[Senate Hearing 115-264]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-264
OPEN HEARING ON THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY'S ASSESSMENT ON RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE 2016
U.S. ELECTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
29-830 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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JANUARY 10, 2017
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Mark R. Warner, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia...... 3
WITNESS
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied
by: John Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
and ADM. Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security
Agency......................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
OPEN HEARING ON THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY'S ASSESSMENT ON RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE 2016
U.S. ELECTIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:03 p.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Burr, Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt,
Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin,
Harris, and Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order. I'd
like to welcome our witnesses: Jim Clapper, Director of
National Intelligence; John Brennan, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; Jim Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; and Admiral Mike Rogers, Director of the
National Security Agency.
Directors Clapper and Brennan, while I've said this to you
before in closed session, this is likely your last appearance
before the Committee, at least in your current roles. I want to
thank each of you, before you get out of here, for your many
years of dedicated service both in uniform and out of uniform.
Jim, John, in many different capacities, you have served your
country in an unbelievable way, both of you. We want you to
know how grateful we are to you and how grateful the Nation is
to you for the service that you've provided.
We convene today to discuss the President's directed review
of Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections.
While Russia and the Soviet Union have used active measures as
tools of statecraft since the 1920s, recent actions by the
Russian government represent, as you reported, a notable
escalation.
I know that the public disclosure of these activities
surprised many and the notion that another state would attempt
to interfere in our elections is quite troubling. However,
Russian active measures as a general topic is not new to the
Members of this Committee. We've held more than 10 hearings and
briefings over the last two years that have focused in whole or
in part to better understand the scale and scope of these
efforts and the intentions behind them.
Each of our witnesses has appeared before us in closed
session to discuss this topic, and in response, on a bipartisan
and bicameral basis, this Committee and its sister committee in
the other body have put forward unclassified and classified
proposals to address these activities. Some work has been done,
but to effectively address this challenge to the integrity of
our system of government will require a ``whole of government''
approach.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the details
of the intelligence community assessment. Intelligence
reporting over the last few years, to include the classified
and compartmented portions of this assessment, gives me no
reason to doubt the findings contained within the product. That
said, we owe it to our colleagues and the American people to do
an independent and bipartisan review of the report and its
conclusions.
I've therefore instructed Committee staff to carry out an
assessment of the sourcing behind this report, and we will be
asking each of our witnesses to provide the Committee access to
the intelligence that contributed to this assessment. I want to
assure my colleagues on this Committee and in this body that we
will follow the intelligence wherever it leads and we will
conduct this review in a nonpartisan manner. I also want to
assure the witnesses before us today, as has long been our
practice, the Committee will treat the protection of these
sources with the level of security and professionalism
required.
I'd also like to quickly thank the men and women of the
intelligence community for their work in completing this
review. To each of our witnesses: Please thank your respective
staffs. I have no doubt that the President's directive, Jim, to
you and to others ruined many's holiday plans.
While this moment in our history is critical and the
testimony before this Committee in an open setting will, I
hope, help the American people understand what Russia attempted
to accomplish as part of its focus on our 2016 elections, I
want to make this clear: Our democracy is not at risk. We can
rest assured in the strength of the United States of America
and have continued faith in the electoral process.
We must be alert, though, to the challenges that face us
and the threats posed by those who seek to undermine Western
democratic values, whether they are through interference in our
elections or relentless propaganda and active measures
targeting our friends and our allies abroad.
Our values are indeed under assault. The key differences
between the efforts of the past and the attacks of today,
however, is the tools being used to carry these out.
Gentlemen, thank you again for being here today. I look
forward to your testimony, General Clapper, and to the
opportunity to query questions to the rest.
I will now turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman, the
Senator from Virginia.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
want to echo, first of all, your comments in terms of
commending all the witnesses, but particularly Director Clapper
and Director Brennan, for your great service to our country.
I also want to acknowledge the new Members of our
Committee, both new Members here, Senator Manchin and Senator
Harris. I know Senator Cornyn will be joining us briefly and,
while she's not here yet, I want to acknowledge the great role
that Senator Feinstein has played, both as Chair and Vice Chair
on this Committee.
We're here today to discuss the intelligence community's
comprehensive review into Russian interference in our 2016
presidential election, for me one of the most serious events of
my public life. Interference in American democracy and our
electoral process by any outside power is unacceptable.
Now, much of the press reporting and conversation about
Russian activities have focused on the hacks of the DNC and
John Podesta. But, as the report pointed out, the Russians also
hacked systems associated with the Republicans. They just chose
not to release that material yet. There's nothing that prevents
them from doing so at a time of their choosing in the future.
While the target of this campaign was Secretary Clinton,
any of us, Democrats or Republicans, including members of this
body, could easily be the next target.
What the Russians did was nothing less than an attack on
our political system and democracy itself. We can simply not
allow it to stand.
The IC assessment is more detailed, but is in line with the
previous assessments from the intelligence community that
Russian officials at the highest level, including President
Putin, engaged in--in your words, not mine--``in an
unprecedented level of interference in our election.'' It
concludes that ``these actions had the goal of harming the
candidacy of Hillary Clinton and boosting the candidacy of
President-elect Donald Trump.''
We are not here to re-litigate the results of the election.
At the same time, I am committed to ensuring that there is a
thorough, bipartisan, and expeditious Congressional
investigation of Russia's role. In my view, our Committee
should focus on three broad areas: the Russian hacking and
release of stolen information; Russia's use of state-owned
media and other means to amplify real and fake news to further
their goal; and contact between Russian government and its
agents and associates of any campaign and candidate.
I, like you, Mr. Chairman, have written to all the
witnesses here today asking them to cooperate with us in this
investigation and turn over as many documents and as much
evidence as quickly as possible. I, like you, am reiterating
that call today. It is equally important that the incoming
Administration and those folks who will take Director Clapper
and Director Brennan's roles going forward will continue to
cooperate in this effort.
Additionally, it's my hope, while we've made a first step,
that we'll continue to try to declassify as much material as
possible while again protecting sources and methods.
The American people deserve to know, as soon as possible,
that their elected representatives have taken a close look at
the intelligence report that we're considering today. They
deserve to know whether we concur or not with its conclusions
and that we're prepared to respond to the threats outlined in
the assessment.
The actions that the President took recently in response to
Russian activities were an appropriate first step. At the same
time, I still have questions why the Obama Administration
didn't act further and didn't act sooner.
But as we look forward, preventing future attempts to
undermine our democracy and our position in the world will
require a sustained response from the incoming Administration
and from this Congress. I truly believe the strength of
America's democracy will be measured in part on what actions we
take to develop a robust and proactive cyber strategy.
Part of that strategy must include tools and capabilities
to deter and effectively respond to future attempts by foreign
actors to influence America's democratic process.
One of the things I've always valued about service on this
Intelligence Committee is the tradition of leaving partisanship
at the door oftentimes when we go into that SCIF. I look
forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and all our Members
to complete this investigation as quickly and expeditiously as
possible.
Gentlemen, your agencies--the work that your agencies
completed underscores the importance of the role the Nation's
intelligence community plays and the men and women who quietly
work every day to keep our country safe. This report represents
the best analysis of the men and women of the intelligence
community. These are professionals who have taken an oath of
office to present the whole truth as they see it, faithfully to
Republicans and Democratic administrations alike.
As a member of this Committee, I think all of us who've
served for some time have seen first-hand the dedication of the
men and women who work for you. I know that one of the most
primary missions of the intelligence professionals is to render
the best professional judgment, regardless of political
considerations, and always be willing to speak truth to power.
I support them for their work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
For Members: Once Director Clapper has been recognized and
completes his testimony, it is the intention of the Chair to
recognize members based upon seniority for five-minute
questions. There is a vote that's scheduled right now for 2:30.
It's the intent of the Chair to complete our questions in open
session by the conclusion of that vote, and it is the intent of
the Chairman to then move to a closed session, which would
start after the 2:30 vote. If there's need to adjust that,
we'll make an adjustment on the way.
Having said that, a reminder to all members that we're in
open session and that you should take that into account from
the standpoint of the questions that you ask and realize that
there are unclassified and classified reports.
With that, Director Clapper, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY: JOHN BRENNAN, DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; JAMES COMEY, DIRECTOR OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ADM. MICHAEL ROGERS,
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Director Clapper. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner,
Members of the Committee: First, thank you for your gracious
comments, particularly for John and me, as this should be our
last hearing, although one never knows. There's still 10 days
left. But more importantly, the comments about the work, the
dedication and the patriotism of the women and men of the
intelligence community. So we appreciate that.
