

Calendar No. 120

119TH CONGRESS } 1st Session }	SENATE	{ REPORT 119-51
-----------------------------------	--------	-----------------------

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

JULY 29, 2025.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. COTTON, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany S. 2342]

The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an original bill (S. 2342) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

Pursuant to Section 364 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010* (Public Law 111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 4, 2025, that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2026 was \$81.9 billion. Other than for limited unclassified appropriations, the classified nature of United States intelligence activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026* and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is made available to the Commit-

tees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976), as amended, and the Rules of Procedure for the Committee.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (the “Act”) reported by the Committee.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year 2026.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2026 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law

Section 103 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 104. Limitation on transfer and reprogramming of funds

Section 104 clarifies that funds authorized to be appropriated for the NIP may not be transferred or reprogrammed until those funds are made available for purposes of Section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and may only be transferred or reprogrammed as authorized by section 102A(d).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2026.

TITLE III—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property

Section 301 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized access to IC property.

Section 302. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft.

Section 302 amends the *Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949* to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by unmanned aircraft.

Section 303. Modification of acquisition authorities

Section 303 amends Section 102A of the *National Security Act of 1949* to enhance the authority of the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to enter into transactions and agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities.

Section 304. Strategies for enhancing jointness during modernization of Common Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination systems

Section 304 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) to develop and submit strategies for the use by the Department of Defense (DoD) of the Distributed Common Ground System.

Section 305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community

Section 305 requires the heads of each element of the IC to conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual survey of analytic objectivity among such element's officers and employees.

Section 306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic standards

Section 306 modifies section 6312 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023* to ensure analytic training includes instructions on avoiding political bias.

Section 307. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705

Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an estimate of the amount of obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government to ensure that all sensitive compartmented information facilities of the IC are compliant with Intelligence Community Directive 705.

Section 308. Amendments regarding Presidential appointments for intelligence community positions

Section 308 amends the requirements for Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of certain IC positions.

Section 309. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury

Section 309 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Section 310. Counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury networks and systems

Section 310 requires the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Treasury to implement policies and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support to Department of Treasury entities responsible for safeguarding networks and systems, and to coordinate counterintelligence threat mitigation, cyber network, and system defense efforts.

Section 311. Report on Director's Initiatives Group personnel matters

Section 311 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on personnel matters of the Director's Initiatives Group.

Section 312. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security

Section 312 prohibits funds made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from being used for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence programs.

Section 313. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule

Section 313 makes a technical correction to the *Higher Education Act of 1965*, as amended by Section 7316 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024*, with respect to officers or employees of elements of the IC.

Section 314. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate assessment

Section 314 amends Section 30 of the *Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949* to require the Director of the CIA to complete and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual workplace climate assessment that includes an opportunity for Agency employees to express their opinions regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual harassment, and the effectiveness of such response.

Section 315. Report on sensitive commercially available information

Section 315 requires each element of the IC to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the access to, as well as collection, processing, and use of, sensitive commercially available information by such element. Section 315 further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the IC with respect to sensitive commercially available information.

Section 316. Report on secure mobile communications systems available to employees and of the intelligence community

Section 316 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the secure mobile communica-

tions systems available to employees and officers of the IC, disaggregated by element of the IC.

Section 317. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities

Section 317 requires the DNI to develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to implement an integrated tracking system for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities.

Section 318. Counterintelligence threats to United States space interests

Section 318 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Section 318 also requires the head of the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop and appropriately distribute an assessment of the counterintelligence risks to commercial spaceports.

Section 319. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central Intelligence Agency

Section 319 amends Section 26 of the *Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949* to make certain enhancements to the Chaplain Corps of the CIA, including by requiring that the Chief of Chaplains report directly to the Director of CIA and that the Chaplain Corps have a global presence.

Section 320. Review by Inspectors General of reform efforts for special access programs and controlled access programs

Section 320 requires the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) and the Inspector General of DoD to jointly conduct a review of the processes, oversight, and management of special access programs and controlled access programs.

Section 321. Prohibition on contractors collecting or selling location data of individuals at intelligence community locations

Section 321 prohibits contractors or subcontractors of an element of the IC from collecting location data of individuals at IC locations, except as necessary for the provision of contracted services, and from selling such data to any individual or entity that is not an element of the IC.

Section 322. Technical amendment to procurement activities of Central Intelligence Agency

Section 322 makes a technical correction to Section 3(a) of the *Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949*.

Section 323. Consolidation of reporting requirements applicable to All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office

Section 323 amends 50 U.S.C. § 3373a to consolidate certain All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting requirements.

Section 324. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting Federal Reserve information

Section 324 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to brief the Federal Reserve on foreign threats and work with the Chair of the Board of Governors to implement security and classification measures for protecting information collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.

Section 325. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data and services program management office

Section 325 requires the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the NRO to submit a plan to establish a joint program management office for commercial geospatial and data services.

Section 326. Inspector General review of adequacy of policies and procedures governing use of commercial messaging applications by intelligence community

Section 326 requires the IC IG to submit a review of the adequacy of policies and procedures governing the IC's use of commercial messaging applications.

Section 327. Authority for National Security Agency to produce and disseminate intelligence products

Section 327 permits the Director of the NSA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to national security.

Section 328. Conditions on procurement of telecommunications equipment by intelligence community

Section 328 directs the IC to utilize standard contractual clauses to promote cybersecurity in the acquisition of telecommunications products or services.

