Print[Senate Report 117-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
117th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 117-2
_______________________________________________________________________
R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
covering the period
JANUARY 4, 2019
to
JANUARY 3, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
March 23, 2021.--Ordered to be printed
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
19-010 WASHINGTON : 2021
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Charles E. Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
James Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Christopher A. Joyner, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Acting Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine RON WYDEN, Oregon
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
JOHN CORNYN, Texas KAMALA HARRIS, California
BEN SASSE, Nebraska MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Charles E. Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
James Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
Christopher A. Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
PREFACE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
this report on its activities from January 4, 2019, to January
3, 2021. This report also includes references to activities
underway at the conclusion of the 116th Congress that the
Committee expects to continue into the future.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the
Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be
discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods.
Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has
submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to
provide the American public with information about its
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the
Senate, in observance of this practice.
We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members
of the Committee in the 116th Congress. In particular, we take
special note of a colleague who completed her service on the
Committee. Senator Harris served on the Committee from the
115th Congress until she retired from the U.S. Senate on
January 18, 2021, in order to assume the office of Vice
President of the United States. Her commitment to the important
work of the Committee has helped to ensure a strong IC and a
secure nation. We are grateful for her contributions.
We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all
members of the Committee's staff during the 116th Congress.
Their vigilance, professionalism, and perseverance in the face
of unprecedented public health challenges were essential to the
Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.
Mark R. Warner,
Chairman.
Marco Rubio,
Vice Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Preface.......................................................... III
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. Legislation......................................................2
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020........................................... 2
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021..... 4
III. Oversight Activities.............................................5
A. Hearings................................................ 5
1. Worldwide Threats Hearing............................. 5
2. Russia................................................ 6
3. Afghanistan........................................... 7
4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America...................... 7
5. Iran.................................................. 7
6. Asia-Pacific Region................................... 7
7. Middle East and North Africa.......................... 8
B. Investigations and Reviews.............................. 9
1. Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election................. 9
C. Intelligence Community Issues........................... 10
1. Defense Intelligence Enterprise....................... 10
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017................. 10
3. USA FREEDOM Act....................................... 10
4. IC Intelligence Analysis.............................. 11
5. Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G)... 12
6. Counterterrorism...................................... 13
7. Cyber Domain.......................................... 13
8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 14
9. Covert Action......................................... 14
10. Space................................................ 15
D. Other Matters........................................... 15
1. Classification and Declassification................... 15
2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern.......... 16
3. Inspectors General.................................... 16
4. Committee Audits and Projects Team.................... 16
5. Personnel Vetting Reform.............................. 17
6. Technical Advisory Group (TAG)........................ 18
7. IC Response to COVID-19............................... 18
IV. Nominations.....................................................19
A. William R. Evanina...................................... 19
B. Christopher Scolese..................................... 20
C. John L. Ratcliffe....................................... 20
D. Peter Michael Thomson................................... 20
E. Christopher C. Miller................................... 20
F. Patrick Hovakimian...................................... 21
G. Allen Robert Souza...................................... 21
V. Support to the Senate...........................................21
VI. Appendix........................................................21
A. Summary of Committee Actions............................ 21
1. Number of meetings.................................... 21
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee..... 22
3. Bills referred to the Committee....................... 22
4. Committee publications................................ 22
117th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 117-2
======================================================================
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
_______
March 23, 2021.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Warner, from the Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress
included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation
of appointees to key intelligence leadership posts, inquiries
on the performance and activities of the Intelligence Community
(IC), and completion of the Committee's investigation of
Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee's
paramount legislative priority in the 116th Congress was
enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years (FY)
2018, 2019, and 2020, and the IAA for FY 2021.
The Committee also dedicated considerable effort to
completing and publishing a comprehensive, five-volume report
on Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. The
investigation underlying this report comprised witness
interviews, hearings, staff briefings, site visits, and
frequent interactions with IC leadership and personnel from
across the counterintelligence enterprise.
Notably, the COVID-19 global pandemic had a direct impact
on the Committee during the second session of the 116th
Congress. The Committee adapted to the coronavirus during 2020,
prioritizing protection of public health, while continuing to
perform its critical oversight mission. While most Senate
offices shifted to mostly or fully remote operations, the
Committee did not have that option because of the requirements
for physical access to classified spaces and communications
networks to perform its oversight of sensitive intelligence
activities.
Despite the challenges that the pandemic posed, the
Committee committed to a schedule that physically separated
staff while continuing to meet its oversight obligations--
passing authorizing legislation, conducting regular hearings,
processing presidential nominations, and meeting routinely with
representatives of the IC to conduct oversight. Member events
complied with Office of the Attending Physician guidelines.
Staff were provided greater information technology tools to
enhance their ability to work remotely. Staff were also given
additional access to secure Senate office space to conduct
their work.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
In the 116th Congress, the Committee emphasized the
continued enactment of annual intelligence authorization acts
as a primary means of its oversight. During the prior term, the
individual Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years
2018 and 2019 were not enacted. The Committee re-introduced the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 (S. 245) on
January 28, 2019. (Messrs. Nelson and Pollard were staff
members of the House and Senate intelligence committees,
respectively, who had recently passed away.) The Senate did not
act on that bill. Therefore, at the start of the 116th
Congress, the Committee continued to work with the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and pursue passage
of an Intelligence Authorization Act that covered Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020.
The intelligence entities covered by the annual budget
reviews included: the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the intelligence
capabilities of the military services and the U.S. Coast Guard;
and, the intelligence-related components of the Federal Bureau
of Intelligence (FBI), as well as the Departments of State,
Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
As part of its budget review, the Committee received
testimony from senior IC officials in closed hearings.
Committee budget monitors evaluated classified budget
justifications submitted by the Executive Branch. Based on
those reviews, the Committee prepared a classified annex to its
annual authorization bill and report. This annex contained a
classified schedule of authorizations and classified direction
to IC elements.
The Committee also reviewed the Administration's
legislative proposals for the bill, which included new or
amended legislative authority requested by the IC.
The Committee passed the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020, reported the bill (S.1589) on May 22,
2019, and subsequently issued an accompanying report (S. Rpt.