We're here today to present the intelligence community's
assessment of Russian activities and intentions during the
recent U.S. presidential election. As you indicated, some
aspects of our report involve very sensitive sources and
methods that we can't discuss in this open televised hearing.
So obviously we're asking for your support and understanding as
we need to defer to a closed setting.
Our remarks today are based on a highly classified
assessment that was produced by the three agencies represented
here, the CIA, FBI, and NSA, at the request of President Obama,
which we, as you also indicated, released publicly in a
declassified version last Friday afternoon.
The report covers the motivation and scope of Moscow's
intentions regarding the U.S. election and Russia's use of
cyber tools and media to influence U.S. public opinion. I want
to make clear that this report does not--repeat, does not--
assess the impact of Russian activities on the actual outcome
of the 2016 election or draw any conclusions in that regard one
way or the other. The IC's role is to assess the intentions,
capabilities, and actions of foreign actors, not to analyze
U.S. political processes or U.S. public opinion. We can say
that we did not see evidence of the Russians altering vote
tallies.
We can't discuss the full range of classified information
that supports our conclusions because of the extreme
sensitivity of these sources. But the key judgments in the
public and classified versions are the same. I can say that the
report draws on intelligence collected by all three of these
agencies represented here, some of which only came to light
after Election Day.
When the IC says high confidence, we mean we have multiple
high-quality sources of information that contribute to that
assessment. The intelligence comes from a wide range of
sources, including human sources, technical collection, and
open source information. The key judgments are based on
corroborating sources that are consistent with our
understanding of historical and current Russian behavior.
While we cannot publicly disclose most of the information
that backs up these judgments, we have briefed the report in
detail to President Obama and his team, President-elect Trump
and his team, and Congressional leadership, and this morning
the House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence. They
have had the opportunity to explore the report and pose any
questions they have had about the basis for our conclusions.
Both the classified and public versions of this report were
written by seasoned, nonpartisan intelligence professionals,
consistent with the highest standards of analytic objectivity
and tradecraft that the IC has refined over the last 15 years
or so to ensure we provide policymakers the most accurate
insights that we can. I also need to add that this reflects the
intelligence community's view, not that of the Administration.
Attributing cyber operations is difficult, but not
impossible. Every cyber operation, malicious or not, leaves a
trail. IC analysts use this trail and their constantly growing
knowledge base of malicious actors and their tools and methods
to trace operations back to their source and determine their
connections to foreign governments. This is exactly what we did
here.
Let me start with respect to the findings, to first address
Russia's goals and intentions. We have high confidence that
President Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at
the U.S. presidential election. The goals of this campaign were
to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process,
denigrate Secretary Clinton and harm her electability and
potential presidency.
Putin and the Russian government also developed a clear
preference for President-elect Trump. Russia aspired to help
President-elect Trump's election chances when possible by
discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her
unfavorably to him.
Moscow's approach evolved over the course of the campaign
based on Russia's understanding of the electoral prospects of
each of the candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that
Secretary Clinton was likely to win, the Russian influence
campaign began to focus more on undermining her future
presidency.
Moscow's influence campaign blended covert intelligence
operations with overt efforts by Russian government agencies,
state-funded media, third party intermediaries, and paid social
media users.
We're highly confident that the Russian intelligence
services conducted cyber operations against people and
organizations associated with the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, including both major U.S. political parties. Russian
military intelligence, or the GRU, compromised the email
accounts of Democratic Party officials and publicly released
victim data using the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com and
in exclusives to media outlets. They also relayed material to
WikiLeaks.
Russia collected on some Republican-affiliated targets, but
did not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign.
Russia's intelligence obtained and maintained access to
elements of multiple U.S. State or local electoral boards.
However, the Department of Homeland Security assesses these
types of systems were not involved, not involved, in vote
tallying.
Russia's state-run propaganda machine contributed to the
influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin
messaging using Russian government-funded outlets, such as RT.
Moscow has long sought to undermine U.S.-led liberal
democratic order. Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a
history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on
U.S. presidential elections. They've used intelligence
officers, influence agents, and press placements to disparage
candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.
Moscow's behavior reflects Russia's more aggressive cyber
posture in recent years, which poses a major threat to U.S.
military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure
networks, as well as, as we've seen now, our elections.
However, Russia's activities in 2016 demonstrated a significant
escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of
effort compared to previous operations. We assess Moscow will
apply the lessons learned from the 2016 campaign aimed in the
future to influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S.
allies.
I'd like to wrap up by saying I've now got just 10 days
left in my 53 years or so in the intel business, and I've seen
the IC get things right and get things wrong. But I believe the
level of professional tradecraft and cross-agency intelligence
integration required to put this report together gives me great
confidence that we've gotten it right here.
With that, we're open for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Clapper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Director, thank you for that thorough and
concise testimony.
Director Clapper, as I stated in my opening statement, I've
instructed a select group of Committee staff to complete an
independent and bipartisan review of the reporting that
underpins the intelligence community assessment before us
today. Do I have your assurance that you will provide the
access that they need to the reporting necessary to make their
conclusions?
Director Clapper. Yes.
Chairman Burr. Director Comey, let me talk about forensics
for just a minute, because the FBI has the expertise there. I
know there's tremendous investigative value when the FBI is
actually able to conduct their own forensics review on devices
that have suffered cyber intrusions and attacks.
I believe there's some confusion, though, or at least some
conflicting reporting as to whether the FBI requested access to
the DNC's services, the Democratic Congressional Committee
servers, and John Podesta's personal devices. Did the FBI
request access to those devices to perform forensics on them?
Director Comey. Yes, we did.
Chairman Burr. Would that access have provided intelligence
or information helpful to your investigation and possibly to
the findings included in the intelligence community
assessments?
Director Comey. Our forensics folks would always prefer to
get access to the original device or server that's involved. So
it's the best evidence.
Chairman Burr. Were you given access to do the forensics on
those servers?
Director Comey. We were not. A highly respected private
company eventually got access and shared with us what they saw
there.
Chairman Burr. But is that typically the way the FBI would
prefer to do the forensics, or would your forensics unit rather
see the servers and do the forensics themselves?
Director Comey. We'd always prefer to have access hands-on
ourselves if that's possible.
Chairman Burr. Do you know why you were denied access to
those servers?
Director Comey. I don't know for sure. I don't know for
sure.
Chairman Burr. Was there one request or multiple requests?
Director Comey. Multiple requests at different levels, and
ultimately what was agreed to is the private company would
share with us what they saw.
Chairman Burr. There has been much debate over the content
released by WikiLeaks, Director Clapper--I should say DCLeaks--
and what the intentions were behind those disclosures. Director
Clapper, you made it perfectly clear in your testimony that the
community feels that vote tallies were not altered.
Director Clapper. That's correct.
Chairman Burr. Do you believe there's any evidence that the
DNC or the DCCC or the Podesta emails released publicly were
altered in any way?
Director Clapper. We have no evidence of that.
Chairman Burr. Director Comey, do you have any intelligence
that any Republican system that was targeted by these same
groups was either successfully penetrated or, if penetrated and
there was data exfiltrated, was there any exfiltration?
Director Comey. There were successful penetrations of some
groups and campaigns, particularly at the State level, on the
Republican side of the aisle, and some limited penetration of
old Republican National Committee domains.
Chairman Burr. Penetrations of those National Committee
domains?
Director Comey. Right, that were no longer in use.
Chairman Burr. From the standpoint of Republican candidates
that were running for President, were those campaigns, any of
those campaigns, targeted under this same effort by the
Russians?
Director Comey. The campaigns themselves, not to my
knowledge.
Chairman Burr. Okay.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, let me thank you, Director Clapper, for your report
and the point that you continue to make, that it was not your
job to analyze the effects in terms of the political campaign.
I would add that any of us who are up here who've ever been
through a close election, it means that any small item can be
cause for harm.
I want to follow up on where the Chairman was headed.
Director Comey, there was some information, though, that was
taken from Republican-affiliated entities. There was a great
deal of information taken from Democrats. There was selective
leaking with, as the Director has indicated, with clear
political intent in the process.
One of the things that I'm a little flabbergasted at is
that somehow this is viewed by some as in their rear-view
mirror. Don't the Russians have the capability of taking, even
if it's old information about Republicans or other information
about Democrats, and selectively leak that prospectively?
Director Comey. Sure.
