Open Hearing: Nomination of Philip S. Goldberg to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and Caryn A. Wagner to be Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security

[Senate Hearing 111-556] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] S. Hrg. 111-556 NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS AND NOMINATION OF PHILIP S. GOLDBERG TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ DECEMBER 1, 2009 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-433 WASHINGTON : 2009 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BILL NELSON, Florida SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio ---------- David Grannis, Staff Director Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- DECEMBER 1, 2009 OPENING STATEMENTS Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1 Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri....................................................... 3 WITNESSES Wagner, Caryn A., Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis-Designate............................ 4 Goldberg, Philip S., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research-Designate............................ 6 Prepared statement........................................... 8 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees for Caryn A. Wagner...................................................... 20 Prehearing Questions for the Record and Responses of Ms. Wagner.. 33 Questions for the Record and Responses of Ms. Wagner............. 53 Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated November 17, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report for Ms. Wagner.......................................... 59 Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees for Philip S. Goldberg.................................................... 69 Prehearing Questions for the Record and Responses of Mr. Goldberg 90 Questions for the Record and Responses of Mr. Goldberg........... 105 Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated November 2, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report for Mr. Goldberg........................................ 110 NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS AND NOMINATION OF PHILIP S. GOLDBERG TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ---------- TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2009 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, and Risch. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA Chairman Feinstein. The meeting will come to order. The committee meets today to consider two nominations to the intelligence community in positions that require Senate confirmation. They are Ambassador Philip Goldberg, nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which we fondly know as INR, and Ms. Caryn Wagner, nominated to be Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, or I&A. I'd like to welcome both of you and say congratulations. Both individuals were nominated by President Obama on October 26th. They have since met with me and other members of the committee and have responded to numerous prehearing questions. Their responses are now posted on the Intelligence Committee's website for public view. Interestingly enough, both nominees come from different backgrounds and are nominated to lead two very different intelligence organizations. Ambassador Goldberg is nominated to lead an organization with a very distinguished and respected history. The State Department Bureau of Intelligence & Research conducts all- source intelligence analysis to advise the Secretary of State and other senior department officials and serves as an active participant in intelligence community-wide analytic products. Its analysts, while far fewer in number than the all-source analysis organizations at the CIA and DIA, are highly expert in their fields and have no qualms about vocally dissenting from judgments they believe to be incorrect or unsubstantiated, and that's very much appreciated. One example of importance to me was INR's view in the 2002 NIE on Iraq that Iraq was not reconstituting nuclear weapons, especially due to INR's different view on the use of aluminum tubes in centrifuges. That obviously proved to be correct. Ambassador Goldberg himself has been long involved in national security issues and has received intelligence throughout his career but has no past experience inside the intelligence community. We will be very interested in hearing Ambassador Goldberg's views on his preparations to assume the responsibility. Ambassador Goldberg is a career Foreign Service officer. He has distinguished himself over a 20-year period, including Charge d'affaires and Deputy Chief of mission in Santiago, Chile, Chief of Mission in Pristina, Kosovo, and United States Ambassador to Bolivia. Since June he has served as the coordinator for the implementation of United Nations resolutions on North Korea. Earlier in his career he served in Bogota, Colombia, and Pretoria, South Africa. Of particular note is his being declared persona non grata by Bolivian President Evo Morales in September of 2008. The committee has looked at this incident, and members may have a few questions, but it's pretty clear to me that Ambassador Goldberg had no blame in this matter. Ms. Wagner, by contrast, is a career intelligence professional, beginning as an Army SIGINT officer and rising to the level of captain. After three years on the House Intelligence Committee, Ms. Wagner joined the senior ranks of the DIA before becoming Director of the Intelligence Community Management staff, and subsequently the Assistant Deputy DNI and chief financial officer. She returned to the House Intelligence Committee as budget director and is now a faculty member of the Intelligence and Security Academy, LLC. She is being nominated to head the Office of Intelligence & Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, which, unlike INR, is a young intelligence organization and one that has struggled to identify a clear mission and bring together an appropriate workforce. We have discussed that earlier. The committee's report accompanying the FY 2010 intelligence authorization bill noted some of these concerns. They include that, as of this summer, contract personnel make up a staggering 63 percent of the workforce of the Office of Intelligence & Analysis, including a large percentage of its intelligence analysts. In my view, this is an inherently governmental function and should be done by the government, not by contractors. The office has written analysis that inappropriately analyzed legitimate activities of U.S. persons based in part on highly questionable and non-credible open-source information. In addition, the office has numerous and unclear missions, some of which overlap with work being done by other departments. According to the Homeland Security Institute, the office is unstable and lacks structures for budget and management accountability. I discussed that this morning with Mrs. Wagner, and I actually believe she's up to it. So we'll see what comes. I'm told that the Office of Intelligence & Analysis has been drafting a plan to restructure and refine its mission, but the plan won't be finalized until a new Under Secretary is confirmed. So that will be clearly, Ms. Wagner, your first big job. I think this committee will be very interested in your views as a professional on what the office should be doing and how it should be structured or restructured. Again, I welcome both witnesses, and I will turn to the Vice Chairman for any opening comments he might have. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. You've laid down a tough gauntlet. We welcome both of the nominees and ask, do you have family members here or close friends who are supporting you today? Ms. Wagner? Ms. Wagner. Yes. Thank you, Senator Bond. My husband, Chad Lash, is here with me. And I have numerous friends which I won't name, because I will no doubt forget one. But I thank you. Vice Chairman Bond. We will recognize your husband. Welcome, sir. Ambassador. Ambassador Goldberg. I have my colleagues from the State Department. Vice Chairman Bond. Well, thank you very much. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI Vice Chairman Bond. While the public of ten hears about other elements of the intelligence community, the office each of you is nominated to head, INR at State and Intelligence & Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, can and should be making valuable contributions to the community and to our national security. As the Chairman said, I also have had conversations with you and pointed out some things where we think you can enhance and improve the operations of intelligence. Now, Ambassador Goldberg, the Chair stole one of my best lines, but I wanted to say that few people in history can claim the honor of being expelled by the likes of Evo Morales. So it's clear that you've already chalked up a major accomplishment, at least in my book, and I congratulate you on that. I'm interested to hear how you expect your experiences in Bolivia and other diplomatic posts will help you head an analytic shop. Ms. Wagner, a few months ago at a reception I had the pleasure of sitting next to a former MI-5 official who shared some insights on the importance in this war on terror of forging solid and productive relationships among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. His point to me was that what the Brits do and we do not do is use the contacts we have, the continuing contacts we have with state and local officials, to task them to bring information up the chain of command. We send information down, but a local police department or a local sheriff's office is far more likely to know when or hear when something amiss is going on in their community and report that back up the chain. So we've talked about that. And I think that while it's very important--and I hear complaints that not enough intelligence is being pushed downstream--there may not be enough intelligence coming upstream from thousands of communities. And we hope that you will pursue that. We can make fusion centers work, but there's a lot of intelligence, I believe, that can be best gathered at the local level. On the federal level, we need to make a firmer commitment to training these local authorities to identify and collect the intelligence. Now, Ms. Wagner, if you're confirmed, I expect you'll work closely with Director Mueller and the Attorney General in the coming months to make better training programs a reality. They can be done without a lot of additional cost, but the benefits will more than compensate for any price they cost. Madam Chair, I'm sure that both of these nominees are anxiously awaiting our questions, and even more importantly, their exit strategy from Hart 216. So with that, I congratulate them on their nominations and look forward to hearing from them today. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. Ms. Wagner, why don't we begin with you, if that's all right? STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS-DESIGNATE Ms. Wagner. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein, Senator Bond. I'm honored to appear before you today as the nominee for Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. I believe this position occupies a unique mission space between the national intelligence and law enforcement communities and the state, local, tribal and private sector entities that are the front lines of homeland security. There's nothing more important than forging and fostering those connections. If confirmed, I believe I have the right skills to continue building on the foundation laid by Pat Hughes, Charlie Allen and the current acting Under Secretary, Bart Johnson. I began my intelligence career as a signals intelligence officer in the United States Army, serving eight years on active duty. In the years since, I have spent seven and a half years at DIA, five years on the staff at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, three years in the private sector and three years with the ODNI. I've had a mixture of staff and line management jobs, including leading a 2,000-person analytic organization within the Defense Intelligence Agency. I've also had a great deal of experience in an interagency environment, and I'm familiar with all facets of the intelligence community. While my experience with law enforcement has been more limited, I have had significant exposure while working at the DNI and in Congress to the capabilities and contributions of national law enforcement and homeland security agencies. I know I have much to learn about state, local and tribal law enforcement, which is why, if confirmed, I'm eager to get started with the help of Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis Bart Johnson, who's a highly respected and decorated veteran of the New York State police force and who's done an outstanding job as acting Under Secretary for the past six months. I've had the opportunity to observe the Office of Intelligence & Analysis from the outside while I served in the Office of the DNI and on the HPSCI staff, and I am aware of the many challenges that the organization faces. Since my nomination, I've learned more about I&A's statutory mission, its ongoing activities, and the Secretary's vision about where she would like to take the department. I've formed some preliminary views on what needs to be done to enhance I&A's support to its customers and to the department and to improve its standing within the intelligence community and with its congressional overseers. If confirmed, I plan to focus my initial efforts in three main areas: First, creating a true Homeland Security information-sharing enterprise through greater focus on the state and local fusion centers; second, creating a DHS intelligence enterprise as the chief intelligence officer for the department; and third, putting in place the management processes necessary to improve the morale, efficiency and professionalism