Open Hearing: Nomination of David Gompert to be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

[Senate Hearing 111-545] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] S. Hrg. 111-545 NOMINATION OF DAVID C. GOMPERT TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ senate ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-432 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BILL NELSON, Florida SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio ---------- David Grannis, Staff Director Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- OCTOBER 13, 2009 OPENING STATEMENTS Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1 Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri....................................................... 3 WITNESS Gompert, David C., Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence-Designate......................................... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 6 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 24 Prehearing Questions and Responses............................... 47 Answers to Questions for the Record.............................. 101 Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated August 19, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report......................................................... 122 NOMINATION OF DAVID C. GOMPERT TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ---------- TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Feingold, Whitehouse, and Bond. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order. Mr. Gompert, I'd like to welcome you here today to the Committee's hearing on your nomination to be the next Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. That would be the second under the command of DNI Blair. I want you to know I appreciated our meeting last week and believe that you have a strong appreciation for the importance of intelligence, a very firm grasp on the challenges we face around the world and a willingness to work within the intelligence community to make necessary improvements. The Principal Deputy DNI has two main responsibilities-- one, to assist the Director of National Intelligence and, two, to act on behalf of the DNI in his absence or due to a vacancy in the position. The role of the Principal Deputy is essential to the success of the intelligence community and to its continued transformation. If confirmed, Mr. Gompert will be the third Principal Deputy DNI since Congress created the position in 2004. Now, both Vice Chairman Bond and I know that there are a number of challenges that the intelligence community faces, and there are also rays of light. The recent intelligence operation to identify and arrest Najibullah Zazi, we believe, shows great improvement in collection abilities and the ability for agencies to work together. So before getting to a list of issues in need of improvement, I'd like to take a moment to register my appreciation for the fine work that is going on already. We talked about some areas last week where I think you'll need to focus. One of them is ensuring that the intelligence community produces accurate and timely National Intelligence Estimates to help policymakers tackle the toughest national security issues we face and to help make sure that intelligence does not lead us wrongly into war ever again. And I think I mentioned to you that one of my main interests in being Chairman of this Committee was to see that never again is there an NIE like the Iraq NIE was. And I believe we're on our way to changing that--to improving analysis, to improving red-teaming, to really prevent it from ever happening again--and requiring and building the systems to allow the intelligence community to share information so that the stovepipes which were once up and are now down remain down at virtually all levels of the 15-member intelligence community. Improving our language capabilities across the IC so that we can interpret and analyze all of the information coming in. I strongly believe that the language deficit is one of the greatest hindrances our intelligence community has; Reducing our reliance on contractors in the IC. And I believe that those things that have inherently governmental functions should be done, in fact, by government employees; Improving how the IC acquires technical collection systems to prevent the huge cost and schedule overruns that had become the norm, not the exception. So let me say a few words about this nominee. Mr. Gompert has almost 40 years of experience as a national security professional and information technology company executive. Most recently, he was a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation and previously served as the President of RAND Europe. In 2003 he was a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He has been on the faculty of the National Defense University, the United States Naval Academy, and he served on the National Security Council and State Department staffs. So he has experience as a national security analyst in senior White House and State Department positions, where he worked at the intersection of intelligence and policy. Mr. Gompert also worked as an executive in the private sector from 1983 to 1990, where he held Vice Presidential positions at Unisys and at AT&T. These experiences give him a good management expertise and a unique perspective on how to address the challenges lying ahead for the intelligence community. One point I want to draw attention to is Mr. Gompert's written answers to our Committee's pre-hearing questions, where he expressed his views that the current size of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is more or less right. Mr. Gompert wrote in his answer that the ODNI has less than 2 percent of the overall intelligence community employees and less than 1 percent of employees in the IC dedicated to tasks other than those that are part of operational centers like the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Intelligence Council. In fact, two-thirds of ODNI employees are assigned to those operational centers and mission support activities. This Committee has fought hard for resources to give the ODNI the tools it needs to be effective, and we will continue to do so, especially as we prepare for conference negotiations with our House colleagues on the 2010 Intelligence Authorization Bill, which has passed the Senate now and, we hope, can pass the House very soon. With that, I would ask unanimous consent that any opening statements that Members may have or that the witness may have be included in the record in full. And, hearing no objection, so ordered. Mr. Vice President, I'd like to turn it over to you and then ask Mr. Gompert to introduce his family, to welcome them, and let him make a statement if he'd care to. Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, thank you very much. I was actually Vice President of the Alfalfa Club last year, but I'm now Vice Chairman of this Committee and the President of the Alfalfa Club. But never mind---- Chairman Feinstein. But what does that get you, now, Mr. Vice Chairman? Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. It gets me an opportunity to pay a bunch of writers to write a very expensive and, we hope, focused roast of everybody in sight. It's a machine-gun opportunity. [Laughter.] Chairman Feinstein. I won't be in sight. Vice Chairman Bond. We might be able to find a spot for you. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI Vice Chairman Bond. I agree with all that you said about Mr. Gompert. His background is outstanding. We're delighted that he has agreed to take this position. I also join with you in issuing congratulations and I will second that statement that the intelligence community worked together on the recently-announced investigations and the successful dealing with some of the challenges here in the homeland. And that required great cooperation. There still are some more areas we need to work on. Madam Chair, I was disappointed to hear that this Committee was not going to be able to get an opportunity to consider in a classified session some of the provisions in the bill that Judiciary just passed out on the PATRIOT Act, because we have some questions about it and we've heard those from members of the intelligence community. And I would like at least to have our members have an opportunity to discuss some of them before they reach the floor. As one who thinks that the Intelligence Committee is too often bypassed, certainly this Act has great ramifications for the work that the intelligence community does. And I want to make sure we get it right and we don't put unnecessary burdens on the intelligence community in collecting the information that they need. But, with that, I join the Chair in welcoming Mr. Gompert, and we look forward to seeing him often. We always have lots of questions and we welcome your comments and we thank you for taking on these weighty responsibilities. The responsibilities of the DNI and his Principal Deputy, unfortunately, are not matched by a set of clear and complete legal authorities. You've got the responsibility, but not always the authority. I've repeatedly expressed my concern with this disparity, which is the reason I did not vote for the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. For several years now I've been asking your predecessors and past DNIs to tell this Committee which authorities need to be enhanced or clarified. While the Committee has heard general complaints, that's not enough. We cannot change the law unless we understand from your standpoint exactly what the problems are. I hope you will break the tradition of suffering in silence and that you and Director Blair will speak loudly if you believe legislation that we could work on here can help you do your job better. Now, Mr. Gompert, I was heartened by the emphasis that you placed on personal accountability in your written statement and responses to the Committee's questions, when you stated, `Àccountability must include meeting financial commitments and, if confirmed, I would insist on that.'' In this vein, you further noted that, `À budget is a compact whereby a unit can count on an agreed amount of resources and the corporation can count on agreed results, and that overruns are not just accounting entries but have real consequences which, in the national security domain, can be profound.'' I couldn't agree more. I'd hope that if you're confirmed you'll put these words into action and make it your business to instill in the IC greater business discipline and personal accountability, both of which have been sorely lacking in the intelligence community. We have many wonderful people out there who are doing great jobs. But they have to be accountable to the people of America through this Committee and other committees. And we want to assure that accountability. As I'm sure you've learned in your preparation for this hearing, over the last decade, the IC has spent nearly $10 billion on advanced imagery satellites that have never produced a single picture. And that's unacceptable. It's also unacceptable that at the same time millions of taxpayers face increasing economic hardship the IC still cannot produce auditable financial statements detailing how they are spending these tax dollars. Even worse is the fact that the IC does not expect to be able to produce these statements until at least 2015. I doubt that the American family, average American family could survive that long without taking a hard look at their own budget. Now, I don't mean to suggest that the IC is without significant accomplishment. The Committee regularly hears about the successes and the hard work and dedication of IC employees that make those successes possible. Part of our oversight responsibility and a significant part of your responsibilities, if confirmed, will be to ensure that the IC has what it needs to be successful all the time. You'll have your work cut out for you. The Committee's oversight has revealed some stark contrasts within the IC which would be fascinating, but for the fact that our national security is on the line. For example, as I said earlier, the IC is full of talented, brave and dedicated personnel. But it has no discernible culture of personal accountability. The IC recently demonstrated in the Zazi investigation and other counterterrorism successes, as the Chair has indicated and I have endorsed, that they have made real progress in information sharing and interagency cooperation. Yet there are still too many FBI intelligence personnel without easy access to top-secret databases and desktop Internet connections. The IC is capable of technological marvels which have produced a wide array of actionable intelligence for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, most of the IC's major acquisition programs are hugely over cost and behind schedule and, as I noted, some have flat-out failed. As you mentioned in your written responses to this Committee, when it comes to strategic intelligence, the IC failed to warn policymakers of virtually every seismic geopolitical change in the last few decades, including the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of communism, the emergence of the Internet, the rise of jihadism, and last fall's global economic collapse. If you're confirmed, the task of working with the DNI to address these shortcomings will fall on your shoulders. I believe you and I'm confident you're up to the task, and I hope and look forward to you working closely with this Committee as you wade into these issues. I congratulate you on your nomination and look forward to learning more about how you intend to help lead the IC to produce consistently superior results that our nation deserves and demands. With that, I thank you, Madam Chair. And I apologize. I'm going to listen standing up, because I have a bad back and I've been traveling all weekend, and I am a lot more comfortable standing up as I listen to Mr. Gompert. Chairman Feinstein. Sorry to hear that. Vice Chairman Bond. So please don't feel that I'm walking out on you. I'm just standing up for a little pleasure. Thanks. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. Mr. Gompert, if you'd like to introduce your family, and any comments you would make we'd be happy to receive. STATEMENT OF DAVID C. GOMPERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE Mr. Gompert. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond. I'm honored to come before you as the President's nominee for position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I am, as you suggested, very pleased that my family could be here: my son-in-law, Kwan, my daughter Ellie, and my wife Cynthia, who has been with me for decades of public service, and has helped me immeasurably in the service to the American people. Chairman Feinstein. Welcome to your family. We're delighted to have them here. Thank you. Mr. Gompert. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. If confirmed, it will be a privilege to continue that service to the American people, to assist Director Blair and to work with this Committee. The President has stressed the need for first-rate intelligence to keep the nation safe, to inform U.S. policies and to support U.S. troops operating in harm's way. In turn, Admiral Blair has set very demanding standards for the intelligence community and is working tirelessly to transform that community. If confirmed, I'll do my best to meet those very high expectations of the President, of the Director, and of this Committee. My career consists of three decades in national security, a decade in private industry as a senior executive, a record, both in and out of government, of institutional reform and a commitment to objectivity, and, as the Vice Chairman noted, to accountability. I hope you will find that I have the qualifications to fulfill the responsibilities of the Principal Deputy, the most important of which are to ensure that intelligence affecting the nation's safety and matters of war, peace and policy is of the highest quality, reliable, timely, useful, and totally objective, and also to integrate and improve the intelligence community for the future. If confirmed, I would have no higher duty than to do my part to help keep the nation secure from attack. I would also support our national decisionmakers and our military commanders with intelligence of the highest quality. And finally, work to make the intelligence community stronger, by which I mean more agile, more integrated, more collaborative and more resourceful. In approaching