models on
intelligence community systems
Section 711 prohibits the IC from using AI systems that
have been found to have generated child sexual abuse material
or nonconsensual intimate images of adults. Section 711 further
requires such models to be removed from IC networks unless the
IC can implement safeguards or the model's provider cures its
defects.
TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS
Section 801. Modification to notification requirements for authorized
and ordered departures
Section 801 requires the Department of State to inform the
congressional intelligence and national security committees if
an American embassy is subject to an authorized or ordered
departure.
Section 802. Identification of reallocable frequencies
Section 802 amends the authorization of the Spectrum
Relocation Fund to clarify eligibility for Title 50 agencies
that utilize spectrum and whose usage could be impacted by
future reallocation decisions.
Section 803. Protection of classified information relating to budget
functions
Section 803 requires the Executive Branch to use secure
systems for NIP budget functions, including obligating and
expending funds, performing financial management services, and
developing and submitting budget materials to Congress.
Section 804. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States of transactions in real estate near intelligence
community facilities
Section 804 directs the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States to review real estate transactions involving
a foreign person or entity near IC facilities.
Section 805. Intelligence support to the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation
Section 805 requires the DNI to provide intelligence
support to the U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation.
Section 806. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting
Federal Reserve information
Section 806 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the FBI, to work with the Chair of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to implement security
measures for protecting information collected or generated by
the Federal Reserve.
Section 807. Amendments to prohibit payments to obtain national
security information or approvals
Section 807 amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,
the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled
Applications Act, and the National Security Act of 1947 to
prohibit payments to obtain national security licenses,
authorizations, or access to classified information.
Section 808. Offenses involving espionage
Section 808 removes the statute of limitations for certain
espionage offenses.
Section 809. Parental bereavement leave
Section 809 amends Title 5, Section 6329d to extend
bereavement leave to employees who have suffered the natural or
spontaneous loss of an unborn child.
Section 810. Definition of foreign instrumentality for purposes of
economic espionage prohibition
Section 810 amends the definition of foreign
instrumentalities in Title 18, Section 1839 to include
enterprises domiciled in Russia, China, Iran, or the DPRK.
Section 811. Protection of trade secrets
Section 811 amends Title 18 to extend jurisdiction over
economic espionage and theft of trade secret offenses,
criminalize the unauthorized transmission of trade secrets
outside the United States, criminalize inciting the theft of
trade secrets and economic espionage, and establish that
enterprises domiciled in Russia, China, Iran, or the DPRK are
foreign instrumentalities for the purposes of the chapter.
Section 812. Technical amendments
Section 812 makes minor technical amendments to the
National Security Act of 1947.
Committee Comments and Direction
Notification of Certain Declassifications
The Committee has historically not received timely notice
when the heads of IC elements declassify or downgrade
information or intelligence relating to intelligence sources,
methods, or activities. Therefore, the Committee directs the
DNI, or the Principal Deputy DNI, as delegated by the DNI, to
notify the congressional intelligence committees and the
Archivist of the United States in writing immediately upon
declassifying, downgrading, or directing the declassification
or downgrading of information or intelligence relating to
intelligence sources, methods, or activities pursuant to
section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526, or any successor
order. The Committee further directs the head, or senior
official, of each element of the IC, to notify the
congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the
United States in writing immediately upon declassifying,
downgrading, or directing the declassification or downgrading
of information or intelligence relating to intelligence
sources, methods, or activities pursuant to section 3.1(d) of
Executive Order 13526, or any successor order. Each
notification made pursuant to this paragraph shall include a
copy of the information that has been, or has been directed to
be, declassified or downgraded.
Briefing on Space and Counterspace Matters
The Committee derives enormous value from ad hoc, periodic
briefings from both the Department of Defense (DoD) and IC on
combined Title 10 and Title 50 activity in the space domain.
The Committee particularly values the congressional defense
committees endorsement of one-time read-ins for select Title 10
programs to enhance the congressional intelligence committees'
understanding of how the DoD defends the IC space architecture.
However, the Committee remains concerned about siloes between
Title 10 and Title 50 special access programs that impede
oversight.
Therefore, the Committee will continue its practice of
holding an annual briefing with the Director of the NRO and the
Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force. This briefing
shall include (1) an assessment of the space and counterspace
capabilities of the United States and its adversaries; (2) an
identification of all threats to the national security space
infrastructure of the United States; and (3) proposals of any
policy needed to protect, or otherwise advance, the national
security interests of the United States in space. Each briefing
shall be conducted at the highest classification level without
restrictions, and all compartmented information related to
space and counterspace matters shall be made available to the
Committee during the briefing.
Requirement for Office of the Director of National Intelligence to
Establish a Memorandum of Understanding with the National
Defense University Clarifying its Role in the National
Intelligence University
The Committee supports the decision of the DNI to transfer
responsibility for the NIU to the NDU. However, there remain
many unanswered questions about what role, if any, the DNI will
play in providing financial resources for NIU infrastructure,
students, staff and faculty, or research efforts; allowing NIU
students to continue using Roberdeau Hall during the transfer
period; participating in the Senior Advisory Board to provide
strategic direction and input into NIU's curriculum; and
ensuring that ODNI students, faculty, or staff may participate
in the NIU once it has transferred to NDU. Therefore, the
Committee directs the DNI to establish a Memorandum of
Understanding with NDU within 90 days of enactment of this Act
that addresses these questions and any other issues that the
President of NDU deems necessary to ensure a successful
transfer of NIU.