of I&A as an organization. The unique niche that DHS I&A occupies is best defined by its responsibility to share information with state, local and tribal authorities and the private sector on the full range of threats to the homeland, often referred to as all threats, all hazards. First responders at the state and local level are the nation's first line of defense. They are uniquely able to identify anomalous or criminal behavior that could have a terrorist nexus. It's critical to educate them on terrorist indicators as they are identified, to capture information that is lawfully obtained while strictly adhering to privacy, civil rights and civil liberties regulations, and share it with the wider enterprise. This is a multi-faceted challenge that requires adapting analytic methodologies and product lines, a great deal of training at all levels of the enterprise and IT and information-sharing solutions to enable two-way information flow. It also requires an approach that is tailored to the different threat and operational realities of the individual fusion centers. If confirmed, I intend to develop a comprehensive multi- year strategic plan for supporting the state and local fusion centers that can be used to guide resource and analytic planning. The role of the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department was created by Secretary Chertoff to empower the Under Secretary to create a DHS intelligence enterprise that was more than the sum of its parts. DHS' operational components have intelligence elements that support their individual missions and they also have data and expertise that can be leveraged by I&A in support of departmental priorities or national, state, local and tribal clients, while strictly adhering to privacy, civil rights and civil liberties regulations. In addition, the components may have intelligence or information requirements that are not adequately being met. I&A can help to meet these requirements by leveraging the rest of the intelligence community on their behalf, producing tailored products for or with them, providing analytic training and mentoring, and serving as an advocate for increasing their capabilities. By leveraging both the components' and I&A capabilities, we can build on recent progress to create a true intelligence enterprise that enables I&A and the Department to achieve their full potential and best serve their customers. If confirmed, I will view the role of Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department as one of the most important of my missions, and put in place a staff structure to manage it. Finally, in the management arena, I&A is still a young organization, and several recent studies have suggested that it suffers from a lack of institutionalized processes and from poor morale. If confirmed, one of my biggest priorities will be developing and formalizing internal processes for planning, programming and budgeting, for performance measurement and human capital management, measurement, and most certainly I will be taking a hard look at contractors. I believe that communicating clear mission guidance, implementing fair and transparent processes for hiring, promoting, and rewarding people and developing a structured and inclusive process for building the budget will go a long way towards improving morale. If confirmed, I also plan to make training a centerpiece of my agenda. I've already mentioned the importance of training to building information-sharing and intelligence enterprises, but it is equally important for professional development and morale within I&A. If confirmed, I will focus on ensuring that I&A analysts receive the tradecraft training they need. Finally, if confirmed, I will work hard to establish and maintain constructive partnerships, particularly with the Office of the DNI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI and the Congress. If confirmed, I pledge to keep you fully informed of I&A's progress and activities. Thank you very much. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Goldberg-- Ambassador I should say. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP S. GOLDBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH-DESIGNATE Ambassador Goldberg. Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, it is a great honor to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I am grateful to the President and Secretary of State Clinton for their confidence in nominating me for this position, as well as to the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, for his support in my nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to work closely with this Committee as it plays a vital role in the oversight of the intelligence community. Madam Chairman, INR has been a treasured source of information and analysis for policymakers for more than 60 years. INR is also a deeply respected voice within the intelligence community. INR's success has not been based on its size or budget. Rather, it has been based on the extraordinary experience, judgment and analytical skill of its personnel. INR's well-earned reputation for insight and professionalism is based on a mix of civil and foreign service personnel, a combination of those who spend years and often decades on an issue, buttressed by those with recent experience in our embassies overseas. If confirmed, I will work to enhance the ability of these fine professionals to do their jobs through training, academic opportunities, and service overseas. And I will work to recruit the finest people available. I will also defend both the process of independent and unbiased analysis as well as the people who produce it. As you point out, Madam Chairman, the people of INR have in recent times won praise for the quality of their work as well as sticking to their analytic conclusions when necessary. INR has another essential role: assuring that intelligence activities are consistent with, and supportive of, our foreign policy and national security objectives. In this area too, INR is fortunate to have a staff of professionals who have special expertise and years of experience in often very technical areas. If confirmed, I look forward to working with these professionals to support the Secretary and Department in assuring that foreign policy concerns are a central consideration in intelligence community decisions and activities. I will also work with the relevant committees of Congress as they carry out their essential oversight roles. Madam Chairman, I believe that, if confirmed, I would bring a set of skills and experience to the job of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research that will add to the value of the bureau. While I have not previously served in a position in the intelligence community, I've had extensive and relevant experience in almost all aspects of INR's core functions. I have worked closely with analysts in the intelligence community as a political, economic and biographic officer at embassies overseas in helping to produce analytical