[Senate Report 106-3]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
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106th Congress Report
1st Session SENATE 106-3
_______________________________________________________________________
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
__________
SPECIAL REPORT of the SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
JANUARY 7, 1997 TO OCTOBER 21, 1998
February 3, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-010 WASHINGTON : 1999
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JON KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DAN COATS, Indiana
Trent Lott, Mississippi, Ex Officio
Thomas A. Daschle, South Dakota, Ex Officio
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Taylor W. Lawrence, Staff Director
Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, January 1999.
Dear Mr. President: As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence, we submit to the Senate the
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding
its activities during the 105th Congress from January 1997 to
October 1998. The Committee is charged by the Senate with the
responsibility of carrying out oversight of the intelligence
activities of the United States. While the majority of its work
is necessarily conducted in secrecy, the Committee believes
that as much information as possible about intelligence
activities should be made available to the public. This
unclassified, public report to the Senate is intended to
contribute to that objective.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Introduction................................................. 1
II. Legislation.................................................. 3
A. Intelligence Budget................................... 3
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1998............ 4
C. Disclosure to Congress Act of 1998.................... 6
D. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1999............ 7
E. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention....... 11
III.Oversight Activities......................................... 12
A. Hearings.............................................. 12
1. National Security Threats to the U.S............. 12
2. Zona Rosa........................................ 13
3. Disclosures Act.................................. 15
4. Mexico and Counter-Narcotics..................... 16
5. The Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat....... 16
6. Covert Action Quarterly Reviews.................. 18
7. China............................................ 18
8. Russia........................................... 18
9. Iraq............................................. 19
10. Intelligence Sharing with UNSCOM................. 20
11. Khobar Towers.................................... 20
12. Roger E. Tamraz.................................. 20
B. Investigations........................................ 21
1. China Investigation, Part 1....................... 21
2. China Investigation, Part 2....................... 23
C. Community Issues...................................... 24
1. Indian Nuclear Tests and the Jeremiah Panel...... 24
2. The Ballistic Missile Threat and the Rumsfeld
Commission....................................... 25
3. Proliferation Threats............................ 26
4. Arms Control..................................... 26
5. Embassy Bombings in Africa and the U.S. Response. 26
6. Intelligence Implications of NATO Expansion...... 27
7. Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence...... 28
8. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors
General.......................................... 28
9. Release of JFK Documents......................... 29
10. Security Automation.............................. 30
11. PolicyNet Update................................. 30
12. SSCI Web Page.................................... 31
D. Audits................................................ 32
1. Major Systems Acquisition Program of the NRO...... 32
2. Intelligence Community Use of Cover to Protect
Operations....................................... 33
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act............. 33
E. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) Reports................ 33
1. The Future of SIGINT.............................. 33
2. The Future of HUMINT.............................. 34
IV. Confirmations................................................ 35
A. George J. Tenet....................................... 35
B. John A. Gordon........................................ 35
C. Joan A. Dempsey....................................... 36
D. Robert M. McNamara, Jr................................ 36
E. L. Britt Snider....................................... 37
F. Background Investigation Review....................... 37
V. Appendix..................................................... 38
A. Summary of Committee's Activities..................... 38
1. Number of Meetings................................ 38
2. Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee. 38
3. Bills Referred to the Committee................... 38
4. Publications...................................... 38
106th Congress Report
1st Session SENATE 106-3
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COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
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February 3, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
SPECIAL REPORT
I. Introduction
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established
in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400 in order to strengthen
Congressional oversight of the programs and activities of U.S.
intelligence agencies. Throughout its history, the Committee
has attempted to carry out its oversight responsibilities in a
bipartisan manner. During the 105th Congress, the Committee
continued this bipartisan tradition in crafting important
intelligence reform legislation, conducting major inquiries
into Intelligence Community issues, and by providing funding
for and oversight of a wide array of U.S. intelligence
activities.
As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee
performs an annual review of the intelligence budget and
prepares legislation authorizing appropriations for the various
civilian and military agencies and departments comprising the
Intelligence Community. These entities include the Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, as well as the intelligence related
components of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S.
Marine Corps, Department of State, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of the Treasury, and Department of
Energy. The Committee also conducts periodic audits,
investigations, and inspections of intelligence activities and
programs with the goal of assuring that the appropriate
departments and agencies of the United States provide informed
and timely intelligence necessary for the executive and
legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the
national security interests of the nation, and that U.S.
military commanders have dominant awareness of any potential
battle environment. More importantly, the Committee's oversight
seeks to ensure that intelligence activities and programs
conform with the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America and serve U.S. security interests.
As the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact,
and the accompanying loss of this overriding intelligence
focus, the agencies and departments of the U.S. Intelligence
Community have redirected their efforts to the national
security issues now confronting the United States or which may
develop in the coming years. The emergence and growth of
transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking,
international criminal organizations, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction present the nation and the
Intelligence Community with challenges requiring different
doctrine, policy, and programs. As new challenges and threats
confront the country, there is an increasing need for the
oversight provided by the Committee to ensure that our leaders
have the intelligence necessary to make informed national
security decisions.
The Committee took a number of important steps to improve
the country's ability to collect, analyze, and produce
intelligence about America's adversaries. The Committee
achieved strong consensus that timely intelligence is essential
for sound policy and military success. Legislation reported by
the Committee stressed the intelligence targets that threaten
America today and tomorrow, setting guideposts toward future
technologies for collecting and processing intelligence. Funds
were authorized above the President's budget request because
the Committee believes there are areas where additional
resources are needed in this post-Cold War period of
uncertainty. While the mission of U.S. intelligence gathering
organizations has not changed, the areas on which they must
focus have become more diverse and challenging. For that
reason, the Committee concentrated additional resources in the
five areas of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, counter-
proliferation, counter-intelligence, and effective covert
action.
The Committee also focused on a series of critical
challenges facing the Intelligence Community, including faulty
analysis that led to a failure to forecast India's nuclear
tests, an aging U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection
system, the requirement for more effective tools for countering
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, and the Clandestine
Service's eroding technical competence.
The Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998
and 1999 took a number of important steps to address these
problems. The Committee recommended significant increases in
funding for high-priority projects aimed atbetter positioning
the Intelligence Community for the threats of the 20th Century, while
at the same time reducing funds for programs and activities that were
poorly justified or redundant. The net result was a modest increase to
the overall budget request for intelligence for both fiscal years 1998
and 1999.
Also adopted were a number of legislative provisions, such
as new legislation that establishes a clear process for
Intelligence Community employees to pass information about
wrongdoing, including classified information, to the
intelligence oversight committees, and legislation that updated
and strengthened the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
In addition, the Committee focused budget authorization
legislation on key areas such as:
bolstering advanced research and development across
the Intelligence Community, particularly the
modernization of NSA and CIA;
strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation,
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-
intelligence, and effective covert action;
expanding the collection and exploitation of
measurements and signatures intelligence, with a
specific focus on missile intelligence;
developing reconnaissance systems based on new small
satellite technologies that provide flexible,
affordable collection from space with radars to detect
moving targets in all-weather conditions;
boosting education, recruiting, and technical
training for Intelligence Community personnel;
streamlining dissemination of intelligence products;
and
providing new tools for information operations.
During the 105th Congress, the Committee conducted 95
hearings and on-the-record briefings. Of these, forty-seven
were oversight hearings, fifteen were legislative hearings, and
fifteen were nomination hearings. There were sixteen Committee
business or legislative mark-up meetings. The Committee also
held two on-the-record briefings.
II. Legislation
A. Intelligence budget
The Committee conducted annual reviews of the fiscal year
1998 and fiscal year 1999 budget requests for the DCI's
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the
Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program
(JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA). These reviews included receiving testimony from senior
Intelligence Community officials and evaluating detailed budget
justification documents and numerous Intelligence Community
responses to specific questions raised by the Committee. As a
result of these reviews, the Committee made recommendations,
approved by the Senate, that resulted in the authorization of
funds above the President's request for fiscal year 1998. In
fiscal year 1999, the Committee recommended significant
increases in funding for high-priority projects aimed at better
positioning the Intelligence Community for the threats of the
21st Century, due to the uncertainty of this post-Cold War
period, while at the same time reducing funds for programs and
activities that were poorly justified or redundant. Areas of
emphasis in both bills included bolstering advanced research
and development across the Community, to facilitate, among
other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA; strengthening
efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action;
expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and
signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile
intelligence; developing reconnaissance systems based on new
small satellite technologies that provide flexible, affordable
collection from space with radars to detect moving targets in
all-weather conditions; boosting education, recruiting, and
technical training for Intelligence Community personnel;
enhancing analytical capabilities; streamlining dissemination
of intelligence products; and providing new tools for
information operations.
B. S. 858 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
On June 4, 1997, the Committee reported out S. 858, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. In
addition to providing the annual authorization for
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill, inter
alia:
Directed the President to inform all executive branch
employees that disclosing classified information to an
appropriate oversight committee or to their
Congressional representative is not prohibited by any
law, executiveorder, regulation, or policy, provided,
that the employee reasonably believed that the classified information
evidenced a violation of any law, a false statement to Congress on an
issue of material fact, gross mismanagement, or wasted of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial danger to public health or safety.
Designated the Secretary of State as the responsible
official for providing information on violent crimes
against U.S. citizens abroad to victims and their
families. Expressed sense of Congress that it is in the
national interest of the United States to provide
information regarding the murder or kidnaping of United
States persons abroad to the families of the victims.
Addressed the Committee's concern that intelligence
reporting and analysis lacks standards for foreign
names and places.
Authorized the President to delay imposing sanctions
against countries engaged in weapons proliferation in
order to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Provided clear legislative authority for the Central
Intelligence Agency to enter into multi-year leases of
not more than 15 years duration for the purpose of
ensuring cost-efficient acquisition of Agency
facilities.
Amended the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403q(e)
to provide the CIA Inspector General (IG) with
authority to subpoena records and other documentary
information necessary in the performance of functions
assigned to the IG.
The Senate passed S. 858 on a vote of ninety-eight to one.
As noted above, S. 858, contained a provision (Sec. 306)
that directed the President to inform all Executive Branch
employees that disclosing certain classified information to an
appropriate oversight committee to their Congressional
representative was not prohibited by any law, executive order,
or regulation or otherwise contrary to public policy. This
provision was intended to protect employees from adverse
actions based on what was heretofore considered an unauthorized
disclosure to Congress.
The Committee intended disclosure to an appropriate
oversight committee to mean disclosure to a Member or cleared
staff of the Committee with jurisdiction over the agency
involved in the wrongdoing. Members or committee staff who
received such information from an employee were presumed to
have received it in their capacity as members or staff of the
appropriate oversight committee. The Committee believed that
his presumption was necessary because Members and staff are
responsible for ensuring that the information is protected in
accordance with Committee rules and brought to the attention of
the leadership of the Committee. The President, by informing
Executive Branch employees as directed in section 306, would
have authorized disclosure to the appropriate oversight
committee or members, thereby recognizing that these Committees
and members have a ``need to know'' the information as required
by current Executive Branch restrictions on disclosure of
classified information.