Declassification of Church Committee Archival Records
Per the stipulations in S. Res. 474 (96th Cong.), the
archival records of the United States Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (``the Church Committee'') become eligible for
public release starting in October 2026 after undergoing a
declassification review. This Committee supports the
expeditious public release of these historically valuable
records and directs CIA to prioritize their declassification.
Furthermore, this Committee supports CIA's usage of appropriate
AI tools to expedite the declassification process.
Countering Foreign Malicious Cybercriminal Organizations
The Committee directs that, not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI, in consultation
with the Director of the FBI, shall submit to the Committee a
report on hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam
centers and including, at a minimum, Prince Group, Huione
Group, L.Y.P. Group, Jin Bei Group, Funnull Technology Inc.,
TransAsia International Holding Group Thailand Company Limited,
The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, and HH Bank Cambodia PLC.
The report should include:
(A) An identification of the individuals and entities
constituting hostile foreign cyber actors, including
foreign scam centers, that pose the most significant
threat.
(B) An identification of the locations from which the
individuals and entities identified under subparagraph
(A) operate.
(C) A description of the infrastructure, tactics, and
techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including
foreign scam centers, commonly use, including reliance
on any products or services subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
(D) A description of any relationships between the
individuals and entities that operate hostile foreign
cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, and their
governments or countries of origin that could impede
the ability to counter threats from such centers.
(E) An identification of communications and financial
services providers subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States that provide enabling services to
individuals and entities identified under subparagraph
(A).
(F) A description of any relationships that the
individuals and entities identified under subparagraph
(A) have with transnational organized crime groups.
(G) A discussion of the relationships, if any,
between foreign hostile foreign cyber actors, including
scam centers, and foreign security services.
(H) A discussion of any intelligence collection gaps
on such hostile foreign cyber actors, including scam
centers.
(I) A description of the available authorities across
the IC to disrupt the activities of these centers which
target U.S. persons.
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the report
shall be made available to the public.
Prohibition on Clearance Holder Participation in Online Prediction
Markets
Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the DNI shall issue a policy restricting the
participation of covered individuals in online prediction
markets. ``Covered individual'' means an employee or
contractor, or a former employee or contractor, of an element
of the IC who holds a security clearance. The policy shall
provide that, except as necessary to conduct authorized
intelligence activities, no covered individual may participate
in any online prediction market (including any online platform
that allows agreements, contracts, transactions, or swaps
between users over the outcome of non-financial future events,
such as sports, military activities, and elections) on any
topic relating to nonpublic information to which the covered
individual has or had access by virtue of being a covered
individual. The prohibition shall be in effect during (a) the
period during which the covered individual is employed or
contracted by an element of the IC and (b) the two-year period
beginning on the date on which the covered individual ceases to
be employed or contracted by an element of the IC. The policy
shall establish appropriate penalties for violating the
prohibition and providing notice to all covered individuals.
National Counterterrorism Center Social Media Report
The Committee directs that, not later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the NCTC shall submit a
classified report to the Committee identifying existing
challenges for the counterterrorism enterprise in removing
foreign terrorism recruitment content on each widely used
social media platform where online radicalization takes place.
Such a report should detail any current legal restrictions and
social media platform policies which prevent content removal.
IC Efforts Against PRC Cislunar Ambitions
The Committee believes that the United States has real and
growing political, economic, and strategic interests in
cislunar space. Meanwhile, the PRC is moving aggressively to
promote its interests in cislunar space, at the expense of the
United States and the friends and allies of the United States.
The Committee believes the IC must increase its focus on PRC
cislunar programs, activities, and intentions. Therefore, the
Committee directs the DNI to prepare and submit to the
Committee a report that addresses the following matters: an
assessment of the current IC posture to collect timely and
actionable intelligence and provide insightful analysis on the
PRC's cislunar plans, capabilities and operations; a plan to
significantly enhance the IC's posture both in terms of
personnel and collection capabilities to collect information
and provide timely analysis of the PRC's cislunar space plans,
capabilities, and operations; and a listing of the funding
required, on an annual basis over the next five years, to
implement such a plan, including the recommended allocation of
funds across the various IC organizations.
The Committee also directs the DNI to establish an
information exchange program to facilitate engagement with U.S.
companies that are involved in developing, deploying and
operating cislunar and lunar space systems. Such engagements
should include information sharing regarding the PRC's cislunar
space plans, capabilities and operations.
Strategy on Intelligence Sharing and Briefings for Artificial
Intelligence Vendors and Researchers
The Committee has closely tracked the extent to which
leading AI systems demonstrate advanced capabilities in the
generation of synthetic media and computer programming code,
and in areas such as object recognition, natural language
processing, complex system design, and workflow orchestration.
These advanced capabilities, and their accessibility to a wide
range of users, have increased the rate of development and
adoption by foreign adversary countries, which have used or
illicitly acquired American AI capabilities to generate
synthetic media for influence campaigns, develop and manage
computer network exploitation campaigns, design or develop
weapons systems, enhance surveillance capabilities in ways that
undermine the privacy and threaten the security of citizens of
the United States, and facilitate illicit technology transfer.