116-47) on June 11, 2019. The full Senate passed the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 as Divisions F and G of
the Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020 on June 27, 2019 (S.1790), by a vote of 86-8.
The House of Representatives passed the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (H.R. 3494) on July 17, 2019,
by a vote of 397-31. The Committee proceeded to work with the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other
congressional committees on a final version of the legislation.
Subsequently, the Senate and House intelligence committees
included the joint Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 as Division E of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020 (S. 1790). The House passed S. 1790 on
December 11, 2019, by a vote of 377-48. The Senate passed S.
1790 on December 17, 2019, by a vote of 86-8. The President
signed S. 1790 into law on December 20, 2019 (Public Law 116-
92).
As enacted, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 authorizes fiscal year 2020 funding for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and
includes a classified schedule of authorizations and a
classified annex.\1\ It also retroactively authorized funding
for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. The Act contained a number of
legislative provisions, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The Act deemed as authorized the funds already appropriated for
fiscal years 2019 and 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A provision that seeks to deter foreign
influence in U.S. elections and counter aggression from
Russia and other foreign actors by increasing
capabilities to detect Russian activities, including
active measures campaigns and illicit financial
transactions;
A provision requiring assessments of Russian
cyber threats and influence campaigns, and facilitating
information sharing among state, local, and Federal
officials;
A provision creating an independent Social
Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to support the
IC's role in countering Russian propaganda;
A requirement for the DNI to designate a
national counterintelligence (CI) officer within the
National Counterintelligence Security Center (NCSC) to
lead election security-related CI matters;
A provision requiring ongoing notifications
of travel by certain Russian Federation personnel in
the U.S. and any potential active measures campaigns
conducted by those individuals;
A provision requiring reporting on Chinese
influence campaigns directed at Taiwan, including
United States actions to disrupt such operations, as
well as reporting on surveillance technologies;
A provision requiring a plan for reducing
the security clearance background investigation
backlog;
A requirement for a DNI-led task force to
protect IC supply chains from foreign CI risks from
Russia, China, and other adversaries;
A provision requiring the IC to account for
foreign threats to our infrastructure before entering
into foreign intelligence sharing agreements;
A provision increasing pay scales for IC
employees with science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) expertise in cyber missions;
A provision intended to improve retention
and recruiting for underrepresented populations;
A requirement for the DNI to establish an
advisory council to incorporate climate security
analysis across IC components, and to facilitate
coordination with non-IC agencies;
A provision establishing a pilot program
with the National Labs and energy sector to partner
with covered entities and protect against security
vulnerabilities;
A provision establishing requirements to
strengthen the oversight function performed by the IC
Inspector General and promote consistency in IC
whistleblower processes and procedures; and
A requirement for ODNI, FBI, and DHS to
conduct a strategic intelligence assessment of domestic
terrorism, consistent with U.S. Person protections.
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
In early 2020, the Committee began consideration of the
President's request for funding levels and legislative
authority for fiscal year 2021. The Committee's budget monitors
evaluated the requests submitted by the Executive Branch.
Committee staff received a number of briefings, and the
Committee conducted classified budget hearings.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. 3905) on June 8, 2020, and
subsequently reported an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 116-233)
on June 17, 2020. The Committee subsequently incorporated its
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 as Division
F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (S. 4049), which passed the Senate on July 23, 2020, by a
vote of 86-14.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 (H.R. 7856) on July 31, 2020, and then reported the
bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H.
Rpt. 116-595) on October 30, 2020. The Committee proceeded to
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and other congressional committees on a final version of the
legislation.
The product of the two committees' efforts, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, was
incorporated as Division W of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-260). The Consolidated
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021 passed the House on
December 21, 2020, in two separate measures by votes of 359-53
and 327-85, and passed the Senate that same day as a
consolidated measure by a vote of 92-6. The President signed
the consolidated bill into law on December 27, 2020.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities across the U.S. Government and included a classified
schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. The Act as
incorporated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 ensures accountability and integrity from our IC
agencies, which undertake our most sensitive intelligence
programs and activities, and contained a number of legislative
provisions, including:
A provision requiring assessments on risks
to national security from consumer genetic testing, and
mitigation efforts being taken in response by the IC
and DoD;
A provision requiring complex, extensive
assessments of current U.S. critical technologies and
their requisite supply chains;
A provision intended to afford IC agencies
the tools and resources their respective workforce
hiring and retention objectives require;
A provision requiring reporting on
intelligence sharing with ``Five Eyes'' foreign
partners that have or intend to use adversary
telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment;
A provision requiring reporting on foreign
governments' use of commercially-available cyber
intrusion and surveillance technology;
Provisions requiring reporting on Chinese
Community Party (CCP) corruption, CCP influence
operations against technology sectors, and potential
CCP information suppression and/or exploitation
relative to COVID-19;
A provision requiring reporting on Russian
and Eastern European oligarchs' corruption and illegal
activities; and
Provisions intended to strengthen open
source information capabilities across the IC, in part
by requiring IC strategies for coordinated collection
and analysis of open source information.
III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. Hearings
1. Worldwide Threats Hearing
Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to
review the Intelligence Community's assessment of the current
and projected national security threats to the United States.
There was only one year (1999) when the Committee did not hold
a Worldwide Threats hearing. It is one of the few open hearings
that the Committee has regularly conducted to share the work of
the IC with the public. These ``Worldwide Threats'' hearings
cover national security concerns in all geographic regions, as
well as transnational threats such as terrorism and the
proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
On January 29, 2019, the Committee held an open Worldwide
Threats hearing on the current and projected threats to the
United States. The lead witness before the Committee was DNI
Daniel R. Coats. He was joined at the witness table by the
Honorable Gina Haspel, Director of the CIA; the Honorable
Christopher Wray, Director of the FBI; General Paul Nakasone,
Director of the NSA; Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, Director
of the DIA; and Mr. Robert Cardillo, Director of the NGA. The
open hearing was followed by a closedhearing session with the
Committee. Director Coats' unclassified prepared statement for the
record is available in the Hearings section of the Committee's website
and the record of the open hearing is printed as S. Hrg. 116-75. A
video recording of the full hearing can also be found on the
Committee's website.
