Report to Accompany S. 2342, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

Calendar No. 120

119th Congress }                                                {  Report

SENATE

1st Session   }                                                {  119-51

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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

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July 29, 2025.–Ordered to be printed

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Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,

submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany S. 2342]

The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an

original bill (S. 2342) to authorize appropriations for fiscal

year 2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities

of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community

Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement

and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports

favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

Classified Annex to the Committee Report

Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of

National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 4, 2025,

that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP)

for Fiscal Year 2026 was $81.9 billion. Other than for limited

unclassified appropriations, the classified nature of United

States intelligence activities precludes any further

disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its

budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee prepared

a classified annex to this report that contains a classified

Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of

Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 and has the legal status

of public law. The classified annex is made available to the

Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of

Representatives and to the President. It is also available for

review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of

Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976), as amended,

and the Rules of Procedure for the Committee.

Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

The following is a section-by-section analysis and

explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2026 (the “Act”) reported by the Committee.

TITLE I–INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes

appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related

activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year

2026.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts

authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and

intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2026 are

contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that

the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made

available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and

House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized

by law

Section 103 provides that funds authorized to be

appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other

benefits for federal employees may be increased by such

additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for

increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 104. Limitation on transfer and reprogramming of funds

Section 104 clarifies that funds authorized to be

appropriated for the NIP may not be transferred or reprogrammed

until those funds are made available for purposes of Section

102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and may only be

transferred or reprogrammed as authorized by section 102A(d).

TITLE II–CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA

Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2026.

TITLE III–INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property

Section 301 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized

access to IC property.

Section 302. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and

assets from unmanned aircraft.

Section 302 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of

1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and

respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by

unmanned aircraft.

Section 303. Modification of acquisition authorities

Section 303 amends Section 102A of the National Security

Act of 1949 to enhance the authority of the Director of the

National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the National

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to enter into transactions and

agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research

and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities.

Section 304. Strategies for enhancing jointness during modernization of

Common Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination systems

Section 304 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) to develop and submit

strategies for the use by the Department of Defense (DoD) of

the Distributed Common Ground System.

Section 305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and

employees of elements of the intelligence community

Section 305 requires the heads of each element of the IC to

conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees

an annual survey of analytic objectivity among such element’s

officers and employees.

Section 306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic

standards

Section 306 modifies section 6312 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to ensure analytic

training includes instructions on avoiding political bias.

Section 307. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence

Community Directive 705

Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees an estimate of the amount of

obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government

to ensure that all sensitive compartmented information

facilities of the IC are compliant with Intelligence Community

Directive 705.

Section 308. Amendments regarding Presidential appointments for

intelligence community positions

Section 308 amends the requirements for Presidential

appointment and Senate confirmation of certain IC positions.

Section 309. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of

the Department of the Treasury

Section 309 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish

within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of

the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence

and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis.

Section 310. Counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury

networks and systems

Section 310 requires the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis of the Department of Treasury to implement policies

and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support to

Department of Treasury entities responsible for safeguarding

networks and systems, and to coordinate counterintelligence

threat mitigation, cyber network, and system defense efforts.

Section 311. Report on Director’s Initiatives Group personnel matters

Section 311 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report on personnel matters of the

Director’s Initiatives Group.

Section 312. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain

activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field

Intelligence Programs of the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security

Section 312 prohibits funds made available to the Office of

Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland

Security from being used for certain activities of the Overt

Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence programs.

Section 313. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule

Section 313 makes a technical correction to the Higher

Education Act of 1965, as amended by Section 7316 of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, with

respect to officers or employees of elements of the IC.

Section 314. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate

assessment

Section 314 amends Section 30 of the Central Intelligence

Agency Act of 1949 to require the Director of the CIA to

complete and submit to the appropriate congressional committees

an annual workplace climate assessment that includes an

opportunity for Agency employees to express their opinions

regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to

allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual

harassment, and the effectiveness of such response.

Section 315. Report on sensitive commercially available information

Section 315 requires each element of the IC to submit to

the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on

the access to, as well as collection, processing, and use of,

sensitive commercially available information by such element.

Section 315 further requires the DNI to make available to the

public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and

procedures of the IC with respect to sensitive commercially

available information.

Section 316. Report on secure mobile communications systems available

to employees and of the intelligence community

Section 316 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report on the secure mobile

communications systems available to employees and officers of

the IC, disaggregated by element of the IC.

Section 317. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the

intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive

compartmented information facilities

Section 317 requires the DNI to develop and submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a plan to implement an

integrated tracking system for the accreditation of sensitive

compartmented information facilities.

Section 318. Counterintelligence threats to United States space

interests

Section 318 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate

congressional committees an assessment of the

counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration. Section 318 also requires the head of

the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) to develop and appropriately distribute an

assessment of the counterintelligence risks to commercial

spaceports.

Section 319. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central

Intelligence Agency

Section 319 amends Section 26 of the Central Intelligence

Agency Act of 1949 to make certain enhancements to the Chaplain

Corps of the CIA, including by requiring that the Chief of

Chaplains report directly to the Director of CIA and that the

Chaplain Corps have a global presence.

Section 320. Review by Inspectors General of reform efforts for special

access programs and controlled access programs

Section 320 requires the Inspector General of the

Intelligence Community (IC IG) and the Inspector General of DoD

to jointly conduct a review of the processes, oversight, and

management of special access programs and controlled access

programs.

Section 321. Prohibition on contractors collecting or selling location

data of individuals at intelligence community locations

Section 321 prohibits contractors or subcontractors of an

element of the IC from collecting location data of individuals

at IC locations, except as necessary for the provision of

contracted services, and from selling such data to any

individual or entity that is not an element of the IC.

Section 322. Technical amendment to procurement activities of Central

Intelligence Agency

Section 322 makes a technical correction to Section 3(a) of

the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

Section 323. Consolidation of reporting requirements applicable to All-

domain Anomaly Resolution Office

Section 323 amends 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3373a to consolidate

certain All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting

requirements.

Section 324. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting

Federal Reserve information

Section 324 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to

brief the Federal Reserve on foreign threats and work with the

Chair of the Board of Governors to implement security and

classification measures for protecting information collected,

generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.

Section 325. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data

and services program management office

Section 325 requires the Director of the National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the NRO to

submit a plan to establish a joint program management office

for commercial geospatial and data services.

