Print[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4443 Reported in Senate (RS)]
Calendar No. 412
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4443
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 3, 2024
Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, reported the
following original bill; which was read twice and placed on the
calendar
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the
Intelligence Innovation Board.
Sec. 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment
and National Counterintelligence Strategy.
Sec. 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of Intelligence
and Analysis personnel.
Sec. 304. Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
Sec. 305. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 306. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.
Sec. 307. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and
assets from unmanned aircraft.
Sec. 308. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled access
programs.
Sec. 309. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs.
Sec. 310. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast
Guard.
Sec. 311. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property.
Sec. 312. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Sec. 313. Report on sensitive commercially available information.
Sec. 314. Policy on collection of United States location information.
Sec. 315. Display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United
States flag.
TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
Sec. 401. Strategy and outreach on risks posed by People's Republic of
China smartport technology.
Sec. 402. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on
synthetic opioid precursor chemicals
originating in People's Republic of China.
Sec. 404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to evade
United States transparency and national
security regulations.
Sec. 405. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers.
Subtitle B--The Russian Federation
Sec. 411. Assessment of Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of
international terrorism.
Sec. 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine.
Subtitle C--International Terrorism
Sec. 421. Inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials
and members among aliens engaged in
terrorist activity.
Sec. 422. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to the
United States.
Sec. 423. Terrorist financing prevention.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats
Sec. 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western
Hemisphere by nationals of countries of
concern.
Sec. 432. Study on threat posed by foreign investment in United States
agricultural land.
Sec. 433. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment
programs.
Sec. 434. Mitigating the use of United States components and technology
in hostile activities by foreign
adversaries.
Sec. 435. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of
visitors and assignees.
Sec. 436. Prohibition on National Laboratories admitting certain
foreign nationals.
Sec. 437. Quarterly report on certain foreign nationals encountered at
the United States border.
Sec. 438. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence
community with respect to the Israel-Hamas
war.
Sec. 439. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on Tren
de Aragua.
Sec. 440. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security
relationships with state sponsors of
terrorism and foreign terrorist
organizations.
Sec. 441. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures
supporting foreign military and terrorist
activities.
TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Sec. 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize
biotechnologies in ways that threaten
United States national security.
Sec. 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the
National Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center.
Sec. 503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats
relating to biological data.
Sec. 504. National security procedures to address certain risks and
threats relating to artificial
intelligence.
Sec. 505. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center.
Sec. 506. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to
increase private sector capital
partnerships and partnership with Office of
Strategic Capital of Department of Defense
to secure enduring technological
advantages.
Sec. 507. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund.
Sec. 508. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community public-
private talent exchanges.
Sec. 509. Enhancing intelligence community ability to acquire emerging
technology that fulfills intelligence
community needs.
Sec. 510. Management of artificial intelligence security risks.
Sec. 511. Protection of technological measures designed to verify
authenticity or provenance of machine-
manipulated media.
Sec. 512. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors.
Sec. 513. Designation of state sponsors of ransomware and reporting
requirements.
Sec. 514. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure a
national intelligence priority.
TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
Sec. 601. Governance of classification and declassification system.
Sec. 602. Classification and declassification of information.
Sec. 603. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat
programs.
TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE
IMPROVEMENTS
Sec. 701. Security clearances held by certain former employees of
intelligence community.
Sec. 702. Policy for authorizing intelligence community program of
contractor-owned and contractor-operated
sensitive compartmented information
facilities.
Sec. 703. Enabling intelligence community integration.
Sec. 704. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees.
Sec. 705. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 706. Intelligence community workplace protections.
Sec. 707. Sense of Congress on Government personnel support for foreign
terrorist organizations.
TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS
Sec. 801. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to
Inspectors General of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 802. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as
act of reprisal.
Sec. 803. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to
Inspectors General of elements of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 804. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to
receive protected disclosures.
Sec. 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing or
examination.
Sec. 806. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations.
Sec. 807. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and
access determinations.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Sec. 901. Additional discretion for Director of Central Intelligence
Agency in paying costs of treating
qualifying injuries and making payments for
qualifying injuries to the brain.
Sec. 902. Additional discretion for Secretary of State and heads of
other Federal agencies in paying costs of
treating qualifying injuries and making
payments for qualifying injuries to the
brain.
Sec. 903. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by Department
of State for qualifying injuries to the
brain.
TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA
Sec. 1001. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-
domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
Sec. 1002. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified
anomalous phenomena historical record
report.
Sec. 1003. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena.
TITLE XI--AIR AMERICA
Sec. 1101. Short title.
Sec. 1102. Findings.
Sec. 1103. Definitions.
Sec. 1104. Award authorized to eligible persons.
Sec. 1105. Funding limitation.
Sec. 1106. Time limitation.
Sec. 1107. Application procedures.
Sec. 1108. Rule of construction.
Sec. 1109. Attorneys' and agents' fees.
Sec. 1110. No judicial review.
Sec. 1111. Reports to Congress.
TITLE XII--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 1201. Enhanced authorities for amicus curiae under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 1202. Limitation on directives under Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to
certain electronic communication service
providers.
Sec. 1203. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for
Elections through Independent Testing Act
of 2024.
Sec. 1204. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board qualifications.
Sec. 1205. Parity in pay for staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board and the intelligence
community.
Sec. 1206. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.
Sec. 1207. Technical amendments.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2025
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the Federal Government.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives,
and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the
budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2025 the sum of
$656,573,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2025 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2025.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE
INTELLIGENCE INNOVATION BOARD.
Section 7506(g) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``active
and'' before ``potential'';
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community'' and
inserting ``the designated agency ethics official'';
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as
subparagraph (D); and
(D) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the
following:
``(C) Authority for the designated agency ethics
official to grant a waiver for a conflict of interest,
except that--
``(i) no waiver may be granted for an
active conflict of interest identified with
respect to the Chair of the Board;
``(ii) every waiver for a potential
conflict of interest requires review and
approval by the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(iii) for every waiver granted, the
designated agency ethics official shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees
notice of the waiver.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Definition of designated agency ethics official.--In
this subsection, the term `designated agency ethics official'
means the designated agency ethics official (as defined in
section 13101 of title 5, United States Code) in the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 302. NATIONAL THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITIZATION ASSESSMENT
AND NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.
Section 904(f)(3) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of
2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(f)(3)) is amended by striking ``National
Counterintelligence Executive'' and inserting ``Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center''.
SEC. 303. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS PERSONNEL.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2025 for the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security may be
obligated or expended by the Office to increase, above the staffing
level in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act, the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence
Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism
issues.
SEC. 304. APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 215(c) of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b(c)) is amended to read as follows:
``(c) Director.--
``(1) Appointment.--The head of the Office shall be the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The Director of the Office shall
report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) Term.--
``(A) In general.--The Director shall serve for a
term of 6 years.
``(B) Reappointment.--The Director shall be
eligible for reappointment for 1 or more terms.
``(3) Qualifications.--The Director shall--
``(A) be an employee in the Senior Executive
Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior
National Intelligence Service, or any other Service
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director
of National Intelligence, considers appropriate; and
``(B) have substantial expertise in matters
relating to the intelligence community, including
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall take
effect on January 21, 2025.
SEC. 305. IMPROVEMENTS TO ADVISORY BOARD OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
Section 106A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3041a(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A)--
(A) in clause (i)--
(i) by striking ``five members appointed by
the Director, in consultation with the Director
of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense,'' and inserting ``up to 8 members
appointed by the Director''; and
(ii) by inserting ``, and who do not
present any actual or potential conflict of
interest'' before the period at the end;
(B) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii);
and
(C) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
``(ii) Membership structure.--The Director
shall ensure that no more than 2 concurrently
serving members of the Board qualify for
membership on the Board based predominantly on
a single qualification set forth under clause
(i).'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as
paragraphs (6) through (8), respectively;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) Charter.--The Director shall establish a charter for
the Board that includes the following:
``(A) Mandatory processes for identifying potential
conflicts of interest, including the submission of
initial and periodic financial disclosures by Board
members.
``(B) The vetting of potential conflicts of
interest by the designated agency ethics official,
except that no individual waiver may be granted for a
conflict of interest identified with respect to the
Chair of the Board.
``(C) The establishment of a process and associated
protections for any whistleblower alleging a violation
of applicable conflict of interest law, Federal
contracting law, or other provision of law.''; and
(4) in paragraph (8), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``September 30, 2024'' and inserting ``August 31,
2027''.
SEC. 306. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY ACCEPTANCE OF GRANTS.
(a) In General.--Subtitle D of title X of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3227 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``Sec. 1035. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants
``(a) Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence may
authorize the President of the National Intelligence University to
accept qualifying research grants.
``(b) Qualifying Grants.--A qualifying research grant under this
section is a grant that is awarded on a competitive basis by an entity
referred to in subsection (c) for a research project with a scientific,
literary, or educational purpose.
``(c) Entities From Which Grants May Be Accepted.--A qualifying
research grant may be accepted under this section only from a Federal
agency or from a corporation, fund, foundation, educational
institution, or similar entity that is organized and operated primarily
for scientific, literary, or educational purposes.
``(d) Administration of Grant Funds.--
``(1) Establishment of account.--The Director shall
establish an account for administering funds received as
qualifying research grants under this section.
``(2) Use of funds.--The President of the University shall
use the funds in the account established pursuant to paragraph
(1) in accordance with applicable provisions of the regulations
and the terms and conditions of the grants received.
``(e) Related Expenses.--Subject to such limitations as may be
provided in appropriations Acts, appropriations available for the
National Intelligence University may be used to pay expenses incurred
by the University in applying for, and otherwise pursuing, the award of
qualifying research grants.
``(f) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
prescribe regulations for the administration of this section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents preceding section 2
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
1034 the following new item:
``Sec. 1035. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.''.
SEC. 307. PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FACILITIES AND
ASSETS FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 15 the following new
section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such
Act accordingly):
``SEC. 15A. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS FROM UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Budget.--The term `budget', with respect to a fiscal
year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted
to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code.
``(2) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
`congressional intelligence committees' means--
``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
``(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate; and
``(D) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
``(3) Congressional judiciary committees.--The term
`congressional judiciary committees' means--
``(A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
and
``(B) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives.
``(4) Congressional transportation and infrastructure
committees.--The term `congressional transportation and
infrastructure committees' means--
``(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate; and
``(B) the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives.
``(5) Covered facility or asset.--The term `covered
facility or asset' means property owned, leased, or controlled
by the Agency, property controlled and occupied by the Federal
Highway Administration, located immediately adjacent to the
headquarters compound of the Agency, and property owned,
leased, or controlled by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence where the property--
``(A) is identified as high-risk and a potential
target for unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the
Director, in coordination with the Secretary of
Transportation, with respect to potentially impacted
airspace, through a risk-based assessment for purposes
of this section;
``(B) is located in the United States and beneath
airspace that is prohibited or restricted by the
Federal Aviation Administration;
``(C) is a property of which Congress has been
notified is covered under this paragraph; and
``(D) directly relates to one or more functions
authorized to be performed by the Agency, pursuant to
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001) or
this Act.
``(6) Electronic communication.--The term `electronic
communication' has the meaning given such term in section 2510
of title 18, United States Code.
``(7) Intercept.--The term `intercept' has the meaning
given such term in section 2510 of title 18, United States
Code.
``(8) Oral communication.--The term `oral communication'
has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18,
United States Code.
``(9) Radio communication.--The term `radio communication'
has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153).
``(10) Risk-based assessment.--The term `risk-based
assessment' includes an evaluation of threat information
specific to a covered facility or asset and, with respect to
potential impacts on the safety and efficiency of the National
Airspace System and the needs of national security at each
covered facility or asset identified by the Director, an
evaluation of each of the following factors:
``(A) Potential impacts to safety, efficiency, and
use of the National Airspace System, including
potential effects on manned aircraft and unmanned
aircraft systems, aviation safety, airport operations,
infrastructure, and air navigation services relating to
the use of any system or technology for carrying out
the actions described in subsection (c)(1).
``(B) Options for mitigating any identified impacts
to the National Airspace System relating to the use of
any system or technology, including minimizing when
possible the use of any system or technology that
disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic
signals, for carrying out the actions described in
subsection (c)(1).
``(C) Potential consequences of the effects of any
actions taken under subsection (c)(1) to the National
Airspace System and infrastructure if not mitigated.
``(D) The ability to provide reasonable advance
notice to aircraft operators consistent with the safety
of the National Airspace System and the needs of
national security.
``(E) The setting and character of any covered
facility or asset, including whether it is located in a
populated area or near other structures, and any
potential for interference with wireless communications
or for injury or damage to persons or property.
``(F) Potential consequences to national security
if threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems or
unmanned aircraft are not mitigated or defeated.
``(11) United states.--The term `United States' has the
meaning given that term in section 5 of title 18, United States
Code.
``(12) Unmanned aircraft; unmanned aircraft system.--The
terms `unmanned aircraft' and `unmanned aircraft system' have
the meanings given those terms in section 44801 of title 49,
United States Code.
``(13) Wire communication.--The term `wire communication'
has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18,
United States Code.
``(b) Authority.--Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United
States Code, or sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of
title 18, United States Code, or section 705 of the Communications Act
of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 605), the Director may take, and may authorize
Agency personnel with assigned duties that include the security or
protection of people, facilities, or assets within the United States to
take--
``(1) such actions described in subsection (c)(1) that are
necessary to mitigate a credible threat (as defined by the
Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation)
that an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft poses to
the safety or security of a covered facility or asset; and
``(2) such actions described in subsection (c)(3).
``(c) Actions.--
``(1) Actions described.--The actions described in this
paragraph are the following:
``(A) During the operation of the unmanned aircraft
system, detect, identify, monitor, and track the
unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without
prior consent, including by means of intercept or other
access of a wire communication, an oral communication,
or an electronic communication used to control the
unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
``(B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft
system or unmanned aircraft, including by passive or
active and by direct or indirect physical, electronic,
radio, or electromagnetic means.
``(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft
system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent,
including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or
unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or
causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or
radio communications used to control the unmanned
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
``(D) Seize or exercise control over the unmanned
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
``(E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
``(F) Use reasonable force, if necessary, to seize
or otherwise disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
``(2) Coordination.--The Director shall develop the actions
described in paragraph (1) in coordination with the Secretary
of Transportation.
``(3) Research, testing, training, and evaluation.--
``(A) In general.--The Director shall conduct
research, testing, training on, and evaluation of any
equipment, including any electronic equipment, to
determine the capability and utility of the equipment
prior to the use of the equipment for any action
described in paragraph (1).
``(B) Personnel.--Personnel and contractors who do
not have assigned duties that include the security or
protection of people, facilities, or assets may engage
in research, testing, training, and evaluation
activities pursuant to subparagraph (A).
``(4) FAA coordination.--The Director shall coordinate with
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration on any
action described in paragraph (1) or (3) so the Administrator
may ensure that unmanned aircraft system detection and
mitigation systems do not adversely affect or interfere with
safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or
the safe and efficient operation of the National Airspace
System.
``(d) Forfeiture.--Any unmanned aircraft system or unmanned
aircraft that is seized pursuant to subsection (b) as described in
subsection (c)(1) is subject to forfeiture to the United States.
``(e) Regulations and Guidance.--
``(1) Issuance.--The Director and the Secretary of
Transportation may each prescribe regulations, and shall each
issue guidance, to carry out this section.
``(2) Coordination.--
``(A) Requirement.--The Director shall coordinate
the development of guidance under paragraph (1) with
the Secretary of Transportation.
``(B) Aviation safety.--The Director shall
coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation and the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
before issuing any guidance, or otherwise implementing
this section, so the Administrator may ensure that
unmanned aircraft system detection and mitigation
systems do not adversely affect or interfere with safe
airport operations, navigation, air traffic services,
or the safe and efficient operation of the National
Airspace System.
``(f) Privacy Protection.--The regulations prescribed or guidance
issued under subsection (e) shall ensure that--
``(1) the interception or acquisition of, or access to, or
maintenance or use of, communications to or from an unmanned
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft under this section is
conducted in a manner consistent with the First and Fourth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and
applicable provisions of Federal law;
``(2) communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system
or unmanned aircraft are intercepted or acquired only to the
extent necessary to support an action described in subsection
(c);
``(3) records of such communications are maintained only
for as long as necessary, and in no event for more than 180
days, unless the Director determines that maintenance of such
records for a longer period is necessary for the investigation
or prosecution of a violation of law, to fulfill a duty,
responsibility, or function of the Agency, is required under
Federal law, or for the purpose of any litigation; and
``(4) such communications are not disclosed outside the
Agency unless the disclosure--
``(A) is necessary to investigate or prosecute a
violation of law;
``(B) would support the Agency, the Department of
Defense, a Federal law enforcement, intelligence, or
security agency, a State, local, Tribal, or territorial
law enforcement agency, or other relevant person or
entity if such entity or person is engaged in a
security or protection operation;
``(C) is necessary to support a department or
agency listed in subparagraph (B) in investigating or
prosecuting a violation of law;
``(D) would support the enforcement activities of a
regulatory agency of the Federal Government in
connection with a criminal or civil investigation of,
or any regulatory, statutory, or other enforcement
action relating to, an action described in subsection
(b);
``(E) is necessary to protect against dangerous or
unauthorized activity by unmanned aircraft systems or
unmanned aircraft;
``(F) is necessary to fulfill a duty,
responsibility, or function of the Agency; or
``(G) is otherwise required by law.
``(g) Budget.--
``(1) In general.--The Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, as a part of the budget
request of the Agency for each fiscal year after fiscal year
2025, a consolidated funding display that identifies the
funding source for the actions described in subsection (c)(1)
within the Agency.
``(2) Form.--Each funding display submitted pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
``(h) Semiannual Briefings and Notifications.--
``(1) Briefings.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 and semiannually thereafter, the Director shall
provide the congressional intelligence committees, the
congressional judiciary committees, and the congressional
transportation and infrastructure committees a briefing on the
activities carried out pursuant to this section during the
period covered by the briefing.
``(2) Requirement.--Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall
be conducted jointly with the Secretary of Transportation.
``(3) Contents.--Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall
include, for the period covered by the briefing, the following:
``(A) Policies, programs, and procedures to
mitigate or eliminate the effects of the activities
described in paragraph (1) to the National Airspace
System and other critical national transportation
infrastructure.
``(B) A description of instances in which actions
described in subsection (c)(1) have been taken,
including all such instances that may have resulted in
harm, damage, or loss to a person or to private
property.
``(C) A description of the guidance, policies, or
procedures established to address privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties issues affected by the
actions allowed under this section, as well as any
changes or subsequent efforts that would significantly
affect privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties.
``(D) A description of options considered and steps
taken to mitigate any identified effects on the
National Airspace System relating to the use of any
system or technology, including the minimization of the
use of any technology that disrupts the transmission of
radio or electronic signals, for carrying out the
actions described in subsection (c)(1).
``(E) A description of instances in which
communications intercepted or acquired during the
course of operations of an unmanned aircraft system or
unmanned aircraft were maintained for more than 180
days or disclosed outside the Agency.
``(F) How the Director and the Secretary of
Transportation have informed the public as to the
possible use of authorities under this section.
``(G) How the Director and the Secretary of
Transportation have engaged with Federal, State, local,
territorial, or Tribal law enforcement agencies to
implement and use such authorities.
``(H) An assessment of whether any gaps or
insufficiencies remain in statutes, regulations, and
policies that impede the ability of the Agency to
counter the threat posed by the malicious use of
unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned aircraft and any
recommendations to remedy such gaps or insufficiencies.
``(4) Form.--Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall be in
unclassified form, but may be accompanied by an additional
classified report.
``(5) Notification.--
``(A) In general.--Within 30 days of deploying any
new technology to carry out the actions described in
subsection (c)(1), the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a notification of
the deployment of such technology.
``(B) Contents.--Each notification submitted
pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include a
description of options considered to mitigate any
identified effects on the National Airspace System
relating to the use of any system or technology,
including the minimization of the use of any technology
that disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic
signals, for carrying out the actions described in
subsection (c)(1).
``(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed--
``(1) to vest in the Director any authority of the
Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration; or
``(2) to vest in the Secretary of Transportation or the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration any
authority of the Director.
``(j) Termination.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
authority to carry out this section with respect to the actions
specified in subparagraphs (B) through (F) of subsection
(c)(1), shall terminate on the date that is 4 years after the
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025.