The Committee believes that the provision of expedited
clearance adjudication, or one-time read-ins, for leading AI
vendors and researchers would dramatically enhance the ability
of the United States to identify and counter threats posed by
foreign adversary countries enabled by, or directed toward,
commercial AI capabilities in the United States. Additionally,
the Committee has repeatedly heard that a gap exists in
engaging leading U.S. AI firms and researchers with respect to
counterintelligence risks posed by foreign adversary use or
targeting of AI capabilities of U.S. providers.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) and the
Assistant Director of the FBI for the Counterintelligence
Division to jointly establish and implement a strategy to
provide threat intelligence, defensive briefings, and
bidirectional information exchanges, as appropriate, for
vendors of AI systems, including model developers and
infrastructure providers, and other relevant entities and
individuals, such as academic or nonprofit researchers, and to
solicit voluntarily, as appropriate and consistent with
applicable laws, information from such vendors and other
relevant entities and individuals regarding:
(A) Efforts by foreign adversary countries to use
products or research of such vendors or other entities
or individuals for malicious activity described above.
(B) Threats posed by foreign adversary countries,
including indications of compromise to networks
associated with such vendors and other entities and
individuals, or other technical indicators, indicating
a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an AI system, or to the supply chain of
an AI system, including training or test data,
frameworks or software libraries, training or inference
computing environments, or other components necessary
for the training, management, or maintenance of an AI
system.
(C) Activity of foreign entities of concern to
clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously
access the systems of such vendors for purposes of
illicit technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair
economic advantage, including through techniques to
extract a model's technical capabilities to replicate,
develop, or improve a foreign AI model without
authorization by the vendor.
(D) Activity of foreign entities of concern to
sabotage or otherwise clandestinely degrade AI systems
or the supply chain of an AI system, including training
or test data, frameworks or software libraries,
training or inference computing environments, or other
components necessary for the training, management, or
maintenance of an AI system.
(E) Observations, emerging concerns, or other inputs
from vendors or researchers regarding relevant
malicious or clandestine activity of foreign entities
of concern toward an AI system, its supply chain, or
other necessary components.
To the greatest extent practicable, the Committee
encourages such a strategy to leverage existing information
sharing processes, including those that protect sensitive
information shared from private sector parties from disclosure
and provide legal protections for sharing information with the
U.S. Government.
Implementation of Comptroller General Recommendations Relating to the
Personnel Security Clearance Process
While the timeliness of security clearances related to
onboarding has improved, the data needed to analyze choke
points, costs, and reciprocity issues for purposes of cost
efficiencies and overall improvement of the security clearance
process is vital. The Committee notes that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) published several reports on the
government-wide personnel security clearance process, including
recommendations to the DNI. The Committee is encouraged that
ODNI implemented many of these recommendations and made
progress resolving issues GAO identified. Still, more work
remains as ODNI has not fully implemented all of GAO's
recommendations on this process.
In particular, the Committee shares the concerns
highlighted in GAO-26-107100, ``Personnel Security Clearances:
Actions Needed to Address Significant Data Reliability Issues
That Impact Oversight,'' dated December 11, 2025, regarding the
DNI's oversight of agencies' security clearance processes,
particularly regarding the data ODNI collects from agencies on
timeliness, the number of investigations completed, and other
key aspects of the personnel security process. The Committee
also shares GAO's concerns that ODNI has not issued adequate
guidance to agencies for assessing their data and does not
review the data it collects in a way that aligns with data
reliability principles.
Thus, the Committee agrees that the DNI should promptly
take the following actions to implement GAO's recommendations
in that report:
(A) Develop and implement a process that guides
ODNI's efforts to assess agencies' security clearance
data. This process should incorporate data reliability
practices or principles, such as those found in GAO's
``Assessing Data Reliability'' (GAO-20-283G), dated
December 16, 2019, or those established by Data
Management Association International in chapter 13 of
its ``DAMA-DMBOK: Data Management Body of Knowledge,''
2nd edition, 2017.
(B) Issue and monitor agencies' adherence to guidance
clarifying the agencies' role in assessing data to
improve the reliability of the data they report to
ODNI. The guidance should require agencies to assess
the characteristics, quality controls, and limitations
of their data, using data reliability practices or
principles, and address any gaps.
(C) Define, at each relevant agency, the senior data
official's role for assessing the reliability of the
agency's data, and ensure agencies have identified
these accountable officials.
(D) Analyze and update, to the maximum extent
practicable, ODNI's personnel vetting policy framework
to incorporate GAO's key practices for evidence-
building and performance-management activities from its
report ``Evidence-Based Policymaking: Practices to Help
Manage and Assess the Results of Federal Efforts''
(GAO-23-105460), dated July 12, 2023, and apply those
practices in its oversight of the clearance process.
