Open Hearing: Nomination of Matthew Olsen to be Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

[Senate Hearing 112-308] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] S. Hrg. 112-308 NOMINATION OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 72-744 WASHINGTON : 2012 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland DANIEL COATS, Indiana BILL NELSON, Florida ROY BLUNT, Missouri KENT CONRAD, North Dakota MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK UDALL, Colorado MARK WARNER, Virginia HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio ---------- David Grannis, Staff Director Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- JULY 26, 2011 OPENING STATEMENTS Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1 Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 3 Conrad, Hon. Kent, a U.S. Senator from North Dakota.............. 5 WITNESS Olsen, Matthew G., Director-Designate, National Counter-Terrorism Center......................................................... 6 Prepared statement........................................... 9 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Letter Dated July 22, 2011, from William Lynn to Senator Dianne Feinstein...................................................... 15 Letter Dated July 22, 2011, from Keith Alexander to Senator Dianne Feinstein............................................... 16 Letter Dated July 20, 2011, from Mike McConnell to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss........................... 18 Letter Dated July 20, 2011, from Michael Mukasey to Senator Dianne Feinstein............................................... 20 Letter Dated July 14, 2011, from David S. Kris to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss.................................. 22 Letter Dated July 15, 2011, from Michael Leiter to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss........................... 23 Letter Dated July 21, 2011, from Kenneth Wainstein to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss........................... 25 Letter Dated July 22, 2011, from Timothy J. Heaphy to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss........................... 28 Letter Dated July 25, 2011, from J. Patrick Rowan to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss........................... 30 Letter Dated July 25, 2011, from Matthew W. Friedrich to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss........................... 32 Letter Dated July 14, 2011, from Frank R. Wolf to Senator Dianne Feinstein...................................................... 33 Letter Dated July 21, 2011, from Frank R. Wolf to Senator Dianne Feinstein...................................................... 65 Letter Dated July 22, 2010, from Ronald Weich to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss.................................. 79 Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 98 Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 207 Letter from Don W. Fox, Office of Government Ethics, Dated July 11, 2011, to Senator Dianne Feinstein Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report.................................... 231 NOMINATION OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN TO BE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER ---------- TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in Room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Mikulski, Conrad, Udall of Colorado, Warner, Chambliss, Snowe, and Coats. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order. The process will be as follows: I will make some remarks. The Vice Chairman will make some remarks. We will then call on the distinguished Senator from North Dakota for remarks. And then we will proceed. I trust that is agreeable with everybody. The Committee meets today to consider the President's nomination of Matt Olsen to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Mr. Olsen is currently the general counsel of the National Security Agency, and he's held a number of senior positions in the Department of Justice, including the National Security Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Olsen has appeared as a witness before this Committee previously, and he has frequently briefed members and staff over the last several years. I'd like to welcome him back to this Committee. I'd like to begin today by discussing the current terrorist threat and the role of what we call NCTC, which Mr. Olsen will be leading, if confirmed. The NCTC is the central agency within the United States government dealing with the identification, prevention, disruption and analysis of terrorist threats. It's very important. While it's best known for its role in consolidating and analyzing terrorism-related intelligence, it also plays an important role in conducting strategic planning for counterterrorism actions across our government. The NCTC grew significantly in size, capability and maturity under the previous Director, Michael Leiter. Its successes and those of the broader counterterrorism community include numerous terrorist plots that were thwarted, both here at home and abroad. NCTC has also achieved less noticed but equally important advances in the sharing of threat information across the intelligence community--a streamlining, if you will, of intelligence, an improved watch-listing capability, and greatly improved analytic capability. Despite improvements and reforms, especially in response to the findings and recommendations of this Committee and others after the Christmas Day attempted attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, I'm still very concerned about the possibility of terrorist attacks against the United States. I believe this is a very critical time. The period leading up to the 10th anniversary of 9/11 is a period of heightened threat. Despite counterterrorism pressure against al-Qa'ida in Pakistan, including the successful strike against Usama bin Ladin in Abbottabad, the group remains dangerous and vengeful. At the same time, the threat from al-Qa'ida's affiliates and adherents around the world has increased and presents particular challenges. I'm especially concerned about the threat to the United States homeland from al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula--AQAP, we call it--as well as threats emanating from terrorist safe havens in Somalia and elsewhere. This means, at least to me, that this is a crucial time for our counterterrorism establishment to be at full strength and not to be leaderless. NCTC is a linchpin of this establishment. So I'm very pleased that the President has moved quickly to nominate Mr. Olsen, an individual serving in a senior intelligence community position today, to take the helm of this organization. Let me take just a moment to read the first paragraph from a letter of support for Mr. Olsen's nomination, written by General Keith Alexander, the Director of the National Security Agency. `Ì am writing to wholeheartedly endorse the nomination of Matthew G. Olsen to be the next Director of the NCTC. Matt has served as the National Security Agency's general counsel for the past year and has shown true leadership, outstanding judgment and decisionmaking ability. He's been a key part of the agency's efforts to provide intelligence that allows our government to counter terrorist threats. In my opinion, Matt is superbly qualified to hold this critical intelligence community position.'' Before his current position at NSA, Mr. Olsen served in the Department of Justice for 18 years, including 12 years as a federal prosecutor. In a letter of support for Mr. Olsen's nomination, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey wrote of Mr. Olsen, ``He was not only an excellent lawyer and manager, but also an exemplary person in dealing with his colleagues. Matt has, in abundance, every personal and professional quality and skill you could hope to find in a nominee to head the NCTC. His nomination has my unqualified support.'' And finally, there is a letter from Mike McConnell in which he also offers his strongest possible support. `Às a 44-year veteran serving the nation as a member of the intelligence community, I had many opportunities to work with professionals of the Department of Justice. This was particularly true when serving as the Director of the National Security Agency and as the Director of National Intelligence. During those years of service, I never met or served with a more accomplished or dedicated professional than Matt Olsen. He understands the IC, its processes and procedures, and has served with distinction.'' Well, I can go on and on, and I have many more pages here. I'm not going to do it. Suffice it to say that I believe that we have an extraordinarily qualified professional which can step into the leadership of NCTC and, at this very potentially vulnerable period, provide it with the leadership it really does deserve and merit. So, with that, Mr. Vice Chairman, may I ask you to make your remarks? Thank you. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Olsen, congratulations on being nominated to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Thank you for your service to this country, especially in some very demanding roles over the last several years, and we also welcome your family and thank them for their great support to you and thus to our country. So we appreciate that very much. I also want to just say a special word of thanks to Mike Leiter, who you're going to be succeeding. You and I talked about this the other day. You and Mike are good friends. You know the kind of leadership he's provided in some very difficult circumstances. And while we've still had some growing pains at NCTC, Mike has brought us through some very tough times and I think has kind of righted the ship at times when it headed in a wrong direction. And I'm very appreciative of Mike's service and of his leadership. Mr. Olsen, your nomination comes at a critical point in our history in our fight against terrorism. While we've made considerable progress against al-Qa'ida in the FATA, we face growing threats as al-Qa'ida continues to spread. In my view, AQAP in Yemen poses the biggest threat to our safety and I urge you to make dismantling that group your primary focus before they strike us successfully here at home. This past spring brought immense changes to the Middle East, but it remains unclear what effect this may have on our long-term counterterrorism efforts. This uncertainty is further complicated by our own current fiscal condition, where resource constraints will undoubtedly impact our national defense and counterterrorism enterprise. Amid these new threats it is critical to our national security that the NCTC fully perform its