Shortly after the Senate passed S. 858, the Administration
issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) stating that
section 306 was unconstitutional, and that if it remained in
the bill in that form, senior advisors would recommend that the
President veto the bill.
In conference, members of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) agreed not to include section
306 as passed by the Senate. The Senate offered to amend
section 306, thereby significantly narrowing the scope of the
provision to cover only employees of agencies within the
Intelligence Community (the Senate-passed version covered all
executive employees). The Senate amendment further narrowed the
provision by allowing provision by allowing disclosure only to
committees with primary jurisdiction over the agencies involved
(the original language also allowed disclosure to a Member of
Congress who represented the employee).
The Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee
expressed concern over the possible constitutional implications
of such language. They were also mindful of the
Administration's veto threat as expressed in the Statement of
Administration Policy. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in deference to their
House colleagues' concerns agreed to amend the provision to
express a sense of the Congress that Members of Congress have
equal standing with officials of the Executive Branch to
receive classified information so that Congress may carry out
its oversight responsibilities.
The managers' decision not to include section 306 of the
Senate bill in the conference report, however, was not intended
to be interpreted as agreement with the Administration's
position on whether it is constitutional for Congress to
legislate on this subject matter. The managers' actions were
also not to be interpreted as expressing agreement with the
opinion of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel,
which explicitly stated that only the President may determine
when Executive Branch employees may disclose classified
information to Members of Congress. The managers asserted in
their Conference Report that members of Congressional
committees have a need to know information, classified or
otherwise, that directly relates to their responsibilities to
conduct vigorous and comprehensive oversight of the activities
of the executive departments and agencies within their
committees' jurisdiction. The President may not assert an
unimpeded authority to determine otherwise.
While the managers recognized the Chief Executive's
constitutional authority to protect sensitive national security
information, they did not agree with the Administration that
the authority is exclusive. Members of both committees agreed
as well that whatever the scope of the President's authority,
it may not be asserted against Congress to withhold evidence of
misconduct or wrongdoing and thereby impede Congress in
exercising its constitutional legislative and oversight
authority. Therefore, the managers committed to hold hearings
on this issue and develop appropriate legislative solutions in
the second session of the 105th Congress. [See Section III.C.
for a discussion of oversight hearings held on this matter.]
C. S. 1668 disclosure to Congress Act of 1998
On February 23, 1998, the Committee reported out S. 1668, a
stand alone version of Section 306 of S. 858, based on public
hearings on February 4 and 11, 1998 to examine the
constitutional implications of legislation such as section 306.
The Committee heard from constitutional scholars and legal
experts on both sides of the issue. Mr. Randolph D. Moss,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General from the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel, testified in support of the
Administration's position that section 306 and any similar
language represents an unconstitutional infringement on the
President's authority as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive.
The Committee also heard Professor Peter Raven-Hansen, Glen
Earl Weston Research Professor of Law from the George
Washington University Law School and Dr. Louis Fisher, Senior
Specialist (Separation of Powers) from the Congressional
Research Service testify that the President's authority in this
area is not exclusive. Hence, these experts believed that
Congress already has authority to regulate the collection,
retention, and dissemination of national security information.
[See Section III.A.3 for a more extensive discussion of these
hearings.]
The Committee found the latter argument to be persuasive
and determined that the Administration's intransigence on this
issue compelled the Committee to act.
Following the public hearing on February 11th, the
Committee met to markup a modified version of section 306. One
amendment was offered by a member of the Committee and was
adopted unanimously.
The federal ``Whistle Blower Protection Act'' does not
cover employees of the agencies within the Intelligence
Community. [See 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2301 et seq.] The ``whistle
blower'' statute also expressly proscribes the disclosure of
information that is specifically required by Executive Order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the
conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, employees within the
Intelligence Community are not protected from adverse personnel
action if they choose to disclose such information,
irrespective of its classification, to Congress. In fact, an
employee who discloses classified information to Congress
without prior approval is specifically subject to sanctions
which may include reprimand, termination of security clearance,
suspension without pay, or removal. See Exec. Order No. 12,
958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995). Some types of unauthorized
disclosures are also subject to criminal sanctions. See 18
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 (1996); 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 783(b) (1996).
In accordance with Executive Order No. 12, 958, classified
information must remain under the control of the originating
agency and may not be disseminated without proper
authorization. Consequently, an Executive Branch employee may
not disclose classified information to Congress without prior
approval. In fact, employees are advised that the agency will
provide ``access as is necessary for Congress to perform its
legislative functions . . . . ''. ``Information Security
Oversight Office, General Services Administration, Classified
Information Non-disclosure Agreement (SF-312) Briefing
Booklet,'' at 66. In other words, the executive agency will
decide what Members of Congress may ``need to know'' to perform
their constitutional oversight functions. The President, in
effect, asserts that he has exclusive or plenary authority to
oversee the regulation of national security information.
On June 4, 1997 the Committee on Intelligence reported the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, which
included a provision that specifically addressed this issue.
See S. 858, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 306 (1997). On June 9,
1997 the U.S. Senate passed the bill by a vote of ninety-eight
to one.
d. s. 2052 intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1999
The Committee reported S. 2052, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, on May 7, 1998. In
addition to providing the annual authorization for
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill inter
alia:
Extended for one additional year the President's
authority to delay the imposition of proliferation-
related sanctions when necessary to protect an
intelligence source or method or an ongoing criminal
investigation;
Extended for two additional years the Secretary of
Defense's authority to engage in commercial activities
and security for intelligence collection activities;
Authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to
designate personnel to carry firearms to protect
current and former Agency personnel and their immediate
families;
Modified the National Security Education Program to
include counter-proliferation studies;
Authorized the Attorney General or a designated
attorney for the government to apply for court orders
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register
or trap and trace device for investigations to gather
foreign intelligence information or information
concerning international terrorism;
Authorized the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or a designee to apply for court orders
to require common carriers, public accommodation
facilities, or vehicle rental facilities to release
certain records in their possession relating to a
foreign intelligence or international terrorism
investigation; and
Directed that employees within the Intelligence
Community were made aware that they may, without prior
authorization, disclose certain information to
Congress, including classified information, that they
reasonably believe is specific and direct evidence of a
violation of law, rule, or regulation, a false
statement to Congress on an issue of material fact,
gross mismanagement or a gross waste of funds, a
flagrant abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety.
The full Senate passed the bill on October 8, 1998.
Section 305 was included in the bill because the United
States faces a qualitatively new long-term challenge to its
national security interests with the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The
Committee espouses the view that the country should utilize
education as an essential non-proliferation tool in support of
the training of counter-proliferation specialists equipped to
address this threat.
At the present time, however, explicit program authority is
not available to train American students adequately to confront
the proliferation challenge. Particularly noticeable by its
absence is government support for graduate training in the
counter-proliferation area which includes WMD technologies and
capabilities, missile and other delivery system technologies
and capabilities, existing and required domestic response
capabilities, motivations and techniques of state and
subnational proliferations, and a careful assessment of
existing counter-proliferation regimes.
The National Security Education Act (NSEA) was enacted in
1991 ``to provide the necessary resources, accountability, and
flexibility to meet the national security education needs of
the United States, especially as such needs change over time''.
As drafted in 1991 the NSEA emphasized language and area
studies. Since then, the national security needs of the country
have in fact changed. In an effort to generate limited but
sustained Federal support for counter-proliferation activities
and studies, Section 305 amended the National Security
Education Act of 1991 to (1) specify counter-proliferation
studies as a priority area for Federal support, and (2) to
require that the National Security Education Board established
by the Act include the Secretary of Energy. The Committee has
as a goal the allocation of not less than one-third of the
amounts specified under the Act for the awarding of fellowships
to graduate students and grants to institutions of higher
learning in the field of counter-proliferation training and
studies.
In addressing the threats posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the Committee has not only been
supportive of the funding requests of the Intelligence
Community in combating this threat but has also pointed the way
toward enhanced efforts by the community in newer,
nontraditional areas. Committee support for funding of counter-
proliferation education and training through an amended
National Security Education Act is not only consistent with
these efforts but can ultimately contribute to their success.
As mentioned above, the bill contained a provision
(Sec. 501) encouraging the disclosure of certain information to
Congress. The provision would have allowed disclosure of such
information to any Member or staff member of a committee of
Congress having primary oversight responsibility for the
department, agency, or element of the Federal Government to
which such information relates, and reflected a modified
version of this provision proposed in the previous year's
conference.
At Conference, the managers agreed instead to adopt a
modified version of H.R. 3829, the ``Intelligence Community
Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1998.'' This title established
an additional process to accommodate the disclosure of
classified information of interest to Congress. However, the
managers agreed that H.R. 3829 was not the exclusive process by
which an Intelligence Community employee may make a report to
Congress. The managers agreed that the modified language
furthered the goal of, and built on, the Senate language
contained in S. 1668 and S. 2052, which were adopted by the
Senate on three occasions. The managers also highlighted the
fact that Senate action on this issue was central to the
development of this provision and incorporated by reference the
Senate reports on S. 1668 and S. 2052 (S. Rep. Nos. 105-165 and
105-185, respectively) to provide legislative history and the
need for Congressional action on this issue. [The cited Senate
reports on this issue examines the significant constitutional
implications of this legislation.] The managers agreed that an
Intelligence Community employee should not be subject to
reprisals or threat of reprisals for making a report to
appropriate Members or staff of the intelligence committees
about wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community.
As also mentioned above, S. 2052 included important new
authorities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Section 601 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1802, et seq. (FISA), to authorize
pen registers and trap and trace devices in foreign
intelligence and international terrorism investigations being
conducted by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney
General. In particular, it authorized FISA judges to issue a
pen register or a trap and trace order upon a certification
that the information sought is relevant to such an ongoing
investigation.
The amendment allows the use of pen registers and trap and
trace devices in foreign intelligence and international
terrorism investigations. Although such devices can be utilized
at present, current procedures do not reflect changes in the
law since FISA was enacted. Before the use of such a device
today, the complete FISA predicate for actual interception of
the oral or verbal contents on the communication itself must be
satisfied. That predicate is designed to satisfy strict
constitutional requirements or the conduct of a ``search''
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, and
subsequent to passage of FISA in 1978, the Supreme Court held
in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that accessing
numbers dialed to contact another communications facility is
not a Fourth Amendment ``search.'' Thus, current procedures
impose a standard that is more rigorous than the constitution
requires. Section 501 establishes a predicate for the use of
pen registers or trap and trace devices that is consistent with
the opinion and is analogous to the statutory standard for the
use of these devices in criminal investigations. This authority
is necessary in order to permit, as is the case in criminal
investigations, the use of this very valuable investigative
tool at the critical early stages of foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations.
