Open Hearing: Nomination of Christopher Sharpley to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency

[Senate Hearing 115-303] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 115-303 NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY TO BE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2017 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 27-396 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California JOHN CORNYN, Texas MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio ---------- Chris Joyner, Staff Director Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- OCTOBER 17, 2017 OPENING STATEMENTS Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1 Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia..... 2 WITNESS Sharpley, Christopher, nominated to be Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.................................... 3 Prepared statement........................................... 7 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Project on Government Oversight article dated October 16, 2017... 17 Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 36 Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 50 Questions for the Record......................................... 69 NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY TO BE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ---------- TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2017 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Collins, Lankford, Cotton, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, and Harris. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order. I'd like to welcome our witness today, Christopher R. Sharpley, President Trump's nominee to be the next Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Chris, congratulations on your nomination. I'd like to start by recognizing the family that you brought with you here today. I understand your wife Kimberly is here. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. Chairman Burr. As well as your sons Stefan and Aidan. Mr. Sharpley. Yes. Chairman Burr. Stefan, Aidan, give me a wave. OK, good. [Stefan and Aidan wave.] Good. And your daughter Gillian and her husband James, good. And of course, your mother Joyce. Welcome. Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee to consider Mr. Sharpley's qualifications and to allow for thoughtful deliberation by our members. Chris already has provided substantive written responses to 85 questions presented by the committee and its members. Today, of course, members will be able to ask additional questions and to hear from Mr. Sharpley in this open session. Mr. Sharpley earned his B.A. from American University and received his master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. In 1981, he received a commission from the U.S. Air Force, where he trained as a special agent and a counterintelligence officer in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Chris continued to serve in the Air Force in a variety of posts, including as Director of Security, until he retired honorably from the Air Force in 2002. Immediately following his retirement, Chris joined the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy as a civilian Federal special agent. Since then, Chris has worked as the Deputy IG for Investigations and Inspections for the Department of Energy and helped to build the new OIG offices at the TARP program and the Federal Housing Authority. In 2010, Chris received the Presidential Rank Award for meritorious service for that work. In 2012, Chris retired as a Federal civilian law enforcement officer and started his career at the Central Intelligence Agency. Chris, if you don't mind me saying, I don't think you're very good at retiring. [Laughter.] From 2012 to 2015, Chris served as Deputy Inspector General at the CIA. Since 2015, Chris has served as both Deputy and Acting IG of the CIA. Chris, independent and empowered Inspector Generals are critical to the integrity and efficient management of the intelligence community. And I trust that you will lead the CIA's office with integrity and will ensure your officers operate lawfully, ethically and morally. As I mentioned to other nominees during their nomination hearing, I can assure you that this committee will continue to faithfully follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real- time oversight over the intelligence community, its operations, and its activities. We will ask difficult and probing questions of you, your staff, and will expect honest, complete and timely responses. Chris, I look forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring its consideration without delay. I want to thank you again for being here today, for your years of service to your country, both in law enforcement and in our military, and I look forward to your testimony. I now recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman for any opening statement he might make. Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Sharpley. Good to see you again; and welcome, as well, to your family. Congratulations to your nomination to serve as Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. I believe that the job of the Inspector General is critical to the effective operation of any agency. This committee relies upon the Inspector General of the intelligence agencies to ensure that the IC organizations are, one, obviously, using taxpayer dollars wisely; conducting their activities within the rule and spirit of the law; and supporting and protecting whistleblowers, whistleblowers who report fraud, waste and abuse. These IG functions are even more important in an organization like the CIA, which by necessity does not operate in the public. I appreciate that you're the third IG nominee to come before this committee this year. I wish to express my hope that we'll soon receive from the President a nominee for the position of the IG for the overall intelligence community. This position has been vacant since February, and I know you can't affect this directly, but I'm very concerned about the number of changes occurring there. As I mentioned, Mr. Sharpley, I appreciated our meeting earlier this month. We talked about a number of important issues that you will face as the CIA IG I want to reiterate some of our discussion and ask you, for some of these same questions that we had in private, to address these questions in public. One, we discussed the importance of supporting and protecting whistleblowers. Today, I want to hear more about your plans to ensure all CIA employees know their rights and responsibilities, as well as the processes for them to report waste, fraud and abuse. And I'd like to hear a greater commitment from you on this issue. Your job--and we talked about, again, this in our conversation--is to be, I think, hard-hitting, to find problems, uncover abuses and recommend fixes. And you must guard your independence fiercely. I'd like to hear you reaffirm that that's also your view of your role in this terribly important position. As you know as well, this committee completed a report on CIA's detention and interrogation program, and specifically shared it with the Executive Branch to ensure that such abuses are not reported in the future. You and I discussed how your office both lost and then found its copy, the copy of the report, and how you decided to return it to the committee. We talked about the fact that I disagreed with your subsequent decision to return it. Today and in public, please describe how the report came to be lost and why you made the decision to return it to the committee. Finally, I want to get your reassurances that you will support this committee's investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, something the Chairman and I and this committee, I think, has done some very good work on. Again, Mr. Sharpley, thank you for, echoing what the Chairman said, your service to our country. Thank you for being here today. Thank you for agreeing to accept another opportunity to continue to serve our country. I look forward to today's discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator Warner. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman. Mr. Sharpley, would you stand, please, and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth--to give this committee the truth, the full truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Sharpley. I do, sir. Chairman Burr. Please be seated. TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY, NOMINATED TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Chairman Burr. Chris, before we move to your statement, it is practice of this committee that I ask you five standard questions that the committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a simple yes or no answer for the record. Do you agree to appear before the committee, here or in any other venue, when invited? Mr. Sharpley. Yes. Chairman Burr. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited? Mr. Sharpley. Yes. Chairman Burr. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, I do. Chairman Burr. Will you both ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the committee when requested Mr. Sharpley. Yes, I will. Chairman Burr. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to the fullest extent possible, all members of the committee of intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than limit that only to the Chair and the Vice Chair? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, I do. Chairman Burr. Thank you very much. We'll now proceed to your opening statement, after which I'll recognize members by seniority for five-minute question time. Chris, the floor is yours. Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Chairman Burr. Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner and members of the committee: I want to thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you today, as you consider my nomination to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. I'm honored and humbled that President Trump has placed his confidence in me to tackle the challenges of this important position. Chairman, if I may, at the risk of being redundant, I would like to speak to my background and experience that I believe qualify me to serve as the CIA Inspector General. I am grateful to have had an opportunity to serve our Nation over the past 36 years, a journey that began shortly after receiving a commission in the United States Air Force in 1981. My initial training was as a special agent counterintelligence officer in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The skills that I acquired prepared me for challenging assignments during my ten years of active-duty service and also prepared me for my service for another ten years in the Air Force Reserves. My assignments including commander and director of security, leading teams of counterintelligence and security specialists in support of highly classified special access programs. I retired honorably from the Air Force Reserves in 2002. Upon transitioning to the part-time reserves, I began my full-time employment as a civilian special agent at the Department of Energy Office of Inspector General. I rose through the ranks to become the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations and Inspections, with program leadership responsibilities covering the Nation's nuclear weapons complex and system of national laboratories. I was privileged to have been asked by two new Inspectors General, at the Special Inspector General for Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, to assist them in building brand new Offices of Inspector General, focused on detecting and countering fraud in the efforts of the Federal Government to stabilize U.S. banking, securities and financial markets during the economic crisis of the 2008-2012 timeframe. In 2010, I received a Presidential Rank Award for meritorious service for my leadership in building investigative programs that identified billions in fraud and supported successful prosecutions that often returned significant dollars to the U.S. Treasury. In 2012, I retired from Federal service as a civilian special agent law enforcement officer. That is when my experience at CIA began. I was asked by then-CIA Inspector General David Buckley to compete for his deputy Inspector General position. Mr. Buckley informed me that he hoped I would bring the best practices I had gleaned from other IG-related leadership roles to be applied at the CIA Office of Inspector General. I answered that call and entered back into Federal service in 2012, where I served as Mr. Buckley's deputy until his retirement in January 2015, and where I have served as Deputy and Acting Inspector General until now. Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in CIA's mission to preempt threats to our Nation and to further U.S. national security objectives. I also believe the mission of the Inspector General is essential at CIA. I have and continue to stand firmly behind the outstanding work of the CIA Office of Inspector General team of auditors, inspectors, investigators and support staff. As Acting Inspector General, I have issued over 100 classified reports, and have made nearly 350 recommendations to CIA leadership to strengthen key programs and operations and promote economy and efficiency across the CIA mission. I have further strengthened processes and procedures within the Office of Inspector General by incorporating professional standards and best practices utilized by Offices of Inspector General across the Federal community. I have endeavored, I believe successfully, to establish a reputation within CIA as an independent, objective and honest Acting Inspector General who does not hesitate to tackle the hard issues, speaks truth to power and is trusted by CIA officers assigned around the world and by the Director and his senior team. And it is my hope, as it certainly has been my objective, to gain the trust of this committee. If confirmed, I will continue to keep the committee informed of Office of Inspector General work, and I will continue to be responsive to committee concerns and queries. As I observe world events, it strikes me that the mission of the CIA has never been more important than it is right now. National security risks associated with North Korea, Iran, Russia and China, to name but a few, require CIA's keen attention. As these risks increase and the world threat matrix rapidly changes, CIA appropriately responds, and, I believe, independent, robust and objective oversight becomes more vital. I have observed during my career that classified high-risk missions, big and small, do not receive the same level of public scrutiny and feedback that unclassified activities receive. And clearly, there's good reason for that. This is why a capable Inspector General is needed, one who understands intelligence activities and who will independently and effectively audit, evaluate and investigate to ensure mission integrity and efficiency. I'm confident that the experiences and skills I've acquired throughout my career, and in particular as Acting Inspector General at CIA, have prepared me to fulfill the responsibilities of CIA Inspector General. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and the committee. I'm pleased to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Sharpley follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Burr. Mr. Sharpley, thank you for that testimony. Before we begin, it's my intention to move to a committee vote on this nomination early next week. Therefore, for planning purposes I would encourage members, if they have additional questions for the record after today's hearing, that those be submitted by the close of business tonight. I would also remind members that we are in open session. Therefore, questions should reflect that fact. The Chair would recognize himself for up to five minutes. As CIA's Inspector General, you'll be responsible for overseeing a large organization whose work in most cases must be done in secret. But the work of the IG's office can provide that critical point of transparency for employees and, quite frankly, for this committee. How do you plan to continue your efforts to ensure that all CIA employees and contractors are fully aware of the CIA's OIG and its function? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. Within CIA, there is an awareness program. People are required to take certain training on an annual basis. The procedures and processes for making a complaint to the CIA Inspector General are incorporated in that training. We have a significant outreach effort that--we speak with all incoming employees, new employees, and we give briefings on whistleblower, whistleblower reprisal whenever the opportunities arise at conferences, et cetera. Beyond that, we have an extensive. I think a very mature, I'm certain a very mature, whistleblower hotline program and whistleblower retaliation program. I have had the opportunity, Senator Burr, over the years to build two whistleblower hotline programs from the ground up, at Special Inspector General's office, also at FHFA, and to make improvements to two others, one at Energy and the one here at CIA. I'm very proud of the practices that we have put in place that now give CIA officers and those contractors with staff- like access to systems the ability to make a confidential, anonymous or an open complaint to us at any given time. The processes I've put in place ensure that every complaint that's received and concern that's received is given a review by the senior staff of the Office of Inspector General so that particular skill sets, such as audits, inspections or investigations, are able to look at an issue differently, with a different perspective, and say whether they think that that particular complaint or concern should be handled in this way or that way. Chairman Burr. What do you see as the biggest challenge for the CIA's OIG? Mr. Sharpley. Our biggest challenge, sir, is one of recruitment and retention. We use the systems that are in place by the CIA, their recruiting and onboarding processes, to also