``(2) Extension.--The President may extend by 1 year the
termination date specified in paragraph (1) if, before
termination, the President certifies to Congress that such
extension is in the national security interests of the United
States.
``(k) Scope of Authority.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to provide the Director or the Secretary of Transportation
with additional authorities beyond those described in subsections (b)
and (d).''.
SEC. 308. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR NEW CONTROLLED ACCESS
PROGRAMS.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2025 for the National
Intelligence Program may be obligated or expended for any controlled
access program (as defined in section 501A(d) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091a(d))), or a compartment or subcompartment
therein, that is established on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act, until the head of the element of the intelligence community
responsible for the establishment of such program, compartment, or
subcompartment, submits the notification required by section 501A(b) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091a(b)).
SEC. 309. LIMITATION ON TRANSFERS FROM CONTROLLED ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Section 501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091a(b)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Limitation on
Establishment'' and inserting ``Limitations'';
(2) by striking ``A head'' and inserting the following:
``(1) Establishment.--A head''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Transfers.--A head of an element of the intelligence
community may not transfer a capability from a controlled
access program, including from a compartment or subcompartment
therein to a compartment or subcompartment of another
controlled access program, to a special access program (as
defined in section 1152(g) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (50 U.S.C. 3348(g))), or
to anything else outside the controlled access program, until
the head submits to the appropriate congressional committees
and congressional leadership notice of the intent of the head
to make such transfer.''.
SEC. 310. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE COAST GUARD.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard may use up to 1 percent of the
amounts made available for the National Intelligence Program (as such
term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003)) for each fiscal year for intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to objects
of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which amounts
may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and
each such certification shall be considered to be a sufficient voucher
for the amount contained in the certification.
SEC. 311. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 1115. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
``(a) In General.--It shall be unlawful, within the jurisdiction of
the United States, without authorization to access any property that--
``(1) is under the jurisdiction of an element of the
intelligence community; and
``(2) has been clearly marked as closed or restricted.
``(b) Penalties.--Any person who violates subsection (a) shall--
``(1) in the case of the first offense, be fined under
title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 180
days, or both;
``(2) in the case of the second offense, be fined under
such title, imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both; and
``(3) in the case of the third or subsequent offense, be
fined under such title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years,
or both.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents preceding section 2
of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1115. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property.''.
SEC. 312. STRENGTHENING OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS.
(a) In General.--Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 311. Office of Economic Intelligence and Security
``(a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
`counterintelligence', `foreign intelligence', and `intelligence
community' have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(b) Establishment.--There is established within the Office of
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury,
the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security (in this section
referred to as the `Office'), which shall--
``(1) be responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation,
and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence information relating to the operation and
responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury and other
Federal agencies executing economic statecraft tools that do
not include any elements that are elements of the intelligence
community;
``(2) provide intelligence support and economic analysis to
Federal agencies implementing United States economic policy,
including for purposes of global strategic competition; and
``(3) have such other related duties and authorities as may
be assigned by the Secretary for purposes of the
responsibilities described in paragraph (1), subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
``(c) Assistant Secretary for Economic Intelligence and Security.--
The Office shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary, who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the
Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
chapter 3 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to
section 311 and inserting the following:
``311. Office of Economic Intelligence and Security.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 3(4)(J) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)(J)) is amended by striking ``Office of
Intelligence and Analysis'' and inserting ``Office of Economic
Intelligence and Security''.
(d) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation, document,
paper, or other record of the United States to the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury shall be
deemed a reference to the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security
of the Department of the Treasury.
SEC. 313. REPORT ON SENSITIVE COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--
(1) Commercially available information.--The term
``commercially available information'' means--
(A) any data or other information of the type
customarily made available or obtainable and sold,
leased, or licensed to members of the general public or
to non-governmental entities for purposes other than
governmental purposes; or
(B) data and information for exclusive government
use knowingly and voluntarily provided by, procured
from, or made accessible by corporate entities on their
own initiative or at the request of a government
entity.
(2) Personally identifiable information.--The term
``personally identifiable information'' means information that,
alone or when combined with other information regarding an
individual, can be used to distinguish or trace the identity of
such individual.
(3) Sensitive activities.--The term ``sensitive
activities'' means activities that, over an extended period of
time--
(A) establish a pattern of life;
(B) reveal personal affiliations, preferences, or
identifiers;
(C) facilitate prediction of future acts;
(D) enable targeting activities;
(E) reveal the exercise of individual rights and
freedoms, including the rights to freedom of speech and
of the press, to free exercise of religion, to
peaceably assemble, including membership or
participation in organizations or associations, and to
petition the government; or
(F) reveal any other activity the disclosure of
which could cause substantial harm, embarrassment,
inconvenience, or unfairness to the United States
person who engaged in the activity.
(4) Sensitive commercially available information.--The term
``sensitive commercially available information''--
(A) means commercially available information that
is known or reasonably expected to contain--
(i) a substantial volume of personally
identifiable information regarding United
States persons; or
(ii) a greater than de minims volume of
sensitive data;
(B) shall not include--
(i) newspapers or other periodicals;
(ii) weather reports;
(iii) books;
(iv) journal articles or other published
works;
(v) public filings or records;
(vi) documents or databases similar to
those described in clauses (i) through (v),
whether accessed through a subscription or
accessible free of cost; or
(vii) limited data samples made available
to elements of the intelligence community for
the purposes of allowing such elements to
determine whether to purchase the full dataset
and not accessed, retained, or used for any
other purpose.
(5) Sensitive data.--The term ``sensitive data'' means data
that--
(A)(i) captures personal attributes, conditions, or
identifiers that are traceable to 1 or more specific
United States persons, either through the dataset or by
correlating the dataset with other available
information; and
(ii) concerns the race or ethnicity, political
opinions, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, gender
identity, medical or genetic information, financial
data, or any other data with respect to such specific
United States person or United States persons the
disclosure of which would have the potential to cause
substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or
unfairness to the United States person or United States
persons described by the data; or
(B) captures the sensitive activities of 1 or more
United States persons.
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an unorganized association substantially
composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens; or
(C) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, with the exception of any such entity directed
or controlled by a foreign government.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the head of
each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the access
to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive commercially
available information by the respective element.
(2) Contents.--
(A) In general.--For each dataset containing
sensitive commercially available information accessed,
collected, processed, or used by the element concerned
for purposes other than research and development, a
report required by paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(i) A description of the nature and volume
of the sensitive commercially available
information accessed or collected by the
element.
(ii) A description of the mission or
administrative need or function for which the
sensitive commercially available information is
accessed or collected, and of the nature,
scope, reliability, and timeliness of the
dataset required to fulfill such mission or
administrative need or function.
(iii) A description of the purpose of the
access, collection, or processing, and the
intended use of the sensitive commercially
available information.
(iv) An identification of the legal
authority for the collection or access, and
processing of the sensitive commercially
available information.
(v) An identification of the source of the
sensitive commercially available information
and the persons from whom the sensitive
commercially available information was accessed
or collected.
(vi) A description of the mechanics of the
access, collection, and processing of the
sensitive commercially available information,
including the Federal entities that
participated in the procurement process.
(vii) A description of the method by which
the element has limited the access to and
collection and processing of the sensitive
commercially available information to the
maximum extent feasible consistent with the
need to fulfill the mission or administrative
need.
(viii) An assessment of whether the mission
or administrative need can be fulfilled if
reasonably available privacy-enhancing
techniques, such as filtering or anonymizing,
the application of traditional safeguards,
including access limitations and retention
limits, differential privacy techniques, or
other information-masking techniques, such as
restrictions or correlation, are implemented
with respect to information concerning United
States persons.
(ix) An assessment of the privacy and civil
liberties risks associated with accessing,
collecting, or processing the data and the
methods by which the element mitigates such
risks.
(x) An assessment of the applicability of
section 552a of title 5, United States Code
(commonly referred to as the ``Privacy Act of
1974''), if any.
(xi) To the extent feasible, an assessment
of the original source of the data and the
method through which the dataset was generated
and aggregated, and whether any element of the
intelligence community previously accessed or
collected the same or similar sensitive
commercially available information from the
source.
(xii) An assessment of the quality and
integrity of the data, including, as
appropriate, whether the sensitive commercially
available information reflects any underlying
biases or inferences, and efforts to ensure
that any intelligence products created with the
data are consistent with the standards of the
intelligence community for accuracy and
objectivity.
(xiii) An assessment of the security,
operational, and counterintelligence risks
associated with the means of accessing or
collecting the data, and recommendations for
how the element could mitigate such risks.
(xiv) A description of the system in which
the data is retained and processed and how the
system is properly secured while allowing for
effective implementation, management, and
audit, as practicable, of relevant privacy and
civil liberties protections.
(xv) An assessment of security risks posed
by the system architecture of vendors providing
sensitive commercially available information or
access to such sensitive commercially available
information, access restrictions for the data
repository of each such vendor, and the
vendor's access to query terms and, if any,
relevant safeguards.
(xvi) A description of procedures to
restrict access to the sensitive commercially
available information.
(xvii) A description of procedures for
conducting, approving, documenting, and
auditing queries, searches, or correlations
with respect to the sensitive commercially
available information.
(xviii) A description of procedures for
restricting dissemination of the sensitive
commercially available information, including
deletion of information of United States
persons returned in response to a query or
other search unless the information is assessed
to be associated or potentially associated with
the documented mission-related justification
for the query or search.
(xix) A description of masking and other
privacy-enhancing techniques used by the
element to protect sensitive commercially
available information.
(xx) A description of any retention and
deletion policies.
(xxi) A determination of whether
unevaluated data or information has been made
available to other elements of the intelligence
community or foreign partners and, if so,
identification of those elements or partners.
(xxii) A description of any licensing
agreements or contract restrictions with
respect to the sensitive commercially available
information.
(xxiii) A data management plan for the
lifecycle of the data, from access or
collection to disposition.
(xxiv) For any item required by clauses (i)
through (xxiii) that cannot be completed due to
exigent circumstances relating to collecting,
accessing, processing, or using sensitive
commercially available information, a
description of such exigent circumstances.
(B) Research and development data.--For each
dataset containing sensitive commercially available
information accessed, collected, processed, or used by
the element concerned solely for research and
development purposes, a report required by paragraph
(1) may be limited to a description of the oversight by
the element of such access, collection, process, and
use.
(c) Public Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
make available to the public, once every 2 years, a report on the
policies and procedures of the intelligence community with respect to
access to and collection, processing, and safeguarding of sensitive
commercially available information.
SEC. 314. POLICY ON COLLECTION OF UNITED STATES LOCATION INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) United states location information.--The term ``United
States location information'' means information derived or
otherwise calculated from the transmission or reception of a
radio signal that reveals the approximate or actual geographic
location of a customer, subscriber, user, or device in the
United States, or, if the customer, subscriber, or user is
known to be a United States person, outside the United States.
(2) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Attorney General, shall issue a policy on the
collection of United States location information by the intelligence
community.
(c) Content.--The policy required by subsection (a) shall address
the filtering, segregation, use, dissemination, masking, and retention
of United States location information.
(d) Form; Public Availability.--The policy required by subsection
(a)--
(1) shall be issued in unclassified form and made available
to the public; and
(2) may include a classified annex, which the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees.
SEC. 315. DISPLAY OF FLAGS, SEALS, AND EMBLEMS OTHER THAN THE UNITED
STATES FLAG.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Executive agency.--The term ``Executive agency'' has
the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) National intelligence program.--The term ``National
Intelligence Program'' has the meaning given such term in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).
(b) In General.--Any flag, seal, or emblem that is not the United
States flag and is flown, draped, projected, or otherwise displayed as
a visual and symbolic representation at a property, office, or other
official location of an element of the intelligence community--
(1) shall be smaller than the official United States flag;
and
(2) if flown, may not be displayed higher than or above the
United States flag.
(c) Limitation on Availability of Funds for Displaying and Flying
Flags.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2025 for the National
Intelligence Program, may be obligated or expended to fly or display a
flag over a facility of an element of the intelligence community other
than the following:
(1) The United States flag.
(2) The POW/MIA flag.
(3) The Hostage and Wrongful Detainee flag, pursuant to
section 904 of title 36, United States Code.
(4) The flag of a State, insular area, or the District of
Columbia at a domestic location.
(5) The flag of an Indian Tribal Government.
(6) The official branded flag of an Executive agency.
(7) The flag of an element, flag officer, or general
officer of the Armed Forces.
TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
SEC. 401. STRATEGY AND OUTREACH ON RISKS POSED BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA SMARTPORT TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Strategy and Outreach Required.--The Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall develop a strategy and
conduct outreach to United States industry, including shipping
companies, port operators, and logistics firms, on the risks of
smartport technology of the People's Republic of China and other
related risks posed by entities of the People's Republic of China,
including LOGINK, China Ocean Shipping Company, Limited (COSCO), China
Communications Construction Company, Limited (CCCC), China Media Group
(CMG), and Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC), to
the national security of the United States, the security of United
States supply chains, and commercial activity, including with respect
to delays, interruption, and lockout of access to systems and
technologies that enable the free flow of commerce.
(b) Consistency With Statutes and Executive Orders.--The Director
shall carry out subsection (a) in a manner that is consistent with the
following:
(1) Part 6 of title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, as
amended by Executive Order 14116 (89 Fed. Reg. 13971; relating
to amending regulations relating to the safeguarding of
vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities of the
United States.
(2) Executive Order 14017 (86 Fed. Reg. 11849; relating to
America's supply chains), or successor order.
(3) Section 825 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31).
(c) Coordination.--The Director shall carry out subsection (a) in
coordination with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Commander of the Office of
Naval Intelligence, and such other heads of Federal agencies as the
Director considers appropriate.
SEC. 402. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY OF PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Assessment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the Director of the National Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center and such heads of elements of the intelligence
community as the Director of National Intelligence considers
appropriate, conduct an assessment of the current status of the
biotechnology of the People's Republic of China, which shall include an
assessment of how the People's Republic of China is supporting the
biotechnology sector through both licit and illicit means, such as
foreign direct investment, subsidies, talent recruitment, or other
efforts.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Direct of National Intelligence completes the
assessment required by subsection (a), the Director shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment.
(2) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 403. INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ON
SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSOR CHEMICALS ORIGINATING IN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Strategy Required.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, in consultation with the head of the Office of National Security
Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and the
heads of such other agencies as the Director considers appropriate,
develop a strategy to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to
the illicit trafficking of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from
the People's Republic of China and other source countries.
(b) Mechanism for Collaboration.--The Director shall develop a
mechanism so that subject matter experts in elements of the Federal
Government other than elements in the intelligence community, including
those without security clearances, can share information with the
intelligence community relating to illicit trafficking described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 404. REPORT ON EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO EVADE
UNITED STATES TRANSPARENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
REGULATIONS.
(a) Report Required.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on efforts
of the People's Republic of China to evade the following:
(1) Identification under section 1260H of the William M.
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283; 10 U.S.C. 113 note).
(2) Restrictions or limitations imposed by any of the
following:
(A) Section 805 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-
31).
(B) Section 889 of the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public
Law 115-232; 41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.).
(C) The list of specially designated nationals and
blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury
(commonly known as the ``SDN list'').
(D) The Entity List maintained by the Bureau of
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and
set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15,
Code of Federal Regulations.
(E) Commercial or dual-use export controls under
the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801
et seq.) and the Export Administration Regulations.
(F) Executive Order 14105 (88 Fed. Reg. 54867;
relating to addressing United States investments in
certain national security technologies and products in
countries of concern), or successor order.
(G) Import restrictions on products made with
forced labor implemented by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection pursuant to Public Law 117-78 (22 U.S.C.
6901 note).
(b) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
SEC. 405. PLAN FOR RECRUITMENT OF MANDARIN SPEAKERS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive plan
to prioritize the recruitment and training of individuals who speak
Mandarin Chinese for each element of the intelligence community.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle B--The Russian Federation
SEC. 411. ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION SPONSORSHIP OF ACTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(2) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign
terrorist organization'' means an organization that has been
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary
of State, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
(3) Specially designated global terrorist organization.--
The term ``specially designated global terrorist organization''
means an organization that has been designated as a specially
designated global terrorist by the Secretary of State or the
Secretary, pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism).
(4) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor
of terrorism'' means a country the government of which the
Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, for purposes of--
(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));
(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
(C) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or
(D) any other provision of law.
(b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
assessment on the extent to which the Russian Federation--
(1) provides support for acts of international terrorism;
and
(2) cooperates with the antiterrorism efforts of the United
States.
(c) Elements.--The assessment required by subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) A list of all instances in which the Russian
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has
failed to show support for or cooperate with the United States
on international efforts to combat terrorism, such as
apprehending, prosecuting, or extraditing suspected and known
terrorists, including members of foreign terrorist
organizations, and sharing intelligence to deter terrorist
attacks.
(2) A list of all instances in which the Russian
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has
provided financial, material, technical, or lethal support to
foreign terrorist organizations, specially designated global
terrorist organizations, state sponsors of terrorism, or for
acts of international terrorism.
(3) A list of all instances in which the Russian
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has
willfully aided or abetted--
(A) the international proliferation of nuclear
explosive devices to persons;
(B) a person in acquiring unsafeguarded special
nuclear material; or
(C) the efforts of a person to use, develop,
produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons.
(4) A determination of whether the activities of the Wagner
Group constitute acts of international terrorism and whether
such activities continue under any of the successor entities of
the Wagner Group, including Afrika Corps.
(d) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Briefings.--Not later than 30 days after submission of the
assessment required by subsection (b), the Director of National
Intelligence shall provide a classified briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees on the methodology and findings of the
assessment.
SEC. 412. ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY COURSE OF WAR IN UKRAINE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
collaboration with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an assessment of the likely
course of the war in Ukraine through December 31, 2025.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall
include an assessment of each of the following:
(1) The ability of the military of Ukraine to defend
against Russian aggression if the United States does, or does
not, continue to provide military and economic assistance to
Ukraine during the period described in such subsection.
(2) The likely course of the war during such period if the
United States does, or does not, continue to provide military
and economic assistance to Ukraine.
(3) The ability and willingness of countries in Europe and
outside of Europe to continue to provide military and economic
assistance to Ukraine if the United States does, or does not,
do so, including the ability of such countries to make up for
any shortfall in United States assistance.
(4) The effects of a potential defeat of Ukraine by the
Russian Federation on the potential for further aggression from
the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea.
(c) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Subtitle C--International Terrorism
SEC. 421. INCLUSION OF HAMAS, HEZBOLLAH, AL-QAEDA, AND ISIS OFFICIALS
AND MEMBERS AMONG ALIENS ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY.
Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)) is amended, in the undesignated matter following
subparagraph (IX), by striking ``or spokesman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization'' and inserting ``spokesperson, or member of
the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda,
ISIS, or any successor or affiliate group, or who endorses or espouses
terrorist activities conducted by any of the aforementioned groups,''.
SEC. 422. ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON THE THREAT OF ISIS-KHORASAN TO THE
UNITED STATES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, in coordination with such elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers relevant, shall--
(1) conduct an assessment of the threats to the United
States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-Khorasan; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
written report on the findings of the assessment.
(b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the historical evolution of ISIS-
Khorasan, beginning with Al-Qaeda and the attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001.
(2) A description of the ideology and stated intentions of
ISIS-Khorasan as related to the United States and the interests
of the United States, including the homeland.
(3) A list of all terrorist attacks worldwide attributable
to ISIS-Khorasan or for which ISIS-Khorasan claimed credit,
beginning on January 1, 2015.
(4) A description of the involvement of ISIS-Khorasan in
Afghanistan before, during, and after the withdrawal of United
States military and civilian personnel and resources in August
2021.
(5) The recruiting and training strategy of ISIS-Khorasan
following the withdrawal described in paragraph (4),
including--
(A) the geographic regions in which ISIS-Khorasan
is physically present;
(B) regions from which ISIS-Khorasan is recruiting;
and
(C) its ambitions for individual actors worldwide
and in the United States.
(6) A description of the relationship between ISIS-Khorasan
and ISIS core, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist
groups, as appropriate.
(7) A description of the association of members of ISIS-
Khorasan with individuals formerly detained at United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(8) A description of ISIS-Khorasan's development of, and
relationships with, travel facilitation networks in Europe,
Central Asia, Eurasia, and Latin America.
(9) An assessment of ISIS-Khorasan's understanding of the
border and immigration policies and enforcement of the United
States.