Section 329. Reforms to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security

Section 329 prohibits the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis from collecting information or intelligence targeting United States persons, with exceptions for sharing and receiving certain information or intelligence.

Section 330. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons

Section 330 codifies IC Policy Guidance 107.1, which requires each IC element to develop procedures for responding to unmasking requests.

Section 331. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community

Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the head of each element of the IC, to revise all regulations, policies, procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance to ensure such materials do not allow the use of NIP funds for discriminatory practices prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or other Federal law.

Section 332. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data

Section 332 requires the FBI to submit a report on the number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber national security cases.

TITLE IV—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Section 401. Short title

Section 401 names the Title the “Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025.”

Section 402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence

Section 402 modifies the DNI’s authority to prescribe personnel policies and programs and eliminates certain reporting requirements. Section 402 also eliminates the authority to establish National Intelligence Centers, as well as the authority to transfer personnel to those Centers (which are replaced by National Intelligence Task Forces in Section 409), and permits the DNI to delegate to IC elements certain foreign investment analyses and impact statements. Finally, Section 402 requires the DNI to submit a plan to reform each IC element’s acquisition process so that the process uses existing authorities to expedite acquisitions and includes a preference for acquisition of commercial solutions, consistent with current law.

Section 403. Reforms relating to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Section 403 requires the DNI to submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to reduce ODNI staff to a maximum number of full-time equivalents, including assignees, detailees, and contractors, that the DNI requires for the optimized execution of the DNI’s statutory authorities. Section 403 further requires the DNI to initiate the staff reductions on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, with interim written updates to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 403 requires the DNI to certify that staff subject to the reductions will have opportunities to accept alternative government employment, and prohibits involuntary terminations, except in cases involving documented security, counterintelligence, misconduct, or performance issues.

Section 404. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence

Section 404 renames the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence and creates DNI-appointed Assistant Directors of National Intelligence for Mission Integration and Policy and Capabilities.

Section 405. Reform of the National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Officers

Section 405 modifies the National Intelligence Council's (NIC's) duties, including by clarifying that the NIC may produce or coordinate the production of National Intelligence Estimates.

Section 406. Transfer of National Counterintelligence and Security Center to Federal Bureau of Investigation

Section 406 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI and the duties of Director of the NCSC to the Assistant Director of the FBI for Counterintelligence. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to complete those transfers within two years, with quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 406 further makes conforming amendments to the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002.

Section 407. Redesignation and reform of National Counterterrorism Center

Section 407 redesignates the National Counterterrorism Center the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center and imposes limitations regarding domestic counterterrorism intelligence.

Section 408. Transfer and reform of National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center

Section 408 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) to the CIA and the duties of Director of the NCBC to the Director of the CIA. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to complete those transfers within 455 days, with quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 409. National intelligence task forces

Section 409 gives the DNI the authority to convene national intelligence task forces from other IC elements for a limited time, as necessary to address certain intelligence priorities. Section 409 requires congressional notifications when such task forces are convened. Section 409 further provides that if a matter has not concluded within 540 days of convening the respective task force, the DNI shall transfer responsibility to a specific IC element.

Section 410. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and offices

Section 410 repeals various positions, units, centers, councils, and offices, including the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer (50 U.S.C. § 3034b); Intelligence Community Innovation Unit (50 U.S.C. § 3034c); Office of Engagement (50 U.S.C. § 3062);

Framework for Cross-disciplinary Education and Training (50 U.S.C. § 3192); Foreign Languages Program (50 U.S.C. §§ 3201–03); and Joint Intelligence Community Council (50 U.S.C. § 3022). Section 410 further provides that the DNI shall submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to terminate the Foreign Malign Influence Center (50 U.S.C. § 3059), begin taking such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Center on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and complete such actions within 455 days. Section 410 also makes a technical correction to repeal the statute establishing the Climate Security Advisory Council (50 U.S.C. § 3060), which terminated on December 31, 2024.

Section 411. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management Account funds for certain entities

Section 411 prohibits ICMA funds from being used to support analytic collaboration efforts by federally funded research and development centers or non-profit entities that receive funds from foreign governments (with the exception of the Five Eyes), or by certain research or advocacy organizations that receive funds from foreign adversaries.

Section 412. Transfer of National Intelligence University

Section 412 requires the DNI to transfer the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National Defense University within 180 days of enactment of this Act.

TITLE V—MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Subtitle A—Foreign Countries Generally

Section 501. Declassification of information relating to actions by foreign governments to assist persons evading justice

Section 501 requires the Director of the FBI to declassify information relating to whether foreign government officials assisted or facilitated any citizen or national of their country in departing the United States while the citizen or national was under investigation or awaiting trial or sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United States.

Section 502. Enhanced intelligence sharing relating to foreign adversary biotechnological threats

Section 502 requires the DNI to establish and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a policy for streamlining the declassification or downgrading and sharing of intelligence information relating to biotechnological developments and threats.

Section 503. Threat assessment regarding unmanned aircraft systems at or near the international borders of the United States

Section 503 requires an assessment of the threat that unmanned aircraft systems pose at or near United States international borders.

Section 504. Assessment of the potential effect of expanded partnerships among western hemisphere countries

Section 504 requires the NIC to conduct an assessment and submit a report on the potential effect of expanding partnerships among countries in the western hemisphere.

