Open Hearing: Nomination of Lieutenant General Paul M. Nakasone to be the Director of the National Security Agency

[Senate Hearing 115-395] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 115-395 NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov _________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 28-949 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California JOHN CORNYN, Texas MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio ---------- Chris Joyner, Staff Director Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- MARCH 15, 2018 OPENING STATEMENTS Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1 Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia..... 2 WITNESS Nakasone, Lieutenant General Paul M., U.S. Army, Nominated to be Director of the National Security Agency and Chief of the Central Security Service....................................... 4 Prepared statement........................................... 7 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 26 Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 42 Questions for the Record......................................... 59 Statement from the Electronic Privacy Information Center......... 71 NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL. SECURITY SERVICE ---------- THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, King, and Harris. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order. Lieutenant General Paul M. Nakasone, President Trump's nominee to be the next Director of the National Security Agency, General Nakasone, congratulations on your nomination. I'd like to start by recognizing your wife Susan. She's here with us today and your four children: David and Joseph, who are both high school juniors; Sarah, who's studying at the University of Chicago; and Daniel who is at the University of Virginia. You've got them geographically spread around. I know from personal experience just how important a supportive family is. And to each of you--and, Susan, I hope you pass it on to the kids--thank you. Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee to consider the nominee's qualifications and to allow for thoughtful deliberation by our members. Lieutenant General Nakasone has provided substantive written responses to over 45 questions presented by the committee. And today, of course, committee members will be able to ask additional questions and hear from him in open session. General Nakasone graduated from Saint John's University and earned a master's degree from the University of Southern California, the National Defense Intelligence College, and the United States Army War College. He served honorably in the United States Army for over 30 years, including deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Republic of Korea. Prior to leading the United States Army Cyber Command, General Nakasone commanded the Cyber National Mission Force at the United States Cyber Command. General Nakasone, you are being asked to lead the National Security Agency during a period of significant debate about what authorities and tools are lawful and appropriate. I'm hopeful that, moving forward, you will be an influence and an influential and forceful advocate for those foreign intelligence tools you believe are necessary to keep the citizens of this country safe while protecting Americans' privacy. As I have mentioned to others during their nomination hearing, I can assure you that this committee will faithfully follow its charter and conduct a vigorous and real-time oversight of the intelligence community, its operations and its activities. We'll ask difficult and probing questions of you and your staff and we will expect honest, complete and timely responses. You've already been reported favorably out of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March of this year, and I look forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring its consideration without delay. I want to thank you again for being here. I look forward to your testimony. Finally, yesterday the committee received a statement from the Electronic Privacy Information Center and asked that it be entered into the hearing record. I would ask members for unanimous consent that that statement be entered into today's open record. Hearing no objection, so ordered. I now recognize the Vice Chairman for his lengthy comments. [Laughter.] OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since no one is here, I'm sure people are going to be hanging on my every word. General Nakasone, it's great to see you again and welcome. I believe actually, since you're the first director as--as Director of NSA and CYBERCOM, this is the first time, though, as NSA Director that you've appeared before the committee. So a bit of a historic hearing; and, consequently, slightly extended remarks of mine. Obviously, General, if you are confirmed you will take charge of one of the most important assignments in our government and in the intelligence community. You will be entrusted to lead thousands of dedicated men and women of the NSA. It will be your job to ensure accurate and timely signals intelligence is provided to our Nation's leaders and warfighters. You'll be responsible for protecting our military networks, safeguarding the unique capabilities and assets of the United States, and outsmarting our adversaries. And, as Commander of U.S. CYBERCOM, you will also be responsible to--for responding to threats and conduct operations when ordered to do so. At the same time, as we've discussed again, you must ensure that the NSA operate within the law and that it continues to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. The NSA's activities must continue to operate within the parameters of that law, particularly the FISA law, with foolproof mechanisms for ensuring that no Americans are targeted without warrant, and will continue to be subject to robust oversight by this committee. Your nomination I believe comes at a critical time. As I look around the world, I see threats and challenges to our country, to our systems of international institutions and alliances, that frankly have maintained peace and prosperity since World War II. We've also seen domestic threats to the NSA's ability to execute on its mission, with a series of leaks that have challenged the agency and at times undermined the morale of your workforce. The NSA must provide the best intelligence on terrorists and extremist groups, rogue regimes, nuclear proliferation, and regional instability. I'm concerned about the rise of potential nation-state adversaries and their policies which aim to disrupt the international order. In particular, we should all be alarmed by the destabilizing role played by Vladimir Putin's Russia, which threatens both the United States and our allies and, as we've seen by their recent activities in the U.K., there are very few restrictions that Mr. Putin has put on his agent's actions. Matter of fact, the heads of our intelligence agencies were here a month ago and all indicated that Russia will continue to try to interfere in our elections, activities that demand a strong United States response. Our country I believe must develop a whole-of-government response to strengthen our defenses. I believe--and we've again discussed this, we'd like to hear more about this today--that we need a clearly articulated cyber doctrine that will deter nations like Russia from going after our crucial institutions, whether they be civilian, military, or in the private sector. We've got to make sure they know, whether it's Russia or other near-peer adversaries, that there will be consequences to their actions. I believe that our lack of action to date has, frankly, encouraged nations not only like Russia, but China and others, frankly to act with impunity. I also worry that we're on the cusp of what I would call a paradigm shift in the technological development, and not one which we're well-poised to prevail against well-resourced