Open Hearing: Nomination of William R. Evanina to be Director of National Counterintelligence and Security Center

[Senate Hearing 115-396] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 115-396 NOMINATION OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ TUESDAY, MAY 15, 2018 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 30-120 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California JOHN CORNYN, Texas MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio ---------- Chris Joyner, Staff Director Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- MAY 15, 2018 OPENING STATEMENTS Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1 Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia..... 2 WITNESS William R. Evanina, nominated to be Director, National Counterintelligence and Security Center........................ 3 Prepared statement........................................... 6 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 26 Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 48 Questions for the Record......................................... 75 NOMINATION OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER ---------- TUESDAY, MAY 15, 2018 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Burr, Warner, Rubio, Lankford, Wyden, Heinrich, King, and Harris. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order. I'd like to welcome our witness today, Bill Evanina, President Trump's nominee to be Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, or NCSC. Bill, congratulations on your nomination. I'd like to note that you've already served honorably as Director of NCSC since June of 2014, before the position required Senate confirmation, necessitating this hearing. So, this is a little bit out of the ordinary. I'd like to start by recognizing your family: your wife, JulieAnne, and your sons, Dominic, who's 13, and Will, who is 19 months old and currently holding down the fort at home. [Laughter.] I had an opportunity to meet your wife and oldest son as we had breakfast this morning, and I just want to say thank you for allowing him to serve so many years in government. And to Dominic, thank you for your dad, because he does important stuff. I want you to know that. Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee to consider the nominee's qualifications and to allow for thoughtful deliberation by the members. Director Evanina has provided substantive written responses to over 55 questions presented by the committee. And, today, of course, committee members will be able to ask additional questions and to hear from him in open session. Director Evanina graduated from Wilkes University and earned a master's degree in educational leadership from Arcadia University. He has served in government for over 23 years, including service as a supervisory special agent and assistant section chief with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and prior to joining NCSC served as chief of counterespionage at the Central Intelligence Agency. Director Evanina, you're being asked to lead this agency during a period of significant and wide-ranging counterintelligence threats against our Nation. I'm hopeful that, moving forward, you'll be an influential and forceful advocate for those foreign intelligence tools you believe are necessary to keep our citizens safe while protecting Americans' privacy. As I've mentioned to others during this nomination hearing, I can assure you that this committee will faithfully follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight of the intelligence community, its operations and its activities. We'll ask difficult and probing questions of you, your staff; and we expect honest, complete and timely responses. I look forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring consideration without delay. Thank you again for being here. I look forward to your testimony. I'll now recognize the Vice Chairman. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo the Chairman's remarks in welcoming Bill Evanina today. Obviously, Bill, 22-year veteran of the FBI, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. As the Chairman mentioned, you've had this job for four years. But we thought it was so important that we made it Senate-confirmed, so you get to go through your first confirmation hearing process. You're obviously no stranger to this committee and all the members on the committee. You've briefed us many times, and I think you bring remarkable skills to this position. In my questions today, I want to focus on two issues. One is security clearances. This committee has had a couple hearings on that subject, both open and closed. We all know the DNI is the government's security executive agent and you as the DNI's point person have to take the lead on that. As you've acknowledged, and I think this committee additionally has acknowledged, the current system is broken: 740,000-person backlog, costs too much, takes too long, way too complex. We've had lots of testimony about continuous evaluation, better use of technology, trying to knock down, on the DOD side, a big amount of that backlog. I'd like this morning if you would add a little more details and provide us any update. The second issue that I want to focus on will be your role to oversee the counterintelligence security activities across the U.S. government, particularly with regards to some of our near-peer nation-state adversaries, Russia, China, their whole- of-society approaches. I believe, particularly the challenge posed by China in terms of its acquisition of our technology secrets, and their penetration of starting at early stage companies, through the penetration of universities, and some of the companies that this committee has highlighted in the past. We're going to need to up our game on that. So I look forward to your testimony on that subject as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the witness' testimony. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman. Bill, could I ask you to stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear to give the committee the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Evanina. I do. Chairman Burr. Please be seated. TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA, NOMINATED TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER Chairman Burr. Director, before we move to your statement, I'll ask you five standard questions that the committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a simple yes-or-no answer. Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in other venues when invited? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Chairman Burr. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Chairman Burr. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the committee in order to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Chairman Burr. Will you ensure that your office and your staff provides such materials to the committee when requested? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Chairman Burr. And fifth, do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of the committee on all intelligence activities, rather than just the Chairman and the Vice Chairman? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Chairman Burr. Thank you very much. We'll now proceed to your opening statement, after which I'll recognize members by seniority for five minutes. Bill, the floor is yours. Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. Chairman, Vice Chairman, members: I have issued a statement for the record which I'd like to be added to the record and I'll have some brief comments. It's an honor to appear with you today to consider my nomination to be the first Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, or NCSC. It's also an honor and privilege that this Congress has decided this position to be important enough to make it a Senate-confirmed position. I'm also honored the President and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats have the trust and confidence in me to fulfill this position. I would first like to express my gratitude to my family: my father John, my mother Barbara, my brother Steven, my sister Tanya, most especially my wife, JulieAnne, and my sons Dominic and Will. Lastly, I would like to thank the women and men of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, who are dedicated professionals, and their successes in the last few years have made NCSC the global leader in counterintelligence and security. Mr. Chairman, I was born and raised in Peckville, Pennsylvania, a small blue-collar town just north of Scranton. There, through my family and friends, I learned the value of integrity, hard work and service to others. One of those neighbors was Gino Merli, private first class in the U.S. Army during World War II. Mr. Merli was awarded the Medal of Honor, two Purple Hearts and a Bronze Star for his heroic activities in the Battle of the Bulge. Spending time with Mr. Merli and other role models growing up, I learned the value of character, citizenship and service, and we should never take our democracy or freedom for granted. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to be a career public servant. I've been in Federal service for over 29 years, 22 of which as a proud member of the FBI. I've held a wide spectrum of positions in the FBI and, as you mentioned, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's counterespionage group. Mr. Chairman, the threat we face from our adversaries is progressive, persistent, and requires constant mitigation by our government and private sector. The most prominent and enduring nation-state intelligence threats will continue to be Russia and China. However, Iran, North Korea and others are prominent with their intent and increasing capabilities. I believe the aggressive Russian intelligence services will continue their efforts to interfere and create distrust in our democratic processes, encourage anti-U.S. political views, and weaken our U.S. partnerships and European allies. China's utilization of intelligence services and nontraditional collectors to advance their national development continues to place our national security at risk. The U.S. must continually and aggressively respond to China's systematic theft of U.S. technology, trade secrets, proprietary data, research and development across wide swaths of the U.S. economy. Mr. Chairman, I proffer today that our economic security is our national security. Mr. Chairman, historically, the mitigation of these national security threats lay solely at the feet of the intelligence community and Federal law enforcement. I proffer today, that to successfully thwart the threats and the complexity that we see not only requires a whole-of-government approach, but a whole-of-country approach. Mr. Chairman, insider threats are a pernicious intelligence vulnerability that we face every day. Although we'll never eliminate the possibility of a bad actor within our walls, we continue to strive toward enhanced technical and behavioral solutions to prevent catastrophic damage, as well as to develop creative solutions to prevent and deter this activity. Mr. Chairman, as you and the Vice Chairman are fully aware, our government security clearance process is outdated and inefficient. It is currently undergoing a comprehensive overhaul. We plan and will develop and implement a process that results in the expeditious onboarding of qualified U.S. citizens both into government and in cleared industry with agility and reciprocity. At the same time, we must not reduce the quality of the investigations, to ensure that we are bringing on a quality, highly trusted workforce to protect our secrets. If confirmed, and as the executor of the DNI's role of security executive agent, I am committed to leading this effort, in partnership with the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and Department of Defense. Mr. Chairman, I am humbled. If confirmed, I would become the first Senate-confirmed Director representing the men and women of the NCSC. As well, I will represent the men and women who have toiled for decades in the counterintelligence security field, often without attribution and knowledge. They do so to protect our people, our data, our secrets and our Nation. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the committee, thank you again for your consideration of my nomination. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Evanina follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Burr. Bill, thank you very much for that testimony. The Chair would recognize himself, and then the Vice Chairman and then members by seniority for up to five minutes of questions. Bill, we've talked about it before: Leaks of classified information put sensitive sources and methods at risk and cause irreparable damage to our national security. Congress took action accordingly in the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 by imposing enhanced penalties on those convicted of unauthorized disclosures. If confirmed, how do you plan to address insider threats and the security of sensitive and classified information? Mr. Evanina. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. And I would concur that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information is not only traumatic to the secrets that we lose as a country, but they're also harmful and insidious to the men and women who serve to protect them every day. If confirmed, I will continue to work with my Federal law enforcement partners, both at the FBI and Department of Justice, to enhance not only the investigations, but the penalties for such unauthorized disclosures, as well as with the intelligence community, to enhance their ability to identify unauthorized disclosures within their walls and provide the most effective and efficient monitoring and provide information where that information--to the Department of Justice and the FBI for prosecution. Chairman Burr. Good. Foreign counterintelligence threats to our government supply chain continue to increase and China has become a big part of these threats. In your experience in counterintelligence both at NCSC and in your prior positions at CIA and the Bureau, how has China's counterintelligence threat grown? And what should we be concerned with? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do believe China is one of the gravest concerns that we have moving forward as a Nation with respect to our economic security. China's utilization of a whole-of-government approach towards the United States to increase their economic and military development is problematic. The utilization of nontraditional collectors here in the United States--engineers, scientists, students in school--and their ability to, from a cyber-enabled perspective, identify and attract unclassified data from our research facilities, continues to allow the U.S. to not only lose positions, jobs, research and funding, as well as provide first-to-market capability to the Chinese and take our ingenuity and proprietary data and trade secrets away. Chairman Burr. In your response to the committee's questions, you stated that some of the greatest challenges to NCSC include conducting effective and sustained outreach to Federal partners, research labs and the private sector, as well as securing funding for supply-chain risk management. What are the plans for improving our government's supply-chain risk management? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Supply-chain mitigation efforts are nothing new to the U.S. However, in the last couple years they've become increasingly problematic via awareness. What NCSC does is provide that sliver of counterintelligence aspect to the who and why is implementing and mitigating our supply chain, our adversaries. And we provide and work in partnership with the non-Title 50 organizations, General Services Administration, the labs, the weapons labs, DOE labs, to provide awareness and what the threat is emanating from our adversaries, to help them mitigate, from their perspective, and protect their data from leaving their facilities. Chairman Burr. I thank you for that, and I want to encourage you that in the role of Director please continue to focus on that greatly. This committee has been extremely involved in supply chain concerns that we have, and it seems to slip through the cracks from a jurisdictional standpoint in Congress and, for that fact, in government. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bill, I'm going to start with clearance reform. I think you'll recall when we had the hearings, bipartisan complete agreement the system is broken. It's 740,000-plus on the backlog. This is a security risk. This is an economic risk in terms of our ability then to brief companies. I was very concerned that we invited all the relevant parties to testify. OMB chose not to. I would like you to give us an update on whether OMB is on the team now in trying to make this a priority. And we'd had some discussion that that large-number backlog, you were going to be able to cut a dramatic amount of that backlog back in a relatively short timeline. Can you give us an update on that? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Vice Chairman Warner. Yes. As a matter of fact, I think subsequent to our beginning this process back in March, in our Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, with our partners, Office of Management and Budget, OPM and DOD, as well as a host of other organizations and departments, we have been working diligently to provide this committee and the government with two specific things. Number one, a dramatic reduction to the backlog; and number two, the development of a new business process of how we will vet qualified citizens in the U.S. in an agile, expeditious manner, at the same time making sure they're trusted. With respect to your question on the backlog, we currently are in the final stages of a paper for the DNI to issue that's being coordinated through the intergovernmental process right now, which I believe, with some dramatic changes to how we currently do the business process of investigations, once implemented, will probably get us to a position we could estimate probably a 20 percent reduction to backlog within six months. Vice Chairman Warner. Only 20 percent in six months? That's a little less ambitious than I think we discussed earlier. And is OMB part of the process at this point? Mr. Evanina. OMB is a major part of the process. Again, the four main individuals are OMB, OPM, DOD and ODNI. Vice Chairman Warner. Well, and will these new business processes include reciprocity and common standards between government and our contractors? Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir. Vice Chairman Warner. Again, my hope would be, since I understand a lot of these were on the Secret level, the DOD has said there was an ability to take, I thought, a much greater percentage of that backlog down with administrative action. And then, on a going-forward basis I would hope that we would see a reduction greater than 20 percent. That would only take us down--you know, if we moved from 740,000 to half a million, that still doesn't do very well if we're at the end of this calendar year. Mr. Evanina. Senator, I agree with you and concur. I think some of the contingencies will be predicated upon the transfer of the MBIB inventory to DOD and how that impacts the planned mitigation efforts. We do not have an effective algorithm for that at this moment, but we are excited. That 20 percent is probably a conservative number. Vice Chairman Warner. On the question of counterintelligence with China, again, a number of members on this committee have raised concerns about certain of the Chinese telecom companies and their penetration into the American market. I was actually pleased that the President acted on one of those companies, ZTE. Now, it appears that that is simply a bargaining chip in negotiations with China. I don't think that is the appropriate way. If this is a security threat, it is a security threat and needs to be dealt with as such, not as a bargaining chip in terms of greater trade negotiations. My concern as well is that we are asking purchasers of equipment at local government, private sector, we're asking others who are in the venture community and others to understand the threat of China, but I don't believe we can fully brief that threat if they don't have appropriate security clearances within their own institutions-- again, another challenge that comes out of the backlog issue. How will we be able to move aggressively on having a standardized brief to universities, tech companies, VCs on the real threat of China? That brief I think will have to be some parts classified, as well as unclassified. Do you want to address that? Mr. Evanina. Vice Chairman, I would concur. And I think over the last two years we've made a lot of progress with our interagency partners, the FBI and DHS, in promulgating such advice and awareness and threat to not only academia and industry, with respect to the threat from China and other nation-states who are pernicious in their stealing our proprietary data and trade secrets. We will continue to do that and work with the associations. And I concur with your point that I think private-sector leadership, that is at the CEO level, needs to be a little bit more active in terms of obtaining security clearances so that that information that is classified can get to them in a more effective and efficient manner. Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pick up, Mr. Evanina, on the Vice Chairman's point with respect to ZTE specifically. And thank you for the visit we had in our office. I thought it was very helpful. Now, in 2012, the House Intelligence Committee issued a non-classified bipartisan report on national security issues posed by the Chinese telecom companies, and one of them was ZTE. The report concluded that the risks associated with ZTE's provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could undermine American national security interests. Do you agree with that bipartisan report? Mr. Evanina. Senator Wyden, I do. Senator Wyden. Okay. Now, they recommended that the United States should view with suspicion the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market by ZTE. Do you agree with that? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Senator Wyden. Now, I appreciate the response. The President's comment over the weekend about ZTE I think obviously raises extraordinary national security questions, as well as economic policy concerns. So, if you're confirmed, I hope you're going to stand up to the White House on this issue. Let me ask something with respect to where things stand now. What are the national security implications of giving ZTE sanctions relief? Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator Wyden, I'm not particularly up to speed with the sanctions with regard specifically to ZTE. I will say that the intelligence community and Federal law enforcement is on the record with this committee and the American people with respect to the threat posed by China Telecom. Senator Wyden. But as a general proposition, giving sanctions relief to a company like this, where there has been a bipartisan, non-classified report, as a general proposition that strikes me as a mistake from a counterintelligence standpoint, from a cyber-security standpoint, from an economic policy standpoint. So just tell me, as a general proposition, whether you would agree with that. Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator, I would agree that we will continue to provide the policymakers in this body with the relevant intelligence information to have effective policy---- Senator Wyden. That's not the question I'm asking. Set aside ZTE. As a general proposition, does that raise the concerns I mentioned--economics, national security, cyber- security? Seems to me it's pretty low-hanging fruit here to say yes. Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator, again I'm not up to speed with the sanctions per se with your reference. So I would have to continue with--we will continue advising on the foreign intelligence threat to policymakers who want to employ those sanctions. Senator Wyden. Let me ask you one other question. What has been learned, again from a counterintelligence standpoint, since the OPM breach? You know, obviously, that affected an extraordinary number of Americans. I would hope that that would be seen as a wake-up call and there would be some substantive changes. So what has been learned? What has changed since the OPM breach? Mr. Evanina. Thank you for that question, Senator Wyden. I think that the biggest OPM reflection is that I think we learned as a country that nothing is off limits from foreign adversary attack here, specifically in our non-Title 50 organizations in our country and government as a whole. The intelligence community is no longer just the target and victim of adversaries; that as a country we need to be aware of our proprietary data, trade secrets and PII. Senator Wyden. Let me ask you one other question about encryption. Obviously counterintelligence risks are not limited just to classified systems. Extremely politically sensitive information is conveyed every day by government officials and members of Congress over unsecured phones. Should the intelligence community recommend that policymakers encrypt their unclassified phone conversations? Mr. Evanina. Yes, Senator. Senator Wyden. Okay. Thank you. I hope that you will think some more about this matter that has been raised by ZTE. I can understand why you might not want to comment about a specific company. But, I'm telling you, as a general proposition, this ought to be an enormous alarm bell from the standpoint of counterintelligence, cyber-security, and economics. So I hope you'll think more about that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio. Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Evanina, for being here. Would you ever use a ZTE phone? Mr. Evanina. I would not, Senator. Senator Rubio. Would you recommend anyone in any sort of position that's sensitive, whether in commerce or in government or in contracting, use a ZTE phone? Mr. Evanina. No, I would not. Senator Rubio. So it's not an exaggeration to be--there's somehow the notion out there by some that this is a hysteria, not just unique to ZTE. But it is a fact, is it not, that China utilizes its telecommunication companies for purposes of espionage. Even if those companies' leadership may not be open to it, they don't really have a choice but to be cooperative. Mr. Evanina. Senator Rubio, we've been on the record in the intelligence community and law enforcement of that fact. Senator Rubio. There's an additional national security factor at play, and that is that Made in China 2025 is an endeavor by the Chinese government to dominate the top fields of the 21st century, many of them in telecommunications, aerospace, biomedicine, et cetera. If in fact they achieve that because they're more competitive, because they have better ideas, because they out-innovate us, that's one thing. But that's not how they're pursuing it. How they are pursuing it, is it not, is they are stealing intellectual property, reverse- engineering, the transfer of intellectual property? There is a strategic aim on the part of the Chinese government to steal the commercial intellectual property of this country in order to advance themselves into a position of dominance in these key fields. Is that not something that is pretty clear? Mr. Evanina. That is correct, Senator. Senator Rubio. And that poses a national security threat, because our commercial capacity--just like our shipbuilding capacity is important to our military hardware and our aerospace is, our technological capacity in the private sector. If we lose the high ground and another nation is dominant because they cheated their way into that position, does that not pose a direct national security threat to the United States? Mr. Evanina. It does, Senator. And, as I mentioned, I believe our economic security is our national security. Senator Rubio. Now, I want to talk about a separate topic that has not, I don't believe, ever been discussed before, certainly not today. As you know, we live in an environment where false claims, even ones that are totally preposterous, can easily be spread on social media. And often the media, under tremendous pressure to deliver clicks on their website or ratings on their television station through outrage, are quick to jump on it. I raise that because of the concept of something called ``deep fakes.'' Are you familiar with that term? Mr. Evanina. I am not, sir. Senator Rubio. A deep fake is the ability to manipulate sound, images, or video to make it appear that a certain person did something that they didn't do. These videos in fact are increasingly realistic. The quality of these fakes is rapidly increasing due to artificial intelligence. Machine learning algorithms are paired with facial mapping software to make it easy and cheap to insert someone's face into a video and produce a very realistic-looking video of someone saying or doing something they never said or did. This, by the way, technology is pretty widely available on the internet and people have used it already for all sorts of nefarious purposes at the individual level. I think you can only imagine what a nation-state could do with that technology, particularly to our politics. If we could imagine for a moment, a foreign intelligence agency could use deep fakes to produce a fake video of an American politician using a racial epithet or taking a bribe or anything of that nature. They could use a fake video of a U.S. soldier massacring civilians overseas. They could use a fake video of a U.S. official admitting a secret plan to do some conspiracy theory of some kind. They could use a fake video of a prominent official discussing some sort of impending disaster that could sow panic. And imagine a compelling video like this produced on the eve of an election or a few days before major public policy decision with a culture that has already a kind of a built-in bias towards believing outrageous things, a media that is quick to promulgate it and spread it, and of course social media, where you can't stop its spread. I believe that this is the next wave of attacks against America and Western democracies, is the ability to produce fake videos that can only be determined to be fake after extensive analytical analysis, and by then the election is over and millions of Americans have seen an image that they want to believe anyway because of their preconceived bias against that individual. You've never heard of that term, but I ask you, is there any work being done anywhere in the U.S. government to begin to confront the threat that could be posed, or will be posed in my view, by the ability to produce realistic-looking fake video and audio that could be used to cause all sorts of chaos in our country? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator Rubio, for that question. And the answer is yes. The entire intelligence community and Federal law enforcement is actively working to not only understand the complexities and capabilities of our adversaries, but what, from a predictive analysis perspective, we may face going forward, particularly with the election this fall, as well as in 2020. Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Evanina, welcome. The DOD has recently banned sales of ZTE phones at military exchanges, as well as Huawei equipment. And last month, the Commerce Department banned China's smartphone maker, ZTE, from using U.S. technology after it illegally shipped U.S. goods to both Iran and to North Korea. This comes after numerous intelligence community warnings that ZTE poses a major cyber- security threat. Yet, as we saw this week, President Trump announced that he is working with the Chinese president to give ZTE, quote, `à way to get back into business fast,'' end quote. Do you assess that ZTE represents an economic or security threat to the United States? Mr. Evanina. Thank you for the question, Senator. I believe the intelligence community and law enforcement are clearly on the record, both in the public and in classified settings, with the threat from Chinese telecommunications companies. Senator Heinrich. Are you concerned from a counterintelligence perspective? Does it make sense to overrule the advice and judgment of the national security community and to offer ZTE a way to get back into business fast? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I believe our role in the intelligence community and the counterintelligence community is to provide the relevant facts of the issue in the investigations to the policymakers for their decision-making processes. Senator Heinrich. How are you raising those facts with this White House? Mr. Evanina. We are garnering the support of the entire intelligence community and regulatory community. And, as a matter of fact, I think we've had meetings as recently as yesterday at the White House. Senator Heinrich. If China believes that we are willing to use national security matters as bargaining chips in trade negotiations, how do you think that will impact their behavior, moving forward? Mr. Evanina. Senator, thanks for the question. I'm not an expert on the Chinese diplomatic processes, but I can tell you that our national security is first and foremost in our perspective. And the whole-of-country approach posed by China clearly makes it difficult for us to bifurcate the issues. Senator Heinrich. So two months ago DHS and the FBI issued a rare public alert about a large-scale Russian cyber campaign targeting the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure with an intent to extract information and potentially lay a foundation for future offensive operations. This alert went further than past alerts, confirming Russia as the culprit and including indicators of compromise and a list of detection and prevention measures. What's happened since March of this year, when the alert went out? And is this Russian cyber campaign ongoing? Mr. Evanina. Senator, thank you for that question. And I would agree that the pervasive threat from the cyber perspective by the Russian government continues today and will into the future. The Federal Government, specifically the intelligence community, Federal law enforcement and DHS, have been working with the private sector every day. As a matter of fact, NCSC, we brought in not only the Department of Energy, but major companies in the fuel, gas and oil perspective to give them a one-day read-in in a classified brief of the threat, so we could help them mitigate those issues back in their home facilities. Senator Heinrich. Did that include utilities as well? Mr. Evanina. It did. Senator Heinrich. Are you seeing a greater sense of urgency on the part of utility companies and other energy institutions to utilize this new information? Mr. Evanina. Yes. Senator Heinrich. Are we getting utility leadership through the clearance process fast enough? Mr. Evanina. I'm not sure about that, Senator. I'd have to get back to you with respect to the speed at which that's occurring. Senator Heinrich. Because that's another concern. And I know Senator Warner brought up the overall issue. I mean, one of the things that we have heard on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee is, that even former members of Congress who served on the relevant intelligence committee, can't get through that process. And so, if we don't have partners who are read in on the other side, it makes it very difficult for those utilities and those other energy institutions to actually implement the changes that they need to implement. Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I believe, working closely with DHS--they are working diligently to provide an expeditious process to get individuals and companies cleared so they can receive this threat information on a real-time basis. Senator Heinrich. You've said that continuous evaluation is not the future, it's now, and that the government honestly has not done a good job. Industry is able to conduct continuous evaluation of their employees. Why has it been difficult for the government to do so? And what can we do about that? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator, for the question. Continuous evaluation has been a constant bedrock in the intelligence community for years. What we've been asked to do at NCSC, through the auspices of the ODNI, from this committee is provide a robust continuous evaluation program for the rest of the Executive Branch, and we have done that. We are probably 80 percent complete, ahead of schedule, hope to be fully complete by the end of the year. We are expecting to have 20- plus agencies and 100,000 Federal employees outside the intelligence community enrolled into our continuous evaluation plan. Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thanks for being here and for going through this process. And by the way, thank you for your years of service leading up to this. It's exceptionally valuable for the country. You make several very interesting statements in your opening statement and in your written statement that I want to be able to ask you to drill down a little bit deeper on. You made this statement: `À growing set of threat actors are now capable of using cyber operations to remotely access traditional intelligence targets, as well as a broader set of U.S. targets, including critical infrastructure and supply chain, often without attribution.'' What are you recommending there? You're making a statement there, but you're also making a recommendation. Mr. Evanina. Thank you for that question, Senator Lankford. I believe that we as a Nation need to be more in a true public- private partnership with those out in our country who actually make things and build things--our utility companies, the energy, telecommunications and financial networks that are the bedrock of our Nation. The government needs to partner in a very, very close manner with them, so they can understand the threat and provide efforts to help mitigate that threat. Senator Lankford. So what does that look like? In a public- private partnership, are you talking about government dictating how this would work in the private industry and the private industry does it? The private industry sets a set of standards from NIST or from wherever it may be? Is this DHS? What entity do you think does that? And where does that happen most efficiently? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I believe that it's a combination, starting with DHS. What we do at NCSC is provide that sliver of counterintelligence threat to not only the DHS and Department of Energy, but as well as all those companies, so they can understand the who and why and what's happening, and then help other Federal organizations and regulators provide mitigation to those. If I believe that those companies out there providing those services don't understand the threat and how it's manifested, they can't be in an effective position to prevent it. Senator Lankford. What's the best way for them to get information about the threat? If I'm a pipeline company in Oklahoma, what's the best way for me to be able to determine what's the real threats that are coming at me? Mr. Evanina. Two ways, sir: through the Department of Energy, as well as the FERC, who is the regulator for that organization we work very closely with to provide threat information. And I believe that process is pretty effective. Senator Lankford. Talk to me a little bit about hiring and retaining individuals for the team. You've got a lot of competition getting some of the best folks. We've got some incredible patriots that are there because of their love for their country and their respect for the rule of law. What are you seeing right now for hiring and retaining individuals and for the future? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I'm pretty aware that the intelligence community continues to attract to the right type of amazing U.S. citizens for their jobs. I believe that our mission in the intelligence community will win the day. The challenge is getting them in the door, as we spoke of. But I believe the mission will keep them in for long periods of time. The security clearance process has been--the undergoing of the business process re-engineering will help get us the individuals in the door quicker, more expeditious, not only in the government, but in the private sector, including industry as well. Senator Lankford. You had a nice, long hesitation on the security process, which all of us have incredible frustrations with at this desk and those that are doing the hiring. What is the right length of time to be able to get through a security clearance? Because we will do a good security clearance, but right now it's a ridiculous amount of time. What's the right amount of time? Mr. Evanina. Well, Senator, it's a trick question, but I'll give you--I believe that Secret clearances and below, which are primarily Department of Defense, I think in the end state we should be able to clear 80 or 90 percent of those within 30 days. Senator Lankford. How long will it take to get to that spot, you think? Mr. Evanina. Again, with my partners watching closely here, I would have to say within the next two years we're able to get to that as an official policy and implementation. It's a little bit more complicated at the Top Secret level, as you're aware. Senator Lankford. Sure. Mr. Evanina. We're working on those metrics, as well. Senator Lankford. Yes, but most people are not going through the Top Secret level starting out through the clearance. I think a 30-day, 45-day even, is a reasonable amount of time to be able to go through a Secret clearance. What is the time right now per clearance? Mr. Evanina. It's closer to 100 days, sir. Senator Lankford. Right. And for many people in excess of that, and that's a major issue for us. You also make some interesting comments about the election security in your opening statement and in your written statement. Your concerns continue to rise about a Russian threat towards our election security. I know we're partnering with DHS. My question to you is not about the threat; it's about how we're responding to it. What's the current level of cooperation between you and DHS in preparing for those threats because DHS has the lead? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, sir. And DHS has been a great partner, not only with the intelligence side, but NPPD, who has direct interface with the State and locals with respect to the election process, which-- elections are local. We have been working really closely with them, bringing the entire intelligence community to service DHS and provide real, up-to-date threat information like we have never done before, so that DHS can manifest that information and provide mitigation strategies for all elections who are at the local level. Senator Lankford. So cooperation and communication between DHS and you are consistent right now? Mr. Evanina. That's correct. Senator Lankford. Okay, thank you. I yield back. Chairman Burr. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Evanina, welcome. Delighted to have you here today and appreciate the service that you've provided. First, I want to associate myself with Senator Rubio's comments and emphasize one point. He talked about the deep fake, the idea of being able to create an alternative reality. If you add to that the powers of social media, it's a perfect storm of disinformation, because you can create the false reality and then you can circulate it in a way that it's very hard to counteract, to find, to see. If somebody puts a negative ad about you on television, you can put up your own ad to rebut it. In this case, you're chasing smoke. It's all over the place--e-mails, Twitter, Facebook. It's very difficult. So, I think this is a very serious challenge. That brings me to your comment on question 16 of the prehearing questions. You said: `Ì remain concerned that we may still be underestimating Russian capabilities and plans to influence the 2018 midterm and future elections.'' That's a chilling statement. Could you elaborate on that a bit? Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. I would say that I don't think anyone in my profession or the intelligence community will underestimate the potential of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, or the intelligence service in their capabilities, but, more importantly, their intent. And I think, from what we saw in the last election cycle, their intent is there and their capabilities are clearly there. To your first statement regarding the deep fake, I think that serves as an opportunity for us in the analytical community and the Federal Government to provide enhanced training and awareness of the deep fake; and maybe also an opportunity to partner with the private sector and social media companies to understand the capabilities of our adversaries on our own social media networks. Senator King. Well, the ultimate defense on that is for our public to understand when they're being conned, for them to realize where this is coming from. And I think sources are very important. You mentioned about the capabilities of the Russians and their intent. Do you have any doubt about the accuracy of the January 2017 report of the intelligence community on the Russian activities in the 2016 election? Mr. Evanina. I do not. Senator King. Thank you. I also want to emphasize a point that's been made several times before. The clearance backlog is an enormous problem. My frustration is, I can't find out a single point, the single point in the United States government that's in charge of solving this problem. And I know it's not you, but you're in a key position. And I believe that in order to solve it it's going to take--and I keep hearing ``whole-of-government.'' Whenever I hear ``whole-of-government,'' I think that means ``none-of-government.'' Somebody's got to be in charge, and I hope that you will urge the administration, the IC, DNI, to take charge of this issue so that it's not scattered all over the government, because we've got to solve it. We had testimony there are something like 950,000 security clearances in backlog, and we're losing good people. There's an opportunity cost there, and it's just unacceptable in terms of our ability to defend the country. So, I hope you will take on, as part of your mission, pushing for an organizational response to this, where there's some central responsibility and accountability for this. Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. The government looks to the Director of National Intelligence as the security executive agent for this process, and I believe, and the government believes through executive order, that he is accountable for the policies set forth, how we conduct investigations and adjudications. And by virtue of--as executor of that program, I believe that responsibility of leadership lies with me. Senator King. When I was in business, I always tried to formulate contracts and relationships so that you had one throat to choke. [Laughter.] And that was the way you can get things done. On this question of cyber security and the attacks on our country, in my view and the view of many of us in this committee and in other committees, one of the fundamental problems with our response to this is that it's purely defensive; that we're simply trying to patch our way out of this problem; and that there is no deterrent, there is no cyber doctrine or cyber strategy that will deter our adversaries and make them think twice. We had testimony before Armed Services from the head of the NSA that nothing we have done would, quote, ``change the calculus of our adversaries.'' Do you believe that this is an area that we need to do more work in and develop a public deterrence strategy so that those who intend to attack us through cyber, just as they would through kinetic, believe that they will and will certainly pay a price? Mr. Evanina. I do, sir. Senator King. And could you expand on that a bit? Mr. Evanina. Well, I believe two aspects of that. Number one, I think our adversaries need to know that our deterrence policy is real and it will manifest itself in their home base so they understand it. But I think more importantly, I think we owe it to the American people for them to understand that the government has policies and procedures in place to protect them, protect private industry, from these cyber threats that we face. So I concur we need to be a little bit more effective and efficient with our deterrence policies. Senator King. I hope you will help us develop that strategy, because I think otherwise we're just going to continue to be chipped away at. Again, we're looked on as a kind of free lunch in this regard. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony. Mr. Evanina. Thank you. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King. Vice Chairman Warner. I just want to echo what Senator King has said, that we need that articulated cyber doctrine. I was, again, disappointed that it appears the National Security Council is now trying to eliminate the cyber position in the White House, a direct report to the President. That does not send the right signal. But thank you very much, Bill, for your testimony. I look forward to working with you. Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Burr. I have to admit I was questioning whether Senator King was going to be quoted from this hearing about a cyber doctrine or `òne throat to choke.'' [Laughter.] I have a feeling I know which way it's going to go. Senator King. I realized I was taking that risk as the words were leaving my---- [Laughter.] Chairman Burr. I think we have exhausted questions, Director. Thank you, and I thank your family again for your willingness to serve. Let me note for members, QFRs are required before the end of business today. It is my intent to move the Director out of committee next week, so that we can get this to the floor as quickly as we can. With that, again, our thanks for your service. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]

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