(10) An assessment of the known travel of members of ISIS-
Khorasan within the Western Hemisphere and specifically across
the southern border of the United States.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 423. TERRORIST FINANCING PREVENTION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Digital asset.--The term ``digital asset'' means any
digital representation of value that is recorded on a
cryptographically secured distributed ledger or any similar
technology, or another implementation which was designed and
built as part of a system to leverage or replace blockchain or
distributed ledger technology or their derivatives.
(2) Digital asset protocol.--The term ``digital asset
protocol'' means any communication protocol, smart contract, or
other software--
(A) deployed through the use of distributed ledger
or similar technology; and
(B) that provides a mechanism for users to interact
and agree to the terms of a trade for digital assets.
(3) Foreign digital asset transaction facilitator.--The
term ``foreign digital asset transaction facilitator'' means
any foreign person or group of foreign persons that, as
determined by the Secretary, controls, operates, or makes
available a digital asset protocol or similar facility, or
otherwise materially assists in the purchase, sale, exchange,
custody, or other transaction involving an exchange or transfer
of value using digital assets.
(4) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign
financial institution'' has the meaning given that term under
section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
(5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(6) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign
terrorist organization'' means an organization that has been
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary
of State, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
(7) Good.--The term ``good'' means any article, natural or
manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(8) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Treasury.
(9) Specially designated global terrorist organization.--
The term ``specially designated global terrorist organization''
means an organization that has been designated as a specially
designated global terrorist by the Secretary of State or the
Secretary, pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism).
(10) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
(b) Sanctions With Respect to Foreign Financial Institutions and
Foreign Digital Asset Transaction Facilitators That Engage in Certain
Transactions.--
(1) Mandatory identification.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter,
the Secretary shall identify and submit to the President a
report identifying any foreign financial institution or foreign
digital asset transaction facilitator that has knowingly--
(A) facilitated a significant financial transaction
with--
(i) a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
(ii) a specially designated global
terrorist organization; or
(iii) a person identified on the list of
specially designated nationals and blocked
persons maintained by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury, the property and interests in
property of which are blocked pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) for acting on behalf of or
at the direction of, or being owned or
controlled by, a foreign terrorist organization
or a specially designated global terrorist
organization; or
(B) engaged in money laundering to carry out an
activity described in subparagraph (A).
(2) Imposition of sanctions.--
(A) Foreign financial institutions.--The President
shall prohibit, or impose strict conditions on, the
opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a
payable-through account in the United States by a
foreign financial institution identified under
paragraph (1).
(B) Foreign digital asset transaction
facilitators.--The President, pursuant to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, shall
prohibit any transactions between any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and a foreign
digital asset transaction facilitator identified under
paragraph (1).
(3) Implementation and penalties.--
(A) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1702, 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this
Act.
(B) Penalties.--The penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation
of regulations prescribed under this section to the
same extent that such penalties apply to a person that
commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of
such section 206.
(4) Procedures for judicial review of classified
information.--
(A) In general.--If a finding under this
subsection, or a prohibition, condition, or penalty
imposed as a result of any such finding, is based on
classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of
the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C.
App.)), the Secretary may submit to a court reviewing
the finding or the imposition of the prohibition,
condition, or penalty such classified information ex
parte and in camera.
(B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to confer or imply any
right to judicial review of any finding under this
subsection or any prohibition, condition, or penalty
imposed as a result of any such finding.
(5) Waiver for national security.--The Secretary may waive
the imposition of sanctions under this subsection with respect
to a person if the Secretary--
(A) determines that such a waiver is in the
national interests of the United States; and
(B) submits to Congress a notification of the
waiver and the reasons for the waiver.
(6) Exception for intelligence activities.--This subsection
shall not apply with respect to any activity subject to the
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.
(7) Exception relating to importation of goods.--The
authorities and requirements under this section shall not
include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on
the importation of goods.
(c) Special Measures for Modern Threats.--Section 5318A of title
31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2)(C), by striking ``subsection
(b)(5)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (5) and (6) of subsection
(b)''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (5), by striking ``for or on
behalf of a foreign banking institution''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(6) Prohibitions or conditions on certain transmittals of
funds.--If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the
United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating
outside of the United States, 1 or more types of accounts
within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United
States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within, or
involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States to be of
primary money laundering concern, the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, may prohibit, or impose conditions upon,
certain transmittals of funds (as such term may be defined by
the Secretary in a special measure issuance, by regulation, or
as otherwise permitted by law), to or from any domestic
financial institution or domestic financial agency if such
transmittal of funds involves any such jurisdiction,
institution, type of account, class of transaction, or type of
account.''.
(d) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary such funds as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this
section.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats
SEC. 431. ASSESSMENT OF VISA-FREE TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN WESTERN
HEMISPHERE BY NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
assessment of the impacts to national security caused by travel without
a visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by nationals
of countries of concern.
(b) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Countries of Concern Defined.--In this section, the term
``countries of concern'' means--
(1) the Russian Federation;
(2) the People's Republic of China;
(3) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(4) the Syrian Arab Republic;
(5) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(6) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and
(7) the Republic of Cuba.
SEC. 432. STUDY ON THREAT POSED BY FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES
AGRICULTURAL LAND.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, the
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
National Intelligence.
(3) Nonmarket economy country.--The term ``nonmarket
economy country'' has the meaning given that term in section
771(18) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677(18)).
(b) Study and Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director, in coordination with
the elements of the intelligence community the Director
considers appropriate and with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of the Treasury,
shall--
(A) complete a study on the threat posed to the
United States by foreign investment in agricultural
land in the United States; and
(B) provide to the appropriate committees of
Congress a briefing on the results of the study.
(2) Data.--In conducting the study required by paragraph
(1), the Director shall process and analyze relevant data
collected by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Agriculture, and the Secretary of the Treasury, including the
information submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture under
section 2 of the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act
of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 3501).
(3) Elements.--The study required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) Data and an analysis of agricultural land
holdings, including current and previous uses of the
land disaggregated by sector and industry, in each
county in the United States held by a foreign person
from--
(i) a country identified as a country that
poses a risk to the national security of the
United States in the most recent annual report
on worldwide threats issued by the Director
pursuant to section 108B of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043b)
(commonly known as the ``Annual Threat
Assessment'');
(ii) a nonmarket economy country; or
(iii) any other country that the Director
determines to be appropriate.
(B) An analysis of the proximity of the
agricultural land holdings to critical infrastructure
and military installations.
(C) An assessment of the threats posed to the
national security of the United States by malign actors
that use foreign investment in agricultural land in the
United States.
(D) An assessment of warning indicators and methods
by which to detect potential threats from the use by
foreign adversaries of agricultural products for
nefarious ends.
(E) An assessment of additional resources or
authorities necessary to counter threats identified
during the study.
SEC. 433. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT POSED BY CITIZENSHIP-BY-INVESTMENT
PROGRAMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Assistant secretary.--The term ``Assistant Secretary''
means the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of the Treasury.
(3) Citizenship-by-investment program.--The term
``citizenship-by-investment program'' means an immigration,
investment, or other program of a foreign country that, in
exchange for a covered contribution, authorizes the individual
making the covered contribution to acquire citizenship in such
country, including temporary or permanent residence that may
serve as the basis for subsequent naturalization.
(4) Covered contribution.--The term ``covered
contribution'' means--
(A) an investment in, or a monetary donation or any
other form of direct or indirect capital transfer to,
including through the purchase or rental of real
estate--
(i) the government of a foreign country; or
(ii) any person, business, or entity in
such a foreign country; and
(B) a donation to, or endowment of, any activity
contributing to the public good in such a foreign
country.
(5) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
National Intelligence.
(b) Assessment of Threat Posed by Citizenship-by-investment
Programs.--
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director and the Assistant
Secretary, in coordination with the heads of the other elements
of the intelligence community and the head of any appropriate
Federal agency, shall complete an assessment of the threat
posed to the United States by citizenship-by-investment
programs.
(2) Elements.--The assessment required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) An identification of each citizenship-by-
investment program, including an identification of the
foreign country that operates each such program.
(B) With respect to each citizenship-by-investment
program identified under subparagraph (A)--
(i) a description of the types of
investments required under the program; and
(ii) an identification of the sectors to
which an individual may make a covered
contribution under the program.
(C) An assessment of the threats posed to the
national security of the United States by malign actors
that use citizenship-by-investment programs--
(i) to evade sanctions or taxes;
(ii) to facilitate or finance--
(I) crimes relating to national
security, including terrorism, weapons
trafficking or proliferation,
cybercrime, drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and espionage; or
(II) any other activity that
furthers the interests of a foreign
adversary or undermines the integrity
of the immigration laws or security of
the United States; or
(iii) to undermine the United States and
its interests through any other means
identified by the Director and the Assistant
Secretary.
(D) An identification of the foreign countries the
citizenship-by-investment programs of which pose the
greatest threat to the national security of the United
States.
(3) Report and briefing.--
(A) Report.--
(i) In general.--Not later than 180 days
after completing the assessment required by
paragraph (1), the Director and the Assistant
Secretary shall jointly submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the findings of the Director and the Assistant
Secretary with respect to the assessment.
(ii) Elements.--The report required by
clause (i) shall include the following:
(I) A detailed description of the
threats posed to the national security
of the United States by citizenship-by-
investment programs.
(II) Recommendations for additional
resources or authorities necessary to
counter such threats.
(III) A description of
opportunities to counter such threats.
(iii) Form.--The report required by clause
(i) shall be submitted in unclassified form but
may include a classified annex, as appropriate.
(B) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the
date on which the report required by subparagraph (A)
is submitted, the Director and Assistant Secretary
shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress
with a briefing on the report.
SEC. 434. MITIGATING THE USE OF UNITED STATES COMPONENTS AND TECHNOLOGY
IN HOSTILE ACTIVITIES BY FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Foreign defense material, including advanced military
and intelligence capabilities, continues to rely heavily on
products and services sourced from the United States.
(2) Iran drones operating against Ukraine were found to
include several United States components.
(3) The components described in paragraph (2) came from 13
different United States companies and are integral to the
operation of the drones.
(4) The Chinese spy balloon that flew across the United
States in 2023 used a United States internet service provider
to communicate.
(5) The connection allowed the balloon to send burst
transmissions, or high-bandwidth collections of data over short
periods.
(6) Foreign adversaries and affiliated foreign defense
companies frequently acquire components and services, sourced
from the United States, through violation of United States
export control laws.
(b) Supply Chain Risk Mitigation.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in collaboration with such heads of elements of the
intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, develop
and commence implementation of a strategy to work with United States
companies to mitigate or disrupt the acquisition and use of United
States components in the conduct of activities harmful to the national
security of the United States.
(c) Goal.--The goal of the strategy required by subsection (b)
shall be to inform and provide intelligence support to government and
private sector entities in preventing United States components and
technologies from aiding or supporting hostile or harmful activities
conducted by foreign adversaries of the United States.
(d) Consultation.--In developing and implementing the strategy
required by subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence--
(1) shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security;
and
(2) may consult with such other heads of Federal
departments or agencies as the Director of National
Intelligence considers appropriate.
(e) Annual Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until the date that is 3
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall
submit to Congress an annual report on the status and effect of the
implementation of the strategy required by subsection (b).
SEC. 435. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF
VISITORS AND ASSIGNEES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Assignee; visitor.--The terms ``assignee'' and
``visitor'' mean a foreign national from a country identified
in the report submitted to Congress by the Director of National
Intelligence in 2024 pursuant to section 108B of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043b) (commonly referred to as
the ``Annual Threat Assessment'') as ``engaging in competitive
behavior that directly threatens U.S. national security'', who
is not an employee of a National Laboratory, and has requested
access to the premises, information, or technology of a
National Laboratory.
(3) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy (or their designee).
(4) Foreign national.--The term ``foreign national'' has
the meaning given the term ``alien'' in section 101(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
(5) National laboratory.--The term ``National Laboratory''
has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(6) Non-traditional collector.--The term ``non-traditional
collector'' means an individual not employed by a foreign
intelligence service, who is seeking access to sensitive
information about a capability, research, or organizational
dynamics of the United States to inform a foreign adversary or
non-state actor.
(b) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
(1) The National Laboratories conduct critical, cutting-
edge research across a range of scientific disciplines that
provide the United States with a technological edge over other
countries.
(2) The technologies developed in the National Laboratories
contribute to the national security of the United States,
including classified and sensitive military technology and
dual-use commercial technology.
(3) International cooperation in the field of science is
critical to the United States maintaining its leading
technological edge.
(4) The research enterprise of the Department of Energy,
including the National Laboratories, is increasingly targeted
by adversarial nations to exploit military and dual-use
technologies for military or economic gain.
(5) Approximately 40,000 citizens of foreign countries,
including more than 8,000 citizens from China and Russia, were
granted access to the premises, information, or technology of
National Laboratories in fiscal year 2023.
(6) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy is responsible for identifying and
mitigating counterintelligence risks to the Department,
including the National Laboratories.
(c) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that,
before being granted access to the premises, information, or technology
of a National Laboratory, citizens of foreign countries identified in
the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the intelligence community as
``engaging in competitive behavior that directly threatens U.S.
national security'' should be appropriately screened by the National
Laboratory to which they seek access, and by the Office of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence of the Department, to identify and mitigate
risks associated with granting the requested access to sensitive
military, or dual-use technologies.
(d) Review of Sensitive Country Visitor and Assignee Access
Requests.--The Director shall promulgate a policy to assess the
counterintelligence risk each visitor or assignee poses to the research
or activities undertaken at a National Laboratory.
(e) Advice With Respect to Visitors or Assignees.--
(1) In general.--The Director shall provide advice to a
National Laboratory on visitors and assignees when 1 or more of
the following conditions are present:
(A) The Director has reason to believe that a
visitor or assignee is a non-traditional intelligence
collector.
(B) The Director is in receipt of information
indicating that a visitor or assignee constitutes a
counterintelligence risk to a National Laboratory.
(2) Advice described.--Advice provided to a National
Laboratory in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a description of the assessed risk;
(B) recommendations to mitigate the risk; and
(C) identification of research or technology that
would be at risk if access is granted to the visitor or
assignee concerned.
(f) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter, the Director shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, which
shall include--
(1) the number of visitors or assignees permitted to access
the premises, information, or technology of each National
Laboratory;
(2) the number of instances in which the Director advised a
National Laboratory in accordance with subsection (e); and
(3) the number of instances in which a National Laboratory
admitted a visitor or assignee against the advice of the
Director.
SEC. 436. PROHIBITION ON NATIONAL LABORATORIES ADMITTING CERTAIN
FOREIGN NATIONALS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Assignee.--The term ``assignee'' means an individual
who is seeking approval from, or has been approved by, a
National Laboratory to access the premises, information, or
technology of the National Laboratory for a period of more than
30 consecutive days.
(2) Covered foreign national.--
(A) In general.--The term ``covered foreign
national'' means a foreign national of any of the
following countries:
(i) The People's Republic of China.
(ii) The Russian Federation.
(iii) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(iv) The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.
(v) The Republic of Cuba.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``covered foreign
national'' does not include an individual that is
lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined
in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a))).
(3) Foreign national.--The term ``foreign national'' has
the meaning given the term ``alien'' in section 101(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
(4) National laboratory.--The term ``National Laboratory''
has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(5) Senior counterintelligence official.--The term ``senior
counterintelligence official'' means--
(A) the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation;
(B) the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation;
(C) the Executive Assistant Director of the
National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; or
(D) the Assistant Director of the
Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(6) Visitor.--The term ``visitor'' means an individual who
is seeking approval from, or has been approved by, a National
Laboratory to access the premises, information, or technology
of the National Laboratory for any period shorter than a period
described in paragraph (1).
(b) Prohibition.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, a National
Laboratory--
(A) shall not admit as a visitor or assignee any
covered foreign national; and
(B) shall prohibit access to any visitor or
assignee that is a covered foreign national and has
sought or obtained approval to access the premises,
information, or technology of the National Laboratory
as of that date.
(2) Waiver.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a National
Laboratory if the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy and a senior counterintelligence
official, certifies and issues a waiver to the National
Laboratory requesting to admit a covered foreign national as a
visitor or assignee, in writing, that the benefits to the
United States of admittance or access by that covered foreign
national outweigh the national security and economic risks to
the United States.
(3) Notification to congress.--Not later than 30 days after
the date that a waiver is issued pursuant to paragraph (2), the
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate, the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology of the House of Representatives a notification
describing each waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (2),
including--
(A) the country of origin of the covered foreign
national who is the subject of the waiver;
(B) the date of the request by the covered foreign
national for admission or access to a National
Laboratory;
(C) the date on which the decision to issue the
waiver was made; and
(D) the specific reasons for issuing the waiver.
SEC. 437. QUARTERLY REPORT ON CERTAIN FOREIGN NATIONALS ENCOUNTERED AT
THE UNITED STATES BORDER.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Encountered.--The term ``encountered'', with respect to
a special interest alien, means physically apprehended by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection personnel.
(2) Special interest alien.--The term ``special interest
alien'' means an alien (as defined in section 101(a)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3)) who,
based upon an analysis of travel patterns and other information
available to the United States Government, potentially poses a
threat to the national security of the United States and its
interests due to a known or potential nexus to terrorism,
espionage, organized crime, or other malign actors.
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter for the following 3
years, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence, shall publish, on a publicly
accessible website of the Department of Homeland Security, a report
identifying the aggregate number of special interest aliens who, during
the applicable reporting period--
(1) have been encountered at or near an international
border of the United States; and
(2)(A) have been released from custody;
(B) are under supervision;
(C) are being detained by the Department of Homeland
Security; or
(D) have been removed from the United States.
SEC. 438. ASSESSMENT OF THE LESSONS LEARNED BY THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a written assessment of the lessons
learned from the Israel-Hamas war.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) Lessons learned from the timing and scope of the
October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas against Israel, including
lessons related to United States intelligence cooperation with
Israel and other regional partners.
(2) Lessons learned from advances in warfare, including the
use by adversaries of a complex tunnel network.
(3) Lessons learned from attacks by adversaries against
maritime shipping routes in the Red Sea.
(4) Lessons learned from the use by adversaries of rockets,
missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, including attacks by
Iran.
(5) Analysis of the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on the
global security environment, including the war in Ukraine.
(c) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 439. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON TREN
DE ARAGUA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress an intelligence assessment on the
gang known as ``Tren de Aragua''.
(b) Elements.--The intelligence assessment required by subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the key leaders, organizational
structure, subgroups, presence in countries in the Western
Hemisphere, and cross-border illicit drug smuggling routes of
Tren de Aragua.
(2) A description of the practices used by Tren de Aragua
to generate revenue.
(3) A description of the level at which Tren de Aragua
receives support from the regime of Nicolas Maduro in
Venezuela.
(4) A description of the manner in which Tren de Aragua is
exploiting heightened migratory flows out of Venezuela and
throughout the Western Hemisphere to expand its operations.
(5) A description of the degree to which Tren de Aragua
cooperates or competes with other criminal organizations in the
Western Hemisphere.
(6) An estimate of the annual revenue received by Tren de
Aragua from the sale of illicit drugs, kidnapping, and human
trafficking, disaggregated by activity.
(7) A determination on whether Tren De Aragua meets the
definition of ``significant transnational criminal
organization'' in section 3 of Executive Order 13581 (76 Fed.
Reg. 44757; relating to blocking property of transnational
criminal organizations), as amended by Executive Order 13863
(84 Fed. Reg. 10255; relating to taking additional steps to
address the national emergency with respect to significant
transnational criminal organizations).
(8) Any other information the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency considers relevant.
(c) Form.--The intelligence assessment required by subsection (a)
may be submitted in classified form.
(d) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 440. ASSESSMENT OF MADURO REGIME'S ECONOMIC AND SECURITY
RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM AND
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
assessment of the economic and security relationships of the regime of
Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela with the countries and organizations
described in subsection (b), including formal and informal support to
and from such countries and organizations.
(b) Countries and Organizations Described.--The countries and
organizations described in this subsection are the following:
(1) The following countries designated by the United States
as state sponsors of terrorism:
(A) The Republic of Cuba.
(B) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(2) The following organizations designated by the United
States as foreign terrorist organizations:
(A) The National Liberation Army (ELN).
(B) The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-
People's Army (FARC-EP).
(C) The Segunda Marquetalia.
(c) Form.--The assessment required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 441. CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF IRANIAN EXPENDITURES
SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(a) Update Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees an update to the
report submitted under section 6705 of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) to reflect current occurrences,
circumstances, and expenditures.