Unlike the criminal standard, however, this section
requires substantially more than mere ``relevance'' to an
ongoing investigation, as required in 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 3122(B)(2). In addition to relevancy, the government must
also demonstrate that the telephone line involved has been, or
is about to be, used in communication with an international
terrorist or a person engaged in clandestine intelligence
activities that may involve a violation of law.
Each application must also be approved by the Attorney
General or a designated attorney for the Government, with
certification by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the
underlying investigation is being conducted under guidelines
approved by the Attorney General. It is the Committee's
understanding that the ``designated attorney'' for the
Government will be the Counsel for Intelligence Policy at the
Department of Justice. Further delegation of this authority
should occur only after the Committee is briefed on the
compelling need for it.
Applications must be submitted to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court established by FISA; however, the section
also allows the designation of Federal magistrates to hear
applications for and grant orders approving the installation
and use of pen registers or trap and trace devices.
Section 602 also amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) by giving the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in conducting foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations, authority to apply for
court orders to obtain records of common carriers, hotels,
communications providers, and storage facilities.
Under existing criminal law, grand jury subpoenas may be
issued, and the Attorney General has delegated authority to
certain Federal agencies in narcotics investigations to issue
administrative subpoenas. No analogue to these authorities
exist in foreign intelligence and international terrorism
investigations. When the FBI seeks common carrier records
relating to the clandestine activities of an agent of a foreign
power or an international terrorist, compliance is voluntary;
unfortunately some entities have chosen not to cooperate. This
section requires that any or all of the four entities (common
carrier, hotel, communications provider, and/or storage
facility) comply with a court order based on the certification
by the FBI that the records are sought for foreign intelligence
purposes, and that there are specific and particular facts that
substantiate belief that the person to whom the records pertain
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Sections 601 and 602 also include provisions for continuing
Congressional oversight. The Committee felt strongly that these
provisions are necessary to insure that these new authorities
are carefully executed.
Section 604 amended section 2518 of title 18, United States
Code, to allow federal judges to issue an order on the
conversations of a specific person, rather than on the
conversations that occur on a specific telephone.
Under pre-existing law, judges issued wiretap orders
authorizing law enforcement officials to place a wiretap on
specific telephone numbers. Terrorists and spies knew this and
often were able to avoid wiretaps by using pay telephones on
the street at random, or by using stolen or cloned cell
telephones. As law enforcement officials could not know the
numbers of these telephones in advance, they were unable to
obtain wiretap orders on these numbers from a judge in time to
intercept the conversation, and the criminal was able to evade
interception of his communication.
Section 604 addressed this problem by authorizing judges to
issue an order authorizing the interception of all
communications made by a particular person, regardless of what
telephone he may use. The provision does not change the
existing law that requires law enforcement officials to
demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that the
suspect has committed, or may commit, a crime. With this
amendment, law enforcement officials will be required to
demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that the
actions of the suspect could have the effect of thwarting a
wiretap on a specific telephone were the court to order the
more typical method of wiretap, which targets a specific
telephone number.
Sections 601 through 604 of S. 2052 were fully coordinated
with the Judiciary Committee and accepted in total by the
Conference on October 5, 1998.
The President signed the legislation [H.R. 3694] as Public
Law 105-272 on October 21, 1998.
E. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
In order to assist the full Senate in its consideration of
whether to grant its advice and consent to ratification of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (CWC), the Committee commenced in 1994 a thorough
review of the ability of the U.S. Intelligence Community to
monitor compliance by states party to the CWC.
In particular, the Committee examined issues surrounding
the monitoring effectiveness of the U.S. Government's
unilateral capabilities and of the CWC's onsite inspection
regime; the interpretation and implementation of the CWC,
including its three annexes; the counterintelligence and
security implications of the CWC; and the implications of the
CWC for private companies, in light of the obligations imposed
on such companies to provide data declarations and to host
onsite inspections.
On September 30, 1994, after extensive hearings and review,
the Committee published classified and unclassified reports
entitled ``U.S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the
Chemical Weapons Convention.'' The report noted theIntelligence
Community's determination that the CWC will provide another tool in the
U.S. Government's inventory for monitoring and limiting the spread of
chemical weapons worldwide. However, the Committee further noted that
``[i]n general, the Intelligence Community has poor confidence in its
ability to detect prohibited activities [i.e. production or acquisition
of chemical weapons agents or precursors].'' The Committee ``largely
accept[ed] the Intelligence Community's pessimistic assessment of U.S.
capability to detect and identify a sophisticated and determined
violation of the Convention, especially on a small scale.''
The Committee's public report to the Senate (S. Rep. No.
103-390) was approved by a vote of sixteen members in favor and
none opposed. The Committee's Report was provided to the Senate
in anticipation of immediate action on the CWC. However, no
Senate action was taken with regard to the CWC until the first
session of the 105th Congress.
In the interim, a number of Members of the Committee
continued to raise concerns about the verifiability of the
treaty, and the Committee staff reviewed developments to
determine whether any changes or updating of the Committee's
1994 report were in order. They determined that its original
findings and recommendations with respect to the ability of
U.S. intelligence to monitor compliance by states party to the
CWC remained substantially valid. Prior to ratification, then-
Acting CIA Director Tenet and other administration officials
reconfirmed the Intelligence Community's earlier judgments.
In order to address these concerns, the Committee Report to
the Senate contained fourteen recommendations. In
recommendations 1, 6 and 7, the Committee proposed that certain
conditions and declarations be incorporated in the resolution
of ratification and the CWC implementing legislation.
Recommendations 2, 3 and 10 were put forward as the basis for
additional declarations in the resolution of ratification. The
great majority of the recommendations were incorporated in the
resolution of ratification reported favorably by the Committee
on Foreign Relations to the full Senate.
Prior to final disposition of the Convention and the
resolution of ratification by the full Senate in the Spring of
1997, the Senate held a rate closed session of the body in the
old Senate Chamber to discuss the shortcomings in the
Intelligence Community's monitoring capabilities that had been
identified by the Intelligence Community and the SSCI report.
Following debate in both open and closed sessions of the body
and after having disposed of five major amendments to the
proposed resolution of ratification, the Senate agreed on April
24, 1997, by a vote of 74 to 26, to provide its advice and
consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
III. Oversight Activities
a. hearings
1. National security threats to the United States
For several years, the Committee has begun each new session
of the Congress with an open hearing reviewing the Intelligence
Community's assessment of the current and projected national
security threats to the United States. The Intelligence
Community's assessment of the national security threat to the
U.S. plays a critical role in defining our country's foreign
policy--and forms the foundation for our military planning. It
is therefore essential that the Intelligence Community provide
our nation's policymakers with the most accurate and timely
assessment of these threats as possible. The hearings on the
national security threats--which cover a wide range of issues--
are held in open session not only to inform the Committee, but
to enlighten the American public about the threats facing their
country.
On February 5, 1997, the SSCI held an open hearing on the
current and projected national security threats to the U.S.
Testifying before the Committee were Acting Director of Central
Intelligence George J. Tenet, Lt. General Patrick M. Hughes,
USA, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Toby
Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research (INR). On January 28, 1998, the SSCI held a similar
hearing, and testifying before the Committee were Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) George J. Tenet, Lt. General Patrick
M. Hughes, USA, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), and Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research (INR). For the first time, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, represented by Deputy Director
Robert Bryant, participated in the threat hearing to address
counterintelligence, terrorist and information warfare threats
to our national security. On October 8, 1998, Committee Members
met in closed session to receive a classified update briefing
on threats to U.S. interests from Intelligence Community
representatives.
The transcript of the Committee's February 5, 1997 hearing,
``Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United
States, [S. Hrg. 105-201] andthe Committee's January 28, 1998
hearing, ``Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States'' [S. Hrg. 105-587], which includes the responses to a
large number of questions-for-the-record (QFRs) covering a broad
spectrum of national security issues, were printed and made available
to the public.
2. Zona Rosa
In June 1985, at a sidewalk cafe in the Zona Rosa district
of San Salvador, four U.S. Marine embassy guards, two American
citizens, and six other people were brutally murdered by
members of a Marxist guerrilla group. During the 105th
Congress, the Committee continued its Zona Rosa inquiry that
began in mid-1995 after the television show ``60 Minutes''
claimed that the mastermind behind the murder of Americans went
unpunished and was living in the United States. Mrs. Betty
Malone's 12-year search for the truth about her son's death
brought the issue to the attention of the Committee.
The Committee was appalled to learn that Pedro Antonio
Andrade, the alleged planner of the Zona Rosa attack, was
paroled for three years into the United States--by the United
States Government and with CIA funding--in June 1990. Andrade
was paroled even after the U.S. Government--or at least some
parts of the U.S. Government--had concluded that, though there
was not enough evidence to successfully prosecute him in the
United States, Andrade was probably responsible for the Zona
Rosa murders.
In early 1996, the Committee asked the President of the
United States to conduct an investigation of the Zona Rosa
affair, the actions of U.S. Government agencies with respect to
the political and military response to the massacre, the
subsequent investigations and prosecutions, and the
relationship of U.S. Government agencies with the participants
and alleged participants in the massacre. In the Fall of 1997,
the Inspectors General of the CIA, State Department, Defense
Department, and Justice Department issued reports on the matter
that provided the basic factual information which the Committee
used in its deliberations during the 105th Congress.
As a direct result of the actions of the Committee, Andrade
was arrested in September 1996 in the United States, where he
had lived, undisturbed, for six years. And although Andrade
applied for political asylum in the United States, asylum was
denied in March of 1997 based largely on the evidence brought
to light by the Committee. The U.S. Federal judge's decision
was based on a preponderance of evidence indicating that
Andrade was involved in the Zona Rosa killings. Andrade's
appeal was also denied and he was returned to El Salvador in
September 1997.
The Committee held hearings in mid-1997 to consider the
views of families and friends of the victims regarding their
dealings with the U.S. Government. The Committee was dismayed
to learn that at no time during the events, despite several
requests for information, did the United States Government
contact the families to provide further details of their sons'
deaths, or the pursuit of their killers, or of Andrade's parole
into the United States. In addition, the Committee heard the
views of U.S. Government officials with respect to the entry of
Pedro Andrade into the United States. The Committee hearings
reviewed the information available to the decision-makers at
the time, and the conditions under which they had to make their
decisions, to establish the facts, determine appropriate
accountability, and develop procedures to ensure that the
mistakes of the past 12 years would not be repeated.