At the hearing, Director Coats identified election security
as a top priority for the IC, adding the IC's assessment that
``foreign actors will view the 2020 U.S. elections as an
opportunity to advance their interests.'' He also noted the
IC's expectation that foreign actors would ``refine their
capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each
other's experiences and efforts in previous elections.''
Director Coats also explained the principal ``state actor''
threats facing the United States in terms of a ``big four,''
comprising China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Director Coats
highlighted China's exercise of its intelligence and influence
apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages, in
furtherance of Beijing's intent to ``diminish U.S. influence
and extend its own economic, political, and military reach.''
On the subject of Russia, Director Coats indicated that Moscow
was escalating its campaign to ``divide Western political and
security institutions and undermine the post-World War II
international order,'' in part, by waging an ``information war
against democracies, and [using] social media to attempt to
divide our societies.'' Regarding North Korea, Director Coats
noted that the regime had ``halted its provocative behavior
related to its WMD program,'' however tempering the observation
with the assessment that Pyongyang ``will seek to retain its
WMD capabilities and is unlikely to completely give up its
nuclear weapons and production capabilities because its leaders
ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime
survival.'' Director Haspel later added that the North Korean
regime ``is committed to developing a long-range nuclear armed
missile that would pose a direct threat to the United States.''
While the Committee repeatedly engaged with the IC to
arrange for a Worldwide Threats Hearing to be held in the
second session of the 116th Congress, scheduling conflicts,
sustained assertions of witness unavailability, and an apparent
general reluctance by Administration officials to appear before
the Committee to discuss publicly intelligence threat
assessments prevented the Committee from holding a Worldwide
Threats Hearing in 2020.
2. Russia
During the 116th Congress, the Committee focused
extensively on the Russian threat to U.S. national security. In
addition to its report on Russian active measures campaigns and
interference in the 2016 U.S. election, the Committee continued
robust oversight of intelligence relating to the threat posed
by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These
threats include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage; its
continued reliance on misinformation and disinformation to
target global audiences and interfere with elections and
democratic processes in the United States and around the world;
the buildup of its conventional, strategic, and asymmetric
arsenals; its increasingly assertive military deployments on
its periphery and to wider regions, including the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America; its use of mercenary groups and
private military and security corporations such as the Vagner
Group; its support of like-minded authoritarian regimes; and
its use of corruption and criminal networks to further its
strategic goals. The Committee held a number of closed hearings
on these and other issues to assess the IC's posture to warn
of, analyze, understand, expose, and counter the Russian
threat.
3. Afghanistan
The IC's contribution to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan has
been a constant focus of the Committee since 2001. As the U.S.
neared the 20-year mark of its latest involvement in
Afghanistan, the Committee continued its oversight--through
hearings, briefings, roundtables, and pre-pandemic staff travel
to the region--on the IC's operations and analysis in support
of U.S. policy. Following the signing of the February 29, 2020,
U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Committee focused on the IC's
collection on Taliban adherence to its stated commitments, as
well as the IC's coordination with DOD and State Department
plans for an eventual drawdown of the U.S. presence.
4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America
The Committee focused its efforts on monitoring the ongoing
crisis in Venezuela, travelling to meet with allies in the
region to deepen bilateral engagement, and maintaining an
awareness of elections in several key Latin American countries.
The Committee continued to monitor illicit trafficking;
narcotics production; the threat posed by violent transnational
criminal organizations to the United States and the stability
of the region; the military and intelligence activities of U.S.
adversaries in Latin America, including an increase in Chinese
and Russian engagements; and the mystery illnesses (including
brain injuries) contracted by U.S. Government personnel in
Havana, Cuba, and elsewhere, which are likely the result of a
directed energy attack by a foreign adversary. Oversight
activities included numerous staff and Member briefings,
additional hearings, and visits to the region.
5. Iran
The Committee held a number of hearings on Iran with the
purpose of overseeing the IC's ability to collect intelligence
and provide assessments to policymakers on Iran's intentions
and evolving capabilities in areas such as its nuclear program,
role in the Middle East, and support to terrorist groups. In
addition to hearings, the Committee consistently held briefings
related to Iran's nuclear program and its destabilizing
activities in the region and beyond. Over the course of
significant developments related to Iran, the Committee
examined U.S. security and that of U.S. allies and partners in
the region, monitored reporting on evolving threats, and probed
the adequacy of the IC's posture to defend against those
threats. Committee members and staff also engaged officials
from partner countries on dynamics related to Iran.
6. Asia-Pacific Region
The Asia-Pacific region was the focus of considerable
Committee time and attention throughout the 116th Congress.
Intended to facilitate a continual evaluation of the IC's
collection posture and analytic capabilities relative to the
national security threats emanating from the region, the
Committee traveled to the region, held numerous Member and
staff briefings, and dedicated nine Committee hearings to
China, North Korea, regional geopolitical dynamics, and
counterintelligence related topics. The Committee also received
briefings and reports on the region from the National
Intelligence Council, CIA, the Defense Department, the State
Department, and nongovernmental organizations.
These activities were central to the Committee fulfilling
its oversight mandate to ensure the IC duly informs the
national-level policymaking process. In particular, the
Committee's efforts on North Korea focused on political-
military issues related to WMD programs and denuclearization.
On China, the Committee spent considerable time reviewing
Beijing's increasingly globalized activities, relentless
pursuit of illicit technology transfer, targeted human rights
abuses and repression, and lack of transparency on the initial
outbreak and response to the COVID 19 outbreak.
The Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee
also provided over a dozen classified and unclassified
briefings--in partnership with the DNI, Principal Deputy DNI
and top counterintelligence leaders at the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, FBI, and DHS--to the
private sector on strategic economic and technological threats
stemming from Beijing. Committee staff also convened meetings
between the IC elements' top privacy and civil liberties
officers, human resource leaders, securityofficials, and
representatives of ethnic heritage groups to address allegations of
bias and profiling in security and law enforcement practices that may
have occurred as an inadvertent result of efforts to counter China's
aggression.