Subtitle B—People’s Republic of China

Section 511. Countering Chinese Communist Party efforts that threaten Europe

Section 511 requires the President to develop an interagency strategy to counter the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its economic, military, and ideological influence in Europe, which shall include an assessment of the current efforts by the IC to brief members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on intelligence and influence activities by the CCP in Europe.

Section 512. Prohibition on intelligence community contracting with Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing

Section 512 prohibits the IC from contracting with certain Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing.

Section 513. Report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party

Section 513 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to post publicly a report on the wealth of the leadership of the CCP.

Section 514. Assessment and report on investments by the People’s Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil

Section 514 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, to assess the extent of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) investments in Brazil’s agriculture sector.

Section 515. Identification of entities that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army

Section 515 requires the DNI to identify entities in the PRC that support the People’s Liberation Army.

Section 516. Establishing a China Economics and Intelligence cell to publish China Economic Power Report

Section 516 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to establish a China Economics and Intelligence Cell and prepare for public release an annual report on economic and technological developments involving the PRC.

Section 517. Modification of annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party

Section 517 amends 50 U.S.C. § 3237 to expand annual reporting requirements regarding influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the CCP, to include certain PRC law enforcement and academic entities.

Subtitle C—The Russian Federation

Section 521. Assessment of Russian destabilization efforts

Section 521 amends Section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, which requires an annual report on military and security developments involving the Russian Federation, to include an assessment of Russia's efforts to undermine or destabilize the national or economic security of the United States or members of NATO.

Section 522. Enforcing imposition of sanctions with respect to the shadow fleet of the Russian Federation

Section 522 requires the Secretary of the Navy to publish quarterly lists of vessels that shipped Russian petroleum products in violation of sanctions, oil tankers owned by fleet operators based in Russia, and vessels that have engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with such vessels, and to refer such vessels for sanctions.

Subtitle D—Other Foreign Countries

Section 531. Plan to enhance counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico

Section 531 requires the DNI to submit a plan to the congressional intelligence committees, based on information provided by the head of each element of the IC, to enhance counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico.

Section 532. Enhancing intelligence support to counter foreign adversary influence in Sudan

Section 532 requires the Director of the CIA to develop a plan to share with United States allies and partners intelligence relating to foreign adversary efforts to influence the conflict in Sudan, and to counter such efforts.

Section 533. Ukraine lessons learned working group

Section 533 amends Section 6413 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025*, which established the Ukraine Lessons Learned Working Group, to include a requirement to evaluate which lessons should be shared with Taiwan to assist Taiwan's acquisitions decisions and capability development.

Section 534. Improvements to requirement for monitoring of Iranian enrichment of uranium-235

Section 534 amends Section 7413 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024*, which requires the DNI to notify Congress of a significant enrichment activity of Iran, to include no-

tification of intelligence indicating a decision to weaponize uranium.

Section 535. Duty to warn United States persons threatened by Iranian lethal plotting

Section 535 requires each IC element, upon collecting or acquiring credible and specific information indicating a lethal threat to a United States person by Iran or an Iranian proxy, to provide such information to the FBI. Section 535 further requires the FBI to warn the intended victim and notify the appropriate congressional committees.

TITLE VI—EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Section 601. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund

Section 601 creates a fund to assist in transitioning IC products, which have been demonstrated to meet an IC mission need, from the research and development phase to the contracting and production phase, with priority given to small business concerns and non-traditional defense contractors.

Section 602. Enhancing biotechnology talent within the intelligence community

Section 602 requires the DNI to establish a policy for how existing and future funding and resources of the IC can be directed to ensure the IC has sufficient cleared personnel, including private sector experts, to identify and respond to biotechnology threats.

Section 603. Enhanced intelligence community support to secure United States genomic data

Section 603 requires the DNI to provide support to and consult with the FBI, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and other government agencies as appropriate, when reviewing transactions relating to the acquisition of genomic data by foreign entities.

Section 604. Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA

Section 604 requires the DNI to establish a policy to ensure that elements of the IC may not contract with Chinese biotechnology suppliers, including for products made using synthetic DNA or RNA, that are determined by the Director to pose a security threat.

Section 605. Deployment of advanced nuclear technologies

Section 605 requires the DNI to identify one or more IC sites which could benefit from secure, resilient energy through the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies. Section 605 further requires that fuel used for such reactors are domestically sourced.

Section 606. Addressing intelligence gaps relating to outbound investment screening for biotechnology

Section 606 requires the DNI to submit to the President and the congressional intelligence committees a strategy for addressing intelligence gaps relating to investment activity by the PRC in the biotechnology sector of the United States.

Section 607. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial Intelligence Security Center

Section 607 directs NSA’s existing Artificial Intelligence Security Center to establish a research test-bed to support public-private partnerships focused on promoting artificial intelligence (AI) security with frontier AI firms and researchers.

Section 608. Artificial intelligence development and usage by intelligence community

Section 608 applies AI procurement policies established on April 3, 2025, by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for federal civilian agencies to the IC, to promote cost-efficiency, interoperability, and performance-tracking for AI models.

Section 609. High-impact artificial intelligence systems

Section 609 establishes requirements for high-impact AI systems used by the IC, consistent with procedures established by the current OMB guidelines and National Security Memorandum 25.

Section 610. Application of artificial intelligence policies of the intelligence community to publicly available models used for intelligence purposes

Section 610 ensures that publicly available AI models used by the IC are governed by the same established oversight procedures applied to govern commercial AI models used by the IC.