During its hearings, Committee Members examined the balance
between intelligence gathering and law enforcement concerns--an
issue that continues to pose problems in counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, and other operations today. The Committee
explored questions such as why Pedro Andrade was admitted to
the United States, despite all the evidence linking him to the
killings of six Americans. Did the decision-makers have before
them all of the information available at that time within the
U.S. Government, and if not, why not? Why was information not
shared between agencies? Witnesses included family members of
the slain Marines: Mrs. Betty Malone from Northport, Alabama;
Mrs. Brenda Whitt, Mrs. Beth Hildebrandt, and Mr. Patrick
Kwiatkowski from Wisconsin; and Mr. John Weber from Cincinnati,
Ohio. U.S. Government witnesses included: Mr. Richard
Chidester, the Embassy Legal Officer from March 1989 to June
1991; ``Bob'' (last name not revealed for security reasons),
the CIA Chief of Station in El Salvador from June 1989 to June
1991; Mr. Ron Ward, an FBI agent who, in July and August 1989,
participated in the interrogation of Andrade after his arrest
in El Salvador; Ambassador William Walker, Ambassador to El
Salvador from August 1988 to March 1992, who approved the
parole request; Mr. Richard Cinquegrana, CIA Deputy Inspector
General for Investigations; Mr. Floyd Justice, Director of
Support Programs for the Department of State Inspector General;
and Mr. Glenn Fine, Special Investigative Counsel with the
Justice Department's Inspector General.
Following the hearings, the Committee produced legislation
designed to ensure that the U.S. Government would provide
information on violent crimes against U.S. citizens abroad to
victims and their families. Section 307 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for 1998 (S. 858) designated the Secretary of
State as the responsible individual for providing information
on violent crimes against U.S. citizens abroad to victims and
their families. This section included a sense of Congress that
it would be in the national interest of the U.S. to provide
information regarding the killing or other serious mistreatment
of U.S. citizens abroad to the victims of such crimes, or the
families of victims of such crimes if they are United States
citizens.
3. Disclosures Act
The Committee held public hearings on February 4 and 11,
1998 to examine the constitutional implications of legislation
such as Section 306--Encouragement of disclosures of certain
information to Congress of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for FY 1998, S. 858. [See Section II.B. for a discussion of
this legislation.] The Committee heard from constitutional
scholars and legal experts on both sides of the issue. Mr.
Randolph D. Moss, Deputy Assistant Attorney General from the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, testified in
support of the Administration's position that section 306 and
any similar language represents an unconstitutional
infringement on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief
and Chief Executive. Mr. Moss asserted the following:
(a) The President, as Commander-in-Chief, Chief Executive,
and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations has
ultimate and unimpeded authority over the collection,
retention, and dissemination of intelligence and other national
security information.
(b) Any Congressional enactment that may be interpreted to
divest the president of his ultimate control over national
security information is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
exclusive authority of the Executive.
(c) The Senate's language vests lower-ranking personnel in
the Executive Branch with a ``right'' to furnish such
information to a Member of Congress without prior official
authorization from the President or his delegee. Therefore,
section 306 and any similar provision is unconstitutional.
The Committee also received testimony that the President's
authority in this area is not exclusive from Professor Peter
Raven-Hansen, Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law from
the George Washington University Law School, and Dr. Louis
Fisher, Senior Specialist (Separation of Powers) from the
Congressional Research Service. These experts believed that
Congress already has the authority to regulate the collection,
retention, and dissemination of national security information.
Professor Raven-Hansen and Dr. Fisher asserted the following:
(a) A claim of exclusive authority must be substantiated by
an explicit textual grant of such authority by the
Constitution.
(b) There is no express constitutional language regarding
the regulation of national security information as it pertains
to the President.
(c) The President's authority to regulate national security
information is an implied authority flowing from his
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.
(d) As the regulation of national security information is
implicit in the command authority of the President, it is
equally implicit in the broad array of national security and
foreign affairs authorities vested in the Congress by the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has legislated extensively over
a long period of time to require the President to provide
information to Congress.
(e) Congress may legislate in the area because the
Executive and Legislative Branches share constitutional
authority to regulate national security information.
(f) The Supreme Court has never decided a case that
specifically addressed this issue.
(g) The provision is constitutional because it does not
prevent the President from accomplishing his constitutionally
assigned functions, and because any intrusion upon his
authority is justified by an overriding need to promote
objectives within the Constitutional authority of Congress.
The Committee found the last argument to be persuasive and
determined that the Administration's intransigence on this
issue compelled the Committee to act.
Following the public hearing on February 11th, the
Committee met to mark-up a modified version of section 306. One
amendment was offered by a member of the Committee and was
adopted unanimously. The bill was favorably reported from the
Committee on February 23, 1998. The Senate considered the bill
(S. 1668) on March 9, 1998 and passed it on a roll call vote of
93 to one. [See Section II.C.] This bill, as passed by the
Senate was also contained in Title V of S. 2052 which was
approved by the Committee on May 7, 1998 and ordered to be
favorably reported. [See Section II.D. for a discussion of the
final disposition of this legislation.]
4. Mexico and counter-narcotics
The Committee held a closed, classified hearing on Feb. 26,
1998 in conjunction with the Administration's release of the
1998 U.S. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, in
which the President certified Mexico and certain other
countries as being fully cooperative with the United States, or
having taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. The Committee called witnesses from
not only the Intelligence Community, but also from the
diplomatic and federal law enforcement communities. These
witnesses, in a closed setting, were able to provide
information to Members, that would not otherwise have been
available, describing in detail the facts leading to the
President's decision to certify Mexico. This information
included the most recent narcotics trafficking trends and
patterns via Mexico into the United States. The significant
problems associated with the resultant illicit financial flows
were also described, showing the rapidly growing role of drug
monies on the Mexican economy and institutions. This
information allowed Members of the Senate to more accurately
analyze the Administration's decision in considering a measure
that would have decertified Mexico as being fully cooperative
and/or adequate in its counter-narcotics efforts.
5. The biological and chemical weapons threat
In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the
1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo subway, and most
recently, the 1998 arrests in Las Vegas of persons suspected of
possessing deadly anthrax agent, the Committee has been
concerned by the proliferation of biological and chemical
weapons, and the growing prospect of terrorist attack against
the United States using biological or chemical agents.
In March and April 1998, the Committee held a series of
joint hearings with the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism and Government Information to receive both
unclassified and classified testimony on the biological and
chemical threats to the United States and on the United States
Government's strategy and capabilities to prevent or respond to
such an attack. Witnesses included the Attorney General, the
Director of the FBI, senior Intelligence Community officials,
medical experts from the U.S. Army and the Centers for Disease
Control, and expert private witnesses. In addition, Committee
staff met with and debriefed a defector who until 1992 served
as a senior scientist in the Soviet/Russian offensive
biological weapons program.
The Committee has initiated or supported a number of
programs to enhance the Intelligence Community's capabilities
to monitor this threat, including new legislative authorities
in the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999 to
collect certain kinds of critical preliminary information of
relevance to FBI investigations into international terrorism,
and to provide policymakers with the information and tools
needed to support U.S. counter-proliferation and counter-
terrorism policies. The Classified Annex to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 describes in detail the
Committee's efforts in this regard.
The threat of biological or chemical attack poses
extraordinary and, in some cases, unique challenges, ranging
from the difficulty of detecting the production of such agents
and providing timely warning of a potential attack, to the
consequences of a biological event, which could under certain
circumstances be more lethal than a nuclear explosion. Of
particular concern, from the Committee's viewpoint, are the
ready availability and dual use nature of the materials and
equipment used to prepare biological and chemical agents; the
relative ease with which a small group of terrorists could
produce such substances (compared, for example, with nuclear
weapons); the possibility of genetic engineering to defeat
countermeasures and increase the virulence and infectivity of
biological agents; the threats posed by the Iraqi and Iranian
biological weapons programs; and concerns over Russia's
remaining offensive biological warfare program, which according
to published reports could include biological warheads on
ICBMs, as well as the potential for transfer of scientific
expertise, or actual biological agents, from the Russian
program to rogue states or terrorist groups.
Many of the challenges cited above are intrinsic to the
nature of biological and chemical weapons, or otherwise largely
beyond the capacity of the U.S. Government to influence. The
Committee is disturbed, however, by public reports of
widespread problems and deficiencies in the U.S. Government's
counter-terrorism strategy and capabilities, including
intelligence programs and activities under the Committee's
jurisdiction.
6. Covert action quarterly reviews
Covert action funding continued to comprise only a small
proportion of the intelligence budget throughout the 105th
Congress. Nevertheless, the Committee continued to conduct
rigorous oversight of covert action programs, helping to ensure
that such programs serve an agreed foreign policy objective and
are conducted in accordance with American laws and values.
7. China
On September 18, 1997, the Committee undertook a series of
periodic hearings on major regional intelligence issues with
open and closed sessions on ``Chinese Political Developments,
Threats to U.S. National Security, and Intelligence
Challenges.'' In the open hearing, the Committee heard from a
panel of distinguished experts on Chinese foreign policy and
military strategy in the wake of the Cold War and the resulting
threats to U.S. interests, Chinese military pursuit of the
``Revolution in Military Affairs,'' Chinese proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and related technologies (as well
as advanced conventional weapons), and current and future
political and economic developments in China.
Witnesses for the open hearing were noted democracy
activist Harry Wu, a research fellow at the Hoover Institute;
Ambassador James R. Lilley, former U.S. envoy to Beijing and
Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute;
Peter W. Rodman, a former senior NSC and State Department
official who is currently Director of National Security
Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom; Dr. Michael
Pillsbury, an associate fellow at the National Defense
University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; and
Professor Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control.
In an afternoon closed session, the Committee heard
detailed classified testimony from CIA, FBI, and DIA witnesses
on intelligence collection issues, Chinese denial and deception
operations, and Chinese intelligence activities directed at the
United States, as well as classified Intelligence Community
perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military strategy,
Chinese proliferation behavior, and Chinese political and
economic developments.
The Committee continues to closely monitor developments in
China, in particular intelligence collection and analysis on
Chinese military programs, activities, capabilities, and
intentions, and on Chinese weapons proliferation activities.
8. Russia
The precipitous deterioration in the political, economic
and military fabric of the Russian state made that country's
future an issue of utmost concern to the Committee in 1998. In
addition to holding a number of closed briefings focusing on
the fast-paced developments within Russia, the Committee held a
hearing on September 16th during which the full panoply of
national security and intelligence issues associated with these
changes were thoroughly examined. Of chief concern to the
Committee is Russia's export of nuclear and missile technology,
particularly technology transfers to Iran. Related to this
proliferation activity is the issue of nuclear security and
surety within the Russian Federation and the vulnerability of
the increasingly desperate military-industrial workforce to the
influences of organized crime and the lure of employment with
foreign states interested in obtaining weapons of mass
destruction. The Committee also examined possible Russian
nuclear test activities and the implication for monitoring a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the future size and force
structure of Russia's strategic nuclear triad vis-a-vis the
limitations of START II and the prospective START III; the
sharp decline in military readiness and force modernization
funding; the efficacy of U.S. and allied intelligence
collection against Russia and subsequent intelligence
assessments; the causes of the Russian economic crisis; and the
state of democratic reforms during times of social and economic
tumult. Given the growing uncertainty within Russia, the
Committee believes that intelligence collection and analysis
regarding Russia will require considerable oversight in the
upcoming year.