mission. You and I have talked about some of the failings leading up to the Christmas Day bombing attempt, especially NCTC's inability to connect the dots. While there has been much progress, a lot of work remains, including on information-sharing and detainee and data retention. Whether it is an attack or an imminent threat like 12-25 or Times Square, you will often be the first point of contact with this Committee. We will expect your unvarnished analytic judgments, the facts and frank assessments. In the past, efforts to control the message for political purposes have resulted in Congress being given little or inaccurate information. That's not pointing a finger at this administration; it's happened in other administrations. As the NCTC Director, you will be expected to be forthright with this Committee and to push back on any effort to keep information from us. Along these same lines, I have shared with you some of my concerns about the recommendations made by the Guantanamo Review Task Force, which you directed. It disturbs me that under your leadership detainees were transferred or recommended for transfer to Yemen throughout 2009, even as the intelligence community warned the administration about the security situation there. We already knew that former Gitmo detainees were in AQAP leadership in Yemen, but it was only after AQAP's failed Christmas Day attack that the transfers stopped. In my mind this was an unacceptable risk for us to take. You mentioned in my office the pressure on the task force, in part because you were guided by the executive order on closing Gitmo. I suspect that the one-year deadline for closing Gitmo affected task force analysis and decisions. When the only original two options for each detainee were prosecution or transfer, it seems like there would have been significant pressure to lean towards transfer. I wonder if this explains why, after the initial task force review found 92 detainees suitable for transfer, a second review came up with 40 more transferable detainees and another 30 for conditional detention, which at the time was essentially delayed transfer. Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia has expressed similar concerns about transfer decisions in a letter to the Committee, and some of the interactions that he had with you regarding the potential transfer of Uighurs into the United States. I am concerned that a member of Congress thinks he has been misled so I think it would be helpful if you explained your interactions with Congressman Wolf, and you and I have talked about this and I want to give you the full opportunity to do that this morning. But I urge you to be as forthcoming and direct about this, including information provided to or withheld from Congress on this issue. Ironically, in your new position one of your jobs will be tracking former detainees who have re-engaged, including some recommended for transfer by the task force. I urge you to take a fresh look at any intelligence on Gitmo detainees. Given the threat from AQAP and a recidivism rate now over 26 percent, we are in no position to let any more dangerous detainees go. Unfortunately, the drive to close Gitmo has had the immediate and negative impact of leaving us with few options to detain terrorists outside of Afghanistan. As we draw down in Afghanistan, we will even lose that option. I'm sure you have seen press stories noting that the United States may be killing terrorists but we are not trying very hard to capture them, mostly because Gitmo has been taken off the table. Yet capturing and interrogating terrorists remains one of the best ways to get actionable intelligence and to prevent future threats. Again, Mr. Olsen, I congratulate you on your nomination and these issues need to be laid on the table and need to be fleshed out because the direct point of contact with this Committee is going to be you in so many instances, and we need to certainly have that feeling of trust that we have developed and need to develop stronger over the coming years while you're in this position. So thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. And now I'd like to recognize the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, the Chairman of our Budget Committee on the Democratic side, Kent Conrad. Mr. Chairman, welcome. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENT CONRAD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA Senator Conrad. I thank you, Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Vice Chairman Chambliss. Senator Coats, good to see you, and Senator Wyden. Senator Udall, Senator Warner. I am delighted to be able to introduce Matt Olsen. His parents are from North Dakota, people I've known a very long time. Matt's roots are deep in North Dakota. He returns there every chance he gets with his family, his wife, Fern, and his children, Ellie, Nate and Will. His sister Susan is with us as well. As I said, I've known this family for a very long time, and they are the best that it gets. His father was the chief of staff to the man that I defeated for the United States Senate-- and so I know how good he really is. Van passed away three years ago, but I know he's looking down with a twinkle in his eye today, proud of Matt and all that he has accomplished. You know, after defeating Van's boss for the United States Senate, I came here with some trepidation of what my relationship might be like with Van and his wife Myrna. They treated me with the greatest courtesy and over time became very good friends--the highest quality people that our state has to offer, and I believe the highest quality of people in the country. These are Americans through and through. Matt, your father would be so proud of you at this moment. I know he'd be looking down and saying, the boy's done good. And indeed you have. You've served your country with distinction at the Justice Department, the FBI and the National Security Agency, where you're currently the general counsel. Your public service has spanned three presidential administrations. That's a notable and impressive accomplishment and it speaks volumes about your competency and your professionalism. Colleagues, Matt has already accomplished so much, and now the President has asked him to assume one of the most important and demanding jobs in the intelligence community, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. We all know that the NCTC's mission is vital to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing the information with our partners and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. There is no doubt in my mind that Matt has the experience and the character to lead the NCTC. But don't just take my word for it. Admiral Mike McConnell served as Director of National Intelligence in President Bush's administration, and as Director of the NSA in the Clinton administration. Here's what Admiral McConnell had to say about Matt. ``Having known and worked with Mr. Olsen for over four years, I have observed him to be the utmost professional, dedicated to the security of the nation. He understands the intelligence community and the law and processes needed to keep us safe. He has great respect for the law, our values and the activities needed to ensure the safety of the nation. I have every confidence that, if confirmed, Mr. Olsen will serve the nation, the Congress, the administration and the intelligence community at the highest level of service and performance.'' Colleagues, Matt is smart. He is honest and he is a true professional and an absolute patriot. I can't put it much better than Admiral McConnell did. I hope very much that this Committee will move quickly on his confirmation and that our colleagues in the Senate will follow suit. It is really my honor to be here with Matt Olsen. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the remarks. I know you have a busy day. Much is happening, so you feel free to stay or leave, whichever you wish. Senator Conrad. I'll join you. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Olsen, we will now turn to you. I was going to introduce your family. Senator Conrad did to some extent, but perhaps you'd go a little further and even ask them to stand up. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER Mr. Olsen. Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and thank you very much, Vice Chairman Chambliss. I want to thank the entire Committee for taking the time to consider my nomination this morning. I especially want to thank Senator Conrad for that very warm and personal introduction. I really appreciate that. And I am grateful to the many members of the Committee that have had the opportunity over the last two weeks to meet and have conversations with. I really appreciate the thoughtful consideration that the Committee is giving to my nomination. At the outset, I want to thank the President for having the confidence to nominate me for this position and the Director of National Intelligence for supporting me. I am tremendously honored and humbled to be considered for this position. Let me also, if I may, take a moment to express my condolences to the people of Norway in the aftermath of the tragic attacks in Oslo last week. My grandfather emigrated to North Dakota from Norway at the age of 16. I have extended family that was in Oslo. I think that these heartbreaking events serve as a reminder to all of us of the importance of working together as an international community to prevent these sorts of acts of terror. And I appreciate very much, Madam Chairman, the opportunity to introduce my family. So I sit here today before you because of the support of my family and my friends and my colleagues, many of whom are here today. My wife, Fern, is directly behind me. My children--my daughter Elizabeth, my oldest son Nate, my youngest son, Will--are all here with me. I especially want to acknowledge my mother, Myrna, who is sitting here on the end; my father, Van, who was warmly remembered in Senator Conrad's remarks. Along with their love and guidance, my parents, my mother and father, have provided my sisters Susan and Jennifer with an example of how to live, I believe, with honor and integrity and devotion to others, and I couldn't be more grateful for them being here today. Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss, members of the Committee, today, as we approach the 10th anniversary of al- Qa'ida's attacks on September 11th, it is appropriate to reflect on that day, the day that our nation suffered the single most devastating attack in our nation's history. It was in the aftermath of that attack of that day that Congress established the National Counterterrorism Center. NCTC is the primary organization in the federal government for analyzing, integrating and sharing all-source intelligence information pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. In my view, no other organization is as singularly focused on preventing acts of terrorism. A decade after the September 11th attacks, we remain at war with al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. Thanks to the leadership of this Committee and to Congress, and thanks to the work of thousands of dedicated men and women in the intelligence community, including, as well, our men and women in uniform across the globe, al-Qa'ida is weakened. At the same time, al-Qa'ida and its adherents around the world, as well as other terrorist organizations, continue to pose a very significant threat to our country. Confronting this threat and working with focus and resolve to prevent a terrorist attack is NCTC's mission, first and foremost. And to fulfill this solemn responsibility, NCTC brings together a wide array of dedicated and talented professionals. This diverse workforce is, in my view, NCTC's greatest asset. In addition, NCTC embodies the principle that we all must serve as one team to protect the nation. We must work collaboratively and we must use every element of our national power to bring relentless and focused pressure against al- Qa'ida and its adherents, as well as other terrorist networks around the globe. I've been privileged to serve--as a number of comments that were made this morning--in leadership positions dedicated to national security during my almost 20 years of career government service. As the general counsel of the National Security Agency, I've guided it and supported NSA's intelligence operations and I've ensured that the agency's activities adhere to the Constitution and the laws that govern its activities and that protect civil liberties and privacy of Americans. At the FBI, I was privileged to serve as counsel to Director Mueller, and in that role I was able to contribute to the transformation of the FBI into a world-class intelligence organization focused on preventing and disrupting potential terrorist plots. As a career official of the Department of Justice, working closely with this Committee and with Congress, I helped stand up the new National Security Division at Justice, and I managed the implementation of the landmark changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that Congress passed in 2008. I also supervised the Guantanamo Review Task Force, bringing together national security professionals from across the government to compile and analyze intelligence information on detainees. And, finally, I served for about 10 years in the District of Columbia as a federal prosecutor. In that role I learned the value of working as a team with investigators and operators, and I learned the fundamental importance of finding and following the facts wherever they lead. If I am honored to be confirmed to this position, I can assure you that I am committed to forging a strong and cooperative relationship with Congress. I believe, based on years of experience as a career government official, that congressional oversight is essential to NCTC and the effective conduct of intelligence activities. Members of Congress and particularly members of this Committee bring a vital perspective to the difficult issues that the intelligence community faces. The role of Congress is critical to building the trust of the American people in NCTC and in the intelligence community. And if confirmed, I commit to providing full and timely communication and transparency with the Congressional oversight Committees. NCTC's fundamental mission is to protect the nation from a terrorist attack. We must pursue this mission with vigilance and resolve. If confirmed, I pledge to do my very best to earn your trust and to give this effort my all. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman, thank you very much for the honor of appearing before you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.005 Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Olsen. I'd like the Members to know we have received the strongest and largest collection of letters on behalf of this nominee, certainly since I've been on this Committee, and it's from the heads and deputy heads of many different agencies. So those letters, along with the two letters from Congressman Frank Wolf and the addendums to those letters will be placed in the record. 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A housekeeping duty, if I may. If you would answer the following questions yes or no, please: Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the NCTC and designated staff when invited? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that the National Counterterrorism Center and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee of intelligence actions and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman? Mr. Olsen. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Olsen, the ranking member brought up the questions that have been raised by a Member of Congress. We discussed them in our meeting. And in your prepared testimony, on page five, you discuss them as well. You indicate that in April of '09 you were part of a team of officials who provided a briefing about the initial stages of the process of reviewing detainees. And you were authorized during the briefing to discuss the review process. You were not authorized to discuss deliberations or decisions on specific detainees. And so, in accordance with those rules, you state, on page five, ``We provided a full and candid briefing about the detainee review process.'' So I would like you to address this issue--you have read Congressman Wolf's letter--and address it head on, if you will, for this Committee. Mr. Olsen. Yes. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and, as well, Vice Chairman Chambliss, for providing me with the opportunity to address those questions that were raised. Let me just say at the outset that there were essentially, as I understand from Congressman Wolf's letter, two questions or concerns. One was that we altered threat information--that that information was altered in the course of the task force review and that there was intentional misleading of him during a briefing. And I will say, just at the outset, that neither one of those things occurred. And I appreciate the opportunity to provide additional explanation of that. First, the question of whether or not threat information was changed or altered over the course of the task force review--the job that I had as the executive Director of the Guantanamo review task force in 2009 was to bring together career professionals and compile all of the information that had been obtained over the course of several years about each detainee--something that hadn't been done before--and to bring that information together in one place and to give that information a fresh and independent and objective review. We took that information and under my leadership, and under guidelines that we adopted as part of an interagency effort, we looked at that information. It was my responsibility to ensure that that was done in an impartial and unbiased way, that all the information was reviewed, that it was done with an interagency approach, that every dissenting or disparate opinion or view was fully aired. And then we took that information and presented it to a group of senior-level decisionmakers, along with our recommendations. And then the decisions were made based on that information by a senior-level group or review panel from six different agencies. The result of that work over the course of a year was that all 240 detainees were given a disposition, and in every single case, every detainee was determined on a unanimous basis on what the appropriate status was of that detainee. There was never, at any time, any effort to change threat information, to hide from any fact. The explicit guidance--my particular responsibility, I believed, was to follow every fact and be as precise and specific and rigorous in analyzing those facts and then presenting that information to the policy-level decisionmakers. There were occasions when we looked at facts and looked at them differently than prior assessments had done. In particular, JTF-GTMO--joint task force at Gitmo--had prepared assessments. We looked at those. Those were all part of our information. And in many cases--most cases, I believe--we agreed with those assessments. But there were instances when we looked at those facts and came to different conclusions. But there was never, on any occasion, an effort to change, alter or hide from those facts. Those were all fully aired. On the second question, if I may--the question of whether or not I intentionally misled Congressman Wolf in a briefing-- again, I did not. We met in April of 2009, in his office. I was part of a team from the Department of Justice and the White House that went to brief Congressman Wolf on not just the Guantanamo review task force but all three of the task forces that were set up under the three executive orders issued by President Obama in January of 2009. This was at the very early stages of our review process. We had really just begun the effort to review the first set of detainees. And it was made clear to Congressman Wolf before that briefing and during that briefing that the ground rules would be that we could discuss the process that we were undertaking to conduct that review, but that we were not authorized to discuss any particular decisions or any specific detainees. We did, in fact, lay out the process for him, and I understand that now he has expressed concern that he was not given full information about the actual decisionmaking status with respect to the group of detainees known as the Uighurs, the Chinese Uighurs, who were at Guantanamo. I did not discuss, because I was not authorized to discuss or make a unilateral decision as a career Department of Justice official, what the status was of that decisionmaking process. I certainly--as I've said to Congressman Wolf in a conversation I had with him on the telephone a few months ago, I understand his frustration and I very much, very much regret that he has the view that I intentionally misled him. And I do hope that if I'm confirmed, I would have the opportunity to regain his trust and work with him in a collaborative and cooperative way, moving forward. I will say that as a general matter I have been candid, honest and direct in all of my interactions with Congress. I have met many times with staff and Members, particularly of this Committee, over the course of my career as a career government official, not only on the Guantanamo review but also on the FISA Amendments Act and other matters. And I have taken it as a matter of pride and a deeply held view that I have been honest and candid and direct on all occasions. And as I said, I do hope I have the opportunity to regain the trust of Congressman Wolf and work with him. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair. Mr. Olsen, let me carry that question one step further because, obviously, it's a very, very serious issue when you have a member of Congress who thinks he's been misled. So I want you to have full opportunity to explain it. And I want to quote to you what Congressman Wolf's recollection of the scenario was. In the memorandum that he prepared within the last couple of weeks that I know you've had the opportunity to look at, here's what he says: He said, `Ìt has recently come to my attention that I was misled about the status of the transfer of the Uighur detainees in April, 2009. This information confirms the Newsweek report that career federal employees were explicitly directed to hide this information from Members of Congress, especially Republican Members. During an April 22nd, 2009, meeting in my office with members of the Guantanamo Bay detainee review task force, including Mr. Olsen, I inquired about the status of the potential transfer of Uighur detainees to the United States.'' ``Mr. Olsen indicated that a decision had not yet been reached on the transfer of the detainees. None of the other career or political officials in the meeting countered Mr. Olsen's assertion. That is why I was deeply concerned to learn, in an April, 2011, Washington Post article, that the final decision on the transfer of the Uighur detainees had been made during a White House meeting eight days before my meeting with Mr. Olsen. `Àccording to the Washington Post article, the first concrete step toward closing the detention center was agreed upon during an April 14, 2009, session at the White House. It was to be a stealth move. `They were going to show up here and we were going to announce it,' said one senior official describing the swift, secretive operation that was designed by the administration to preempt any political outcry that could prevent the transfer.' '' Mr. Wolf goes on, ``Following the publication of this article in April, I personally called Mr. Olsen to ask whether he was aware at the time of my meeting with him on April 22nd, 2009, that a decision had already been made on the transfer of the detainees. He told me that he was aware of the decision prior to our meeting. I believe that I was intentionally misled by Mr. Olsen and other administration officials during my April 22nd meeting with the task force. `Ì am also concerned that the Attorney General did not acknowledge that a decision had been made when he appeared before the House Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations Subcommittee the following day. That's why I was surprised when my office was notified by a career federal employee that the administration was misleading the Congress and planned to secretly transfer the detainees around May 1, 2009.'' Now, I understand, Mr. Olsen, you're saying you were not at liberty to discuss the details of any particular detainee, but this goes beyond that. His comments go beyond that. So I want to give you a full opportunity to address exactly what Congressman Wolf remembers about that meeting. Mr. Olsen. Yes, thank you very much, Vice Chairman. At the time that that briefing occurred of Congressman Wolf on April 21st or 22nd, there had, at that point, been a decision by senior-level members of the administration--again, our process was to make recommendations to a senior review group. In this case, this went to a very high-level group of senior officials. And the decision at that point--I think April 14th is the right date; I've gone back and looked at my notes--there had been a decision to take, move, transfer a small number of detainees--Uighur detainees--to the United States. There was not, at that time, a decision on which detainees to move or, as I recall, no decision about where, exactly, they would go. But I remember, at the time of the briefing, that there had actually been, as I said, a decision to move, I think two, detainees--two Uighur detainees--to the United States, to transfer those detainees to the United States. So at that time, there had been that decision. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, as I recall, were given the responsibility--not my task force; not the Guantanamo task force--to determine which detainees were the right two to move, given a number of considerations, when to do that, under what circumstances, and where they would go. And those efforts were under way. At no time did I say that there was no decision to Congressman Wolf. I just believe that that is a misrecollection or misperception. I did say that I was not--we were not authorized to talk about specific decisions that were then under way, and I was not authorized to talk about specific detainees. Again, so I do understand his frustration. I don't--I did not mislead. I was not in a position to decide myself at that time that I was going to lay out exactly where that decisionmaking process was. We had met before that briefing and talked about what we were going to say and what we were going to talk about in terms of the review process. And I do very much regret that he has taken that view and I do understand his frustration with learning through the press later that that decisionmaking process was well under way. But Senator, that is exactly where that stood on that day. When I briefed Congressman Wolf, there had been a decision to bring two detainees. They had not been identified as to which ones. And, as I recall, there was no decision about exactly where they would go within the United States. Vice Chairman Chambliss. In Congressman Wolf's memo, he refers to other career political officials that were in that meeting. Did you go back and visit with those individuals to get their recollection of exactly what was said after Congressman Wolf came forward with this? Mr. Olsen. I've talked to others who were part of the preparation for that briefing. I have not talked to--I have talked to other members of that briefing team previously, so several months ago I talked to, because I talked to Congressman Wolf, I think, in April of this year. And around that time, I talked to a number of the individuals who were part of that briefing. And it was--and I think our recollections were the same as to how that briefing went. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Can you provide the Committee with the names of those other individuals that were in that meeting at that time, within the next 24 hours? Mr. Olsen. Absolutely. Absolutely. And the other step I took, Vice Chairman, was to talk to the Department of Justice legislative affairs office. And I believe that the Assistant Attorney General submitted a letter to the Committee along the same lines, that the ground rules for that briefing were that we would talk about the process, but not specific decisions or detainees. And, in fact, a letter was sent to Congressman Wolf in July of 2009, so three months after the April 2009 briefing, which reaffirmed that decision, and that specific detainees were not the subject on which briefings would occur or had occurred, but that we were able to talk about the process. And so even at that time, in July of 2009, in a letter to Congressman Wolf, that was made clear and presented to Congressman Wolf in a letter from the Department of Justice. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair. Mr. Olsen. If I may, may I just add one other quick point on this? Chairman Feinstein. Please. Mr. Olsen. Because I really want to address what I understand is an understandable concern from the Committee if I'm confirmed and I'm in a position such as the Director of NCTC. I believe wholeheartedly that, in that role, that I have an absolute obligation, to the best of my ability, to provide all intelligence information in a full and timely way to this Committee. And I believe, if I am in that position, my authority, my ability to make that judgment in an autonomous and unilateral way, greatly exceeds what it was in April of 2009. And the Committee has my full commitment that I will live up to that obligation. Chairman Feinstein. Mr. Vice Chairman, there is a letter dated July 22nd signed by Ron Weich, Assistant Attorney General, which clearly states the career officials who provided the briefing, including Mr. Olsen, were authorized by the Department to discuss the review process in general but were not authorized to discussion deliberations or decisions about any specific detainees. And it goes on to say, ``Consistent with the parameters set for the briefing, he did not''--he, being Matt Olsen--``did not discuss internal decisionmaking or the status of specific detainees.'' This letter will go in the record and obviously be available. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2744.065 Chairman Feinstein. The next one up was Senator Conrad and he's not here. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Mr. Olsen, thank you for our visit. I appreciated your candor and also your taking extra time to go over and meet in a secure facility so that we could discuss some sensitive matters. I have been on this Committee for more than a decade now, and I believe this is the first time we've had the top lawyer at the National Security Agency before the Committee in an open session. Now, I'm not going to get into any details of how the NSA does business. But since you are the chief legal officer at one of the country's largest intelligence agencies, it's safe to say that you are an expert on surveillance law. So I'd like to begin by asking a few questions about several areas of surveillance law and about how you and your colleagues have interpreted the laws so that we can get some of this information on the public record. The first question is, would you agree that key portions of the USA PATRIOT Act have been the subject of significant secret legal interpretations and that these interpretations are secret today? Mr. Olsen. Senator Wyden, thank you. If I may just say at the outset, I did appreciate the opportunity to talk to you in both your office and in the classified setting to talk about some of these matters. And I appreciate your ongoing interest and concern about them. The direct answer to your question is that there are provisions of the PATRIOT Act that are the subject of matters before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a court that, by design, meets in a classified setting. And some of the pleadings and opinions that relate to the PATRIOT Act that have been part of proceedings before the Foeign Intelligence Surveillance Court are classified. Senator Wyden. So it is fair to say that key provisions of the PATRIOT Act and how they're legally interpreted