Vice Chairman Warner. And could you describe--to my mind,
this is not only one of the most significant items I've seen in
my political life, but this is an ongoing threat to all of us
and our electoral process. We have to be on guard, and could
you speak for, or any other member of the panel speak to, the
fact that--do you expect to see similar tactics used by
Russians in terms of the upcoming elections in Germany, France,
and The Netherlands?
Director Clapper. Yes, we do.
Vice Chairman Warner. And are our allies taking what's
happened in America with significant enough importance and are
they putting up new defenses trying to guard against these
activities?
Director Clapper. I can't say--at least I can't; maybe
others can here--the extent to which they have reacted to this.
But they are certainly aware. Europe has long been a target of
Russian attempts to manipulate electoral processes. So they
will continue with that. And certainly because of the
controversy that's generated in our country, I think that will
reinforce their desire to do that.
Vice Chairman Warner. One of the things that actually
another Member of the Committee raised is, certain Russian
activities, against just to note the seriousness, not only
retrospectively but prospectively, that I believe there was a
Russian dissident in London where Russian agents in effect
planted false information in this individual's personal file
and then called law enforcement and said: Look in this person's
file, and there was child pornography placed there.
Could you anticipate at some time Russia trying, if we
don't take more aggressive actions, trying those actions
against American public officials?
Director Clapper. The Russians I think, while they have no
compunction about using the full array of tools and techniques
available in their kitbag. So I wouldn't put it past them to do
that or any other tools they've used, such as paying people to
participate in social media, for example.
Vice Chairman Warner. This has been described as in effect
the new normal for Russian doctrine; is that correct?
Director Clapper. I believe, yes.
Vice Chairman Warner. And again, we've seen our system,
your words, ``a significant escalation.'' Before us we have
people with service in the IC and the defense of our Nation for
hundreds of years. I'd like to just go down the line. In any of
your careers, have you ever seen this level of Russian
interference in our political process? We'll start with
Director Comey and just go down the line.
Director Comey. No.
Director Clapper. I have not.
Director Brennan. No.
Admiral Rogers. No.
Vice Chairman Warner. I know we've got a lot of Members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Let me begin by saying I don't believe this thing has
anything to do with--well, let me just begin by saying, and I
think the Chairman's already asked, it's clear that there was
no hacking of voting machines and the changes of tallies. I
would argue this has nothing even to--because this term
``hacking'' is thrown around and it makes it sound like some
sort of cyber-specific situation.
That cyber tools were used as a means to an end. It isn't
necessarily what we should be focused on here. What we're
talking about here is active measures, the active measures
taken by the government of Vladimir Putin to influence and to
potentially manipulate American public opinion for the purpose
of discrediting individual political figures, sowing chaos and
division in our politics, sowing doubts about the legitimacy of
our elections.
So if you look at the situation we now face, here's the
aftermath: We had an election where, after some intrusions into
some State databases, there was a leading--one nominee for
President warning about fraud in the election. Then after the
election we have some on the other side questioning the
legitimacy of the President-elect because of Russian
interference. And we have the President-elect questioning the
credibility of the intelligence community because of its
findings.
This sounds like a pretty effective and successful effort
to sow chaos, to undermine credibility of our leaders and of
our government institutions. In essence, it sounds like they
achieved what they wanted, to get us to fight against each
other over whether our elections were legitimate and divide us
in the way that it sows the sort of chaos that they sought to
achieve.
My question is along the lines of what Senator Warner asked
about a moment ago, because we've seen these active measures
employed in the Baltic States, with Russian-speaking media
outlets controlled by the Kremlin, in the Dutch referendum, in
the Brexit vote, in the Italian referendum.
So let me lay out a hypothetical and you tell me if this is
the kind of scenario we could face, because they don't limit
this to elections. They target individual policymakers
throughout many countries in Europe, particularly those in the
former Soviet sphere. Hypothetically, imagine that there's a
U.S. Senator or Congressman who adopts a policy position that
the Kremlin does not agree with. So somehow through a phishing
expedition they gain access to your personal computer network,
and once they gain access to your personal computer network
they use it to fabricate and/or actually conduct--you used the
child pornography example; I'd say let's say money-laundering
activity. Then they call law enforcement and tip them off:
Congressman John So-and-So has been money laundering. And they
go into your home, they seize your computer, and sure enough,
it's sitting there on your network because someone got into it
and did it. Now you're arrested and you're charged and you're
removed from the public discourse.
Is this not what we have seen, the tactics that have been
employed by Russian intelligence on behalf of the government of
Vladimir Putin in other countries around the world? Is that not
a tactic they have used to discredit individual political
figures? And isn't it true that that could very well happen
here in the United States?
Director Clapper. It is certainly well within both their
technical competence and their potential intent to do things
like that. The last two years running in my threat
presentations, I've cited I think the next worrisome trend in
the cyber business will be the compromise of the fidelity of
information, and whether it's for a criminal purpose or a
political purpose. So this is well within the realm, I think,
of possibility.
Senator Rubio. In the context of what their goals were,
ultimately their ultimate goal--they may have or not--I don't
get into the whole thing of who they wanted to see win. But in
the end what they really wanted to see was Americans fighting
against each other, bickering over these things, having
questions about the legitimacy of the process, our leaders,
etcetera.
Was that not their goal? And if it was, have they not
largely achieved that, based on how this issue has been
discussed since the aftermath of the election?
Director Clapper. I think in the first instance that was
their goal. First, as I said in my prepared remarks, was to sow
doubt about the efficacy of our system and to cast aspersions
on our political system.
Senator Rubio. To create doubt about the credibility of our
elections, the legitimacy of our leaders, etcetera?
Director Clapper. All that, yes.
Senator Rubio. So my last point is, the last time I checked
Vladimir Putin is neither a registered Democrat nor a
registered Republican. So what he is interested in is achieving
these measures in the United States for his own strategic
purposes. Therefore, there is literally--neither political
party should take this lightly. This should not be a partisan
issue. This involves whether or not we are going to allow
someone to actively interfere in our political discourse and
divide us as a Nation against each other.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, the same to you. Let me, if I might, begin with
you, Mr. Comey. After the election, as you know, the foreign
minister, the Russian foreign minister, was quoted in various
news reports saying that the Russians had had contacts with
people associated with the Trump campaign. Now, that may or may
not be true. There is, however, extensive press reporting on
the relationships between the Russians and the individuals
associated with both the Trump campaign and the incoming
Administration.
My question for you, Director Comey, is: Has the FBI
investigated these reported relationships and, if so, what are
the agency's findings?
Director Comey. Thank you, Senator. I would never comment
on investigations, whether we have one or not, in an open forum
like this. So I really can't answer it one way or another.
Senator Wyden. Well, can you provide an unclassified
response to these questions and release it to the American
people prior to January 20th?
Director Comey. I'm sorry? You said will I?
Senator Wyden. Yes. Will you provide an unclassified
response to the question I've asked? And as I've said, it's
been reported widely. It's on the Reuters News Service, widely
reported. Will you provide an unclassified response to the
question I asked and release it to the American people prior to
January 20?
Director Comey. Sir, I'll answer any question you ask, but
the answer will likely be the same as I just gave you: I can't
talk about it.
Senator Wyden. Well, I will tell you, I think the American
people have a right to know this. And if there is delay in
declassifying this information and relating it to the American
people, releasing it to the American people, and it doesn't
happen before January 20th, I'm not sure it's going to happen.
That's why I'm troubled, and I hope that you will make a
declassified statement with respect to the questions I've
asked.
Now, let me ask one other question if I might. The report
has a brief description of Russian cyber intrusions into State
and local electoral boards. It reads, and I quote: ``DHS
assesses that the types of systems we observed Russian actors
targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying.''
My question to you--and I think I'd like to have you
involved in this, too, Director Clapper. Director Comey,
Director Clapper, what systems in your view were compromised by
the Russians and what was the nature and extent of those
compromises?
Director Comey. There were intrusions and attempted
intrusions at State-level voter registration databases. That
is, not containing the voting mechanism, but who's registered
to vote and the address and the particulars of that sort. What
the purpose was of those intrusions is not clear to us at this
point. And we saw no activity on Election Day that reflected
that anyone had messed with those voter registration databases.
But there's no doubt that the Russians attacked, intruded, and
took data from some of those systems.
Senator Wyden. Director Clapper.
Director Clapper. I think that's the response. I don't have
anything to add to that.