Section 326. Inspector General review of adequacy of policies and

procedures governing use of commercial messaging applications

by intelligence community

Section 326 requires the IC IG to submit a review of the

adequacy of policies and procedures governing the IC’s use of

commercial messaging applications.

Section 327. Authority for National Security Agency to produce and

disseminate intelligence products

Section 327 permits the Director of the NSA to correlate,

evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to national

security.

Section 328. Conditions on procurement of telecommunications equipment

by intelligence community

Section 328 directs the IC to utilize standard contractual

clauses to promote cybersecurity in the acquisition of

telecommunications products or services.

Section 329. Reforms to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the

Department of Homeland Security

Section 329 prohibits the Department of Homeland Security’s

Office of Intelligence and Analysis from collecting information

or intelligence targeting United States persons, with

exceptions for sharing and receiving certain information or

intelligence.

Section 330. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly

available information concerning United States persons

Section 330 codifies IC Policy Guidance 107.1, which

requires each IC element to develop procedures for responding

to unmasking requests.

Section 331. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community

Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the head

of each element of the IC, to revise all regulations, policies,

procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance

to ensure such materials do not allow the use of NIP funds for

discriminatory practices prohibited by the Constitution of the

United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or other Federal

law.

Section 332. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data

Section 332 requires the FBI to submit a report on the

number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber

national security cases.

TITLE IV–INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Section 401. Short title

Section 401 names the Title the “Intelligence Community

Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025.”

Section 402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the

Director of National Intelligence

Section 402 modifies the DNI’s authority to prescribe

personnel policies and programs and eliminates certain

reporting requirements. Section 402 also eliminates the

authority to establish National Intelligence Centers, as well

as the authority to transfer personnel to those Centers (which

are replaced by National Intelligence Task Forces in Section

409), and permits the DNI to delegate to IC elements certain

foreign investment analyses and impact statements. Finally,

Section 402 requires the DNI to submit a plan to reform each IC

element’s acquisition process so that the process uses existing

authorities to expedite acquisitions and includes a preference

for acquisition of commercial solutions, consistent with

current law.

Section 403. Reforms relating to the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence

Section 403 requires the DNI to submit a plan within 90

days of enactment to reduce ODNI staff to a maximum number of

full-time equivalents, including assignees, detailees, and

contractors, that the DNI requires for the optimized execution

of the DNI’s statutory authorities. Section 403 further

requires the DNI to initiate the staff reductions on a date

that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is

submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this

Act, whichever is later, with interim written updates to the

congressional intelligence committees. Section 403 requires the

DNI to certify that staff subject to the reductions will have

opportunities to accept alternative government employment, and

prohibits involuntary terminations, except in cases involving

documented security, counterintelligence, misconduct, or

performance issues.

Section 404. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence

and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence

Section 404 renames the Principal Deputy Director of

National Intelligence, the Deputy Director of National

Intelligence and creates DNI-appointed Assistant Directors of

National Intelligence for Mission Integration and Policy and

Capabilities.

Section 405. Reform of the National Intelligence Council and National

Intelligence Officers

Section 405 modifies the National Intelligence Council’s

(NIC’s) duties, including by clarifying that the NIC may

produce or coordinate the production of National Intelligence

Estimates.

Section 406. Transfer of National Counterintelligence and Security

Center to Federal Bureau of Investigation

Section 406 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to

submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the

National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to the

Counterintelligence Division of the FBI and the duties of

Director of the NCSC to the Assistant Director of the FBI for

Counterintelligence. Section 406 further requires the DNI to

initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days

after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year

after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is

later, and to complete those transfers within two years, with

quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 406 further makes conforming amendments to the

Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002.

Section 407. Redesignation and reform of National Counterterrorism

Center

Section 407 redesignates the National Counterterrorism

Center the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics

Center and imposes limitations regarding domestic

counterterrorism intelligence.

Section 408. Transfer and reform of National Counterproliferation and

Biosecurity Center

Section 408 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to

submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the

National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) to

the CIA and the duties of Director of the NCBC to the Director

of the CIA. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate

such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the

date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date

of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to

complete those transfers within 455 days, with quarterly

reports to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 409. National intelligence task forces

Section 409 gives the DNI the authority to convene national

intelligence task forces from other IC elements for a limited

time, as necessary to address certain intelligence priorities.

Section 409 requires congressional notifications when such task

forces are convened. Section 409 further provides that if a

matter has not concluded within 540 days of convening the

respective task force, the DNI shall transfer responsibility to

a specific IC element.

Section 410. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and

offices

Section 410 repeals various positions, units, centers,

councils, and offices, including the Intelligence Community

Chief Data Officer (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3034b); Intelligence

Community Innovation Unit (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3034c); Office of

Engagement (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3062); Framework for Cross-

disciplinary Education and Training (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3192);

Foreign Languages Program (50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 3201-03); and

Joint Intelligence Community Council (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3022).

Section 410 further provides that the DNI shall submit a plan

within 90 days of enactment to terminate the Foreign Malign

Influence Center (50 U.S.C. Sec.  3059), begin taking such

actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the

operations of the Center on a date that is at least 90 days

after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year

after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is

later, and complete such actions within 455 days. Section 410

also makes a technical correction to repeal the statute

establishing the Climate Security Advisory Council (50 U.S.C.

Sec. 3060), which terminated on December 31, 2024.

Section 411. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management

Account funds for certain entities

Section 411 prohibits ICMA funds from being used to support

analytic collaboration efforts by federally funded research and

development centers or non-profit entities that receive funds

from foreign governments (with the exception of the Five Eyes),

or by certain research or advocacy organizations that receive

funds from foreign adversaries.

Section 412. Transfer of National Intelligence University

Section 412 requires the DNI to transfer the functions of

the National Intelligence University to the National Defense

University within 180 days of enactment of this Act.

TITLE V–MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Subtitle A–Foreign Countries Generally

Section 501. Declassification of information relating to actions by

foreign governments to assist persons evading justice

Section 501 requires the Director of the FBI to declassify

information relating to whether foreign government officials

assisted or facilitated any citizen or national of their

country in departing the United States while the citizen or

national was under investigation or awaiting trial or

sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United

States.

Section 502. Enhanced intelligence sharing relating to foreign

adversary biotechnological threats

Section 502 requires the DNI to establish and submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a policy for streamlining

the declassification or downgrading and sharing of intelligence

information relating to biotechnological developments and

threats.