these duties, I consider Congressional oversight to be a clear obligation, and much more. That oversight is crucial for earning public trust in U.S. intelligence and for making the intelligence community more effective. If confirmed, you can count on me not only to provide timely and full information, but also actively to seek your counsel and to do whatever I can do to help you fulfill your responsibilities in oversight. So again, Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing at such a busy time for the Senate, and I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Gompert follows:] Prepared Statement of David C. Gompert, Nominee for the Position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am honored to come before you as President Obama's nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI). If I am confirmed, it will be a privilege to serve the Nation in this capacity, to repay the President's confidence in me, to assist Director Blair, and to work with this Committee. I thank Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond for holding today's hearing at a time when Senators have so much on their plates. The President has stressed the importance of high-quality and unbiased intelligence in protecting America, informing U.S. policies and leadership abroad, and supporting U.S. forces serving in harm's way. In turn, Director Blair has set demanding standards for the performance of the Intelligence Community (IC), and is working systematically to transform it, as this Committee has encouraged him to do. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to meet these high expectations and standards. My career can be summed up as three decades of work in national security, senior executive positions in and out of government, a record of institutional reform, experience in exploiting technology for strategic advantage, and a fierce commitment to objectivity. I hope you will find in me both the professional qualifications and personal qualities to fulfill the responsibilities of the PDDNI. Those responsibilities flow from the DNI's, which this Committee has helped conceive and guide. The DNI exists for two fundamental purposes: to ensure that intelligence bearing on the protection of the Nation and on matters of war, peace, and policy is reliable, objective, and timely; and to integrate and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for the future. These purposes require the DNI to organize collaboration and to remove barriers to sharing information throughout the IC and with those who depend on the IC: policy-makers, forces in the field, and those we look to for Homeland defense. In addition, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that intelligence resources, both technical and human, are allocated according to national priorities. To meet pressing and diverse needs in a turbulent world, optimizing IC- wide collection and analytic capabilities is crucial and requires strong DNI leadership. Also, by forming, proposing, and managing an integrated National Intelligence Program, the DNI can assure that investments in improved capabilities are well aligned, that they work together, and that tax dollars are wisely spent to reflect national priorities. This ambitious agenda frames the responsibilities of the PDDNI, whether in assisting or acting for the DNI. The PDDNI's responsibilities are also shaped by the security challenges facing the United States. The foremost challenge is unblinking vigilance against threats of attack on the Homeland. At present, the most acute such threat comes from terrorist groups with strategic aims, strategic reach, and abiding hatred of the United States, the most dangerous of which is al Qa'ida. Beyond warning and preventing attack, we must understand, find, outsmart, strike, cripple, and defeat these terrorists. That they would eagerly use against us any weapon they get their hands on makes this priority all the more compelling. Recent U.S. success against al Qa'ida is a dividend on a more integrated national intelligence effort. Whether on the Afghan- Pakistan border or anywhere else on Earth, the goal of intelligence must be to leave them no place to hide. The second challenge is to prevent and counter the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially by reckless regimes and violent extremists. The recent disclosure of Iran's enrichment facility at Qum underscores that integrated intelligence is a prerequisite of effective counter-proliferation. Iran and North Korea are critical priorities in their own right and because they could spawn further proliferation. The wider challenge is to be able to discover the diversion of fissile material, illicit weapons production, and trafficking in WMD materials and know-how. The third challenge is to comprehend the implications of a changing world--shifting power, emerging threats, economic interdependencies, and new opportunities. China could become a global partner, a rival or both. India has growing capacity and clout, and is strategically located. Cyberspace, health, climate, energy, fragile states, world trade, and financial markets all pose security challenges, thus intelligence challenges. At the same time, more and more countries are willing and able to partner with the United States in tackling these problems. As Director Blair has stressed, good intelligence should illuminate opportunities as well as dangers for U.S. policy and security. Against this background, I would if confirmed have no greater duty than to help keep the United States safe from attack. Even with decisive actions and successful policies abroad, it could take many years to defeat the likes of al Qa'ida. Meanwhile, weapons of mass destruction and delivery means could spread. These conditions place a premium on unimpeded sharing of information, prompt threat assessment, active collaboration, and the setting of clear priorities at every level across the IC. My goal would be to enhance cooperation among all arms of the IC. I would also commit myself, if confirmed, to give our national security decision-makers intelligence on which they can rely. The PDDNI is expected to play a supporting role in the NSC inter-agency process while maintaining strictly the objectivity of intelligence analysis. If confirmed, I would adopt the discipline of explaining what the IC knows in its entirety; what it does not know; what it thinks; what is likely to happen; and what may be unlikely to happen but is very consequential and thus crucial to watch. For these purposes, I would rely on the best intelligence professionals and technologies in the world, making use of secret means while making sense of a growing abundance of open information. I would be as ready to have my thinking challenged as to challenge the thinking of others in the IC. If confirmed, I would also work to make the IC stronger than it is now--more integrated, more agile, and better understood and supported by the public. Stronger also means being more resourceful: exploiting information technology to expand sharing in both intelligence and business functions; creating economies and efficiencies by collaborating; and developing people who can excel in and strengthen such a community. That we are beginning to see a positive return on the effort to transform U.S. intelligence should make us even more determined to press ahead with that transformation, for we have a long way to go. Managing the IC is a challenge. The DNI and PDDNI must accept heavy responsibilities while at the same time empowering the agencies of the IC to facilitate agile operations, encourage initiative, and respond to changing threats and opportunities. The IC's decentralized structure need not be a problem--in fact, it is a strength. Having fifteen of its elements reside within six different departments makes U.S. intelligence more responsive to those who depend on it. Increasingly, these departments are benefiting from the DNI's integrative efforts, and the arrangement of shared authority between the DNI and those department heads is working better and better. Moreover, by organizing cross-agency teaming, such as national intelligence centers and mission management, it is possible to gain the benefits of both integration and decentralization. The imperative of integrated intelligence requires creating