Audit of Intelligence Support to the National Vetting Center
The Committee remains concerned by efforts of the PRC to
access, surveil, and potentially disrupt or steal sensitive
academic research within the United States. The National
Vetting Center (NVC) and the companion Intelligence Community
Support Element (ICSE) play an important role in supporting the
vetting of visa applications by foreign nationals, including
those seeking access to institutes of higher education engaging
in sensitive research, including defense- and national
security-related research. However, the Committee is concerned
about the level of IC support to the NVC and supports efforts
to protect against espionage and the illicit transfer of
critical and emerging technologies to countries of concern.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a performance audit of the ICSE's
role in supporting vetting of applications for student and
research visas by PRC nationals.
The Committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committee on its review within 180 days, with final
results to follow in a mutually agreed upon timeframe and
format.
Exploiting Commercial Hypersonic Capabilities for Indications & Warning
Validation
The Committee notes the rapid pace at which adversary
hypersonic capabilities--including the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) Air Force's fielding of fighter-launched hypersonic
missiles, the PLA Rocket Force's continued expansion of
hypersonic glide vehicle inventories, and Russian deployment of
multiple maneuverable hypersonic systems--are challenging the
IC's ability to characterize and identify indicators and
warnings and counter these threats at the pace of fielding.
The Committee further notes that the United States benefits
from a uniquely competitive commercial hypersonic flight test
ecosystem, with multiple providers conducting recurring flight
test campaigns at scale. The Committee believes that this
domestic ecosystem represents an underutilized resource for IC
foreign hypersonic threat exploitation activities, including
signature characterization, sensor calibration, indication-and-
warning algorithm development, and red-team threat
representation for IC test and evaluation events.
The Committee therefore directs the DNI, in coordination
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
to conduct an assessment of opportunities for the IC to
leverage U.S. commercial hypersonic flight test capabilities--
particularly those capable of air-launched, multi-salvo, and
rapidly reconfigurable threat-representative profiles--to
accelerate foreign hypersonic threat understanding, sensor
calibration, and indications-and-warning system development.
The assessment shall be provided to the congressional
intelligence committees not later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act, and shall include any required
authorities, funding mechanisms, or interagency arrangements
necessary to formalize IC use of commercial hypersonic flight
test capabilities as a sustained intelligence enterprise
activity.
Voice-based Risk Assessment Tools
The Committee recognizes the ongoing importance and
increasing challenge of properly vetting individuals who will
be granted access to sensitive installations throughout the
U.S. national security enterprise. Validating assets, vetting
foreign nationals and supply chain partners, and conducting
continuous evaluation for existing personnel and contractors
all place restraints on capacity and resources that limit the
speed and scale of action across the national security
workforce and its supporting industrial base.
As the IC continues to look for ways to address these
challenges, the Committee encourages the elements of the IC to
evaluate emerging technologies, including voice-based risk
assessment tools, that offer the potential to augment and
complement human-led investigative and vetting processes,
reduce backlogs, support faster and more scalable
adjudications, and strengthen screening of assets, personnel,
contractors, vendors, and other third parties with access to
sensitive programs, facilities, or information. While such
technologies may not be a perfect fit for every agency, it is
critical to explore the use of all tools that can mitigate
counterintelligence risks to the national security enterprise.
Synchronizing National Reconnaissance Office and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency Efforts Related to Commercial Imagery
Acquisition
The NRO is the primary acquirer of commercial satellite
imagery for the IC and the DoD, while the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) is responsible for fulfilling
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) requirements of the IC and
DoD, in addition to its responsibility for acquiring commercial
GEOINT analytic services, or value-added imagery products.
NRO's Electro-Optical Commercial Layer (EOCL) contract is based
on NGA's validated GEOINT requirements to meet IC and DoD
commercial imagery needs through 2032.
The Committee has long been concerned about low levels of
funding for commercial imagery and has questioned whether the
EOCL contract is flexible enough to keep up with emerging
commercial imagery capabilities and constellations. The
Committee has also been concerned that NRO's acquisition of
commercial imagery under the EOCL contract is not well aligned
to NGA's validated GEOINT requirements, resulting in
contracting, resourcing, and management tensions between NRO
and NGA and shortfalls in the collection of foundation GEOINT
imagery.
The Committee maintains that deeper integration of the NRO
and NGA commercial offices can help both organizations address
longstanding challenges to their ability to fully address IC
and DoD commercial imagery needs. The Committee therefore
directs the Directors of the NGA and the NRO to jointly develop
and submit to the Committee quarterly progress reports through
fiscal year 2027--aligned to the delivery of existing quarterly
commercial imagery updates--on efforts to synchronize ongoing
agency efforts related to commercial imagery acquisition. Those
efforts include: (1) further integration of the NRO and NGA
commercial offices through processes, documentation,
activities, and personnel exchanges; (2) improving alignment of
commercial imagery contracts to validated foundation imagery
requirements; and (3) determining the best approach to
integrate commercial imagery data into the ground system
architecture in a manner that ensures flexibility and
traceability of requirements.
Intelligence Diplomacy
The Committee recognizes that intelligence diplomacy--
defined by Intelligence Community Directive 405 (ICD-405) as
the sharing of intelligence information with a foreign
government on a specific threat or issue in support of a
preferred policy objective--is critical to advancing U.S.
foreign policy and national security goals. The Committee
recognizes that intelligence diplomacy provides unique
mechanisms for advancing U.S. strategic objectives through
structured engagement with foreign partners, as well as a
vehicle for ally and partner capacity-building through
technical assistance, professional development, and
infrastructure modernization. Collectively, these and related
efforts help build institutional trust and generate enduring
decision advantage for the United States and its partners.