competitors, who are willing to engage not only in a whole-of-government, but particularly a whole-of- society effort, to obtain economic advantages and access to our most sensitive technologies. The top dozen Chinese technology firms that have already entered or are poised to enter the United States and Western markets, in stark contrast to our country, these firms maintain relationships with and provide access to the Chinese government that is unlike anything we've seen with other developed nations. While we want to encourage an open economy, what are the potential risks to our society from these developments? Now, China is still behind the United States in R&D expenditures, but, with the current spend lines, not for long. China's R&D spending is increasing by about 20 percent a year. By comparison, our R&D expenditures are increasing about 4 percent a year. Frankly, the lines will shortly cross; and China is positioning itself to be a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and bioengineering, and that brings serious implications for our privacy, economic and national security. I believe the NSA will continue to play a critical role in keeping our country ahead in this ever- changing world of emerging technologies. Finally, I'd like to hear your thoughts about the dedicated men and women of the NSA, your workforce of dedicated intelligence professionals. These are men and women who work in silence to keep America safe. Now, they've taken a beating sometimes recently from those who falsely call into question their motivations, their dedication and their honesty. I know that these attacks obscure the truth. My colleagues on this committee and I know that at the NSA headquarters the Memorial Wall lists the names of 176 NSA cryptologists, military and civilian, who made the ultimate sacrifice for their country while serving in silence. I'd like to hear your plans on how we maintain that world-class workforce going forward. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and I look forward to the General's comments. Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman. General, if you would stand and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell--to give this committee the truth, the full truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? General Nakasone. I do. STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, NOMINATED TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE Chairman Burr. Please be seated. General, before we move to your statement, I'll ask you to answer five standard questions the committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They require a simple yes or no response for the record. Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in any other venue when invited? General Nakasone. Yes. Chairman Burr. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited? General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the committee when requested? General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to the fullest extent possible, all members of this committee on all intelligence activities, rather than only the Chair and the Vice Chair? General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you very much for your answers. We'll now proceed to your opening statement, after which I'll recognize members by seniority for up to five minutes. General, the floor is yours. General Nakasone. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and distinguished members of the committee: I am honored to testify here today for my nomination as Director of the National Security Agency and Chief, Central Security Service. I want to thank President Trump, Secretary Mattis, Director Coats, and General Dunford for their confidence in nominating me for these important positions. I'd also like to thank my wife Susan for being here. I owe much of my success to her love and support throughout nearly 25 years of marriage. Today, our children, Sarah, Daniel, David and Joseph, are all in school and will be unable to be with us. We're tremendously proud of them and thankful for their selflessness and support. I'd also like to thank Admiral Mike Rogers for his 36 years of commissioned service for the Nation, and for leading NSA during a time of incredible transformation and tremendous growth. I thank him and his wife Dana for all they have done in service to our Nation. I commissioned in the Army over 31 years ago as an intelligence officer and for the past three decades, have served in intelligence and in leadership positions both at home and abroad, in peace and in war. If confirmed for this position, this will be my fourth assignment to NSA. In my previous assignments to the agency, I've always been impressed by the phrases that greet everyone who enters that building: ``Defend the Nation, secure the future.'' These simple directives captured the critical role the NSA plays in supporting our military and senior policymakers while safeguarding our freedoms. I know that the National Security Agency is a special member of our intelligence community and of unique importance in the defense of our Nation. Throughout the agency's 65 years of service, one constant has remained--the quality of the people. These men and women are national treasures and they're engaged in missions that can only be called one of a kind. If confirmed, I know this workforce will be the foundation of NSA's future and continued success. My focus will begin and end with them. Throughout my career, I've been both a generator and consumer of NSA intelligence products and know first-hand the critical role the agency plays, both as a combat support and signals intelligence agency. The importance of delivering accurate, reliable and timely intelligence products cannot be overstated. And, if confirmed, I commit to upholding the high reputation of the agency as a provider of objective, mission- critical signals intelligence in support of our military and our government. I recognize that our Nation's adversaries continue to pose threats and posture themselves to reduce our global advantage. In light of this, the importance of an effective National Security Agency continues to be paramount to our national defense. I also recognize that we are at the edge of the technological frontier for our Nation. The future that the next director will face presents challenges and opportunities from rapid technological evolution, including machine learning, artificial intelligence and quantum computing, as well as the growing capabilities of the technological industry. If confirmed, I know that a strong public-private partnership will be needed to ensure this country benefits from the leading-edge technology being developed and implemented today and into the future. Finally, I recognize that this nomination is to lead both U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA. Although the co-location and cooperation of the two powerful organizations has been critical to their growth, I also see them as two unique entities with their own identities, authorities, and oversight mechanisms. I am committed to assessing the needs of both to optimize their individual success in the best defense of our Nation. If confirmed, I will ensure that the agency's intelligence customers can continue to rely upon timely and accurate products, delivered with integrity, to ensure we maintain an advantage over increasingly adaptive adversaries. Equally, I will always ensure the National Security Agency upholds full compliance with our laws and the protection of our constitutional rights. I am deeply honored to be considered for these leadership positions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the committee and the entire Congress to ensure we leverage our opportunities and also address our challenges. Chairman Burr, thank you for this opportunity to be here this morning. I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Burr. General, thank you for that statement. Thank you for your service to the