Section 503. Threat assessment regarding unmanned aircraft systems at

or near the international borders of the United States

Section 503 requires an assessment of the threat that

unmanned aircraft systems pose at or near United States

international borders.

Section 504. Assessment of the potential effect of expanded

partnerships among western hemisphere countries

Section 504 requires the NIC to conduct an assessment and

submit a report on the potential effect of expanding

partnerships among countries in the western hemisphere.

Subtitle B–People’s Republic of China

Section 511. Countering Chinese Communist Party efforts that threaten

Europe

Section 511 requires the President to develop an

interagency strategy to counter the efforts of the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) to expand its economic, military, and

ideological influence in Europe, which shall include an

assessment of the current efforts by the IC to brief members of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on intelligence

and influence activities by the CCP in Europe.

Section 512. Prohibition on intelligence community contracting with

Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research,

development, or manufacturing

Section 512 prohibits the IC from contracting with certain

Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research,

development, or manufacturing.

Section 513. Report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese

Communist Party

Section 513 requires the DNI, in consultation with the

Secretary of Defense, to post publicly a report on the wealth

of the leadership of the CCP.

Section 514. Assessment and report on investments by the People’s

Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil

Section 514 requires the DNI, in consultation with the

Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, to assess

the extent of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)

investments in Brazil’s agriculture sector.

Section 515. Identification of entities that provide support to the

People’s Liberation Army

Section 515 requires the DNI to identify entities in the

PRC that support the People’s Liberation Army.

Section 516. Establishing a China Economics and Intelligence cell to

publish China Economic Power Report

Section 516 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for

Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the

Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to establish a China

Economics and Intelligence Cell and prepare for public release

an annual report on economic and technological developments

involving the PRC.

Section 517. Modification of annual reports on influence operations and

campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party

Section 517 amends 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3237 to expand annual

reporting requirements regarding influence operations and

campaigns in the United States by the CCP, to include certain

PRC law enforcement and academic entities.

Subtitle C–The Russian Federation

Section 521. Assessment of Russian destabilization efforts

Section 521 amends Section 1234 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, which requires an

annual report on military and security developments involving

the Russian Federation, to include an assessment of Russia’s

efforts to undermine or destabilize the national or economic

security of the United States or members of NATO.

Section 522. Enforcing imposition of sanctions with respect to the

shadow fleet of the Russian Federation

Section 522 requires the Secretary of the Navy to publish

quarterly lists of vessels that shipped Russian petroleum

products in violation of sanctions, oil tankers owned by fleet

operators based in Russia, and vessels that have engaged in

ship-to-ship transfers with such vessels, and to refer such

vessels for sanctions.

Subtitle D–Other Foreign Countries

Section 531. Plan to enhance counternarcotics collaboration,

coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico

Section 531 requires the DNI to submit a plan to the

congressional intelligence committees, based on information

provided by the head of each element of the IC, to enhance

counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation

with the Government of Mexico.

Section 532. Enhancing intelligence support to counter foreign

adversary influence in Sudan

Section 532 requires the Director of the CIA to develop a

plan to share with United States allies and partners

intelligence relating to foreign adversary efforts to influence

the conflict in Sudan, and to counter such efforts.

Section 533. Ukraine lessons learned working group

Section 533 amends Section 6413 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, which established the

Ukraine Lessons Learned Working Group, to include a requirement

to evaluate which lessons should be shared with Taiwan to

assist Taiwan’s acquisitions decisions and capability

development.

Section 534. Improvements to requirement for monitoring of Iranian

enrichment of uranium-235

Section 534 amends Section 7413 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which requires the DNI

to notify Congress of a significant enrichment activity of

Iran, to include notification of intelligence indicating a

decision to weaponize uranium.

Section 535. Duty to warn United States persons threatened by Iranian

lethal plotting

Section 535 requires each IC element, upon collecting or

acquiring credible and specific information indicating a lethal

threat to a United States person by Iran or an Iranian proxy,

to provide such information to the FBI. Section 535 further

requires the FBI to warn the intended victim and notify the

appropriate congressional committees.

TITLE VI–EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Section 601. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund

Section 601 creates a fund to assist in transitioning IC

products, which have been demonstrated to meet an IC mission

need, from the research and development phase to the

contracting and production phase, with priority given to small

business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors.

Section 602. Enhancing biotechnology talent within the intelligence

community

Section 602 requires the DNI to establish a policy for how

existing and future funding and resources of the IC can be

directed to ensure the IC has sufficient cleared personnel,

including private sector experts, to identify and respond to

biotechnology threats.

Section 603. Enhanced intelligence community support to secure United

States genomic data

Section 603 requires the DNI to provide support to and

consult with the FBI, the Committee on Foreign Investment in

the United States, and other government agencies as

appropriate, when reviewing transactions relating to the

acquisition of genomic data by foreign entities.

Section 604. Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic

United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA

Section 604 requires the DNI to establish a policy to

ensure that elements of the IC may not contract with Chinese

biotechnology suppliers, including for products made using

synthetic DNA or RNA, that are determined by the Director to

pose a security threat.

Section 605. Deployment of advanced nuclear technologies

Section 605 requires the DNI to identify one or more IC

sites which could benefit from secure, resilient energy through

the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies. Section 605

further requires that fuel used for such reactors are

domestically sourced.

Section 606. Addressing intelligence gaps relating to outbound

investment screening for biotechnology

Section 606 requires the DNI to submit to the President and

the congressional intelligence committees a strategy for

addressing intelligence gaps relating to investment activity by

the PRC in the biotechnology sector of the United States.

Section 607. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial

Intelligence Security Center

Section 607 directs NSA’s existing Artificial Intelligence

Security Center to establish a research test-bed to support

public-private partnerships focused on promoting artificial

intelligence (AI) security with frontier AI firms and

researchers.

Section 608. Artificial intelligence development and usage by

intelligence community

Section 608 applies AI procurement policies established on

April 3, 2025, by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for

federal civilian agencies to the IC, to promote cost-

efficiency, interoperability, and performance-tracking for AI

models.

Section 609. High-impact artificial intelligence systems

Section 609 establishes requirements for high-impact AI

systems used by the IC, consistent with procedures established

by the current OMB guidelines and National Security Memorandum

25.