7. Middle East and North Africa
The Committee continued to focus on developments in the
Middle East during the 116th Congress. The Committee held
multiple hearings, hosted many briefings, and monitored events
that bore on the security of the United States, our allies, and
our partners. The Committee also analyzed the resources the IC
devoted to understanding those developments and delivering
advantage to U.S. decision-makers. In Syria and Iraq, Iran's
paramilitary activity, Russia and Turkey's military
deployments, Assad's war crimes, and recidivism among Islamic
Statefighters risk extending and deepening the conflict. Yemen
remains at risk of humanitarian catastrophe, and conflict
involving Iranian supported Houthi forces, Yemeni government
forces, and the Saudi-led military intervention is exacerbating
the country's instability. Iran also directed or supported
attacks against its neighbors, and proliferated advanced
weapons throughout the region, undermining the stability and
security of other nations. Committee Members and staff traveled
throughout the region and met with U.S. partners to better
understand and consider options related to many of these
challenges.
Committee Members and staff also monitored events in North
Africa with implications for U.S. security and that of our
allies and partners in the region and adjacent regions through
a series of hearings, briefings, and travel. The war in Libya
remains a stalemate threatening the health and livelihoods of
the Libyan people as well as the security of Libya's
neighbors--risks that are elevated by the presence and
involvement of Russian military and contract security elements.
The political situation in several other North African
countries is also an area of focus for the Committee, as
governments continue to evolve following the Arab Spring, and
foreign governments seek to undermine these countries'
sovereignty.
B. Investigations and Reviews
1. Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference
in the 2016 U.S. Election
On January 24, 2017, the Committee began a bipartisan
investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. elections.
Unlike previous Committee investigations, there was no separate
vote to initiate it; the investigation was considered a part of
the Committee's regular oversight responsibilities. During the
following 43 months, the Committee interviewed over 200
witnesses, reviewed over a million pages of documents, and held
open and closed hearings on: election security; social media
and disinformation; a review of the January 2017 Intelligence
Community Assessment covering Russian activities; and the U.S.
Government's response to Russia's efforts to interfere in the
2016 U.S. elections. The Committee's efforts were distinctive
for their investigative scope, authority, breadth, and depth,
particularly in contrast to two other related investigations
occurring in parallel. One was begun by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2017 to investigate
Russian interference in the 2016 elections, an effort that
concluded in March 2018.
The other began on May 17, 2017, when the Department of
Justice appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller as a
Special Counsel to investigate potential criminal activity
surrounding Russian interference in the 2016 elections. The
overlap among these reviews led to the Department of Justice
resisting some Committee investigative activity and led to
complications for witnesses to comply with the Committee
inquiry.
The Committee interviewed then-Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, former FBI Director James B. Comey, several high-
ranking Obama administration cabinet officials, as well as
members of President Trump's family, campaign, and business
enterprise in order to ascertain the nature and extent of
Russian influence activity in the 2016 U.S. elections. The
Committee's investigation involved several novel legal and
constitutional issues, including the first successful use of a
congressional subpoena to obtain non-content subscriber
information from telecommunications and social media companies.
While the Committee was successful in obtaining voluntary
testimony and document production from a vast majority of its
witnesses, the Committee was required to issue multiple
subpoenas to compel certain witnesses' testimony. The
Committee's commitment to bipartisanship throughout the course
of its investigation was integral to obtaining witness
cooperation and access to documents held by the Executive
Branch.
Given the large and complex nature of the investigation,
the Committee adopted and released its Report, Russian Active
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election
(S. Rep. 116-290), in five volumes, the last of which was
issued in August 2020. These volumes covered Russian efforts
against election infrastructure (Volume 1), Russia's use of
social media (Volume 2), the U.S. Government's response to the
Russian efforts (Volume 3), a review of the Intelligence
Community Assessment covering the Russian activities (Volume
4), and counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities related
to Russia (Volume 5). The Committee adopted each volume of its
Report with broad bipartisan support and simultaneously adopted
publicly releasable versions of each volume, posted on the
Committee website. The Committee's final unclassified Report
totals 1,346 pages, and stands to date as the most complete
account of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.
C. Intelligence Community Issues
1. Defense Intelligence Enterprise
The Committee's oversight of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise (DIE) included travel to embassies and military
bases, meetings with defense attaches, and numerous staff
briefings. The Committee also held six hearings related to the
DIE, its support to ballistic missile defense, and its view of
global threats. DIE experts also provided critical analytic
threat updates at numerous hearing.
In particular, the Committee's oversight efforts focused
on: DIA's development of the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-
Repository System, a major system acquisition project; the
DIE's integration of machine learning and artificial
intelligence; refreshing the IT technology platform known as
the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
modernization; the transition from an IT concept of operation
from network protection to data protection; reviewing defense
intelligence support to federal law enforcement for First
Amendment activities; DIE capabilities against hard target
threats; defense and military counterintelligence reform
efforts; reviewing the DIE's open source intelligence strategy
and investments profile; and COVID-19 response and workforce
reconstitution plans.
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 2017
The Committee continued to monitor implementation of the
FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (S. 139, P.L. 115-
118), as enacted on January 19, 2018, particularly the critical
intelligence authorities against foreign targets, as set forth
in Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
2008 (most notably against foreigners located abroad under
Section 702). The Committee sought to ensure enhanced
transparency and privacy protections for Americans and
individuals in the United States.
3. USA FREEDOM Act
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 included four foreign
intelligence legal authorities that were set to expire on
December 15, 2019. Those authorities included: (1) business
records collection; (2) call detail records collection; (3)
lone wolf targeting; and (4) roving wiretap surveillance. On
November 21, 2019, Congress extended these authorities to March
15, 2020, as part of the Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2020, and Further Health Extenders Act of 2019(H.R. 3055, P.L,
116 69). Also on November21, 2019, then-Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman
Warner introduced the Protecting Against International Terrorism Act of
2019 (S.2939), which extended all aforementioned authorities for eight
years, with the exception of call detail records. (The Senate did not
act on S. 2939.)