country. One could leave with what you have accomplished, with a great career; but I think greater things are ahead of us for you and for this country. And we're grateful for your willingness and your family's willingness to take this next chapter. Before we begin, I'd like to advise members that, pursuant to Senate Resolution 400, the committee received this nomination on referral from the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March 2018 and we have 30 calendar days within which to report this nomination to the full Senate. It is my intention to move to a committee vote on this nomination as soon as we possibly can. Therefore, for planning purposes, if any members wish to submit questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by close of business today. With that, we will go into the five-minute round by seniority, and I'll recognize myself first. General, leaks of classified information this committee takes very seriously; and we believe it puts sensitive sources and methods at risk and can in many cases cause irreparable damage to our national security. Our committee has already taken action in the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 by imposing enhanced penalties on those convicted of unauthorized disclosures. If confirmed, how do you plan to address the security of sensitive and classified information at the agency? General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, the safeguard of our national secrets, the safeguard of our capabilities, is one of the most important things the next director will continue to address. If confirmed, my intent is to look to make sure that the ``Secure the Enterprise'' and the ``Secure the Network'' initiatives that NSA has undertaken to date are timely, are accurate, are on target, to ensure that we continue to have the safeguard and security of our national treasures. With that being said, I would also add, Mr. Chairman, that there are two elements that I see as we look long-term to this issue. First of all is continuing to hire great people that work at the NSA, not only hiring them but also training them, developing them, and ensuring that their long-term careers with the NSA are well tended to. The second thing, though, is we need to also understand that there are control mechanisms that we as an agency need to continue to look at to ensure that we have the ability to not only safeguard our network, but also secure our environment. Chairman Burr. General, do I have your commitment that, if such a leak happens, that you will, as timely as you can, notify the committee? And will you continually notify the committee on progress that NSA makes towards preventing and deterring unauthorized leaks? General Nakasone. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you. General, the committee Intel Authorization Act of 2018 and fiscal year 2017 included provisions to enhance NSA's ability to recruit and retain science, technology, engineering, and mathematics--STEM--employees. Nevertheless, NSA employees still will be compensated less than their private sector counterparts. How do you plan to recruit and retain those top STEM candidates, especially given that there is that compensation gap between government and the private sector? General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, first of all thank you to the committee for the Intelligence Authorization Act. I think that is a very, very important element, important ability for the next director to be able to leverage in the future. As I take a look at NSA's workforce and my previous experience, the one thing that sets NSA apart is their mission. I believe the most critical thing that we have to continue to do at the National Security Agency is to ensure our people understand and are able to work this very important mission: Defend the Nation, secure the future. This is what I think is essential for us and is our advantage as we look to the future. Mr. Chairman, I would also say as we look to the future we have to continue broad abilities to recruit from a very, very diverse population, academia, industry, inside our government. I think this is critical that we can continue to attract our best and brightest people. Chairman Burr. General, are you familiar with NSA21? General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am. Chairman Burr. Would you just briefly comment on your views on that initiative, which is to prepare for the 21st century a more efficient, effective NSA? General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, NSA21, as I understand it, the largest reorganization of the agency since 2000. And that's significant if you consider the fact that 70 percent of the agency has been hired since 9/11. It was designed to improve, obviously, and focus on people, integration, and innovation. It was designed to address a number of changes in our environment, changes to our networks, changes to competition for our workforce, changes to our budget. I would say to date, it has just been instantiated at the end of 2017. And so, if confirmed, I would ask if I could have a bit of time to take a look, evaluate what has been done, look at what has been successful and what may need assessment and continue that dialogue with the committee. Chairman Burr. You've got a commitment to do that. With that, my time's expired. The Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, General, congratulations on your nomination and thank you for your service. One of the things I think this committee prides itself on is our strong working relationship with all components of the intelligence community. And as you're aware, we have had an ongoing investigation into Russian activities stemming from the 2016 election. For the record, will you commit to ensuring that this committee will be provided with all the information requested pursuant to our ongoing Russia investigations? General Nakasone. I will, Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. At our last open hearing, we had all of the heads of all the principal intelligence community agencies. Every one of them, including your predecessor Admiral Rogers, reconfirmed their support for the January 2017 assessment that Russia interfered in our last elections. I want to get in, for the record: Do you agree with that January 2017 IC assessment, that Russia interfered in our 2016 elections? And the second part, editorial comment here: In light of their success in those efforts, do you expect further interference by Russia in our elections and, for that matter, the elections of our allies? General Nakasone. Mr. Vice Chairman, I agree with the 2017 assessment. I think the Director of National Intelligence has said it best with regards to future actions of the Russians. And that is, ``Unless the calculus changes, that we should expect continued issues.'' Vice Chairman Warner. Well, we would look forward to working with you on making sure--this committee is going to have a public hearing next week on this issue of election security, and I'm very proud of members of both sides of the aisle and how hard they've worked on that. And we, if confirmed, would look forward to working with you on this issue of election security. One of the things that I've found and believe is that we don't have, I think, a clearly articulated cyber doctrine at this point that not only defends our government, but also deters particularly near-peer adversaries. I think I could better articulate our strategy vis-a-vis second-level states like North Korea, Iran, and terrorist threats like ISIS. But I am concerned with near-peer adversaries we don't have that clear cyber doctrine. And I know you're just coming into this position, but who do you think in the Administration is in charge of developing a cyber doctrine policy that would deter, whether it's Chinese theft of our intellectual property or Russia misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Who's going to be in charge of developing that doctrine and where do