Section 610. Application of artificial intelligence policies of the

intelligence community to publicly available models used for

intelligence purposes

Section 610 ensures that publicly available AI models used

by the IC are governed by the same established oversight

procedures applied to govern commercial AI models used by the

IC.

Section 611. Revision of interim guidance regarding acquisition and use

of foundation models

Section 611 clarifies existing IC guidance that evaluation

of training data and other model characteristics should not be

a determinative factor in whether the IC’s use of that model

constitutes “collection.”

Section 612. Strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing relating

to critical and emerging technologies

Section 612 requires the DNI to develop a strategy for

intelligence relating to critical and emerging technologies

across the IC.

TITLE VII–CLASSIFICATION REFORM AND SECURITY CLEARANCES

Section 701. Notification of certain declassifications

Section 701 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to

require the DNI to notify the congressional intelligence

committees and the Archivist if the Director exercises her

authority under section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 to

declassify or downgrade properly classified information.

Section 701 also requires each IC element to notify the

congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist if the

element exercises the authority under section 3.1(d) of

Executive Order 13526 to declassify information where the need

to protect such information is outweighed by the public

interest in disclosure.

Section 702. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory

revocation of security clearances and access determinations

Section 702 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an

employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal

with respect to the current or former employee’s security

clearance or access determination.

Section 703. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance

and access determinations

Section 703 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse

security clearance or access determination against a

whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that the agency would have made the same security clearance or

access determination in the absence of the whistleblower’s

disclosure. Section 703 further establishes parity in the legal

standards applied to IC whistleblower matters.

Section 704. Reforms relating to inactive security clearances

Section 704 requires the DNI to review and evaluate the

feasibility of updating standards and procedure for security

clearance eligibility for individuals who have retired or

otherwise separated from the IC, including subjecting inactive

security clearances to continuous vetting.

Section 705. Protection of classified information relating to budget

functions

Section 705 requires Executive Branch departments and

agencies to use secure systems that protect NIP budget

functions and processes.

Section 706. Report on executive branch approval of access to

classified intelligence information outside of established

review processes

Section 706 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report on approvals of interim

security clearances or other access to classified intelligence

information for IC employees that do not satisfy the

investigative and adjudicative standards established under

Executive Order 12968.

TITLE VIII–WHISTLEBLOWERS

Section 801. Clarification of definition of employee for purposes of

reporting complaints or information to Inspector General

Section 801 clarifies the definition of “employee” for

the purposes of submitting a matter of urgent concern to the IC

IG.

Section 802. Protections for whistleblower disclosures to office of

legislative or congressional affairs

Section 802 protects from reprisal IC whistleblowers who

submit a complaint to IC agency offices of congressional or

legislative affairs.

Section 803. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity

as act of reprisal

Section 803 prohibits knowing or willful disclosures that

reveal an IC employee’s or IC contractor employee’s identifying

information without consent, so as to identify such employee or

contractor employee as a whistleblower, except as necessary

during the course of an investigation. Section 803 further

establishes a private right of action for an IC whistleblower

if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the

whistleblower for bringing a complaint.

Section 804. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to

Inspectors General of the intelligence community

Section 804 permits urgent concerns submitted by IC

whistleblowers to the inspectors general of the IC to be

provided directly to Congress rather than going through the

heads of agencies.

Section 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing

or examination

Section 805 amends Section 1104 of the National Security

Act of 1947 to establish that a decision to order psychiatric

testing or examination is a prohibited personnel practice when

taken or threatened as a reprisal for a protected disclosure.

TITLE IX–ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Section 901. Standard guidelines for intelligence community to report

and document anomalous health incidents

Section 901 requires the DNI to issue standard guidelines

for IC personnel to document and report anomalous health

incidents (AHIs).

Section 902. Review and declassification of intelligence relating to

anomalous health incidents.

Section 902 requires the DNI to review IC holdings of AHIs,

including AHI reports, intelligence on foreign government

efforts related to AHIs, and assessments of the IC’s success in

detecting such foreign government programs. Section 902 further

requires the DNI to perform a declassification review of such

AHI holdings for publication.

TITLE X–OTHER MATTERS

Section 1001. Declassification of intelligence and additional

transparency measures relating to the COVID-19 pandemic

Section 1001 requires the DNI to conduct declassification

reviews and publish intelligence on the origins of the COVID-19

pandemic.

Section 1002. Counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed

Forces

Section 1002 requires the USD(I&S) to conduct

counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces.

Section 1003. Denial of visas to foreign nationals known to be

intelligence officers for accreditation to multilateral

diplomatic missions

Section 1003 requires the Secretary of State to deny visas

to certain foreign nationals, who are accredited to a United

Nations mission or other multilateral international

organization in the United States, if the Secretary determines

that such individuals have committed known or suspected

intelligence activities or espionage activities or are known or

suspected of being intelligence officers.

Section 1004. Policy toward certain agents of foreign governments

Section 1004 requires, as United States policy, that the

United States pursue parity regarding reciprocal privileges and

immunities of United States diplomatic personnel in

negotiations with countries conducting harmful intelligence

activities. Section 1004 further requires the Secretary of

State, the Director of the FBI, and the DNI to submit a report

documenting foreign governments engaged in intelligence

activities within the United States that receive diplomatic

benefits that exceed the reciprocal diplomatic benefits in such

country of official representatives of the United States.

Section 1005. Tour limits of accredited diplomatic and consular

personnel of certain nations in the United States

Section 1005 codifies limits for how long accredited

diplomatic and consular personnel of foreign adversaries who

are located in the United States can receive diplomatic

privileges and immunities.

Section 1006. Strict enforcement of travel protocols and procedures of

accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations

in the United States

Section 1006 codifies travel restrictions for accredited

diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations in the

UnitedStates, including advance approval requirements and

penalties for noncompliance.

Section 1007. Offenses involving espionage, procurement of citizenship

or naturalization unlawfully, or harboring or concealing

persons

Section 1007 extends the statute of limitations for certain

espionage offenses, including criminal charges for acting as an

unregistered agent of a foreign government, gathering or

delivering defense information to a foreign government, or

unlawfully procuring citizenship while working at the direction

of a foreign government.

Section 1008. Identification of reallocable frequencies

Section 1008 amends the authorization of the Spectrum

Relocation Fund to clarify eligibility for Title 50 agencies

that utilize spectrum and whose usage could be impacted by

future reallocation decisions.