(b) Form.--The update submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
SEC. 501. STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN ADVERSARY EFFORTS TO UTILIZE
BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN WAYS THAT THREATEN UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that as
biotechnologies become increasingly important with regard to the
national security interests of the United States, and with the addition
of biotechnologies to the biosecurity mission of the National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the intelligence community
must articulate and implement a whole-of-government strategy for
addressing concerns relating to biotechnologies.
(b) Strategy for Biotechnologies Critical to National Security.--
(1) Strategy required.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, acting through the Director of the National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center and in coordination
with the heads of such other elements of the intelligence
community as the Director of National Intelligence considers
appropriate, develop and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a whole-of-government strategy to
address concerns relating to biotechnologies.
(2) Elements.--The strategy developed and submitted
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) Identification and assessment of
biotechnologies critical to the national security of
the United States, including an assessment of which
materials involve a dependency on foreign adversary
nations.
(B) A determination of how best to counter foreign
adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies that
threaten the national security of the United States,
including technologies identified pursuant to paragraph
(1).
(C) A plan to support United States efforts and
capabilities to secure the United States supply chains
of the technologies identified pursuant to paragraph
(1), by coordinating--
(i) across the intelligence community;
(ii) the support provided by the
intelligence community to other relevant
Federal agencies and policymakers;
(iii) the engagement of the intelligence
community with private sector entities; and
(iv) how the intelligence community can
support securing United States supply chains
for and use of biotechnologies.
(D) Proposals for such legislative or
administrative action as the Directors consider
necessary to support the strategy.
SEC. 502. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND BIOSECURITY CENTER.
Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3057)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking ``biosecurity and''
and inserting ``counterproliferation, biosecurity, and''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking
``analyzing and'';
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking
``Establishing'' and inserting ``Coordinating
the establishment of'';
(iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking
``Disseminating'' and inserting ``Overseeing
the dissemination of'';
(iv) in subparagraph (E), by inserting
``and coordinating'' after ``Conducting''; and
(v) in subparagraph (G), by striking
``Conducting'' and inserting ``Coordinating and
advancing''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and
analysis'';
(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (C)
through (E) as subparagraphs (D) through (F),
respectively;
(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (B)
the following:
``(C) Overseeing and coordinating the analysis of
intelligence on biosecurity and foreign biological
threats in support of the intelligence needs of Federal
departments and agencies responsible for public health,
including by providing analytic priorities to elements
of the intelligence community and by conducting and
coordinating net assessments.'';
(iv) in subparagraph (D), as redesignated
by clause (ii), by inserting ``on matters
relating to biosecurity and foreign biological
threats'' after ``public health'';
(v) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by
clause (ii), by inserting ``and authorities''
after ``capabilities''; and
(vi) by adding at the end the following:
``(G) Coordinating with relevant elements of the
intelligence community and other Federal departments
and agencies responsible for public health to engage
with private sector entities on information relevant to
biosecurity, biotechnology, and foreign biological
threats.''.
SEC. 503. ENHANCING CAPABILITIES TO DETECT FOREIGN ADVERSARY THREATS
RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL DATA.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the
heads of such Federal departments and agencies as the Director
considers appropriate, take the following steps to standardize and
enhance the capabilities of the intelligence community to detect
foreign adversary threats relating to biological data:
(1) Prioritize the collection, analysis, and dissemination
of information relating to foreign adversary use of biological
data, particularly in ways that threaten or could threaten the
national security of the United States.
(2) Issue policy guidance within the intelligence
community--
(A) to standardize the handling and processing of
biological data, including with respect to protecting
the civil liberties and privacy of United States
persons;
(B) to standardize and enhance intelligence
engagements with foreign allies and partners with
respect to biological data; and
(C) to standardize the creation of metadata
relating to biological data.
(3) Ensure coordination with such Federal departments and
agencies and entities in the private sector as the Director
considers appropriate to understand how foreign adversaries are
accessing and using biological data stored within the United
States.
SEC. 504. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS CERTAIN RISKS AND
THREATS RELATING TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Artificial intelligence systems demonstrate increased
capabilities in the generation of synthetic media and computer
programming code, as well as areas such as object recognition,
natural language processing, and workflow orchestration.
(2) The growing capabilities of artificial intelligence
systems in the areas described in paragraph (1), as well as the
greater accessibility of large-scale artificial intelligence
models and advanced computation capabilities to individuals,
businesses, and governments, have dramatically increased the
adoption of artificial intelligence products in the United
States and globally.
(3) The advanced capabilities of the systems described in
paragraph (1), and their accessibility to a wide-range of
users, have increased the likelihood and effect of misuse or
malfunction of these systems, such as to generate synthetic
media for disinformation campaigns, develop or refine malware
for computer network exploitation activity, enhance
surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy of
citizens of the United States, and increase the risk of
exploitation or malfunction of information technology systems
incorporating artificial intelligence systems in mission-
critical fields such as health care, critical infrastructure,
and transportation.
(b) Procedures Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and issue
procedures to facilitate and promote mechanisms by which--
(1) vendors of advanced computation capabilities, vendors
and commercial users of artificial intelligence systems, as
well as independent researchers and other third parties, may
effectively notify appropriate elements of the United States
Government of--
(A) information security risks emanating from
artificial intelligence systems, such as the use of an
artificial intelligence system to develop or refine
malicious software;
(B) information security risks such as indications
of compromise or other threat information indicating a
compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an artificial intelligence system, or
to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence
system, including training or test data, frameworks,
computing environments, or other components necessary
for the training, management, or maintenance of an
artificial intelligence system;
(C) biosecurity risks emanating from artificial
intelligence systems, such as the use of an artificial
intelligence system to design, develop, or acquire
dual-use biological entities such as putatively toxic
small molecules, proteins, or pathogenic organisms;
(D) suspected foreign malign influence (as defined
by section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3059(f))) activity that appears to be
facilitated by an artificial intelligence system; and
(E) any other unlawful activity facilitated by, or
directed at, an artificial intelligence system;
(2) elements of the Federal Government may provide threat
briefings to vendors of advanced computation capabilities and
vendors of artificial intelligence systems, alerting them, as
may be appropriate, to potential or confirmed foreign
exploitation of their systems, as well as malign foreign plans
and intentions.
(c) Briefing Required.--
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives.
(2) In general.--The President shall provide the
appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on procedures
developed and issued pursuant to subsection (b).
(3) Elements.--The briefing provided pursuant to paragraph
(2) shall include the following:
(A) A clear specification of which Federal agencies
are responsible for leading outreach to affected
industry and the public with respect to the matters
described in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph
(1) of subsection (b) and paragraph (2) of such
subsection.
(B) An outline of a plan for industry outreach and
public education regarding risks posed by, and directed
at, artificial intelligence systems.
(C) Use of research and development, stakeholder
outreach, and risk management frameworks established
pursuant to--
(i) provisions of law in effect on the day
before the date of the enactment of this Act;
or
(ii) Federal agency guidelines.
SEC. 505. ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency
shall establish an Artificial Intelligence Security Center within the
Cybersecurity Collaboration Center of the National Security Agency.
(b) Functions.--The functions of the Artificial Intelligence
Security Center shall be as follows:
(1) Making available a research test bed to private sector
and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in
artificial intelligence security research, including through
the secure provision of access in a secure environment to
proprietary third-party models, with the consent of the vendors
of the models.
(2) Developing guidance to prevent or mitigate counter-
artificial intelligence techniques.
(3) Promoting secure artificial intelligence adoption
practices for managers of national security systems (as defined
in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code) and elements
of the defense industrial base.
(4) Coordinating with the Artificial Intelligence Safety
Institute of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
(5) Such other functions as the Director considers
appropriate.
(c) Test Bed Requirements.--
(1) Access and terms of usage.--
(A) Researcher access.--The Director shall
establish terms of usage governing researcher access to
the test bed made available under subsection (b)(1),
with limitations on researcher publication only to the
extent necessary to protect classified information or
proprietary information concerning third-party models
provided through the consent of model vendors.
(B) Availability to federal agencies.--The Director
shall ensure that the test bed made available under
subsection (b)(1) is also made available to other
Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis.
(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.--In
carrying out subsection (b)(1), the Director shall leverage, to
the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other
resources provided under section 5.2 of the Executive Order
dated October 30, 2023 (relating to safe, secure, and
trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence).
(d) Access to Proprietary Models.--In carrying out this section,
the Director shall establish such mechanisms as the Director considers
appropriate, including potential contractual incentives, to ensure the
provision of access to proprietary models by qualified independent
third-party researchers if commercial model vendors have voluntarily
provided models and associated resources for such testing.
(e) Counter-artificial Intelligence Defined.--In this section, the
term ``counter-artificial intelligence'' means techniques or procedures
to extract information about the behavior or characteristics of an
artificial intelligence system, or to learn how to manipulate an
artificial intelligence system, in order to subvert the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial
intelligence system or adjacent system.
SEC. 506. SENSE OF CONGRESS ENCOURAGING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO
INCREASE PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITAL PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERSHIP WITH OFFICE OF STRATEGIC CAPITAL OF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO SECURE ENDURING TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANTAGES.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) acquisition leaders in the intelligence community
should further explore the strategic use of private capital
partnerships to secure enduring technological advantages for
the intelligence community, including through the
identification, development, and transfer of promising
technologies to full-scale programs capable of meeting
intelligence community requirements; and
(2) the intelligence community should undertake regular
consultation with Federal partners, such as the Office of
Strategic Capital of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on
best practices and lessons learned from their experiences
integrating these resources so as to accelerate attainment of
national security objectives.
SEC. 507. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY BRIDGE FUND.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Nonprofit organization.--The term ``nonprofit
organization'' means an organization that is described in
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that
is exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code.
(2) Work program.--The term ``work program'' means any
agreement between In-Q-Tel and a third-party company, where
such third-party company furnishes or is furnishing a product
or service for use by any of In-Q-Tel's government customers to
address those customers' technology needs or requirements.
(b) Establishment of Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of
the United States a fund to be known as the ``Intelligence Community
Technology Bridge Fund'' (in this subsection referred to as the
``Fund'') to assist in the transitioning of products or services from
the research and development phase to the contracting and production
phase.
(c) Contents of Fund.--The Fund shall consist of amounts
appropriated to the Fund, and amounts in the Fund shall remain
available until expended.
(d) Availability and Use of Fund.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (3), amounts in the
Fund shall be available to the Director of National
Intelligence to provide assistance to a business or nonprofit
organization that is transitioning a product or service.
(2) Types of assistance.--Assistance provided under
paragraph (1) may be distributed as funds in the form of a
grant, a payment for a product or service, or a payment for
equity.
(3) Requirements for funds.--Assistance may be provided
under paragraph (1) to a business or nonprofit organization
that is transitioning a product or service only if--
(A) the business or nonprofit organization--
(i) has participated or is participating in
a work program; or
(ii) is engaged with an element of the
intelligence community or Department of Defense
for research and development; and
(B) the Director of National Intelligence or the
head of an element of the intelligence community
attests that the product or service will be utilized by
an element of the intelligence community for a mission
need, such as because it would be valuable in
addressing a needed capability, fill or complement a
technology gap, or increase the supplier base or price-
competitiveness for the Federal Government.
(4) Priority for small business concerns and nontraditional
defense contractors.--In providing assistance under paragraph
(1), the Director shall prioritize the provision of assistance
to small business concerns (as defined under section 3(a) of
the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632(a))) and nontraditional
defense contractors (as defined in section 3014 of title 10,
United States Code).
(e) Administration of Fund.--
(1) In general.--The Fund shall be administered by the
Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Consultation.--In administering the Fund, the
Director--
(A) shall consult with the heads of the elements of
the intelligence community; and
(B) may consult with In-Q-Tel, the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Investment Fund, and the Defense
Innovation Unit.
(f) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than September 30, 2025, and
each fiscal year thereafter, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the Fund.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include, for the period covered by the report,
information about the following:
(A) How much was expended or obligated using
amounts from the Fund.
(B) For what the amounts were expended or
obligated.
(C) The effects of such expenditures and
obligations.
(D) A summary of annual transition activities and
outcomes of such activities for the intelligence
community.
(3) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), there is
authorized to be appropriated to the Fund $75,000,000 for
fiscal year 2025 and for each fiscal year thereafter.
(2) Limitation.--The amount in the Fund shall not exceed
$75,000,000 at any time.
SEC. 508. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-
PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGES.
(a) Focus Areas.--Subsection (a) of section 5306 of the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Not later than''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Focus areas.--The Director shall ensure that the
policies, processes, and procedures developed pursuant to
paragraph (1) include a focus on rotations described in such
paragraph with private-sector organizations in the following
fields:
``(A) Finance.
``(B) Acquisition.
``(C) Biotechnology.
``(D) Computing.
``(E) Artificial intelligence.
``(F) Business process innovation and
entrepreneurship.
``(G) Cybersecurity.
``(H) Materials and manufacturing.
``(I) Any other technology or research field the
Director determines relevant to meet evolving national
security threats in technology sectors.''.
(b) Duration of Temporary Details.--Subsection (e) of section 5306
of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.
3334) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``3 years'' and inserting
``5 years''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``3 years'' and inserting
``5 years''.
(c) Treatment of Private-sector Employees.--Subsection (g) of such
section is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) shall not be considered to have a conflict of
interest with an element of the intelligence community solely
because of being detailed to an element of the intelligence
community under this section.''.
(d) Hiring Authority.--Such section is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
``(j) Hiring Authority.--
``(1) In general.--The Director may hire, under section
213.3102(r) of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, or
successor regulations, an individual who is an employee of a
private-sector organization who is detailed to an element of
the intelligence community under this section.
``(2) No personnel billet required.--Hiring an individual
under paragraph (1) shall not require a personnel billet.''.
(e) Annual Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 2 more years, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual report on--
(1) the implementation of the policies, processes, and
procedures developed pursuant to subsection (a) of such section
5306 (50 U.S.C. 3334) and the administration of such section;
(2) how the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community are using or plan to use the authorities provided
under such section; and
(3) recommendations for legislative or administrative
action to increase use of the authorities provided under such
section.
SEC. 509. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ABILITY TO ACQUIRE EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY THAT FULFILLS INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NEEDS.
(a) Definition of Work Program.--The term ``work program'' means
any agreement between In-Q-Tel and a third-party company, where such
third-party company furnishes or is furnishing a property, product, or
service for use by any of In-Q-Tel's government customers to address
those customers' technology needs or requirements.
(b) In General.--In addition to the exceptions listed under section
3304(a) of title 41, United States Code, and under section 3204(a) of
title 10, United States Code, for the use of competitive procedures,
the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the
intelligence community may use procedures other than competitive
procedures to acquire a property, product, or service if--
(1) the source of the property, product, or service is a
company that completed a work program in which the company
furnished the property, product, or service; and
(2) the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an
element of the intelligence community certifies that such
property, product, or service has been shown to meet an
identified need of the intelligence community.
(c) Justification for Use of Procedures Other Than Competitive
Procedures.--
(1) In general.--A property, product, or service may not be
acquired by the Director or the head of an element of the
intelligence community under subsection (b) using procedures
other than competitive procedures unless the acquiring officer
for the acquisition justifies the use of such procedures in
writing.
(2) Contents.--A justification in writing described in
paragraph (1) for an acquisition using procedures other than
competitive procedures shall include the following:
(A) A description of the need of the element of the
intelligence community that the property, product, or
service satisfies.
(B) A certification that the anticipated costs will
be fair and reasonable.
(C) A description of the market survey conducted or
a statement of the reasons a market survey was not
conducted.
(D) Such other matters as the Director or the head,
as the case may be, determines appropriate.
SEC. 510. MANAGEMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY RISKS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence safety incident.--The term
``artificial intelligence safety incident'' means an event that
increases the risk that operation of an artificial intelligence
system will--
(A) result in physical or psychological harm; or
(B) lead to a state in which human life, health,
property, or the environment is endangered.
(2) Artificial intelligence security incident.--The term
``artificial intelligence security incident'' means an event
that increases--
(A) the risk that operation of an artificial
intelligence system occurs in a way that enables the
extraction of information about the behavior or
characteristics of an artificial intelligence system by
a third party; or
(B) the ability of a third party to manipulate an
artificial intelligence system to subvert the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an
artificial intelligence system or adjacent system.
(3) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The
term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means a
weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be
exploited by a third party to, without authorization, subvert
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an
artificial intelligence system, including through techniques
such as--
(A) data poisoning;
(B) evasion attacks;
(C) privacy-based attacks; and
(D) abuse attacks.
(4) Counter-artificial intelligence.--The term ``counter-
artificial intelligence'' means techniques or procedures to
extract information about the behavior or characteristics of an
artificial intelligence system, or to learn how to manipulate
an artificial intelligence system, so as to subvert the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial
intelligence system or adjacent system.
(b) Voluntary Tracking and Processing of Security and Safety
Incidents and Risks Associated With Artificial Intelligence.--
(1) Processes and procedures for vulnerability
management.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology shall--
(A) initiate a process to update processes and
procedures associated with the National Vulnerability
Database of the Institute to ensure that the database
and associated vulnerability management processes
incorporate artificial intelligence security
vulnerabilities to the greatest extent practicable; and
(B) identify any characteristics of artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities that make
utilization of the National Vulnerability Database
inappropriate for their management and develop
processes and procedures for vulnerability management
of those vulnerabilities.
(2) Voluntary tracking of artificial intelligence security
and artificial intelligence safety incidents.--
(A) Voluntary database required.--Not later than 1
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of the Institute, in coordination with the
Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, shall--
(i) develop and establish a comprehensive
database to publicly track artificial
intelligence security and artificial
intelligence safety incidents through voluntary
input; and
(ii) in establishing the database under
clause (i)--
(I) establish mechanisms by which
private sector entities, public sector
organizations, civil society groups,
and academic researchers may
voluntarily share information with the
Institute on confirmed or suspected
artificial intelligence security or
artificial intelligence safety
incidents, in a manner that preserves
the confidentiality of any affected
party;
(II) leverage, to the greatest
extent possible, standardized
disclosure and incident description
formats;
(III) develop processes to
associate reports pertaining to the
same incident with a single incident
identifier;
(IV) establish classification,
information retrieval, and reporting
mechanisms that sufficiently
differentiate between artificial
intelligence security incidents and
artificial intelligence safety
incidents; and
(V) create appropriate taxonomies
to classify incidents based on relevant
characteristics, impact, or other
relevant criteria.
(B) Identification and treatment of material
artificial intelligence security or artificial
intelligence safety risks.--
(i) In general.--Upon receipt of relevant
information on an artificial intelligence
security or artificial intelligence safety
incident, the Director of the Institute shall
determine whether the described incident
presents a material artificial intelligence
security or artificial intelligence safety risk
sufficient for inclusion in the database
developed and established under subparagraph
(A).
(ii) Priorities.--In evaluating a reported
incident pursuant to subparagraph (A), the
Director shall prioritize inclusion in the
database cases in which a described incident--
(I) describes an artificial
intelligence system used in critical
infrastructure or safety-critical
systems;
(II) would result in a high-
severity or catastrophic impact to the
people or economy of the United States;
or
(III) includes an artificial
intelligence system widely used in
commercial or public sector contexts.
(C) Reports and anonymity.--The Director shall
populate the database developed and established under
subparagraph (A) with incidents based on public reports
and information shared using the mechanism established
pursuant to clause (ii)(I) of such subparagraph,
ensuring that any incident description sufficiently
anonymizes those affected, unless those who are
affected have consented to their names being included
in the database.
(c) Updating Processes and Procedures Relating to Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program and Evaluation of Consensus
Standards Relating to Artificial Intelligence Security Vulnerability
Reporting.--
(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Common vulnerabilities and exposures program.--
The term ``Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Program'' means the reference guide and classification
system for publicly known information security
vulnerabilities sponsored by the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency.
(B) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the
Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency.
(C) Relevant congressional committees.--The term
``relevant congressional committees'' means--
(i) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(ii) the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate;
(iii) the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate;
(iv) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate;
(v) the Committee on Oversight and
Accountability of the House of Representatives;
(vi) the Committee on Energy and Commerce
of the House of Representatives;
(vii) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and
(viii) the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director shall--
(A) initiate a process to update processes and
procedures associated with the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures Program to ensure that the program and
associated processes identify and enumerate artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities to the greatest
extent practicable; and
(B) identify any characteristic of artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities that makes
utilization of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Program inappropriate for their management and develop
processes and procedures for vulnerability
identification and enumeration of those artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities.
