Open Hearing: Nomination of Ms. Shannon Corless to be the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury

[Senate Hearing 117-247] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 117-247 NOMINATION OF SHANNON CORLESS TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ NOVEMBER 30, 2021 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 46-623PDF WASHINGTON : 2022 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine ANGUS KING, Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas BOB CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio ---------- Michael Casey, Staff Director Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- NOVEMBER 30, 2021 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia............... 1 Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida................... 2 Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from Texas..................... 3 WITNESS Corless, Shannon, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury..... 11 Prepared Statement........................................... 14 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Nomination material for Shannon Corless Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 34 Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 51 Post-Hearing Questions....................................... 61 Letter of support dated November 29, 2021 from Senator Dan Coats...................................................... 5 Letter of support dated November 17, 2021 from Stuart Levey.. 6 Letter of support dated November 1, 2021 from James R. Clapper.................................................... 8 Letter of support dated October 29, 2021 from Hon. Mike Rogers..................................................... 10 NOMINATION OF SHANNON CORLESS TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ---------- TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2021 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R. Warner (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand, Burr, Risch, Collins, Blunt, Cornyn, and Sasse. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Chairman Warner. I would like to call this hearing to order. Before we get to our witnesses, I want to acknowledge that today is the birthday of the oldest Member on the Committee, Richard Burr, and we want to wish Richard a very, very happy birthday. Senator Burr. I will correct you on that. You're right about the birthday. You're not right about the oldest. Chairman Warner. I know. I was hoping that somebody might self-correct that. But Richard, happy birthday. Again, welcome Ms. Corless, and welcome to your family. I had a chance to meet briefly Josh and Declan and your mom, Linda, and your brother, Chet. Congratulations on your nomination to be Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis. Welcome also, obviously, to John Cornyn, who's going to introduce you. You come to this position as a highly qualified and highly recommended nominee. You're currently the Intelligence Community Executive and National Intelligence Manager for Economic Security and Financial Intelligence at the office of the DNI. It's clearly a position of direct relevance to the position you're about to be nominated for and hopefully will be confirmed for. My understanding is that you currently have the IC's activities and assessments relating to economic security, energy security, export controls, investment security, sanctions, the supply chain, telecom, threat, finance and trade, including engagements with interagency process and our foreign partners. So we'll probably ask you on each of those subjects today. You obviously have come highly recommended by your former boss, DNI Jim Clapper. I understand Dan Coats and former HPSCI Chairman Mike Rogers, as well. And obviously, John Cornyn doesn't introduce or recommend that many folks, so that's a very, very good sign as well. The fact is, that kind of broad bipartisan support is absolutely what we need in the Intelligence Community. Nonpartisan professionalism throughout the community. The office that you hopefully will be coming to, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, is really, really important. I know you're going to be over at Treasury. When we get to our questions, I'd like to hear your thoughts on the importance of financial intelligence to the IC, and what capabilities Treasury's OIA brings to the table, especially as we enter a period of strategic competition with countries like China and Russia. I have not mentioned this to Senator Rubio yet, but Senator Cornyn and I, most or all of us on this Committee, are obviously very supportive of the CHIPS Bill and trying to make sure that we protect our semiconductor industry. I'm reading today from DIA, there was some information about a potential American company that is perhaps being acquired by China. This is exactly the thing we need to prevent. And I don't know whether I can, I'm not sure where that kind of responsibility fits in the overall framework. Senator Cornyn, Senator Feinstein did a good job on CFIUS Reform a few years back. But this is still an area that we need, I think, a lot more work on. This whole movement around financial intelligence--follow the money--was obviously a critical component of our fight against terrorism extremism. I think we're going to have to follow the money in the same way, particularly as we see the emerging challenges that China and particularly the Communist Party of China is putting forward. I think we also are interested in some of the effects of the digital Yuan, how that plays into the whole power balance. Also, how we deal with Russia from their cyber activities to their use of proxies. And again, the follow the money component, I think, is terribly important. So I thank you for being willing to serve. And a big thank you to all the women and men who served under your leadership in your current position. The Vice Chairman will now make a statement, followed by Senator Cornyn. And then, Ms. Corless, you will be sworn in and invited to give your introductory statement. After this, the Members' questions will be in five minute rounds. I now recognize the Vice Chairman. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ms. Corless, for being here, for your willingness to serve in this capacity, for your years of service. You have two decades of service in the Intelligence Community and extensive experience in financial intelligence. And this is a department, in the Treasury Department, that is a really critical member of the Intelligence Community. It has a really important mandate. I think one that's become even more important in the last few years. Obviously, within the context of those challenges, I think none is greater at this point, that's widely acknowledged, than that posed by the Chinese Communist Party. They have a holistic, comprehensive, long-term, and committed plan that they're using both licit and illicit means to dominate particularly global emerging technologies to displace the United States, and, ultimately, to reshape the rules based on international order to its benefit. They used to hide that ambition. They hide it a lot less these days. And it certainly puts a tremendous amount of pressure on us. So I appreciate your long standing work on CFIUS. I would be interested to hear a little bit today about how you'll support efforts to identify and ensure U.S. companies are not providing--not just being acquired--but providing data, capital technology, know-how to Chinese state-owned companies and state controlled, so called private companies that advance the goals of the Communist Party, as I described earlier. Through the things like joint venture, venture capital, private equity, and other vehicles, which make the tracking of some of these things harder than ever before. I know it's not your doing or in your department, but once again today for the second time at hearing, I expressed the concern I have with the Administration's recent decision to remove the FARC from the Foreign Terrorist Organization lists. I'm just deeply concerned that it's going to contribute to a quick unraveling of decades of progress in Colombia and actually goes against the wishes of our democratic partners in Colombia, a very stable ally, who we worked very closely with throughout all these years. Without, I think, the expectation of this Committee in a role, like the one you will play, is that you will provide the support needed to better inform policy decisions such as these and others, and that it not be driven by political agendas. From all I have seen and read so far, there's no reason to expect that you won't meet that standard. And so, we're grateful for your willingness to continue to serve, and we look forward to your testimony. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I now recognize Senator Cornyn for a formal introduction. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS Senator Cornyn. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you for holding this hearing to consider the nomination of Shannon Corless to serve as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Treasury. She's accompanied by her husband and son and her mom and her brother, and we welcome all of you here today. I appreciate the opportunity to introduce her to you briefly. I had a chance to work with Ms. Corless a few years ago when we were working on reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which we all know as CFIUS. There was a clear need to modernize the CFIUS process to prevent predatory investments by adversaries like China and Russia from impacting our national security. To close that security gap, Senator Feinstein and I introduced the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, now known as FIRRMA, and we looked to Ms. Corless for her expert non-partisan advice. Her tireless work as an intelligence professional was integral to ensuring that we got this legislation right. She provided expertise, advice, and experience to a process that ultimately saw FIRRMA signed into law. But her interaction with that legislation did not end there. In her capacity at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Shannon has adeptly overseen the expansion of capabilities within the Intelligence Community to comply with the requirements to support the updated CFIUS regime. I'm proud of the process we all made together, since FIRRMA became law, and I imagined Ms. Corless is as well. She should be. But we all know that the threat from our foreign adversaries has not all of a sudden evaporated. Our adversaries continue searching for ways to undermine the United States and threaten our position as the preeminent global power. That's exactly why we need intelligence professionals like Ms. Corless in key positions. In a meeting in my office yesterday, Ms. Corless and I had the opportunity to discuss the importance of export controls and outbound investment reviews, something along the lines that Senator Casey and I have been advocating for, as a way to round out what we began with CFIUS reform. And we look forward to asking you a few questions about that topic. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, the Department of Treasury plays a vital role in ensuring our continued economic security. At a time when our adversaries are testing American power all around the world, we cannot ignore the economic component of our national security. Ms. Corless' passion for national security, her work at the ODNI and her nearly 20 years of experience in the Intelligence Community, in my opinion, make her an ideal candidate for this position. I have confidence that if confirmed, she'll continue to serve our country with honor and integrity and act in the best interest of our national security. Our country is fortunate to have leaders willing to answer the call to preserve American strength and to serve our country despite the hard work, long hours, and thankless expectations that often accompany such service. Finally, I would be remiss if I didn't mention in my comments that while Shannon is a native of Florida, she did live in Dallas, Texas, for a few years as a child, and that makes her a fellow Texan in my eyes--or at least an honorary Texan. I'm honored to introduce her to the Committee today. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. I now ask unanimous consent that the many letters of support for the nominees received by the Committee be entered into the record without objection. [Letters of support for the Nominee follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. With that we'll proceed to the administering of the oath. So, will the witness please stand and raise her right hand? Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the full truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Ms. Corless. I do. Chairman Warner. Please be seated. Before we move to your opening statement, I'll now ask you to answer the five standard questions that the Committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They require a simple yes or no as an answer for the record. First, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? Ms. Corless. I agree. Chairman Warner. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? Ms. Corless. Yes. Chairman Warner. Do you agree to provide documents or other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Ms. Corless. Yes. Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such material to the Committee when requested? Ms. Corless. Yes. Chairman Warner. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible, all members of the Committee on intelligence activities, covert activity, and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and the Vice Chairman? Ms. Corless. Yes. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, and we will now proceed to your opening statement. STATEMENT OF SHANNON CORLESS, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Ms. Corless. Chairman, Vice Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, it is truly an honor to sit before you today as you consider my nomination for the role of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. I am deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, Secretary Yellen, and Deputy Secretary Adeyemo for their confidence in me, and also to the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines for her support and encouragement in my decision to accept this nomination. I want to take a moment to recognize several important individuals in my life, without whom today would not have been possible. First and foremost, my husband Josh; he is the love of my life, my best friend, and the most amazing father to our two children, Declan and Margo. I would also like to recognize my mother and father Linda and Bill Ratliff and my brother Chet. Our parents were the ultimate role models. They instilled in us from a young age a sense of confidence that we are capable of achieving our goals and realizing our dreams. My father passed away nearly 10 years ago, and while it saddens me enormously that he's not around to savor this moment, I know that he is with me every step of the way. I would also like to recognize my in-laws, Joseph and Sylvia Corless, who have truly become like a second set of parents to me. And finally, I would like to recognize my late grandmother, Virginia Moser Horgan, who passed away on Christmas night of 2020 from complications related to COVID. There are so many more people, family, friends and colleagues to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for their love and support. My interest in service to country came at an early age. I grew up in Tampa, Florida, near MacDill Air Force Base. I vividly recall watching my father, a television anchor at WFLA TV in Tampa, report daily on Operation Desert Storm. The conflict and my father's role in reporting it led to many conversations at home about the history of service in my family. This included my great grandfather's service in World War I, both grandfathers' service in World War II and the Korean War respectively, and my great uncle, Colonel Robert Montel, who spent over 30 years in the Army. My uncle served in a variety of special forces roles and posts throughout his career, including as commander of the 5th Special Forces Group. He was my inspiration to pursue a career in national security. And he readily indulged and encouraged my growing interest as a child and young adult. This passion for national security led me first to work with the Office of Naval Intelligence and then at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, where I have overseen the provision of broad intelligence for support to Treasury, including with respect to Treasury's role as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. I am currently responsible for leading the Intelligence Community's economic security and financial intelligence mission. In short, my team is responsible for ensuring that the IC is postured to support policy customers on issues such as CFIUS reviews, export controls, telecommunications, sanctions implementation, and the rise of digital assets, among many others. The position I am being considered for today, the Assistant Secretary for the Department of the Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis, or OIA, is perhaps one of the most unique roles in the IC. The Department of the Treasury is the only finance ministry in the world to have its own intelligence component. Though OIA may have been born out of 9/11 and designed to play a key role in the U.S. government's