Senator Wyden. I hope you will also tell us in the days
ahead, Director Comey, more about the nature of those systems,
because it is very clear, given what you found and reported in
the declassified version, that we're going to be dealing with
these issues coming up. And I think we need to know more
specifics, maybe do it in a classified session, about the
nature of those systems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me start by thanking Director Clapper and
Director Brennan for your many years of service to your
country. I also want to say that I appreciate the work that has
been done by the intelligence community to produce this report,
and I accept its findings.
I do think that it's important that we understand more
fully the extent of Russian intrusions into the electoral
process to try to shape public opinion. And it is important to
underscore two points that have been brought out already, and
that is that there is no evidence that voting totals were
manipulated or changed or that emails that were released were
manipulated or changed. Is that correct, Director Clapper?
Director Clapper. That's correct.
Senator Collins. The unclassified assessment states that
Republican-affiliated web sites were hacked by the Russians,
but the report does not go into detail about whether or not
data were taken, stolen, from those systems and whether
information came from networks used by Republican candidates,
whether that included the Trump campaign.
Could you give us a fuller understanding of the hacking on
the Republican side? Was the Trump campaign, for example,
hacked by the Russians? Or if Mr. Comey is the better person
for this.
Director Comey. Thank you, Senator. I want to be thoughtful
about what I say in an open setting. There was evidence that
there was hacking directed at State-level organizations, State-
level campaigns, and the RNC, but old domains of the RNC, that
is email domains that they were no longer using, and that
information was harvested from there, but it was old stuff.
None of that was released.
We did not develop any evidence that the Trump campaign or
the current RNC was successfully hacked.
Senator Collins. Does the IC's conclusion that the Russians
sought to assist President-elect Trump's campaign depend upon
an assessment, then, that the Russians covertly collected
information from primarily Democratic sources, but some
Republican sources as well, but only chose to release the
derogatory information from Democratic sources?
Director Clapper. That's correct.
Senator Collins. And I noticed, having looked at many IC
assessments, that this one was produced by three agencies.
Usually I'm used to seeing assessments where the entire
intelligence community is involved. For example, the State
Department's Bureau, which was the Bureau that was correct
about the weapons of mass destruction, was not mentioned in the
report.
Is there a reason why it was--did you only need the CIA,
the FBI, and the NSA?
Director Clapper. It had a lot to do with the sensitivity
of the sources and who could actually contribute to putting the
assessment together. We can discuss all that in closed session.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Finally, I just want to underscore your point that we have
talked a lot about the Russians' attempt to mold public opinion
for our campaign and, as Senator Rubio so eloquently said, sow
the divisions and seeds of doubt that has everyone questioning
and charges and countercharges, which are really not healthy in
our democracy when a new administration is taking over.
But there's also an active Russian campaign to infiltrate,
as you have said, military systems, defense contractor systems,
critical infrastructure, commercial interests. Don't we need to
take a broad look at all of the efforts by our adversaries to
either control critical infrastructure, for example, or
influence decision making in those arenas as well?
Director Clapper. Oh, I think if I understand your comment,
Senator Collins, the point is valid that this is a multi-
faceted activity. It began with a rather broad-gauged assault,
if you will, attempt to infiltrate many entities across the
board--military, commercial, governmental, party-related.
So yes, they think of this holistically and use many tools,
as they did in this case. Hacking was just one of them.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Senator Collins for her continued focus on
critical infrastructure, because that's something that, in
light of what we've learned, I think we need to think through
and realize what our exposures are.
I want to thank all of our witnesses. Attribution,
obviously, of responsibility in cyber attacks is the first key
step towards imposing a cost on those involved. Since a number
of us wrote to the President in November asking that
information on Russian interference in the presidential
election be declassified, the four of you and your respective
agencies have done some very important work in making as much
of your findings public as possible. I want to say I'm very
grateful for that. The public needs to understand what is at
risk here.
To those who criticize these investigations as partisan, I
would remind them that Russia didn't do this to help the
Republican candidate. Russia did this to help Russia and to
weaken America, and therein lies the heart of why this is so
important, because in the next election the shoe could easily
be on the other foot and a foreign power could decide it wants
the Democrat to win this time.
I think that both scenarios are deeply offensive, and
foreign influence on our elections is intolerable no matter
which party benefits in any given election. The ongoing efforts
of Russia to impact U.S. elections threatens to undermine faith
in our democratic systems, which is precisely their goal, and I
think it's critical that they pay a price for their actions.
I want to return to the issue of the Russians being able to
obtain access to parts of our electoral infrastructure, not the
actual machines that count the votes, but the databases. We've
had a couple of questions on this, but I want to ask, first of
all, do we know if they would be able to manipulate the kinds
of data that they had access to? So, for example, if you have a
voter databases in a local county that was penetrated, would
they be able to change the information within that database?
Director Comey. Potentially, and that was our concern at
the time we discovered this. We saw no indication of that, but
that's a definite possibility.
Senator Heinrich. If that had happened and, for example,
the FBI or other elements of the intelligence community were
not looking for that, would the electoral boards have had
indications that that data had changed?
Director Comey. Potentially not. They would have the
indication. When chaos erupted on Election Day, when someone
shows up to vote and your address is different or your middle
initial is different or some particulars different, that
creates delay, controversy, confusion.
Senator Heinrich. So, unfortunately, I think this tells us
that we are vulnerable to future attacks and manipulation in
this case. I think that, obviously, you've laid out a scenario
that would be very evident, but also we could have very subtle
impacts to the elections. You could potentially have a scenario
where someone's voter history, for example, was changed and if
they haven't voted for a certain number of years maybe they get
purged from the rolls.
Or many of us have had--we've seen flyers of our colleagues
who've been criticized for missing a particular election. Maybe
they didn't actually miss that election. So I think it begs the
question what can we do in concert with those local, county,
and State entities to make sure that we are protecting this
data the way that we should.
Director Clapper. Well, part of our charge in this report
was carried out jointly by--and I'll ask Director Comey to
speak to this--the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI,
to come up with a set of sort of best practices for inculcating
greater degrees of cyber security.
DHS reached out in the run-up to the election to the states
and I think ultimately about every State took advantage of the
recommendations proffered by DHS.
Jim, do you want to add to that?
Director Comey. No, I think that's the answer, is just
understanding that they're a target and availing themselves of
the expertise and technology to try to protect themselves, then
we on the intelligence community side pushing to them
indicators of the bad guys.
Senator Heinrich. Director Clapper, I want to with my last
question sort of change gears here for a moment. I asked you in
the Armed Services Committee hearing last week about the role
of Russian propaganda media outlets like RT. I saw a comment
from General Flynn last August that sort of compared RT to CNN
or MSNBC. Is that a fair analogy? Is there a structural
difference between the way that RT exists within the media
infrastructure and, say, a Fox News or MSNBC or CNN or CBS?
Director Clapper. To me, the major difference here is the
bulk of funding for RT comes from the Russian government, and
the Russian government gives editorial direction on what RT is
supposed to broadcast. So I think that's a little bit different
than CNN.
Senator Heinrich. And they seem to exercise that
discretion.
Director Clapper. Yes, they do.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Director Clapper, does RT get any of its
broadcasts into the United States?
Director Clapper. Yes, it does, some.
Senator Blunt. It does?
Director Clapper. It's very prevalent in Europe and lesser
so--I think there's an RT channel here.
Senator Blunt. And that would be a channel that would be
accessible here to some number of people here?
Director Clapper. Yes.
Senator Blunt. Let me----
Director Clapper. I don't know the audience size of RT.
Senator Blunt. I doubt if it's very large, would be my
guess. But I don't want to defend RT. I think it's a propaganda
arm of a government that is definitely not on our side, and we
need to be aware of that. We also need to be aware that--I
think you said at one point that they--I think at that point
you meant the Russians--think about this holistically and use
many tools. We have lots of other countries, the Chinese
particularly, that we also believe look holistically and use
many tools. It's one of the topics, as you know, from our other
meetings over the years, I'm very concerned about cyber
generally.
I'm also concerned about our failure to secure Federal
records. I think we could certainly give advice to states as to
how to secure their records since we've had intrusions into our
personnel system, since we've had hacking into the clearance
process that a significant number of Americans, including all
of you and most of us, have gone through, that are very
detailed.
I was the State election official, chief election official
in Missouri at one time, and those records, while could be
confusing on Election Day, I don't believe there's any evidence
of polling places where people had lines that were backed up
because there were record changes that were out of the
ordinary. I mean, often people show up and say, oh, I know I
sent my voter transfer in, when they may or may not have.
But, Director Comey, we don't have any evidence of any
disruption of the participation process because somebody got
into local registration records; is that correct?