On March 11, 2020, the House of Representatives passed the
USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020 (H.R. 6172) by a vote
of 278-136. The bill extended the business records, lone wolf,
and roving authorities through December 1, 2023, while
repealing the call detail records collection authority. The
bill also required FISA application accuracy reviews, expanded
notifications of the use of business records in legal
proceedings, limited business records retention periods (with
certain exceptions), included penalties for FISA abuse,
expanded amicus curiae participation in certain Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court matters, and required
additional compliance and oversight.
On March 16, 2020, the Senate passed a bill to provide a
77-day extension of certain authorities for foreign
intelligence and international terrorism investigations (S.
3501), which extended the business records, lone wolf, and
roving authorities through May 30, 2020 (retroactive to March
14, 2020). (The House of Representatives did not act on this
bill.)
On May 13, 2020, the Senate proceeded to consider H.R.
6172. Pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement requiring a 60-
vote threshold, the Senate voted on three amendments: (1)an
amendment cosponsored by Senators Lee and Leahy to expand the
amici's authorities and access (agreed to by a vote of 77-19);
(2) an amendment cosponsored by Senators Daines and Wyden to
preclude the use of business records authorities to obtain
Internet web browsing and search history information (not
agreed to by a vote of 59-37); and (3) an amendment sponsored
by Senator Paul that precluded targeting United States persons
via FISA's electronic surveillance, physical searches, business
records collections, and other foreign intelligence tools (not
agreed to by a vote of 11-85). On May 14, 2020, the Senate
passed H.R. 6172, as amended, by a vote of 80-16.
On May 28, 2020, by a vote of 284-122, the House of
Representatives passed a motion to disagree with the Senate
amendments and request a conference. Neither chamber has taken
further action on the USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.
4. IC Intelligence Analysis
The Committee conducted oversight of the IC's analytic
enterprise during the 116th Congress, with an emphasis on
analytic objectivity and duplication. Committee staff engaged
with ODNI, CIA, and other agencies responsible for analytic
production to ensure that IC analysis was meeting customer
demands, devoid of politicization and compliant with standards
for objectivity, and properly resourced. Committee staff held
many engagements with the IC to better understand and reduce
analytic duplication, while recognizing the virtue in analytic
redundancy to promote diversity of perspective. The Committee
also engaged with the IC on hiring and retention for hard-to-
fill analytic positions. These topics were interwoven through
multiple hearings during the 116th Congress. The most prominent
hearing showcasing IC analysis, the annual Worldwide Threats
Hearing, occurred in 2019, but not in 2020, due to the ODNI's
reluctance to engage publicly with Congress on IC threat
assessments, as discussed in Section III.A.1. of this Report.
5. Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G)
The Committee investigated the significant national
security implications posed by 5G telecommunications
technology. Part of the challenge is the paucity of 5G
equipment vendors, especially those that do not have a nexus
with the Chinese Communist Party. The Committee convened
several meetings with the leadership of several executive
branch agencies and telecommunications companies to discuss the
United States' strategy for 5G and opportunities to mitigate
the related national security vulnerabilities.
The Committee also engaged with Five Eyes nations and other
allies to develop and examine multi-national efforts to
mitigate potential national security vulnerabilities.
Recognizing that the United States must provide secure,
competitive alternatives to Huawei's and ZTE's 5G technology,
on June 8, 2020, the Committee included a provision in its
Committee-reported Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 (IAA), S. 3905, to establish:
A Communications Technology Security and
Innovation Fund to support the development and
deployment of open standards-based compatible,
interoperable equipment for fifth-generation wireless
networks to create a more secure and diverse
telecommunications vendor market; and
A Multilateral Telecommunications Security
Fund to support the adoption of secure and trusted
communications technologies in key markets globally.
The Committee subsequently introduced an amendment to the
Senate National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(NDAA) (S.4049) that established:
A Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation
Fund for the NTIA Administrator (in consultation with
other relevant agencies) to make grants that will
support 5G research and its commercial application; and
A Multilateral Telecommunications Security
Fund for the Secretary of State (in consultation with
other relevant agencies) to deploy funds, contingent on
foreign government partners' agreement to participate
in development and adoption of secure 5G technologies.
The Committee's amendment was incorporated into an NDAA
Manager's Amendment, and passed as part of the Senate NDAA on
July 23, 2020.
The provision was considered in the NDAA conference with
other relevant Senate and House committees of jurisdiction. The
NDAA conference report included a 5G provision that established
the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund and the
Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund, both of which
the Committee will work to fund from future congressional
appropriations. The provision further requires multiple reports
to Congress for each respective fund.
The NDAA conference report passed the House and the Senate
on December 8, 2020, and December 11, 2020 (H.R. 6395). The
President vetoed the NDAA on December 23, 2020. On December 28,
2020, the House passed the NDAA over the President's veto by a
vote of 322-87. On January 1, 2020, the Senate passed the NDAA
over the President's veto by a vote of 81-13. The NDAA, with
the aforementioned 5G provision, was enacted as Public Law
Number 116-283.
6. Counterterrorism
During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of the IC's counterterrorism efforts. This was done
through a range of activities, including Committee hearings and
roundtables, as well as staff-level briefings and engagement
with the IC. In 2019, the Committee traveled overseas and
visited multiple facilities to see firsthand the IC's
counterterrorism efforts and evaluate plans, resources, and
authorities.
SSCI authorized counterterrorism budgets and legal
authorities accordingly based on this oversight. As the
counterterrorism threat continued to evolve--both domestically
and abroad--the Committee conducted multiple oversight meetings
to ensure that the IC's authorities and resources align with
this threat. This includes tracking transnational threats like
racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups, as
well as al-Qa'ida, ISIS core, and their global affiliates.
7. Cyber Domain
During the 116th Congress, Committee staff continued to
monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber
actors that pose threats to the United States and its allies.
The establishment of the Cybersecurity Directorate at the
National Security Agency aligns intelligence and information
security resources under the Deputy National Manager for
National Security Systems. The Committee conducted vigorous
oversight of the establishment of this new organization to
ensure its mission and resources are appropriate to advance the
cybersecurity of the nation, without compromising NSA's
commitment to its intelligence mission.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence also
created the Cyber Executive, a new position that consolidates
the National Intelligence Manager for Cyber, the Cyber Threat
Intelligence Integration Center, and the Intelligence
Community's Security Center under a single responsible
official. The Committee anticipates ongoing engagement with
this new executive to bolster the cyber threat intelligence
mission.