(3) Evaluation of consensus standards.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology shall
initiate a multi-stakeholder process to evaluate
whether existing voluntary consensus standards for
vulnerability reporting effectively accommodate
artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities.
(B) Report.--
(i) Submission.--Not later than 180 days
after the date on which the evaluation under
subparagraph (A) is carried out, the Director
shall submit a report to the relevant
congressional committees on the sufficiency of
existing vulnerability reporting processes and
standards to accommodate artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities.
(ii) Post-report action.--If the Director
concludes in the report submitted under clause
(i) that existing processes do not sufficiently
accommodate reporting of artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities, the
Director shall initiate a process, in
consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology and the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, to update relevant vulnerability
reporting processes, including the Department
of Homeland Security Binding Operational
Directive 20-01, or any subsequent directive.
(4) Best practices.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in collaboration
with the Director of the National Security Agency and the
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and leveraging efforts of the Information Communications
Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force to the
greatest extent practicable, convene a multi-stakeholder
process to encourage the development and adoption of best
practices relating to addressing supply chain risks associated
with training and maintaining artificial intelligence models,
which shall ensure consideration of supply chain risks
associated with--
(A) data collection, cleaning, and labeling,
particularly the supply chain risks of reliance on
remote workforce and foreign labor for such tasks;
(B) inadequate documentation of training data and
test data storage, as well as limited provenance of
training data;
(C) human feedback systems used to refine
artificial intelligence systems, particularly the
supply chain risks of reliance on remote workforce and
foreign labor for such tasks;
(D) the use of large-scale, open-source datasets,
particularly the supply chain risks to repositories
that host such datasets for use by public and private
sector developers in the United States; and
(E) the use of proprietary datasets containing
sensitive or personally identifiable information.
SEC. 511. PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO VERIFY
AUTHENTICITY OR PROVENANCE OF MACHINE-MANIPULATED MEDIA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Machine-manipulated media.--The term ``machine-
manipulated media'' has the meaning given such term in section
5724 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (Public Law 116-92; 50 U.S.C. 3024 note).
(2) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several
States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
(b) Prohibitions.--
(1) Prohibition on concealing subversion.--No person shall
knowingly and with the intent or substantial likelihood of
deceiving a third party, enable, facilitate, or conceal the
subversion of a technological measure designed to verify the
authenticity, modifications, or conveyance of machine-
manipulated media, or characteristics of the provenance of the
machine-manipulated media, by generating information about the
authenticity of a piece of content that is knowingly false.
(2) Prohibition on fraudulent distribution.--No person
shall knowingly and for financial benefit, enable, facilitate,
or conceal the subversion of a technological measure described
in paragraph (1) by distributing machine-manipulated media with
knowingly false information about the authenticity of a piece
of machine-manipulated media.
(3) Prohibition on products and services for
circumvention.--No person shall deliberately manufacture,
import, or offer to the public a technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof that--
(A) is primarily designed or produced and promoted
for the purpose of circumventing, removing, or
otherwise disabling a technological measure described
in paragraph (1) with the intent or substantial
likelihood of deceiving a third party about the
authenticity of a piece of machine-manipulated media;
(B) has only limited commercially significant or
expressive purpose or use other than to circumvent,
remove, or otherwise disable a technological measure
designed to verify the authenticity of machine-
manipulated media and is promoted for such purposes; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in
concert with that person with that person's knowledge
for use in circumventing, removing, or otherwise
disabling a technological measure described in
paragraph (1) with an intent to deceive a third party
about the authenticity of a piece of machine-
manipulated media.
(c) Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in subsection (b) shall inhibit
the ability of any individual to access, read, or review a
technological measure described in paragraph (1) of such
subsection or to access, read, or review the provenance,
modification, or conveyance information contained therein.
(2) Exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and
educational institutions.--
(A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in
this subsection, subsection (b) shall not apply to a
nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution
which generates, distributes, or otherwise handles
machine-manipulated media.
(B) Commercial advantage, financial gain, or
tortious conduct.--The exception in subparagraph (A)
shall not apply to a nonprofit library, archive, or
educational institution that willfully for the purpose
of commercial advantage, financial gain, or in
furtherance of tortious conduct violates a provision of
subsection (b), except that a nonprofit library,
archive, or educational institution that willfully for
the purpose of commercial advantage, financial gain, or
in furtherance of tortious conduct violates a provision
of subsection (b) shall--
(i) for the first offense, be subject to
the civil remedies under subsection (d); and
(ii) for repeated or subsequent offenses,
in addition to the civil remedies under
subsection (d), forfeit the exemption provided
under subparagraph (A).
(C) Circumventing technologies.--This paragraph may
not be used as a defense to a claim under paragraph (3)
of subsection (b), nor may this subsection permit a
nonprofit library, archive, or educational institution
to manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product,
service, component, or part thereof, that circumvents a
technological measure described in paragraph (1) of
such subsection.
(D) Qualifications of libraries and archives.--In
order for a library or archive to qualify for the
exemption under subparagraph (A), the collections of
that library or archive shall be--
(i) open to the public; or
(ii) available not only to researchers
affiliated with the library or archive or with
the institution of which it is a part, but also
to other persons doing research in a
specialized field.
(3) Reverse engineering.--
(A) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) Circumvention.--The term
``circumvention'' means to remove, deactivate,
disable, or impair a technological measure
designed to verify the authenticity of machine-
manipulated media or characteristics of its
provenance, modifications, or conveyance.
(ii) Interoperability.--The term
``interoperability'' means the ability of--
(I) computer programs to exchange
information; and
(II) such programs mutually to use
the information which has been
exchanged.
(B) In general.--An authorized user of a
technological measure described in subsection (b)(1)
may circumvent such technological measure for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of
the technological measure that are necessary to achieve
interoperability with that authorized user's own
technological measures intended for similar purposes of
verifying the authenticity of machine-manipulated media
or characteristics of its provenance, modifications, or
conveyance.
(C) Law enforcement, intelligence, and other
government activities.--Subsection (b) does not
prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative,
protective, information security, or intelligence
activity of an officer, agent, or employee of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a
State, or a person acting pursuant to a contract with
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
of a State.
(d) Enforcement by Attorney General.--
(1) Civil actions.--The Attorney General may bring a civil
action in an appropriate United States district court against
any person who violates subsection (b).
(2) Powers of the court.--In an action brought under
paragraph (1), the court--
(A) may grant temporary and permanent injunctions
on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or
restrain a violation, but in no event shall impose a
prior restraint on free speech or the press protected
under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States;
(B) at any time while an action is pending, may
order the impounding, on such terms as it deems
reasonable, of any device or product that is in the
custody or control of the alleged violator and that the
court has reasonable cause to believe was involved in a
violation;
(C) may award damages under paragraph (3);
(D) in its discretion may allow the recovery of
costs against any party other than the United States or
an officer thereof; and
(E) may, as part of a final judgment or decree
finding a violation, order the remedial modification or
the destruction of any device or product involved in
the violation that is in the custody or control of the
violator or has been impounded under subparagraph (B).
(3) Award of damages.--
(A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in
this section, a person committing a violation of
subsection (b) is liable for statutory damages as
provided in subparagraph (C).
(B) Statutory damages.--
(i) Election of amount based on number of
acts of circumvention.--At any time before
final judgment is entered, the Attorney General
may elect to recover an award of statutory
damages for each violation of subsection (b) in
the sum of not less than $200 or more than
$2,500 per act of circumvention, device,
product, component, offer, or performance of
service, as the court considers just.
(ii) Election of amount; total amount.--At
any time before final judgment is entered, the
Attorney General may elect to recover an award
of statutory damages for each violation of
subsection (b) in the sum of not less than
$2,500 or more than $25,000.
(C) Repeated violations.--In any case in which the
Attorney General sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that a person has violated subsection
(b) within 3 years after a final judgment was entered
against the person for another such violation, the
court may increase the award of damages up to triple
the amount that would otherwise be awarded, as the
court considers just.
(D) Innocent violations.--
(i) In general.--The court in its
discretion may reduce or remit the total award
of damages in any case in which the violator
sustains the burden of proving, and the court
finds, that the violator was not aware and had
no reason to believe that its acts constituted
a violation.
(ii) Nonprofit library, archive,
educational institutions, or public
broadcasting entities.--In the case of a
nonprofit library, archive, educational
institution, or public broadcasting entity, the
court shall remit damages in any case in which
the library, archive, educational institution,
or public broadcasting entity sustains the
burden of proving, and the court finds, that
the library, archive, educational institution,
or public broadcasting entity was not aware and
had no reason to believe that its acts
constituted a violation.
SEC. 512. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS.
It is the sense of Congress that foreign ransomware organizations,
and foreign affiliates associated with them, constitute hostile foreign
cyber actors, that covered nations abet and benefit from the activities
of these actors, and that such actors should be treated as hostile
foreign cyber actors by the United States. Such actors include the
following:
(1) DarkSide.
(2) Conti.
(3) REvil.
(4) BlackCat, also known as ``ALPHV''.
(5) LockBit.
(6) Rhysida, also known as ``Vice Society''.
(7) Royal.
(8) Phobos, also known as ``Eight'' and also known as
``Joanta''.
(9) C10p.
(10) Hackers associated with the SamSam ransomware
campaigns.
(11) Play.
(12) BianLian.
(13) Killnet.
(14) Akira.
(15) Ragnar Locker, also known as ``Dark Angels''.
(16) Blacksuit.
(17) INC.
(18) Black Basta.
SEC. 513. DESIGNATION OF STATE SPONSORS OF RANSOMWARE AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Designation of State Sponsors of Ransomware.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence, shall--
(A) designate as a state sponsor of ransomware any
country the government of which the Secretary has
determined has provided support for ransomware demand
schemes (including by providing safe haven for
individuals engaged in such schemes);
(B) submit to Congress a report listing the
countries designated under subparagraph (A); and
(C) in making designations under subparagraph (A),
take into consideration the report submitted to
Congress under section 514(c)(1).
(2) Sanctions and penalties.--The President shall impose
with respect to each state sponsor of ransomware designated
under paragraph (1)(A) the sanctions and penalties imposed with
respect to a state sponsor of terrorism.
(3) State sponsor of terrorism defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a
country the government of which the Secretary of State has
determined has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism, for purposes of--
(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));
(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
(C) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or
(D) any other provision of law.
(b) Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Sanctions relating to ransomware report.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress
that describes, for each of the 5 fiscal years immediately
preceding the date of such report, the number and geographic
locations of individuals, groups, and entities subject to
sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control who
were subsequently determined to have been involved in a
ransomware demand scheme.
(2) Country of origin report.--The Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall--
(A) submit a report, with a classified annex, to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives that
identifies the country of origin of foreign-based
ransomware attacks; and
(B) make the report described in subparagraph (A)
(excluding the classified annex) available to the
public.
(3) Investigative authorities report.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall issue a report
that outlines the authorities available to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the United States Secret Service, the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Homeland
Security Investigations, and the Office of Foreign Assets
Control to respond to foreign-based ransomware attacks.
SEC. 514. DEEMING RANSOMWARE THREATS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE A
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.
(a) Critical Infrastructure Defined.--In this section, the term
``critical infrastructure'' has the meaning given such term in
subsection (e) of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001
(42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b) Ransomware Threats to Critical Infrastructure as National
Intelligence Priority.--The Director of National Intelligence, pursuant
to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001
et seq.), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-458), section 1.3(b)(17) of Executive Order 12333 (50
U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities),
as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act,
and National Security Presidential Directive-26 (February 24, 2003;
relating to intelligence priorities), as in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act, shall deem ransomware threats to
critical infrastructure a national intelligence priority component to
the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, submit to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a
report on the implications of the ransomware threat to United
States national security.
(2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall address the following:
(A) Identification of individuals, groups, and
entities who pose the most significant threat,
including attribution to individual ransomware attacks
whenever possible.
(B) Locations from which individuals, groups, and
entities conduct ransomware attacks.
(C) The infrastructure, tactics, and techniques
ransomware actors commonly use.
(D) Any relationships between the individuals,
groups, and entities that conduct ransomware attacks
and their governments or countries of origin that could
impede the ability to counter ransomware threats.
(E) Intelligence gaps that have impeded, or
currently are impeding, the ability to counter
ransomware threats.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
SEC. 601. GOVERNANCE OF CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Controlled unclassified information.--The term
``controlled unclassified information'' means information
described as ``Controlled Unclassified Information'' or ``CUI''
in Executive Order 13556 (75 Fed. Reg. 68675; relating to
controlled unclassified information), or any successor order.
(2) Executive agent.--The term ``Executive Agent'' means
the Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification
designated under subsection (b)(1)(A).
(3) Executive committee.--The term ``Executive Committee''
means the Executive Committee on Classification and
Declassification Programs and Technology established under
subsection (b)(1)(C).
(b) Establishment of Classification and Declassification
Governance.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(A) designate a Federal official as Executive Agent
for Classification and Declassification to identify and
promote technological solutions to support efficient
and effective systems for classification and
declassification to be implemented on an interoperable
and federated basis across the Federal Government;
(B) designate a Federal official--
(i) to establish policies and guidance
relating to classification and declassification
and controlled unclassified information across
the Federal Government;
(ii) to conduct oversight of the
implementation of such policies and guidance;
and
(iii) who may, at the discretion of the
President, also serve as Executive Agent; and
(C) establish an Executive Committee on
Classification and Declassification Programs and
Technology to provide direction, advice, and guidance
to the Executive Agent.
(2) Executive committee.--
(A) Composition.--The Executive Committee shall be
composed of the following or their designees:
(i) The Director of National Intelligence.
(ii) The Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security.
(iii) The Secretary of Energy.
(iv) The Secretary of State.
(v) The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget.
(vi) The Archivist of the United States.
(vii) The Federal official designated under
subsection (b)(1)(B) if such official is not
also the Executive Agent.
(viii) Such other members as the Executive
Agent considers appropriate.
(B) Chairperson.--The Executive Agent shall be the
chairperson of the Executive Committee.
(c) Report to Congress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
Congress a report on the administration of this section.
(2) Contents.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include the following:
(A) Funding, personnel, expertise, and resources
required for the Executive Agent and a description of
how such funding, personnel, expertise, and resources
will be provided.
(B) Authorities needed by the Executive Agent, a
description of how such authorities will be granted,
and a description of any additional statutory
authorities required.
(C) Funding, personnel, expertise, and resources
required by the Federal official designated under
subsection (b)(1)(B) and a description of how such
funding, personnel, expertise, and resources will be
provided.
(D) Authorities needed by the Federal official
designated under subsection (b)(1)(B), a description of
how such authorities will be provided, and a
description of any additional statutory authorities
required.
(E) Funding and resources required by the Public
Interest Declassification Board.
(d) Public Reporting.--
(1) In general.--The report required by subsection (c)
shall be made available to the public to the greatest extent
possible consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
(2) Publication in federal register.--The President shall
publish in the Federal Register the roles and responsibilities
of the Federal officials designated under subsection (b), the
Executive Committee, and any subordinate individuals or
entities.
SEC. 602. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 801 the
following:
``SEC. 801A. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.
``(a) In General.--The President may, in accordance with this
section, protect from unauthorized disclosure any information owned by,
produced by or for, or under the control of the executive branch of the
Federal Government when there is a demonstrable need to do so to
protect the national security of the United States.
``(b) Establishment of Standards, Categories, and Procedures for
Classification and Declassification.--
``(1) Governmentwide procedures.--
``(A) Classification.--The President shall, to the
extent necessary, establish categories of information
that may be classified and procedures for classifying
information under subsection (a).
``(B) Declassification.--At the same time the
President establishes categories and procedures under
subparagraph (A), the President shall establish
procedures for declassifying information that was
previously classified.
``(C) Minimum requirements.--The procedures
established pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B)
shall--
``(i) be the exclusive means for
classifying information on or after the
effective date established by subsection (c),
except with respect to information classified
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
``(ii) ensure that no information is
classified unless there is a demonstrable need
to do so to protect the national security and
there is a reasonable basis to believe that
means other than classification will not
provide sufficient protection;
``(iii) ensure that no information may
remain classified indefinitely;
``(iv) ensure that no information shall be
classified, continue to be maintained as
classified, or fail to be declassified in
order--
``(I) to conceal violations of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error;
``(II) to prevent embarrassment to
a person, organization, or agency;
``(III) to restrain competition; or
``(IV) to prevent or delay the
release of information that does not
require protection in the interest of
the national security;
``(v) ensure that basic scientific research
information not clearly related to the national
security shall not be classified;
``(vi) ensure that information may not be
reclassified after being declassified and
released to the public under proper authority
unless personally approved by the President
based on a determination that such
reclassification is required to prevent
significant and demonstrable damage to the
national security;
``(vii) establish standards and criteria
for the classification of information;
``(viii) establish standards, criteria, and
timelines for the declassification of
information classified under this section;
``(ix) provide for the automatic
declassification of classified records with
permanent historical value not more than 50
years after the date of origin of such records,
unless the head of each agency that classified
information contained in such records makes a
written determination to delay automatic
declassification and such determination is
reviewed not less frequently than every 10
years;
``(x) provide for the timely review of
materials submitted for pre-publication;
``(xi) ensure that due regard is given for
the public interest in disclosure of
information;
``(xii) ensure that due regard is given for
the interests of departments and agencies in
sharing information at the lowest possible
level of classification;
``(D) Submittal to congress.--The President shall
submit to Congress the categories and procedures
established under subsection (b)(1)(A) and the
procedures established under subsection (b)(1)(B) at
least 60 days prior to their effective date.
``(2) Agency standards and procedures.--
``(A) In general.--The head of each agency shall
establish a single set of consolidated standards and
procedures to permit such agency to classify and
declassify information created by such agency in
accordance with the categories and procedures
established by the President under this section and
otherwise to carry out this section.
``(B) Submittal to congress.--Each agency head
shall submit to Congress the standards and procedures
established by such agency head under subparagraph (A).
``(c) Effective Date.--
``(1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall take
effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025.
``(2) Relation to presidential directives.--Presidential
directives regarding classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information, including
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), in effect on the day
before the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as
procedures issued pursuant to such Presidential directives,
shall remain in effect until superseded by procedures issued
pursuant to subsection (b).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 805(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3164(2)) is amended by inserting ``section 801A,'' before ``Executive
Order''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents preceding section 2
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
801 the following new item:
``Sec. 801A. Classification and declassification of information.''.
SEC. 603. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR EXECUTIVE AGENCY INSIDER THREAT
PROGRAMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive agency
as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, any
military department as defined in section 102 of such title,
and any other entity in the executive branch of the Federal
Government that comes into the possession of classified
information.
(2) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' means information that has been determined to
require protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or predecessor or
successor order, to protect the national security of the United
States.
(b) Establishment of Insider Threat Programs.--Each head of an
agency with access to classified information shall establish an insider
threat program to protect classified information from unauthorized
disclosure.
(c) Minimum Standards.--In carrying out an insider threat program
established by the head of an agency pursuant to subsection (b), the
head of the agency shall--
(1) designate a senior official of the agency who shall be
responsible for management of the program;
(2) monitor user activity on all classified networks to
detect activity indicative of insider threat behavior;
(3) build and maintain an insider threat analytic and
response capability to review, assess, and respond to
information obtained pursuant to paragraph (2); and
(4) provide insider threat awareness training to all
cleared employees within 30 days of entry-on-duty or granting
of access to classified information and annually thereafter.
(d) Annual Reports.--Not less frequently than once each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall, serving as the Security
Executive Agent under section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3162a), submit to Congress an annual report on the
compliance of agencies with respect to the requirements of this
section.
TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE
IMPROVEMENTS
SEC. 701. SECURITY CLEARANCES HELD BY CERTAIN FORMER EMPLOYEES OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Issuance of Guidelines and Instructions Required.--Section
803(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(c)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of
Federal agencies to ensure that any individual who was
appointed by the President to a position in an element of the
intelligence community but is no longer employed by the Federal
Government shall maintain a security clearance only in
accordance with Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to access to classified information), or successor
order.''.
(b) Submittal of Guidelines and Instructions to Congress
Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in the
Director's capacity as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to
subsection (a) of section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3162a), submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of
title 10, United States Code) the guidelines and instructions required
by subsection (c)(5) of such Act, as added by subsection (a) of this
section.
(c) Annual Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than once
each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence
shall, in the Director's capacity as the Security Executive
Agent pursuant to section 803(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(a)), submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United
States Code) an annual report on the eligibility status of
former senior employees of the intelligence community to access
classified information.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include, for the period covered by the report, the
following:
(A) A list of individuals who were appointed by the
President to a position in an element of the
intelligence community who currently hold security
clearances.