recruit our folks. And there is a, in my opinion, inefficient process of onboarding people at CIA. And it's one that I feel so very strongly about that I've recently initiated a review to examine. For every person that I want to bring on, so if I can--if I identify an individual that meets a certain requirement to be an auditor or an investigator--I have to give three conditional offers of employment. So I know that, statistically, two out of the three I will lose over the period of time from the time I give the conditional offer to the time that they would onboard. And for every conditional offer of employment, I have to conduct five interviews. So to fill 10 slots in an organization that does receive turnover, because we're highly trained in the Office of Inspector General and many other mission areas would like the services of my folks--so if I want to fill 10 slots, I have to offer 30 conditional offers of employment. And in order to do 30 COEs, I need to do 150 interviews. That's an onerous process and an onerous statistical outlay. So our biggest challenge right now is the process of onboarding folks. And I would say that is the most prominent of our challenges. Chairman Burr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back, first of all, to the discussion we had in the office and following up on the Chairman's comments about protecting whistleblowers. I'd like to again--you mentioned the fact of building some of these whistleblower programs at other agencies. I'd like you to talk a little bit more about what else you could do, particularly with the unique nature of the CIA since it has to operate in private, what you can do not only on the hotline, but also on programs in terms of preventing retaliation. Specifically, in answers to written questions you said you would try to beef up these programs and beef up whistleblower protections. You said--but rather than offering some specifics, you talk about bringing in an outside expert to help advise you. Could you also describe what kind of outside expert that would be? Would it be somebody from government? And take us through your commitment to the whistleblower protections; and particularly, since we've seen increased amounts, I believe, of retaliation and reprisals, how we can prevent that on a going- forward basis to those whistleblowers? Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator. Whistleblowing and the programs that the Offices of Inspector General put in place are essential to the success of any Office of Inspector General. In every program that I have built, you need to build a program where there's confidence by whistleblowers or those raising concerns about a particular issue that they feel, and are, in fact, comfortable providing information. If they're not comfortable providing information, they won't come to you, and then you can't fulfill your mission of exploring fraud, waste, and abuse and mismanagement and these issues. So it is--it's critical to the success of every Office of Inspector General, in particular at CIA because of the nature of the mission, meaning that everything's compartmented and people are scattered around the world doing mission. The first thing that I did to improve the whistleblowing program at CIA is ensure that we had a robust outreach program. Senator Warner, I described a little bit earlier today about what that program was about and we talked in private. But the main thrust of that outreach is to ensure that, no matter where a CIA officer or a CIA contractor with access to our system is located around the world, that they can make a confidential, anonymous or open complaint or sharing of concern with our office and they are guaranteed confidentiality if they seek it. Vice Chairman Warner. But how do you go about improving? You said you would look at outside experts. Talk, speak to that for a moment, because I only have two minutes left. Mr. Sharpley. All right, Senator. I am very comfortable, sir, with the program that we have, that it is effective. But we know from the type of work that we're in, which is independent assessments and evaluations of the effectiveness of the various programs around--so I know that, even though I'm comfortable with the program that I have, it would be appropriate and prudent for me to invite others in. There are individuals within the IG community that are known to have very solid, very large programs. Some of them are Postal, some of them are Department of Energy. When I refer to this in my pre-hearing questionnaire, I've already asked my chief of staff to reach out to these groups, these individuals, and ask for an independent assessment of the programs that I've put in place--not just our outreach programs, but our education program, our education effort, and our ability to assess objectively and independent each complaint as it comes in to ensure it's handled in a timely fashion and that individuals, if they're concerned about retaliation, that we move promptly as a priority to address those issues, so that any potential wrongdoing or adverse personnel action against them can be prevented promptly and quickly. Vice Chairman Warner. I know a number of my members on this side of the aisle are going to ask somewhat in depth about the RDI study, and I will allow them to get into the point of your reasoning for returning it. But one thing that did come up, obviously, was how the report was lost and then re-found. I think I owe you the opportunity to try to offer me the same--offer the public the same explanation you offered me in my office. And then, the fact that it was lost and found, was anyone held accountable for that losing of it as well? Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator Warner. I'd be happy to discuss those issues. I know that is on the minds of a number of the committee members, and I understand. It's an important issue and it's an important report. So if I briefly go through the explanation: We received a copy of the committee's RDI study--6,000- page, highly classified--in December of 2014 and it was provided to us on a disk. The then-Inspector General ordered that the report be uploaded to a classified Office of Inspector General system and that was done. Shortly thereafter, we received guidance that the report should not be placed into any system because of an ongoing litigation, a FOIA litigation, Freedom of Information Act litigation in the D.C. circuit, with the Department of Justice and others. So an e-mail was sent back to the organization that had uploaded, back to our investigative organization, where the classified system is held, to delete the report and to take the disk containing the study and place it in a classified safe. The report was deleted from the system. But the individual, the IT administrator responsible for the uploading of the report and for handling the disk, the media, did not receive that e-mail. The processes in place at CIA, and at CIA OIG, when we take a report off of media in order to control classified when we place it onto our classified systems is to destroy that diskette. So, some time later, several months later, when requested did we have the disk, where was it, as I recall to the best of my knowledge, I asked where the disk was. Nobody could find the disk. I informed the committee that we could not find the disk. Then I initiated an investigation, an internal investigation to ensure that the disk was nowhere, to find out exactly what happened to it. Testimony given to us by the IT administrator was that the disk had been shredded and he was--this particular IT administrator was unaware of the deletion of the document from our system, and had shredded the disk. Several months later, during the course of an individual departing, leaving employment and retiring, they were going through their classified safe and they found the disk. Coincidentally and a bit embarrassing--it was an embarrassment to me--coincidentally, the litigation with the--on the FOIA issue had ceased at that time. It was done, and part of the conclusion of that litigation was that the document was a Congressional document. I informed the committee that we had found the disk. I also opened another investigation to continue to find out what happened, how was it that we could find testimony that this diskette was shredded when it had not been shredded. The bottom line was we found the individual, who had since left employment from the Office of Inspector General and the CIA, and that person told us that it was essentially a guess. They don't remember actually shredding the disk, but they felt, because they had shredded other media, they had shredded that disk as well. It's embarrassing and I have apologized. And it was also right around that time that, in response to a request from the chair of the committee that produced the study to return that study on the disk, that I made an independent judgment to return the disk. I stand by that judgment. The judgment and decision to return the disk is not a reflection on what I feel the quality of the report was or the efforts that went into it. It was a five-year effort, a 6,000-page report, and I understand its value to the committee and its value for history's sake. I do have an unclassified copy of the executive summary, as well as a classified copy of the executive summary, in my possession. So those were--those were the circumstances. The individual responsible for giving the wrongful, if you will, or the incorrect testimony is no longer employed with us. I have since changed the processes at CIA OIG to ensure that something like this cannot happen again, so that there's a second decision level on all shredded media, even though the processes--we've never undergone something like that in the past. That process is in place. I stand by it, and I am convinced that nothing like this would ever happen again. Chairman Burr. Senator Risch Senator Risch. Mr. Sharpley, thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I thought you were candid and answered the questions appropriately and fully as far as I was concerned. So thank you for that. Mr. Chairman, any other questions I have would be for a classified setting. I will save them for either there or submit them for the record in a classified fashion. Thank you. Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator. Senator Feinstein. Senator Feinstein. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for meeting with me. I did hear the disk story from you. I have one question: When did you inform the committee that you had found the disk? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I don't have the specific date in front of me, but as soon as I found the disk I called up and informed the staff chiefs about that I found it. Senator Feinstein. If you could find the day, I would appreciate knowing this. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, ma'am. Senator Feinstein. I have a special interest in this. I was chairman of the committee when the report was done, and have a great belief--to my knowledge, not a fact has been refuted in that 7,000- page report or the 500-page summary to date. So the point of distributing it to the departments was in the hope that they would read it, not look at it as some poison document, and learn from it. I very much doubt that that has happened, and I really look forward to its declassification. I think the time is coming very shortly when it should be declassified, and I'm heartened to see that, increasingly, members of Congress agree with that. So let me, if I can, go to a document that I just received having to do with a whistleblower situation. And I'm going to read a little bit and then ask you for your comment. It points out that ``The Sharpley nomination comes at a time when the intelligence community's handling of whistleblowers has begun to attract questions from lawmakers and the public.'' They point out one instance of a man by the name of Ellard and says that this highlights the community's continuing struggle to deal with the issue. The document, dated February 2017, appears on the official letterhead of the Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and details what it describes as serious flaws in procedures used to investigate retaliation cases across the intelligence community. Bearing the title, `Èvaluation of Reprisal Protections Pertaining to Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information,'' it is unclassified. The author's name is redacted. I would ask that you send a copy of that document to our office, to the Intelligence Committee's office. Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I am unfamiliar with that document. I am not aware of its contents or really can speak to---- Senator Feinstein. Have you looked for it? It's on the Office of the IG of the--on the letterhead of the IG of the Intelligence Community. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator. The ICIG did not make me aware of it as the Acting IG at CIA. So this is the--this is the first I'm hearing of this particular program. But there's something you said, Senator, if I may respond. Senator Feinstein. Well, let me read the conclusion. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, ma'am. Senator Feinstein. Because it's stark: ``The deficiencies in reprisal protections policies, procedures and standards in the evaluated agencies are causing a failure to provide reprisal protections for individuals making protected disclosures,'' end quote. In the context of the document, quote, ``'Protected disclosures,''' end quote, ``refer to legally sanctioned revelations of alleged wrongdoing by intelligence employees to their superiors or others in the government designated to receive the information.'' The document states that, and I quote, `À complainant alleging reprisal for making a protected disclosure has a minimal chance to have a complaint processed and adjudicated in a timely and complete manner,'' end quote. So then it says--and then I'll let you speak--`Ìn response to damaging leaks, then- President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 19, PPD/ 19, parts of which were enacted into law, establishing procedures under which whistleblowers could report waste, fraud and abuse without fear of retaliation.'' The document I'm reading from also has a couple of cases of people that have been retaliated against that I won't go into right now. But I'm interested that you have not seen this document. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Senator Feinstein. So do you know of which--of what I am speaking? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I do not. I do not--I'm not in possession of that document. I am unaware of it. Senator---- Senator Feinstein. Well, let me give you the title. It says ``CIA Inspector General Nominee Has Three Open Whistleblower Retaliation Cases Implicating Him.'' It's by a man by the name of Adam Zagorin and this is the Project on Government Oversight. That's the letterhead. So what do you know about this, and three cases? Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. I recently read an article by this gentleman. Senator, I'm unaware of any open investigations on me, the details of any complaints about me. So it's hard for me to respond to that. But I would say, if there are complaints, if there are investigations out there and I'm unaware of it, that wouldn't be--I put it this way: I support a process that's in place that would protect the confidentiality of anyone or the anonymity of anyone who wanted to bring a complaint forward on an Acting IG or anybody else, any other official. As an Acting Inspector General who works in the world of confidentiality, anonymity, etcetera, I think it's very important that we recognize these processes and that we, frankly, as I said before, we honor them. They're our bread- and-butter. But I can't speak to specifics because I don't know about it, Senator. Senator Feinstein. No, I understand what you're saying. Mr. Chairman, I'd ask that this document be put in the record so that Mr. Sharpley can take a good look at it. And perhaps you would let us know in writing what is fact and what is fiction. Mr. Sharpley. I would be pleased to do that, Senator Feinstein. If I may take one moment, with respect to the document you're referring to, that it has done an assessment of, you know, that there's a minimal ability of people who have been retaliated against to have their particular issue looked at in a timely fashion, and this is across the ICIG. I can't speak for the rest of the Inspectors General across the IC. I can speak for the CIA Office of Inspector General, and I challenge the validity of those statements. I feel very strongly about our whistleblower retaliation program and our whistleblower hotline program. We handle all, all concerns, whether they're involving a potential crime or mismanagement, or about an individual, under the quality standards that are put out from the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. I'm very proud of our program. So I don't know where that's coming from. I'm unaware of any assessments that have been accomplished on the CIA OIG from the outside, for anyone to make those, those claims. Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Chairman Burr. At the Senator's request, without objection, it will be included into the record. [The material referred to follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Burr. I would also ask staff, if I understood Senator Feinstein's reading of this document, it is the ICIG who holds that document; it is not the CIA IG So I would say to staff, we need to request that document from the Intelligence Community's IG, okay? Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sharpley, just to close out this line of questioning, without commenting directly on any specific allegations or claims that may or may not have been made against you, have you ever retaliated against any whistleblower either within the CIA's IG's office or any other Federal agency? Mr. Sharpley. No, Senator, I have not. Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Sharpley, I want to commend you for being a very productive Inspector General. As I understand it, the CIA Office of Inspector General has issued more than 100 audits and inspection reports and made more than 340 recommendations to the agency to improve efficiency and effectiveness in just the last year. One of the committee's top priorities is to make sure that each of the intelligence agencies is doing everything that it can to minimize the risk posed by insider threats. Insiders have repeatedly exposed devastating amounts of highly classified information. I noted, therefore, with great interest that your office conducted a review of the agency's insider threat programs and activities. Without getting into any classified information, could you confirm whether the agency has fully implemented all of the IG's recommendations with respect to that audit or inspection regarding insider threats? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator Collins. Thank you very much. It's a very important question and this is an extremely important issue having to do with CIA mission. They have not implemented all of our open recommendations. Some time ago, a few years back, I initiated an insider threat initiative, as we've referred to it, where we've issued over 26 reports and 64 recommendations addressing a number of areas in insider threat, having to do with security clearances, polygraph exams, physical threats in the workplace, privileged user and access to the information system, et cetera, across the board. This is a very important area that you bring up. That said, I know that the--and I won't speak for the Director, but he has placed an emphasis on the Counterintelligence Mission Center, who carries out, along with the Office of Security, programs and mission involving insider threat. And I know that the Director has taken a particular interest in this area. And they have done a lot of work on insider threat. But a lot more work needs to be done. And even though I am in the process now of issuing a capping report that will summarize all the work that we've done, as I described, and also add to the affray some additional areas that we've examined, that does not mean that I am going back off the issue of insider threat. This continues to be an area of challenge for the CIA. And in fact, I've emphasized that in my recent issuance of the highest challenges that the agency has to address. So it's a very important area. Senator Collins. I'm very glad to hear that. I would ask that you keep the committee fully apprised of your efforts in this area and in particular identify to the committee recommendations that have not been implemented, because they're really--that's really hard to understand, given the egregious breaches that have occurred in the intelligence community. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator, I commit to do that. Senator Collins. Thank you. Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sharpley, as we talked about, I am very troubled about your decision to return your copy of the torture report. The report was sent to your office so that lessons could be learned, not just about torture, but a variety of topics, including Inspector General oversight. I just believe your decision sets a terrible precedent for the committee's current and future work. If your office and the committee are going to be erasing historical records because somebody down the road is unhappy about them, our country is going to need a lot of erasers. So, hypothetically, I'd like to ask you: What if, a few years from now, after this committee has sent your office a report on Russia's interference in our election, a future chair of the committee says he doesn't like the report and wants it returned. What would you do? Mr. Sharpley. Well, sir, I avoid hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions of any course. Senator Wyden. Okay, then let me just ask it this way. How does your decision not set a terrible precedent? Mr. Sharpley. My decision, Senator, was in response to a request from the Chair and that's--that was the trigger for my returning the report. Senator Wyden. So you're obligated to follow the law. I don't see why the law doesn't govern this, but maybe I'm missing something. I mean, your highest obligation is to follow the law, and I guess you're saying that you made your judgment on the basis of other factors. You were asked for it and that was that. But I got to tell you, I don't like the concept of your office picking and choosing which investigative reports you're going to keep. And that's the inescapable conclusion about all this. I followed the business about the shredded disk and then you found it, but you still returned it. And I'd like to know anything else that may have driven your judgment here? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, it's very straightforward. I made an independent judgment to return the report at the request of the chair of the committee that produced the report. Senator Wyden. But you're not concerned about your obligation to follow the law and you're not concerned about a precedent? I mean, it seems to me this sets a horrible precedent, which is why I asked you about, say, somebody down the road in the future saying they're concerned about the Russian report. You're not concerned about setting any precedent here? Mr. Sharpley. No, sir. We're talking about a hypothetical, once again, and---- Senator Wyden. I'm asking you about something that conceivably could happen and because of the decision you've made, it certainly sets a precedent for in effect your office kind of picking and choosing which investigative reports you're going to keep. I'm going to oppose your nomination because I think our highest duty here is to follow the law and the idea that the chair asked for it and that governed your judgment isn't acceptable to me. Now let me ask you one other question if I might. My colleagues have mentioned this question of whistleblowers and you brought up CIA contractor whistleblowers. Now, this is just a yes or no answer: Do you believe that whistleblower protections should extend to CIA contractors? This is an area where there's been bipartisan interest. My colleague Senator Collins over the years has been very interested in whistleblowers. So, yes or no, do you believe whistleblower protections ought to extend to CIA contractors? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, I do. Senator Wyden. Okay, making some progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sharpley, good to see you again. Thanks for the long visit we had. We walked through a lot of issues in a private and classified setting. I wanted to be able to follow through on a couple of those conversations. As you know full well, the Office of Inspector General is the eyes and ears of this committee. This committee has oversight over all the intelligence entities, but we're very dependent on the independent investigations, the ongoing investigations that are happening within the Inspectors General office. That's you, so I want to be able to get some clarity from you on this as well. Covert operations are especially difficult and there is occasionally a perception that ``covert'' doesn't mean they have oversight. So do covert operations have oversight and should they have oversight, the same as any other operation? Mr. Sharpley. The answer, Senator--and it's good to hear from you again, sir--is yes and they do. I review all covert action efforts at least every three years and those reports are available to the committee, sir. Senator Lankford. Do you have the resources that you need to be able to fulfill that requirement to have oversight on covert operations? Mr. Sharpley. I currently do, Senator. Senator Lankford. So you've been there a while. This is a season where you--going into a permanent nomination here, you have a little more time to be able to focus on things that are a longer look. Are there structural changes that you can look at, at this point, either within your office or around the agency, that you would say we need to take a long look in these areas? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator, there are. Thank you for the question. If I am confirmed, my intent is to do a top to bottom review of our organizational structure--that should not worry my staff--to ensure that our resources are focused in the right places so we can use them most efficiently. There are areas of covert action that I believe that we could focus, I think, a little more effectively on. And as an Acting Inspector General, you don't want to make far-reaching organizational changes, particularly if there are others being in the nomination process. So if confirmed, I would go ahead and look at those programs. Senator Lankford. Thank you. Let me ask one final question about metrics for success. It is a challenge of any organization, especially an organization that has such a difficult task as the CIA has, to be able to measure success. So for dollars that are invested from the American people, that are to be overseen by this committee, and that you have the responsibility and oversight of as well, how will you work with the agency to break down into individual operations and into units within CIA to make sure that they are looking at metrics for success, that those metrics are being evaluated, whether that's the right measurement to be able to use, and that they're actually hitting the target? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator. I agree with you that measures of effectiveness are very important. We're spending a lot of taxpayer funds here on matters that don't see the light of day. And I think it's important from a business enterprise standpoint and from a risk valuation standpoint, that they have--that certainly covert action, and other areas of the CIA mission, have measures of effectiveness in place. They--those areas are typically examined when we conduct an audit or an inspection. And as we spoke, sir, you'll find that in many of our reports if they--if they're not there, that we'll make a recommendation that goes to the area of, you need to look at this and examine whether this is--if this is effective or if this is efficient. And that really goes to the, if you will, metrics of our overall approach, our standards of how we conduct our audits, our inspections to a different--in a different respect, our investigations. But I think one way of ensuring that an organization is running efficiently, or whether it's effective is to, again, look at the measures of effectiveness. And I commit to continue to look in that area. Senator Lankford. That's great. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich. Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sharpley, as the deputy and then the Acting IG, did you read the Senate Intelligence Committee's full report on the CIA's torture and interrogation techniques? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, no I didn't. Senator Heinrich. Why not? Mr. Sharpley. I had no opportunity to read it. The report was placed in a classified information system within the Office of Inspector General and very shortly thereafter deleted from that system. And then the disk we thought was shredded. It was not. It had been misplaced. Senator Heinrich. It seems to me that it's awfully hard to learn the potential lessons of that report if--if it wasn't consumed and read and processed in your office. Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I have had the opportunity to read the unclassified---- Senator Heinrich. Most of us read the executive. Mr. Sharpley. Yes. Senator Heinrich. However, there were certainly chapters that dealt specifically with the operations of the IG's office that, it seems to me, would've been something you'd want to be able to process to make sure that, if mistakes were made, they weren't made again. Did you consider that before returning the report? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, again, my decision to return the report is not a reflection of the value that I place on the report. Senator Heinrich. Did you consider reading the report before returning the report so that you could do your job more effectively? Mr. Sharpley. No I did not. Senator Heinrich. Why not? Mr. Sharpley. I did not have an opportunity to sit down and read the report because at the time the--with the timeline, the time we found the report, the request, right around that same time, had come in requesting the report be returned. I accepted---- Senator Heinrich. But you returned it based on your own independent judgment. So you could've taken the time to read the report and then return the report. Mr. Sharpley. I could have, sir, yes. Senator Heinrich. But you chose not to. Mr. Sharpley. I chose not to, given the time at hand. Senator Heinrich. You said that it was your independent judgment to return the report. Walk us through that. That doesn't give us a lot of detail. What was your--what was your thinking? And what was your legal basis for why you decided that? Mr. Sharpley. I conducted no legal basis, Senator. I'm not an attorney and I did not look at it. It was very straightforward. From my standpoint, the conclusion of the litigation determined that the report was a Congressional document and the chair of the committee that produced the report requested that I return it. I made the independent judgment to return it. Senator Heinrich. Did the vice chair request that you return it, or just the chair? Mr. Sharpley. I don't recall what the letter said or what the request was. Senator Heinrich. Did you think through the implications of what that might mean for future reports? Mr. Sharpley. I don't recall beyond what I've already testified to. Senator Heinrich. Could you see how people would be concerned that a decision in this case might set a precedent for future cases? Mr. Sharpley. I can understand the concern, yes. Senator Heinrich. So with regard to the report itself and the loss and then the, finally, finding that report once again, the story that it'd been shredded which turned out not to be the case, you said it was testified to by a former employee that it was essentially a guess. That doesn't inspire a lot of confidence in how something as important as this document, as important as this report to the IG's operation, would be handled within the office. Can you speak to how you've addressed that in subsequent-- for subsequent media? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator. I'd be pleased to. The individual who was responsible for handling the disk is the individual who said they shredded it. When we found that disk and went back to speak with that individual, who is no longer an employee of ours or the CIA, he said--he shrugged his shoulders and said: `Ìt was a guess. I don't actually remember seeing it being shredded. I--I just had a stack of media and-- and thought that I shredded it.'' Senator Heinrich. I can see how an employee would--who had a stack of media on their desk would have that reaction. I'm just thinking that something as important as this maybe should have required a higher level of attention. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. So the changes that I referred to when we were talking about this earlier, changes I referred to, is that I put in place that there must be a supervisory-level approval before any media is shredded. So that way if other instructions have come out and for some reason it misses the IT administrator in the future, there will be a quality assurance, if you will, in place to review and authorize the shred, and that way we'll avoid something like this happening in the future. Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Heinrich. Before I turn to Senator King real quick: Since most of your questions deal with the request I made of this IG and a request I made of every agency of the Federal Government that had copies of the RDI report, let me set the stage. The stage is that this was battled on our behalf by the Justice Department of the Obama administration. They didn't have to do it. They believed that it was a committee document. They fought it in court. We won in the District Court, the D.C. Court of Appeals. The last court was the United States Supreme Court and they ruled there that this was committee property. I appreciate the fact that members disagree with the actions of the chairman, but I made a determination when I initiated the belief that this was a committee document that there was precedent, there was precedent here, and you're right the next chairman can determine that they'd like to push this out. There was never a committee vote to push this out. That was a unilateral decision. So I made the decision to pull it back in and, with the exception of several copies, all have been returned. In every case, lawyers within those agencies made a determination, based upon the court process, that I had every right to make the request and that they were, in most cases, if not all cases, obligated to return them. So I share that with you to give you a little bit of history and maybe you won't necessarily condemn Mr. Sharpley for doing something that I think is extremely important, responding to the chairman of the committee. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Not to belabor this issue too much, but when you made the decision to return the document did you consult with anyone? Did you consult with the General Counsel or anyone other than yourself in making that decision? Mr. Sharpley. My counsel, my IG counsel. Senator King. And what was the nature of that advice? Mr. Sharpley. Just that it was my decision, I was making a decision to return this; what are the circumstances surrounding the issues, is anything else I should know? And the answer was: No, this is your--this is your judgment to respond to the chair. Senator King. Thank you. I think you have one of the most important jobs in the United States Government, because a secret agency in a democracy is an anomaly. I would argue it's a necessary anomaly, but it's still an anomaly, because the transparency and accountability that applies to virtually every other aspect of the United States Government isn't present by necessity. That means those of us, including you and us, who are given--the responsibility of providing really the only oversight of this agency is especially awesome in my view. And I just want to have your commitment that you realize that this is a different job qualitatively in my view than the IG of the Department of Agriculture or even the Pentagon. Do you understand the weight of this, this position? Mr. Sharpley. Absolutely, Senator. As I said in my opening remarks, it's my belief that programs that are highly classified--the more classified they are, they see the less light of day. They don't share best practices. They focus on mission and they're not necessarily focused on efficiency and effectiveness. And I think it's--when you're dealing with those types of programs, as I have in Defense with special access programs and at Energy with nuclear weapons programs--here at CIA, that's all they do, very, very classified areas, very classified missions--you need an IG to look at this and shine that flashlight, shine that light on those activities to ensure that they're adhering to the law, that the programs are being run in an efficient and effective manner, and, as I've discussed with you in our private discussions, to give the taxpayer a seat at the table to make sure that their money, hard-earned money, and their taxes are being utilized properly. Senator King. And that their Constitution is being abided by. Mr. Sharpley. That's correct. Yes, sir. Senator King. Now, Senator Coburn and I a couple of years ago had a provision in the authorization bill that instructed the GAO, which has people with full clearance, to do some analysis of the siting of physical facilities and whether we were efficiently utilizing those facilities. That report occurred. Do you view the GAO as a possible ally in your work? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator, I do. I understand that GAO is working at the request, at the direction of the oversight committees. There are policies and procedures that are at CIA and across the Office of Director of National Intelligence dealing with the work with the GAO. I've worked with GAO in the past, and my only concern that I have--and this really falls back into my lap--is to reach out to GAO when they start work and do work at Central Intelligence Agency, that they check with us to ensure that the work that we've done--and we may have products that are useful, and this would be inefficient if we've already done work, independent work in that. Senator King. I wouldn't want the GAO to add to the inefficiency. I understand your concern. But what you're telling me is that you in certain situations would view the GAO as an ally, as an asset of your office. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, I would. Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that. One final question. Do you view checking on or reviewing the integrity of the analytic process and the intelligence production process as part of your bailiwick in terms of your responsibility? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator, I do. Senator King. I think I want to emphasize that, because there's a grave danger. And you indicated, I think, earlier, talking about mission and operations, that there's a danger of contamination of intelligence product because of commitment to the mission, if you will. And again, you're one of the few bulwarks against that in this system of oversight of what is otherwise a secretive agency. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. I agree with that. We do have a body of work that we have looked at analytic objectivity. We plan in the coming year and out years, if I am confirmed, to continue our work in that area. I think it's a very important area. Senator King. I want to emphasize the importance of that, because if you look back over the past 50 years, many of our foreign policy disasters were based upon skewed intelligence, based upon the desires of the policymakers, whether it was the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Iraq, whatever. And so I want to really emphasize that analytic integrity, it seems to me, and objectivity is an absolutely key function because human nature is always to tell the boss what they want to hear. Mr. Sharpley. Sure. Senator King. And you are one of the people that sits astride that process, and I hope you'll take that responsibility especially seriously. Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I understand your concern. I share it. You have my commitment to take that--to take on that issue and continue to look at it. Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Senator Manchin. Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sharpley, for being here today. Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, sir. Senator Manchin. Having your family with you for support, I appreciate that. And the fact that you served as Inspector General at a variety of levels, maybe you might want to explain how that prepared you for the job that we're asking you to do or that you're asking us to confirm you to do---- Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. Senator Manchin [continuing]. That put you in that unique position. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator, I'd be pleased to do that. I fortunately had an opportunity many years ago, back in the nineties, to be a part of a group, the predecessor of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency, the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, to be a part of the development of the quality standards for investigations and the quality standards for inspections. Those standards are sort of benchmark best practices for oversight. They have since then matured and changed slightly, but the basic practices are there. When I arrived at CIA IG, the reason I was asked to come aboard or compete for the position and come aboard and decided to take it was because I wanted to make sure that the processes utilized by our inspections, audits, and investigative groups use those standards. And that's exactly what I did. I've implemented those standards across our mission set. Having had the opportunity to stand up, be a significant part of standing up, two brand-new Offices of Inspector General at the Special Inspector General for Troubled Asset Relief Program at Federal Housing and Finance Agency, I was able to utilize that knowledge, those skills that I had obtained from the previous period of time, and put them to work at those organizations. And those organizations have been very successful supporting prosecutions that have returned billions to the U.S. Treasury. That same approach I've used at CIA Office of Inspector General. Senator Manchin. Let me just--a couple of things I want to go over. Being a former governor myself and Senator King here, we know how having full control over your budget gives you the flexibility to do the things where you think it's most important. Do you feel--I'm sure you looked at the budget now. Are you siloed? Are you able to move money to where you know the critical need is? How important is that for you? Mr. Sharpley. Senator--thank you, Senator. The discussion that you and I had in this area caused me to sit back on my heels, sort of stand back on my heels and reconsider this. Senator Manchin. You might want to tell people a little bit what we talked about, because there were areas you identified you weren't able to do what needs to be done because--but you had money in other siloes that could help you do it. Mr. Sharpley. Right. There are various siloes. One silo of money is used for salaries and awards, the other used for contracting and travel, this type of thing. Senator Manchin. Yes. Mr. Sharpley. And the policy of the CIA is that you can't blend those monies. You can't cross the monies across the silo. But we had a discussion, I thought it was very productive and I appreciated it. And that is--and I appreciate the chair and vice chair's advice in this area as well. And that is, if there were a way to move money across, it would allow me to address issues and needs that I have. For example, when---- Senator Manchin. Not that you need more money, even though everybody needs more money. Mr. Sharpley. Everyone needs more money. Senator Manchin. But if you don't have more money, how to be more efficient. Mr. Sharpley. That's correct. This is a discussion on the efficient use of money. So I've asked my attorney to address this with the agency, to see if there's a way that I can't do that. And we are now doubling down and addressing that to see if there is a way that we can do it. So again, I would ask the---- Senator Manchin. Let us know if we can help. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. And I would ask the committee's support if we're not able to do it for a legal reason that I'm unaware of. But as it stands currently, I'm going to attack this and see if we can do it a little bit more efficiently. Senator Manchin. I've got two more quick questions. Mr. Sharpley. Yes. Senator Manchin. First of all, the most important: What do you think is the greatest security risk that the United States of America faces? Mr. Sharpley. Well, outside of the threats to our Nation-- -- Senator Manchin. Yes---- Mr. Sharpley [continuing]. Whether it be---- Senator Manchin [continuing]. That are obvious. Mr. Sharpley. Yes. Outside of the threats, it is ensuring the integrity of our intelligence programs and that those involved in the various intelligence missions remain dedicated and true to their oath. That is why I have taken or done a lot of work in the area of insider threat and how to strengthen the systems of the agency to ensure that when people do run astray, staff members or contractors, that we have systems in place that work, that we can detect it and counter it. Senator Manchin. And then finally, if you are asked by the President to render your assessment and evaluation, do you feel confident you can speak truth to power? Mr. Sharpley. I absolutely do feel confident I can speak truth to power. And if you would ask the current director and the former two directors, they would tell you the same. Senator Manchin. Thank you. Mr. Sharpley. Yes, sir. Chairman Burr. Senator Harris. Senator Harris. Thank you. So I think you know, we all know, that it's very important that politics not shape the work that we do in our intelligence agencies and in the intelligence community. Can you tell this committee whether as Acting IG, if you've ever been asked or experienced any effort to limit your full independence since you've been the Acting IG? Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator Harris. That is a very good question. Senator Harris, I don't know if you remember our--when you were Attorney General in California, I worked at SIGTARP and you were very helpful, and I thank you again for your---- Senator Harris. Thank you. Mr. Sharpley [continuing]. Help there. There has never been a time under any director that I've worked--or am I aware of, anyone trying to undermine the independence of this Office of Inspector General. I think it's very clear that the reputation that I've built at CIA, that that is something that I don't think anyone would attempt. But certainly, independence is written into the very fabric of our processes. At every opportunity, conferences, onboarding, new employees, etcetera, we emphasize the importance of independence. I know that this director, Director Pompeo, is very aware of that and I'm sure very supportive of my independence. Senator Harris. And will you commit to this committee that if ever you are in any way talked with or anyone indicates that they hope you might do one thing or another, that you will report that to this committee? Mr. Sharpley. Absolutely, Senator. You have my commitment. Senator Harris. And have you--I believe in fact that you have faced some resistance that has prevented you from getting access to information that you need to fully assess a situation in terms of performing your oversight responsibilities. Will you commit today to notifying this committee if in the future you face any resistance whatsoever in your efforts to obtain information that is necessary for you to pursue your responsibilities? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I do commit to that. I'm unaware of any circumstance since I've been the Acting Inspector General or as deputy where anybody has either encumbered or tried to or have been successful at not providing us the information we need to do our important oversight role. Senator Harris. Well, please rely on this committee to help you if you need help in accomplishing that goal. Mr. Sharpley. Thank you, Senator. Senator Harris. And there's been a lot of discussion about whistleblowers. I understand that you have not or were not aware of the POGO, the Project on Government Oversight, report that was released yesterday regarding three open cases involving allegations that you and others committed retaliation against whistleblowers. But, obviously, this is a serious concern. I'm going to assume that right after this hearing you're going to familiarize yourself with what's in that report. And my request to you is that you then immediately, and before we need to vote on your confirmation, report back to this committee in writing your analysis and your perspective on the contents of that report. Are you willing to do that? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I don't want to--I want to make sure that I don't conflate the two. There was a POGO article that refers to a report that was written by the ICIG. I'm unfamiliar with the report from the ICIG. With respect to the POGO article, I am aware of that they cite the complaints that are against me on retaliation just because it was brought up in this hearing. I'm unaware of any ongoing investigations or the details of any complaints and have no--no action, or conclusions of wrongdoing have been made about my career or anything that I've done. Senator Harris. So as it relates then to the ICIG letter that was referred to earlier by Senator Feinstein, will you familiarize yourself with the contents of that and report back to this committee your perspective on what that says about these three cases? Mr. Sharpley. Yes, Senator. I commit to doing that. Senator Harris. Okay. And you obviously understand that when we are talking about the importance of whistleblowers, for those folks to come forward and report what they know it's an intimidating process. They are putting their jobs on the line. They are certainly opening themselves up to the likelihood of retaliation and if they don't have confidence in the system, it is likely, one, that they will not report to the IG; but two, equally likely that, wanting their information to get out and to have transparency and sunlight on the issue, that they are even prone probably to leak that information to the press. So we are talking often, however, about classified information, which creates its own problems when that classified information is leaked to the press. So will you commit to improving and strengthening the systems that are currently in place to ensure that there is no retaliation whatsoever when whistleblowers come forward? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I can investigate concerns about retaliatory actions and I commit to you that we will continually improve upon our systems and our programs in place. Senator Harris. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Harris. Any member seek any additional questions? Seeing none---- Vice Chairman Warner. Can I just ask one question? Chairman Burr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Sharpley, a lot of concern about whistleblower issues and I understand--my understanding at least, if there is an ICIG, you might not be aware of the contents of that, that investigation in the normal course. But one thing that I've looked at--and I didn't offer this amendment earlier because there was not full-fledged support, but that there would be granted to the IC, to the IC community, stay authority, which I know you are familiar with, which in effect would make sure that a whistleblower would be able to request the head of the agency to hold harmless a valid whistleblower from being reprised, retaliated against. Most all the rest of the Federal Government has those kind of stay authority protections. I know we talked about this briefly in my office. Do you believe that the employees--even though that this is not going to be in law, but do you believe that the employees at CIA ought to have this type of protection that every other Federal employee has had since 2001? Mr. Sharpley. Senator, I support any improvement on protections to whistleblowers. I fully support them. I am not aware in my five-plus years at CIA where having stay authority would have changed the circumstance. That doesn't mean that something couldn't happen in the future where that authority could be used effectively. So I do support---- Vice Chairman Warner. I just believe, in light of some of the concerns raised and echoing both Senator Harris and Senator King in terms of the importance of this job, our job and your job, because of the unique nature of the agency operating in secret, I do think going the extra mile that there would be this approach, in terms of holding harmless a valid whistleblower's complaint against any type of reprisal from the agency itself is terribly important. And should you be confirmed, I hope that you will--you would bring that message back to the agency. Mr. Sharpley. You have my commitment, Senator. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Sharpley. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman. Mr. Sharpley, thank you for your testimony to the committee. I will repeat that it's my intention to move this nomination next week and I would urge members, if they have additional questions, to make those questions available before the end of business today. Kimberly, thank you for being here to support your husband. To you, your children, and to your mother, it's great to have you here for this. With that, the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]

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