you think it stands at this point? General Nakasone. Senator, ultimately I would anticipate that strategies such as this would come from the Executive Branch, perhaps the National Security Council. However, I would anticipate that all elements of the government would contribute to the strategy. In terms of, if confirmed, my role, I would anticipate that I would provide my insights to both the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense as this strategy is developed. Vice Chairman Warner. Well, with your strong intelligence background, I hope we can count on you to be part of that. I think it is time that we have that clearly articulated doctrine. And again, this is not a criticism in this case of the current Administration. This has been a problem, I think, that has plagued our Nation for more than a decade. One of the areas that I constantly come back to and I think is an example of where we need a doctrine is with how we deal with the dramatic increases of devices that are connected to the internet, the so-called Internet of Things. We're roughly at about 10 billion devices connected now. That number is estimated to go to 20 to 25 billion within the next five or six years. Matter of fact, the Director of the DIA, General Ashley, emphasized that our weakest technology components, mobile devices and the Internet of Things, was an area of exploitation for potential adversaries. How do you think we would go about securing devices connected to the internet? And do you think that there ought to be at least a basic policy put in place that would say that the Federal Government's purchasing power ought to be used with some determination that we only would buy devices that, for example, are patchable or don't have embedded pass codes so that we don't, frankly, embed within our Federal Government enormous new vulnerabilities? General Nakasone. So, Senator, certainly awareness, as you talk about, the Internet of Things is very important for all of us to understand both the opportunities and certainly the challenges here. I think there will likely be, obviously, movement that will have to come from the private sector on this. In terms of policy decisions, I would defer that to the Department of Defense as they weigh in to this. But my sense is that we have to have a very candid discussion about the growth, the explosion of the Internet of Things, and most importantly the impact that it could have on our economy and certainly our national security. Vice Chairman Warner. Well, again, I think you can play a critically important role here. I just would hate for us five years from now to realize we've bought literally billions of devices, just within the Federal Government, and they have actually increased our vulnerability. Thank you for your responses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman. Senator Blunt. Senator Blunt. General, let's just start where Senator Warner did. You know, Admiral Rogers, who we all have great respect for, got a lot of attention recently, I believe on the House side, saying he'd been given no new directions as to how to deal with things like Russian interference in the elections. So let's--let's take that in two directions. One is, do you need any new direction, in your view, to deal with defending against those kinds of attacks? Do you have all the defensive authorization you need? Not whether you have all the equipment and staff you need, but do you--do you have all the authorization you need to defend our institutions against outside aggression? General Nakasone. So, Senator, certainly in terms of defending the Department of Defense networks, I think that there are all the authorizations and policies and authorities that are necessary. Senator Blunt. What do you need about the non-department? NSA, what if somebody's attacking the--the State Department or some other? General Nakasone. So certainly, if confirmed as the Director of the National Security Agency, the authorities for the national security systems falls within the purview of the Director of NSA and I believe has the authorities on which he would be able to execute that defense. Senator Blunt. Do you need more authorities to work with State and local election officials? General Nakasone. So certainly, there would need to be a policy decision, Senator, that would indicate that that there would be, you know, more authorities for--for Cyber Command or NSA to be able to do something like that. Senator Blunt. But for the Federal Government and for the military, your defensive role is clearly understood? General Nakasone. So certainly for--on the NSA side for the national security systems, it is understood; and on the CYBERCOM side for the defense of DOD networks, certainly understood. Senator Blunt. And I think we all, and I believe this was Senator Warner's question, well, worded maybe a little bit differently: How do we develop a more well-understood response, an offensive guideline, if you would? How do we--what do we need to do to be sure that our adversaries know that there's a price to be paid, beyond just us trying to subvert their efforts to get into our networks? Do we have an offensive strategy and do we need one? General Nakasone. So, Senator, I think both Vice Chairman Warner and yourself speak to this idea of a strategy: What is the strategy for the Nation in terms of cyberspace? I think that strategy being developed in terms of how we defend ourselves, certainly, is important, and it would lay out roles, responsibilities, functions of the major elements of our government. And I think that that is obviously one of the things that would help both internally for the elements of our government, but also externally, as you say, to provide a set of left and right boundaries perhaps for our adversaries to understand. Senator Blunt. Well, I think a determination to create where those boundaries are and what we might do may need to be made outside of your agency. But inside your agency, I can't imagine a more important person to be at the table when we try to determine what--how that--how that determination could actually be implemented. I think there's a strong sense that there's too much of no price to be paid at this point by people who try to either steal our intellectual property, or interfere with elections, or whatever else they might try to do. The other area where I think you may have to look for an even more expansive role is the acquisition of equipment, signal intelligence equipment, by other agencies. I think you have a role to play there in one of the many hats you'll be wearing in this job. Do you have concerns that other Federal agencies may be buying equipment that could in the future be troublesome for us? General Nakasone. Senator, I certainly have concerns. I think the recent statements by the Department of Homeland Security and their directives with regards to select antivirus companies throughout the world and the ensuing National Defense Authorization Act that prohibited the use of select antivirus products within our government is very, very important for the future. Senator Blunt. Well, again, I think you bring the information to the table on that. And my last question would be something we've talked about before. Particularly at the Cyber Command level, what's the value of the Reserve force or the National Guard? I know Missouri has a really good cyber unit. I think cyber units in the Reserves, back to maybe the Chairman's question about how we have the talent we need: How do we bring that part-time talent to use to our benefit, if that's a good idea in your opinion? General Nakasone. Senator, I think it's a tremendous idea. In my current role as the Commander of Army Cyber, our Army is building 21 cyber protection teams, 10 in the U.S. Army Reserve and 11 in the National Guard. What you indicate is critical for us as we look to increase the best and brightest of our Nation being able to commit to the defense of our Nation in cyberspace. The Guard, the Reserve, have tremendous talent that we look to in the future to provide us what we often term the strategic depth for our Nation. And so very, very pleased to serve with those fine Americans and hopefully in the future continue to be able to incorporate and to promote their service for our Nation. Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and colleagues, just a quick comment before we go to our nominee. The nomination of Gina Haspel to head the CIA comes at an especially momentous time. Senator Heinrich and I have asked that certain aspects of her background be declassified so that the American people can see what sort of person might head the agency at a particularly important time. I'll just wrap up this point by saying I hope members will support what Senator Heinrich and I are calling for with respect to declassification. Mr. Nakasone, a historic day because, as I understand it, you are the first nominee from the NSA to be considered at this committee; and we welcome you; and let me begin with some questions. In 2001, then-President Bush directed the NSA to conduct an illegal, warrantless wiretapping program. Neither the public nor the full Intelligence Committee learned about this program until it was revealed in the press. Speaking personally, I learned about it from the newspapers. So there is a lot riding on how you might address a similar situation, and we've already noted the history of your being here. If there was a form of surveillance that currently requires approval by the FISA Court and you were asked to avoid the court based on some kind of secret legal analysis, what would you do? General Nakasone. Senator, thank you for that question. First, I would offer, with regards to the situation that you describe, I would obviously have a tremendous amount of legal advice that would be provided to me, if confirmed, by those in the agency, by those in the department, by those obviously that are in the Director of National Intelligence. At the end of the day, I think that one of the most important things is that we have the conversation between the National Security Agency and this oversight committee to understand---- Senator Wyden. Let me just stop it right there, so I can learn something that didn't take place before. You would, if asked, tell the entire committee that you had been asked to do that? General Nakasone. So, Senator, I would say that I would consult with the committee. I would obviously ensure---- Senator Wyden. Would you inform--when you say ``consult,'' you would inform us that you had been asked to do this? General Nakasone. So, again, Senator, I would consult with the committee and have that discussion. I think that one of the important things that I have seen is the relationship between the National Security Agency and this committee. My intent would continue that, that discussion. But at the end of the day, Senator, I would say that there are two things that I would do: I would follow the law; and I would ensure, if confirmed, that the agency follows the law. Senator Wyden. First of all, that's encouraging, because that was not the case back in 2001. In 2001, the President said: We're going to operate a program that clearly was illegal, illegal. You've told us now you're not going to do anything illegal. That's a plus. And you've told us that you would consult with us if you were ever asked to do something like that. So I appreciate your answer. Now let me move next to encryption. The widespread consensus from encryption experts is that tech companies can't modify their encryption to permit law enforcement access to Americans' private communications and data without also helping sophisticated foreign government hackers get in. You are as familiar with the capabilities of our adversaries as anybody. Do you agree or disagree with those experts? General Nakasone. So, Senator, in terms of encryption I would begin with saying this is something that for 65 years NSA has been at the forefront of doing, encrypting our national security systems, our data, our information, our networks. What has changed these days is the fact that the power of encryption, particularly in the private sector, has put law enforcement at times, even with a court order, at risk of being able to--be able to investigate or perhaps even prosecute a crime. I would offer that for the future this is one of those areas that, if confirmed, I have much to learn and---- Senator Wyden. My time--my time is up, General. Just a yes or no answer to the question with respect to what experts are saying. Experts are saying that the tech companies can't modify their encryption to permit law enforcement access to America's private communications without the bad guys getting in, too. Do you disagree with the experts? That's just a yes or no. General Nakasone. So I would offer, Senator, that it's a conditional yes; that there are times when---- Senator Wyden. Right. That is--that's encouraging as well. I look forward to working with you in the days ahead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. General, thank you. Thanks for your service in the past and I appreciate you stepping up into this role. The nomination process is not a fun process. It's not someone, anyone, wakes up and says: Gosh, I'd like to go through Senate confirmation, because of the length of the investigation, the information you've already put out, and the questioning time. So I just want to tell you, I appreciate you doing it and stepping up to work through the long, difficult process. Help me understand the role of collaboration between the NSA and commercial entities and their networks, critical infrastructure and their networks, just the communication in trying to be able to determine real threats that are there that we may face domestically or internationally? General Nakasone. Senator, in terms of collaboration, so NSA for many, many years has been at the forefront obviously of understanding advances of our--of our adversaries. That reporting, that communication with other elements of our government, whether or not it's the Federal Bureau of Investigation or it's the Department of Homeland Security, has been critical to inform other members of our critical infrastructure and key resources. I see this as an element that must continue into the future and a sharing and integration that's important for the overall defense of our Nation. Senator Lankford. How do we get that faster? What does it take to have faster collaboration? General Nakasone. So I think faster collaboration is driven by, you know, several things. One is a demand signal, a demand signal that's coming from not only other elements of our government, private sector. I would also say that it's--it's also part of supply, being able to grow a number of analysts and an ability to continue to report. I think those are two of the key elements, Senator. Senator Lankford. So let's talk about this wonderful term that's thrown around NSA all the time, the ``dual hat,'' working with U.S. Cyber Command and then also directing the NSA. You made a comment in your opening statement about that, that that has been and will continue. But you also made a comment that you see those as unique entities. Help me understand a little bit. Are there walls between those two entities, or are they just distinct roles, or how do you see them as unique entities? General Nakasone. Senator, if I might begin with the dual hat discussion. In terms of the dual hat arrangement, I'm not predisposed in terms of whether that arrangement stays or ends. Senator Lankford. Right. General Nakasone. I know that the President and Congress both have spoken on it, the President in August of 2017 and then Congress in the NDAA that listed a series of six conditions that both the Secretary and the Chairman must attest to before the dual hat is terminated. It's my assessment that what we should do at the end of the day is make a determination that is in the best interest of the Nation. That's the key, critical piece of it. If