shared networks, setting common standards for handling sensitive data, and overcoming cultural barriers. In time, sharing across all intelligence agencies should be institutionalized, resources optimized, operations harmonized, and the Nation made safer with less need for DNI insistence and intervention. Meanwhile, it is up to the DNI and PDDNI to create conditions so that responsibility remains clear, the power of decentralization is fostered, the hardest challenges are tackled by cross-agency teaming, and collaboration becomes the norm. To me, the Intelligence Community's oversight by and cooperation with Congress are not only obligatory but also crucial for maintaining public trust and for the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence. Trust between the American people and their Intelligence Community is critical because of the secrecy that must surround its work, the potency of its tools, natural concerns about privacy and civil liberties, and the consequences of intelligence failure. Key to building public trust is the IC's accountability, both to the President as the executive and to the Congress as the people's representatives. Moreover, a close working relationship with Congress will make the IC better at meeting the dangers the Nation faces. Strengthening this relationship is a major responsibility of the PDDNI. It requires not only furnishing timely, full, and reliable information on significant matters to Congress but also inviting your counsel and your concerns. This DNI has made clear to the entire IC, and to me, the importance he places on communications and cooperation with Congress. He and I both believe that the IC benefits from your oversight. If confirmed, I will make myself fully available to you and will actively seek your views. This is both a critical and a formative time for U.S. intelligence. Success requires that the leaders of the IC work to build the confidence of the American people. Director Blair has said that he wants to increase public understanding of, trust in and admiration for the Intelligence Community and its talented and dedicated people--the way our military has earned such respect. If confirmed, I will join him in that effort. The way we work with and answer to this Committee can be instrumental to that purpose. Again, Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and thanks to all Members for considering my nomination. I welcome your questions. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Gompert. I have just, first of all, some very precise but rudimentary questions that we ask every witness. Yes or no will suffice. Do you agree to appear before the Committee, here or in other venues, when invited? Mr. Gompert. Yes, I do, Madam Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to appear before the Committee and designated staff when requested? Mr. Gompert. Yes, I do, Madam Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents and any other material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Mr. Gompert. Yes, I do. Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that your respective offices provide such material to the Committee when requested? Mr. Gompert. I will do so, Madam Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. You're batting 100 percent so far. Thank you. Mr. Gompert, could you describe how you and Director Blair will be sharing and dividing responsibilities, if you are confirmed? And let me give you just a couple of specifics. I understand you may assist Director Blair by briefing policymakers, so that he'll be able to focus on the so-called ``big picture'' issues. Is that correct? Secondly, who will be briefing the President each morning? And thirdly, who will be coming to Congress to testify on oversight hearings? Mr. Gompert. Madam Chairman, from the day he asked if I could take this position, if nominated, Director Blair and I have been discussing what an appropriate and helpful division of labor would be. What we've worked out, and what he's decided upon, is a little bit different than you often see with regard to the number one and number two person in a large government organization. Often the number one person is engaged primarily in external work--in the case of intelligence, in participating in the interagency policy process--and the number two is much more of an internal manager. Director Blair has decided on a somewhat different division of labor in our case, given my broad background in national security, including policymaking and bringing intelligence to bear on the policy process. He feels that I could be of greatest use to him, to the community, and to the nation by being heavily involved in the interagency process--bringing our intelligence products to bear on policymaking. That would give him that much more time to concentrate on the daunting task of transforming and integrating the intelligence community. Now, having said that, Madam Chairman, I do want to stress that both of us have responsibilities that cut across the entire intelligence community, both internal and external. I have management duties; I will be will be chairing various committees; I will certainly be mindful of the needs to continue to develop our personnel. So I will have many internal responsibilities. But to answer your question directly, I think I'll be mostly working the `òutside beat,'' if I can put it that way. Chairman Feinstein. The `òutside beat,'' or the inside beat? What you're saying is, how intelligence affects policies. Mr. Gompert. That's correct. Chairman Feinstein. So does this mean you'd do the President's PDB? Mr. Gompert. On the President's PDB, the Director is the chief adviser to the President on---- Chairman Feinstein. So he will do that. Mr. Gompert [continuing]. On matters of intelligence, and he would certainly continue to do that. Of course, in his absence, I would be present for that briefing. Chairman Feinstein. And he would continue, then, to regularly brief the Intelligence Committees? Mr. Gompert. Yes, he would. But there is one area in which he has stressed to me that we would not have a division of labor, and that is with regard to the Congress and to this Committee. We would both regard that as important responsibilities. So you will see a great deal of both of us--certainly no less of him, and a good deal of me. Chairman Feinstein. Give me an example of what you would do where intelligence meets the road of policy. Mr. Gompert. I would first see to it that all of the intelligence capabilities that we can bring to bear--collection capabilities, as well as analytic capabilities throughout the intelligence community--are brought to bear on whatever policy question is presented. I would guarantee, of course, that the intelligence effort not wander across the line between the provision of objective intelligence and policy advocacy. That's an extremely important line. Chairman Feinstein. Well, let me be clear. For example, what to do in Afghanistan. Would it be your responsibility, then, to assemble all of the relevant intelligence for the President to consider in making his decision with respect to General McChrystal's recommendations? Mr. Gompert. Yes. On a matter of such tremendous national importance, certainly both the DNI and the Principal Deputy would be deeply involved in collecting and synthesizing the intelligence for the President for such a decision. And, in fact, Director Blair has been extremely busy doing precisely that over recent weeks as the President has faced this decision. But this is not something that the Director would delegate to me. On a matter of that importance, we would both be heavily involved. Chairman Feinstein. On the subject of contractors, I think our Committee has been very outspoken on the need to reduce the IC's reliance on contractors. We have doubled the cut in the authorization bill from five to 10 percent. I'm encouraged by your written questions that contractors should be used less, and my specific question is exactly how do you prepare to proceed, because the number of contractors used by these agencies is astronomic. Mr. Gompert. Well, Madam Chairman, the Committee is quite right to raise this question because there has been substantial growth, really since the end of the 1990s. We dipped down in terms of our head count in the first decade after the Cold War and then, finding all of the intelligence demands we face, we found that the quickest way to meet those demands was not by growing our professional staff but by going out and contracting work. And the pendulum is swinging back in the other direction, as well it should. One specific thing that I will do that I think will move the pendulum in the right direction is every time someone approaches me and says that we have to use a contractor because we lack certain governmental capabilities to perform a task, the question I will ask is should we have those capabilities. Should we have provided those capabilities? And what steps do we have to take, including coming to Congress, to ensure that we build those capabilities for the future so we're never in a situation where we must use contractors for lack of government capabilities? While that's true in general, it is all the more true when we talk about inherently governmental functions and other critical and sensitive functions that the government and only the government should perform. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. The Chair mentioned Afghanistan, so I thought I'd ask you if you believe you have enough intelligence, based on your experience and what you may have learned about Afghanistan. Do you have a view on whether the United States would see the Taliban, if they were to regain a substantial foothold in Afghanistan, providing safe haven for armed groups including al-Qa'ida, as they did during their short reign from the late 1990s until 2001? Mr. Gompert. Mr. Vice Chairman, I do have some experience with Afghanistan. I've been there---- Vice Chairman Bond. I know you have. Mr. Gompert [continuing]. A number of times, I think the first time was in 1974. I have not, however, been involved in the preparation of any intelligence materials, let alone in the process that Director Blair has been involved in with the NSC on Afghanistan. So I would have no basis for commenting on---- Vice Chairman Bond. That's why I asked. That's the kind of question that probably the next time you come before the Committee you will be asked about. Mr. Gompert [continuing]. Absolutely. Vice Chairman Bond. That's just a heads up. Those are the kinds of things, if you're representing the DNI, we want to know. I mentioned the lack of explicit legislative authority and, in the answers to questions about working with the IC, you conclude that the arrangement currently under way `àppears to be working well and steadily improving.'' Do you have any concern that things seem to be working well now because of the good personal relationships which could quickly change? We think there's great personal compatibility in working coordination. If those personalities were not there, would the DNI be able to function as effectively as we hope he functions now? Mr. Gompert. Vice Chairman, I think that's an extremely important question because we are blessed by having personalities in the intelligence community and the departments that have elements of the intelligence community who know how to make things work. I've known both Director Blair and Secretary Gates for decades and these two leaders have certainly helped to produce a much improved relationship between the military side and the civilian side. The key is not to depend upon personalities and personal harmony, because you're not always going to have it. When you do have it, as we do now, it is important to institutionalize this relationship. So what I've looked at carefully with regard to the relationship between the Defense Department and its intelligence elements and the rest of the intelligence community is, are we institutionalizing this good relationship. And I think the answer is yes, we are with regard to the allocation of resources, the setting of priorities and so on. Vice Chairman Bond. I would ask, if you see that additional authorities are needed, I would ask you to share those views with the Committee, even if there may be others in the Administration who do not agree with them. Would you be so kind as to share those views with us? Mr. Gompert. Yes, I would, sir. As I've said, my in-going position is that we have the authorities we need, and if that proves to be inadequate, I would not hesitate with the Director to come back to you and take you up on your offer. Vice Chairman Bond. Well, let me get right to the heart of the matter. The DNI has no budget authority over the Military Intelligence Program or MIP, but significant portions of the National Intelligence Program, NIP, budget directly support military operations to Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, and the DOD exercises considerable influence over NIP budget and acquisition decisions. Do you think the DNI should have greater authority to influence the MIP, at least as much influence as the Secretary of Defense exercises in the NIP? Mr. Gompert. One of the important officials in the intelligence community in this regard is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, currently retired General Clapper. And that official occupies a very important position on the question you raise because he in a way is the portal of the DNI and the PDDNI into the Defense Department and into the Military Intelligence Program. So we count on the Under Secretary to ensure that the views of national intelligence, as articulated by the Director and the Principal Deputy, are in fact communicated as the Military Intelligence Program is formulated within the defense budget. You're right to say that there is no control exercised by the DNI over the Military Intelligence Program. But I believe that we do have the opportunity to have considerable influence on it. So I will watch that very closely, and if I judge that, because of a lack of authority in that regard, working through the Under Secretary for Intelligence, that there's something else we should do to bring about greater harmony than we currently have, then again, with the Director, I would not hesitate to come back and talk to you about it, Senator. Vice Chairman Bond. I would just suggest that you follow the admonition of a leader a few years ago who said trust but verify. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. Senator Feingold. Senator Feingold. I thank the Chair and thank you, Mr. Gompert, for your willingness to serve in this position for which you are clearly qualified, and I really did appreciate the meeting we had last week and just want to quickly revisit a few of the issues we discussed, starting with Congressional notification, including statutory notification obligations. After our meeting, did you have a chance to look at the National Security Act, and, if so, do you agree that the provision authorizing the so-called Gang of Eight notifications appears only in the section of the law related to covert action? Mr. Gompert. Yes, Senator, I did go back and study the language and also spend some time with the General Counsel discussing this. And you're absolutely right that that particular method of consultation is covered under Section 503 and not under 502. In discussing this with counsel, the view there is that the fact that it is not covered explicitly under 502 neither mandates the use of that particular method nor precludes the use of that particular method, and that, therefore, from the point of view of our General Counsel, the fact that there has been a practice of applying the method specified by 503 also to activities other than covert activities suggests that it is a reasonable interpretation. But, Senator, I acknowledge that it does appear in one section and not in the other section. Senator Feingold. I appreciate that. And you know my view that I don't think it's a reasonable approach to statutory interpretation to say that somehow you can import that language into another amendment that isn't there and that that isn't a prohibition. But you've been fair in responding. Let me take this tack. Would you agree with Director Blair that this would only give the DNI a degree of latitude with regard to how and when, not whether, the full Committee should be notified? And would you agree that months and years of keeping the Committee in the dark, as was the case with the warrantless wiretapping program, certainly exceeds whatever such authorities might