Accordingly, the Committee supports elevating intelligence
diplomacy as a tool of U.S. statecraft and directs the DNI, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of
relevant IC elements, to prioritize sustained investment in
intelligence diplomacy initiatives with Major Non-NATO Allies
and other key partner nations. Such initiatives should include
institutional capacity-building, partner professionalization,
senior leader engagement, robust bilateral intelligence
exchanges, tailored liaison officer exchanges, and the
development of bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements. These
efforts should advance U.S. strategic interests, counter
adversary influence and gray-zone activities, and bolster
allied resilience against current and future security
challenges.
Proliferation Assessments Regarding the Export of Artificial
Intelligence-Related Technologies
The Committee believes that proliferation of advanced AI
technology presents a unique national security challenge.
Frontier AI systems--including the most capable model weights,
advanced integrated circuits, and the manufacturing equipment
required to produce them--can be leveraged by U.S. adversaries
for applications ranging from autonomous weapons and signals
intelligence exploitation to mass surveillance and offensive
cyber operations. A single export decision that places these
capabilities in the hands of a U.S. adversary could degrade
U.S. military and intelligence advantages for years,
particularly if the technology is subject to onward transfer to
adversary end-users beyond the reach of U.S. enforcement.
The Committee is unaware of any formal mechanism to ensure
that a comprehensive national security assessment reaches the
President and Congress before a consequential export is
approved. Meanwhile, Congress has mandated intelligence
assessments in analogous high-stakes export contexts. The
Committee finds that the strategic importance of advanced AI
technology--and the difficulty of reversing the consequences of
a flawed export decision--warrants a comparable mechanism.
Accordingly, the DNI, acting through the National
Intelligence Council and in coordination with the Directors of
the CIA and the NSA, and the heads of other appropriate
elements of the IC, is directed to produce a written report for
the President and the congressional intelligence committees no
fewer than 90 days before either (1) the Secretary of Commerce
grants a license for the export, reexport, or in-country
transfer of AI intelligence technology--including U.S.-origin
model weights, advanced integrated circuits, semiconductor
manufacturing equipment, and items controlled under ECCN 3A090
or 4A090; or (2) the United States enters into or joins an
agreement on AI with a foreign government.
The report should include the following information:
(A) An assessment of recipient country's export
control system for AI technology.
(B) Past, present, or expected commercial and
governmental interactions between the recipient and
countries of proliferation concern, particularly China.
(C) An assessment of the consequences of onward
proliferation for U.S. national security.
(D) Mitigation measures the recipient could
reasonably undertake.
(E) In the case of a license, specific IC measures to
evaluate compliance with associated restrictions.
(F) Whether the recipient's intended and likely end
uses, including military, intelligence, and
surveillance applications, are consistent with U.S.
national security interests.
Each report should be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
Prohibition on NCTC Assessments with No Foreign Nexus
The Committee directs that no funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act may be used by the NCTC to prepare or
contribute to intelligence analytic products concerning
terrorist threats that have no identified foreign nexus. This
direction shall not be interpreted as restricting the Director
of NCTC from responding to a terrorist attack of unknown origin
that takes place in the United States or from performing
activities necessary to determine determining whether an
individual or group operating within the United States has any
connection to a known or suspected foreign terrorist, foreign
terrorist group, foreign power, or other foreign entity.
Prohibition on Use of National Intelligence Program Funds for Domestic
Terrorism Analysis by the Department of Homeland Security
Office of Intelligence and Analysis
The Committee is concerned about the use of NIP funds to
collect information on U.S. persons absent any affiliation with
foreign intelligence or foreign adversaries, and the subsequent
dissemination and/or use of that information. Therefore, the
Committee directs that no funds authorized to be appropriated
by this Act may be used by the DHS I&A for purposes of domestic
terrorism analysis. This direction shall not be interpreted as
restricting I&A from responding to a terrorist attack of
unknown origin that takes place inside the United States or
from performing activities necessary to determine whether a
violent extremist or group operating within the United States
has any connections to a known or suspected foreign terrorist,
foreign terrorist group, foreign power, or other foreign
entity.
Russia and China Nuclear Tests
The Committee appreciates the IC keeping the Committee
fully and currently informed of the nuclear developments of
Russia and China.
Since signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) in 1996, China and Russia have conducted yield-producing
nuclear weapons tests. Both China and Russia have built
extensive nuclear test ranges in underground facilities and
have taken steps to avoid their test activities being detected
by the International Monitoring System (IMS).
China conducted annual nuclear-weapons-related tests at its
Lop Nur nuclear test site in support of its nuclear expansion
efforts. Some of these tests were intended to produce yields up
to hundreds of tons. An IMS seismic station in Kazakhstan
detected one of China's tests on 22 June 2020. During the last
few years, China has expanded many facilities at Lop Nur,
illustrating continued support for its testing activities and
suggesting that designers will execute more complex test
seasons in the future.
Russia has conducted annual nuclear-weapons-related tests
at its Novaya Zemlya nuclear test facility every year, except
for 2020. Some of these tests have produced nuclear yield that
would be inconsistent with the US's interpretation of zero-
yield CTBT.