(B) The number of such former employees who still
hold security clearances.
(C) For each former employee described in
subparagraph (B)--
(i) the position in the intelligence
community held by the former employee;
(ii) the years of service in such position;
and
(iii) the individual's current employment
position and employer.
(D) The Federal entity authorizing and adjudicating
the former employees' need to know classified
information.
SEC. 702. POLICY FOR AUTHORIZING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROGRAM OF
CONTRACTOR-OWNED AND CONTRACTOR-OPERATED SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES.
(a) Policy.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish
a standardized policy for the intelligence community that authorizes a
program of contractor-owned and contractor-operated sensitive
compartmented information facilities as a service to the national
security and intelligence enterprises.
(b) Requirements.--The policy established pursuant to subsection
(a) shall--
(1) authorize the head of an element of the intelligence
community to approve and accredit contractor-owned and
contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information
facilities; and
(2) designate an element of the intelligence community as a
service of common concern (as defined in Intelligence Community
Directive 122, or successor directive) to serve as an
accrediting authority on behalf of other elements of the
intelligence community for contractor-owned and contractor-
operated sensitive compartmented information facilities.
(c) Cost Considerations.--In establishing the policy required by
subsection (a), the Director shall consider existing demonstrated
models where a contractor acquires, outfits, and manages a facility
pursuant to an agreement with the Federal Government such that no
funding from the Federal Government is required to carry out the
agreement.
(d) Briefing Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date on
which the Director establishes the policy pursuant to subsection (a),
the Director shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on--
(1) additional opportunities to leverage contractor-
provided secure facility space; and
(2) recommendations to address barriers, including
resources or authorities needed.
SEC. 703. ENABLING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTEGRATION.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113B the following new
section:
``SEC. 113C. ENABLING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTEGRATION.
``(a) Provision of Goods or Services.--Subject to and in accordance
with any guidance and requirements developed by the Director of
National Intelligence, the head of an element of the intelligence
community may provide goods or services to another element of the
intelligence community without reimbursement or transfer of funds for
hoteling initiatives for intelligence community employees and
affiliates defined in any such guidance and requirements issued by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(b) Approval.--Prior to the provision of goods or services
pursuant to subsection (a), the head of the element of the intelligence
community providing such goods or services and the head of the element
of the intelligence community receiving such goods or services shall
approve such provision.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the National
Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 113B the following:
``Sec. 113C. Enabling intelligence community integration.''.
SEC. 704. APPOINTMENT OF SPOUSES OF CERTAIN FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.
(a) In General.--Section 3330d of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``military and
Department of Defense civilian spouses'' and inserting
``military and Department of Defense, Department of State, and
intelligence community spouses'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) by redesignating the second paragraph (4)
(relating to a spouse of an employee of the Department
of Defense) as paragraph (7);
(B) by striking paragraph (5);
(C) by redesignating paragraph (4) (relating to the
spouse of a disabled or deceased member of the Armed
Forces) as paragraph (6);
(D) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the
following:
``(3) The term `covered spouse' means an individual who is
married to an individual who--
``(A)(i) is an employee of the Department of State
or an element of the intelligence community; or
``(ii) is a member of the Armed Forces who is
assigned to an element of the intelligence community;
and
``(B) is transferred in the interest of the
Government from one official station within the
applicable agency to another within the agency (that is
outside of normal commuting distance) for permanent
duty.
``(4) The term `intelligence community' has the meaning
given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(5) The term `remote work' refers to a work flexibility
arrangement under which an employee--
``(A) is not expected to physically report to the
location from which the employee would otherwise work,
considering the position of the employee; and
``(B) performs the duties and responsibilities of
such employee's position, and other authorized
activities, from an approved worksite--
``(i) other than the location from which
the employee would otherwise work;
``(ii) that may be inside or outside the
local commuting area of the location from which
the employee would otherwise work; and
``(iii) that is typically the residence of
the employee.''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following:
``(8) The term `telework' has the meaning given the term in
section 6501.''; and
(3) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the
end;
(B) in the first paragraph (3) (relating to a
spouse of a member of the Armed Forces on active duty),
by striking the period at the end and inserting a
semicolon;
(C) by redesignating the second paragraph (3)
(relating to a spouse of an employee of the Department
of Defense) as paragraph (4);
(D) in paragraph (4), as so redesignated--
(i) by inserting ``, including to a
position in which the spouse will engage in
remote work'' after ``Department of Defense'';
and
(ii) by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) a covered spouse to a position in which the covered
spouse will engage in remote work.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for
subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, is amended
by striking the item relating to section 3330d and inserting the
following:
``3330d. Appointment of military and Department of Defense, Department
of State, and intelligence community
civilian spouses.''.
SEC. 705. PLAN FOR STAFFING THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION POSITIONS OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for
ensuring that the Directorate of Operations of the Agency has staffed
every civilian full-time equivalent position authorized for that
Directorate under the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2024 (division G of Public Law 118-31).
(b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) Specific benchmarks and timelines for accomplishing the
goal described in such subsection by September 30, 2025.
(2) An assessment of the appropriate balance of staffing
between the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of
Analysis consistent with the responsibilities of the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(d) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036(d)).
SEC. 706. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS.
(a) Employment Status.--
(1) Conversion of positions by director of national
intelligence to excepted service.--Section 102A(v) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(v)) is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (4) as
paragraphs (3) through (5), respectively;
(B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) The Director shall promptly notify the congressional
intelligence committees of any action taken pursuant to paragraph
(1).''; and
(C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by
subparagraph (A), by striking ``occupying a position on
the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012''.
(2) Conversion of defense intelligence positions to
excepted service.--Section 1601(a) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection
(d); and
(B) by inserting after subsection (a) the
following:
``(b) Congressional Notification.--The Secretary shall promptly
notify the congressional defense committees and the congressional
intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) of any action taken pursuant to
subsection (a).
``(c) Retention of Accrued Rights Upon Conversion.--An incumbent
whose position is selected to be converted, without regard to the
wishes of the incumbent, to the excepted service under subsection (a)
shall remain in the competitive service for the purposes of status and
any accrued adverse action protections while the individual occupies
that position or any other position to which the employee is moved
involuntarily. Once such individual no longer occupies the converted
position, the position may be treated as a regularly excepted service
position.''.
(3) Conversion within the excepted service.--An
intelligence community incumbent employee whose position is
selected to be converted from one excepted service schedule to
another schedule within the excepted service without regard to
the wishes of the incumbent shall remain in the current
schedule for the purpose of status and any accrued adverse
action protections while the individual occupies that position
or any other position to which the employee is moved without
regard to the wishes of the employee.
(b) Congressional Notification of Guidelines.--
(1) Submittal to congress.--Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element
of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the guidelines and regulations of the
element relating to employment status and protections relating
to that status.
(2) Notice of changes.--In any case in which a guideline or
regulation of an element of the intelligence community
submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) is modified or replaced,
the head of the element shall promptly notify the congressional
intelligence committees of the change and submit the new or
modified guideline or regulation.
(c) Termination Authorities of the Director of the CIA.--
(1) Process and notification.--Section 104A(e) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036(e)) is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph
(3); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director shall not take
an action under paragraph (1) to terminate the employment of an officer
or employee, except in accordance with guidelines and regulations
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees.
``(B) The Director may take an action under paragraph (1) without
or in contravention of the guidelines and regulations specified in
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph if the Director determines that
complying with such guidelines and regulations poses a threat to the
national security of the United States. If the Director makes such a
determination, the Director shall provide prompt notification to the
congressional intelligence committees that includes--
``(i) an explanation for the basis for the termination and
the factual support for such determination; and
``(ii) an explanation for the determination that the
process described in subparagraph (A) poses a threat to the
national security of the United States.''.
(d) Improvement of Congressional Notice Requirement Relating to
Termination of Defense Intelligence Employees.--Section 1609(c) of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following: ``Such notification shall include the following:
``(1) An explanation for the determination that the
termination was in the interests of the United States.
``(2) An explanation for the determination that the
procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize
the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be
invoked in a manner consistent with the national security of
the United States.''.
(e) Congressional Notification of Other Suspension and Removal
Authorities.--Section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) The head of an element of the intelligence community who
takes an action under this section shall promptly notify the
congressional intelligence committees of such action.
``(2) Each notification under paragraph (1) regarding an action
shall include the following:
``(A) An explanation for the determination that the action
is necessary or advisable in the interests of national
security.
``(B) If the head of an element of the intelligence
community determines, pursuant to subsection (a), that the
interests of national security do not permit notification to
the employee of the reasons for the action under that
subsection, an explanation for such determination.
``(3) In this subsection, the terms `congressional intelligence
committees' and `intelligence community' have the meanings given such
terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).''.
(f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to
diminish the rights conferred by chapter 75 of title 5, United States
Code, or other applicable agency adverse action or disciplinary
procedures.
SEC. 707. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that for the purposes of adjudicating
the eligibility of an individual for access to classified information,
renewal of a prior determination of eligibility for such access, or
continuous vetting of an individual for eligibility for such access,
including on form SF-86 or any successor form, each of the following
should be considered an action advocating for an act of terrorism:
(1) Espousing the actions of an organization designated as
a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
(2) Advocating for continued attacks by an organization
described in paragraph (1).
(3) Soliciting funds for an organization described in
paragraph (1).
TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS
SEC. 801. IMPROVEMENTS REGARDING URGENT CONCERNS SUBMITTED TO
INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--Section
103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of'';
(B) by inserting ``in writing'' before ``to the
Inspector General''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) The Inspector General shall provide any support necessary to
ensure that an employee can submit a complaint or information under
this subparagraph in writing and, if such submission is not feasible,
shall create a written record of the employee's verbal complaint or
information and treat such written record as a written submission.'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the
following:
``(B)(i)(I) Not later than the end of the period specified in
subclause (II), the Inspector General shall determine whether the
written complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A)
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector
General shall transmit to the Director notice of that determination,
together with the complaint or information.
``(II) The period specified in this subclause is the 14-calendar-
day period beginning on the date on which an employee who has submitted
an initial written complaint or information under subparagraph (A)
confirms that the employee has submitted to the Inspector General the
material the employee intends to submit to Congress under such
subparagraph.
``(ii) The Inspector General may transmit a complaint or
information submitted under subparagraph (A) directly to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(I) without transmittal to the Director if the Inspector
General determines that transmittal to the Director could
compromise the anonymity of the employee or result in the
complaint or information being transmitted to a subject of the
complaint or information; or
``(II) following transmittal to the Director if the
Director does not transmit the complaint or information to the
congressional intelligence committees within the time period
specified in subparagraph (C).'';
(3) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``or does not
transmit the complaint or information to the Director
in accurate form under subparagraph (B),'' and
inserting ``does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under
subparagraph (B)(i)(I), or makes a determination
pursuant to subparagraph (B)(ii)(I) but does not
transmit the complaint or information to the
congressional intelligence committees within 21
calendar days of receipt,''; and
(B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the
following:
``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i)
only if--
``(I) the employee, before making such a contact--
``(aa) transmits to the Director, through
the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice
of the employee's intent to contact the
congressional intelligence committees directly;
and
``(bb) obtains and follows from the
Director, through the Inspector General,
direction on how to contact the congressional
intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(II) the Inspector General--
``(aa) determines that--
``(AA) a transmittal under
subclause (I) could compromise the
anonymity of the employee or result in
the complaint or information being
transmitted to a subject of the
complaint or information; or
``(BB) the Director has failed to
provide adequate direction pursuant to
item (bb) of subclause (I) within 7
calendar days of a transmittal under
such subclause; and
``(bb) provides the employee direction on
how to contact the congressional intelligence
committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(J) In this paragraph, the term `employee', with respect to an
employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee
assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an
employee of a contractor to the intelligence community who may submit a
complaint or information to the Inspector General under subparagraph
(A), means--
``(i) a current employee at the time of such submission; or
``(ii) a former employee at the time of such submission, if
such complaint or information arises from and relates to the
period of employment as such an employee.''.
(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.--Section
17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3517(d)(5)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by inserting (i) before ``An employee'';
(B) by inserting ``in writing'' before ``to the
Inspector General''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) The Inspector General shall provide any support necessary to
ensure that an employee can submit a complaint or information under
this subparagraph in writing and, if such submission is not feasible,
shall create a written record of the employee's verbal complaint or
information and treat such written record as a written submission.'';
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking clause (i) and inserting the
following:
``(i)(I) Not later than the end of the period specified in
subclause (II), the Inspector General shall determine whether the
written complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A)
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector
General shall transmit to the Director notice of that determination,
together with the complaint or information.
``(II) The period specified in this subclause is the 14-calendar-
day period beginning on the date on which an employee who has submitted
an initial written complaint or information under subparagraph (A)
confirms that the employee has submitted to the Inspector General the
material the employee intends to submit to Congress under such
subparagraph.''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) The Inspector General may transmit a complaint or
information submitted under subparagraph (A) directly to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(I) without transmittal to the Director if the Inspector
General determines that transmittal to the Director could
compromise the anonymity of the employee or result in the
complaint or information being transmitted to a subject of the
complaint or information;
``(II) following transmittal to the Director if the
Director does not transmit the complaint or information to the
congressional intelligence committees within the time period
specified in subparagraph (C) and has not made a determination
regarding a conflict of interest pursuant to clause (ii); or
``(III) following transmittal to the Director and a
determination by the Director that a conflict of interest
exists pursuant to clause (ii) if the Inspector General
determines that--
``(aa) transmittal to the Director of National
Intelligence could compromise the anonymity of the
employee or result in the complaint or information
being transmitted to a subject of the complaint or
information; or
``(bb) the Director of National Intelligence has
not transmitted the complaint or information to the
congressional intelligence committees within the time
period specified in subparagraph (C).'';
(3) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``or does not
transmit the complaint or information to the Director
in accurate form under subparagraph (B),'' and
inserting ``does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under
subparagraph (B)(i)(I), or makes a determination
pursuant to subparagraph (B)(iii)(I) but does not
transmit the complaint or information to the
congressional intelligence committees within 21
calendar days of receipt,''; and
(B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the
following:
``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if--
``(I) the employee, before making such a contact--
``(aa) transmits to the Director, through the
Inspector General, a statement of the employee's
complaint or information and notice of the employee's
intent to contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly; and
``(bb) obtains and follows from the Director,
through the Inspector General, direction on how to
contact the congressional intelligence committees in
accordance with appropriate security practices; or
``(II) the Inspector General--
``(aa) determines that--
``(AA) the transmittal under subclause (I)
could compromise the anonymity of the employee
or result in the complaint or information being
transmitted to a subject of the complaint or
information; or
``(BB) the Director has failed to provide
adequate direction pursuant to item (bb) of
subclause (I) within 7 calendar days of a
transmittal under such subclause; and
``(bb) provides the employee direction on how to
contact the congressional intelligence committees in
accordance with appropriate security practices.''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(I) In this paragraph, the term `employee', with respect to an
employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the Agency, who may
submit a complaint or information to the Inspector General under
subparagraph (A), means--
``(i) a current employee at the time of such submission; or
``(ii) a former employee at the time of such submission, if
such complaint or information arises from and relates to the
period of employment as such an employee.''.
(c) Other Inspectors General of Elements of the Intelligence
Community.--Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; and
(B) by inserting before paragraph (2), as
redesignated by paragraph (1), the following:
``(1) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an
employee of an element of the Federal Government covered by
subsection (b), or of a contractor to such an element, who may
submit a complaint or information to an Inspector General under
such subsection, means--
``(A) a current employee at the time of such
submission; or
``(B) a former employee at the time of such
submission, if such complaint or information arises
from and relates to the period of employment as such an
employee.'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in the paragraph heading, by inserting
``; support for written submission''; after
``made'';
(ii) by inserting ``in writing'' after
``may report the complaint or information''
each place it appears; and
(iii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting
``in writing'' after ``such complaint or
information''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) Support for written submission.--The
Inspector General shall provide any support necessary
to ensure that an employee can submit a complaint or
information under this paragraph in writing and, if
such submission is not feasible, shall create a written
record of the employee's verbal complaint or
information and treat such written record as a written
submission.'';
(3) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the
following:
``(1) Credibility.--
``(A) Determination.--Not later than the end of the
period specified in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the written complaint
or information submitted under subsection (b) appears
credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit to the head of the
establishment notice of that determination, together
with the complaint or information.
``(B) Period specified.--The period specified in
this subparagraph is the 14-calendar-day period
beginning on the date on which an employee who has
submitted an initial written complaint or information
under subsection (b) confirms that the employee has
submitted to the Inspector General the material the
employee intends to submit to Congress under such
subsection.''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Transmittal directly to intelligence committees.--The
Inspector General may transmit the complaint or information
directly to the intelligence committees--
``(A) without transmittal to the head of the
establishment if the Inspector General determines that
transmittal to the head of the establishment could
compromise the anonymity of the employee or result in
the complaint or information being transmitted to a
subject of the complaint or information;
``(B) following transmittal to the head of the
establishment if the head of the establishment does not
transmit the complaint or information to the
intelligence committees within the time period
specified in subsection (d) and has not made a
determination regarding a conflict of interest pursuant
to paragraph (2); or
``(C) following transmittal to the head of the
establishment and a determination by the head of the
establishment that a conflict of interest exists
pursuant to paragraph (2) if the Inspector General
determines that--
``(i) transmittal to the Director of
National Intelligence or the Secretary of
Defense could compromise the anonymity of the
employee or result in the complaint or
information being transmitted to a subject of
the complaint or information; or
``(ii) the Director of National
Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense has
not transmitted the complaint or information to
the intelligence committees within the time
period specified in subsection (d).'';
(4) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``or does not
transmit the complaint or information to the head of the
establishment in accurate form under subsection (c),'' and
inserting ``does not transmit the complaint or information to
the head of the establishment in accurate form under subsection
(c)(1)(A), or makes a determination pursuant to subsection
(c)(3)(A) but does not transmit the complaint or information to
the intelligence committees within 21 calendar days of
receipt,''; and
(5) in subsection (e), by striking paragraph (2) and
inserting the following:
``(2) Limitation.--An employee may contact the intelligence
committees directly as described in paragraph (1) only if--
``(A) the employee, before making such a contact--
``(i) transmits to the head of the
establishment, through the Inspector General, a
statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent
to contact the intelligence committees
directly; and
``(ii) obtains and follows from the head of
the establishment, through the Inspector
General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(B) the Inspector General--
``(i) determines that the transmittal under
subparagraph (A) could compromise the anonymity
of the employee or result in the complaint or
information being transmitted to a subject of
the complaint or information; or
``(ii) determines that the head of the
establishment has failed to provide adequate
direction pursuant to clause (ii) of
subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of a
transmittal under such subparagraph; and
``(iii) provides the employee direction on
how to contact the intelligence committees in
accordance with appropriate security
practices.''.
SEC. 802. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER IDENTITY AS
ACT OF REPRISAL.
(a) In General.--Section 1104(a) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as
subparagraph (K); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the
following:
``(J) an unauthorized whistleblower identity
disclosure;''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) Unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure.--The
term `unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure' means,
with respect to an employee or a contractor employee described
in paragraph (3), a knowing and willful disclosure revealing
the identity or other personally identifiable information of
the employee or contractor employee so as to identify the
employee or contractor employee as an employee or contractor
employee who has made a lawful disclosure described in
subsection (b) or (c), but does not include such a knowing and
willful disclosure that meets any of the following criteria:
``(A) Such disclosure was made with the express
consent of the employee or contractor employee.
``(B) Such disclosure was made during the course of
reporting or remedying the subject of the lawful
disclosure of the whistleblower through management,
legal, or oversight processes, including such processes
relating to human resources, equal opportunity,
security, or an Inspector General.
``(C) An Inspector General with oversight
responsibility for the relevant covered intelligence
community element determines that such disclosure--
``(i) was unavoidable under section 103H of
this Act (50 U.S.C. 3033), section 17 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3517), section 407 of title 5, United
States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such
title;
``(ii) was made to an official of the
Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be
undertaken; or
``(iii) was required by statute or an order
from a court of competent jurisdiction.''.
(b) Private Right of Action for Unlawful Disclosure of
Whistleblower Identity.--Subsection (f) of such section is amended to
read as follows:
``(f) Enforcement.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of
this section.
``(2) Harmonization with other enforcement.--To the fullest
extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement of
this section in a manner that is consistent with the
enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States
Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used
to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.