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, established by section
1652 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232), delivered its final report
on March 11, 2020, which contained a series of findings and
recommendations to bolster the nation's cyber posture. The
commission's report provided a series of legislative proposals
that the Committee used as a basis to enhance the nation's
cyber posture. One such proposal was the establishment of a
National Cyber Director within the Executive Office of the
President to coordinate the government's cyber activities, with
the caveat that the National Cyber Director may not direct
intelligence activities or resources and cannot modify
classification of intelligence information.
The Committee also conducted oversight of the IC's
activities to identify and track foreign cyber actors. However,
the Committee faced difficulties in conducting effective
oversight of joint cyber activities involving U.S. Cyber
Command and the Intelligence Community.
8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
The Committee staff conducted close oversight of ODNI as it
underwent a number of personnel, organizational, and policy
changes during the 116th Congress. A number of forced
resignations (of DNI Dan Coats, Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI)
Sue Gordon, Acting DNI and Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Joe Maguire, Intelligence
Community Inspector General Michael Atkinson, and Chief
Operating Officer Deirdre Walsh), along with use of a novel
position of ``Principal Executive'' to perform the duties of
the PDDNI, created instability and leadership gaps that
demanded close attention to ensure the DNI's statutory
functions could still be performed. The DNI's unwillingness to
testify at the Committee's annual worldwide threats hearing was
emblematic of the turbulence. At the close of the 116th
Congress, four of the six ODNI positions subject to Senate
confirmation--PDDNI, General Counsel, IC Inspector General, and
Director of NCTC--were being fulfilled by ``acting'' officials
or personnel ``performing the duties of'' that position, which
required specific attention to ensure those offices' missions
were being fulfilled.
Committee staff held several briefings on organizational
changes adopted by Acting DNI Ric Grenell and DNI John
Ratcliffe, to include moving from four deputy DNIs to two;
creating a new Director's Adviser for Military Affairs;
establishing ``executives''' for space, cyber, election
threats, and economic security and financial intelligence; and
altering the grade structure of the ODNI. Committee staff also
scrutinized the impact of two Executive Orders--13950 on
combating race and sex stereotyping, and 13957 regarding a new
Schedule F in the excepted civil service--to ensure the ODNI
could maintain a workforce ethos of inclusiveness and a
commitment to objectivity.
Finally, the Committee closely reviewed a number of ODNI
policy and programmatic initiatives. Staff closely monitored
workforce initiatives to recruit, hire, develop, and retain a
quality, diverse, and trusted workforce. Staff studied ODNI's
use of the Staff Reserve program to make temporary hires to
ensure this program complied with, and did not circumvent,
Office of Personnel Management guidelines. Staff continued
quarterly briefings on the IC Information Technology
Enterprise. Lastly, staff ensured ODNI was appropriately
supporting the Biden-Harris transition once the General
Services Administration ascertained the 2020 presidential
election.
9. Covert Action
The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action
programs throughout the 116th Congress. The Committee's rules
require the Committee's Staff Director to ``ensure that covert
action programs of the United States government receive
appropriate consideration once a quarter.'' In accordance with
this rule, the Committee receives a written report every
quarter on each covert action that is being carried out under a
presidential finding. Committee staff reviews these reports and
meets with IC personnel to discuss their substance and pose
additional questions. The Committee also holds periodic
hearings and briefings on covert action programs, and receives
written reviews of covert actions from the CIA Inspector
General, which are often the basis for additional staff
inquiries.
Further, under section 3093 of the National Security Act,
the DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and
entities of the United States Government involved in a covert
action are required to keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions
that are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are
carried out for or on behalf of any department or agency of the
United States. Upon receiving such notifications, the Committee
reviews the details of each and receives briefings to fully
understand the issues.
The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs
are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.
10. Space
During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of the IC's role in the space domain. The Committee's
ongoing efforts to ensure reliable and resilient access to, and
operation in, space to provide intelligence support took on
greater urgency in light of an increasingly hostile space
environment. Committee oversight has been key in tracking
growing requirements to improve the speed and quality of data
delivered to the warfighter and other government customers,
which is resulting in shifting roles and responsibilities among
IC elements.
As Congress drafted legislation to establish the U.S. Space
Force, the Committee supported preserving the NRO as a separate
entity in the DoD, recognizing its key role in the national
intelligence enterprise beyond its contributions to the DoD
mission. The Committee continues to advocate for effective
collaboration between NRO and the range of stakeholders in DoD.
The Committee held hearings and briefings on space launch
capabilities, NRO's evolving approach to a ``hybrid'' space
architecture, and adversary threats in space. The Committee
also examined key budget and cross-cutting technology issues,
such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing, and
continued to encourage the NRO to capitalize on the ongoing
revolution in the space sector, which has yielded reductions in
the cost of launch, new kinds of sensors, smaller satellites,
and more sophisticated data analytics and services.
In addition to hearings, the Committee and its staff
engaged frequently on overhead architecture topics with the
NRO, NGA, ODNI, and other IC and government officials, and
conducted site visits to government facilities and commercial
companies to meet with government officials and industry
leaders. The Committee also closely monitored the establishment
of the U.S. Space Force as the 18th and newest element of the
IC to ensure it meets the standards set for all IC elements.
D. Other Matters
1. Classification and Declassification
The Committee continued its oversight of the government's
classification and declassification systems to ensure that
classified information is handled appropriately and that it is
released to the public when the requirements for classification
are no longer met. The Committee has exclusive oversight of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which has
statutory responsibilities for protecting sources and methods,
as well as for developing, implementing, and overseeing
security clearance policies and procedures as the federal
government's Security Executive Agent. The staff met a number
of times with the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)
at the National Archives and Records Administration, which
serves as the policy oversight mechanism for Executive Order
13526, ``Classified National Security Information,'' and
Executive Order 12829, ``National Industrial Security
Program.'' It also met with classification offices across the
IC.