Access to Classified Intelligence Information Outside of Established
Review Processes
The Committee directs that, not later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter
for 5 years, the DNI shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the approval of interim
security clearances, or other approvals to access classified
intelligence information that deviate from the investigative
and adjudicative standards established under Executive Order
12968 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 note; relating to access to
classified information), for employees or contractors of the
IC, or other individuals granted access to the facilities or
information maintained by the IC, during the preceding calendar
year.
The Committee directs that the first report under this
provision shall include information for each of the calendar
years 2017 through 2026. Each report required by this provision
should include: (1) the number of such approvals, disaggregated
by sponsoring agency, duration of access, and level of security
clearance or access; (2) the investigative and adjudicative
process conducted, if any, for each such level of security
clearance or access; (3) a categorization of the justifications
supporting such approvals, and the number of approvals in each
category; and (4) the disposition of such approvals after 6
months from the initial access or interim clearance,
disaggregated by the number of instances in which access was
terminated, continued, or resulted in completion of a process
satisfying investigative and adjudicative standards required by
Executive Order 12986.
Committee Action
On May 20, 2026, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
The Committee made the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill,
together with the classified annex for Fiscal Year 2027, the
base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two
amendments to the base text.
By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Senator Wyden to amend the National Security
Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 regarding certain whistleblower-related
authorities. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:
Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no;
Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no;
Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator
Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye.
By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Senator Wyden to prohibit IC contractors and
subcontractors from collecting and selling certain location
data. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman
Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator
Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator
Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman
Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator
King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye;
Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted a
motion to table by Chairman Cotton in response to Senator
Wyden's appeal of the ruling of the Chairman that Senator
Wyden's two annex amendments were not filed in compliance with
Committee deadlines. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator
Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator
Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator
Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator
Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; Senator Kelly--no.
Votes to report the committee bill
On May 20, 2026, the Committee voted to report the bill, as
amended, by a vote of 14 ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator
Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator
Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator
Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye;
Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--
no; Senator Kelly--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 20,
2026, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN COTTON, SENATOR RISCH, SENATOR COLLINS,
SENATOR ROUNDS, AND SENATOR BUDD
We are pleased to include in this bill several corrective
provisions that respond to abuses of intelligence authorities
that took place under the Biden administration. First, this
bill clarifies that the definition of intelligence includes
only foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. According to
50 U.S.C. Sec. 3003, ``the term intelligence includes `foreign
intelligence' and `counterintelligence'.'' Yet under the Biden
administration, we witnessed various elements of the
Intelligence Community (IC) engage in mission creep into purely
domestic activities. Section 609 of the bill refines the
definition of intelligence to ensure only foreign and
counterintelligence can be considered as ``intelligence'' for
the purposes of intelligence activities under Title 50.
Similarly, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
under the Biden administration interpreted the existing statute
as permitting the production of intelligence analysis on
domestic, law enforcement matters lacking any foreign or
counterintelligence nexus. The NCTC was established by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458) in response to the failure of law enforcement and the
IC to ``connect the dots'' leading up to the September 11, 2001
attacks. The NCTC was to serve as a ``go-between'' where law
enforcement could check IC holdings as to whether a person of
interest in a terrorism investigation might have a connection
to foreign terrorist groups. The NCTC itself was never meant to
work solely in the domestic, law enforcement space. Section 305
of the bill clarifies a limitation in what NCTC can do with
regard to domestic activities. While it remains entirely
appropriate for law enforcement to query NCTC's holdings for
foreign connections, NCTC may not perform solely domestic work.
Nothing in this section is meant to limit NCTC's support for
Trump administration efforts to go after transnational criminal
organizations such as the cartels, all of which have been
designated as ``foreign terrorist organizations'' and therefore
fall squarely within NCTC's responsibilities.
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in 2002
with the enactment of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296).
Its primary mission was to ``access, receive, and analyze law
enforcement information, intelligence information, and other
information from agencies of the Federal Government, State and
local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies),
and private sector entities, and to integrate such
information'' in order to identify, assess, detect, and
understand terrorist threats to the homeland. This mission
filled a critical gap by enabling information sharing among
state and local governments, the private sector, and relevant
parts of the Federal government (including the IC and the other
components of DHS). This was in keeping with the long-held
precedent in U.S. law that foreign intelligence collection and
analysis should be separate and distinct from domestic law
enforcement.
With enactment in 2007 of the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53), I&A's mission
expanded beyond facilitating information sharing to preventing
terror attacks against the homeland. Specifically, this Act
directed I&A to support both the functions of the newly-created
National Counterterrorism Center, as well as the ``mission
responsibilities of the Department'' as they related to
terrorism against the homeland. This is significant, because
DHS defines ``terrorism'' in part as ``any activity that
involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially
destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and is
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State or other subdivision of the United States.'' This statute
fundamentally changed I&A's original foreign intelligence
function by giving it responsibilities that fall squarely in
the domestic, law enforcement arena.