confirmed, my intent would be to spend the first 90 days looking at that, providing an assessment to both the Secretary and the Chairman, and then moving forward from there. Senator Lankford. Okay. Would you allow us to be in that conversation as well, as far as your assessment? General Nakasone. Certainly, after talking with the secretary and the Chairman, yes, Senator. Senator Lankford. That's fine. That'd be just fine. So talk to me a little bit about this issue about cyber doctrine. That is something this committee has talked about often. It has been something that has been a frustration. I'm just trying to see who is giving recommendations to the President on how we respond, the speed of our response. Attribution for where attacks came from are difficult to do, as you know extremely well. But, if we don't get a quick response to that and individuals aren't able to make decisions with accurate, timely information, it makes it much tougher. So the question that we always have is who makes the call? Who is it that presents the set of ideas to the President to say, here are the options that you have? Where does--where do you expect that comes from? General Nakasone. Senator, if I might begin with the strategy or the doctrine piece and then, with regard to the options, address that as well. I do believe that an overall strategy for how the Nation is going to defend itself in cyberspace is very important. What are the roles of the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation and, of course, the Department of Homeland Security? How do we ensure that there's cross talk, that there's obviously roles and responsibilities that are-- that are fully delineated? I think that's an important piece. With regards to options in the future, if confirmed I would see that as my role as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command to prove a series of options within cyberspace that the Secretary of Defense and the President can consider. I would offer, however, that--that that may not be the only set of options that are necessary. When we look at the strength of this Nation, the Nation has tremendous strengths diplomatically, informationally, economically, and those might also be options presented. Senator Lankford. But who's the clearinghouse to be able to gather those and be the final presentation to the President? General Nakasone. So, in terms of military options, Senator, I think that would be myself to the Secretary of Defense and then the President. Senator Lankford. Okay. That's what we need to hear. Thank you very much. Chairman Burr. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following-up on that question, I think this is one of the most important areas of policy. Just moments ago, we received information that the United States Government has imposed additional sanctions on Russia in response to the activities in 2016. The question is, are sanctions enough? Sanctions are important, but the question is sanctions always, by definition, occur after the attack. The best attack is the one that doesn't occur. That gets to the question of deterrence. And I hope, as we discussed in the Armed Services Committee, one of the tasks you will take on is doing just what you said, of developing options that would be available to us, that we could talk about as deterrence. Your thoughts on the importance of having some deterrent capability, as well as after-the-fact punishment capability? General Nakasone. Senator, I agree in terms of having a range of options, and I would certainly see, if confirmed, my role to provide a series of cyber options that might be used in a deterrent role. But I think it's important to state that it's not only cyber or military options that may be the most effective. And, in fact it may be less effective than other options that might be considered. And so I think that that's an important piece that, you know, as we consider the future, what are the range of options that might include the entire government is critical for us. Senator King. And I agree. I'm not--I'm not suggesting that it has to be cyber for cyber or military for military. But the point is, adversaries have to know they will pay a price for attacking us, whether it's cyber or kinetic. General Nakasone. I agree, Senator. Senator King. And also, it was mentioned in this morning's press conference apparently, and I just have one sentence on this, the Administration has warned the country about potential attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly the electric grid. My concern is that the electric grid is not only vulnerable; but, from public reports, that there are already efforts to plant malware or to seed malware in SCATA systems, et cetera. Is this something that you're familiar with and are concerned about? General Nakasone. Senator, certainly the entire defense of our, you know, electrical system within our critical infrastructures is of great concern to me. I am aware that there has been reporting with regards to elements within-- within our ICS and SCATA systems. That's something that should concern all of us. Senator King. Do you see part of your job at NSA as working with the private sector? Because this is not--it's not like there's an attack on an air base. There might be an attack on the financial system or on the electrical system in the Midwest. And it seems to me this is an area, it's sort of new territory, if you will, where there has to be a closer relationship between the private sector and government. General Nakasone. Senator, I certainly agree with you in terms of the new relationship. If we consider cyberspace, 90 percent of, you know, our critical infrastructure is held within the private sector. Senator King. Right. General Nakasone. Currently right now, you know, the work that DHS does in terms of informing the private sector in the critical infrastructure is critical for us. In terms of the future, you know, I would see that in looking at, you know, if we're understanding what's going on in the sector, obviously a rich dialogue has to occur between, you know, the National Security Agency and those that--that have this type of technology. Senator King. Does that dialogue exist today? General Nakasone. Senator, I would--I would have to defer on that. That's something that, given my current position in Army Cyber, I'm not sure. Senator King. But I take it if confirmed for this position, that dialogue is something you would seek to--to establish? General Nakasone. Senator, certainly a dialogue with industry, but I would also say a dialogue with, you know, our universities and academia, our dialogue with a partnership. I think those are all kind of components that you have to have if you are going to lead a place like the National Security Agency. Senator King. I'm changing the subject entirely in the few seconds I have left. I just heard a new term, ``STEMorrhage.'' That's a hemorrhage of STEM people. And that that's something that is occurring at the NSA. Is this something--how can we compete to retain and attract the strongest STEM talent, which is what we need, in competition with Silicon Valley or the private sector? And is this a priority that you see as important in your mission? General Nakasone. Senator, in terms of priorities if confirmed, I can't imagine a more important priority than talent. In terms of STEM, again I thank the committee for their support for, you know, future pay increases for STEM candidates within the National Security Agency. The way that I would assess that we have to look at it is we have to begin with: What's the mission of the agency? Because for many, many years the agency has been able to recruit and train and retain the best in our Nation based upon the idea of being able to secure our Nation and being able to defend it. I think that still is an advantage that the agency has. I think that appeals to people. And I would also offer that NSA is a place where technological advances in innovation occur all the time. And I think that that is of great interest to our young people. Senator King. I hope and I understand that this will be a priority, because ultimately talent is the ultimate competitive advantage. And I commend you for your willingness to take on what is a very important challenge in our country. Thank you, General. Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton. Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General, for your appearance. Congratulations on your nomination. I'd like to discuss with you the threat posed to the U.S. national security by Chinese telecom companies like Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom. I believe this threat is grave. I've introduced legislation that would prohibit the U.S. Government from using Huawei or ZTE or even companies that use them. I think there's a good chance we'll pass that into law this year. Last month, at our Worldwide Threats Hearing, I asked all of the intelligence agency directors that appeared before us-- DNI Coats, Director Wray, General Ashley, Director Cardillo, Admiral Rogers, Director Pompeo, Secretary-designate Pompeo--if they would use Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom products. They all said they would not. Would you use any products from those companies, General? General Nakasone. I would not, Senator. Senator Cotton. Okay. You're a special case because you're about to be the director of the signals intelligence agency of our government. So would you recommend to any of your family or friends that are just normal private citizens, that they use products from those companies? General Nakasone. I would not, Senator. Senator Cotton. Thank you for that. President Trump two days ago, using the powers that he has under current law and from the CFIUS's recommendation, stopped the attempted takeover of Qualcomm by Broadcom. It's no secret that that's done in part because Qualcomm and Huawei are in a competition to establish the worldwide standards and protocols for the 5G network. The intelligence community, though not a member of CFIUS, is an ex officio member. And on something like that, it would probably be assigned to the DNI who would task it out to, most likely, the NSA to give advice. Do you think CFIUS and the President made the right decision to stop the attempted takeover of Qualcomm by Broadcom? General Nakasone. So, Senator, I'm aware of the situation based upon what I've read in the public reports. I don't have any other background on this. But what I would say is our microelectronics industry is critical for us for the future. If you consider what 5G will bring to this Nation, 100 times speeds of what we're experiencing today, it's hard not to imagine the importance of ensuring that we have confidence in our microelectronics industry for the future. Senator Cotton. Thank you. I am somewhat concerned that some of our allies don't share our concerns about Huawei and ZTE. Can I ask you, if confirmed, that you'll consult with the Five Eyes partners and other partners, South Korea and Japan, to try to convey our government's concerns about Huawei and ZTE? General Nakasone. I certainly will, Senator. Senator Cotton. And maybe if we could talk about that, if confirmed, at one of your early hearings. I know you just committed 90 days in to look at the dual hat issue. If maybe 90 days in we could talk about that in a classified setting would be fine. A somewhat similar topic is the counterintelligence and security threats that could be posed by certain GPS-reliant devices, things like Fitbits and smartphones. There was a recent story in The Washington Post I suspect you saw, about soldiers using Fitbits around the world. Secretary Mattis, I thought wisely, ordered a review of DOD policies and procedures regarding these devices. Senator Blumenthal and I also sent Secretary Mattis a letter asking that he include other devices, particularly Google and Android devices, as part of that review, because it appears that Google and Android send quite a bit of information from their devices back home to the mothership. That means they track very detailed user information and precise location in order to push people advertisements. So, for instance, if you drive past the same grocery store or department store every single day, pretty soon you are getting advertisements from those locations. How would you view the privacy and counterintelligence threats posed by devices like these Fitbits and smartphones that are tracking locations, revealing patterns of life, and send them back to headquarters? Privacy for our private citizens, but counterintelligence for our government employees, and especially intelligence officers and military personnel? General Nakasone. Senator, I think you accurately describe the environment upon which we live today. This is commander's business with regards to, in the Army, our operational security. Ten, 15, 20 years ago, we were concerned about what we said on phones. Today, we're concerned about what our soldiers wear, where they're talking, where they are able to be monitored. And I think that this is indicative of how we have to approach the future, which is we are technologically informed; we also have to be informed for our operational security as well. Senator Cotton. Any thoughts on how we can balance the legitimate uses of those technologies? I mean, most soldiers are living on a limited budget, so it's valuable for them to have advertisements pushed to them saying, you know, when a restaurant is offering a special on the way home, or if a grocery store is having--has some coupons, and things like that. But obviously, these do pose a security risk. Any thoughts on how to balance those? General Nakasone. Senator, I believe you--you have to begin with just understanding what perhaps the threats are out there, and understanding, you know, when is it appropriate that civilians that are working in a place like the National Security Agency or military members within their own formations have their phones or are wearing Fitbits. Is there--are there places where they shouldn't have those things on? And, I think that that's, perhaps, the most important piece that we have to have is realization, and then an understanding of those operational security risks. Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. Chairman Burr. Senator Harris. Senator Harris. Thank you. And to follow-up on Senator Cotton's questions: Will you commit to coming back to our committee after doing an assessment of the vulnerabilities that are created by the use of these smart devices by our troops, and give us some suggestion about what might be a more appropriate policy? General Nakasone. Certainly--I'm sorry, Senator. I would welcome the opportunity to continue this dialogue on that. Senator Harris. Okay. Thank you. I'd like to talk with you about insider threats. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as of October of 2015 4.3 million Americans held security clearances. Some of the most damaging national security breaches in recent years, however, have not come from traditional spies, but insiders at our own agencies. Unfortunately, several of these incidents happened at NSA, and I am thinking three in particular that received a lot of attention and did a lot of damage. Have you studied what happened in those cases? General Nakasone. Senator, to date in my current role I have not studied. I would offer that I think what you point out here is very important, that we considered most of our threats from external actors. We thought that a foreign nation was, you know, our greatest threat. We have to reconsider that, particularly as we look at our networks, our data, our weapon systems. We have to have a whole spectrum of insider and, certainly, external threats as well. Senator Harris. And will you commit to doing an assessment and reporting back to us on what additional steps might be taken to prevent that insider threat? General Nakasone. Senator, I do know that the NSA has undertaken a number of different initiatives, ``Secure the Network'' and ``Secure the Enterprise.'' If confirmed, I will certainly commit to digging deep into that, understanding what has been done, what has been successful, what needs to be perhaps funded for the future, and then continuing that dialogue with this committee, if that's okay. Senator Harris. Yes. And have you had any experience dealing with this at Army Cyber Command? General Nakasone. So, Senator, in terms of experience, I would say that one of the things that we have been very, very vigilant about is just understanding the threats, again, to our network, our data and our weapons systems. I can't think of a specific example, but I will tell you that it is something that we are obviously trained on and think about very, very often. Senator Harris. And I want to talk--there's been discussion with you already, but I'd like to get a little deeper into the issue of the talent drain issue and recruiting. There's a report that suggests that since 2015, the NSA has lost several hundred employees, including engineers and data scientists. We know that we're going to be outpaced by the private sector in terms of salaries. So to your point, people who come to us to serve the public will do it because they actually care about public service and working on behalf of our government. But have you given any thought to how we might engage the private sector workforce--and I'm thinking of the folks of Silicon Valley--in creative ways that might include, for example, bringing people on who cannot join the IC full-time? Have you thought about that and what would that look like? I think it would be challenging, but there must be some creative thoughts out there about we could engage folks, even if they don't come full-time. General Nakasone. Senator, I have thought about that. And, you know, I take example of what NSA has done to date with their own Point of Presence, which is an initiative to be in Silicon Valley and one of their early initiatives, even before DIUx. I think it's a very good example of how we need to think about the future. You indicate one way that we might look at in bringing a larger population to our mission. I would offer, one of the things that I most admired about the agency is that they are looking at a very, very broad range of capabilities, people that have even disabilities that, you know, that need to be able to work, and have the infrastructure that will support that. I think that's tremendously important for us as we look at a broader supply, a broader talent base, that we need to be able to prosecute our mission. Senator Harris. And I really appreciate that you mentioned the disabled community as part of the focus and what should be the focus about how we are thinking about the need to be more diverse in terms of our recruitment and retention policies. So, thank you for that. And then election security. Admiral Rogers recently testified, and I'm going to quote, ``What I see on the Cyber Command side leads me to believe that if we don't change the dynamic here, that this is going to continue and 2016 won't be viewed as isolated.'' And then he went on to add, ``We're taking steps, but we're probably not doing enough'' on the issue of election security. Do you agree with that statement? General Nakasone. Senator, in my current role I do not have, obviously, the background of what Admiral Rogers was speaking to. That's not part of my current responsibilities, but certainly, if confirmed, one of the most important things that I would face in the new term, to learn more about this and make that assessment. Senator Harris. And I'd ask that you would make that a priority as soon as you are confirmed, expecting that you will be, because obviously folks are starting to vote now and the 2018 election is upon us. So, thank you for that. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator. General, we have exhausted the members that have questions here today. I have asked members to submit questions for the record by the end of business today. And I would once again say to designees, please try to meet that deadline. I would also say to you, if you would respond to those questions for the record as timely a manner as you can it would benefit us greatly to set the schedule for moving your nomination out of the committee and falling within the time frame that we're working with with the Senate Defense Committee. It strikes me you've been nominated at a very pivotal time where technology, as the Vice Chairman pointed out, is changing annually the same way technology used to change literally decade by decade. And I think this is a tremendous opportunity and it is a tremendous challenge. I think you're the right person at the right time. And I think your ability to understand whether that technological change is an asset to you or a liability--and I think that was in the crux of Senator Wyden's question about encryption, and it sort of depends on which window you're looking at in the same room. It's tough for me to admit that you're the right person at the right time because I never thought that I would say that about somebody that had--a soldier that had never rotated through a North Carolina facility. General Nakasone. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] Chairman Burr. But I do want to say to you that we're grateful for your service to the country. We look forward to your leadership at NSA. The relationship between this committee and that agency has never been better than it is right now, and I think that that's because it's been earned on both sides, the agency and the committee. The agency has provided us an unprecedented access to its products as we've worked for the last 14 months through a very difficult investigation, which is distinctly different from the oversight role, traditional oversight role of the committee. And I would ask you, as long as that investigation continues, that it's important on your end that you distinguish the request for the investigative portion from the oversight, ongoing oversight and real-time oversight of the committee, because it will require us to see products that we wouldn't historically ask for and, if we did, we would probably be refused. But it is essential for this committee to do a thorough and complete review of what has happened to our election system, what has happened from a standpoint of phishing operations--I'm not telling you anything that you don't know, given your current role--that has been exploited, that will only get worse in the future. Our ability to understand that and to not only enhance our defensive capabilities, but to begin, as the Vice Chairman says frequently, to form a strategic outline of options that we have, both defensive and offensive, is absolutely important. So we put a tremendous amount of emphasis on our ability to get this right, and in large measure that's because of the access that the NSA has provided us. And I'm sure that under your leadership that will continue. General, we're proud of you. But, more importantly, we're proud of the men and women that every day go to the National Security Agency, many of them without any public acknowledgement that they work there. It's not the prettiest campus, as you know. It's not in the easiest place to get to in Northern Virginia and Southern Maryland. But they go there and they sacrifice salary for a commitment to their country. And they provide the foundation for the protection and security of the American people. We can't say enough times to them: ``Thank you for what you do.'' We are here as a tool for you, for your successful leadership at the NSA that we know will happen. And I hope you will call on us anytime we can enhance that role as Director of the National Security Agency. With that, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Committee Leadership

Tom Cotton

Mark Warner

All Committee Members

Recent Legislation Activity

Hearings & Meetings

Reports & Publications

Committee Resources