counterterrorism efforts, it is increasingly pivotal to our government's efforts to compete with China and assure U.S. economic security and that of our allies. Leading an organization with such a unique and critical responsibility is an opportunity I am eager to take on. And one I feel I am prepared to lead, drawing upon my decades of service to the IC and leadership in the IC. If confirmed to the role of Assistant Secretary, I will strive to ensure that OIA has the human capital and technology resources it needs to successfully execute its mission. Intelligence integration has been a central pillar and guiding principle of my career at ODNI. If confirmed, I intend to leverage that experience and ensure that OIA continues to lead when appropriate, and partners with IC colleagues always. My entire career has been in the IC, where I am privileged to work with extraordinarily committed and talented colleagues. I never imagined I would have the opportunity to be considered for this role, but I am deeply honored to be nominated and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of the Nominee follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Thank you, Ms. Corless. And for planning purposes, if any members of the Committee wish to submit questions for the record, after today's hearing, please do so by 5 p.m. this Thursday, December 2nd. And as usual, we recognize members for five minutes each in order of seniority at the gavel, followed by order of arrival. Because we actually got a larger turnout than I anticipated, I'm only going to ask you one question and make sure all my colleagues get in, if there's something they don't get to them, I'll get you on a second round. How do we, from your vantage point right now at ODNI, we're supposed to see some of these efforts to collaborate these economic financial challenges and threats we face. How do we make sure we stay up with what China's doing? I want to cite this case, where they're potentially buying into a cutting-edge semiconductor entity here in the United States and seems like everything we've done that should have been red flashing lights. How do we make sure that we don't have gaps in obtaining this information? That we have the right tools in place to follow it? I know from a written standpoint where Treasury OIA fits in, but how do you see your role fitting in with having this role of coordination at ODNI? And what do we need to do to improve the product? Ms. Corless. Sure, Senator, thank you very much for that question. Thank you again for the opportunity to meet with you the other day. So I think I would offer a couple of points to your question. First, OIA's responsibility within the Department of the Treasury is to identify, deter, and help enable disruption of threats to the U.S. financial system. And I think that would come in a variety of different ways that would certainly come through potential cyberattacks to financial system, but it also comes through efforts to acquire intellectual property, to invest in as U.S. companies gain access to technological capabilities. So I think the role and responsibility of OIA in this regard is to ensure that it is providing strategic analysis to Secretary Yellen, and to other senior leadership within the government, so that they understand how we see that China is trying to adjust to our efforts to stop their access to technology, through efforts like CFIUS reform. Something that I think we all well know is that China is a learning adversary and while we make great strides to reform how we are reviewing the foreign investments in the U.S., we should expect that they will try to continue to get around those. So certainly making sure that we have our collection and analysis. Our collection and priorities in place that they are in alignment with what we understand to be the priorities of the administration. But also critical to that is our partnerships with our foreign partners and our private sector partners. Without those partnerships, and without understanding what private sector sees as trends in industry, it'll be hard for us to necessarily get ahead of the problem. Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, I would simply say I was out at ODNI recently, and on the subject of China's economic efforts and kind of ask a basic question about which American venture funds are investing in which of these Chinese tech companies and these good analysts, but they almost felt like they were constrained from looking at American enterprise. I mean, this was a question that at a big Wall Street firm, you'd have a first year analyst to get an answer in a matter of hours, if not, days. So I do hope with your background coming into this role, this is an area we're going to need to beef up our skills and our playing sense. And, again, your question about making sure we partner with, or your comment making sure we partner with the private sector, is very critical. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, again for being here. Look, it's my belief that the Communist Party of China isn't simply a competitor of the United States, but they're engaged in a zero- sum game that they seek to grow at our expense, and ultimately to displace us as the world's most powerful and influential nation in every realm. Do you agree with that assessment? Do you share that same view? Ms. Corless. Sure. Senator Rubio, I see China as perhaps our greatest strategic competitor. We know that they go after U.S. critical technologies using a whole of government, in a comprehensive approach we know they use the traditional methods such as espionage. We also know that they work with academia. They leverage the seams in our system, whether it would be CFIUS reviews or export control. They take advantage of those. So I absolutely agree that we are facing a significant challenge with China. Vice Chairman Rubio. Yes. I get that they're a challenge. And they're not our only global competitor. I guess the question really is, are they engaged in a zero-sum game in your view? You don't have to agree with my view, I'm just wondering, do you agree that they seek to displace us to become the world's most powerful country as opposed to simply being a competitor that wants to reach parity? Ms. Corless. Senator, that is a very good question. It's a complex one. And I do think that there is a great reason for concern that they do have an aim of displacing U.S. economic superiority. And I think for that reason, it's all the more important that OIA, makes sure that it provides the best strategic analysis that it can to the Secretary. If confirmed, I will ensure that OIA will do so. Vice Chairman Rubio. So is there anything in the time that you've been working in that position--you can't divulge it obviously in this setting--that leads you to be more cautious about the assessment than I've been? I mean, I've made a pretty straightforward pronouncement. And that is China is involved in a zero-sum game in which they believe either they win or we win, but we can't both benefit. Is there anything that you've seen or come across, that gives you some pause and reaching the same conclusion in such terms? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you very much for that question. I think that is probably one that is better reserved for a classified conversation, and I would be more than happy to come back and talk to you and your staff about that question. Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay, so putting aside anything in your work, I just want to be fundamentally clear: what I just said about the zero-sum game, you obviously acknowledge that that's a concern, and you acknowledge that they are a significant, powerful competitor. But you're not able to say, as I have said, that they're involved in a zero-sum game, at least not in this setting? Ms. Corless. So, Senator, yes, I think I would agree with everything that you've just said. We absolutely see them as perhaps our greatest strategic competitor. And they are, at least sitting in within my role right now, they are the priority of the ODNI and of the Intelligence Community in terms of how we are placing our resources and trying to get at the challenge. Vice Chairman Rubio. Alright, let me ask you, related to that question: the Chinese laws require companies to turn over information to the Chinese State and the CCP, clearly blurring the military and civilian sector through this military/civil fusion strategy. Given that, is there any meaningful distinction, for example, at this point between Chinese state-owned entities and what they claim to be private companies, given the reach--in essence, no matter how private you think you are, under Chinese law, if the Communist Party tells you, we need your data, we want your information, you have to do this, they have to do it, or they don't exist as a company anymore. At this point, is there any real distinction when it comes to the purpose of reviewing investments and things of that nature? Ms. Corless. Senator, if I understand your question correctly, are you asking if there is truly a distinction between the state-owned enterprises and a company that may put itself out as a private Chinese company? Vice Chairman Rubio. Correct. Ms. Corless. I think that while there may be some validity to making that distinction, I think what we ultimately have to realize is that the Chinese government has a number of levers over companies that may put themselves out as being private, and there are requirements for them to go back to seek certain approvals from the government in order to seek outbound investments in the United States or in countries like our allies in Europe. And so I think whether--I almost wondered the extent sometimes whether it's a distinction without a difference, because of the nature of the Chinese laws, as you pointed out. Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay, thank you. Chairman Warner. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you, Ms. Corless, and I certainly know you've gotten positive reviews for your work. I'm going to start with a question we told you then I would ask you about under the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. The Treasury Department obtains information on financial transactions from the Swift Company, which is used by thousands of financial institutions to move money around the world. The program has been controversial, because the Treasury Department just scoops up the data, meaning it gets information on the personal financial transactions of countless innocent people. More than a year ago, the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Board reviewed the program, and urged the Treasury do more to protect the privacy of individual Americans, as we indicated before the hearing. What's been done? Ms. Corless. I'm sorry, Senator, could you repeat the last part of your question? Senator Wyden. We said that we would be asking, given the recommendation from the board more than a year ago, that more had to be done to protect the privacy of individual Americans. What's been done? Ms. Corless. So, Senator, thank you for the question. I am familiar with the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. But it is one that I would need to be briefed on, if confirmed, upon arrival with the Treasury, to better understand how it is used and what OIA's role is in it. That being said--and certainly how I would be implementing any of the board's recommendations--I do want to ensure, I would ensure, that OIA, if I'm confirmed for this role, abides by both the spirit and the intent of the ODNI's processes and procedures with respect to handling U.S. persons' information, and ensuring protection of civil liberties. Senator Wyden. Why don't I let you put that in writing? Because I did tell you that I was going to ask the question. Second question is about following the money. Over the years, the previous Presidents spent decades developing and maintaining and relying on financial relationships with Russia. Other administration officials had compromising links to other countries such as Turkey. And I'm very concerned about foreign adversaries exploiting financial entanglements to undermine our democracy. Are you? Ms. Corless. Senator, yes, I absolutely am concerned about that. And I think, understanding how money moves, it gives us insight into the nature of the relationships and how these adversaries might be trying to circumvent U.S. laws, to circumvent our sanctions process. If confirmed, that is absolutely something that I would ensure that OIA continues to do because it is core to their mission. While OIA was born out of 9/11 and focused on countering terrorism threats, we see considerable applicability of that same approach to understanding how China and Russia and other adversaries such as Iran and North Korea are trying to use that approach. Senator Wyden. Let's be very specific then. I appreciate your answer. As chairman of the Senate Finance Committee--and I should note that I believe there are six members of the Committee in the room now--so there is a real connection between the Finance Committee, Treasury, and Intelligence and as chairman of the Committee, I've long been concerned about the ways in which government investigators are prevented from following the money. Specifically, large private investment funds are a $10 trillion global industry, yet are exempt from most due diligence and disclosure rules that other investment vehicles are subject to. If you're confirmed, will you examine whether private offshore investment funds like hedge funds and private equity firms are being used to launder money at scale and potentially evade sanctions or finance terrorism? Ms. Corless. Senator Wyden, thank you for your question. If confirmed, I will ensure that OIA will continue to look at a variety of mechanisms which are used for money laundering, whether it be through mechanisms, such as what you just mentioned, whether it may be through the use of cryptocurrencies or other tools. Senator Wyden. I'd like a written answer to that question as well, Ms. Corless. These are hugely consequential issues. Ten trillion, a global industry to a great extent exempt from due diligence and disclosure rules that other investment vehicles are subject to. I want to know whether you're going to examine those. So I've asked you two questions. As I say, I've heard only positive things about you. I'd like those in writing and under the rules that comes in through the Chair and the Vice Chair. So I'll look forward to that. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. I would echo this issue of investment firms. I think is something that literally only fairly recently I have become aware of. You talk about terrorism. You also talk about all the challenges we've--we've tried to deal with challenging, for example China. That's all opaque as well. Senator Burr. Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Shannon, welcome. Our paths have had the opportunity to cross a number of times over the years. I don't have questions for you, I just have a few comments. One, it's refreshing to see somebody as qualified nominated for a spot in the intelligence community and I will say that this administration has held a high standard for anybody within the intel community and you're at the top of that list. You talk about I&A being created out of 9/11. I can still remember when the office stood up and we had these young, smart guys with computers downstairs in the basement, probably the worst office in the building, and it didn't take them long before they tracked down exactly how terrorist financing was happening. And they began to shut it down, even in the most rudimentary way. My observation on that is we can do much more than just track terrorism dollars down there. I would hope that when you got there you would look at an expanded horizon as to how that asset can be used. And I'm sure it's there, probably in a different office. Probably they're a little older now, probably the technology they use is a little bit better, but I think it is a strong force multiplier for us in a lot of the things that we're concerned with. Second, Treasury is the loudest voice in the room for CFIUS, but it seems that entities like the State Department bring more assets to tip the scales when the vote happens and how the votes line up. I just want to encourage you to make sure that not only is Treasury a loud voice, they're the loudest voice in the room. What the Chairman and the Vice Chairman have expressed about China concerns all of us on this Committee. It should concern every American, but we've reached out and read companies and academia into the China threat, and it by no means is overwhelming when they walk away that they understand just how big a threat this is. You'll see it, you'll know it, you'll have the factual information. Make sure that the voice at Treasury is the loudest voice that goes in the room on some of the CFIUS decisions. The last thing I want to say is you're probably the only one in an intel role that fits into an agency that's not an intelligence agency with the possible exception of the State Department. We have high expectations about this intelligence component at the Treasury and it's much different than the intelligence component at the State Department because your information goes to a much broader array of the intelligence community. They don't have the insight that you're going to have from your technical folks, from your analytic team. So it is valuable that you make sure that that is properly broadcast throughout the intelligence community to influence what analysts are writing, but more importantly so the products that we get on the Hill, as policymakers, we make the best decisions that we possibly can. So you really are in a pivotal, pivotal role where you're going. I wish you tremendous success. I have high expectations of you. I know you're going to make us proud and you already have made your parents proud. Thank you for doing this. Chairman Warner. Senator Casey. Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much. Ms. Corless, we're grateful for your willingness to serve again, especially at this time. I wanted to raise some questions with you, some of which we had a chance to talk about recently, I guess just last week, about this question of outbound investment and the review of that investment. We've seen over the last couple of years how the Chinese government has really politicized--I think that's an understatement--both U.S. supply chain security as well as so many other issues relating to this concern that I have and many have about outbound investment. We know that CFIUS and the export control regime have not been designed to address the gaps in knowledge that we face and how this outbound U.S. investment to China and other non-market economies are in fact badly compromising U.S. supply chain and our national security. The good news is this recognition that many of us have identified, or this concern, I should say, that many of us have recognized has gotten the attention of both branches of government and some other entities as well. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted in July, and I'm quoting, ``That the White House is looking at the impact of outbound U.S. investment flows that could circumvent the spirit of export controls and otherwise enhance the technological capacity of our competitors in a way that harm--in ways that harms our national security,'' unquote. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission published a series of recommendations--32 of them. Number 13 says, and I quote, Congress should consider, quote, ``legislation to create the authority to screen the offshoring of critical supply chains and production capabilities to the PRC to protect U.S. national and economic security interests''--and it goes on from there. As Senator Cornyn made reference to in his opening statements here today, in his introduction of you, we've teamed up to a really bipartisan bill, beyond just the two of us, to introduce the National Critical Capabilities Defense Act which would establish the mechanism we're talking about. So first question is to what extent are both industrial and supply chain intelligence--or to what extent are they an element of financial intelligence? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that question. I think you could easily argue that they are an element of financial intelligence because it is about trying to understand how our adversaries are trying to disrupt our financial infrastructure. And so to the extent that we're talking about industrial policies or efforts that they may have underway to take advantage of vulnerabilities in our supply chains, vulnerabilities in our infrastructure, you could easily make a connection between the two. Senator Casey. And the second question, I guess my last, would be what gaps do we have in understanding how Chinese state-owned enterprises weaponize either investment or weaponize the outflow of capital, or even joint ventures, to the detriment of, and against the interests of the United States? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that question. I think in part that question is one that's easier to discuss in more detail in a classified setting, but I think it's very clear when China shares with us its five-year plans, they share what exactly they are intending to invest in, and that is certainly something that we can use to help us better understand where we need to focus our efforts to countering the challenges that they present to us. But yes, I'd be more than happy to answer those more in depth in a classified setting. Senator Casey. Well, I appreciate that and I thank you for the answers to the questions. We'll have more time to discuss them in a different setting as well, but we're grateful not only for your public service but that of your family by extension. So thanks very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn? Senator Cornyn. Ms. Corless, thank you. Senator Casey's asked most of my questions--how we can fill the gaps left by CFIUS reform on the export side, export controls, and the like. But recently colleagues and I went to Taipei to Taiwan Semiconductor where they use Dutch lithography machinery, which is enormously expensive and sophisticated machinery, to build the most advanced microchips in Taiwan. But I know at different times the People's Republic of China and the CCP have attempted to purchase that kind of machinery, and that that there's been discussions about whether they should be able to gain access to that. But in the absence of formal or legal controls on the sale and export of machines made in other countries, what tools, if any, are available to the U.S. Government to try to deter the sale of some of this advanced equipment that would allow China, conceivably at some point, to catch up with the rest of the world? Ms. Corless. Senator Cornyn, thank you for that question and thanks again for the opportunity to meet yesterday in advance of this hearing and for your kind remarks in your introduction of me. Perhaps it's less appropriate for me to talk about tools available to the U.S. Government and more appropriate for me to speak to the need for the IC and for OIA in particular to make sure that we are providing--that we have our collection priorities align such that they can ensure that we get better insight into what China's gaps are, what their capability gaps are, what gaps they're trying to close. And then similarly, to ensure that OIA, in concert with other IC colleagues, is producing strategic analysis that informs any policies that Secretary Yellen or others in the government might take on to try and counter this challenge. I think I would also add here that this is another example of making sure that we have really strong and robust relationships with our foreign partners because to the extent that we may not have tools that we can use to counter this challenge, they may very well. Or it could be that it's an issue that falls out of our jurisdiction, in which case partnerships that we have with some of our European allies, I think--and our allies such as Japan and India and Australia--are increasingly important. Chairman Warner. Senator Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Corless. I appreciate your dedication to serving in this capacity and I want to echo the remarks of Senator Burr. I thought his statements were exactly on point. In your responses to questions sent by the Committee, you listed, quote, ``Ensuring that OIA is effectively utilizing human resources to enhance the financial intelligence expertise of OIA's workforce,'' as your first priority. Given that OIA was largely born of the post-9/11 work on investigating terrorism financing, do you feel confident that the current workforce has the necessary skills and training to meet the challenge posed to our Nation by China? And what skills and capabilities can you identify as necessary to ensuring OIA is able to protect and increase its competitive advantages against China and Russia? Furthermore, if confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that you're hiring, training, and retaining the necessary talent at OAI to counter the threat posed to the United States by China? And what lessons have you learned from your time at ODNI that will inform your approach to ensuring your workforce is able to meet the strategic challenges posed by China? Ms. Corless. Senator Gillibrand, thank you very much for that question. I appreciate it. While I'm obviously not in the position of assistant secretary yet within OIA, my current position has given me a decent amount of insight into the unique nature of the mission as well as the broad skill set that is required to support the efforts with respect to following the money; for example, economics, global financial infrastructure, virtual currencies, and the like. That's an example of the broad set of expertise that OIA has and needs to continue to build out. Unfortunately, as you all probably well know, these are very similar skill sets that the private sector highly values and so we need to make sure that we are doing what we can to recruit folks with this expertise--and that we are training them appropriately, as well. These are folks that we often lose to Wall Street, to the tech firms, and the like. So I think it's important that we understand what our baseline competencies are that we need. I think we need to make sure that we take advantage of a variety of U.S. Government tools that exist to recruit highly qualified experts and I know that there is a provision in the upcoming Intel Authorization Act which essentially is a pilot program of sorts to bring individuals like this in and to compensate them accordingly. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee and across the Department to see that pilot program through. Senator Gillibrand. So one of the ideas that is in the NDAA for this Committee is a Cyber Academy to do exactly that, to train a whole set of young recruits like the service academies to work in civilian capacities in the Federal Government like at Treasury, like for you in the intel community, throughout the intel community including Department of Energy, including CIA and NSA, to do the type of work you're talking about. Because I would imagine you will also need skills in data protection, surveillance capitalism, cryptocurrency, blockchain; and people who have the expertise to be able to understand how those technologies are being used by China, by Russia, by adversaries to undermine national security, to undermine our economy, to undermine our financial services industry, to undermine our entire financial underpinnings. So to the extent recruitment and retention of the brightest and best workforce will be essential for your completion of your mission and duties, we hope that we can create this Cyber Academy, to create a curriculum and to create even an ROTC-type program and collaborate with existing universities to build that workforce for you. I hope that I can work with you on developing that curriculum and developing that pipeline of talent to staff some of your efforts. Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that. I am always in favor of new and innovative ways come at critical challenges like this, particularly with respect to recruitment of a next generation workforce for the intelligence community. And to the extent that we have opportunities to work together and with your staff to explore those, if confirmed, I would be honored to do so. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you. Let me begin, Ms. Corless, by congratulating you for your nomination. I would join my colleagues in saying that you have an impressive background and that it should equip you well in your new position should you be confirmed--I know you always have to add that phrase--which I anticipate that you will be. I want to talk a bit about the fact that we are pivoting away from terrorism and terrorism financing in the focus on Russia and China. The collapse of Afghanistan amid the chaotic withdrawal by the administration has allowed the Taliban obviously to seize control of the country, but equally worrisome, it opens the possibility that once again Afghanistan will be a safe haven for terrorist groups intent on attacking us. What can be done to ensure that any humanitarian assistance that is sent to Afghanistan, whose people are in dire need, is not diverted to strengthen terrorist groups? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that question and I think it's a valid one, what you highlighted at the outset, the pivot from counterterrorism to great power competition and the focus on China and Russia. Certainly the core mission of OIA is still going to remain through a pivot like this, identifying tracking and enabling the threats of disruption to the U.S. financial system; and certainly understanding, too, how much is moving to places where we may not want it to go. And so I think what I would offer as well, while OIA is making an effort to pivot toward great power competition, that capability still resides within OIA to follow the money, if you will, and also to work closely with interagency partners to understand where U.S. aid may be going, to understand what those targets might be so, that we can potentially inform and better direct, as a government, where that aid is going. Senator Collins. About a decade ago, when former Senator Joe Lieberman and I headed the Homeland Security Committee, I remember vividly testimony that we received from the Treasury Department in which the officials said that Saudi Arabia was the epicenter of terrorism financing. That was his phrase. As you look around the world today and as we see increasing threats which I believe will become even stronger with the collapse of Afghanistan, what country or countries would you describe as the epicenter of terrorism financing? Ms. Corless. Senator, I thank you very much for that question. What I think I would offer in this setting is that financial centers around the world are attractive to people engaged in illicit financial activity. It's crucial that OIA continues to partner with these financial centers to understand how the systems are being abused and to understand how money may be used to--furthering efforts with respect to terrorism- related activity. So if confirmed, I pledge that I would continue to work with our Treasury policy counterparts to understand where illicit financial activity is occurring so that we can effectively engage with counterparts around the world. Senator Collins. Well, just quickly, a final question. Would Iran be on your list? Ms. Corless. Senator Collins, I think we are certainly concerned with Iran's malign influence behavior and their funding of Hezbollah. So yes, I think I would be concerned. Senator Collins. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Senator Blunt. Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. Shannon, congratulations to you and your family. This hasn't been the toughest hearing anybody's ever had in this Committee--for good reason. I've watched your work. Dan Coats and others, in addition to Senator Cornyn, have stepped up to say great things about your work in the past. Following up on Senator Collins' question about diverted aid, there have been several stories recently about state- sponsored groups that seem to do very well collecting U.S. unemployment during the pandemic and even terrorist groups that, you know, would suggest they were obviously people they weren't and start collecting those kinds of funds. How big a problem do you think that is and what can we do about it and what's the role of somebody in your job, working with the Department of Labor or wherever these checks are going from, to people who actually are in other countries? Though obviously they're not saying that when they apply for those moneys. And I've seen numbers adding up to billions of dollars maybe going to places that were just pure fraud and some of them were state-sponsored entities. Ms. Corless. Senator Blunt, thank you for that question. So I have heard what--much of what you have just shared. It is something that I probably would need to go back and get briefed on by colleagues to better understand the challenge and the-- the veracity of the concerns. So I'd be more than happy to come back and discuss in further detail with you and your staff. Senator Blunt. Well, I'd like you to do that and I think, you know, it's obvious people with access to computers and lots of great skills to suggest they're different people and they really can take advantage of particularly situations like we've been in for the last 18 months, where we're trying to get aid to people as quickly as we can who wouldn't have anticipated needing it, and what do we do to see that we're not using that to fund other activities that we don't want to fund. What would you say is the greatest outside threat to our financial system? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that question. I think without a doubt we are greatly concerned about the cyber threats posed by China and Russia to the U.S. financial system and their efforts and intents to take advantage of the vulnerabilities both with our financial system but also with respect to our critical infrastructure. We may not talk about it as much and as at length as we do with China and Russia, but I think we also would share that we had the same concerns with Iran and North Korea as well, too. If confirmed for this position, I would ensure that OIA continues to stay on top of that issue and produce a strategic analysis that examines those issues in detail and ensures that the Secretary and other senior leaders within the government are informed to take actions that they feel are necessary to protect our infrastructure. Senator Blunt. Right. Cyber threat. And as I suggested in the other question, and as Senator Collins suggested in her question, is serious cybercrime, some state-sponsored, some terrorist-sponsored, some just sponsored by people who'd rather they had our money than we had our money in the United States. I think that could wind up taking a lot of the time of this job over the foreseeable future. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Warner. Let me echo what Senator Blunt said. I'd be really curious. I mean, I saw those same stories, literally in the hundreds of millions, if not billions potentially, that--and the stories appeared and then I never saw--and maybe shame on all of us--that that was many, many months ago and I don't think we've ever gotten a readout on that ever. Senator Blunt. Yes. I saw some stories just this week and we had somebody in our office the other day talking about people in prison, also with lots of time and the access to computers, and they've just decided they're going to apply for unemployment on behalf of them or somebody they know who starts getting unemployment checks. But I think where Shannon's concerned, particularly the outside people that could use that and, you know, they spend their time, particularly terrorist groups, being totally deceptive and this is a source of revenue we don't want them to have. Chairman Warner. Absolutely. Well, Ms. Corless, my friend Senator Blunt said you've gotten through this hearing so far pretty well, but you're down to that last Senator who's always been a bit notorious about trying to raise the zinger questions. Senator Sasse. Failing nominees? Is that what I'm known for? Well, let's call the--. Chairman Warner. We're going to move to Senator Sasse. Senator Sasse.--let's call the Chairman of the Finance Committee instead, Mark. This question you're asking about, all of the fraud in the payments in the COVID response package three and four seems like great, important work for the Finance Committee to do as oversight. So when Chairman Wyden was here, he noted that six of the nine of us who were here at that point were on that committee. Maybe you and I could jointly stiff-arm him that we ought to actually have a Finance Committee hearing. Ms. Corless, congratulations on your nomination and congratulations to your family as well and getting to have, I guess, two-thirds of them with you today. In your response to your pre-hearing questions, you noted that malign actors cannot be permitted to utilize cryptocurrency, digital assets, or other electronic payment forms as a means of evading sanctions, financing terrorism, or violating other U.S. laws. Is China included in that list? Ms. Corless. If I understand your question correctly, Senator, you're asking if China is using cryptocurrency to circumvent the U.S. financial system? Senator Sasse. Yes. Ms. Corless. So I think this is again one probably I would like to discuss in more detail appropriately in a classified setting, but that said, I think we are generally concerned with the potential that criminal actors, non-State actors, and then certainly countries like China and Russia, would use cryptocurrencies as a manner to circumvent--and Iran and North Korea as well--to circumvent U.S. sanctions and other U.S. laws. Absolutely. Senator Sasse. Thank you. I think there are probably a lot of us on this Committee who would like to continue to learn from you on that topic in a classified setting. So then in our public setting, walk us and the American people through, more broadly, not the classified piece, but what does it mean that China is pursuing the digital yuan? What does it mean for them and what does it mean for us? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that question. I think there are some legitimate concerns with respect to the digital yuan. It is a new technology and so I think I would caveat my forthcoming remarks by saying that technological innovation in and of itself is not a bad thing. It is impressed that the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve is also exploring digital currency as well, too. So I think there's still a lot to be learned, but certainly with respect to China's efforts with the digital yuan, I think there is concern about the potential that it creates a new opportunity for surveillance, more collection of data of U.S. persons or people around the world, the extent to which it is adopted more beyond China's borders. So I think it's something that we need to pay extremely close attention to. I know that they are planning to use the Beijing Olympics as an opportunity to roll that out and it is something the community and certainly other colleagues across the policy interagency are watching very closely, as you all know. Senator Sasse. Yes. I appreciate the distinction you drew there because obviously the world has benefited, the U.S. has benefited, but the world has benefited that the dollar has remained the reserve currency of the world for the whole post- World War II global order. It has been a positive-sum game that nations that allied with us, nations that believe in human rights, free trade, open navigation to seaways, transparent contracts, et cetera, have benefited. It has been a positive- sum game, not a zero or a negative-sum game as the CCP wants, going back to Vice Chairman Rubio's questions. So there's all sorts of threat to the U.S. as the global reserve currency, but in addition, there's all this exported surveillance State powers that the CCP continues to offer to autocracies around the world that they can track. They could potentially track all payments denominated in that digital currency in real time, both their citizens and the citizens of other countries that governments are scared of and want to hold down. What do you think the role of OIA should be in preventing strategic surprise, not just for Treasury, but also for the Federal Reserve more broadly? Ms. Corless. Thank you very much for that question, Senator. I think to sort of sum up your points, I think we can easily say that the financial system is undergoing some substantial changes right now with the arrival of digital assets, to include cryptocurrencies and to include digital currencies as well. How the financial system evolves will affect the departments as a whole. It will affect their work across both licit economic and illicit finance portfolios. So if confirmed as the assistant secretary for OIA, I will ensure that OIA is tracking these developments very carefully through engagements with colleagues across the department, counterparts in the Federal Reserve, and others across the interagency to understand what's going on, make sure that the workforce is able to provide expert level advice to Secretary Yellen and others across the government. Senator Sasse. We're basically out of time for me, so I'll be brief on this one, but thinking of the office, not to which you've been nominated, but the one you're departing from, and the coordinating responsibilities of ODNI across CIA and other agencies in particular, do you think we have the right human capital right now to do that kind of high level of financial/ intel integration work? Ms. Corless. That's an excellent question. I think what I would say is that these are issues that elements of the IC have been studying for a long time. Generally speaking, they tend to be sort of smaller groups, I think, vis-a-vis the level of importance that is being placed on the issues today. So I think we have an opportunity here, thanks to the interest--the recognition of our senior IC leadership, and the importance of these issues with respect to countering China and Russia and other competitors, as well. They recognize the importance, they recognize the need to invest in human capital. And certainly we've had some good opportunities with the committee staff to look at opportunities to how we can better invest. So I think we are in a good place. However, we have a ways to go, particularly given the complexity of the issues which we are facing today. Senator Sasse. Thanks for being frank. Chairman Warner. Very good job. I want to follow-up on two things that Senator Sasse said, then I've got just a learning question on my part. One, I do think your--Senator Sasse's last comment--we've got a lot of bright people in the intel community, but the kind of basic financial knowledge that you get in the first couple years at a McKinsey or at a Goldman or I think back to some of my times--. Very smart folks on trying to sort through Chinese tech firms. And again, I think we need to always make clear our beef is with the Communist Party of China, not the Chinese people. The CCP manipulating these tech firms. There was an enormous lack of knowledge of that--again, a first-year or second-year associate in investment firms would know how to get that information--and I don't know whether part of that is because there's a reluctance to look at American assets that comes from the intelligence side. But where that fits? And is that going to be your job if we're going to ask, all right, how many of the