The Committee also met several times with the Public
Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) to discuss the Board's
recommendations related to the modernizing technology to make
classification and declassification system more effective and
efficient and creating a government-wide executive agent
(specifically the Director of National Intelligence) for
declassification. The Committee held a public hearing on
declassification reform on September 9, 2020, with witnesses
from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and a
member of the PIDB. The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020 permanently reauthorized the PIDB, first
authorized in the IAA for Fiscal Year 2000.
2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern
The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls,
facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified
whistleblowers on matters they believe to be of urgent concern.
Committee staff reviewed and, where warranted, investigated
those complaints. The Committee also receives formal
whistleblower complaints from IC inspectors general deemed to
be of urgent concern. Among these matters was a complaint
concerning a phone call between former President Trump and the
President of Ukraine, which ultimately became the basis of a
presidential impeachment trial. The Committee held a hearing
and conducted witness interviews of the IC IG and other IC
officials in furtherance of its review of the IC's handling of
the complaint.
3. Inspectors General
The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and
oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC.
Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency Semiannual
Reports and Annual Work Plans, as well as specific audits and
reviews.
4. Committee Audits and Projects Team
The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing
standards.'' This function was distributed to Committee
professional staff during the 113th Congress. During the 116th
Congress, the Committee reconstituted this effort under its
``Audits and Projects Team.'' The Committee charges the Audits
and Projects Team to conduct in-depth reviews of IC-related
matters and assist the Committee with its oversight
obligations.
In order to institutionalize its work, the Audits and
Projects Team designed a robust and standardized process for
selecting and conducting its studies, audits, reviews, and
investigations. The Committee also assigned the Audits and
Projects Team the responsibility for managing the relationship
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to include
overseeing the development and execution of reviews that the
Committee assigns to GAO.
The Audits and Projects Team began two on-going, Committee-
authorized projects during the 116th Congress. The first is a
lessons-learned review of a compartmented IC acquisition
program. The final report will offer recommendations to improve
acquisition and contracting processes to ensure acquisitions
meet expectations for costs, schedule, and performance. The
second is an organizational assessment of a component within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The final
report will make recommendations regarding this component's
resources, organizational structure, and authorities.
5. Personnel Vetting Reform
The Committee continued its close oversight of reform to
the government's personnel vetting enterprise, consistent with
its inclusion as part of the President's Management Agenda and
the Government Accountability Office's identification of the
security clearance process as ``high risk.'' The personnel
vetting framework has remained largely unchanged since 1947,
and signs of its ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and fragility
have grown. Insider threats such as Edward Snowden, timelines
for granting clearances exceeding in some cases two years, and
the inability to capitalize on modern technology to access
publicly available information have demanded action.
Toward this end, the Committee held a closed hearing on
this topic in January 2020 with the principal members of the
interagency Performance Accountability Council (PAC) who lead
the executive branch reform effort. Committee staff continued
holding quarterly briefings for the eight House and Senate
committees of jurisdiction with these PAC members, as well as
separate briefings with individual agencies. Such oversight led
to significant progress in reducing the backlog in background
investigation to a ``healthy'' steady state of roughly 220,000
(from a peak of 725,000), and returning to timelines for
processing SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances nearly to the
standards established in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. Committee staff have engaged closely
with the cleared industry community as well, to include
presentations at conferences. The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020 contained an entire title comprised of a
dozen provisions to support and enable this success. The
Committee worked closely with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as the government's statutory Security
Executive Agent and the Office of Personnel Management as the
government's Suitability, Fitness, and Credentialing Executive
Agent in their development of the Trusted Workforce 2.0
initiative to modernize personnel. The Committee supported
issuance of policies that enabled agility in personnel vetting
practices during the COVID-19 global pandemic.
The Committee looks forward to overseeing executive branch
plans for a singular framework for determining trust for
security, suitability, fitness, and credentialing to enable
workforce mobility; a reduced number of tiers in this framework
to simplify the system's complexity; use of a behavioral model
for personnel trustworthiness that reflects today's threats and
workforce patterns of life; and use of continuous vetting model
for identifying personnel risk over time, rather than time-
based periodic reinvestigations.
6. Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
During the 116th Congress, the Committee maintained its
relationship with the TAG, an external group of experts that
the Committee consults for substantive technical advice. Most
notably, the TAG's researchers and experts in social network
analysis, social media political content and hate speech,
disinformation, and algorithms were instrumental to the
Committee's understanding of Russia's 2016 use of social media
to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread
disinformation and societal division in the United States. The
efforts of these TAG researchers led to the release of two
public reports on this information warfare campaign, furnishing
the Committee, social media companies, U.S. law enforcement,
international partners, fellow researchers and academics, and
the American public with an enhanced understanding of how
Russia-based actors, at the direction of the Russian
government, carried out a sustained campaign of information
warfare aimed at influencing how the United States' citizens
think about themselves, their government, and their fellow
Americans. The TAG's findings were foundational to the
Committee's investigation of Russia's activities and feature
prominently in Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media.
7. IC Response to COVID-19
The Committee exercised close oversight of the IC's
adaptation to the coronavirus pandemic to ensure public health
while continuing to perform its important national security
mission. The Committee closely monitored IC agencies'
implementation of public health measures, as well as their
rates of infections, to ensure the safety of the workforce. It
also encouraged maximal application of the flexibility for
remote work allowed by the Office of Personnel Management and
Office of Management and Budget, consistent with the needs for
security. The Committee encouraged use of this public health
crisis as a moment to reconsider what Intelligence Community
work could be performed in spaces that might not be deemed a
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), on
unclassified networks, and even by personnel not all fully
cleared to the TOP SECRET/SCI level. Such new thinking could
revolutionize where work could be done across the United
States; it could also significantly expand the population of
personnel talent the IC could draw on and enable operation
beyond the Washington Metropolitan area, which is of particular
interest in areas of rapidly evolving technology such as
cybersecurity.