``(3) Private right of action for disclosures of
whistleblower identity in violation of prohibition against
reprisals.--Subject to paragraph (4), in a case in which an
employee of an agency takes a personnel action described in
subsection (a)(3)(J) against an employee of a covered
intelligence community element as a reprisal in violation of
subsection (b) or in a case in which an employee or contractor
employee takes a personnel action described in subsection
(a)(3)(J) against another contractor employee as a reprisal in
violation of subsection (c), the employee or contractor
employee against whom the personnel action was taken may,
consistent with section 1221 of title 5, United States Code,
bring a private action for all appropriate remedies, including
injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, in an
amount not to exceed $250,000, against the agency of the
employee or contracting agency of the contractor employee who
took the personnel action, in a Federal district court of
competent jurisdiction.
``(4) Requirements.--
``(A) Review by inspector general and by external
review panel.--Before the employee or contractor
employee may bring a private action under paragraph
(3), the employee or contractor employee shall exhaust
administrative remedies by--
``(i) first, obtaining a disposition of
their claim by requesting review by the
appropriate inspector general; and
``(ii) second, if the review under clause
(i) does not substantiate reprisal, by
submitting to the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community a request for a review
of the claim by an external review panel under
section 1106.
``(B) Period to bring action.--The employee or
contractor employee may bring a private right of action
under paragraph (3) during the 180-day period beginning
on the date on which the employee or contractor
employee is notified of the final disposition of their
claim under section 1106.''.
SEC. 803. PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS MAKING AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES TO
INSPECTORS GENERAL OF ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--Section
103H(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3))
is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses
(i) and (ii), respectively;
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) An individual may disclose classified information to
the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable
security standards and procedures established under Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), section 102A or section 803,
chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et
seq.), or any applicable provision of law. Such a disclosure of
classified information that is made by an individual who at the
time of the disclosure does not hold the appropriate clearance
or authority to access such classified information, but that is
otherwise made in accordance with such security standards and
procedures, shall be treated as an authorized disclosure and
does not violate--
``(i) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure
agreement;
``(ii) any otherwise applicable regulation or order
issued under the authority of Executive Order 13526 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national
security information) or chapter 18 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.); or
``(iii) section 798 of title 18, United States
Code, or any other provision of law relating to the
unauthorized disclosure of national security
information.''; and
(3) in the paragraph enumerator, by striking ``(3) '' and
inserting ``(3)(A)''.
(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.--Section
17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3517(e)(3)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses
(i) and (ii), respectively;
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) An individual may disclose classified information to
the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable
security standards and procedures established under Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), section 102A or 803 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024; 3162a), or
chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et
seq.). Such a disclosure of classified information that is made
by an individual who at the time of the disclosure does not
hold the appropriate clearance or authority to access such
classified information, but that is otherwise made in
accordance with such security standards and procedures, shall
be treated as an authorized disclosure and does not violate--
``(i) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure
agreement;
``(ii) any otherwise applicable regulation or order
issued under the authority of Executive Order 13526 or
chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2271 et seq.); or
``(iii) section 798 of title 18, United States
Code, or any other provision of law relating to the
unauthorized disclosure of national security
information.''; and
(3) in the paragraph enumerator, by striking ``(3) '' and
inserting ``(3)(A)''.
(c) Other Inspectors General of Elements of the Intelligence
Community.--Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) Protection for Individuals Making Authorized Disclosures.--An
individual may disclose classified information to an Inspector General
of an element of the intelligence community in accordance with the
applicable security standards and procedures established under
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), section 102A or 803 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024; 3162a), or chapter 12 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.). Such a disclosure
of classified information that is made by an individual who at the time
of the disclosure does not hold the appropriate clearance or authority
to access such classified information, but that is otherwise made in
accordance with such security standards and procedures, shall be
treated as an authorized disclosure and does not violate--
``(1) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;
``(2) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued
under the authority of Executive Order 13526 or chapter 18 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.); or
``(3) section 798 of title 18, or any other provision of
law relating to the unauthorized disclosure of national
security information.''.
SEC. 804. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF CERTAIN INSPECTORS GENERAL TO
RECEIVE PROTECTED DISCLOSURES.
Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting ``or covered
intelligence community element'' after ``the appropriate
inspector general of the employing agency''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by inserting ``or covered
intelligence community element'' after ``the appropriate
inspector general of the employing or contracting agency''.
SEC. 805. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS RELATING TO PSYCHIATRIC TESTING OR
EXAMINATION.
(a) Prohibited Personnel Practices.--Section 1104(a)(3) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)(3)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following new
subparagraph:
``(J) a decision to order psychiatric testing or
examination; or''.
(b) Application.--The amendments made by this section shall apply
with respect to matters arising under section 1104 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 806. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR ADVERSE SECURITY CLEARANCE
AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.
Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is amended
to read as follows:
``(C) Contributing factor.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii),
in determining whether the adverse security
clearance or access determination violated
paragraph (1), the agency shall find that
paragraph (1) was violated if the individual
has demonstrated that a disclosure described in
paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the
adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual.
``(ii) Circumstantial evidence.--An
individual under clause (i) may demonstrate
that the disclosure was a contributing factor
in the adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual
through circumstantial evidence, such as
evidence that--
``(I) the official making the
determination knew of the disclosure;
and
``(II) the determination occurred
within a period such that a reasonable
person could conclude that the
disclosure was a contributing factor in
the determination.
``(iii) Defense.--In determining whether
the adverse security clearance or access
determination violated paragraph (1), the
agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was
violated if, after a finding that a disclosure
was a contributing factor, the agency
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have made the same security
clearance or access determination in the
absence of such disclosure.''.
SEC. 807. ELIMINATION OF CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR RETALIATORY
REVOCATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES AND ACCESS
DETERMINATIONS.
Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is amended, in the
second sentence, by striking ``not to exceed $300,000''.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
SEC. 901. ADDITIONAL DISCRETION FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IN PAYING COSTS OF TREATING QUALIFYING INJURIES
AND MAKING PAYMENTS FOR QUALIFYING INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
(a) Additional Authority for Covering Costs for Treating Qualifying
Injuries Under Extraordinary Circumstances.--Subsection (c) of section
19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``The Director may'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--The Director may''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Extraordinary circumstances.--Under such
circumstances as the Director determines extraordinary, the
Director may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a
covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent
or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a
covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise
covered by a provision of Federal law, regardless of the date
of the injury and the location of the employee, individual, or
dependent when the injury occurred.''.
(b) Additional Authority for Making Payments for Qualifying
Injuries to the Brain Under Extraordinary Circumstances.--Subsection
(d)(2) of such section is amended--
(1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Extraordinary circumstances.--Under such
circumstances as the Director determines extraordinary,
the Director may provide payment to a covered employee,
a covered individual, or a covered dependent for any
qualifying injury to the brain, regardless of the date
of the injury and the location of the employee,
individual, or dependent when the injury occurred.''.
(c) Congressional Notification.--Such section is amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Congressional Notification.--Whenever the Director makes a
payment or reimbursement made under subsection (c) or (d)(2), the
Director shall, not later than 30 days after the date on which the
payment or reimbursement is made, submit to the congressional
intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) a notification of such payment
or reimbursement.''.
SEC. 902. ADDITIONAL DISCRETION FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AND HEADS OF
OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES IN PAYING COSTS OF TREATING
QUALIFYING INJURIES AND MAKING PAYMENTS FOR QUALIFYING
INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
(a) Additional Authority for Covering Costs for Treating Qualifying
Injuries Under Extraordinary Circumstances.--Subsection (b) of section
901 of division J of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020
(22 U.S.C. 2680b) is amended to read as follows:
``(b) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State or the head of
any other Federal agency may pay or reimburse the costs
relating to diagnosing and treating--
``(A) a qualifying injury of a covered employee for
such costs, that are not otherwise covered by chapter
81 of title 5, United States Code, or other provision
of Federal law; or
``(B) a qualifying injury of a covered individual,
or a covered dependent, for such costs that are not
otherwise covered by Federal law.
``(2) Extraordinary circumstances.--Under such
circumstances as the Secretary of State or other agency head
determines extraordinary, the Secretary or other agency head
may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent or may
reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a
covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise
covered by a provision of Federal law, regardless of the date
on which the injury occurred.''.
(b) Additional Authority for Making Payments for Qualifying
Injuries to the Brain Under Extraordinary Circumstances.--Subsection
(i)(2) of such section is amended--
(1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Extraordinary circumstances.--Under such
circumstances as the Secretary of State or other agency
head with an employee determines extraordinary, the
Secretary or other agency head may provide payment to a
covered dependent, a dependent of a former employee, a
covered employee, a former employee, and a covered
individual for any qualifying injury to the brain,
regardless of the date on which the injury occurred.''.
(c) Changes to Definitions.--Subsection (e) of such section is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by
striking ``a employee who, on or after January 1,
2016'' and inserting ``an employee who, on or after
September 11, 2001''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, or duty
station in the United States'' before the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``January 1, 2016'' and inserting
``September 11, 2001''; and
(B) by inserting ``, or duty station in the United
States,'' after ``pursuant to subsection (f)'';
(3) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by
striking ``January 1, 2016'' and inserting ``September
11, 2001''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, or duty
station in the United States'' before the semicolon;
and
(4) in paragraph (4)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by inserting ``, or
duty station in the United States'' before the
semicolon; and
(B) in subparagraph (B)(i), by inserting ``, or
duty station in the United States'' before the
semicolon.
(d) Clarification Relating to Authorities of Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.--Such section is further amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(k) Relation to Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--The
authorities and requirements of this section shall not apply to the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
SEC. 903. IMPROVED FUNDING FLEXIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS MADE BY DEPARTMENT
OF STATE FOR QUALIFYING INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
Section 901(i) of division J of the Further Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b) is amended by striking
paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
``(3) Funding.--
``(A) In general.--Payment under paragraph (2) in a
fiscal year may be made using any funds--
``(i) appropriated specifically for
payments under such paragraph; or
``(ii) reprogrammed in accordance with an
applicable provision of law.
``(B) Budget.--For each fiscal year, the Secretary
of State shall include with the budget justification
materials submitted to Congress in support of the
budget of the President for that fiscal year pursuant
to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, an
estimate of the funds required in that fiscal year to
make payments under paragraph (2).''.
TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA
SEC. 1001. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES REVIEW OF ALL-
DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``congressional
defense committees'', ``congressional leadership'', and ``unidentified
anomalous phenomena'' have the meanings given such terms in section
1683(n) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
(50 U.S.C. 3373(n)).
(b) Review Required.--The Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct a review of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (in
this section referred to as the ``Office'').
(c) Elements.--The review conducted pursuant to subsection (b)
shall include the following:
(1) A review of the implementation by the Office of the
duties and requirements of the Office under section 1683 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50
U.S.C. 3373), such as the process for operational unidentified
anomalous phenomena reporting and coordination with the
Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and other
departments and agencies of the Federal Government and non-
Government entities.
(2) A review of such other matters relating to the
activities of the Office that pertain to unidentified anomalous
phenomena as the Comptroller General considers appropriate.
(d) Report.--Following the review required by subsection (b), in a
timeframe mutually agreed upon by the congressional intelligence
committees, the congressional defense committees, congressional
leadership, and the Comptroller General, the Comptroller General shall
submit to such committees and congressional leadership a report on the
findings of the Comptroller General with respect to the review
conducted under subsection (b).
SEC. 1002. SUNSET OF REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AUDITS OF UNIDENTIFIED
ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA HISTORICAL RECORD REPORT.
Section 6001 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023 (50 U.S.C. 3373 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``until April 1,
2025'' after ``quarterly basis''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by inserting ``until June 30, 2025''
after ``semiannually thereafter''.
SEC. 1003. FUNDING LIMITATIONS RELATING TO UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS
PHENOMENA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' means--
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
and
(D) the minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.--The term
``unidentified anomalous phenomena'' has the meaning given such
term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)).
(b) Limitations.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated
or otherwise made available by this Act may be obligated or expended in
support of any activity involving unidentified anomalous phenomena
protected under any form of special access or restricted access
limitation unless the Director of National Intelligence has provided
the details of the activity to the appropriate committees of Congress
and congressional leadership, including for any activities described in
a report released by the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office in fiscal
year 2024.
(c) Limitation Regarding Independent Research and Development.--
Independent research and development funding relating to unidentified
anomalous phenomena shall not be allowable as indirect expenses for
purposes of contracts covered by such instruction, unless such material
and information is made available to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership.
TITLE XI--AIR AMERICA
SEC. 1101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Air America Act of 2024''.
SEC. 1102. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Air America and its affiliated companies, in
coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, provided
direct and indirect support to the United States Government
from 1950 to 1976.
(2) The service and sacrifice of employees of Air America
included--
(A) suffering a high rate of casualties in the
course of service;
(B) saving thousands of lives in search and rescue
missions for downed United States airmen and in allied
refugee evacuations; and
(C) serving lengthy periods under challenging
circumstances abroad.
SEC. 1103. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Affiliated company.--The term ``affiliated company'',
with respect to Air America, includes Air Asia Company Limited,
CAT Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company Limited, and the
Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport.
(2) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air
America, Incorporated.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Oversight and Accountability,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(4) Child; dependent; widow; widower.--The terms ``child'',
``dependent'', ``widow'', and ``widower'' have the meanings
given those terms in section 8341(a) of title 5, United States
Code, except that such section shall be applied by substituting
``individual who performed qualifying service'' for ``employee
or Member''.
(5) Covered decedent.--The term ``covered decedent'' means
an individual who was killed in Southeast Asia while supporting
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency during the period
beginning on January 1, 1950, and ending on December 31, 1976,
as a United States citizen employee of Air America or an
affiliated company.
(6) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
(7) Qualifying service.-- The term ``qualifying service''
means service that--
(A) was performed by a United States citizen as an
employee of Air America or an affiliated company during
the period beginning on January 1, 1950, and ending on
December 31, 1976; and
(B) is documented in--
(i) the corporate records of Air America or
an affiliated company;
(ii) records possessed by the United States
Government; or
(iii) the personal records of a former
employee of Air America or an affiliated
company that are verified by the United States
Government.
(8) Survivor.--The term ``survivor'' means--
(A) the widow or widower of--
(i) an individual who performed qualifying
service; or
(ii) a covered decedent; or
(B) an individual who, at any time during or since
the period of qualifying service, or on the date of
death of a covered decedent, was a dependent or child
of--
(i) the individual who performed such
qualifying service; or
(ii) the covered decedent.
SEC. 1104. AWARD AUTHORIZED TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS.
(a) In General.--Subject to the limitation in subsection (d), the
Director shall provide an award payment of $40,000 under this section--
(1) to an individual who performed qualifying service for a
period greater than or equal to 5 years or to a survivor of
such individual; or
(2) to the survivor of a covered decedent.
(b) Requirements.--
(1) In general.--To be eligible for a payment under this
subsection, an individual who performed qualifying service or
survivor (as the case may be) must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Director that the individual whose
qualifying service upon which the payment is based meets the
criteria of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a).
(2) Reliance on records.--In carrying out this subsection,
in addition to any evidence provided by such an individual or
survivor, the Director may rely on records possessed by the
United States Government.
(c) Additional Payment.--If an individual, or in the case of a
survivor, the individual whose qualifying service upon which the
payment is based, can demonstrate to the Director that the qualifying
service of the individual exceeded 5 years, the Director shall pay to
such individual or survivor an additional $8,000 for each full year in
excess of 5 years (and a proportionate amount for a partial year).
(d) Survivors.--In the case of an award granted to a survivor under
this section, the payment shall be made--
(1) to the surviving widow or widower; or
(2) if there is no surviving widow or widower, to the
surviving dependents or children, in equal shares.
SEC. 1105. FUNDING LIMITATION.
(a) In General.--The total amount of awards granted under this
title may not exceed $60,000,000.
(b) Requests for Additional Funds.--If, at the determination of the
Director, the amount of funds required to satisfy all valid
applications for payment under this title exceeds the limitation set
forth in subsection (a), the Director shall submit to Congress a
request for sufficient funds to fulfill all remaining payments.
(c) Awards to Employees of Intermountain Aviation.--The Director
may determine, on a case-by-case basis, to award amounts to individuals
who performed service consistent with the definition of qualifying
service as employees of Intermountain Aviation.
SEC. 1106. TIME LIMITATION.
(a) In General.--To be eligible for an award payment under this
title, a claimant must file a claim for such payment with the Director
not later than 2 years after the effective date of the regulations
prescribed by the Director in accordance with section 1107.
(b) Determination.--Not later than 90 days after receiving a claim
for an award payment under this section, the Director shall determine
the eligibility of the claimant for payment.
(c) Payment.--
(1) In general.--If the Director determines that the
claimant is eligible for the award payment, the Director shall
pay the award payment not later than 60 days after the date of
such determination.
(2) Lump-sum payment.--The Director shall issue each
payment as a one-time lump sum payment contingent upon the
timely filing of the claimant under this section.
(3) Notice and delays.--The Director shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees of any delays in making an
award payment not later than 30 days after the date such
payment is due.
SEC. 1107. APPLICATION PROCEDURES.
(a) In General.--The Director shall prescribe procedures to carry
out this title, which shall include processes under which--
(1) claimants may submit claims for payment under this
title;
(2) the Director will award the amounts under section 1104;
and
(3) claimants can obtain redress and appeal determinations
under section 1106.
(b) Other Matters.--Such procedures--
(1) shall be--
(A) prescribed not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) published in the Code of Federal Regulations;
and
(2) shall not be subject to chapter 5 of title 5, United
States Code.
SEC. 1108. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to--
(1) entitle any person to Federal benefits, including
retirement benefits under chapter 83 or 84 of title 5, United
States Code, and disability or death benefits under chapter 81
of such title;
(2) change the legal status of the former Air America
corporation or any affiliated company; or
(3) create any legal rights, benefits, or entitlements
beyond the one-time award authorized by this title.
SEC. 1109. ATTORNEYS' AND AGENTS' FEES.
(a) In General.--It shall be unlawful for more than 25 percent of
an award paid pursuant to this title to be paid to, or received by, any
agent or attorney for any service rendered to a person who receives an
award under section 1104, in connection with the award under this
title.
(b) Violation.--Any agent or attorney who violates subsection (a)
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code.
SEC. 1110. NO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
A determination by the Director pursuant to this title is final and
conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial review.
SEC. 1111. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
Until the date that all funds available for awards under this title
are expended, the Director shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a semiannual report describing the number of
award payments made and denied during the 180 days preceding the
submission of the report, including the rationales for any denials, and
if, at the determination of the Director, the amount of funds provided
to carry out this title is insufficient to satisfy any remaining or
anticipated claims.
TITLE XII--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 1201. ENHANCED AUTHORITIES FOR AMICUS CURIAE UNDER THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Expansion of Appointment Authority.--
(1) In general.--Section 103(i)(2)(A) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(2)(A))
is amended by striking clause (i) and inserting the following:
``(i) shall appoint one or more individuals
who have been designated under paragraph (1),
not less than one of whom possesses privacy and
civil liberties expertise, unless the court
finds that such a qualification is
inappropriate, to serve as amicus curiae to
assist the court in the consideration of any
application or motion for an order or review
that, in the opinion of the court--
``(I) presents a novel or
significant interpretation of the law,
unless the court issues a finding that
such appointment is not appropriate;
``(II) presents exceptional
concerns with respect to the activities
of a United States person that are
protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States,
unless the court issues a finding that
such appointment is not appropriate;
``(III) targets a United States
person and presents or involves a
sensitive investigative matter,
unless--
``(aa) the matter
represents an immediate danger
to human life; or
``(bb) the court issues a
finding that such appointment
is not appropriate;
``(IV) targets a United States
person and presents a request for
approval of programmatic surveillance
or reauthorization of programmatic
surveillance, unless the court issues a
finding that such appointment is not
appropriate; or
``(V) targets a United States
person and otherwise presents novel or
exceptional civil liberties issues,
unless the court issues a finding that
such appointment is not appropriate;''.
(2) Definition of sensitive investigative matter.--
Subsection (i) of section 103 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(12) Definition of sensitive investigative matter.--In
this subsection, the term `sensitive investigative matter'
means--
``(A) an investigative matter that targets a United
States person who is--
``(i) a United States elected official;
``(ii) an appointee of--
``(I) the President; or
``(II) a State Governor;
``(iii) a United States political
candidate;
``(iv) a United States political
organization or an individual prominent in such
an organization;
``(v) a United States news media
organization or a member of a United States
news media organization; or
``(vi) a United States religious
organization or an individual prominent in such
an organization; or
``(B) any other investigative matter involving a
domestic entity or a known or presumed United States
person that, in the judgment of the applicable court
established under subsection (a) or (b), is as
sensitive as an investigative matter described in
subparagraph (A).''.