9. Iraq
At a time when Iraq remained the most vexing foreign policy
issue facing the United States, the Committee continued its
extensive oversight of intelligence collection and analysis in
support of U.S. policy toward that country. Iraq figured
prominently in the Committee's global threat hearings, and
Committee members and staff received numerous closed briefings
throughout the 105th Congress, including extensive briefings on
the intelligence on Iraq missile, chemical, biological and
nuclear programs, and on the prospects for Saddam Hussein's
regime. In particular, a February 1998 briefing by the Director
for Intelligence (J-2) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major
General James C. King, highlighted issues associated with
intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction sites needed
tosupport effective U.S. military action--a problem that still
has not been resolved. The Committee is monitoring the intelligence
support prior to and in the wake of Operation Desert Fox.
Reflecting broad bipartisan concern with the conduct of
U.S. policy toward Iraq since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the
Committee, including Chairman Shelby and Vice Chairman Kerrey,
played a role in Senate consideration of the Iraq Liberation
Act of 1998 (or ``ILA''), which was signed into law by the
President on October 31, 1998 (Public Law 105-338). The Iraq
Liberation Act, inter alia, declared that it should be the
policy of the United States to remove the regime headed by
Saddam Hussein and promote the emergence of a democratic Iraq.
To that end, the legislation authorized the drawdown of U.S.
military stocks to provide military assistance to designated
Iraqi democratic resistance groups. Consistent with the ILA,
the Administration has modified its Iraq policy and stated that
it seeks the replacement of the Saddam Hussein regime. The
Administration has also announced its intention to designate
seven Iraqi democratic resistance groups for U.S. assistance.
The Committee will closely monitor the continued implementation
of the ILA, in particular the drawdown of U.S. military stocks
to provide aid to the designated groups.
10. Intelligence sharing with the United Nations Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM)
Following the successful conclusion of Operation Desert
Storm, the United Nations Security Council established the
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in order to
implement relevant Security Council resolutions regarding the
elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. After having
served for several years as one of UNSCOM's principal
inspectors, Scott Ritter resigned in August 1998. Mr. Ritter
subsequently testified before various Congressional committees
regarding his concerns about evolving U.S. policy toward Iraq.
Mr. Ritter, in other fora, also expressed concerns about
certain aspects of intelligence sharing between U.S.
intelligence agencies and UNSCOM. In addition, various press
reports in October described some of the inner workings of
UNSCOM, including information-sharing arrangements with certain
foreign governments. In 1998, the Committee staff initiated a
review of intelligence sharing between U.S. intelligence
agencies and UNSCOM officials. That review is continuing.
11. Khobar Towers
The Committee continues to monitor the investigation of the
June 25, 1996 terrorist bombing of the U.S. military housing
facility at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, which killed 19
military service personnel, and at least one Saudi civilian,
wounded more than 200 Americans, and injured hundreds of other
civilians. At the time, the Khobar Towers complex was home for
the airmen of the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Fighter Wing
(Provisional), under the operational command of U.S. Central
Command, who were participating in the United Nations effort to
enforce the ``no-fly'' zone in southern Iraq. The Committee
held hearings focusing on the investigation of and follow up to
the Khobar Towers bombing, including possible state
sponsorship, on terrorism generally, and on intelligence
support to law enforcement.
12. Roger E. Tamraz
During the consideration of the nomination of Anthony Lake
to be the Director of Central Intelligence, the Committee
became aware of Roger E. Tamraz and his involvement with the
White House and the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Tamraz, a
Lebanese native turned U.S. citizen, was, at the time,
attempting to negotiate an agreement to construct a
multibillion-dollar oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to
Turkey. On June 2, 1995, Mr. Tamraz met with NSC officials in
an attempt to secure the administration's endorsement, or at
least assurances that the Clinton administration wouldn't
oppose his plan. He received neither. In fact, NSC staff
recommended to senior White House officials that Mr. Tamraz be
granted no further meetings or access to the White House.
Notwithstanding NSC staff warnings, Mr. Tamraz attended
four additional White House events with President Clinton
following pleas by Democratic National Committee Chairman
Donald Fowler to White House officials to ignore NSC staff
recommendations regarding Mr. Tamraz. Mr. Tamraz and his
company Tamoil, Inc. contributed at least $177,000 to the
national and state Democratic parties in 1995 and 1996.
Of particular interest to the Committee, however, was Mr.
Fowler's contact with CIA personnel in pursuit of a favorable
report on Tamraz, which was subsequently provided to NSC staff
in hopes of winning NSC support for Tamraz. Apparently, Tamraz
told Mr. Fowler that he had cooperated with the CIA in the past
and that the CIA would vouch for him. The Committee was
extremely concerned that apolitical official could reach into a
highly secret federal government agency and extract information to help
a generous contributor. The Committee was also concerned that the CIA
was distributing information to the NSC on an American citizen.
On March 13, 1997, then-Acting Director of Central
Intelligence George J. Tenet directed an Inspector General
investigation into what appeared to be improper contacts
between Democratic National Committee and CIA officials and
contacts with Roger E. Tamraz. The CIA IG conducted what the
Committee considers to be a thorough investigation. The
Committee has endorsed its conclusions and recommendations. On
April 2, 1998, the chairman and Vice Chairman asked the DCI to
advise the Committee of the actions he had taken or planned to
take to address the IG's recommendations.
On December 16, 1998, the Executive Director of the CIA
responded to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's request. The
Executive Director stated that, in early 1998, the DCI
established a Special Accountability Board to review the
actions and performance of the agency personnel identified in
the IG report and to make recommendations regarding individual
employees. The DCI reviewed the Board's report and concurred
with their conclusions and recommendations. The Committee
continues to examine the DCI's actions in accordance with the
Board's review and the IG's report. The Committee will respond
to the DCI upon completion of that review.
b. investigations
1. China investigation, part 1
On June 2, 1998, the Committee unanimously approved Terms
of Reference for two investigations into the impacts to U.S.
national security stemming from the transfer of advanced U.S.
satellite and related technology to the People's Republic of
China, and reports of a covert Chinese Government program to
influence the political process in the United States during the
1996 election cycle.\1\
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\1\ The investigation into Chinese efforts to influence the U.S.
political process is described in the next China sub-section of this
report.
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With respect to satellite technology, the Committee voted
to determine the facts and recommend policies and possible
changes to law regarding the following questions:
1. To what extent, from 1988 to the present, have
U.S. export control policies regarding the launch of
U.S. manufactured communications satellites on Chinese
launch vehicles affected U.S. national security?
a. Which specific Chinese launches of U.S.
manufactured satellites, if any, facilitated
the transmittal of technical knowledge to the
Chinese launch industry?
b. Did such information enable China to
develop more effective ballistic missiles? If
so, what were the resulting Chinese
improvements?
c. Was national security information
available prior to export policy decisions that
indicated that the exports could pose a threat
to U.S. national security?
d. If so, what steps were taken to
disseminate such information to appropriate
Executive Branch officials and Congressional
oversight Committees?
e. Are sufficient intelligence resources
dedicated to obtaining information on Chinese
ballistic missile developments, including the
potential impact of U.S. technology exports?
f. What are the gaps in the Intelligence
Community's ability to obtain such information?
g. What is the history of U.S. Government
security procedures for protecting national
security when U.S. manufactured satellites are
launched from China and are current procedures
adequate?
h. Were these procedures following during
each Chinese launch of a U.S. satellite?
i. What are the national security advantages
and disadvantages of launching U.S.
manufactured satellites on Chinese launch
vehicles?
In the course of its investigation, the Committee held 10
hearings, and heard from expert witnesses from the CIA, the
Defense Department's Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA), the Department of State, the National Air Intelligence
Center (NAIC), the National Security Agency, and the General
Accounting Office. Committee staff also conducted numerous
interviews, and reviewed tens of thousands of documents
provided by Executive Branch agencies and U.S. satellite
manufacturers.
The investigation of the transfer of satellite and related
technology was prompted by press reports of a Justice
Department criminal probe into whether Loral Space and
Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corp. violated
export control laws by providing to the Chinese their analysis
of the cause of the failed launch of a Loral-built Intelsat
satellite on a Chinese Long March rocket in February 1996.
There was also reports that the White House had approved a
waiver of Tiananmen Square sanctions for a subsequent Loral
satellite launch despite Justice Department concerns of the
possible effect of such approval on its ongoing criminal
investigation.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Justice Department investigation continues today. The
Committee's investigation is focused on the national security impact of
technology transfer; it is not intended to duplicate the Justice
Department's criminal investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the Loral-Hughes revelations, press reports have
identified additional events of serious concern, including
Hughes' transfer to China of a failure analysis of the 1995
launch of the Hughes Apstar 2 satellite, and the absence of
U.S. Government monitors at Chinese launches of three Hughes
satellites in 1995-1996. Press reports also raised concerns
that China may have developed technology applicable to Multiple
Independently Retargetable Vehicles (MIRVs) through its
development, to U.S. specifications, of a multiple-satellite
``Smart Dispenser'' to place Motorola ``Iridium''
communications satellites in orbit.
The export of commercial satellites for launch in China was
first approved by the Reagan Administration in 1988, in the
wake of the Challenger disaster, and the first launch took
place in 1990. A number of launches took place during the Bush
administration and during the Clinton administration.
The Chinese rockets used as space launch vehicles to place
satellites in orbit are virtually identical to Chinese
ballistic missiles used to deliver nuclear warheads and other
military payloads. There have been longstanding concerns that
by helping the Chinese launch U.S. satellites, U.S. companies
might--either advertently or inadvertently--provide sensitive
know-how, information, or technology that would improve China's
space launch systems, and that any resulting improvements could
be transferred to Chinese military missile's systems.
Reflecting the above concerns, export control laws were
developed to manage the risk of technology transfer, and
commercial satellite exports are subject to extensive security
and monitoring requirements. These procedures do not eliminate
the risk of some transfer of information and are not always
followed. Moreover, concerns have been raised that changes in
export controls, including shifting jurisdiction over such
exports from the Department of State to the Department of
Commerce, have resulted in increased risk of technology
transfer. Jurisdiction over commercial satellites lacking
certain ``militarily significant'' characteristics was first
transferred from the State Department to the Commerce
Department in 1992; jurisdiction over the remaining satellites
was transferred to Commerce in 1996. Following hearings by the
SSCI and other committees, the fiscal year 1999 Defense
Authorization Act returned all such satellites to State
Department jurisdiction.
The Committee's investigations are continuing, and are
expected to be completed in February 1999.
2. China investigation, part 2
On June 2, 1998 the Committee authorized an investigation
into the allegations that the People's Republic of China (PRC)
Government had covertly influenced the 1996 U.S. election
cycle. The investigation was in part prompted by press reports
of PRC influence in the 1996 election cycle and in part by
earlier closed hearings held by the Committee into whether and
how information about these activities had been collected and
reported in the executive branch. Specifically, the Committee
adopted the following language as its ``Terms of Reference''
for the investigation:
Is there intelligence information that substantiates
the allegation that the Chinese Government undertook a
covert program to influence the political process in
the United States through political donations, and
other means, during the 1996 election cycle?
a. When was any such information obtained, and what
steps were taken to disseminate it to appropriate
Executive Branch officials and Congressional oversight
Committees?
b. Does information exist that indicates the Chinese
covert effort is continuing today?
c. Does a covert effort to influence the U.S.
political process represent a threat to U.S. national
security?
d. In what ways does a covert effort to influence the
U.S. political process differ from other types of
international influences on elections?
e. Are sufficient intelligence resources dedicated to
obtaining information on Chinese, or other foreign,
covert influences on the U.S. political process?
f. What are the gaps in the Intelligence Community's
ability to obtain such information?