Section 1009. NEPA national security waivers for intelligence community

facilities

Section 1009 permits the President to waive requirements

for the IC to prepare certain environmental documents if

certain national security-related conditions are met.

Section 1010. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

Section 1010 modifies and repeals certain prior

congressional intelligence committee reporting requirements

that, for certain reasons, are no longer relevant or necessary

to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 1011. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United

States of transactions in real estate near intelligence

community facilities

Section 1011 extends a provision in the Foreign Investment

Risk Review Modernization Act that requires the Committee on

Foreign Investment in the United States to review land

transactions by foreign actors near United States military

installations to also apply to foreign land transactions near

IC-owned facilities.

Section 1012. Requiring penetration testing as part of the testing and

certification of voting systems

Section 1012 directs the Election Assistance Commission

(EAC) to provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part

of the voluntary testing, certification, decertification, and

recertification of voting system hardware and software.

Section 1013. Independent security testing and coordinated

cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure program for election

systems

Section 1013 directs the EAC to establish a voluntary

Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability

Disclosure Pilot Program for Election Systems to test for and

disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.

Section 1014. Church committee historical intelligence records

processing

Section 1014 requires the Director of the CIA to take steps

to prepare for and expedite the required declassification of

the Church Committee archival files.

Section 1015. Foreign material acquisitions

Section 1015 permits the Secretary of Energy, acting

through the Director of the Office of Intelligence and

Counterintelligence, to enter into contracts or other

arrangements for goods and services through the National

Laboratories or certain other Department of Energy entities,

for purposes of foreign material acquisition supporting

national security requirements.

Section 1016. Prohibition on admittance to national laboratories and

nuclear weapons production facilities

Section 1016 expands a prohibition enacted in section 3112

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025

to restrict access to all national labs by certain foreign

adversary nationals, and provides for a waiver in certain

circumstances.

Section 1017. Extension of Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of

2015

Section 1017 extends the expiration of the Cybersecurity

Information Sharing Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-113, Div. N) from

September30, 2025 to September 30, 2035.

Committee Comments and Direction

Prioritization of open source information related to PRC development

finance and influence abroad

For several years, the Committee has pushed the IC to

utilize commercially available information to track the PRC’s

financial activity that undermines U.S. interests, ranging from

investments in critical technologies, to creating monopolies

through beneficial ownership, to growing influence abroad

through financing of infrastructure projects. This committee

has been particularly focused on PRC infrastructure investments

in partner countries that pressure governments to take policy

positions in opposition to U.S. positions, such as recognition

of Taiwan.

However, the IC has struggled to identify and utilize open

source data to track such PRC malign influence activity abroad.

Open source data sets tracking 20,985 PRC development finance

projects across 165 countries supported by grant and loan

commitments worth $1.34 trillion are now available. This

information covers all regions, sectors, and sources and types

of financial and in-kind transfers from government and state-

owned institutions in China.

Therefore, given the availability of commercially available

information that can inform analysis related to PRC malign

influence activity abroad, the Committee directs the DNI to

coordinate with heads of relevant IC agencies, including the

CIA, to prioritize collection of reliable, detailed open source

information on the PRC’s use of foreign aid, debt, and equity

investments to influence outcomes in developed and developing

countries across economic, technological, political, military,

intelligence, and governance domains.

Ongoing Intelligence Community Efforts to Counter Cocaine Trafficking

In addition to the synthetic opioid crisis, the Committee

is concerned about the increasing cocaine production in South

America and its transshipment into the United States. Over the

last decade, cocaine overdose deaths among Americans have

surged from nearly 5,000 in 2013 to almost 30,000 in 2023. The

Committee is further concerned about cocaine trafficking as a

source of revenue for drug trafficking organizations engaged in

the production and shipment of illicit synthetic opioids to the

United States. Competition for control of the cocaine market is

resulting in rising violence and instability throughout Latin

America.

The Committee supports whole-of-government efforts to track

and interdict cocaine shipments to the United States and will

continue to ensure appropriate that IC resources are devoted to

countering cocaine trafficking.

Cryptocurrency Mining Threats to National Security

The Committee is concerned that Chinese-owned

cryptocurrency mining facilities inside the United States pose

a danger to national security. Located throughout the 50 states

and equipped with machinery made by Bitmain, a privately-owned

Chinese company with ties to the CCP, these mines are located

near sensitive defense installations or critical U.S.

infrastructure such as power grids, creating several disturbing

vulnerabilities.

First, co-location of Chinese-owned cryptocurrency mines

near sensitive defense installations gives China an opportunity

to pursue a full suite of intelligence collection activities

against those sites. Even if these Chinese-owned companies are

not connected to the CCP, they can be forced by the PRC to turn

over data in accordance with China’s national security law.

This is an unnecessary counterintelligence risk to sensitive

defense installations.

Second, the Bitmain machines used in these facilities have

the capability to be remotely controlled by Bitmain personnel

in China. According to a New York Times article from October

13, 2023, “In the past, researchers have found `back doors”

that would have allowed the company to covertly operate its

equipment. After one was discovered in 2017, the company

confirmed it could have remotely controlled its mining

machines.” It is estimated that each mining facility houses

10,000 machines. Considering Bitmain’s connections to the CCP,

having tens of thousands of machines whose operations can be

run from Beijing located near sensitive defense installations

is an unacceptable risk.

Lastly, it appears the majority of these Chinese mining

machines have made their way into the U.S. illegally. Customs

and Border Protection have discovered widespread customs fraud

when it comes to these machines entering the United States, to

include mis-manifestation of what these machines are and

undervaluation of their worth. It is estimated that the

financial loss to the United States government could be as much

as $10 billion and growing. Failure to address China’s blatant

efforts to smuggle malicious crypto-mining machines inside our

country will undermine the Trump administration’s policies to

better balance trade with China.

There have been some efforts to address the national

security threats these Chinese-owned facilities pose. For

example, one such facility in Cheyenne, WY, located near a

nuclear missile installation, was the subject of a review by

the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States which

led to an Executive Order blocking the Chinese-backed firm from

owning the property near the installation in order to “protect

national security.” While this is a good start, the Committee

believes more needs to be done to address this egregious threat

to national security.

Therefore, the Committee directs the relevant elements of

the IC to work together with law enforcement partners in an

effort to shut down any Chinese cryptocurrency mining

operations that pose a threat to national security.