Section 611. Revision of interim guidance regarding acquisition and use of foundation models

Section 611 clarifies existing IC guidance that evaluation of training data and other model characteristics should not be a determinative factor in whether the IC’s use of that model constitutes “collection.”

Section 612. Strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing relating to critical and emerging technologies

Section 612 requires the DNI to develop a strategy for intelligence relating to critical and emerging technologies across the IC.

TITLE VII—CLASSIFICATION REFORM AND SECURITY CLEARANCES

Section 701. Notification of certain declassifications

Section 701 amends the *National Security Act of 1947* to require the DNI to notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist if the Director exercises her authority under section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 to declassify or downgrade properly classified information. Section 701 also requires each IC element to notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist if the element exercises the authority under section 3.1(d) of Executive Order 13526 to declassify information where the need to protect such information is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure.

Section 702. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory revocation of security clearances and access determinations

Section 702 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal with respect to the current or former employee's security clearance or access determination.

Section 703. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance and access determinations

Section 703 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse security clearance or access determination against a whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the agency would have made the same security clearance or access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's disclosure. Section 703 further establishes parity in the legal standards applied to IC whistleblower matters.

Section 704. Reforms relating to inactive security clearances

Section 704 requires the DNI to review and evaluate the feasibility of updating standards and procedure for security clearance eligibility for individuals who have retired or otherwise separated from the IC, including subjecting inactive security clearances to continuous vetting.

Section 705. Protection of classified information relating to budget functions

Section 705 requires Executive Branch departments and agencies to use secure systems that protect NIP budget functions and processes.

Section 706. Report on executive branch approval of access to classified intelligence information outside of established review processes

Section 706 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on approvals of interim security clearances or other access to classified intelligence information for IC employees that do not satisfy the investigative and adjudicative standards established under Executive Order 12968.

TITLE VIII—WHISTLEBLOWERS

Section 801. Clarification of definition of employee for purposes of reporting complaints or information to Inspector General

Section 801 clarifies the definition of "employee" for the purposes of submitting a matter of urgent concern to the IC IG.

Section 802. Protections for whistleblower disclosures to office of legislative or congressional affairs

Section 802 protects from reprisal IC whistleblowers who submit a complaint to IC agency offices of congressional or legislative affairs.

Section 803. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as act of reprisal

Section 803 prohibits knowing or willful disclosures that reveal an IC employee's or IC contractor employee's identifying information without consent, so as to identify such employee or contractor employee as a whistleblower, except as necessary during the course of an investigation. Section 803 further establishes a private right of action for an IC whistleblower if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the whistleblower for bringing a complaint.

Section 804. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors General of the intelligence community

Section 804 permits urgent concerns submitted by IC whistleblowers to the inspectors general of the IC to be provided directly to Congress rather than going through the heads of agencies.

Section 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing or examination

Section 805 amends Section 1104 of the *National Security Act of 1947* to establish that a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination is a prohibited personnel practice when taken or threatened as a reprisal for a protected disclosure.

TITLE IX—ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Section 901. Standard guidelines for intelligence community to report and document anomalous health incidents

Section 901 requires the DNI to issue standard guidelines for IC personnel to document and report anomalous health incidents (AHIs).

Section 902. Review and declassification of intelligence relating to anomalous health incidents.

Section 902 requires the DNI to review IC holdings of AHIs, including AHI reports, intelligence on foreign government efforts related to AHIs, and assessments of the IC's success in detecting such foreign government programs. Section 902 further requires the DNI to perform a declassification review of such AHI holdings for publication.

TITLE X—OTHER MATTERS

Section 1001. Declassification of intelligence and additional transparency measures relating to the COVID-19 pandemic

Section 1001 requires the DNI to conduct declassification reviews and publish intelligence on the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Section 1002. Counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces

Section 1002 requires the USD(I&S) to conduct counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces.

Section 1003. Denial of visas to foreign nationals known to be intelligence officers for accreditation to multilateral diplomatic missions

Section 1003 requires the Secretary of State to deny visas to certain foreign nationals, who are accredited to a United Nations mission or other multilateral international organization in the United States, if the Secretary determines that such individuals have committed known or suspected intelligence activities or espionage activities or are known or suspected of being intelligence officers.

Section 1004. Policy toward certain agents of foreign governments

Section 1004 requires, as United States policy, that the United States pursue parity regarding reciprocal privileges and immunities of United States diplomatic personnel in negotiations with countries conducting harmful intelligence activities. Section 1004 further requires the Secretary of State, the Director of the FBI, and the DNI to submit a report documenting foreign governments engaged in intelligence activities within the United States that receive diplomatic benefits that exceed the reciprocal diplomatic benefits in such country of official representatives of the United States.

Section 1005. Tour limits of accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations in the United States

Section 1005 codifies limits for how long accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of foreign adversaries who are located in the United States can receive diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Section 1006. Strict enforcement of travel protocols and procedures of accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations in the United States

Section 1006 codifies travel restrictions for accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations in the United States, including advance approval requirements and penalties for non-compliance.

Section 1007. Offenses involving espionage, procurement of citizenship or naturalization unlawfully, or harboring or concealing persons

Section 1007 extends the statute of limitations for certain espionage offenses, including criminal charges for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, gathering or delivering defense information to a foreign government, or unlawfully procuring citizenship while working at the direction of a foreign government.