As of the date of this report, the investigation is
continuing. The Committee has held formal hearings and taken
the testimony of key witnesses from the CIA, FBI and other
intelligence agencies. In addition, Committee staff have
interviewed witnesses and read hundreds of documents that are
relevant to the investigation.
c. community issues
1. Indian nuclear tests and the Jeremiah Panel
On May 11 and 13, 1998, the Intelligence Community was
taken by surprise when India conducted a number of nuclear
tests. In response to concerns expressed by the Chairman and
Vice Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
reported in testimony before the SSCI on May 14, 1998 that he
had asked Retired Admiral David Jeremiah to examine the quality
and quantity of intelligence reporting and analysis on the
Indian nuclear tests. Admiral Jeremiah sought to evaluate the
Intelligence Community's performance, to examine the decisions
the Intelligence Community made, and to suggest whether and how
improvements should be implemented.
On June 2, 1998, the Committee held a closed hearing to
review the findings of the Jeremiah Panel, which identified
numerous analytical and collection failures, and DCI Tenet's
response to those findings. At the request of the Committee,
the DCI provided an unclassified summary of the recommendations
of the Jeremiah Report on June 22, 1998. The recommendations
fall under the following categories: Analytic Assumptions and
Tradecraft; Collection Management and Tasking; Manning and
Training; and, Organizing and Integrating the Intelligence
Community.
Subsequent to the Jeremiah Report's recommendations, the
DCI complied with the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997
and filled the positions of Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence (ADCI) for both Collection, and Analysis and
Production. The DCI appointed John Gannon, Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, as the ADCI for Analysis and
Production, and Charlie Allen, Chairman of the National
Intelligence Collection Board, as the ADCI for Collection. The
DCI further directed specific steps to be taken to address the
other recommendations of the Jeremiah Panel. The Committee
believes that these positions will have a significant impact on
the overall organization and effectiveness of the Intelligence
Community and its ability to redress several of the serious
shortfalls and weaknesses in the Intelligence Community
consistent with the recommendations made by the Jeremiah Panel.
The Committee looks forward to Presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation of these ADCI positions in full compliance
with the provisions of the law.
2. The ballistic missile threat and the Rumsfeld Commission
On July 29, 1998, the Committee met to hear the testimony
of the Rumsfeld Commission chaired by former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission was
established by Congress in the wake of a controversial National
Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threats that was
completed in November 1995. That estimate concluded ``that in
the next 15 years, no country other than the declared major
nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could
threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.''
Subsequently, that estimate was criticized by many
observers. For example, the General Accounting Office concluded
that the estimate overstated the certainty of its conclusions,
contained analytical shortcomings, and did not explicitly
identify its critical assumptions. In addition, a panel headed
by former DCI Robert Gates reported that the estimate, although
not politicized, was politically naive and that its failure to
include Alaska and Hawaii was foolish from every possible
perspective.
A new estimate in the form of an annual report to Congress
on foreign missile developments likewise addresses the emerging
missile threat. The Committee received that report in March
1998. However, while this estimate was viewed as an improvement
over NIE-95-19, the conclusions contained in that report and
the Rumsfeld Commission's current assessment differ.
The Rumsfeld Commission, in addition to its review of ``the
potential of existing and emerging powers to pose a ballistic
missile threat to the United States and to arm ballistic
missiles with weapons of mass destruction'', reviewed U.S.
collection and analysis capabilities to assess the ability of
the Intelligence Community to warn of the ballistic missile
threat.
The Commission unanimously concluded that first, the threat
to the U.S. posed by emerging capabilities is broader, more
mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in
estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community and
secondly, that the Intelligence Community's ability to provide
timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to
the U.S. is eroding and that this erosion has roots both within
and outside the intelligence process itself.
The Committee supports the report's central conclusion that
the ability of U.S. intelligence to provide timely warning of
missile threats is eroding and believes that the Commission's
exhaustive report represents a valuable input to the on-going
debate on the threat posed by ballistic missiles to U.S.
national security interests and the proper structure and
direction of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the 21st
Century. The Committee has sought to direct the Community's
efforts in ways that may enable it to minimize the type of
proliferation surprise that may come more frequently in the
future if the Community is unable to assess the threats facing
the United States in the coming decade.
3. Proliferation threats
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and their means of delivery remains a central threat to
U.S. national security. The Committee undertook a significant
effort to better understand the scope and direction of
proliferation trends, to enhance dialogue with the Intelligence
Community on proliferation topics, to assess and strengthen the
Intelligence Community's ability to monitor and respond to
proliferation threats, and to inform the rest of the Senate on
key proliferation topics.
The Committee held hearings on a number of proliferation
topics in addition to the world threats hearings, which also
addressed proliferation concerns. These included hearings on
the Indian nuclear tests and the North Korean launch of the
Taepo Dong I, a launch vehicle that displayed some of the
capabilities of an intercontinental range ballistic missile.
The Committee received numerous briefings and reviewed numerous
Intelligence Community products addressing proliferation from
both the supply and demand sites of the proliferation equation,
and established a regular monthly series of briefings on
proliferation topics in addition to frequent special briefings
on topics of concern. These briefings have provided a valuable
channel for regular communication with the Intelligence
Community on topics of concern, and because appropriately
cleared staff from other committees are regularly invited, have
also offered an opportunity to increase the overall level of
awareness of proliferation topics.
4. Arms control
In May 1997, the Senate approved the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As part of Senate
consideration, Chairman Shelby and Vice Chairman Kerrey managed
a historic closed debate of the Senate on verification and
compliance aspects of the CWC treaty. The Senate relied on
findings contained in SSCI classified and unclassified reports
which were prepared in the 103rd Congress.
The Committee also held staff briefings on possible Russian
nuclear test activities, and the implications for monitoring a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
On other arms control issues, during the 105th Congress,
the Chairman and Vice Chairman joined together in a letter to
the Secretary of State to highlight the importance they attach
to the verifiability and monitoring of arms control agreements.
They urged the Secretary of State to ensure that the
verifiability and compliance reports be completed by a Senate
confirmed individual. The Committee will follow with interest
the merger of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into
the State Department to ensure that the Committee's concerns
are addressed.
The Committee also sought to increase its oversight into
the implementation of existing arms control agreements,
including the START and INF Treaties.
5. Embassy bombings in Africa and the U.S. response
On August 7, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. On August 20,
retaliatory and preemptive missile strikes were launched
against training bases in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated
with radical extremist and terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin,
identified by U.S. and foreign intelligence services as
responsible for the bombings. A pharmaceutical company in
Sudan, identified by U.S. intelligence as a chemical weapons
facility in which Bin Ladin is reported to have a financial
interests, was also struck. President Clinton also signed an
executive order freezing assets owned by BinLadin, specific
associates, and their self-proclaimed Islamic Army Organization, and
prohibiting U.S. individuals and firms from doing business with them.
In addition to numerous staff briefings, on September 2,
1998, the Committee held a closed hearing to review the
intelligence aspects of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa and
the U.S. response. The Committee is continuing its review of
the Intelligence Community's performance, including
intelligence warnings of the terrorist bombings, and the
intelligence supporting the U.S. military response.
6. Intelligence implications of NATO enlargement
In 1998, the full Senate considered modifications to the
North Atlantic Treaty in order to accommodate the membership of
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. A resolution of
ratification to accompany the new Protocols of that treaty was
reported out of the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 3,
1998.
At the direction of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, the
staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prepared a
report in clssified and unclassified form to support the
ratification process by providing the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the full Senate its assessment of the
intelligence and counterintelligence implications of the
admission of these former Warsaw Pact adversaries into the NATO
intelligence structure.
In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent to
ratification of a modified North Atlantic Treaty, committee
staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence
officials and reviewed documents prepared by the intelligence
Community on the intelligence and counterintelligence
implications of NATO enlargement. Finally, the Committee
required the Executive Branch to provide a formal report on the
intelligence and counterintelligence ramifications of NATO
expansion. Committee staff also met with members of the
Alliance's Interagency Working Group on NATO Enlargement to
discuss integration efforts in the intelligence field. Finally,
Committee members and staff traveled to the national capitals
of the three aspiring members and a more detailed knowledge of
how the civilian and military services of those countries
operate, and whether adequate procedures were in place for the
sharing of sensitive information with current NATO members.
The Committee identified certain counterintelligence risks
arising from the admission of the new members, but concluded
that the intelligence relationships with Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus for U.S. and
NATO interests.
Consistent with and as a consequence of its findings, the
Committee proposed a condition to the resolution of
ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty. The
purpose of the condition was to chart the progress that the
three aspiring members were making in adopting NATO practices
and regulations as standard operating procedures in their own
intelligence services as well as to encourage all NATO members
to enhance their measures for protecting intelligence sources
and methods. To that end, the condition required the President
or the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the
appropriate committees of Congress with various reports on
these efforts, two before and one after formal accession of
these countries to the Alliance. That proposed condition was
accepted unanimously by the full Senate.
7. Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence
The Committee continued its efforts to develp more
effective management of Intelligence Community. During the
second session of the 105th Congress, the Director of Central
Intelligence appointed an interim Assistanct Director of
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. During the
short period in which the two positions have been filled, the
Committee has found both appointments to have fulfilled a much-
needed function in assisting the DCI in the management of the
Intelligence Community. There are now clear lines of
responsibility for intelligence collection and for intelligence
production providing expertise and insights for both the
Committee and to the Intelligence Community. Just prior to
adjournment of the 105th Congress, the President submitted to
the Senate his nomination for the Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Administration. The Senate adjourned before
the Committee could conduct hearings and provide a
recommendation to the Senate on this latter nomination. The
Committee looks forward to Presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation of all ADCI's in full compliance with the law.
8. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General
During the 105th Congress, the Committee continued to
closely monitor the activities of the Inspectors General (IGs)
of the Intelligence Community. This oversight included: review
of over a hundred IG products, to include audit
reports,inspection reports, reports of investigation, and semi-annual
reports of IG activities; numerous visits to IG offices for updates on
plans and procedures; and attendance at several IG conferences and NSA
IG Day. In addition to a variety of hearings focused on issues reviewed
by the Intelligence Community IGs, the Committee arranged a number of
briefings with community program and IG personnel in order to follow up
on the status of IG recommendations. Examples include NRO financial
practices, employee grievances, lease and sale of real property,
contracting procedures, employee recruitment and security processing,
and effective use of resources on new technology.