The Committee has witnessed this statute being used
inappropriately in numerous instances, to include in 2021, when
I&A began producing analysis on ``domestic terrorism'' that
lacked any connection to a foreign nexus. It was also deputized
to be a part of DHS's ill-advised, and now-defunct,
``Disinformation Governance Board,'' an effort to restrict
American speech by labeling speech the government disapproved
of as ``disinformation.'' I&A also collects information on U.S.
persons, even if those individuals lack any foreign or
counterintelligence nexus. These are just some of the
disturbing activities I&A supported in recent years.
Intelligence elements should not engage in activities that
lack any foreign intelligence or counterintelligence nexus, and
we are pleased that the underlying bill includes a section that
provides needed reforms to I&A.
Section 506 amends I&A's underlying statute to ensure that
it stays within the scope of responsibilities of an
intelligence element. Specifically, section 506 replaces the
references to ``terrorism'' or ``terror attacks'' with
``foreign threats,'' and strikes I&A's responsibility to
support the ``mission responsibilities of the Department.''
Further, section 506 better protects Americans' privacy by
prohibiting I&A from collecting any intelligence or information
on U.S. persons, and prohibiting any clandestine collection.
The IC is vitally important to national security, and it is
critical that it remain laser-focused on foreign intelligence
threats to the United States. Domestic activities lacking any
foreign intelligence nexus fall squarely within law
enforcement. We are pleased that several of the provisions in
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027
reinforce this important distinction.
With enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Congress provided the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) broad authority to
coordinate relationships and intelligence sharing with foreign
intelligence services with the expectation that the DNI would
be transparent with the congressional intelligence committees
in doing so. At the time, Congress did not believe it was
necessary to hold the DNI to the same notification requirements
imposed on the Secretaries of Defense and State for military
assistance. However, during Israel's effort to bring to justice
the HAMAS perpetrators of the horrific October 7, 2023 attacks
on Israeli civilians as well as hostage recovery efforts of
United States persons, the Secretary of Defense notified
Congress of pauses in weapons shipments, but DNI Avril Haines
did not notify Congress regarding any adjustments to
intelligence support to Israel. This lack of transparency
hinders the congressional intelligence committees' oversight
responsibilities to ensure that intelligence sharing enhances
the bilateral relationship between Israel and the United
States.
Section 622 amends the DNI's authority to require
notification to the congressional intelligence committees of
any major change to the intelligence sharing relationship
between the United States and Israel and prohibits suspension
or material reduction of intelligence sharing with Israel
absent a significant national security concern. It further
authorizes DNI Walter ``Jay'' Clayton and the Trump
administration to enhance intelligence sharing with Israel and
Abraham Accord countries in support of the President's policies
to eliminate the threat posed by Iran.
Tom Cotton.
James E. Risch.
Susan M. Collins.
M. Michael Rounds.
Ted Budd.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BENNET
I am pleased that under the leadership of Chairman Cotton
and Vice Chairman Warner, the Committee reached bipartisan
agreement on an Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal
Year 2027 that will strengthen U.S. national security by
providing our intelligence community (IC) personnel, including
thousands of Coloradans, with the resources and authorities
that they need to protect our nation.
This bill addresses many of my priorities, most especially
the importance of ensuring the uninterrupted provision of U.S.
intelligence support to Ukraine. As a result of U.S. and allied
investments, Ukraine has substantially halted Russia's momentum
on the battlefield and developed a capacity to conduct warfare
unlike any NATO member state. Ukraine's armed forces are now
not only less dependent on U.S. military support; they also are
postured to contribute to U.S. and NATO efforts to deter and
help defeat any future Russian aggression in Europe, as well as
address evolving threats to U.S. forces in the Middle East and
Indo-Pacific.
The Committee's bipartisan action to codify U.S.
intelligence support to Ukraine in this bill ensures that the
architecture underlying Ukraine's recent battlefield success
will not be interrupted and increases pressure on Russian
President Putin to come to the negotiating table, supporting
diplomacy aimed at securing a comprehensive settlement of the
conflict. Moreover, by removing the ambiguity as to whether the
United States will continue its intelligence support of Ukraine
in the event of any future peace deal, the bill enables long-
term planning, budgeting, and execution by the IC necessary to
help enforce a future agreement, bolster U.S. and NATO
deterrence against future Russian aggression, and deepen joint
efforts with Ukraine in areas of mutual benefit (e.g., U.S.-
Ukraine cooperation on unmanned aerial systems and countering
unmanned aerial systems, which Sen. McConnell and I propose to
strengthen through the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense
Authorization Act).
I am similarly pleased that this bill provides for stronger
intelligence cooperation with U.S. allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific to enhance multilateral deterrence, requires
measures to address the national security risks posed by the
proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to
U.S. adversaries, and supports sustained investment in
intelligence diplomacy. These are all priorities that I
championed.
Separately, and consistent with the Committee's
longstanding practice, the bill provides for continued U.S.
intelligence cooperation with Israel. Although such cooperation
offers potential benefits to the United States, I am concerned
by the gaps between what Israeli intelligence officials
reportedly anticipated would occur in the event of an armed
conflict with Iran and what has unfolded after the United
States and Israel jointly attacked Iran on February 28, 2026,
without congressional authorization. Additional bipartisan
oversight is necessary to clarify why senior U.S.
decisionmakers apparently discounted U.S. intelligence and
military assessments that diverged from Israel's optimistic--
and, in hindsight, mostly inaccurate--projections of how the
war with Iran would unfold.