are being kept secret as of today. Mr. Olsen. It is certainly fair to say that there are opinions from the court that are classified. I do feel it's important to add that those opinions are part of what is provided to this Committee and that the activities that are undertaken in accordance with those orders of the court are subject to extensive oversight from across the government. Senator Wyden. Would you agree that key portions of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 have been the subject of significant secret legal interpretations and that those are secret today? Mr. Olsen. Let me say yes, and then let me add that the answer is that, similar to the PATRIOT Act, there are particular provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that, in the course of implementing those provisions, the government--and I was part of this effort--submits pleadings to the FISA court. And then, by design, again, under the statute, the FISA court issues--considers those pleadings in a classified setting and then issues opinions authorizing or not those activities. And it is the case, if I may also add, that as we've reviewed those opinions, as we've looked at those opinions, working with you and others, that it's very difficult at times to separate those portions of the opinions that are subject to--could be disclosed because they only contained legal information versus the linkage or intertwining of legal analysis and facts. Senator Wyden. So you have said that there are, in fact, secret legal interpretations with respect to both the PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act. And is there anything further that you can tell us about their subject matter? Mr. Olsen. I don't think there's anything further that I can discuss in an open setting. I know you appreciate that, Senator. I know you appreciate--obviously you do--the importance of protecting the sources and methods that are described in those opinions. I would restate what I just said, that---- Senator Wyden. Let's--my time is very short. Mr. Olsen [continuing]. Certainly. Senator Wyden. You've given thoughtful answers. As you know, we have a difference of opinion here. It's my view that we have to keep operations and methods secret, but we've got to also have public awareness of the laws on the books. We're going to continue this discussion, I'm sure. I need to ask you one other question, and that is on a different legal topic. Do government agencies have the authority to use cell-site data to track the location of Americans inside the United States for intelligence purposes? Mr. Olsen. Senator, I know that that's a question that you've posed to the Director of National Intelligence, Director Clapper. It is a question that is a complicated and difficult question to answer, particularly in this setting. I will say that the intelligence community is working as we speak--I know we've talked to your staff--in developing a comprehensive answer to that question, which will be provided to you in writing. Senator Wyden. Madam President, I know my time has expired, but just a quick follow-up on that. You seem to be suggesting, then, Mr. Olsen, that the executive branch has not yet settled that question. Is that accurate? Mr. Olsen. I think it's very important to be precise about exactly what the question is. And I---- Senator Wyden. The question is, does the government have the authority to use sell-site data to track the location of Americans inside the country? I think you answered initially that it had not yet been settled by the executive branch with respect to whether or not there is that authority. I think this is an extremely important point, and I just want to make that clear, and I believe you're saying it has not yet been settled by the executive branch that it has that authority. Mr. Olsen [continuing]. I think there are certain circumstances where that authority may exist. I do think it's a very complicated and difficult question. And I would ask your indulgence to allow that question to be prepared in an unclassified setting in writing to you, Senator. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. And if I may, Senator, I well know of your concerns, and we have discussed them. And what I'd like to do in our first hearing, in September, when we come back-- assuming there is an August break--I'd like to have that classified session, and would ask, Mr. Olsen, that you have that memo prepared, that the answer's in writing, that you and any authorities you wish to bring with you will attend the hearing. Do I have your agreement? Mr. Olsen. Yes, absolutely. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Senator Wyden. Madam Chair, just on this point, to wrap up, I would just like to say to you and to colleagues that you have been very fair in terms of handling this issue. As you know, Senator Udall and I and other colleagues have had concerns about it. We've been examining it in both classified and open session. And I want to thank you for the way you're handling it. Chairman Feinstein. Oh, you're very welcome. Happy to do it. Senator Conrad. Senator Conrad. Madam Chair and Vice Chair and Members of the Committee, instead of asking questions, I'd like to make a further statement, if I could, Madam Chair, about this nominee. He comes from a family that I have known for 30 years, a family that was on the other side of the aisle from me. As I indicated before, his father was the chief of staff of the man I defeated for the United States Senate. And yet he treated me with the greatest generosity of spirit that anybody could ask for. Now, I just want to say, these are people of the highest quality, of the very highest quality, in every single way. The highest character--I would trust Matt Olsen with every penny that I've got, because of the character of this family. And I know around here it's all demolition derby. My God, when does it end? If we can't take somebody who has, at every step, been endorsed with the strongest praise--people from the Republican side of the aisle, the Democratic side of the aisle--the highest performance standard, the highest quality standard, the highest character standard--and I understand we have an oversight responsibility, we have a responsibility to ask the tough questions. But I just want to say to colleagues, I would put my entire reputation on the line for this nominee. That's how strongly I feel. So--you know, I've been here 25 years. I think I've conducted myself with character. And I hope it counts for something when we have a nominee of this quality. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. I think those are very heartfelt remarks and very much appreciated. So thank you. Senator Coats. Senator Coats. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Olsen, I appreciate the discussion we had in my office earlier, and your testimony today. Your educational background is superb, and your experience background is, if not unmatched, very impressive. And the recommendations that you've had from former Attorney General Mukasey, Mr. McConnell and General Alexander speak highly of you. And other people, very credible people, including Senator Conrad, have spoken about your character, your family, the kind of person you are. And I think that's high recommendation, from my colleague as well as from a number of other people. As you know, we discussed in my office the same concerns that Senator Chambliss discussed with you. I don't want to repeat all of that. I do want to state that it's disturbing that, assuming these new sources are credible about a secretive plan, a stealth plan--it's disturbing if those are true. These are reputable news organizations. I assume The Washington Post--which I don't always agree with everything they do, but they usually check very carefully before they make this type of allegation. This is a serious allegation, some kind of concocted White House stealthy, secret plan. You've discussed and, for the record, explained your position relative to this, where you were and your relationship with Mr. Wolf and so forth. But the larger question is, given the politics of the issue at the time, the fact that a decision was made by someone at the highest levels to bypass through a stealthy, secret plan is a serious, serious charge and, if true, a serious, serious offense. My question to you is--and you made your pledge to us that you will not withhold any type of intelligence that is available to you from this Committee. And I take you at your word for that. What I want to ask you is the reverse of that: If you become aware of some action, some policy decision, some piece of intelligence that this Committee ought to know about but that it is politically sensitive and perhaps there are concerns that you might be sharing information that people at policy levels don't want shared, are you willing to serve as an independent Director of NCTC and provide us with your independent opinion as to that? I just think it's critical that we are aware of that. And so I would like to get your reaction to that on the reverse side of what you do know relative to intelligence, or what you don't know but have some concerns about not knowing-- have something withheld from you that you've said, you know, I don't feel like I've been given full information relative to what this Committee ought to be aware of. Mr. Olsen. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. The answer is yes, I absolutely do pledge to the best of my ability to provide my unvarnished views to the Committee; as I said, I commit to providing full, timely intelligence information to the Committee at all times. I commit to being an advocate for providing as much information as possible to the Committee within the executive branch. I wholeheartedly believe in the essential role that the Committee plays, and that that role is a partnership, particularly when it comes to intelligence matters and national security; that there is no place for political considerations when it comes to counterterrorism and the fundamentally important mission of NCTC. And so I would be both a person who would view that role as a partnership with this Committee, that I would provide that information and that I would be, as I said, an advocate for leaning as far forward as possible, as my abilities allow, into providing that type of information at all times to the Committee. And if I could maybe just address, sir, the specific issue, I don't want the record to reflect that I view or had the understanding that there was a stealthy or secret effort to move detainees into the United States. I don't believe--I was not aware that that was ever the case, and I don't believe that ever was the case. In other words, there was a decision to move two detainees--two Uighur detainees to the United States. There was an effort undertaken then by the FBI and DHS to determine who and where. But I never was under any impression--I never believed that that effort had progressed to the point that it was going to be a secret or stealthy move but rather that the time for disclosing that was being discussed and was not something that was my decision to make. Senator Coats. Thank you for that answer. I just want to restate how critically important it is that we have a trust with each other---- Mr. Olsen. Yes. Senator Coats [continuing]. Because we are dealing with matters of incredible importance to the safety and security of the American people. And if we lose that element of trust in terms of how we communicate with each other within the intelligence community--and we have a responsibility to ensure that, you know, we live up to our part of the bargain on this also. And I'm hoping that we can do that with you. And I think that perhaps this is a little warning sign here in terms of let's be diligent to make sure that that level of trust exists and that level of sharing of information with the Committee and us with you exists. With that, Madam Chairman, I yield back my time. Mr. Olsen. I could not agree more, Senator. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Coats. Senator Snowe. Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome, Mr. Olsen. You certainly come to this position with an impressive array of credentials, and I congratulate you. And certainly Senator Conrad's commendations on your behalf certainly speaks volumes about what you represent and what you bring to this position, which is obviously significant as we continue to face a growing threat. I'd like to just explore with you for a moment in the aftermath of the assassination of Usama bin Ladin, how would you describe the al-Qa'ida threat and what it poses today? I know you have said it remains the most significant threat to the United States, in combination with regional affiliates that are dispersed. And as you've mentioned, it's certainly a dynamic and complex environment and certainly an asymmetrical threat, hard to identify, hard to quantify. So where do you think we stand today in terms of, one, mitigating that threat, and certainly since the killing of Usama bin Ladin? Mr. Olsen. Thank you very much, Senator. The threat I think today is as diffuse and as complex and challenging as it has been at any time. Certainly it is the case that, again through the leadership of the Congress and the hard work of thousands of men and women, both in the intelligence community and the military, we've made substantial progress against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. And the killing of Usama bin Ladin was a significant milestone in that effort. And it is clear, I think, from the threat information that I've seen, both beginning in 2004 when I started working with the FBI through my time at the Department of Justice and to my position now at the National Security Agency, that al-Qa'ida in many ways is weakened. It remains the case, however, that it is a more diffuse and dispersed threat, as you made reference to. And in particular, I think the concern that the Vice Chairman made reference to with respect to al-Qa'ida's presence in Yemen and in places like Somalia makes it particularly challenging from a counterterrorism perspective. I think that in some ways the opportunity that presents itself now to the counterterrorism community in the United States, as well as with our allies around the world, is that we must actually redouble our efforts, that, as the President has said, al-Qa'ida is on the path to defeat, but we have to look at that threat in all of its various forms, not only in the tribal regions of Yemen but in the FATA in Pakistan and also in parts of North Africa, and in Somalia. Ultimately the NCTC's mission is to stop another terrorist attack. And if I may just say that the leadership of Mike Leiter and now, in acting capacity, of Andrew Liepman, I think NCTC has played a vital role in that effort. But it's a team approach and we face as challenging a time, I think, as we ever have. Senator Snowe. Are you confident that we have the ability to, you know, work across the agencies, as you--obviously the obligation of the NCTC is to coordinate and to integrate all of that analysis. Do you think we've got it? Mr. Olsen. I think that we've made a lot of progress. I do think as this Committee, in its report on the Abdulmutallab attack of December 25, 2009, demonstrated, we still face challenges. And particularly I reviewed the Vice Chairman's and Senator Burr's separate opinion, which was quite critical, and appropriately so I think, in certain ways, of NCTC. Senator, if I may say, I think the greatest challenge facing NCTC is in some way its greatest strength--that it brings together analysts, planners, other professionals from across the intelligence community and the military to bring all these different viewpoints together. How do we reconcile the different backgrounds and perspectives? That's really its greatest strength. We need to rely on the intelligence community to continue to provide those professionals and provide an atmosphere and environment where they are located together and collaborate. So, in direct response to your question, I think that is one of the greatest strengths of NCTC. I think we have some progress to be made both with respect to the collaboration feature but also information sharing and breaking down barriers to sharing information not only within NCTC but with our partners. Senator Snowe. You mentioned that we've degraded the capability of al-Qa'ida in Pakistan. How would you compare that threat with respect to the regional affiliates? Which is greater? Mr. Olsen. It's difficult to answer a ``which is greater?'' I think I do agree with the Vice Chairman's observation that recent events would suggest that the regional affiliates, particularly al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and its presence in Yemen, have shown a willingness and a level of capability to strike in the United States. I think that it must be a primary focus of NCTC and of the counterterrorism community broadly. Senator Snowe. Do you think that that is the single greatest goal of al-Qa'ida, is to strike the United States? Is that their foremost goal? Mr. Olsen. It certainly remains a significant goal. I think that its goals are multivaried, and the threat--again, part of the challenge is that threat is not so much the senior leadership in Pakistan with one unified goal. It's now diffused in various regional locations under various leaders and with various goals. But it is certainly sufficiently a goal that it has to be NCTC's number one mission. Senator Snowe. How would you define the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida leadership? Mr. Olsen. The strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida? I think I would define it as ending the threat that al-Qa'ida and all of its affiliates pose to the United States and its interests around the world. Senator Snowe. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Olsen. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. Senator Wyden has some additional questions, and the Vice Chairman and I also. So, Senator Wyden, why don't you go ahead? Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And just two additional matters. Following up on Senator Snowe's questions, Mr. Olsen, beyond al-Qa'ida's core leadership in Pakistan and the al- Qa'ida affiliate in Yemen, which terrorist group, in your view, poses the greatest threat to the country? Mr. Olsen. I would say that beyond al-Qa'ida senior leadership in Pakistan, its presence in Yemen, that probably the next most significant terrorist threat may emanate from the al-Qa'ida presence in Somalia in terms of the willingness and apparent ability, or at least the intent, to strike outside of that particular country. We know that that country, that group, has successfully mounted an attack in Uganda, and the apparent ability of a regional affiliate such as that to move outside of the borders of that country I think poses a significant threat. But the threat goes beyond even just al-Qa'ida, of course, and its affiliates, to other groups such as Hezbollah. So I think, again, I have to say that I'm not in a position at NCTC now so I approach these types of questions with some humility and some deference to the professionals who are looking at these questions on a daily basis. Senator Wyden. One last question, if I might. Earlier this year Under Secretary Cohen from the Treasury Department told the Finance Committee, on which I serve, that Kuwait has become one of the most challenging countries to deal with when it comes to counterterrorism, and, in addition, that as other Gulf states have improved their cooperation with U.S. terrorist activity in the Gulf we are seeing, in effect, Kuwait become more permissive--significantly more permissive. Do you have an opinion on this yet? Mr. Olsen. My answer, Senator, if I may, is somewhat general, which--I would say that our relationships with countries such as Kuwait, other Gulf states, certainly countries like Pakistan are complex and have multiple dimensions. I do think that the counterterrorism effort is a central goal or central feature of those relationships. If I'm confirmed, I would look forward to the opportunity in the role of NCTC Director to provide my objective and unvarnished view about the counterterrorism threat to contribute to the overall discussion and development of a posture toward a country like Kuwait. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Vice Chairman, why don't you go ahead, and I'll finish up. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Sure. Mr. Olsen, I want to ask you, on three or four different subjects here, to give us a general discussion and response to some questions that I'm going to lay out. But I'm more interested in your general discussion on the issues. But obviously I think the questions will throw out some ideas for you. By December 2009, it had become clear that many transferred Gitmo detainees had joined AQAP in Yemen. Additionally, the IC and State Department took a dim view of the willingness or capability of the Yemeni government to monitor detainees. And I believe such assessments were made clear to the task force. Yet in late 2009, the task force decided to transfer seven Yemeni detainees back to Yemen, only one of whom was ordered released by the court. And his case was not appealed. Now, my questions are, in December 2009, did you personally believe it was a good idea to transfer detainees to Yemen? Secondly, you've told us before that you were trying to test the system by sending the group of detainees back in December of 2009. Do you think testing the system when the result of a failed test could be an attack on Americans was a good idea? And lastly, in hindsight, in light of the fact that the government is winning all of its habeas appeals, would you have changed any of the task force transfer decisions? And do you think dangerous detainees were transferred as a result of the task force process? Mr. Olsen. Senator, thank you. And I do very much understand, of course, in our conversations--both my conversation with you as well as the ongoing discussions I've had with members of the Committee staff--the substantial concern about the detainees from Yemen and the transfer decisions that were made back in 2009. So if I may give you a relatively general, longer answer, I appreciate your indulgence. The Yemen detainee population was a concern of the task force's from its onset. When we started this process under the President's executive order in February of 2009, there were 97 Yemeni detainees out of the 240 detainees at Guantanamo subject to the review. So by far the single largest nationality represented at Guantanamo were from Yemen. And this was a problem that existed before 2009. In other words, prior to 2009, government officials had struggled with how handle the disposition of this substantial number of Yemen detainees. Over the course of that year, through our task force effort, we were very aware of a number of different factors. One, that the security situation in Yemen was continuing to deteriorate over the course of that year, and by December of 2009 we were quite aware of the concerns that the intelligence community and our military leaders were expressing about Yemen. We were also quite aware that our record of success in the habeas courts, that the number of Yemeni detainees as well as others were challenging the lawfulness of their detention, and we were being briefed by the Department of Justice about how those cases were going. At one point in September of 2009, I recall that we were approximately eight successful defenses versus 31 losses in the federal courts. And there was a real concern being expressed by the Department of Justice that not only were we losing these cases, but we were losing our credibility generally in a way that was affecting facts and legal rulings that might impact cases down the road. I think the other factor that was a significant one for us with respect to Yemen was that there were no options that appeared to be available in terms of other countries willing to take detainees from Yemen, not countries that had rehabilitation programs and not countries in Europe that had been taking a number of detainees--I think over 50 over the course of the last couple years--who had humane-treatment concerns about being repatriated to their home country. So I know I've just laid out to you a problem that you're well familiar with. But those were the factors that were presented to us as we conducted this review. Our job on the task force, I felt--and my responsibility as the executive Director--was to provide the best factual information in the most precise, specific and rigorous way possible to decisionmakers. We did that over the course of the review. The decision to send seven detainees in December--now I know an eighth Yemeni detainee has been repatriated to Yemen-- those decisions have all been made at very senior levels, and all based on the unanimous judgment of representatives of six different agencies, including the Department of Defense, the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two of those eight detainees were ordered released by the court. I think when I said in our conversation that the six or so that went in December--if that number's correct--or before, in the fall of 2009--I don't remember the exact timeframe--but the thought there--and I was present for some of the discussions, although I wasn't a voting member or a decisionmaker--the thought was we would never at any time send a significant number of Yemeni detainees back. The question was, could the Yemeni government and security forces handle the security measures that would be necessary to ensure that those transfers were handled responsibly? Our process had a very strict standard. No detainee would be eligible for transfer unless any threat that detainee posed could be sufficiently mitigated through adequate and appropriate security measures in the host country--in the destination country. That standard never changed from the beginning to the end of our task force review. And that was a standard that the decisionmakers who made that decision applied. So if I may, in sum--I think those were very difficult decisions. And I want to address your question before I forget. It is true I cited the habeas record of eight and 31. We've done much better from the executive branch's point of view since that time. We've had a number of successful litigation victories in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The question whether or not that would have changed our view or the view of the decisionmakers on a particular detainee I think is hard to answer, and somewhat speculative on my part. I do think that it would have lowered the significance of that factor as it pertained to a particular detainee. So it would have--you know, I suppose I could say it's possible that it may have affected a decision. But it would be speculative for me to say more about that. Vice Chairman Chambliss. You mentioned in my office with respect to the pressure on the task force that there was pressure in part because the task force was guided by the executive order on closing Gitmo. Can you explain now about how that pressure existed and what you did to try to make sure your decisions were not influenced by it? How many attorneys assigned to the task force had represented detainees before joining your staff? And did you feel pressure from any of those attorneys, others in DOJ or other parts of the administration to lean towards transferring as many detainees as possible? Mr. Olsen. As I mentioned to you, Senator, in our meeting, it certainly was the case that we had an executive order issued by the President in January of 2009 and that we were duty bound to follow that executive order. That executive order set forth three potential options for each detainee: transfer, if such a transfer could be accomplished consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. That was the first option. If transfer was not available, prosecution, if feasible. And if neither transfer nor prosecution was an appropriate option, then select another appropriate option, undefined in the executive order. I wouldn't necessarily say that that was pressure. That was guidance or direction from the President of the United States to follow that. And I felt my obligation was to ensure that everything that the task force did certainly followed that direction but did not respond to any of the what was obvious at the time, controversy from both sides about Guantanamo. It's been a subject of controversy for many years. I felt it was my obligation to insulate the career professionals who worked on this review. Over the course of the year in 2009, over a hundred people worked on this review from the Department of Defense, from the intelligence community, CIA, NCTC, Homeland Security, State, Justice. And every single one of them was a career individual. In response to your question, I don't believe that a single one of the attorneys who worked on the review had ever played a role in representing detainees. I know that's been a subject of controversy and been reported in the press in the past with respect to other Department of Justice attorneys. I don't believe that anyone on our task force had ever worked in that capacity. Again, everyone who worked on my review came from the career ranks. As I said, I felt it was my responsibility to insulate that group from any of the types of controversy surrounding Guantanamo. And I think, if I may, Senator, say the results of the review, the recommendations and the analysis we did, resulting in unanimous decisions on 240 detainees, speak for themselves, I think, in this regard. Out of those 240 detainees, there were 126 transfer decisions. But there were also 48 decisions to hold those detainees under the laws of war. When we started the review in January of 2009, that was not necessarily even considered an option. We pushed for that as the right option for 48 detainees--that they could not be tried, there was not evidence to try them. They could not be transferred safely. They needed to be held indefinitely under the laws of war. That's 48 of those detainees; in addition, 36 detainees referred either to the military commission or to federal courts for prosecution, 36 in that category, and then 30 in the category Yemeni detainees of conditional detention. Those 30 detainees, the decision was that they would not be transferred. They would be detained until the security situation in Yemen substantially improved, something that obviously has not happened. So they are effectively in the same category as the 48 held under the laws of war. Vice Chairman Chambliss. The Chairman and I are both very concerned about the fact that we currently have no detention and interrogation policy going forward with respect to individuals who may be captured, high-value targets who may be captured outside of Afghanistan. As Director of NCTC, you will be integrally involved in the deliberations relative to any proposal for a long-term plan on detention and interrogation. And my question to you is, are you prepared to give sound advice, number one, that you're going to be asked to give? And secondly, if the administration appears to be headed down a road that you don't think is the right direction to go, will you say to this Committee now that you're going to express yourself in a very strong manner to help to try to develop the best possible policy for detention and interrogation of high- value targets, even though your opinion may be contrary to the folks at the White House who are nominating you today? Mr. Olsen. Yes, absolutely. And if I may, I do make that pledge. I think, in my prior positions, I have taken that position. In other words, I have given advice in an unvarnished, objective, independent way. As a career government official, I've made known my personal views and sought to move positions based on my objective and independent and non- political perspective. I do think that these questions, Senator--if I may say, some of these questions are some of the most difficult ones that we face from a counterterrorism perspective, the question of detention policy. I absolutely agree that it would be my responsibility, if I'm honored to be confirmed, to give my unvarnished and objective views, share the intelligence with this Committee, and advocate for what I believe is the right thing, to the best of my abilities within the executive branch. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Some would argue that Gitmo should be closed because it is used as a recruiting tool for al- Qa'ida. And that may be true. But yet al-Qa'ida uses our Israel policy, the Afghan war, the death of bin Ladin and a host of other issues as recruiting tools, and no one suggests that we should change these policies. In your current position or positions you have held, have you seen any evidence that we are safer or that recruits have fallen off as a result of the President's announcement of his intent to close Guantanamo? Mr. Olsen. I've not seen, from, again, my perspective, both on the task force and in a much more limited perspective in my current role at the National Security Agency, anything, in specific response to your question, to that effect, that there's a change in recruiting based on the current government policy. Vice Chairman Chambliss. All right. Lastly, let me tell you an issue that we've got that I know you're aware about and get your thoughts on. In the past, NCTC has raised a number of concerns about not having access to all the intelligence information it needs. Of particular concern is access to information in the possession of the Department of Homeland Security. Generally, DHS is reluctant to provide information relating to an individual's asylum application or refugee status on the grounds that sharing that information would violate U.S. person restrictions. The specific legal basis for DHS's position is unclear. Have you got any thoughts on how we can address that problem with DHS? And are asylum seekers U.S. persons or considered U.S. persons? Is that an issue in your mind? Mr. Olsen. Senator, I am generally familiar with this area or this issue. I don't have the specifics of the particular concern with DHS. I've had some briefings about this question. If I may say, I do believe that, given my role at the Department of Justice and my role now, that I have both an understanding--actually, quite a deep understanding of the rules that apply to protect civil liberties and privacy of U.S. persons. But I also, I think, have a very strong view and a record of finding the appropriate ways to overcome legal, sometimes perceived legal, as well as the policy barriers to sharing information. I don't believe that there is a strong basis for, as a policy matter, not allowing information to be shared when that information is necessary to protect the American people. And if I am honored to be confirmed, it will absolutely be my commitment to find a way to overcome expressed concerns about sharing information when that information is necessary to support NCTC's mission, and that is to prevent another terrorist attack. So the Committee certainly has my commitment to look very hard at that question. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Well, as you and I discussed in my office, the critical role that NCTC plays is, for the most part, centered around information sharing, both in its requirement that you, as Director of NCTC, share information you have, but you've got to get the information first. And let me just say that the Chairman and I, I think, stand without question ready to make sure that you've got all the tools that you need. And from a policy standpoint, we're prepared to do what's necessary to make sure that the information that you have to be shared is all of the intelligence information. And let me just close by saying that, as the Chairman stated, we've gotten inundated with letters of recommendation, which you should feel very honored to be supported in that respect. And I know you are. The letter from General Alexander was very complimentary. And not only did he write a letter, but he happens to be a good friend, a guy that I have the utmost respect for, and he called yesterday to reinforce that recommendation. And, because I have such respect for General Alexander, that means a lot. So we'll look forward to moving down the road. And the only thing I would remind you of is if you could get us those names of those individuals in that briefing. And hopefully we'll get this nomination moved quickly. Madam Chair, thank you. Mr. Olsen. Thank you very much. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. You know, I'd like to close off the briefing. I cannot imagine a more thankless task than being Director of the policy Committee of which you were Director, because you know, no matter what, it's thankless. And no matter what, there's going to be criticism, and particularly in those days, as I recall them, where it was so very, very difficult. So I just want to thank you for that. And in my book, you're a straight shooter. And I think that's what matters here. I would like to just talk about the vision thing for a moment, if I might. One of NCTC's statutory responsibilities is to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities and integrate all of the instruments of national power. However, when it granted NCTC this responsibility, Congress didn't provide you with any authority to compel actions in these areas. So we may have to go back and look at that again. But the question is, what is your vision of NCTC's role in conducting strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities and integrating all the instruments of national so- called power into that planning? Mr. Olsen. Thank you very much, Senator. As you point out, one of the critical missions of NCTC is the strategic operational planning mission. I do believe that NCTC is uniquely positioned to conduct that mission. And my vision for that is consistent with, I think, the effort and the progress that NCTC has made in that regard over the last couple years--that is, bringing together the various represented entities, whether it's military or intelligence community, combining those perspectives--and those perspectives vary--in a way that will allow us to make sure that the efforts that the U.S. government is undertaking to combat terrorism, whether it is on a regional level, focusing on a particular region or a particular problem or a particular topic such as countering violent extremism--conducting an all-of-government approach to address those issues, something that NCTC is, I think, as I said, uniquely positioned to do, both because it has members from all these different agencies brought together and because it has the mission granted to it by Congress. So I would consider that to be one of the focuses that I would have. And I would also commit and I would not hesitate to return to this Committee with updates on that effort and to tell you if I think that there are authorities that are lacking or necessary. Chairman Feinstein. Good. Now, you're also the national intelligence manager for counterterrorism. And in that regard, you're going to be responsible for evaluating the intelligence community's performance on terrorism and recommending budget allocations across agencies. In my book, this is a very important job. How do you see yourself carrying this part of your responsibility out? Mr. Olsen. Thank you for that question. I have had an opportunity to talk at least briefly with Director Clapper about this very important role, particularly under the leadership that he has for ODNI and the intelligence community in general. I think that NCTC has done a good job in its role as the NIM. It is, I think, a real focus because of the challenges that we face---- Chairman Feinstein. I don't particularly like that acronym, the NIM. Mr. Olsen. It is not my favorite either, so I will---- Chairman Feinstein. Because this is a big deal. Mr. Olsen. Yeah. Chairman Feinstein. I mean, I don't think it should be trivialized. And I think it's one area where not enough is done and there is not enough central administration of budget authority. Mr. Olsen. Right. So I will stick with ``national intelligence manager.'' Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Mr. Olsen. I think the challenge is that we do face a much more difficult budgetary environment than we did in the last few years. And I fully appreciate that reality. I've seen it in my role at NSA, where I've been part of senior leadership meetings about how NSA is going to react and respond to the budget constraints that we are likely to face, that we will face. The question will be, how do we make sure that we are focusing on the right priorities as a counterterrorism community? And how do we achieve efficiencies where we can in order to meet the challenge that the current budget environment poses? Chairman Feinstein. Well, you see, from my point of view, counterterrorism is extraordinarily important. It is vital to the protection of the homeland. Therefore, having a strategy and an approach to it and a pattern and a practice that's well established and carried out across the government is very, very vital to have. Candidly, I don't know whether we have that today. And so this question is meant with a view that I think it's really a prime mission of yours. Mr. Olsen. Well, I appreciate that. And again, I will, for that reason, make that a prime mission of mine and will, again, commit to come back and talk to you and the Committee and the staff and keep you apprised as often as necessary on the progress we're making. Chairman Feinstein. Right. One last thing. As you know, the defense bill has some language on detention in it, some of which is good and some of which we think is not good. We--you know, as Chairman of the Committee--are trying to draft some legislation. I'd like to ask that you help us and work with us on that, if you will. Mr. Olsen. Of course. I will, yes. Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Thank you very much. I see no other Member. So we would like to have the Director of the NCTC in place actually before going on the August recess. And I really think this is a very important matter that we're able to do that. So I would like to ask that any questions for the record be submitted by 5:00 on Wednesday--that's tomorrow afternoon--so we can get answers and vote on the nomination just as soon as possible. We do not want to leave this agency leaderless. So I thank you for your service to our country. I've been watching the faces of your three children and your wife's supervision in her eyes as this hearing has gone on. And I just want you three to know how very proud we are of your father, that he has been just of enormous service to this country and has much more yet to do. And I hope you are very proud as well. So, with that in mind, we'll conclude this hearing and move your nomination onward. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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