Section 1008. Identification of reallocable frequencies

Section 1008 amends the authorization of the Spectrum Relocation Fund to clarify eligibility for Title 50 agencies that utilize spectrum and whose usage could be impacted by future reallocation decisions.

Section 1009. NEPA national security waivers for intelligence community facilities

Section 1009 permits the President to waive requirements for the IC to prepare certain environmental documents if certain national security-related conditions are met.

Section 1010. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

Section 1010 modifies and repeals certain prior congressional intelligence committee reporting requirements that, for certain reasons, are no longer relevant or necessary to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 1011. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of transactions in real estate near intelligence community facilities

Section 1011 extends a provision in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act that requires the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to review land transactions by foreign actors near United States military installations to also apply to foreign land transactions near IC-owned facilities.

Section 1012. Requiring penetration testing as part of the testing and certification of voting systems

Section 1012 directs the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the voluntary testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software.

Section 1013. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure program for election systems

Section 1013 directs the EAC to establish a voluntary Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot Program for Election Systems to test for and disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.

Section 1014. Church committee historical intelligence records processing

Section 1014 requires the Director of the CIA to take steps to prepare for and expedite the required declassification of the Church Committee archival files.

Section 1015. Foreign material acquisitions

Section 1015 permits the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to enter into contracts or other arrangements for goods and services through the National Laboratories or certain other Department of Energy entities, for purposes of foreign material acquisition supporting national security requirements.

Section 1016. Prohibition on admittance to national laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities

Section 1016 expands a prohibition enacted in section 3112 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025* to restrict access to all national labs by certain foreign adversary nationals, and provides for a waiver in certain circumstances.

Section 1017. Extension of Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015

Section 1017 extends the expiration of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (P.L. 114–113, Div. N) from September 30, 2025 to September 30, 2035.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS AND DIRECTION

Prioritization of open source information related to PRC development finance and influence abroad

For several years, the Committee has pushed the IC to utilize commercially available information to track the PRC's financial activity that undermines U.S. interests, ranging from investments in critical technologies, to creating monopolies through beneficial ownership, to growing influence abroad through financing of infrastructure projects. This committee has been particularly focused on PRC infrastructure investments in partner countries that pressure governments to take policy positions in opposition to U.S. positions, such as recognition of Taiwan.

However, the IC has struggled to identify and utilize open source data to track such PRC malign influence activity abroad. Open source data sets tracking 20,985 PRC development finance projects across 165 countries supported by grant and loan commitments worth \$1.34 trillion are now available. This information covers all regions, sectors, and sources and types of financial and in-kind transfers from government and state-owned institutions in China.

Therefore, given the availability of commercially available information that can inform analysis related to PRC malign influence activity abroad, the Committee directs the DNI to coordinate with heads of relevant IC agencies, including the CIA, to prioritize collection of reliable, detailed open source information on the PRC's use of foreign aid, debt, and equity investments to influence outcomes in developed and developing countries across economic, technological, political, military, intelligence, and governance domains.

Ongoing Intelligence Community Efforts to Counter Cocaine Trafficking

In addition to the synthetic opioid crisis, the Committee is concerned about the increasing cocaine production in South America and its transshipment into the United States. Over the last decade, cocaine overdose deaths among Americans have surged from nearly 5,000 in 2013 to almost 30,000 in 2023. The Committee is further concerned about cocaine trafficking as a source of revenue for drug trafficking organizations engaged in the production and shipment of illicit synthetic opioids to the United States. Competition for control of the cocaine market is resulting in rising violence and instability throughout Latin America.

The Committee supports whole-of-government efforts to track and interdict cocaine shipments to the United States and will continue to ensure appropriate that IC resources are devoted to countering cocaine trafficking.

Cryptocurrency Mining Threats to National Security

The Committee is concerned that Chinese-owned cryptocurrency mining facilities inside the United States pose a danger to national

security. Located throughout the 50 states and equipped with machinery made by Bitmain, a privately-owned Chinese company with ties to the CCP, these mines are located near sensitive defense installations or critical U.S. infrastructure such as power grids, creating several disturbing vulnerabilities.

First, co-location of Chinese-owned cryptocurrency mines near sensitive defense installations gives China an opportunity to pursue a full suite of intelligence collection activities against those sites. Even if these Chinese-owned companies are not connected to the CCP, they can be forced by the PRC to turn over data in accordance with China's national security law. This is an unnecessary counterintelligence risk to sensitive defense installations.

Second, the Bitmain machines used in these facilities have the capability to be remotely controlled by Bitmain personnel in China. According to a *New York Times* article from October 13, 2023, "In the past, researchers have found 'back doors' that would have allowed the company to covertly operate its equipment. After one was discovered in 2017, the company confirmed it could have remotely controlled its mining machines." It is estimated that each mining facility houses 10,000 machines. Considering Bitmain's connections to the CCP, having tens of thousands of machines whose operations can be run from Beijing located near sensitive defense installations is an unacceptable risk.

Lastly, it appears the majority of these Chinese mining machines have made their way into the U.S. illegally. Customs and Border Protection have discovered widespread customs fraud when it comes to these machines entering the United States, to include mis-manifestation of what these machines are and undervaluation of their worth. It is estimated that the financial loss to the United States government could be as much as \$10 billion and growing. Failure to address China's blatant efforts to smuggle malicious crypto-mining machines inside our country will undermine the Trump administration's policies to better balance trade with China.