I have repeatedly warned that some actions by Prime
Minister Netanyahu's government are detrimental to U.S.
national security and risk undermining the American people's
support for U.S.-Israel security cooperation. In particular, I
am gravely concerned by the explosion in extremist settler
violence in the West Bank, which affects U.S. citizens and
permanent residents and which current and former Israeli
officials acknowledge the Netanyahu government has failed to
curtail. As I noted during the drafting process of this year's
IAA, the U.S. government lacks a systematic intelligence
assessment of extremist settler violence in the West Bank and
the consequences for U.S. policy goals. I hope there will be
bipartisan support in the future for directing the production
of such an assessment, consistent with Congress's Article I
authority to direct intelligence production in support of its
oversight responsibilities.
Similarly, senior Administration officials, including the
President, Vice President, and Secretary of State, have rightly
and publicly reaffirmed U.S. opposition to Israeli annexation
of the West Bank. In seeming contravention of this U.S. policy,
however, the Netanyahu government has directed record levels of
new settlement authorization in the West Bank, legalized
previously unauthorized outposts, approved large-scale land
declarations, and provided for significant Israeli government
expenditures on settlement construction and administration.
Structured IC scrutiny of these and other Israeli activities,
in the form of a recurring assessment, would inform Congress'
oversight.
I have long argued that the IC is the essential backbone of
U.S. national security. Critical to the IC's remarkable
successes is ensuring that our IC personnel are not asked to
undertake missions that may be better suited for other U.S.
departments and agencies. Indeed, experience suggests that IC
mission creep and an over-reliance by policymakers on covert
tools of statecraft can sometimes lead to unintended
consequences and undermine progress toward U.S. national
security goals. With this as context, I expect that the
Committee, in furtherance of its best bipartisan tradition and
mandate, will continue robust oversight aimed at ensuring that
the IC's evolving activities and mission set complement and do
not supplant the equally consequential work performed by U.S.
diplomats and military personnel.
Michael F. Bennet.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Fiscal Year 2027 Intelligence Authorization Act
represents a dramatic retreat from years, and in some cases
decades, of congressional oversight.
As was the case last year, the bill eliminates Senate
Advice and Consent for key Intelligence Community leadership
positions. First, it surrenders the Committee's, and the
Senate's, opportunity to vet the general counsels of the CIA
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. At a
time of rampant lawbreaking by the Trump Administration, it is
especially troubling that the only Intelligence Community
general counsels currently subject to Senate confirmation--the
people responsible for offering legal advice on secret,
potentially controversial intelligence activities--would be
appointed without any congressional or public input or
scrutiny.
The bill also eliminates Senate Advice and Consent for the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center at a time in
which the Center is expanding its activities into the realm of
domestic law enforcement, particularly through the NCTC
Intelligence Fusion Center, in a manner that poses a real
danger to Americans' rights. It also removes the Director of
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center from the
Senate confirmation process, even as the bill puts the Director
in charge of a new Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office in the Department of Commerce, a wrongheaded and
unnecessary expansion of the Intelligence Community.
This year's bill omits important whistleblower protections
that have been in previous Committee-reported bills, in some
cases for the last five years. I am disappointed that my
amendment to include these whistleblower protections in the
bill was defeated on a party-line vote. The Committee's retreat
from what had been a long-standing bipartisan approach to
whistleblower protection legislation is especially troubling
during an administration that commits so many abuses. I do
welcome a provision preventing the DNI and the CIA Director
from thwarting whistleblowers' efforts to come to Congress by
denying them guidance on how to do so, a problem I have long
sought to address. The bill does not, however, resolve the
legitimate concerns of whistleblowers who may not want the
details of their complaints submitted to the directors in the
first place, for fear of retaliation.
The bill also excludes a critically important provision
that was included in last year's bill. That provision stated
that, if a company wants to be an Intelligence Community
contractor, it can't also be a data broker selling the location
data of intelligence officers. That provision would address a
real counterintelligence vulnerability and I am dismayed that
my amendment to include it in this year's bill was rejected by
a party-line vote.
I also filed two amendments to the classified annex to
address intelligence activities about which I have deep
concerns. I submitted these amendments five days prior to the
committee mark-up of this bill, but regrettably the Chairman
and the Majority refused to vote on these amendments and denied
me the opportunity to even discuss the underlying, troubling
intelligence activities. I have served on this Committee for
more than twenty-five years and do not recall a single instance
in which the Committee rejected an amendment to the classified
annex from any consideration at all, regardless of when it was
submitted. It is a sad irony that, almost fifty years to the
day after the Senate created the Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Chairman and Majority set out to prevent
debate on the annual authorization of classified activities,
one of the Committee's most important oversight
responsibilities.
Ron Wyden.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH AND SENATOR RON WYDEN
We voted against the Intelligence Authorization Act because
of deep concerns about the markup process, which denied
necessary debate on certain classified activities. We are also
concerned about the activities themselves and their support in
the classified annex.
Martin Heinrich.
Ron Wyden.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
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Senate Intelligence Committee Releases Bipartisan Report Detailing Foreign Intelligence Threats
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