products. In addition, I have myself produced analytic products for policymakers, from assignments in embassies as well as in Washington. This experience has given me a strong appreciation for the independence, intellectual rigor, experience and personal integrity that contribute to good analytical products. Having worked on policy matters in four geographic bureaus and on the seventh floor of the department, I have a strong appreciation for how intelligence can best support diplomacy and its practitioners. This is INR's primary mission. As a Charge d'affaires and two-time chief of mission, I have ensured that intelligence and law enforcement activities were carried out in support of foreign policy and national security objectives. Most recently, I have served as Coordinator for Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, a job that requires analysis of intelligence information and close coordination with other intelligence community members. My experience leading large and complex missions overseas, as well as managerial assignments at the State Department, have prepared me to lead this large bureau. Madam Chairman, we live in a time of enormous foreign policy and national security challenges. On issues of war and peace, nonproliferation, climate change, and the economic and financial situation around the globe, our leaders need and deserve the very best information and analysis before making difficult decisions. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues to make sure that happens. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Goldberg follows.] Prepared Statement of Philip S. Goldberg, Nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a great honor to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). I am grateful to the President and Secretary of State Clinton for their confidence in nominating me for this position, as well as to the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, for his support of my nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to work closely with this Committee as it plays a vital role in dealing with the many difficult and complex issues that confront the United States around the world. Madam Chairman, INR has been a treasured source of information and analysis for policymakers for more than 60 years. INR is also a deeply respected voice within the Intelligence Community. INR's success has not been based on its size or budget. Rather, it has been based on the extraordinary experience, judgment and analytical skill of its personnel. The Bureau's personnel define expertise--an average of 10 years on account among all analysts, a third of the analytical body with PhDs in their areas, and most analysts with command of the language or languages relevant to their portfolios. INR's well-earned reputation for insight and professionalism is based on a mix of Civil and Foreign Service personnel--a combination of those who spend years and often decades on an issue, buttressed by those with recent experience in the field. If confirmed, I will work to enhance the ability of these fine professionals to do their jobs through training, academic opportunities, and service overseas. I will work to recruit the finest people available. I will work to defend both the process of independent and unbiased analysis as well as the people who produce it. If confirmed, I would be proud to lead a group of people who have in recent times won praise for both the quality of its work as well as its willingness to stick to its analytic conclusions when necessary. INR has another essential role: assuring that intelligence activities are consistent with, and supportive of, our foreign policy and national security objectives. In this area too, INR is fortunate to have a staff of professionals who have special expertise and years of experience in often very technical areas. If confirmed, I look forward to working with these professionals to support the Secretary and Department in assuring that foreign policy concerns are a central consideration in Intelligence Community decisions and activities. I will also work with the relevant committees of Congress as they carry out their essential oversight roles. Madam Chairman, I believe that, if confirmed, I would bring a set of skills and experience to the job of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research that will add to the value of the bureau. While I have not previously served in a position in the Intelligence Community, I have had extensive and relevant experience in almost all aspects of INR's core functions. As a political, economic and biographic officer at embassies overseas, I have worked closely with analysts in the Intelligence Community to produce analytical products. In addition, I have myself produced analytic reports for policymakers, from assignments in embassies overseas as well as in Washington. This experience has given me a strong appreciation for the independence, intellectual rigor, experience and personal integrity that contribute to good analytical products. Having worked on policy matters in four geographic bureaus and on the seventh floor of the department, I have a strong appreciation for how intelligence can best support diplomacy and its practitioners. This is INR's primary mission. As a Charge d'affaires and two-time chief of mission, I have ensured that intelligence and law enforcement activities were carried out in support of foreign policy and national security objectives. Most recently, I have served as Coordinator for Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, a job that requires analysis of intelligence information and close coordination with other IC members. My experience leading large and complex missions overseas, as well as managerial assignments at the State Department, have prepared me to lead this large bureau. Madam Chairman, we live in a time of enormous foreign policy and national security challenges. On issues of war and peace, nonproliferation, climate change, and the economic and financial situation around the globe, our leaders need and deserve the very best information and analysis before making difficult decisions. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues to make sure that happens. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you both very, very much. I have a list of four questions that we ask all nominees, if you would just respond yes or no to each of them. The first is do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? Ambassador Goldberg. Yes. Ms. Wagner. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. I often wonder what we would do if someone said no. Okay. Vice Chairman Bond. We would confirm them. Chairman Feinstein. Yes. Vice Chairman Bond. I gather Ms. Wagner nodded yes. Chairman Feinstein. She said yes. Vice Chairman Bond. I didn't hear her up here. Chairman Feinstein. I heard her. Do you agree to send officials from your respective organizations to appear before the committee and designated staff when requested? Ms. Wagner. Yes. Ambassador Goldberg. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents and any other material requested by the committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Ms. Wagner. To the best of my ability yes. Ambassador Goldberg. The same, to the best of my ability yes. Chairman Feinstein. What does that mean? Ambassador Goldberg. As far as the INR bureau goes and as far as I'm concerned, I will share whatever we can. There are some issues that from time to time might come up about document executive privilege and the rest that might be beyond my control to share. Chairman Feinstein. Well, let me just say this is the first time anybody has qualified their answer, and that's going to have to be looked into more deeply because this committee expects to get documents it requests. We are the oversight committee and to have intelligence agencies without the ability to conduct oversight is not acceptable to us. Ambassador Goldberg. No, I---- Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, I might add that the President has a right to declare things at higher security levels and we would, before we would accept that, we would need to know from the White House that this was something over which they're exercising their national security authority. Chairman Feinstein. Well, that's right, Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Bond. And we would carry our argument down to 1600. Chairman Feinstein. That's right. And executive privilege can't be a drift net to pick up everything that people don't want to have oversight about. And that's where we become the guardian angel, so to speak. Ambassador Goldberg [continuing]. Absolutely. Chairman Feinstein. Just so you understand that. Ambassador Goldberg. Madam Chairman, I didn't at all mean to say otherwise. We, from our point of view and from my point of view, would share all information requested by the committee. That was the qualification and it really isn't a qualification; it's something that would be beyond my control. Chairman Feinstein. Well, I just want everybody to know if the committee were to ask for it, we expect to get it unless there's not a good reason---- Ambassador Goldberg. I understand. Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Or you're going to have to tangle with us and you don't want to do that. Ambassador Goldberg. No. Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Last question. Will you ensure that your respective offices provide such material to the committee when requested? Ambassador Goldberg. Yes. Ms. Wagner. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Let me ask each one of you one question and then I'll move on. Ms. Wagner, in testimony before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on September 30 of this year, DHS Secretary Napolitano noted that I&A is ``currently undergoing an important realignment to strengthen the delivery of useful, actionable intelligence to state and local law enforcement based on their particular needs.'' Here's the question. Have you been briefed on this realignment and do you support it? Ms. Wagner. Yes, Madam Chairman, I have been briefed. And the realignment is still ongoing. It has not been finalized, but Bart Johnson did brief me on what he is proposing to do at the top level. I think it makes sense, but I would like to reserve the right, if confirmed, to be able to make adjustments to that, and so I would prefer to come up and brief you after I'm confirmed, if I'm confirmed, on where that is. Chairman Feinstein. Well, if I understand you correctly, you're saying that you will have some input into the realignment. Ms. Wagner. Yes, Madam Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. And therefore it is not finalized and that you would---- Ms. Wagner. It is not finalized. Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Well, we will take you at your word because I think it's fair to say that there's some weaknesses in your area and we'd like to see them corrected, so the correction that you can bring about could be very important and we'd like to have you discuss that with us, if that's agreeable with you. Ms. Wagner. Yes, Madam Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Let me move to Mr. Goldberg. We talked this morning about the fact that you have not previously worked in an intelligence agency or produced intelligence analysis. Now, you do have significant experience in a lot of different areas--in receiving it in particular. And so, in my view at least, you're clearly qualified for this work. But can you give the committee some specific examples from your background of when you have provided judgments that run counter to policy preferences? Ambassador Goldberg. I think the kinds of policy analysis and just plain analytical work that I've done, particularly on the Balkans in the 1990s, oftentimes was in a difficult atmosphere. When we were debating within the United States government about whether to intervene first in Bosnia, later in Kosovo, and those kinds of issues were ones that I was fortunate enough to be able to weigh in on and give my unvarnished view on, I think in part because of the people I worked for, but also because I felt that it was important to do so. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. I'm not going to ask you what your views were, but I think it's very important. One of the things that we want to see are really independent intelligence agencies that give policymakers the unvarnished truth as they see it and are not swayed by what they perceive an administration or anybody else for that matter might want. Ambassador Goldberg. Absolutely. I agree. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair. Following up, Ms. Wagner, on the questions from the Chair, what do you think should be the primary focus of I&A-- operational support of its components and fusion centers, disseminating finished intelligence products and unclassified information, or some other thing? And what would be your priorities? Ms. Wagner. Senator Bond, I think that the primary mission of I&A is spelled out in the legislation. What Congress expects of it is to share information with the state, local, tribal, and private sector entities. And I&A, as far as I can tell, is the only element of the intelligence community that views those people as its primary customer set. It also, as a departmental intelligence element, has the responsibility to support the other elements of the department and to sort of orchestrate the intelligence symphony, if you will, of the intelligence elements within the various components. So I think those two things are key, but it also goes back to what you had said in your opening comments, that sharing flows both ways. We need to make sure that they're the clients, but we also need to be aware that they have a wealth of information that needs to be synthesized and analyzed and shared with the larger intelligence community to support national intelligence as well. Vice Chairman Bond. Do you think you'd be able to provide training for the representatives of the local law enforcement agencies so they will be able to carry back to their forces, to their teams, what information, what activities may be useful? Do you see that being---- Ms. Wagner. I do. I think that the department and I&A can do a lot by providing training. I know the Secretary wants to support analytic excellence at the fusion centers. That's certainly an area where I&A can help with training, and the department is already helping with developing training on ensuring that privacy, civil rights and civil liberties are protected. And at the fusion centers there's a great deal that can be done, and I think training is a key element. Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. Thank you, Ms. Wagner. Ambassador, you said, ``On issues of war and peace, nonproliferation, climate change and the economic and financial situation around the globe, our leaders need and deserve the very best information and analysis before making difficult decisions.'' Do you really believe that studying climate change is really the best use of our limited intelligence analysis resources? Ambassador Goldberg. I believe that it is one area. It is largely a scientific issue and probably not INR's--necessarily its competence to judge. But we are involved in negotiations in the climate change area, and policymakers would need information and analysis on the positions of others and how they would approach these issues. And so it would be more in line with our more traditional diplomatic role. Vice Chairman Bond. All right. Well, I assume, given recent revelations, you might be looking into the process of some of the analysis that came out of certain so-called scientific institutions. But that may be beyond your scope. I mentioned to you that INR has developed a reputation for being a dissenting voice in intelligence community products. And I think some INR analysts believe this is a positive, but I've heard from others that it may be a negative because continuing dissent may make those views ignored. What's your view about this type of reputation? Is it a problem? What could you do to change the perception without impacting INR's independence? Ambassador Goldberg. I think, Mr. Vice Chairman, that the reputation of INR is also for feistiness and independence, which is something to be encouraged in the production of intelligence analysis. I took your statement very much to heart when we had a chance to meet, and I went back to look at estimates this year. And without going into the details of the estimates, there was less than--I think it was three out of 13 that there were either--two of them were dissents in part and one was more or less a more general dissent. So I don't know that it's a huge issue, but certainly I want to encourage our analysts to use their best judgment and to put their best thoughts forward. That's I think my responsibility. Vice Chairman Bond. Finally, one of the responses you made to the committee's questions--you said the role of the Assistant Secretary is ``to play a key role in assuring that diplomatic and foreign policy positions are represented in the formulation of intelligence policy and activities.'' Can you explain what that means? Ambassador Goldberg. It means, Mr. Vice Chairman, that we have a responsibility to assure that foreign policy concerns are one consideration and that the regional assistant secretaries and the Secretary have a voice in that process. I would view INR's role as very much that of an honest broker because we have a responsibility certainly to the intelligence community and we want to make sure that the intelligence flow continues. But foreign policy is one consideration, and that is a role that is designated to INR and to the State Department, so it's one that within the councils of the IC is one of many factors that would be taken into consideration. Vice Chairman Bond. So policy positions would affect intelligence operations? Ambassador Goldberg. No, sir. Maybe I didn't express it well. It's more of a risk-reward kind of issue, to point out the possible downsides, possible damage, the possible consequences if something happens so that that's known up front before something would occur so that it can be taken into account at that time. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. Senator Whitehouse. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. Could I ask each of you, first of all, about cyber security issues? It does not appear in either of your statements as a matter of concern, and I'm interested in knowing, A--briefly, because my time is short--what type of a priority you think it is, and, B, whether additional efforts on the part of your agency should, you think, be required. Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Senator. I'll take that one. I think it is obviously a critical issue and it is something that I've already looked into in the limited time I've had as a nominee. I know there are ongoing analytic efforts as part of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Analysis effort at the department. I don't know yet whether those are sufficient. I would expect, if I'm confirmed, one of the first things that I plan to do is to go talk to Phil Reitinger, who is the Deputy Under Secretary responsible for cyber, and talk to him about how I&A can effectively team with him to make sure he gets the analytic support that he needs. And I know that as this issue continues to evolve there's probably room to sort out exactly who's going to do what. But it's an area I expect to focus on. I was the cyber security coordinator for the HPSCI before I retired, so I'm very familiar with some of those issues. Senator Whitehouse. Good. Ambassador Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg. Senator, I agree. It is an absolutely critical issue. It's one that INR has taken the lead role in at the State Department in organizing us to deal with a critical issue. We are still in a bit of a state of flux on some of the cyber issues in terms of organization because INR, as the link with the intelligence community, has a very large role, but some of the issues that may be coming up in the years to come will be diplomatic missions, as well, and that's not a traditional INR role. We are organized to deal with the internal issues for the State Department in terms of our cyber issues. I have already had a discussion, a brief one, with General Alexander about some of the larger issues involved. It's going to be a very important foreign policy issue, as well. So we're on it, and we need to continue to follow it very closely and we will. Senator Whitehouse. On a second point, I think there is a strong bipartisan consensus on the part of this committee that we are sick to death of leaks out of the Executive Branch of government. And not only is it a bipartisan concern of this committee, but it's a bipartisan issue. There was leaking like a sieve in the Bush administration. It doesn't seem to have stopped with the change of administrations. And