The Committee also closely monitored the impact of COVID on
the industrial base that supports the IC. It worked closely
with other committees on the development, passage, and
enactment of Section 3610 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, which allowed IC industrial partners to
seek reimbursement under their contracts for activities that
allowed them to remain in a ``ready state.'' The Committee
supported the two extensions of this authority that occurred
during the 116th Congress.
IV. NOMINATIONS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee received seven
nominations from President Donald J. Trump.
Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended)
and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of
nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended
S.Res.400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the
IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent be reported by the
Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions
within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of
other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the
given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on
the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the
resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security be reported by the Judiciary Committee, but referred
to the Select Intelligence Committee. In the wake of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, which made
the directors and inspectors general of the NRO and the NSA
Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res. 470,
July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the nominee were
a civilian, the Select Intelligence Committee would report the
nomination and refer it to the Armed Services Committee, and if
the nominee were a member of the Armed Forces on active duty,
the reverse.
A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers
all nominations for inspectors general to the committees of
primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under
this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA
Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this
consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which
is considered exclusively by the Select Intelligence Committee.
The following nominations were referred to the Committee
during the 116th Congress:
A. William R. Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
On January 16, 2019, President Trump nominated William R.
Evanina to be the Director of the National Counterintelligence
and Security Center. At that time, Mr. Evanina was serving in
that same position. (President Trump previously nominated Mr.
Evanina to this position on February 5, 2018. The full Senate
did not act on that nomination.)
The Committee reported the nomination favorably on February
28, 2019. The Senate invoked cloture on the nomination on May
6, 2020 by a vote of 83-7. The Senate approved the nomination
on May 6, 2020 by a vote of 84-7.
B. Dr. Christopher J. Scolese, Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office
On February 12, 2019, President Trump nominated Dr.
Christopher J. Scolese to be the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office. At that time, Dr. Scolese was serving as
Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.
Upon primary referral, the Committee held a hearing on May
1, 2019, and reported the nomination favorably on May 9, 2019.
Upon sequential referral, Senate Committee on Armed Service
held a nomination hearing on June 4, 2019. Following the
hearing, the Senate Committee on Armed Services reported the
nomination favorably on June 10, 2019. The Senate approved the
nomination by voice vote on June 27, 2019.
C. John L. Ratcliffe, Director of National Intelligence
On March 2, 2020, President Trump nominated John L.
Ratcliffe be the Director of National Intelligence. At that
time, Mr. Ratcliffe was serving as a United States
Representative from Texas.
The Committee held a nomination hearing on May 5, 2020.
Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination
favorably on May 19, 2020. Pursuant to the Senate's unanimous
consent agreement on May 20, 2020, the Senate debated and
approved the nomination on May 21, 2020 by a vote of 49-44.
D. Peter Michael Thomson, Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency
On April 6, 2020, President Trump nominated Peter Michael
Thomson to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency. At that time, Mr.Thomson was a partner at the law firm
of Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLP.
The Committee held a nomination hearing on June 24, 2020.
Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination
favorably on July 1, 2020.
E. Christopher C. Miller, Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
On May 4, 2020, President Trump nominated Christopher C.
Miller to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center. At that time, Mr. Miller was the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense forSpecial Operations and Combatting
Terrorism at the Defense Department.
The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 22, 2020.
Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination
favorably on July 29, 2020. The Senate approved the nomination
by voice vote on August 6, 2020.
F. Patrick Hovakimian, General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
On May 21, 2020, President Trump nominated Patrick
Hovakimian to be the General Counsel of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. At that time, Mr. Hovakimian
was serving as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the
Department of Justice. The Committee held a nomination hearing
on July 22, 2020.
G. Allen Robert Souza, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
On September 23, 2020, President Trump nominated Allen
Robert Souza to be the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community. At that time, Mr. Souza was serving as the Principal
Deputy Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the
National Security Council.
V. SUPPORT TO SENATE
Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this
responsibility by providing access to IC information and
officials to the U.S. Senate.
The Committee facilitated access to IC information for
members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to
participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided
intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members
outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues
with intelligence agencies.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Summary of Committee Actions
1. Number of meetings
During the 116th Congress, the Committee held a total of
102 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and
hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. These included
multiple witness interviews, staff briefings to Committee
members, hearings, and business meetings in furtherance of the
Committee's investigation of Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election. There were 86 oversight hearings,
including nine hearings on the IC budget and six on election
security, and open confirmation hearings for four
administration nominees. Of these 86 hearings, 5 were open to
the public and 81 were closed to protect classified information
pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held 13 business
meetings including mark-ups of legislation. Additionally, the
Committee staff conducted multiple on-the-record briefings and
interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings.
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee
S. 245--Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
S. Res. 51--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 1589--Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020.
S. 3905--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021.
3. Bills referred to the Committee
S. 314--Modernizing the Trusted Workforce for the 21st
Century Act of 2019.
S. 544--A bill to require the Director of National
Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the death of
Jamal Khashoggi, and for other purposes.
H.R. 1404--Vladimir Putin Transparency Act.
S. 838--A bill to protect integrity, fairness, and
objectivity in decisions regarding access to classified
information, and for other purposes.
H.R. 3494--Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020.
S. 2316--Manufacturing, Investment, and Controls Review for
Computer Hardware, Intellectual Property, and Supply Act of
2019.
S. 2493--Combatting Foreign Influence Act of 2019.
S. 2528--A bill to require the Director of National
Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the purpose,
scope, and means of expanded Chinese influence in international
organizations, and for other purposes.
S. 3142--Increasing Efficiency of All United States-Based
Terrorism Information Sharing Act of 2019.
S. 3153--A bill to prohibit the sharing of United States
intelligence with countries that permit the operation of Huawei
fifth generation telecommunications technology within their
borders.
S. Res. 666--A resolution honoring the faithful and
unwavering service of Civil Air Transport and Air America to
the United States.
4. Committee publications
Report 116-20--Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence covering the period January 3, 2017-January 3,
2019.
Report 116-47--Report to accompany the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 together with Additional
Views (S. 1589).
Report 116-233--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 together with Minority
Views (S. 3905).
Report 116-290--Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election together with Additional
Views--November 10, 2020.
[all]
Senate Intelligence Committee Releases Bipartisan Report Detailing Foreign Intelligence Threats
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