During the 105th Congress, the Committee also continued its
efforts to monitor the operations of the Intelligence Community
Offices of Inspector General. The most significant product in
this area was a formal review of the operations of CIA's Office
of Inspector General. The objective of the SSCI's review was to
gain further details on the operations of the three IG staffs
(Audit, Inspection, and Investigation). Particular emphasis was
placed on the Investigations Staff because it had changed the
most since the IG was statutorily authorized in 1990. The
review focused on both the policies and procedures of the IG
office as a whole and those of the individual staffs.
The review found that CIA IG had taken many steps toward
improvement in the years since Congress made it statutory.
Examples noted included: better training for inspectors and
investigators; improved follow up on IG recommendations;
strengthened quality controls; additional staff to meet an
increased work load; and creation of an IG Counsel team.
These changes resulted in CIA IG reports being widely
viewed as quality products that address the issues at hand with
the proper amount of analysis, criticism, and independence. In
addition, the office has increased the level of trust and
respect from within the Agency, the oversight committees, and
the Intelligence Community. During the review, several areas
were noted where improvements could be made to further increase
the effectiveness and stature of the office. These included
better definition of the auditable/inspectable universe, and
formalizing a number of IG policies. These matters have already
been addressed by CIA IG.
Another significant Committee accomplishment during the
105th Congress was the confirmation of the second statutory
Inspector General at the Central Intelligence Agency on July
14, 1998. Also during this Congress, the Committee included
language within the 1998 Authorization Act that provided CIA IG
with subpoena powers held by all other statutory IGs.
Finally, the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act included
language that doubled the size of the NRO IG in order to allow
that office to more effectively oversee NRO programs and
activities. The Committee also closely monitored the progress
of the joint CIA and DOD IG review of the NRO IG office. While
the review has remained in the draft stage for some time, the
NRO has already acted on the majority of the review's findings,
and a new NRO IG has been named. DOD IG is currently conducting
a similar evaluation of DIA IG, and the results of that review
will be assessed by the Committee's Audit Team.
9. Release of JFK documents
Public Law 102-526, the ``President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992,'' mandated the
disclosure of records relevant to the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy.
In the spring of 1993, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence inventoried the original records of the Church
Committee (some 450 boxes) and identified 175 archived boxes of
material as having possible relevance to the assassination. A
page by page review by Committee staff was conducted and
resulted in the identification of over 34,000 pages of relevant
material.
Coincident with the document identification and cataloging
process, agencies with equities in these documents were invited
by the Committee to conduct a security review of the 34,000
pages. Most of the documents were declassified and are
available to the public through the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). The Committee transmitted all
declassified and redacted documents directly to the NARA. In
addition, twelve volumes of classified documents were
transmitted to the President's Review Board on November 25,
1997, for final disposition.
Moreover, in 1997 the Review Board wrote to the Committee
and identified additional missing testimony directly relevant
to the Church Committee's investigation of the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, as well as testimony regarding
alleged CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders. The
Committee staff forwarded the specific transcripts that had
been identified by the Review Board and the NARA throughout
1997-98. The Committee staff furtheridentified and produced
scores of microfilmed copies of the requested transcripts. This
testimony was processed and placed into the JFK Collection.
To ensure that the Committee was in total compliance with
the JFK Act, the entire collection of Church Committee records
were made available to the Review Board staff to verify that
the Church Committee files did not contain any additional
documents relative to their inquiry. On August 5, 1998, the
Review Board staff completed their review of the Church
Committee's files. The Review Board determined that there were
no additional records relating to the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy and that the Review Board was
satisfied that the Committee had completed its obligation under
the Act. In conclusion, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence turned over more than 60,000 records relating to
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy that are now
available to the public through the National Archives and
Records Administration.
10. Security automation
The Committee replaced its expensive, decade-old local area
network (LAN) and is creating a fully automated LAN to provide
Members and appropriately cleared Committee staff access to the
Nation's most sensitive intelligence information. Because
multi-level security is an unrealized goal in the field of
automation, the Committee has taken unusual and creative steps
to provide unprecedented access to information while at the
same time compartmenting information based on an absolute
``need-to-know.'' Both the Senate Rules Committee and the
Senate Computer Center have been especially helpful in ensuring
the Committee's unique and extremely sensitive requirements are
being fully met. The project should be completed early in the
106th Congress.
11. PolicyNet update
In the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act,
funds were set aside for the establishment of a secure computer
network, referred to as PolicyNet, with CIA designated as the
executive agent, to connect the Intelligence Community with the
Legislative Branch to provide timely notification and access to
intelligence products generated by the Executive Branch.
Since its inception, the Committee staff have worked
closely with representatives of the Intelligence Community to
enhance and fine tune the capabilities of this computer network
and to provide the Legislative Branch with ``on-line'' access
to Intelligence Community products.
PolicyNet is the CIA's Automated Information System that
provides classified intelligence products, maps, charts, video,
imagery, etc. to the Congress and selected Executive Branch
agencies involved with intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination. In addition, the network's secure video
conferencing feature provides the DCI, as well as other senior
intelligence officials, with the ability to communicate ``face-
to-face'' with members of the Intelligence Committee on
extremely sensitive issues of national importance. This feature
also provides for timely briefings of sensitive late breaking
events in areas of importance.
PolicyNet provides the Intelligence Committee members and
staff with a vehicle that greatly assists the Committee's
oversight responsibilities by providing timely intelligence in
``near real-time'' rather than requiring them to wade through
thousands of pages of paper documents. The secure video
conferencing benefits the Congressional oversight committees,
as well as the Intelligence Community, by providing a
capability to brief both the House and Senate on sensitive
intelligence matters rather than briefing each Committee
separately.
The Committee has greatly benefitted from the resources
that the Intelligence Community has made available on PolicyNet
through direct ``on-line'' access. The most precious resource
of any organization is information and the ability to retrieve
it quickly. PolicyNet's around the clock accessibility is key
to providing members and staff with timely notification and
access to intelligence products.
Moreover, the funds authorized also provided connectivity
to the Office of Senate Security for non-Committee members and
their appropriately cleared staff to have greater access to
intelligence related material on a variety of issues.
12. SSCI web page [www.senate.gov/committee/intelligence.html]
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) web site
[www.senate.gov/committee/intelligence.html] was established in
1998 in response to increased constituent and Intelligence
Community demand for information regarding scheduled Committee
hearings, press releases, Committee publications, and
legislation.
The SSCI web site serves as a means to publicize
information derived from unclassified proceedings, pursuant to
the restrictions of S. Res. 400 and Committee rules for
dissemination of certain categories of information. The site
also serves as a means by which our current leadership and
membership is displayed.
Visitors to the SSCI web site will find an array of images,
graphics, and animation, as well as an outline as follows: The
Home Page; Committee Members Page; Jurisdiction Page;
Legislation Page; Hearings Page; Press Releases Page;
Publications Page; Intelligence Laws Page; and the Other Links
Page.
The Home Page.--Displays welcome information, the address
and telephone number for the Committee, photos of current
Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, with links to their
perspective U.S. Senate personal office web site.
Committee Members Page.--Displays a list of current
Committee members, including the Committee Chairman and Vice
Chairman, as well as the Ex-Officio members, Senator Trent Lott
(R--Mississippi), and Senator Thomas A. Daschle (D--South
Dakota). There is a link to the U.S. Senate personal office web
site of each respective member listed.
Jurisdiction Page.--This page contains S. Res. 400 and the
Rules of Procedure by which the Committee Members and staff
must comply.
Legislation Page.--All Committee-sponsored legislation is
posted here, including the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999.
Hearings Page.--Lists all open hearings of the SSCI,
beginning in the 105th Congress through the current date,
posted individually and listed in reverse chronological order.
Upon clicking a posted hearing link, the visitor goes to a
separate web page that list the names of the witnesses in
attendance at the respective hearing. If the witness(s)
provides a statement, it will be posted. Transcripts for the
respective hearings will be available either as an attachment
or via a link to another source.
Press Releases Page.--All SSCI press releases commencing in
the 105th Congress through to the current date, posted in
reverse chronological order.
Publications Page.--All SSCI publications commencing in the
105th Congress through to the current date, posted in reverse
chronological order.
Intelligence Laws Page.--This page lists all of the
intelligence-related laws, statutes, and executive orders that
are under the jurisdiction of the SSCI or that are of interest
to the Intelligence Committee.
Other Links Page.--This page provides a link to other web
sites external to the SSCI web site, that pertain to
intelligence-related matters.
d. audits
The Committee's Audit Staff was created in 1988 to provide
``a credible independent arm for Committee review of covert
action programs and other specific Intelligence Community
functions and issues.'' During the 105th Congress the Audit
Team consisted of three full-time auditors, with support
provided by other staff on an as needed basis. The team led or
provided significant support to the Committee's review of a
number of administrative and operational issues relating to the
agencies of the Intelligence Community. In addition, the Audit
Staff completed four in-depth reviews of specific intelligence
programs or issues. These reviews included the following:
1. Major Systems Acquisition Program of the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO)
The audit team conducted a thorough review of the NRO's
financial management, contract administration, and program
oversight practices for a major satellite system. The final
report noted both strengths and weaknesses in the financial
management of the program and contained recommendations to
improve the NRO's acquisition management practices.
2. The Intelligence Community's use of cover to protect operations
Cover became a significant concern in February 1995, when
the Committee received notification from the Central
Intelligence Agency that the French Interior Minister had
delivered a demarche to the U.S. Ambassador to France regarding
U.S. intelligence activities in France. The audit was conducted
to determine whether cover problems, such as those which
occurred in Paris, were unique or represented a systemic
weakness within the Intelligence Community. The audit uncovered
a number of significant issues, and the report included short
term recommendations to correct immediate problems, as well as
long-term solutions. Long-term solutions require more
operational planning, and investment in researchand development
of new intelligence collection methods to be successfully deployed in
the technically challenging environment of the future.
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
1998 marked the 20th anniversary of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA established
comprehensive legal standards and procedures for the use of
electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence within the United States. In 1994, FISA was
expanded to include physical search authority. The objective of
the SSCI staff audit was to follow up on preliminary work
initiated during the 104th Congress by conducting the
Committee's first comprehensive review of the FISA process
since 1984. The audit covered each of the categories of FISA
collection identified in the Act, but focused most closely on
policies for approving, implementing, and managing FISA
operations. In addition, the procedures of the Department of
Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy Review and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court were considered. The audit
found that FISA legal review and approval procedures are
appropriately rigorous, effective, and consistent with the law.
The report makes recommendations to enhance certain FISA
procedures, ensure the continued utility of FISA authorities,
and standardize Committee oversight.
In addition to these efforts, the Audit Team initiated a
review of CIA's contracting procedures and participated in the
Committee's China investigation by conducting a review of the
Intelligence Community's collection and analysis capabilities
against this target.
e. technical advisory group (tag) reports
1. The future of signals intelligence (SIGINT)
The Committee appointed a panel of experts knowledgeable in
a wide range of technologies to advise the Committee on
challenging and compelling technical issues that face the
Intelligence Community. This group, the Technical Advisory
Group (TAG), was formed into two Panels--one to focus on Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) issues and challenges, and the second to
address Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).