exist? Mr. Gompert. Yes, Senator, I certainly agree with Director Blair that this is not a matter of whether there's an obligation to provide full and current notification, but how it's provided. As to the question of oversight and notification and the sharing of information in general, I feel quite strongly that this is a matter of obligation, but not only a matter of obligation, that the intelligence community has to constantly work to earn public confidence and public trust. It's in the nature of our work that we have to work very hard to that end. And I think that being open with you and full and timely in that openness is really an important aspect of winning and keeping that public trust, and also in permitting you to perform your oversight duties, which in turn, I believe, helps us be more effective. So to me, it's not only a question of are we absolutely obligated, but should we--above and beyond our obligations, is it in the interest of the country to do so? Senator Feingold. I appreciate that, and we'll get back to the issue about notification over time. You said that in setting--on a different issue--in setting intelligence community priorities, ``the immediate should not overwhelm the future.'' And, as you know, I've long shared these concerns. I also know that you have particular responsibilities for meeting the intelligence needs of policymakers, who, as we all know, are inevitably focused on current crises often rather than long-term or long-range strategic threats. So how is the Deputy DNI an interlocutor with these policymakers? Will you try to overcome this persistent problem? Mr. Gompert. The problem, as I see it, is that there's a very strong current demand from the policy community and from our military commanders for intelligence collection and analysis on immediate problems. This does not mean that our commanders and our decisionmakers are shortsighted, but this is really what they most need. Therefore, it is really up to the leadership of the intelligence community--and by this, I mean not only the Director and the Principal Deputy Director, but all the leaders throughout the intelligence community who command both collection and analysis resources--to realize that we have a duty to perform strategic analysis, to look at the issues that could become major national security problems in the future, even if they aren't today, to perform strategic warning, and also to look at things that would be of great consequence even if they may not seem very probable. So the first point is that we have to accept that it is our responsibility to do that even if it is not in response to immediate demand. Second, we have to allocate resources accordingly. And again, resources will tend to flow toward where the demand is the greatest and the loudest. And we are going to have to fence off the analytical capacity and use our intelligence-gathering capabilities to address these long-term questions, some of which are at least as complex if not more complex than some of the immediate problems we face. I think that, when you look back over decades, we've missed some very important developments, watershed developments, that may not have seemed likely before they happened, but if we had only listened to that one dissenting voice, if we had paid attention more to what might change all of our assumptions, we might have been better prepared. So it is a struggle. I have discovered, though, in my preparations for this confirmation, in talking to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and our NIOs, that there is a keen awareness of this. There has recently been stood up a unit specifically for long-term analysis. There is a growing commitment to working a variety of issues where the intelligence community may not be active in gathering information because it's all out there in the public domain, but in assessing that information and getting it to policymakers in a form that they can use to take preventive action. So I sense that the intelligence community, for all of the immediate pressures we face, is mindful of your admonition in this regard, and they'll certainly hear it from me as well. Senator Feingold. I really appreciate that answer. And I thank the Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Gompert. Thank you for your willingness to take on this task. And I must say I particularly appreciate your administrative and management background. As you probably know, there are very significant acquisitions programs which, in the covert world, do not benefit from daylight, public oversight, press scrutiny and other things. And I think your attention to some of these classified programs and the manner in which they are pursued will be very helpful. Every agency risks becoming the captive of its contractors. And in the dark areas of our national security program, that concern is, I think, particularly acute. And your experience in that area will be helpful. One of the problems that you will encounter--with me, anyway--is the question of declassification. As you are aware, there is such a thing as a declassifier in the United States government, somebody who can utter essentially any secret, and instead of having divulged it or revealed it, they have declassified it. And all of those people are presently in the executive branch of government. And, regrettably, in recent years that fact has been used to rhetorical advantage, even at considerable cost in misleading the American public about what the actual facts are. As somebody who has spent a good deal of his life in a courtroom, I will tell you I feel intense personal frustration when I know facts that would rebut a case that an Administration is making, and they've declassified their side of the argument and kept mine classified, and I have to keep my peace even though the public is being misled. I think there's something that we now need to do about that. I think that horse is out of the barn. There's no Administration that will ever unlearn what the previous Administration learned in terms of that capability. And I just want to let you know that I think that's an issue that we need to work on. I'm not quite sure what the solution is. But to the extent that, among the rival branches of government, the executive branch has that power unilaterally, the desire and the reward of using it, I think, will continue to prove irresistible. And in my view, it has led to very, very substantial misapprehensions of what circumstances are by the American people, because they've frankly been fooled. And we haven't had the chance to explain things more clearly because of that declassification muzzle that we've been under. So I look forward to working with you on that. The third topic that I think is of key interest where you have considerable background and interest is in maintaining our cybersecurity. You mentioned in your testimony China in particular as a threat that is constantly, I think you said, exerting its power in cyberspace. And I would like to hear your thoughts on where we stand, both in terms of policy, preparedness, and resources to deal with the cyber challenge, bearing in mind that this is a public forum. Mr. Gompert. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate the strong views that you shared with me with regard to acquisition policy and results and also with regard to the need for objectivity--strict objectivity--with regard to declassification. I will heed both of those comments and be happy to come back and discuss with you whether you think there's more that I can do on those points. Senator Whitehouse. As long as you're aware of them as a matter of concern, and I'm sure you are on the first one, I wanted to highlight for you the second one because, as I said, as somebody who's used to the give-and-take of argument in courtrooms, in politics and a variety of other forums, the idea of being muzzled when you know things that should be in the debate is deeply frustrating, particularly when it leads to the public being misled. But back to cyber. Mr. Gompert. Right. Well, Senator, I don't think I can assure you that this country or, for that matter, this government has achieved a satisfactory ability to defend all of its networks. We've seen such a remarkably rapid growth of information networking of all forms, especially the Internet, to the point where we are heavily dependent and, by virtual of that dependence, also vulnerable. So I think we have to face that. You know, we're vulnerable to the exploitation of, interference with, and disruption of information on which we rely vitally as a country and on which each individual relies vitally. So we need to start with that understanding, and I think there is a broad understanding now within the executive branch and with the Congress and, increasingly, within the industry itself to that effect. I think it's important to establish responsibilities, which is not easy because the starting point is that every organization that manages, designs, or operates a network has the responsibility for the integrity and security of that network. Cyber security is not something that you can appoint somebody to take care of and then the rest of us can forget about because all of us who use networks and, certainly, all who control networks have that responsibility. For the government, the responsibility falls heavily to the Department of Homeland Security for the non-national security networks and non-national security information. And I'm told that the Department of Homeland Security is ramping up significantly its capabilities to improve network defense for such government networks and to work with other network providers where critical infrastructure is concerned. Whether they have enough capability at this particular stage, I can't say, but I can say that they are growing that capability rapidly. On the national security side, of course, we have considerably more capability, both in the defense establishment and in the intelligence community. Our responsibility, along with our defense colleagues, is the security of our national defense and intelligence networks, and I believe--in fact, I know there's excellent cooperation between DoD and the intelligence community on the security of the networks on which we rely for national security functions. It doesn't mean that we should not be concerned about those networks, but we've got excellent capabilities in this regard. The intelligence community does have important responsibilities. One, of course, is to ensure the cyber security of the intelligence community's own networks. But the other responsibility is in threat assessment. We're responsible for assessing the threat not only to the intelligence community's networks but to our national security networks, other government networks, and, indeed, those throughout the country where we have important information about the growth of one or another kind of threat. The intelligence community has the responsibility to share that information, again, as you suggested, consistent with concerns about classification. So we take very seriously--and I would, if confirmed, take very seriously--that larger responsibility in cyber security. I think that the Administration will be appointing a coordinator. I've heard that this position will be filled. I think that's a good step. I think that's important not only for bringing about greater harmony and some standards across government networks but also speaking to the country at large about the importance of cyber security and the responsibilities that all users bear. I hope that's responsive to your question. I'd be happy to go further. Chairman Feinstein. It was substantial in length, if not in responsiveness. In any event--no, I didn't mean that as a knock. I just meant it as a friendly comment. I want to go back to why the DNI was authorized in the first place. And I think both Senator Bond and I were on the Committee at that time. There was real concern about the sharing, about the need to transform the intelligence agencies from a CIA/KGB mentality into this new asymmetric world to be able to engage in cultures where we had not previously engaged. We found that the intelligence community was intensely territorial and competitive. And, therefore, the creation of one overarching authority that could, in fact, move the deck chairs on the Titanic, so to speak, but could better coordinate, better direct, better see that intelligence needs were fulfilled was important. It was not meant to interfere with the operations of any department, particularly the CIA. The question I want to ask is, if you look at the DNI's budget today, it's getting very big. And I'm concerned that the original intent is subsumed into a much broader agenda. And I really don't want to see that happen. How would you work to prevent it from happening? Mr. Gompert. Well, Madam Chairman, just a couple comments, if I may, first of all. Chairman Feinstein. Sure. Mr. Gompert. I think significant progress has been made toward exactly the vision of the DNI and of the intelligence community that you had and that the Senate had in its role in conceiving and launching the DNI. I do not believe--in fact, I'm absolutely sure from all of my discussions with Director Blair and his chief lieutenants-- that there is any interest in going beyond that vision, none whatsoever. He has those overarching authorities and oversight responsibilities, as you suggested, and he also has the responsibility to make the community more collaborative, as you suggested. But as to micromanaging the activities of various agencies--16, for that matter--there is no interest in doing that and, really, no significant capability to do that. When you think about the size of the ODNI staff, I would point out, as you yourself suggested, Madam Chairman, that two-thirds of the folks on the ODNI staff are performing line intelligence activities that are best organized at the IC level and, therefore, report to the Director, like the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterintelligence Center, and the National Counterproliferation Center. The actual staff of the Director is 500 to 600 people which, given the size and the decentralized nature and the diversity of the intelligence community and the need to transform it, does not strike me as an excessive staff at all and certainly not an indication that any of us would want to overstep the important line that you suggested between oversight and integration on the one hand and the management of operations on the other. Chairman Feinstein. One of my concerns is the inability to get human intelligence that is of the culture, of the languages. And we note that progress is extraordinarily slow in that regard. Do you have any positive suggestions that might encourage greater progress? Mr. Gompert. I would certainly start by looking at the language deficit that you mentioned. Part of learning a language is learning the context of that language and learning the culture. It doesn't do you any good just to learn the grammar and vocabulary if you don't really understand that culture. So I consider language training and education to be of critical importance. We have to recognize that we may not have all we need, but as part of that effort we should also be improving the cultural awareness and sensitivity and ability to operate throughout the intelligence community. Chairman Feinstein. I mean practical suggestions. Mr. Gompert. I would like to discuss that, if I could, with our chief of human capital and find out what I could do that would be most helpful to the Director and to our human capital people and then come back to you with something more concrete, if I could, Madam Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. Well, we will schedule that. I will not forget that. So I'd very much appreciate it if you would do that, because I think we have pushed on this for at least six years now and it's excruciatingly slow. And to have major platforms in Islamic countries where so few of the people speak the language I think is really not effective. So we will be very interested in your observations and your recommendations. Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Just a couple of questions I wanted to follow up on in answer to the Chair's first question. You talked about the division of responsibility with the DNI--briefing Presidents and attending meetings, which too many of us are plagued with meetings. We find that that is one of the most infectious diseases up here for which there's been no vaccine developed. But we have heard complaints from the working-level DNI staff and seen examples where the pressing daily requirements on the DNI to brief the President and the Congress and attending meetings with interagency senior leadership has not allowed enough attention to be paid to day-to-day staff management, resulting in inertia, stalemates on important policy and oversight issues--things that need to be settled by someone with authority. Now, will the DNI be focusing on that or will you be focusing on it? Apparently we hear there's a problem. Which one of you is going to solve it? Mr. Gompert. It sounds to me, Mr. Vice Chairman, that it's a problem that both of us will have to work on, because we both need to manage the external demands on the community and the DNI staff. And certainly we both have those management responsibilities. But I know that the sort of concerns that you have expressed would be of great concern to the DNI. I'll report those to him and one or both of us would return to you with some evaluation of that and comment on what we can do to lessen the daily load and pay more attention to the long-term stability of the staff and its work. Vice Chairman Bond. Nothing personal, but based on a little experience I've had in management, I want the belly-button solution. I want to know who's taking primary responsibility for it, because if we continue to hear it, I want to know one person whose belly button I should point to to ask that question. Would you let us know how you and the DNI choose to handle it and who's going to be focusing on that? Mr. Gompert. Well, since I'm here, Vice Chairman, I can volunteer this belly button. And if the Director says, ``No, I will take it,'' then we will let you know that he is taking it. Vice Chairman Bond. You've got the belly button until we hear of a hand-off. Mr. Gompert. Yes, sir. Vice Chairman Bond. I want to ask you one other question that's a particular interest of mine, and that is information on energy. Energy security is, I think, a vital concern these days, because, as we all know, tremendous amounts of the fuel that we currently use is controlled by people who are not friendly to the United States in varying degrees--some of them being near zero on the friendliness scale. And we need to have better information, because energy can be used as a tool for major foreign policy initiatives; it can be used as a direct weapon--cutoff of energy supplies can be almost as effective as a cyber attack or a military attack. And the previous DNI claimed that the NIO for economics was the quarterback, yet when we informed this officer of the DNI's view, she was surprised that that was her responsibility. Do you think energy security is an area that could benefit from formal mission management; and do you see any analogy between the role of a combat commander and that of an IC mission manager? How important do you think that is? What degree of emphasis do you think that particular area should consume? Mr. Gompert. Vice Chairman, I think it warrants a great deal of attention--more than it has had in the past. Now, there are two aspects of this on which the intelligence community should especially concentrate. One has to do with the technical aspects of it. My understanding is that the intelligence unit--the analytic unit--within the Department of Energy is doing more on the question of energy security from the point of view of the economic and technical aspects. The other aspect, as you alluded to it, is that energy insecurity may result from political instability or manipulation on the part of states--either weak states or unfriendly states. So that aspect also must be addressed by the intelligence community, starting with our analysts in the CIA and our National Intelligence Council. I did raise this in my discussions in preparation for this hearing with the National Intelligence Council. And the strong impression I had is that they are devoting more attention to this and will continue to do so because of the great concerns that you and others have registered about it. Vice Chairman Bond. I think that's something we'll have continuing discussions about with you. And I thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. My final question, Mr. Gompert. We've had, on the Intelligence Committee, considerable-- we've experienced, I guess, considerable dismay at the news reports of classified information, very often attributed to present or former executive branch officials. And some of the leaks have been of information that at least when presented to us has been presented in a very high security context with staff, you know, required to leave the room and things like that. Then the next thing you know, a newspaper has it. The intelligence community has profited, I believe, very considerably from the teamwork and coordination of different services and different elements of the intelligence community and I'd like your thoughts on two things. One, how significant at this point do you consider the problem of leakage out of our covert agencies to be; and two, if you consider it to be a problem that merits serious attention, would the strategies of interagency coordination and so forth that have proven so valuable in intelligence gathering be applicable in this area, so that prosecutors who might have to look at these cases, FBI agents who might have to investigate these cases, counterintelligence folks in the covert community who might have to screen them to protect the integrity of the agency secrets, H.R. people who have to deal with what folks' rights are who may be under a cloud of suspicion could all be brought together and in a more coordinated way try to take a better look at this? There seems to be a lot of people standing around in the outfield with the balls falling between them right now. Mr. Gompert. Well, over 30 years of service in national security I've developed a very low tolerance for leaks of classified information. Senator Whitehouse. Well, you're in for a treat then. Mr. Gompert. I'm not sure, Senator, that I see it getting worse. I'm not sure that I would say that it is worse in one part of the executive branch than it is in another. Leaks are harmful and they seem to be inherent, but should not be tolerated. So I feel very strongly about that. Whether the particular method that you have suggested would pay off in practical terms I would like to give some thought to. What you're suggesting is---- Senator Whitehouse. If you don't mind, take that as a question for the record and get back to me, because it's much a proposal as it is a question. But it does strike me that this is one of those things where everybody talks about it and everybody has strong opinion about it, but nobody ever does anything about it. And when you see places where there should be coordination--for instance, between the intelligence community and the Department of Justice when it comes to prosecution-- that handoff should be a pretty seamless one; and yet there's a chasm between the two agencies about what each reports about the other's performance across that linkage, which causes me to think that some of those techniques and strategies of coordination might be useful in this area. Mr. Gompert [continuing]. I will certainly get back to you after discussing the idea and give you my opinion about it, including whether and how we might be able to move it forward. Senator Whitehouse. I appreciate that. Thank you, sir. And again, thank you for your willingness to serve in this capacity. And my congratulations and respect to your family for the long hours and late nights and stresses and strains that they will share with you, without compensation, as members of your family. Mr. Gompert. Thank you very much, Senator. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse. Mr. Gompert, the Committee will be sending you additional questions for the record. I'd like to ask all members through their staffs here today to have any questions submitted by noon on Friday so that we can send them to the nominee. I agree with those who have pointed out that you are clearly qualified--dramatically so. I do not foresee any problems, but who knows. In any event, we'd like to thank you; we'd like to thank your family. And thank you also for the service you are about to render. We very much appreciate it and this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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