Director Comey. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Blunt. It's also my opinion that in any State I'm
aware of there's nothing in those records that's not publicly
available. You can go to the local registration office. You can
often go directly into those records to access those records.
Frankly, we have lost a lot more secure records at the Federal
level than the relatively open voter registration records.
That doesn't mean that we don't want to help State and
local officials secure their records in every way. But those
are neither the most confidential records nor the hardest
records to get into. And I guess for purposes of this
discussion most importantly, there's no indication that any
effort to get into those records impacted Election Day. I think
you've all repeatedly said absolutely no indication that
anything--that there was any intrusion into the vote-counting
process.
I was a local election official when we first started
counting ballots with computers and one of my concerns always
was that the security for how you verify that system was only
really protected by how many of those systems were going on all
over the country. The diversity of the system itself makes it
fairly hard to manipulate. I don't know that we benefit by
trying to standardize it, either. But we would benefit by
providing guidance on how to secure those important records.
No evidence, I think you said, Director Comey, that the
Russians were able to get into Trump campaign email or other
records or the current RNC records; is that right?
Director Comey. That's correct.
Senator Blunt. So since we don't believe they got in, the
fact that they had nothing to release should not be a shock, on
the records?
Director Comey. Yes.
Senator Blunt. And we do believe they tried to get in?
Director Comey. We can't say with respect to the Trump
campaign. With respect to the RNC, there's no doubt they hit an
RNC domain. So it could be they were aiming at the current one
and just missed it and hit an old one. But I can't say for sure
sitting here.
Senator Blunt. Well, I do know that the Chairman of the
RNC, I heard him say over the weekend he thought they had done
a better job securing their records. Whether that's true or
not, I wouldn't know.
I think I did read in one, more than one published account,
that the password to Mr. Podesta's email was ``Password1,''
with a couple variations of spelling, of using capitals or
something, and ``password.'' So hopefully lots to be learned
here, and thanks to all of you for your efforts to help us
learn it.
Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I? For the
Senator, and it was in the public report, in terms of YouTube
views and YouTube subscribers, RT actually has a bigger
presence in the United States than the BBC.
Senator Blunt. And the BBC is also funded by the
government, right?
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Well, I'll just follow up on that point,
because this is in the annex to the published report. RT
America, millions of views on YouTube, 850 million; BBC, about
two-thirds of that; CNN, significantly lower. The same thing in
YouTube subscribers: RT America, 450 million.
So RT is a significant media presence. I think the
important point with regard to RT is that we are talking about
hacking. That's how this discussion is characterized. But this
was a comprehensive strategy involving RT, trolls, paid
bloggers, hacking, the whole package.
In fact, General Clapper, this is exactly what the Russians
have done throughout Eastern Europe for some years; isn't that
correct?
Director Clapper. That's correct. It's just as technology
has progressed the Russians have taken advantage of it for this
purpose.
Senator King. I just want to be sure I heard correctly. Mr.
Comey, did you answer Senator Wyden's question that there is an
investigation under way as to connections between either of the
political campaigns and the Russians?
Director Comey. I didn't say one way or another.
Senator King. You didn't say that----
Director Comey. That was my intention at least.
Senator King. You didn't way one way or another whether
even there's an investigation under way?
Director Comey. Correct. Especially in a public forum, we
never confirm or deny a pending investigation.
Senator King. The irony of your making that statement here
I cannot avoid. But I'll move on.
Director Comey. Well, we sometimes think differently about
closed investigations. But you asked me if I had any pending
investigations and we're not going to talk about that.
Senator King. All right.
Is it my understanding that there are actually three
reports--a highly classified that only went to certain
individuals; classified, which this Committee has seen; and the
public report--but that the conclusions of those three reports
are identical? Is that correct?
Director Clapper. That's correct.
Senator King. And the only issue, the difference between
them, is sources and methods; is that correct?
Director Clapper. Largely.
Senator King. And the reason you can't reveal sources and
methods is that you would compromise future opportunities to
gain information and also compromise fragile sources?
Director Clapper. Exactly.
Senator King. It seems to me that trust is one of the
issues. I mentioned in the Armed Services Committee, my folks
in Maine tend to be skeptical: Prove it. Speak to me for a
moment about the difficulty of proving what you've concluded
pretty unequivocally, without revealing sources and methods?
How do I convince my barber in Brunswick that this is for real?
Director Clapper. Well, that's why we have intelligence
oversight committees, to represent the American people, with
whom we cannot share as fully and completely as we might like
the evidentiary proof that we have and in which we're very
confident.
So we're very dependent, given the nature of intelligence
work to start with, very dependent on you as our overseers to
look at that yourselves on behalf of the electorate.
Senator King. But I think it is important to make the point
to the public why sources and methods need to be protected.
Director Clapper. Well, we spend money that you the
Congress appropriates. We literally spend billions of dollars
gaining these accesses, which we would jeopardize. And of
course, this then impairs the support that we can render to the
oncoming administration and successive administrations. When we
lose these accesses, it takes money and time to recover them,
not to mention putting potentially assets who work for us lives
at risk.
Senator King. Was there any political influence brought to
bear on any of the three of you in the preparation of this
report? Did the President tell you what he wanted to find? Or
was this somehow a politicized investigation?
Director Clapper. Absolutely not. The President asked us to
compile all available information that we had, and when he was
briefed on it he made the point once again that he was not--had
not and was not going to give us any direction. That's why this
is an IC product; it is not that of the current Administration.
Senator King. Mr. Comey, would you affirm that as well?
Director Comey. Yes. I hope I've demonstrated by now I'm
tone deaf when it comes to politics, and that's the way it
should be.
Senator King. Thank you.
Director Brennan, the same conclusion?
Director Brennan. Yes, absolutely.
Senator King. A final sort of technical question. I notice
that the October 10th--sorry--the October 7th statement was the
IC, the community itself, implying the entire community. This
one was FBI, CIA, and DNI. Is there any difference? Why wasn't
the report that was just released represent the entire 17-
agency community?
Director Clapper. Again, because the three exclusive
contributors to this are represented here and because of the
sensitivity of many of the sources, we made a judgment to
restrict it to these three agencies.
Senator King. So there was no elimination of other views?
Director Clapper. No, there was none. But we felt, again
because of the sensitivities, the sensitivity of the source,
which we tried to protect even within the intelligence
community, to cast the report as emanating from these three
agencies.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you for your
work and your service to the country and the leadership you've
brought. I need to ask a couple of questions, some that you've
heard before, just for quick review, and then I want to build
on several things from the report.
Just to clarify again, does anyone know of any votes that
were changed or an attempt to change votes in voting machines?
Director Clapper. As we stated in the report, we have no
evidence of any manipulation of vote tallies whatsoever.
Senator Lankford. Voter rolls?
Director Clapper. No. There was reconnoitering, intrusion
on certain voter rolls, but to the best of our knowledge no
manipulation of them.
Senator Lankford. Give me a best guess: How many other
countries is Russia currently or have, let's say in the last
four years, tried to influence in their elections?
Director Clapper. I think one of the annexes portrays that,
the number of countries that to one degree or another Russia
has expended effort to try to influence political views or
opinions.
Senator Lankford. 15 countries, 20? Give me a ballpark?
Director Clapper. A couple dozen maybe.
Senator Lankford. So maybe 20 or so.
You also make a comment in the report itself about previous
U.S. elections and Russian engagement in previous U.S.
elections, going all the way back to KGB putting a person--
recruiting a Democratic Party volunteer or activist--you don't
give the details on it--even on Jimmy Carter's campaign in the
1970s--moving forward.
Tell me about the differences in aggressiveness and style.
If the Russians and then back to even the Soviets before have
been involved in our elections since the 1970s and before, tell
me the degree of difference in this one versus how they've been
engaged in others?
Director Clapper. The history of this goes back to the
sixties, when the Russians attempted to fund certain
candidates, parlay certain lines of opinion or lines of view.
And of course, you had the radio broadcasts and that sort of
thing they would do. As the technology has increased and
they've gotten more tools available to them, they've broadened
the spectrum of things that they have done.
What is unique and what is disturbing, though, about this
election, 2016, is the aggressiveness and the variety of tools
they use and their activism in trying to convey information
that they stole, in an effort to influence the outcome of the
election. That's different than any previous case.
Senator Lankford. So additional tools, additional
aggressiveness. They've been engaged in our elections before;
this one's just at a much higher level?
Director Clapper. Yes.