Assessment of Threat posed by TikTok to the Private Personal

Information of United States Citizens

The Committee is concerned that the declassified

Intelligence Information Report (IIR) (IIR 4 212 7305 20) by

the FBI further reinforces the vulnerability of U.S. personally

identifiable information (PII) posed by TikTok and other

adversary-nation controlled mobile applications. As documented

in the IIR, the government of the PRC in August 2020 collected

private user data from TikTok accounts in order to produce a

large amount of fraudulent drivers’ licenses to allow foreign

nationals in the United States to vote in the 2020 election.

The Committee is further concerned that the IIR was recalled

and not subsequently re-issued even after the source of the

original IIR was re-interviewed and corroborated and after

20,000 fraudulent drivers licenses were seized by U.S. Customs

and Border Protection in 2020.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the FBI,

in coordination with the heads of other federal agencies, as

appropriate, to submit to the congressional intelligence

committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act an

assessment of the threat posed by TikTok and other foreign

mobile applications to the private personal information of

American citizens. Specifically, such assessment shall include

all information, including metadata and content, that these

applications can collect from U.S. users and for what purposes

such information can be used for.

The Committee further directs the heads of other elements

of the IC to review their holdings for information that corroborates

the TikTok reporting of the original IIR.

COVID-19 Declassification

Section 1001 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2026 directs the DNI to undertake a

declassification review of intelligence relating to both the

origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and to efforts by the PRC to

disrupt the global response to the pandemic. The Committee is

concerned by efforts by the PRC to increase its global standing

in multilateral bodies, including global health agencies, and

believes that the American people and policymakers must have a

full accounting for the PRC’s past mistakes and malfeasance in

responding to the most lethal and disruptive global health

emergency in decades. The Committee notes the important step

forward of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 in releasing

valuable information to the public on the origins of the

pandemic, but believes more action is needed for full

transparency and accountability to occur.

Therefore, the Committee directs that in completing the

declassification review directed by Section 1001 of this Act,

the DNI should cooperate with the Public Interest

Declassification Board, to include delegating, as appropriate,

identification of and recommendations for declassification of

COVID-19-related intelligence. The DNI shall retain final

authority to declassify any identified intelligence and shall

not permit delegated actions to supersede the statutory

requirement to complete the declassification review within 180

days after enactment of this Act.

Vetting Support Agencies

Vetting Support Agencies (VSAs) are integral to the

national vetting enterprise in that they are responsible for

protecting the nation from terrorists, threats to public

safety, and threats to our national security. VSAs have seen a

surge in processing as a result of (1) additional vetting

requirements arising from Executive Order 14161 and (2)

increased categories of aliens needing to be vetted through the

National Vetting Center (NVC). The Committee supports the

importance of processing these vetting requests in a timely

manner, and recognizes many IC partners supporting this mission

require increased staff to meet the demand.

Therefore, the Committee recommends vetting support

agencies have adequate staffing for their caseloads, with a

minimum of one watch officer from the VSA available to support

the activities of the NVC 24 hours per day and 7 days per week.

Illicit Financing for Counternarcotics

The Committee is encouraged by the IC’s enhanced focus on

illicit trafficking of synthetic opioids in recent years, as

evidenced by the establishment of a National Intelligence

Manager for Counternarcotics at the ODNI and other efforts.

However, despite the Committee’s repeated inquiries regarding

collection, mapping, and interdiction of entities that provide

the financial infrastructure for narcotics production and

trafficking, including the use of cryptocurrency, money

laundering, and other methods, the Intelligence Community has

failed to demonstrate a clear focus and effort on this element

of the counternarcotics mission.

Therefore, the Committee directs that, not later than 90

days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI

conduct a review of intelligence collection and other

activities of the intelligence community related to countering

illicit financing for narcotics traffickers and narcotics

trafficking and submit to the congressional intelligence

committees a report on the results of the review that includes

for each element of the intelligence community, the following:

(1) An accounting of the analytic and operational resources of

the element for countering illicit financing for narcotics

trafficking, including a breakdown of budgets and staffing

dedicated to countering such financing; and (2) An assessment

of the intelligence and resource gaps of the element related to

countering illicit financing for narcotics trafficking.

Requirement for the Central Intelligence Agency to Implement Certain

Recommendations Regarding Medical Care and Benefits for

Individuals Affected by Anomalous Health Incidents

In December 2024, the Committee’s Audits and Projects Team

issued a report examining CIA’s efforts to provide facilitated

medical care and benefits to individuals affected by AHIs. The

Committee directs CIA to prioritize implementing the report

recommendations pertaining to (1) developing written polices

for all medical care and benefit programs available to AHI

reporters that include clear eligibility criteria and

adjudication processes; and (2) developing and documenting a

comprehensive and resource-informed plan for how the Agency

will provide, facilitate, or support medical evaluations and

acute and long-term care for individuals affected by AHIs or

and other counterintelligence-related health incidents. The

Committee further directs the CIA to brief the congressional

intelligence committees on the progress of the CIA in

addressing these recommendations not later than 90 days after

the date of enactment of this Act.

Committee Action

On July 15, 2025, a quorum being present, the Committee met

to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The

Committee took the following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman’s and

Vice Chairman’s bill, together with the classified annex for

Fiscal Year 2026, the base text for purposes of amendment.

By unanimous consent, the Committee adopted for inclusion

in the en bloc amendment (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton,

cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of

the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s base text; and (2) an

amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the

potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western

Hemisphere countries.

By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc thirty-five

amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman

Cotton to consolidate certain All-Domain Anomaly Resolution

Office reporting requirements; (2) an amendment by Chairman

Cotton regarding protections for Federal Reserve information;

(3) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding processing of

Church Committee records; (4) an amendment by Chairman Cotton

requiring an assessment of investments by the PRC in Brazil’s

agricultural sector; (5) an amendment by Chairman Cotton

requiring a report on the wealth of CCP leadership; (6) an

amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a review by the

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regarding

real estate transactions near IC facilities; (7) an amendment

by Chairman Cotton improving the requirement for monitoring

Iranian enrichment of Uranium-235; (8) an amendment by Chairman

Cotton requiring a duty to warn United States persons

threatened by Iranian lethal plotting; (9) an amendment by

Chairman Cotton requiring annual training and reporting on

analytic standards; (10) an amendment by Chairman Cotton

requiring an annual survey of analytic objectivity among IC

officers and employees; (11) an amendment by Chairman Cotton

establishing a China Economics and Intelligence Cell to publish

a China Economic Power Report; (12) an amendment by Chairman

Cotton establishing certain reforms of the Office of

Intelligence and Analysis; (13) an amendment by Chairman Cotton

codifying procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly

available information concerning United States persons; (14) an

amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring protection of classified

information related to budget functions; (15) an amendment by

Chairman Cotton establishing reforms of the ODNI and broader

IC; (16) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying section 307

of the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s base text regarding the