American private equity firms that candidly have refused to take a classified briefing from this committee on the challenges presented by China, how many of these private equity firms have major investments in Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, TikTok? The list goes on and on. Where should I go to try to get that question from somebody in the IC or USG? Would it be your office? Ms. Corless. That is a good question, Senator, I think one that I would have to explore in more detail and take back. I think it is possible that that information is available through a couple of different locations within the government and certainly to the extent that that information is available in terms of who is investing where, OIA, in partnership with other IC partners, including those at the FBI, would certainly welcome the opportunity to engage with those . . . [Crosstalk.] Chairman Warner. Some of this is public, you know--a lot of this is public information that you could get from the SEC or if you just look at the filing reports. I worry--again echoing what Senator Sasse said and indirectly what Senator Gillibrand said--that we may not have the skill set that has that background as it's more than just kind of technically follow the money, but look at the analysis of investment patterns. It's one reason why so many of us on this committee think In-Q- Tel is a very valuable asset. But I would hope this would be something you think about. Let me take another question that Senator Sasse raised and we've had some spirited discussions with the IC about the digital yuan and the movement within the financial community to more digital assets. I think there's a lot of upside there, but there's also some challenges. One of the theories that have been said is that the ubiquity of Chinese mobile payment systems, which will be, as you said, rolled out at the Olympics and then, God willing, we'll see the demise of COVID and tourism return, Chinese tourists in Europe. And if those global payment systems get picked up as the de facto payment system the currency that backs, most consumers won't care. Could be the digital yuan. I do think we could get to where Senator Sasse was headed on his questions about ultimately the dollar's reserve currency. If we were looking at that and trying to get the answers and monitor that and follow that, where should I ask that question? To whom in USG? Would it be OIA or would it be somebody in the traditional IC community? Ms. Corless. Certainly, Senator. I think OIA would probably be one of the first places to go based on my understanding of how they are looking at this activity, but certainly there are other organizations within the IC that would be very well positioned to discuss this as well. Chairman Warner. Well, sitting there from your current position at ODNI, when you list that mouthful title that you've got, are you, in your current role, supposed to be coordinating all that activity? I mean, like one of the things I worry about--we've got lots and lots of expertise in the IC and I'm still not sure that we're bringing it all together in one spot. But you've done a great job, you've got a committee that's obviously very, very supportive. I'm not trying to do a gotcha here, but where should that be taking place? Ms. Corless. Senator Warner, it's a valid question. I think in my current role right now, our emphasis, I would say, is two-fold. First, we work to ensure that the DNI and the principal deputy and other leadership are prepared to engage with--with their cabinet level counterparts and IC meetings downtown and with respect to their engagements with the White House, as well. But the other part of my role is ensuring that the IC has the resources that it needs to focus on issues such as this. So I would say while we are responsible to a degree in my current role for having some of that insight and expertise. Really, where the work is done is out in the IC and so it is my current job to ensure that we've got our collection and analytic priorities in place and that we are working with IC agencies to ensure that they have additional resources---- Chairman Warner. But does that mean, you bring in CIA analysts? I know ODNI's got some of their own analysts. Do you bring in OIA? You know, do you bring in--can you tap resources of folks at the Fed? I mean, how do we make sure all this information, particularly in new technology, emerging spaces around finances that we're tapping into all that expertise? Ms. Corless. Sure. It's less about bringing the resources to ODNI from CIA and as much as it is--or other agencies as-- and as much as it is ensuring that they have the resources and then we work with all the agencies to help coordinate the production that is done so that we can take advantage of whatever unique expertise resides in each agency. So that we minimize redundancies and that we are providing a more complete picture of the challenge to our various policy customers. Chairman Warner. I think we've still got some room for improvement there. Let me ask you--this will be my last question. When Senator Burr and I and this committee took on the Russia investigation, we spent some time with FinCEN which was, you know--I think actually while the administration did some good reforms there, but it's still pretty opaque to me. At OIA, do you have the ability to garner data from FinCEN or how do you get this trove of information that FinCEN--or would you have to go through law enforcement? How would you access some of that information? Ms. Corless. Senator, thank you for that question. I offer this without yet being confirmed for the position. As I understand it, there is a good working relationship between the two organizations and they are working through appropriate ways for how to share information between the two organizations. If confirmed, that's certainly something that I'd want to continue to work on--and resolve--and certainly work with your staff as appropriate. Chairman Warner. Well, I think, again, that would be something we found a not a very productive relationship from the committee to FinCEN and I sit on the Banking Committee and the Finance Committee, so I've followed this in a variety of ways and, again, I think some of the people--. But I think when we're thinking about--echoing a bit of Senator Wyden's concerns around the privacy issue--but still getting at--that data to be able to follow--. I again, coming back to something I read today about the very aspect of everything this Committee's been trying to prevent in terms of China potentially, you know, not stealing through cyber, but through direct investment into a struggling American semiconductor facility that's at the cutting edge. I mean, it was a little bit of a--holy heck, I mean, how is this even still popping up? Where are the warning signals supposed to come from? And I'm not really sure that I'm still clear, even as much time as I've spent on this, whose responsibility is it inside the American government? It may even be pre-actual investment, which then might still go through FIRRMA. But, you know, if this is floating out there, whose responsibility is it to go, you know, tell the company beware? Is it FBI? Is it OIA? Do you have a sense on that or any advice to give me? Ms. Corless. Certainly, Senator. So I think it's a reflection of the complexity of the environment that we're in these days and the, I would say, sort of almost meteoric rise of the use of economic and financial tools as a way to counter these challenges. So there's a little bit of catch up that I think the intelligence community in general, and maybe to some extent, you could argue, the U.S. Government more broadly, is going through right now to contend with the use of these very powerful and effective tools when implemented correctly. So I think while there is room for the IC to play a role in this conversation, certainly I think the FBI is a critical partner in engaging industry as well, with these challenges. Chairman Warner. Well, it's something, you know you clearly have a lot of support sitting around this committee and helping us think it through and helping us find these answers with the broad background that my friend Senator Burr talked about that you bring to this job, we hope to engage with you. And then, again, I guess final, final comment is: Declan, your mom did really good and, Linda, your daughter did really good. So we will remind the staff that if you've got questions for the record, please get them in by 5 p.m. on Thursday. We look forward to trying to move this nomination as quickly as possible. Any other questions? [No response.] This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 3:47 p.m.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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