Senator Lankford. You mentioned as well about the Russians
trying to hack into both Democrats' computers and political
operations and Republican, Democratic computer and political
operations. Between the--let's just say DNC and RNC. We'll just
use loose terms here. I understand there's multiple other
entities that are connected there.
Between DNC and RNC, were they able to penetrate to the
same level, to get the same quantity, quality, and type of
materials? Or was there a difference between what they were
able to glean from the Democratic DNC or the RNC?
Director Comey. They got far deeper and wider into the DNC
than the RNC.
Senator Lankford. Did they use similar methods with both?
They were able to actually penetrate deeper or wider?
Director Comey. Hard to say. Hard to say in this forum.
Hard to say even in a closed forum. Because they didn't get
into the RNC, it's harder to see. It makes it harder to answer.
Similar techniques, the spear phishing techniques, were used in
both cases. But there's no doubt they were more successful at
DNC, deeper and wider, than at the RNC. They did hit some
Republican-affiliated organizations, but not the current RNC
itself; they didn't get in.
Senator Lankford. So they weren't getting to current
information, basically?
Director Comey. Not on the RNC. They got at the State-level
current information, but not RNC current.
Senator Lankford. Okay. You also highlight several other
ways that the Russians have been engaged in our Nation just as
a whole. You mention not only the election and previous
elections, but you also move and give two practical examples of
how the Russians have been engaged in our political system. One
was an anti-fracking campaign that the Russians seemed to be
engaged in. Another one was the Occupy Wall Street movement
that the Russians were engaged in as well.
Any additional highlights or any additional details that
you can give on that? It was interesting that you highlighted
those. Can we tell the nature of, for instance, with the Occupy
Wall Street, the social media pages that were created to give
communications capabilities to the Occupy protesters, how those
were used and if they were used?
Director Clapper. We probably ought to take that one for
the record, Senator, just to be for the sake of accuracy and
just exactly what they did in those two campaigns. I don't have
that on the top of my head.
Senator Lankford. It was just in the report. I thought it
was interesting just as a way of illustration in the report
that there was an illustration to say that they've also been
engaged in some of the anti-fracking and some of the Occupy
Wall Street movement as well.
I appreciate your work. Thank you.
Yield back.
Chairman Burr. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of
you for your service.
If I might ask, were there any disagreements on the
involvement that Russia has had or attempts to have in this
process of our elections by any of the intelligence community?
Did any of you have different takes on this or have to
collaborate in order to come to one conclusion?
Director Clapper. There was one aspect that there was a
difference in confidence levels held by NSA versus the rest of
us on one single aspect. I'd be more comfortable discussing
that in a closed session.
Senator Manchin. Any other countries that have been hacking
us from the standpoint that it brings the concern that you have
with this? You're saying no one's ever done this to this level
in our political process, but when you look at espionage,
sabotage, basically through military or industrial----
Director Clapper. Well, there's a lot of espionage,
certainly, collecting and exfiltrating information. Obviously,
the Chinese come to mind. But very much a contrast between the
passive collection, passive exfiltration, as opposed to
actively purloining information and then using it for a
political end. That's the difference here. The Russians are
unique.
Senator Manchin. Yes. I think all of us have been very much
concerned that the outcome of the election was altered, and you
have been very clear saying it has not been altered, nor would
the outcome of this election have been any different.
Director Clapper. I have to clarify one aspect of what you
just said, Senator. We did not assess the impact on the
electorate. We did not do public opinion polls, because that's
not our charter of the intelligence community to do that. So we
just can't say about whether the release of the hacked
information--how that changed any voters' opinion. We don't
know.
Senator Manchin. Knowing that, then, what recommendations
of sanctions would you have? What sanctions recommendation do
you think would deter Russia or any other country from
continuing hacking us?
Director Clapper. Well, that's clearly a policy call. We
got into that last Thursday at the Senate Armed Services
Committee, and there are a range of tools that we can use. I
think Admiral Rogers and my view is that we should consider the
whole range of tools, not necessarily do a cyber for cyber
reaction, and look at all of them.
Senator Manchin. I'm thinking--what I'm trying to get to
is, if hacking is so serious and the technology we have today
can alter our lives relatively very quickly, if that's all
capability and possibilities of happening, shouldn't we have a
broad basically policy in the United States of America that any
hacking internationally that's been confirmed and concurred by
the intelligence community, once you all basically authorize
that this happened, as you agreed right now this happened in
our electoral process, that we should enforce sanctions on any
country that does this, to deter them from doing it?
Director Clapper. Well, I think again the discussion we had
in the Armed Services Committee Thursday was if you are
conducting espionage then if we're going to punish, nation-
states are going to punish each other for conducting espionage,
which is a passive collection of information, that's a pretty
heavy policy call which I don't think any of us want to make.
When it's an activist campaign as it was here, that's a
different proposition. Again, I think it's not our call to
decide what to do in response. Our only comment--and I will
repeat it--was to consider the whole range of potential tools,
instruments of power, national power, to respond.
The challenge you get into with cyber for cyber, of course,
is you have to also consider the counter-retaliation to that.
While we spend a lot of time agonizing over precision and being
very surgical, the adversaries may not be quite as precise as
we might be. So again, the bottom line: Consider all tools.
Senator Manchin. I'm just saying that when we now it's
state-sponsored--Article 5 of the NATO Treaty specifies that
all NATO members will defend the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of other allies if they are attacked. Has NATO
intervened at all? Have any of the other countries intervened
in this, NATO allies?
Director Clapper. Well, I can't speak for each individual
NATO member, what they may or may not have done to defend
themselves or to retaliate against a perceived cyber attack.
Senator Manchin. Do we as the United States defend any of
them when they've been attacked?
Director Clapper. Well, if the NATO alliance and member
nation invokes Article 5--I believe that's the provision; I'm
getting out of my lane here--that's where an attack against one
is considered an attack against all. I don't know that that's
ever been exercised, I don't think it has, in the cyber
context.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. I want to add my voice of gratitude to the
many Members of this Committee who have expressed our gratitude
for the men and women of our intelligence community. As
President-elect Trump said on Friday, he has tremendous respect
for those men and women, and I share that as well.
Second, those men and women have concluded that Russia
hacked into the DNC and John Podesta's email. And while this
Committee, as the Chairman said, will conduct a thorough
inquiry into this matter, I have no reason to doubt those
conclusions.
Third, I don't doubt it in part because Vladimir Putin is
KGB, always has been, always will be. Back in the Cold War,
Russian intelligence used to refer to the United States as
``the main enemy,'' and they still do today. Vladimir Putin
undermines the United States and our interests for the same
reason the scorpion stings the frog as it crosses the river:
It's in his nature. And he's done much worse for the last 18
years across numerous domains.
Seventh, Donald Trump won this election fair and square.
Vladimir Putin didn't hack into Hillary Clinton's calendar and
delete rallies in Michigan and Wisconsin, and didn't hack into
a speech writer's computer and delete speeches that laid out a
compelling vision for the working class. It's time to look into
the mirror and say that Hillary Clinton lost this election, not
because of Vladimir Putin or Jim Comey or fake news or the
Electoral College, but because she ran a bad campaign.
That brings me to a conclusion in the report about the
clear escalation, Director Clapper, of the scope of the
activities: that Russia has conducted these kind of activities
in recent years, but this was a clear escalation in the scope
and the scale; is that correct?
Director Clapper. That's correct.
Senator Cotton. Why did they think they could get away with
that kind of clear escalation against U.S. interests?
Director Clapper. I think the challenge, particularly in
the cyber realm, I'll say, is that there's kind of an insidious
progression of aggressiveness. I've certainly seen this over
the last six years or so, where other countries get
progressively more--as they develop more capability, they also
have an attendant willingness to try to use it.
We're seeing this particularly with kind of the second
tier, meaning North Korea and Iran, who don't have the cyber
capability, we don't believe, of the level of sophistication of
certainly the Russians or the Chinese, but they are
progressing. That's to me what's bothersome about this whole
business of cyber and when do you draw the line to say enough's
enough.
Senator Cotton. Let's move to the question of motive. The
report states that at first Russia, in the assessment of the
IC, had a desire to undermine U.S. democracy, to sow discord
and confusion. Over time, though--as it viewed Hillary Clinton
as the likely winner, to undermine her presidency. But over
time it developed a ``clear preference''--that's the language--
for Donald Trump.
Can you tell us when Russia viewed Hillary Clinton as the
likely winner?
Director Clapper. I think that was in the summer time
frame, perhaps July-August or so.
Senator Cotton. Can you tell us when you believe that
Vladimir Putin developed a clear preference for Donald Trump?