There have been some efforts to address the national security threats these Chinese-owned facilities pose. For example, one such facility in Cheyenne, WY, located near a nuclear missile installation, was the subject of a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States which led to an Executive Order blocking the Chinese-backed firm from owning the property near the installation in order to "protect national security." While this is a good start, the Committee believes more needs to be done to address this egregious threat to national security.

Therefore, the Committee directs the relevant elements of the IC to work together with law enforcement partners in an effort to shut down any Chinese cryptocurrency mining operations that pose a threat to national security.

Assessment of Threat posed by TikTok to the Private Personal Information of United States Citizens

The Committee is concerned that the declassified Intelligence Information Report (IIR) (IIR 4 212 7305 20) by the FBI further reinforces the vulnerability of U.S. personally identifiable information (PII) posed by TikTok and other adversary-nation controlled mobile applications. As documented in the IIR, the government of the PRC in August 2020 collected private user data from TikTok accounts

in order to produce a large amount of fraudulent drivers' licenses to allow foreign nationals in the United States to vote in the 2020 election. The Committee is further concerned that the IIR was recalled and not subsequently re-issued even after the source of the original IIR was re-interviewed and corroborated and after 20,000 fraudulent drivers licenses were seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection in 2020.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the FBI, in coordination with the heads of other federal agencies, as appropriate, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act an assessment of the threat posed by TikTok and other foreign mobile applications to the private personal information of American citizens. Specifically, such assessment shall include all information, including metadata and content, that these applications can collect from U.S. users and for what purposes such information can be used for.

The Committee further directs the heads of other elements of the IC to review their holdings for information that corroborates the TikTok reporting of the original IIR.

COVID-19 Declassification

Section 1001 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 directs the DNI to undertake a declassification review of intelligence relating to both the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and to efforts by the PRC to disrupt the global response to the pandemic. The Committee is concerned by efforts by the PRC to increase its global standing in multilateral bodies, including global health agencies, and believes that the American people and policymakers must have a full accounting for the PRC's past mistakes and malfeasance in responding to the most lethal and disruptive global health emergency in decades. The Committee notes the important step forward of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 in releasing valuable information to the public on the origins of the pandemic, but believes more action is needed for full transparency and accountability to occur.

Therefore, the Committee directs that in completing the declassification review directed by Section 1001 of this Act, the DNI should cooperate with the Public Interest Declassification Board, to include delegating, as appropriate, identification of and recommendations for declassification of COVID-19-related intelligence. The DNI shall retain final authority to declassify any identified intelligence and shall not permit delegated actions to supersede the statutory requirement to complete the declassification review within 180 days after enactment of this Act.

Vetting Support Agencies

Vetting Support Agencies (VSAs) are integral to the national vetting enterprise in that they are responsible for protecting the nation from terrorists, threats to public safety, and threats to our national security. VSAs have seen a surge in processing as a result of (1) additional vetting requirements arising from Executive Order 14161 and (2) increased categories of aliens needing to be vetted through the National Vetting Center (NVC). The Committee supports the importance of processing these vetting requests in a time-

ly manner, and recognizes many IC partners supporting this mission require increased staff to meet the demand.

Therefore, the Committee recommends vetting support agencies have adequate staffing for their caseloads, with a minimum of one watch officer from the VSA available to support the activities of the NVC 24 hours per day and 7 days per week.

Illicit Financing for Counternarcotics

The Committee is encouraged by the IC's enhanced focus on illicit trafficking of synthetic opioids in recent years, as evidenced by the establishment of a National Intelligence Manager for Counternarcotics at the ODNI and other efforts. However, despite the Committee's repeated inquiries regarding collection, mapping, and interdiction of entities that provide the financial infrastructure for narcotics production and trafficking, including the use of cryptocurrency, money laundering, and other methods, the Intelligence Community has failed to demonstrate a clear focus and effort on this element of the counternarcotics mission.

Therefore, the Committee directs that, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI conduct a review of intelligence collection and other activities of the intelligence community related to countering illicit financing for narcotics traffickers and narcotics trafficking and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the results of the review that includes for each element of the intelligence community, the following: (1) An accounting of the analytic and operational resources of the element for countering illicit financing for narcotics trafficking, including a breakdown of budgets and staffing dedicated to countering such financing; and (2) An assessment of the intelligence and resource gaps of the element related to countering illicit financing for narcotics trafficking.

Requirement for the Central Intelligence Agency to Implement Certain Recommendations Regarding Medical Care and Benefits for Individuals Affected by Anomalous Health Incidents

In December 2024, the Committee's Audits and Projects Team issued a report examining CIA's efforts to provide facilitated medical care and benefits to individuals affected by AHIs. The Committee directs CIA to prioritize implementing the report recommendations pertaining to (1) developing written policies for all medical care and benefit programs available to AHI reporters that include clear eligibility criteria and adjudication processes; and (2) developing and documenting a comprehensive and resource-informed plan for how the Agency will provide, facilitate, or support medical evaluations and acute and long-term care for individuals affected by AHIs or and other counterintelligence-related health incidents. The Committee further directs the CIA to brief the congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the CIA in addressing these recommendations not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On July 15, 2025, a quorum being present, the Committee met to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The Committee took the following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for Fiscal Year 2026, the base text for purposes of amendment.

By unanimous consent, the Committee adopted for inclusion in the *en bloc* amendment (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text; and (2) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western Hemisphere countries.