The Committee asked the SIGINT Panel to provide an
assessment of the ``Future of SIGINT'', looking toward the 21st
Century where global communications networks will dominate. The
Panel began by reviewing a ``cryptologic architecture'' which
was the product of a Community-wide effort to create a
framework for the future, and was led by NSA. From this
document the Panel identified a number of issues to research in
greater depth. Based on their research, the SIGINT Panel made
many recommendations, both evolutionary and revolutionary, to
the Committee. Some of the Panel's key findings:
NSA's core mission is an essential national
capability, and must be dramatically rejuvenated. NSA
must move aggressively in a number of areas (e.g.,
modernization) to preserve their key role in the
Intelligence Community.
Declining budgets and obsolete equipment are impeding
NSA's ability to maintain their technical edge.
Advanced research and development must receive greater
emphasis and more funding. The Panel suggested that
significant investment should be made in basic research
projects--high risk but potentially extraordinary
payoff.
NSA must revitalize and modernize recruiting and
hiring techniques.
NSA's general organizational structure is not
maximized to meet today's challenges. More
administrative and support tasks should be contracted,
as well as many information services. The TAG suggested
distributing budget and authority to those with the
problems being worked, and developing more effective
metrics.
NSA has initiated several actions in response to the
recommendations of the TAG. Many of these actions require a
significant infusion of funds, some of which were provided by
Congress in fiscal year 1999. Many of the projects,
particularly the Information Technology modernization efforts,
will require sustained effort before the goals can be
accomplished. The Committee will continue to closely monitor
NSA's efforts to modernize.
2. The future of human intelligence (HUMINT)
In 1997, as part of its efforts to gain a better
understanding of the technology issues facing the Intelligence
Community, the Committee also established a Technical Advisory
Group (TAG) to examine human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering
capabilities and plans of the CIA's Directorate of Operations
(DO). Comprised of prominent scientists and former high-ranking
intelligence community officials with extensive expertise in
technical matters, the TAGexamined how the Directorate of
Operations could effectively leverage the explosion in information
technologies.
The HUMINT TAG made several observations and
recommendations. Among them:
Clandestine operations are an absolutely essential
element of national security and will play an
increasingly important role in a complex future world
posing significant new threats to our national
security;
A HUMINT vision and plan must recognize and place
proper emphasis on the threats as well as the
opportunities brought about by the accelerating pace of
technological innovation in a world dominated by
information technology;
Of paramount concern are threats from both national
and transnational groups populated by a diverse
collection of cultures and armed with high technology;
and
Future U.S. clandestine operations can yield the
required quantity and quality of foreign intelligence
only with a well-constructed vision of the future and
an executable, affordable plan for meeting these future
challenges.
In response to the TAG's recommendations, the CIA made key
changes in an effort to more effectively take advantage of
opportunities provided by technological innovation. As in the
case of NSA, the committee will closely monitor the DO's
efforts to make better use of technological innovations.
IV. Confirmations
a. george j. tenet
On December 15, 1996, John M. Deutch resigned as Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI). Twenty-four days later the
President of the United States nominated William Anthony
Kirsopp Lake to replace Dr. Deutch. The Committee held public
hearings on March 11-13, 1997 to consider Mr. Lake's
nomination. Before the Committee had an opportunity to vote on
Mr. Lake's nomination, however the President withdrew Mr.
Lake's nomination and in the alternative nominated George J.
Tenet.
On May 6, 1997, the Committee held a public hearing on Mr.
Tenet's nomination. Mr Tenet had served as Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for approximately one year at the time of
his nomination to be DCI. He had previously served as Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence
Programs at the National Security Council. He also served on
President Clinton's national security transition team following
almost four years as Staff Director for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Tenet holds a BSFS from the
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and an MIA
from the School of International Affairs at Columbia
University.
On July 10, 1997, the Committee favorably reported Mr.
Tenet's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The Senate
approved his nomination in executive session on July 10, 1997.
b. lieutenant general john a. gordon, usaf
On October 1, 1997, the Committee held a public hearing on
the nomination of Lieutenant General John A. Gordon, USAF to be
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. General Gordon was
serving as Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Military Support at the time of his nomination. General Gordon
previously served as Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief
of Staff for Long Range Planning and also served as the
Director of Operations for the Air Force Space Command after
having worked on the National Security Council staff
specializing in defense and arms control, including the START
II negotiations. General Gordon holds a BS with honors in
physics from the University of Missouri, an MS from the Naval
Postgraduate School, and an MA in business administration from
the Highlands University.
On October 8, 1997, the Committee favorably reported Lt.
General Gordon's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0.
The Senate approved his nomination in executive session on
October 27, 1997.
c. joan a. dempsey
On May 21, 1998, the Committee held a public hearing on the
nomination of Joan A. Dempsey to be the first Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence for Community management (DDCI/CM). The
DDCI/CM position was created by the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 as a part of the Committee'songoing
Intelligence Community reform efforts. The DDCI/CM is intended to be
the principal manager of the various components of the Intelligence
Community.
Ms. Dempsey was serving as Chief of Staff for the Director
of Central Intelligence at the time of her nomination. Ms.
Dempsey previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security and Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence. She also served as the Director of the National
Military Intelligence Production Center, Director of the
Military Intelligence Staff, and the Deputy Director of the
General Defense Intelligence Program Staff. Ms. Dempsey holds a
BA from Southern Arkansas University and an MPA from the
University of Arkansas.
On May 22, 1998, the Committee favorably reported Ms.
Dempsey's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The
Senate approved her nomination in executive session on that
same day.
D. Robert M. Mc Namara, Jr.
The Committee attempted to create a confirmable General
Counsel position in the Fiscal Year 1994 and 1995 Intelligence
Authorization Bills, but was unable to reach agreement in
conference with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives. In 1996, however, a consensus
was reached and on October 11, 1996, the President signed into
law the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(P.L. 104-293). Section 813 of that Act established the
statutory position of General Counsel for the Central
Intellengence Agency. Until the enactment of P.L. 104-293, all
elements of the Intelligence Community, save for the CIA, were
within departments served by a statutory General Counsel
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The
Committee firmly believed and still believes that the
confirmation process enhances accountability to Congress while
raising the prestige of the individual occupying the position.
On October 31, 1997, the President nominated Robert M.
McNamara, Jr. to be the first General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency confirmed by the Senate. Mr. McNamara was
serving as Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement at the
U.S. Department of the Treasury at the time of his nomination.
Mr. McNamara previously served as General Counsel of the Peace
Crops, Assistant Director of Enforcement at the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Assistant Majority Counsel of the
U.S. Senate Watergate Committee, and as an Assistant United
States Attorney. Mr. McNamara holds a BA from Mount Carmel
College, an AB from John Caroll University, and a JD from
Georgetown University.
On November 7, 1997, the Committee favorably reported by
Mr. McNamara's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The
Senate approved his nomination in executive session on November
8, 1997.
E. L. Britt Snider
On July 8, 1998, the Committee held a public hearing on the
nomination of L. Britt Snider to be Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Snider was serving as Special
Counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence at the time of
his nomination. He previously served as Staff Director for the
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence
Community, General Counsel for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (Counterintelligence and Security), Counsel of the
Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee), and
Counsel to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee
on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate. Mr. Snider holds a BA from
Davidson College and a JD from the University of Virginia
School of Law.
On July 14, 1998, the Committee favorably reported Mr.
Snider's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The Senate
approveed his nomination in executive session on July 30, 1998.
f. new standard for background investigation review
In accordance with Rule 5.6 of the Committee's Rules of
Procedure, a nomination may not be reported to the Senate
unless the nominee has filed a background statement with the
Committee. Nowhere in the rules of procedure, however, is the
term ``background statement'' defined. During the consideration
of Mr. Anthony Lake to be the Director of Central Intelligence,
the nature and extent of background information that should be
made available to the Committee and the Senate became an issue.
At a business meeting of the Committee on April 23, 1997 to
discuss the matter, the following resolution was adopted:
Be it resolved, That no confirmation hearing in
connection with the nomination of the Director of
Central Intelligence referred to this Committee, shall
be held sooner than seven days after the nominee's
financial disclosure statement is filed with the
Committee and the background investigation is made
available for review by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman.
At the request of members only of the Committee, the
Chairman or Vice Chairman shall authorize them to
review the background investigation file. The
background investigation file shall contain materials
that are equivalent to those routinely made available
to the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with
judicial nominations, i.e., the full Federal Bureau of
Investigation field office investigative reports
(including Form 302s and investigative inserts) and a
letterhead memorandum reflecting the results of indices
checks and other inquiries.
There was debate on whether the resolution should also be
extended to other nominees. After some discussion, the
Committee agreed that the Chairman and Vice Chairman could
extend this standard to any nominee at their discretion.
V. Appendix
a. summary of committee's activities
1. Number of meetings
During the 105th Congress, the Committee held a total of 95
hearings or on-the-record briefings. Of these, forty-seven were
oversight hearings, fifteen were legislative hearings, and
fifteen were nomination hearings. There were sixteen Committee
business or legislative mark-up meetings. Also, the Committee
held two on-the-record briefings.
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the committee
S. Res. 30--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 858--An original bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
S. 1668--An original bill to encourage the disclosure to
Congress of certain classified and related information.
S. 2052--An original bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes.
3. Bills referred to the committee
S. 1751--A bill to extend the deadline for submission of a
report by the Commission to Assess the Organization of the
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction.
4. Committee publications
Senate Report 105-1--Special Report--Committee Activities
January 4, 1995-October 3, 1996.
Senate Report 105-24--SSCI Report to accompany FY 98
Intelligence Authorization Bill (June 9, 1997).
Senate Hearing 105-201--Hearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence--Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States (February 5, 1997).
Senate Hearing 105-234--Nomination of Lieutenant General
John Gordon, USAF, to be Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (October 1, 1997).
Senate Hearing 105-276--Hearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence--People's Republic of China
(September 18, 1997).
Senate Hearing 105-290--Hearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence--1985 Zona Rosa Terrorist Attack in
San Salvador, El Salvador (May 20, July 30, 1997).
Senate Hearing 105-314--Nomination of George J. Tenet to be
Director of Central Intelligence (May 6, 1997).
Senate Hearing 105-424--Hearing on Nomination of Anthony
Lake to be Director Central Intelligence (March 11, 12, 13,
1997).
Senate Report 105-165--Report to accompany S. 1668--The
Disclosure to Congress Act of 1998 (February 23, 1998).
Senate Report 105-185--Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence report to accompany the FY 1999 Intelligence
Authorization Bill (S. 2052) filed May 7, 1998.
Senate Hearing 105-587--Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence hearing on Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States (January 28, 1998).
Senate Hearing 105-729--Disclosure of Classified
Information to Congress (February 4, 11, 1998).
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