Deputy Director of the CIA’s position; (17) an amendment by

Chairman Cotton prohibiting discrimination in the IC; (18) an

amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying certain reporting on CCP

influence operations; (19) an amendment by Vice Chairman

Warner, cosponsored by Senator Collins, to secure election

systems; (20) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to impose

certain limitations on reprogramming funds; (21) an amendment

by Vice Chairman Warner imposing additional functions and

requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Security Center;

(22) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner establishing

procurement conditions on IC telecommunications equipment; (23)

an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner applying IC AI policies to

publicly available models used for intelligence purposes; (24)

an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner revising interim guidance

regarding acquisition and use of foundation models; (25) an

amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding IC AI development

and usage; (26) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding

high-impact AI systems; (27) an amendment by Vice Chairman

Warner to the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s base text,

modifying certain IC acquisition authorities; (28) an amendment

by Vice Chairman Warner requiring a plan to establish a

Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Data and Services Program

Management Office; (29) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner

requiring an IC IG review of policies and procedures governing

the IC’s use of commercial messaging applications; (30) an

amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring counterintelligence

support for Department of Treasury networks and systems; (31)

an amendment by Senator Moran permitting certain foreign

material acquisitions within the Department of Energy; (32) an

amendment by Senator Kelly requiring a report on Executive

Branch approval of access to classified intelligence

information outside of established review processes; (33) an

amendment by Senator Lankford requiring identification of

entities that provide support to the PLA; (34) an amendment by

Senator Young requiring a strategy on intelligence coordination

and sharing related to critical and emerging technologies; (35)

an amendment by Senator Budd authorizing the NSA to produce and

disseminate intelligence products; (36) an amendment by

Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike

section 315 of the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s base text;

and (37) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment

of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western

Hemisphere countries.

By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by Vice

Chairman Warner to extend the expiration date of the

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, with Senator Wyden

recorded as a no. By unanimous consent, the Committee approved

Senator Wyden’s request to submit a separate statement

regarding his vote.

By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an

amendment by Chairman Cotton to prohibit access by certain

foreign nationals to National Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons

Production Facilities. The votes in person or by proxy were as

follows: Chairman Cotton–aye; Senator Risch–aye; Senator

Collins–aye; Senator Cornyn–aye; Senator Moran–aye; Senator

Lankford–aye; Senator Rounds–aye; Senator Young–aye; Senator

Budd–aye; Vice Chairman Warner–no; Senator Wyden–no; Senator

Heinrich–no; Senator King–no; Senator Bennet–no; Senator

Gillibrand–no; Senator Ossoff–no; Senator Kelly–no.

By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to substitute a

second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own original-

filed amendment providing certain protections, mandating that

incumbents in competitive service positions converted to

excepted service positions retain their competitive service

rights under Title 5, imposing reporting requirements on the IC

regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting the Director

of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee except in

accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted to the

congressional intelligence committees, unless the Director

determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national

security and provides an explanation for such determination to

the committees. The second-degree amendment did the same, but

omitted the provisions regarding converted positions. By a vote

of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt Senator

Wyden’s amendment, as amended. The votes in person or by proxy

were as follows: Chairman Cotton–no; Senator Risch–no;

Senator Collins–no; Senator Cornyn–no; Senator Moran–no;

Senator Lankford–no; Senator Rounds–no; Senator Young–no;

Senator Budd–no; Vice Chairman Warner–aye; Senator Wyden–

aye; Senator Heinrich–aye; Senator King–aye; Senator Bennet–

aye; Senator Gillibrand–aye; Senator Ossoff–aye; Senator

Kelly–aye.

By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a

second-degree amendment by Senator King to Senator Wyden’s

amendment to require annual FBI reporting on the number of

counterintelligence, counterterrorism, domestic terrorism, and

cyber national security cases. The second-degree amendment

omitted the number of domestic terrorism cases. By voice vote,

the Committee adopted Senator Wyden’s amendment, as amended.

By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt

an amendment by Senator Wyden to require that, if the head of

an IC element transfers money from an Inspector General and

that Inspector General does not approve, the head of that IC

element has to explain to the relevant congressional committees

why it is in the vital national security interests of the

United States to do so. The votes in person or by proxy were as

follows: Chairman Cotton–no; Senator Risch–no; Senator

Collins–no; Senator Cornyn–no; Senator Moran–no; Senator

Lankford–no; Senator Rounds–no; Senator Young–no; Senator

Budd–no; Vice Chairman Warner–aye; Senator Wyden–aye;

Senator Heinrich–aye; Senator King–aye; Senator Bennet–aye;

Senator Gillibrand–aye; Senator Ossoff–aye; Senator Kelly–

aye.

By a vote of 5 ayes and 12 noes, the Committee did not

adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to the classified annex.

The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman

Cotton–no; Senator Risch–no; Senator Collins–no; Senator

Cornyn–no; Senator Moran–no; Senator Lankford–no; Senator

Rounds–no; Senator Young–no; Senator Budd–no; Vice Chairman

Warner–aye; Senator Wyden–aye; Senator Heinrich–aye; Senator

King–no; Senator Bennet–no; Senator Gillibrand–aye; Senator

Ossoff–aye; Senator Kelly–no.

Votes to report the committee bill

On July 15, 2025, the Committee voted to report the bill,

as amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and two noes. The votes in

person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton–aye;

Senator Risch–aye; Senator Collins–aye; Senator Cornyn–aye;

Senator Moran–aye; Senator Lankford–aye; Senator Rounds–aye;

Senator Young–aye; Senator Budd–aye; Vice Chairman Warner–

aye; Senator Wyden–no; Senator Heinrich–no; Senator King–

aye; Senator Bennet–aye; Senator Casey–aye; Senator

Gillibrand–aye; Senator Ossoff–aye; Senator Kelly–aye.

By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to

make technical and conforming changes to the bill and

classified annex.