By voice vote, the Committee adopted *en bloc* thirty-five amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton to consolidate certain All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting requirements; (2) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding protections for Federal Reserve information; (3) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding processing of Church Committee records; (4) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring an assessment of investments by the PRC in Brazil's agricultural sector; (5) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a report on the wealth of CCP leadership; (6) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regarding real estate transactions near IC facilities; (7) an amendment by Chairman Cotton improving the requirement for monitoring Iranian enrichment of Uranium-235; (8) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a duty to warn United States persons threatened by Iranian lethal plotting; (9) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring annual training and reporting on analytic standards; (10) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring an annual survey of analytic objectivity among IC officers and employees; (11) an amendment by Chairman Cotton establishing a China Economics and Intelligence Cell to publish a China Economic Power Report; (12) an amendment by Chairman Cotton establishing certain reforms of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (13) an amendment by Chairman Cotton codifying procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons; (14) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring protection of classified information related to budget functions; (15) an amendment by Chairman Cotton establishing reforms of the ODNI and broader IC; (16) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying section 307 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text regarding the Deputy Director of the CIA's position; (17) an amendment by Chairman Cotton prohibiting discrimination in the IC; (18) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying certain reporting on CCP influence operations; (19) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner, cosponsored by Senator Collins, to secure election systems; (20) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to impose certain limitations on reprogramming funds; (21) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner imposing additional functions and requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Security Center; (22) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner establishing procurement conditions on IC telecommunications equipment; (23) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner applying IC AI policies to publicly available models used for intelligence purposes; (24) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner revising interim guidance regarding acquisition and use of foundation models;

(25) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding IC AI development and usage; (26) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding high-impact AI systems; (27) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text, modifying certain IC acquisition authorities; (28) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring a plan to establish a Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Data and Services Program Management Office; (29) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring an IC IG review of policies and procedures governing the IC's use of commercial messaging applications; (30) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury networks and systems; (31) an amendment by Senator Moran permitting certain foreign material acquisitions within the Department of Energy; (32) an amendment by Senator Kelly requiring a report on Executive Branch approval of access to classified intelligence information outside of established review processes; (33) an amendment by Senator Lankford requiring identification of entities that provide support to the PLA; (34) an amendment by Senator Young requiring a strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing related to critical and emerging technologies; (35) an amendment by Senator Budd authorizing the NSA to produce and disseminate intelligence products; (36) an amendment by Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text; and (37) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western Hemisphere countries.

By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to extend the expiration date of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, with Senator Wyden recorded as a no. By unanimous consent, the Committee approved Senator Wyden's request to submit a separate statement regarding his vote.

By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an amendment by Chairman Cotton to prohibit access by certain foreign nationals to National Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton—aye; Senator Risch—aye; Senator Collins—aye; Senator Cornyn—aye; Senator Moran—aye; Senator Lankford—aye; Senator Rounds—aye; Senator Young—aye; Senator Budd—aye; Vice Chairman Warner—no; Senator Wyden—no; Senator Heinrich—no; Senator King—no; Senator Bennet—no; Senator Gillibrand—no; Senator Ossoff—no; Senator Kelly—no.

By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to substitute a second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own original-filed amendment providing certain protections, mandating that incumbents in competitive service positions converted to excepted service positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5, imposing reporting requirements on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national security and provides an explanation for such determination to the committees. The second-degree amendment did the same, but omitted the provisions regarding converted positions.

By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Senator Moran—no; Senator Lankford—no; Senator Rounds—no; Senator Young—no; Senator Budd—no; Vice Chairman Warner—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich—aye; Senator King—aye; Senator Bennet—aye; Senator Gillibrand—aye; Senator Ossoff—aye; Senator Kelly—aye.

By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a second-degree amendment by Senator King to Senator Wyden's amendment to require annual FBI reporting on the number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, domestic terrorism, and cyber national security cases. The second-degree amendment omitted the number of domestic terrorism cases. By voice vote, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended.

By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to require that, if the head of an IC element transfers money from an Inspector General and that Inspector General does not approve, the head of that IC element has to explain to the relevant congressional committees why it is in the vital national security interests of the United States to do so. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Senator Moran—no; Senator Lankford—no; Senator Rounds—no; Senator Young—no; Senator Budd—no; Vice Chairman Warner—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich—aye; Senator King—aye; Senator Bennet—aye; Senator Gillibrand—aye; Senator Ossoff—aye; Senator Kelly—aye.

By a vote of 5 ayes and 12 noes, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to the classified annex. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Senator Moran—no; Senator Lankford—no; Senator Rounds—no; Senator Young—no; Senator Budd—no; Vice Chairman Warner—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich—aye; Senator King—no; Senator Bennet—no; Senator Gillibrand—aye; Senator Ossoff—aye; Senator Kelly—no.

Votes to report the committee bill

On July 15, 2025, the Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and two noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton—aye; Senator Risch—aye; Senator Collins—aye; Senator Cornyn—aye; Senator Moran—aye; Senator Lankford—aye; Senator Rounds—aye; Senator Young—aye; Senator Budd—aye; Vice Chairman Warner—aye; Senator Wyden—no; Senator Heinrich—no; Senator King—aye; Senator Bennet—aye; Senator Casey—aye; Senator Gillibrand—aye; Senator Ossoff—aye; Senator Kelly—aye.

By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to make technical and conforming changes to the bill and classified annex.

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE XLIV

Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires publication of a list of any “congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit” that is included in the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

ESTIMATE OF COSTS

Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 16, 2025, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of this legislation.

CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to expedite the business of the Senate.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

The Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant step backward for congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community. First, the bill eliminates the long-standing requirement that the general counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence be confirmed by the Senate. This change would leave a conspicuous hole in congressional oversight of national security, given that the general counsels of the Department of Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy, as well as the Legal Advisor of the State Department, are all Senate confirmed. It is particularly troubling as Intelligence Community general counsels operate secretly, making decisions and offering legal advice on topics such as surveillance and torture, with no public accountability other than the vetting and scrutiny that comes from the confirmation process.

Second, the bill lacks a provision, which was included in last year's Committee-passed bill, that would require the Intelligence Community to explain to the Committee when the heads of Intelligence Community entities exercise their authority to fire personnel without any process or protections. Given the rash of dubious and unexplained firings in recent months, this lack of oversight hamstrings the Committee's ability to scrutinize and mitigate efforts to politicize the Intelligence Community workforce.

I have a number of concerns related to the bill's provisions related to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and urge the Committee to conduct an in-depth review of what reforms will advance, rather than undermine the purposes for which the Office was created after 9/11. For example, the bill renames the National Counterterrorism Center the "National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center," suggesting that two very different threats to the country should be addressed under the same government framework, relying on the same resources and personnel, and operating under the same set of intelligence authorities. Such an approach risks undermining the country's efforts to combat both.

The bill extends for ten years the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, whose passage I opposed due to a lack of protections for Americans' personal information. In September 2024, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General issued a report (OIG-24-60) that found that the government was not sharing cyber threat information with companies, and that companies were not sharing cyber threat information with each other or the government. These findings highlight how the program has failed and is not worthy of reauthorization.

I also have serious concerns about classified matters that are either in the classified annex or that the annex fails to address. At the same time, I am deeply troubled by increasing impediments to

Committee oversight. Abuses of both the “Gang of 8” briefings, whereby the Intelligence Community withholds information from the full Committee, and restrictions on staff access to intelligence programs are the worst they have been in 20 years.

Several other topics related to the bill are worthy of discussion. First, the bill prohibits the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) from “engaging in the collection of information or intelligence targeting any United States person.” Given I&A’s abuses in Portland, Oregon, in 2020, I welcome efforts to rein in its authorities, particularly if they have the effect of prohibiting the compilation of dossiers of Americans’ First Amendment-protected speech and precluding I&A from secretly infiltrating private communications, which the current nominee to be Under Secretary for I&A has incorrectly asserted is permissible. I am concerned, however, that this provision falls short. The exception permitting I&A to collect from the “private sector” might be read to allow I&A to obtain information on Americans through their landlords, their bosses, their neighborhood grocery stores or data brokers. The provision also fails to address collection on Americans by other intelligence components within the Department of Homeland Security, despite the Under Secretary’s statutory mandate to issue policies and guidelines for those components.

Second, the bill is being reported at a time of serious threat to the independence of the inspectors general. The Director of National Intelligence recently fired the IC IG’s acting counsel under a mistaken reading of the law that grants IGs final approval for personnel decisions (50 U.S.C. § 3033(j)(3)). That statutory language originated with the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the report to which clearly stated it was intended to bring the authorities of the IC IG into conformity with the augmented authorities created by the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. That law established that “each Office of Inspector General shall be considered to be a separate agency” and “the Inspector General who is the head of an office . . . shall, with respect to such office, have the functions, powers, and duties of an agency head or appointing authority under such provisions.” The IG’s statutory personnel authorities concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General is thus clearly intended to cover all OIG personnel not detailed from another agency, rather than creating an arbitrary and unworkable carve out of the IG’s authorities over its own personnel, as the DNI would have it. It is in the context of this dispute that I offered an amendment requiring that, if the head of an IC element transfers money from an IG over the IG’s objections, the IC has to explain to the Committee why it is in the vital national security interests of the United States to do so. The Committee’s defeat of this amendment represents another set-back for oversight.

Despite these concerns, I am pleased that the bill includes many provisions I put forward. These include protections for whistleblowers, allowing them to come to Congress without having to go through their agencies, ensuring that their efforts to communicate with Congress through the IC’s offices of congressional and legislative affairs are protected from reprisal, ensuring that their security clearances can’t be revoked on a pretext, removing the cap on dam-

ages for retaliatory revocation of whistleblower clearances, and prohibiting, as acts of reprisal, disclosures of whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake psychological examinations. The bill also includes a provision from last year's bill requiring congressional and public reporting on the Intelligence Community's purchase and use of sensitive data on Americans.

The bill further includes my provision prohibiting the Intelligence Community from contracting with companies that collect and sell geolocation data associated with intelligence facilities, as well as my amendment requiring annual reporting on FBI national security investigations.

Finally, the bill includes my provision requiring the FBI to declassify any information related to whether foreign government officials have helped their nationals flee the United States while under investigation or awaiting trial or sentencing for a crime committed in the United States. In 2016, a Saudi national was accused in the hit-and-run death of Fallon Smart, a 15-year-old Portland girl. The flight from the United States of that Saudi national before trial prompted me to push through legislation requiring the declassification of a 2019 FBI report describing a pattern of Saudi officials helping Saudi nationals flee the country to avoid the U.S. justice system. The subsequent adoption by the State Department of a policy to identify and revoke the visas of foreign officials responsible for these practices was an important step forward, but implementation of the policy, as well as warnings to local U.S. officials, depends on the declassification of any additional information known to the United States government.

RON WYDEN