Director Clapper. Some time after that. I don't know that,
certainly not in this setting, we can pick a date when he
shifted gears, but he clearly did.
Senator Cotton. Did he or the intelligence services ever
believe that Donald Trump was a likely winner?
Director Clapper. Initially, no. They thought that he was a
fringe candidate and didn't think that at all.
Senator Cotton. A newspaper headline about the report over
the weekend said something--I paraphrase--Russian cyber attack
aims to install Putin in White House. Would a more accurate
headline perhaps be ``Russian cyber attack aims to undermine
expected Clinton presidency''?
Director Clapper. I don't think you'll find a line like
that in our report.
Senator Cotton. Your assessment of motive is based in part
on the selective leaking and the relative levels of targeting
Democratic material and Republican material on the one hand
versus the other; is that correct? More democratic material was
leaked, even though----
Director Clapper. Yes, clearly.
Senator Cotton. Is it possible that they just leaked the
Democratic material because they thought Hillary Clinton was
going to win and they wanted to undermine her and they didn't
view it as profitable to leak Republican material?
Director Clapper. Well, that's--yes. I mean, that would
seem to be the logical observation, that they favored the
President-elect and they wished to denigrate as much as
possible Hillary Clinton. And had she won, their plan was to
try to undermine her presidency.
Senator Cotton. One final question about the leaks that
have happened in this case, first in December before President
Obama directed this review to occur, and then there were none
until last Wednesday night when the Washington Post reported on
what may be sensitive signals intelligence. Director Comey,
have you received a crimes report from anyone in the
intelligence community about these leaks?
Director Comey. I don't think yet as to the December leak
or, obviously, anything this month, not yet.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we should
include those leaks as part of our inquiry.
Chairman Burr. The Chair and the Vice Chair are working on
that right now.
Senator Harris.
Senator Harris. Director Clapper, your report states that,
quote, ``We assess Russian intelligence services will continue
to develop capabilities to provide Putin with options to use
against the United States, judging from past practice and
current efforts.'' You go on to write: ``Immediately after
Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a spear
phishing campaign targeting U.S. Government employees and
individuals associated with United States think tanks and NGOs
in national security, defense, and foreign policy fields. This
campaign could provide the material for future influence
efforts.'' Then you indicate that the, quote, ``election
operation signals a new normal in Russian influence
operations.''
So indeed this is troubling. My question is, is the
intelligence community supporting efforts to ensure that the
computer networks and personal devices of the President-elect
and his transition team are protected from continued influence?
Director Clapper. It's my understanding that they are very,
very sensitive to this threat, and we've done what we can to
educate the transition team about the pitfalls of mobile
devices in secure areas and the like.
Senator Harris. Do you believe your education efforts have
been successful?
Director Clapper. You'd have to ask them, I think.
Senator Harris. What about the President-elect's Twitter
account, and in particular what is being done to safeguard his
phone and account, given the potentially dire national security
consequences of an infiltration?
Director Clapper. Probably best left to a closed
environment to talk about that.
Senator Harris. Okay.
Director Comey, this is more of a comment than a question,
but I wanted to echo the points made by Senators Wyden and
King. I understand why the FBI could not disclose and comment
on ongoing investigations. However, it seems that, despite past
precedent, the new standard that was created over the summer
and fall regarding the investigation into Secretary Clinton's
email server was that there was a unique public interest in the
transparency of that issue.
Particularly given the findings of your report, I am not
sure I can think of an issue of more serious public interest
than this one. This Committee needs to understand what the FBI
does and does not know about campaign communications with
Russia, and I hope that we can follow up on this in closed
session to have more of an idea of what the FBI knows and what
we might do to prevent any further harm.
Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to each
of you for your service to the country and for the people you
represent, who faithfully discharge their duties daily, many
times unheralded.
I wanted to ask first of all, there seems to be a disparity
between the RNC servers and the DNC servers in terms of their
vulnerability. Admiral Rogers, this perhaps is a good question
for you. Is good practice in terms of defenses important in
terms of securing information like that that was stolen in
these hacks?
Admiral Rogers. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. Would this also be--would your concerns
about the vulnerability of a private server also extend to
government officials using private email servers and engaging
in an exchange of classified information on those private email
servers?
Admiral Rogers. I would argue everyone needs to have an
awareness of how they communicate, whether we're talking
personal or at work. That's the nature of the world we find
ourselves in.
Senator Cornyn. And to do so in compliance with the law,
the protocol, etcetera, of the Federal Government.
When did the Russians first begin to hack U.S. networks,
Admiral Rogers?
Admiral Rogers. With respect to this particular issue?
Senator Cornyn. No. I'm just wondering, how long has this
been going on?
Admiral Rogers. Since the 1990s, off the top of my head.
Senator Cornyn. So while this has certainly become much
more visible and focused, given the focus of the effort, this
really is a longstanding effort by nation-states, including
Russia, to hack into our networks, correct?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, we have seen longstanding efforts to
hack into our networks.
Senator Cornyn. This was perhaps unusual--maybe I should
ask you--in that there was a coordination between the hacking
and the propaganda efforts of Russia in order to try to
undermine the legitimacy of the election process. Director
Clapper, would you agree with that statement?
Director Clapper. Yes, orchestrated by the intelligence
services.
Senator Cornyn. Is this the first time in your experience
where you've seen that sort of multi-layered, multi-faceted
coordination between propaganda efforts and hacking into our
networks, or is this a new normal?
Director Clapper. Well, it's a progression of capabilities
as they've acquired them and used them. They certainly have
longstanding practices like that against European countries.
Senator Cornyn. What has the United States done since--the
United States Government or--let's start with the U.S.
Government. What have we done to respond to the hackings that
have been occurring in U.S. networks since the 1990s in order
to discourage or deter that sort of activity?
Director Clapper. Well, we've tried to up our game
defensively. We have selectively responded. The Sony Picture
attack comes to mind, and certainly there was a response to
this, this case. But the issue, as I said earlier, is if
nation-states are conducting espionage against one another,
which we do as well, as many other nation-states, that's--and
if the standard is to punish because of the conduct of detected
espionage, well, that's another policy call.
Senator Cornyn. As I recall, during the publicity about the
Sony hack there was a lot of discussion as to how do you
characterize this? Was this an act of war, was this a
commercial--criminal activity involving a commercial
enterprise? How do you think about that? Have we gotten better
about characterizing the nature of the attack?
Director Clapper. Well, we in the intelligence community,
particularly the Bureau, I think do an excellent job of
attribution. Then of course the hard part is what, if anything,
to do about it. Again, I would repeat what was said earlier
about, against a cyber activity is the best response a counter-
cyber activity or not? In the end, that wasn't the case with
the Sony attack.
Senator Cornyn. Well, there could be multiple options, as I
think you alluded to. It doesn't need to just be cyber for
cyber. There are a multitude of retaliatory options, correct?
Director Clapper. Exactly, yes, sir. That was the point I
think that Admiral Rogers and I made to the Senate Armed
Services Committee when we had this discussion there Thursday.
Senator Cornyn. Perhaps this is heresy since I'm a new
Member of the Intelligence Committee, but let me just give you
my impression: that we have so fractured the jurisdiction of
oversight of cyber issues that we need to figure out some
better whole-of-government approach. I see Senator Reed smiling
because, of course, the Armed Services Committee has some
involvement in this; Homeland Security and Government Affairs.
But we need to figure out some way, I think, to deal with a
whole-of-government approach so we are working as efficiently
and effectively as possible. I know from what I read in the
newspaper President-elect Trump has said he wants to commission
a study to come back to him within 90 days, if I'm not
mistaken, with some recommendations in that regard. We would
certainly welcome your insight and advice.
Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for your dedicated service to the Nation for many, many, years.
The non-classified intelligence assessment which is
available to the public concludes that, quote: ``Putin, his
advisers, and the Russian government developed a clear
preference for President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton,''
close quote, in part because, quote, ``Putin has had many
positive experiences working with Western political leaders
whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with
Russia, such as former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.''
Either General Clapper or Director Comey, does the
community have any intelligence that suggests that President-
elect Trump or those close to him may have business interests
that made them more disposed to deal with Russia?
Director Clapper. The Russians just believed or came to the
conclusion that, because the President-elect is a businessman,
that he would be easier to make deals with than the Democrats.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Director Clapper, at the Armed Services Committee hearing I
asked you whether, given the scope and the difficulty of hiding
all the different aspects of this comprehensive campaign, was
this--first, was Putin advised that there was a significant
chance of being discovered? And second, did he disregard that
because he wanted to send a message as well as being disruptive
of our process? And you deferred that response until after you
had briefed the President and the President-elect. Can you add
anything to that?