Compliance With Rule XLIV

Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires

publication of a list of any “congressionally directed

spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff

benefit” that is included in the bill or the committee report

accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the

Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending

items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the

report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of

authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of

authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited

tariff benefits.

Estimate of Costs

Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing

Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to

include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the

provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the

operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 16,

2025, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional

Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred

in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the

Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no

substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing

the provisions of this legislation.

Changes to Existing Law

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the

Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is

necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to

expedite the business of the Senate.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

The Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act

represents a significant step backward for congressional

oversight of the Intelligence Community. First, the bill

eliminates the long-standing requirement that the general

counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence be confirmed by the Senate. This change would

leave a conspicuous hole in congressional oversight of national

security, given that the general counsels of the Department of

Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Departments of

Homeland Security and Energy, as well as the Legal Advisor of

the State Department, are all Senate confirmed. It is

particularly troubling as Intelligence Community general

counsels operate secretly, making decisions and offering legal

advice on topics such as surveillance and torture, with no

public accountability other than the vetting and scrutiny that

comes from the confirmation process.

Second, the bill lacks a provision, which was included in

last year’s Committee-passed bill, that would require the

Intelligence Community to explain to the Committee when the

heads of Intelligence Community entities exercise their

authority to fire personnel without any process or protections.

Given the rash of dubious and unexplained firings in recent

months, this lack of oversight hamstrings the Committee’s

ability to scrutinize and mitigate efforts to politicize the

Intelligence Community workforce.

I have a number of concerns related to the bill’s

provisions related to the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence and urge the Committee to conduct an in-depth

review of what reforms will advance, rather than undermine the

purposes for which the Office was created after 9/11. For

example, the bill renames the National Counterterrorism Center

the “National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center,”

suggesting that two very different threats to the country

should be addressed under the same government framework,

relying on the same resources and personnel, and operating

under the same set of intelligence authorities. Such an

approach risks undermining the country’s efforts to combat

both.

The bill extends for ten years the Cybersecurity

Information Sharing Act of 2015, whose passage I opposed due to

a lack of protections for Americans’ personal information. In

September 2024, the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector

General issued a report (OIG-24-60) that found that the

government was not sharing cyber threat information with

companies, and that companies were not sharing cyber threat

information with each other or the government. These findings

highlight how the program has failed and is not worthy of

reauthorization.

I also have serious concerns about classified matters that

are either in the classified annex or that the annex fails to

address. At the same time, I am deeply troubled by increasing

impediments to Committee oversight. Abuses of both the “Gang

of 8” briefings, whereby the Intelligence Community withholds

information from the full Committee, and restrictions on staff

access to intelligence programs are the worst they have been in

20 years.

Several other topics related to the bill are worthy of

discussion. First, the bill prohibits the Department of

Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

from “engaging in the collection of information or

intelligence targeting any United States person.” Given I&A’s

abuses in Portland, Oregon, in 2020, I welcome efforts to rein

in its authorities, particularly if they have the effect of

prohibiting the compilation of dossiers of Americans’ First

Amendment-protected speech and precluding I&A from secretly

infiltrating private communications, which the current nominee

to be Under Secretary for I&A has incorrectly asserted is

permissible. I am concerned, however, that this provision falls

short. The exception permitting I&A to collect from the

“private sector” might be read to allow I&A to obtain

information on Americans through their landlords, their bosses,

their neighborhood grocery stores or data brokers. The

provision also fails to address collection on Americans by

other intelligence components within the Department of Homeland

Security, despite the Under Secretary’s statutory mandate to

issue policies and guidelines for those components.

Second, the bill is being reported at a time of serious

threat to the independence of the inspectors general. The

Director of National Intelligence recently fired the IC IG’s

acting counsel under a mistaken reading of the law that grants

IGs final approval for personnel decisions (50 U.S.C.

Sec. 3033(j)(3)). That statutory language originated with the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the report

to which clearly stated it was intended to bring the

authorities of the IC IG into conformity with the augmented

authorities created by the Inspector General Reform Act of

2008. That law established that “each Office of Inspector

General shall be considered to be a separate agency” and “the

Inspector General who is the head of an office . . . shall,

with respect to such office, have the functions, powers, and

duties of an agency head or appointing authority under such

provisions.” The IG’s statutory personnel authorities

concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of

Inspector General is thus clearly intended to cover all OIG

personnel not detailed from another agency, rather than

creating an arbitrary and unworkable carve out of the IG’s

authorities over its own personnel, as the DNI would have it.

It is in the context of this dispute that I offered an

amendment requiring that, if the head of an IC element

transfers money from an IG over the IG’s objections, the IC has

to explain to the Committee why it is in the vital national

security interests of the United States to do so. The

Committee’s defeat of this amendment represents another set-

back for oversight.

Despite these concerns, I am pleased that the bill includes

many provisions I put forward. These include protections for

whistleblowers, allowing them to come to Congress without

having to go through their agencies, ensuring that their

efforts to communicate with Congress through the IC’s offices

of congressional and legislative affairs are protected from

reprisal, ensuring that their security clearances can’t be

revoked on a pretext, removing the cap on damages for

retaliatory revocation of whistleblower clearances, and

prohibiting, as acts of reprisal, disclosures of

whistleblowers’ identities as well as orders to undertake

psychological examinations. The bill also includes a provision

from last year’s bill requiring congressional and public

reporting on the Intelligence Community’s purchase and use of

sensitive data on Americans.

The bill further includes my provision prohibiting the

Intelligence Community from contracting with companies that

collect and sell geolocation data associated with intelligence

facilities, as well as my amendment requiring annual reporting

on FBI national security investigations.

Finally, the bill includes my provision requiring the FBI

to declassify any information related to whether foreign

government officials have helped their nationals flee the

United States while under investigation or awaiting trial or

sentencing for a crime committed in the United States. In 2016,

a Saudi national was accused in the hit-and-run death of Fallon

Smart, a 15-year-old Portland girl. The flight from the United

States of that Saudi national before trial prompted me to push

through legislation requiring the declassification of a 2019

FBI report describing a pattern of Saudi officials helping

Saudi nationals flee the country to avoid the U.S. justice

system. The subsequent adoption by the State Department of a

policy to identify and revoke the visas of foreign officials

responsible for these practices was an important step forward,

but implementation of the policy, as well as warnings to local

U.S. officials, depends on the declassification of any

additional information known to the United States government.

Ron Wyden