over and over again we are subjected to the unhelpful spectacle of, you know, having our staffs cleared out of a room for some hyper-secure briefing that we then read about a day later in The New York Times. And I would like to hear what--leaking is politics in Washington. It's the way people expand their turf and make their moves, and so a tolerance for it has developed that I think, frankly, needs to be adjusted. And I would like to hear both of you put yourselves on record on the subject of leaks, how seriously you will take their investigations, whether you will engage in them yourselves and how you consider that problem. Again, Ms. Wagner, if you could go first. Ms. Wagner. Well, Senator, I share your concern about leaks and also your perspective on why they happen. I do take them seriously. If I am confirmed and I have reason to believe that anyone in my organization is leaking, I will deal with that as a matter of management accountability. If it rises to a level that it requires that a crimes report be submitted, I would certainly support doing that. So I share your concern, and I'll take every action that I can to ensure that the leaks do not come from I&A if I'm confirmed. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you. Ambassador. Ambassador Goldberg. I share Ms. Wagner's statement. I would add that the personnel at INR are not involved in politics, and they shouldn't be involved in politics. They have no business being involved in politics, and if a leak were to be seen to be coming even from our general direction, it's something I would take very seriously. Senator Whitehouse. And each of you may very well be called upon to be witnesses or to make your staff available as witnesses in investigations of leaks that may take place higher up, but the trail is back through information developed by your organization. I assume I can hear you say that you will provide your full cooperation unstintingly to such investigations? Ambassador Goldberg. Yes. Senator Whitehouse. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Before recognizing Senator Wyden, I'd like to point out that I have appointed a task force on cyber, which is a very serious concern to this committee. Senator Whitehouse heads that task force. Senator Mikulski and Senator Snowe are members, and they will be probably talking with you in a more serious nature at a later time. But it is of major importance to this committee, and I just wanted to have the opportunity to say that. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome to both nominees. Ms. Wagner, it seems to me there are some very serious problems that are now facing the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence unit and I want to ask you specifically about your response to several of those. And let me start by reading you a brief excerpt from a report that the committee approved unanimously earlier this year. And I quote here: ``The committee has raised a number of concerns with reports issued by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis that inappropriately analyzed the legitimate activities of U.S. persons. These reports raised fundamental questions about the mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and often used certain questionable open source information as a basis of their conclusions.'' Now the committee is not talking here about one instance. They are talking about a pattern, and this report was approved unanimously by the entire committee. So my first question is, if you're approved, what specific steps would you take to make sure that the office stops this inappropriate analysis of the legitimate activities of law-abiding Americans? Ms. Wagner. Well, Senator Wyden, I am aware of some of the troubling products that have been released from I&A in the past. And, if I'm confirmed, I intend to attack that several different ways. There are a couple of issues that are reflected in this product. One is basically poor tradecraft, lack of analytical rigor. The other is the problem with the failure to take into proper account privacy, civil rights, civil liberties and First Amendment-protected speech. And the problem with the definitions in one particular product was it did not draw a sufficient distinction between beliefs and actions. So I would put in place a very strict tradecraft training program, to include mentoring for the analysts. I would also ensure that there is training for everyone on the guidelines that we are to follow that flow from E.O. 12333 and have been coordinated with the Justice Department to make sure that all of those concerns vis-a-vis privacy, civil rights and civil liberties are built into the products early on. And, finally, as a sort of insurance measure, I will make sure that there is in place a very thorough vetting process for review before those products are actually released. Senator Wyden. Do you believe that it is ever appropriate for your office to analyze the legitimate activities of law- abiding Americans? Ms. Wagner. No, Senator, I do not. Senator Wyden. Okay. Now, the Homeland Security Institute-- and they're federally funded as a research center--conducted an independent evaluation of the office. The evaluation gave the office an overall ranking of 1.5 out of five with regard--I gather it's called ``general functionality.'' In particular it noted: ``Back office processes are ill-defined, inconsistent and ad hoc.'' And they stated, ``Planning, programming and budget processes are ill-defined and lack division manager involvement.'' Now you are a former chief financial officer for the agency, the budget director for the House Intelligence Committee. I assume you're up on these general issues. Do you agree with the independent evaluation? Ms. Wagner. Senator Wyden, I haven't had an opportunity to be briefed on all these processes in detail, but as far as I know, the evaluation is accurate, and I expect to make addressing those management issues and processes one of my top priorities if I'm confirmed. Senator Wyden. Since I'm running out of time, based on what you know now, what specific steps would you take to address these concerns from the independent analysis? Ms. Wagner. It seems to me that the primary problem is a lack of repeatable and transparent processes that give people trust in the organization and their leadership. And I think I would take steps to put those processes in place. I have done that before as the director for analysis and production at DIA leading a large analytic organization, and I think that I have the ability to address some of those issues. It will take a little bit of time, but I am going to make it a priority. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator. Senator Feingold. Senator Feingold. I thank the Chair and I want to thank the nominees for your willingness to serve in these positions. Last month, I had the pleasure of chairing a nomination hearing for Ambassador Goldberg at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, so I'm going to address my questions to Ms. Wagner today. As Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, you'll have responsibility for setting policies related to the collection, analysis, mining, dissemination and retention of open-source information, including on Americans. And, as I know you're aware, this is an important Homeland Security responsibility, but it's also fraught with privacy and civil liberties implications. For example, DHS sent open-source information to the Maryland state police about the First Amendment-protected protest activities of local anti-war groups, something that Senators Mikulski and Cardin and I expressed concerns about earlier this year. Ms. Wagner, what in your mind constitutes open-source information on Americans? And what is I&A's role in setting policies for how that information can be used? Ms. Wagner. Senator Feingold, I believe there are well- established guidelines and processes already in place that just need to be followed, and the analysts need to be rigorously trained. The language in E.O. 12333 that protects U.S. persons' data hasn't changed since 1981. There are guidelines that I&A is using, should be using, that flow from that, and that, again, have been coordinated with the Department of Justice. I believe that training, oversight and review-and-release mechanisms are critical to ensure that we are only using data that it is appropriate and lawful for us to use in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations. Senator Feingold. Well, Director Blair has said it is one thing for a private company to have detailed private information. It is another for the U.S. government, with all its power and authority, to have the same information. So when is it appropriate for the government to purchase from private companies data on Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing? And should that information be considered open source? Ms. Wagner. I don't believe so, Senator. I think that for us to have information, it needs to be tied to a legitimate intelligence requirement that we can defend. It needs to be consistent with our legal authorities and it needs to be handled consistent with the privacy guidelines that are laid out in the documents that I mentioned earlier. Senator Feingold. Okay. Then would it be fair to say-- because a lot of Americans voluntarily put a lot of information on the Internet to be read by everyone, including government officials, would it be fair to say that there are limits to how much of that information can be retained and when it can be subjected to data mining? Ms. Wagner. Yes, I think there are limits, and, again, I think there are some very crucial legal tests that need to be met in dealing with that information. Senator Feingold. The FBI's authority to collect, retain, and use information on Americans are subject to statute and the Attorney General's guidelines and oversight. This and other committees periodically debate whether those authorities are too broad or not broad enough and whether the checks and balances are adequate, but members of Congress generally know where to look to understand the legal framework for what the FBI does. I&A, on the other hand, is a new institution. It has operated with little specific legal guidance governing intelligence activities that have a potential impact on Americans. Ms. Wagner, as I&A policies continue to take shape, where should this guidance come from? Is there a role for the Department of Justice and have you identified unresolved constitutional or statutory questions or other gaps in the legal guidance currently available to I&A? And if you identified those gaps, how would you go about resolving them? Ms. Wagner. I have not yet identified any gaps, but if I'm confirmed and I do, I think I intend to rely heavily on the department's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Privacy Office. I&A is in the process of hiring its own dedicated privacy officer. I would first look in-house for guidance on how to deal with appropriate information or programs, and then I would expect that we would deal with the Department of Justice if it required any changes to the guidelines that we currently operate under, which we did negotiate and consult with them on. Senator Feingold. Okay. I've long been concerned about the lack of a meaningful standard governing the seizure of travelers' laptop computers by the Department of Homeland Security. Can you tell me what I&A's policy is for obtaining, retaining, analyzing, and disseminating the contents of seized laptops? Ms. Wagner. Senator, as you know, I&A doesn't actually seize the laptops, but under certain circumstances if data that was in the laptops was provided to I&A, we'll treat it in accordance with all of the applicable laws and regulations on analyzing and storing that data. Senator Feingold. Would you commit to considering a policy whereby DHS must seek to obtain a warrant before it can hold the contents of a seized laptop for more than 24 hours? Ms. Wagner. Senator Feingold, I really don't feel I'm in a position to answer that question right now. I just don't know enough to answer it, but I'd be happy to come back and discuss that with you further if I am confirmed. Senator Feingold. Could you get back to me as soon as you can with your response on that? Ms. Wagner. Yes, I can. Senator Feingold. Thank you. I thank the Chair. Senator Wyden [presiding]. I thank my colleague. Senator Risch, welcome. No questions? Senator Risch. Pass. Senator Wyden. Senator Whitehouse, additional questions? Senator Whitehouse. I'm good. Senator Wyden. Ambassador Goldberg, one question for you. What role, in your view, Ambassador, do you believe the Assistant Secretary should play in ensuring that intelligence- sharing relationships support broader diplomatic relationships and, obviously, vice versa? Ambassador Goldberg. Senator, I think intelligence relationships, among others that take place with foreign governments, are very important and very strong contributors to our national security. They have to be done, obviously, with great care. Our particular interest in INR is that the chief of mission and his or her authorities as delegated by the President and the authorities conferred by the President be respected as the oversight for the executive branch at the embassy. That is the particular State Department interest. Senator Wyden. I thank you for that. My colleagues, still no questions? [No response.] Senator Wyden. We don't have anything further. Either of you, is there anything else the two of you would like to add? [No response.] Senator Wyden. The committee is going to have additional questions for the record. So it's clear to all Senators and staff, we ask that Members submit questions by 2:00 on Friday so it will be possible to send them to the nominees. It's the committee's intent to review your responses, and it will be our desire to vote this month. So, with that, the committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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