(b) Authority To Seek Review.--Subsection (i) of such section (50
U.S.C. 1803), as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is further
amended--
(1) in paragraph (4)--
(A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting ``;
authority'' after ``Duties'';
(B) by striking ``the amicus curiae shall'' and all
that follows through ``provide'' and insert the
following: ``the amicus curiae--
``(A) shall provide'';
(C) in subparagraph (A), as so designated--
(i) in clause (i), by inserting before the
semicolon at the end the following: ``,
including legal arguments regarding any privacy
or civil liberties interest of any United
States person that would be significantly
impacted by the application or motion''; and
(ii) in clause (iii), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) may seek leave to raise any novel or
significant privacy or civil liberties issue relevant
to the application or motion or other issue directly
impacting the legality of the proposed electronic
surveillance with the court, regardless of whether the
court has requested assistance on that issue.'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (7) through (12) as
paragraphs (8) through (13), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
``(7) Authority to seek review of decisions.--
``(A) FISA court decisions.--Following issuance of
a final order under this Act by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in a matter in which an
amicus curiae was appointed under paragraph (2), that
amicus curiae may petition the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to certify for review to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review a question of
law pursuant to subsection (j). If the court denies
such petition, the court shall provide for the record a
written statement of the reasons for such denial. Upon
certification of any question of law pursuant to this
subparagraph, the Court of Review shall appoint the
amicus curiae to assist the Court of Review in its
consideration of the certified question, unless the
Court of Review issues a finding that such appointment
is not appropriate.
``(B) FISA court of review decisions.--An amicus
curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review to
certify for review to the Supreme Court of the United
States any question of law pursuant to section 1254(2)
of title 28, United States Code, in the matter in which
that amicus curiae was appointed.
``(C) Declassification of referrals.--For purposes
of section 602, if the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review denies a petition filed
under subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph, that
petition and all of its content shall be considered a
decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review described in
section 602(a).''.
(c) Access to Information.--
(1) Application and Materials.--Subparagraph (A) of section
103(i)(6) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(6)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(A) In general.--
``(i) Rights of amicus.--If a court
established under subsection (a) or (b)
appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2),
the amicus curiae--
``(I) shall have access to, to the
extent such information is available to
the Government and the court
established under subsection (a) or (b)
determines it is necessary to fulfill
the duties of the amicus curiae--
``(aa) the application,
certification, petition,
motion, and other information
and supporting materials
submitted to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
in connection with the matter
in which the amicus curiae has
been appointed, including
access to any relevant legal
precedent (including any such
precedent that is cited by the
Government, including in such
an application);
``(bb) a copy of each
relevant decision made by the
Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the
Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review in
which the court decides a
question of law, without regard
to whether the decision is
classified; and
``(cc) any other
information or materials that
the court determines are
relevant to the duties of the
amicus curiae; and
``(II) may make a submission to the
court requesting access to any other
particular materials or information (or
category of materials or information)
that the amicus curiae believes to be
relevant to the duties of the amicus
curiae.
``(ii) Supporting documentation regarding
accuracy.--The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, upon the motion of an
amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) or
upon its own motion, may require the Government
to make available the supporting documentation
regarding the accuracy of any material
submitted to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court in connection with the
matter in which the amicus curiae has been
appointed if the court determines the
information is relevant to the duties of the
amicus curiae.''.
(2) Clarification of access to certain information.--Such
section is further amended by striking subparagraph (C) and
inserting the following:
``(C) Classified information.--An amicus curiae
appointed by the court shall have access, to the extent
such information is available to the Government and the
court determines such information is relevant to the
duties of the amicus curiae in the matter in which the
amicus curiae was appointed, to copies of each opinion,
order, transcript, pleading, or other document of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, including,
if the individual is eligible for access to classified
information, any classified documents, information, and
other materials or proceedings, but only to the extent
consistent with the national security of the United
States.''.
(3) Consultation among amici curiae.--Such section is
further amended--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and
(D) as subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively;
and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the
following:
``(B) Consultation.--If the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review determines that it is
relevant to the duties of an amicus curiae appointed by
the court under paragraph (2), the amicus curiae may
consult with one or more of the other individuals
designated to serve as amicus curiae pursuant to
paragraph (1) regarding any of the information relevant
to any assigned proceeding.''.
(d) Term Limits.--
(1) Requirement.--Paragraph (1) of section 103(i) of such
Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new sentence: ``An individual may serve as an amicus
curiae for a 5-year term, and the presiding judges may, for
good cause, jointly reappoint the individual to a single
additional 5-year term.''.
(2) Application.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall
apply with respect to the service of an amicus curiae appointed
under section 103(i) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) that
occurs on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
regardless of the date on which the amicus curiae is appointed.
SEC. 1202. LIMITATION ON DIRECTIVES UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 RELATING TO CERTAIN ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS.
Section 702(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(7) Limitation relating to certain electronic
communication service providers.--
``(A) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
``(i) Appropriate committees of congress.--
The term `appropriate committees of Congress'
means--
``(I) the congressional
intelligence committees;
``(II) the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate; and
``(III) the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
``(ii) Covered electronic communication
service provider.--The term `covered electronic
communication service provider' means--
``(I) a service provider described
in section 701(b)(4)(E); or
``(II) a custodian of an entity as
defined in section 701(b)(4)(F).
``(iii) Covered opinions.--The term
`covered opinions' means the opinions of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review authorized for public release on August
23, 2023 (Opinion and Order, In re Petition to
Set Aside or Modify Directive Issued to
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], (FISA Ct.
[REDACTED] 2022) (Contreras J.); Opinion, In re
Petition to Set Aside or Modify Directive
Issued to [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], (FISA Ct.
Rev. [REDACTED] 2023) (Sentelle, J.; Higginson,
J.; Miller J.)).
``(B) Limitation.--A directive may not be issued
under paragraph (1) to a covered electronic
communication service provider unless the covered
electronic communication service provider is a provider
of the type of service at issue in the covered
opinions.
``(C) Requirements for directives to covered
electronic communication service providers.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii),
any directive issued under paragraph (1) on or
after the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025 to a covered electronic communication
service provider that is not prohibited by
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall
include a summary description of the services
at issue in the covered opinions.
``(ii) Duplicate summaries not required.--A
directive need not include a summary
description of the services at issue in the
covered opinions if such summary was included
in a prior directive issued to the covered
electronic communication service provider and
the summary has not materially changed.
``(D) Foreign intelligence surveillance court
notification and review.--
``(i) Notification.--
``(I) In general.--Subject to
subclause (II), each time the Attorney
General and the Director of National
Intelligence issue a directive under
paragraph (1) to a covered electronic
communication service provider that is
not prohibited by subparagraph (B) and
each time the Attorney General and the
Director materially change a directive
under paragraph (1) issued to a covered
electronic communication service
provider that is not prohibited by
subparagraph (B), the Attorney General
and the Director shall provide the
directive to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court on or before the
date that is 7 days after the date on
which the Attorney General and the
Director issue the directive, along
with a description of the covered
electronic communication service
provider to whom the directive is
issued and the services at issue.
``(II) Duplication not required.--
The Attorney General and the Director
do not need to provide a directive or
description to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court under subclause (I)
if a directive and description
concerning the covered electronic
communication service provider was
previously provided to the Court and
the directive or description has not
materially changed.
``(ii) Additional information.--As soon as
feasible and not later than the initiation of
collection, the Attorney General and the
Director shall, for each directive described in
subparagraph (i), provide the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court a description
of the type of equipment to be accessed, the
nature of the access, and the form of
assistance required pursuant to the directive.
``(iii) Review.--
``(I) In general.--The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Court may
review a directive received by the
Court under clause (i) to determine
whether the directive is consistent
with subparagraph (B) and affirm,
modify, or set aside the directive.
``(II) Notice of intent to
review.--Not later than 10 days after
the date on which the Court receives
information under clause (ii) with
respect to a directive, the Court shall
provide notice to the Attorney General,
the Director, and the covered
electronic communication service
provider, indicating whether the Court
intends to undertake a review under
subclause (I) of this clause.
``(III) Completion of reviews.--In
a case in which the Court provides
notice under subclause (II) indicating
that the Court intends to review a
directive under subclause (I), the
Court shall, not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Court
provides notice under subclause (II)
with respect to the directive, complete
the review.
``(E) Congressional oversight.--
``(i) Notification.--
``(I) In general.--Subject to
subclause (II), each time the Attorney
General and the Director of National
Intelligence issue a directive under
paragraph (1) to a covered electronic
communication service provider that is
not prohibited by subparagraph (B) and
each time the Attorney General and the
Director materially change a directive
under paragraph (1) issued to a covered
electronic communication service
provider that is not prohibited by
subparagraph (B), the Attorney General
and the Director shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress the
directive on or before the date that is
7 days after the date on which the
Attorney General and the Director issue
the directive, along with description
of the covered electronic communication
service provider to whom the directive
is issued and the services at issue.
``(II) Duplication not required.--
The Attorney General and the Director
do not need to submit a directive or
description to the appropriate
committees of Congress under subclause
(I) if a directive and description
concerning the covered electronic
communication service provider was
previously submitted to the appropriate
committees of Congress and the
directive or description has not
materially changed.
``(ii) Additional information.--As soon as
feasible and not later than the initiation of
collection, the Attorney General and the
Director shall, for each directive described in
subparagraph (i), provide the appropriate
committees of Congress a description of the
type of equipment to be accessed, the nature of
the access, and the form of assistance required
pursuant to the directive.
``(iii) Reporting.--
``(I) Quarterly reports.--Not later
than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
and not less frequently than once each
quarter thereafter, the Attorney
General and the Director shall submit
to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on the number of
directives issued, during the period
covered by the report, under paragraph
(1) to a covered electronic
communication service provider and the
number of directives provided during
the same period to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court under
subparagraph (D)(i).
``(II) Form of reports.--Each
report submitted pursuant to subclause
(I) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified
annex.
``(III) Submittal of court
opinions.--Not later than 45 days after
the date on which the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review issues an opinion relating to
a directive issued to a covered
electronic communication service
provider under paragraph (1), the
Attorney General shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a
copy of the opinion.''.
SEC. 1203. STRENGTHENING ELECTION CYBERSECURITY TO UPHOLD RESPECT FOR
ELECTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT TESTING ACT OF 2024.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Strengthening
Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for Elections through
Independent Testing Act of 2024'' or the ``SECURE IT Act of 2024''.
(b) Requiring Penetration Testing as Part of the Testing and
Certification of Voting Systems.--Section 231 of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(e) Required Penetration Testing.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall
provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the
testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of
voting system hardware and software by the Commission based on
accredited laboratories under this section.
``(2) Accreditation.--The Commission shall develop a
program for the acceptance of the results of penetration
testing on election systems. The penetration testing required
by this subsection shall be required for Commission
certification. The Commission shall vote on the selection of
any entity identified. The requirements for such selection
shall be based on consideration of an entity's competence to
conduct penetration testing under this subsection. The
Commission may consult with the National Institute of Standards
and Technology or any other appropriate Federal agency on lab
selection criteria and other aspects of this program.''.
(c) Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems.--
(1) In general.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new part:
``PART 7--INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS
``SEC. 297. INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION
SYSTEMS.
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Commission, in consultation with
the Secretary, shall establish an Independent Security Testing
and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot Program for
Election Systems (VDP-E) (in this section referred to as the
`program') to test for and disclose cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in election systems.
``(2) Duration.--The program shall be conducted for a
period of 5 years.
``(3) Requirements.--In carrying out the program, the
Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall--
``(A) establish a mechanism by which an election
systems vendor may make their election system
(including voting machines and source code) available
to cybersecurity researchers participating in the
program;
``(B) provide for the vetting of cybersecurity
researchers prior to their participation in the
program, including the conduct of background checks;
``(C) establish terms of participation that--
``(i) describe the scope of testing
permitted under the program;
``(ii) require researchers to--
``(I) notify the vendor, the
Commission, and the Secretary of any
cybersecurity vulnerability they
identify with respect to an election
system; and
``(II) otherwise keep such
vulnerability confidential for 180 days
after such notification;
``(iii) require the good faith
participation of all participants in the
program;
``(iv) require an election system vendor,
within 180 days after validating notification
of a critical or high vulnerability (as defined
by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology) in an election system of the
vendor, to--
``(I) send a patch or propound some
other fix or mitigation for such
vulnerability to the appropriate State
and local election officials, in
consultation with the researcher who
discovered it; and
``(II) notify the Commission and
the Secretary that such patch has been
sent to such officials;
``(D) in the case where a patch or fix to address a
vulnerability disclosed under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I)
is intended to be applied to a system certified by the
Commission, provide--
``(i) for the expedited review of such
patch or fix within 90 days after receipt by
the Commission; and
``(ii) if such review is not completed by
the last day of such 90-day period, that such
patch or fix shall be deemed to be certified by
the Commission, subject to any subsequent
review of such determination by the Commission;
and
``(E) 180 days after the disclosure of a
vulnerability under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify the
Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency of the vulnerability for inclusion in
the database of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures.
``(4) Voluntary participation; safe harbor.--
``(A) Voluntary participation.--Participation in
the program shall be voluntary for election systems
vendors and researchers.
``(B) Safe harbor.--When conducting research under
this program, such research and subsequent publication
shall be--
``(i) authorized in accordance with section
1030 of title 18, United States Code (commonly
known as the `Computer Fraud and Abuse Act'),
(and similar State laws), and the election
system vendor will not initiate or support
legal action against the researcher for
accidental, good faith violations of the
program; and
``(ii) exempt from the anti-circumvention
rule of section 1201 of title 17, United States
Code (commonly known as the `Digital Millennium
Copyright Act'), and the election system vendor
will not bring a claim against a researcher for
circumvention of technology controls.
``(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this
paragraph may be construed to limit or otherwise affect
any exception to the general prohibition against the
circumvention of technological measures under
subparagraph (A) of section 1201(a)(1) of title 17,
United States Code, including with respect to any use
that is excepted from that general prohibition by the
Librarian of Congress under subparagraphs (B) through
(D) of such section 1201(a)(1).
``(5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Cybersecurity vulnerability.--The term
`cybersecurity vulnerability' means, with respect to an
election system, any security vulnerability that
affects the election system.
``(B) Election infrastructure.--The term `election
infrastructure' means--
``(i) storage facilities, polling places,
and centralized vote tabulation locations used
to support the administration of elections for
public office; and
``(ii) related information and
communications technology, including--
``(I) voter registration databases;
``(II) election management systems;
``(III) voting machines;
``(IV) electronic mail and other
communications systems (including
electronic mail and other systems of
vendors who have entered into contracts
with election agencies to support the
administration of elections, manage the
election process, and report and
display election results); and
``(V) other systems used to manage
the election process and to report and
display election results on behalf of
an election agency.
``(C) Election system.--The term `election system'
means any information system that is part of an
election infrastructure, including any related
information and communications technology described in
subparagraph (B)(ii).
``(D) Election system vendor.--The term `election
system vendor' means any person providing, supporting,
or maintaining an election system on behalf of a State
or local election official.
``(E) Information system.--The term `information
system' has the meaning given the term in section 3502
of title 44, United States Code.
``(F) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
``(G) Security vulnerability.--The term `security
vulnerability' has the meaning given the term in
section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to
subtitle D of title II the following:
``PART 7--Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems
``Sec. 297. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity
vulnerability disclosure program for
election systems.''.
SEC. 1204. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD QUALIFICATIONS.
Section 1061(h)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(h)(2)) is amended by striking
``and relevant experience'' and inserting ``or experience in positions
requiring a security clearance, and relevant national security
experience''.
SEC. 1205. PARITY IN PAY FOR STAFF OF THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 1061(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(j)(1)) is amended by striking
``except that'' and all that follows through the period at the end and
inserting ``except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may
exceed the highest amount paid by any element of the intelligence
community for a comparable position, based on salary information
provided to the chairman of the Board by the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 1206. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Briefing on Iranian Expenditures Supporting Foreign Military
and Terrorist Activities.--Section 6705(a)(1) of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412(a)(1)) is amended by
striking ``, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter
provide a briefing to Congress,''.
(b) Reports and Briefings on National Security Effects of Global
Water Insecurity and Emerging Infectious Diseases and Pandemics.--
Section 6722(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3024 note; division E of Public Law 116-92) is amended by--
(1) striking paragraph (2); and
(2) redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (2)
and (3), respectively.
(c) Repeal of Report on Removal of Satellites and Related Items
From the United States Munitions List.--Section 1261(e) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note;
Public Law 112-239) is repealed.
(d) Briefing on Review of Intelligence Community Analytic
Production.--Section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c)) is amended by striking
``December 1'' and inserting ``February 1''.
(e) Repeal of Report on Oversight of Foreign Influence in
Academia.--Section 5713 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369b) is repealed.
(f) Repeal of Briefing on Iranian Expenditures Supporting Foreign
Military and Terrorist Activities.--Section 6705 of the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (b);
(2) by striking the enumerator and heading for subsection
(a);
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively, and moving such subsections, as so
redesignated, 2 ems to the left;
(4) in subsection (a), as so redesignated, by redesignating
subparagraphs (A) and (B) as paragraphs (1) and (2),
respectively, and moving such paragraphs, as so redesignated, 2
ems to the left; and
(5) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by redesignating
clauses (i) through (v) as subparagraphs (A) through (E),
respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, as so
redesignated, 2 ems to the left.
(g) Repeal of Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--Section 6716 of
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.
3370a) is repealed.
(h) Repeal of Report on Intelligence Community Loan Repayment
Programs.--Section 6725(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334g(c)) is repealed.
(i) Repeal of Report on Data Collection on Attrition in
Intelligence Community.--Section 306(c) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3334h(c)) is
repealed.
SEC. 1207. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Requirements Relating to Construction of Facilities to Be Used
Primarily by Intelligence Community.--Section 602(a) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3304(a))
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``$6,000,000'' and
inserting ``$9,000,000''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``$2,000,000'' each place it
appears and inserting ``$4,000,000''; and
(B) by striking ``$6,000,000'' and inserting
``$9,000,000''.
(b) Copyright Protection for Civilian Faculty of Certain Accredited
Institutions.--Section 105 of title 17, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``Sec. 105. Subject matter of copyright: United States Government works
``(a) In General.--Copyright protection under this title is not
available for any work of the United States Government, but the United
States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding
copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.
``(b) Copyright Protection of Certain Works.--Subject to subsection
(c), the covered author of a covered work owns the copyright to that
covered work.
``(c) Use by Federal Government.--
``(1) Secretary of defense authority.--With respect to a
covered author who produces a covered work in the course of
employment at a covered institution described in subparagraphs
(A) through (K) of subsection (d)(2), the Secretary of Defense
may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government
with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive
license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such
covered work for purposes of the United States Government.
``(2) Secretary of homeland security authority.--With
respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the
course of employment at the covered institution described in
subsection (d)(2)(L), the Secretary of Homeland Security may
direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government
with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive
license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such
covered work for purposes of the United States Government.
``(3) Director of national intelligence authority.--With
respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the
course of employment at the covered institution described in
subsection (d)(2)(M), the Director of National Intelligence may
direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government
with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive
license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such
covered work for purposes of the United States Government.
``(4) Secretary of transportation authority.--With respect
to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course
of employment at the covered institution described in
subsection (d)(2)(N), the Secretary of Transportation may
direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government
with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive
license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such
covered work for purposes of the United States Government.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered author.--The term `covered author' means a
civilian member of the faculty of a covered institution.
``(2) Covered institution.--The term `covered institution'
means the following:
``(A) National Defense University.
``(B) United States Military Academy.
``(C) Army War College.
``(D) United States Army Command and General Staff
College.
``(E) United States Naval Academy.
``(F) Naval War College.
``(G) Naval Postgraduate School.
``(H) Marine Corps University.
``(I) United States Air Force Academy.
``(J) Air University.
``(K) Defense Language Institute.
``(L) United States Coast Guard Academy.
``(M) National Intelligence University.
``(N) United States Merchant Marine Academy.
``(3) Covered work.--The term `covered work' means a
literary work produced by a covered author in the course of
employment at a covered institution for publication by a
scholarly press or journal.''.
Calendar No. 412
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4443
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
June 3, 2024
Reported the following original bill; which was read twice and placed
on the calendar