Director Clapper. I'm sorry, sir. Would you repeat the
question?
Senator Reed. Given the multiple aspects of this campaign--
the hacking, the trolling, the social media--the idea that this
could be done unnoticed--and given the scale and the intent--
would be unnoticed, raises one question at least: Was he in any
way advised that, you're taking a risk here? And second, did he
disregard that risk, not only to be disruptive, but also to
signal to the world that he is prepared to engage in this cyber
operation and send us a signal?
Director Clapper. Well, I think, as we've seen, he I think
always feels that, or felt, that he had deniability. And of
course, that's what--both the Russian government and the
Russian media are denying any culpability. And we're somewhat
restricted because of our sources and methods concerns about
showing our hand, showing our deck here, so to speak, and what
led us to those conclusions that we feel so strongly about.
So he knows that. He's a professional intelligence officer
and he probably understands our approach to the protection of
sources and methods, and so he can just deny it and get away
with it.
Senator Reed. Let me just a final point here----
Director Brennan. If I could add, Senator.
Senator Reed. Yes.
Director Brennan. When this started to break in the press
in early August, I had a conversation with the director of the
FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, and told him clearly that if Russia
was doing this they were playing with fire and it would
backfire and they would be roundly condemned by not only the
U.S. Government, but also the American people.
And he said he would relay that to Mr. Putin at the time.
He denied any activity along these lines, but I made it very
clear to him that basically we were onto him.
Senator Reed. A final point. Everyone has indicated and the
report indicates that there was an effort made against the
Democratic political campaigns and Republican political
campaigns, but one was much more aggressive, frankly, than the
other in terms of finding ways into the servers of not only the
DNC, but the individual Democratic operatives.
Given what you posit as the goal of Putin, which was to
discredit Secretary Clinton as much as possible, assuming she
might be President, or in some way disrupting her campaign, it
seems to me, at least to me, logical that they would devote
those kind of resources to, one, to going after Democratic
computers rather than resources to Republicans. Is that borne
out by your analysis, Director Clapper?
Director Clapper. Yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, after
sitting through this, to put this in perspective for the
American people, those of us who are involved in intelligence
matters at the dais here, for that matter at the table, I doubt
there was anyone who was shocked or even mildly surprised when
these facts came out.
This hacking business is ubiquitous and it has been since
the internet was set up. The question was asked, when did
Russia start this? I would expect it was the day that they
hooked up to the internet. This goes on constantly, and as
we've been sitting here there have been thousands of efforts
against U.S. entities, U.S. computers, government, non-
government, and that's just in the U.S. This has been going on
all over the world.
Those of us who engage in this and have watched these
things, most of which have never become public, on a scale of
one to 10, we've seen a number of 10s. This one doesn't come
close to a 10. But the interesting thing is, because it's been
in the political--it's in the political spectrum, it has caught
the fancy of the media, it's caught the fancy of the American
people.
Russia is not in my judgment the most aggressive actor in
this business. I think there are other actors that are much
more aggressive, and indeed I think much more dangerous. It
isn't limited to state actors. There's state actors, there's
non-state actors, and there's combinations. They go after
everything.
The criminal element is particularly troubling to a lot of
people. I just heard Director Clapper. I think it's the first
time I've ever heard an admission by an intelligence person
that the U.S. does espionage. By that I think he's inferring,
in the context we're in, that the U.S. does this. Now, I am not
confirming that. I'll leave that to Mr. Clapper to do.
But nonetheless, the other interesting thing I've found is
that I think I agree with Director Clapper entirely that you
want to be careful here when you're talking about how you're
going to respond to this. If it's responded to with a similar
type of hacking, that escalates very, very quickly. We've sat
through, actually gamed out what would happen in the situation
where we had an actual hacking and then decided how we were
going to respond to it, and if we did how the other side would
respond to it.
The good that has come out of all of this is that finally I
think the American people are getting a picture of how big
this, how ubiquitous it is, how dangerous it is, and that
something has to be done about it. Director Clapper I think is
correct that our response has been to up our game as far as our
defensive posture is concerned. Really, that is where the focus
needs to be.
Again, one would hope we could find the silver bullet where
you could stand up a defense and say: Look, it's there; this
can never be penetrated; anything that happens behind this wall
is just fine. I don't know if I'll live to see that day. I
don't know if anybody will.
But in any event, it is good that we have this on the
table. It's good that we're having the discussion about it. And
I'm hoping that everyone will be patient with us and will be
supportive as we do our best to up our game, to defend on these
things, particularly in the realm of most of the challenges
that the government generally and the public generally doesn't
hear about, but the intelligence community does.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Risch.
The vote has started. Senator Warner would like a question
and a clarification. I have a clarification. Do any other
members seek anything in this open session?
[No response.]
If not, I'll recognize Senator Warner.
Vice Chairman Warner. My question is this. One, I'm
intrigued by my colleague's comments. Many of us felt the
conclusions were accurate. In many ways, it was the President-
elect until Friday who was questioning these results.
I believe--and I would go back to my comments in my first
line of questions, when all four of you, with literally
hundreds of years of experience, said you have never seen
anything in your career that approaches this level of Russian
activities. We can debate who is the most serious threat, but
anyone that underestimates the seriousness of this Russian
threat I think does so at their own peril.
I want to ask you, Director Comey, and then I want to get a
clarification. If a thief came up to the DNC and broke in and
stole all of the most valuable information, and that same thief
then drove up to the RNC and, because they had a better lock on
the door, was only able to break in and get some old
information, would both of those be crimes and would both of
those be prosecuted?
Director Comey. Sure, yes.
Vice Chairman Warner. Director Clapper, one thing that I
want to clarify, because I think, particularly with Senator
Collins, there might have been some ambiguity. The conclusion
you reached that the Russian government at its highest levels
was targeting Clinton and favoring Putin was not the result
simply of more--I'm sorry, favoring Trump and disfavoring
Clinton--was not the result simply of more leakage on the
Democratic side, but I believe, based upon page 1 of your
unclassified report, is that Putin most likely wanted to
discredit Clinton since he'd publicly blamed her since 2011 and
then a series of other activities. That conclusion of favoring
Trump and not favoring Clinton was not simply the result of
disproportionate leaking on the Democratic side; is that
correct? I just want to clarify that for the record.
Director Clapper. You mean just by virtue of the hacking?
Vice Chairman Warner. My understanding, I was left with the
impression that the reason you reached the conclusion that
there was favoring of Trump over Clinton was because of the
disproportionate releasing of information. I've seen in the
non-classified report lots of evidence that it was ongoing
concerns between Putin and Clinton.
Director Clapper. Clearly, one aspect of this. But we
reviewed the totality of what they were doing. Whether by this
means or by the multi-faceted propaganda campaign, the use of
social media tools, planting fake news, there was a campaign,
all of which clearly seemed to favor, clearly favored----
Vice Chairman Warner. Including after the election----
Director Clapper [continuing]. A preference for the
President-elect over Secretary Clinton.
Vice Chairman Warner. Including after the election, the
fact that Russian efforts to discredit the electoral process in
America stopped?
Director Clapper. Well, I think that was an overall
objective throughout, to accomplish that objective, then as
things moved on and progressed clearly a proclivity for the
President-elect and an attempt to denigrate Secretary Clinton.
Director Comey. If I might add, Senator, that's the
challenge of the unclassified forum. There's more behind that
conclusion. We just can't talk about it here.
Chairman Burr. Director Clapper, I think this is in the
scope of an open session. You'll tell me if it's not. Is there
any intelligence that Russian leadership, specifically Putin,
directed the GRU or the SVR to penetrate these political
organizations? Or was the leadership involvement in this
process triggered by what they were able to exfiltrate and when
the leadership saw the breadth of information they directed a
disinformation campaign to happen?
Director Clapper. I think, as we said in our October
statement, this came from the highest levels of the government,
and I would assess that there was overall broad direction
given, with execution carried out by the services.
Chairman Burr. So one can take the fact that this has been
a continual fishing process on the part of the Russians that
started in 2014, and from 2014 forward, that was all directed
by the highest echelons of the Russian government?
Director Clapper. Yes. Again, I think it would be best to
get into the details of that in a classified setting.
Chairman Burr. And we will do that.
There are a couple minutes left in a two-vote session. We
will reconvene in the Committee room in closed session at the
completion of that vote. This open hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]
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