Open Hearing: Nomination of Nicholas J. Rasmussen to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

[Senate Hearing 113-609] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 113-609 HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF MR. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN TO SERVE AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 29-497 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ANGUS KING, Maine HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio ---------- David Grannis, Staff Director Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- NOVEMBER 20, 2014 OPENING STATEMENTS Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1 WITNESS Rasmussen, Nicholas, Nominee to be Director of the National Counterterrorism Center........................................ 18 Prepared statement........................................... 22 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Letter dated November 15, 2014, from Michael Leiter supporting the nomination................................................. 3 Letter dated November 16, 2014, from Matthew Olsen supporting the nomination..................................................... 5 Letter dated November 14, 2014, from Admiral William McRaven supporting the nomination...................................... 7 Letter dated November 14, 2014, from Sean Joyce supporting the nomination..................................................... 9 Letter dated November 17, 2014, from Juan Zarate supporting the nomination..................................................... 10 Letter dated November 18, 2014, from Thomas E. Donilon supporting the nomination................................................. 13 Letter dated November 18, 2014, from Kenneth Wainstein supporting the nomination................................................. 15 Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 38 Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 61 Questions for the Record......................................... 84 HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF MR. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN TO SERVE AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER ---------- THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:22 p.m. in Room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, Warner, Heinrich, King, Burr, Risch, Rubio, and Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA Chairman Feinstein. Let me just say to the soon-to-be Chairman of this Committee that this is not my usual way of operation. I like to be on time. We got into a bit of a problem in the caucus, and I just wanted to say that to you. The Committee will come to order. We meet today in open session to consider the President's nomination of Mr. Nick Rasmussen to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center or, as we call it, NCTC. Mr. Rasmussen is well known and respected by the Committee. He has appeared numerous times in closed session as the Deputy Director of NCTC and, since Matt Olsen's resignation, as the Acting Director. It is my intention, pending today's session, to move this nomination quickly to the Senate and seek his confirmation before our adjournment in December. Mr. Rasmussen has been the Deputy Director of NCTC since 2012. Prior to this, he served from 2007 to 2012 as the Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council. He is well versed in terrorist threats to the United States and the growth of terrorist groups around the country. Mr. Rasmussen's government service goes back to 1991, with a series of positions at the Department of State, the NSC, and NCTC. Mr. Rasmussen, I enjoyed reading in the background materials for this hearing that public service is part of your family, and I'm pleased to welcome your family here who have been in public service as well. I know that I speak for the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Chambliss, who regrets he can't be here with us today, and for myself when I say that we need a full-time, Senate- confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center as soon as possible. I won't go into the threats to our Nation, but they will go into the record, and it's clear I think to all of us who deal in this situation, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL in Iraq and Syria, we continue our efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda in the FATA of Pakistan, and the number of AQ affiliates and other terrorist groups across the world is growing. So it is a real problem and it is escalating. These groups now have safe havens in Syria, in Libya, across other parts of North Africa, and in many places on line. The threat from ISIL, the Khorasan Group, AQAP in particular, pose a direct threat to the United States homeland, both from external attack and from directed and inspired lone wolf attacks from within the United States. The NCTC needs to be at the front of our efforts to identify these attacks, as it has done many times in the past. At the same time, the Director of NCTC is the National Intelligence Manager for Counterterrorism and the official in charge of government-wide strategic operational planning to defeat terrorism. So, Mr. Rasmussen, you have a big job before you. I've gone through the answers to the questions that you've submitted. I see no problem whatsoever, but it's a great pleasure to welcome you and your family here today. I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the record the letter of support for Nick's nomination from former NCTC Directors Mike Leiter and Matt Olsen, Admiral William McRaven, former Director, FBI--former Deputy FBI Director Sean Joyce, and former Deputy National Security Adviser Juan Zarate. In the interest of moving forward, let me stop, welcome the nominee, and ask Senator Burr for his opening statement. [Letters received by the Committee regarding the nomination of Mr. Rasmussen follow:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Senator Burr. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Nick, let me first say that I want to thank you for your many years of government service at the State Department, the White House, the ODNI, and at NCTC. And I thank you for the time that you spent with me the other day and your insight into the areas of interest that we had an opportunity to talk about. I'd like to welcome your wife, your parents. I know all three of you are proud of the progress of his career and I thank you for sharing him with the country, because it is invaluable. Over the last 10 years, you've focused primarily on analyzing the terrorist threat to our country and devising policies to address those threats. NCTC is going to need your experience in the years to come. 13 years after 9-11, we continue to face Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia, Yemen, North Africa, Syria, and now the Indian subcontinent. Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabab in Somalia, ISIL and Al-Nusra Front in Syria and request, and the list goes on and on and on and on. These groups raise money via criminal acts, growing business enterprises, and in some cases state sponsorship. Extremists with technical degrees, special skills and expertise, building IEDs or being lured to support complex attack plotting. Western fighters, to include Americans, are exploiting local and regional conditions to train extensively before returning home. Here at home, we face the threat by home-grown violent extremists, extremists who often utilize the information and connections from on-line and plan smaller-scale simple plots that are harder to detect. These terrorists are capable, well organized, well financed, and they aspire to attack U.S. persons and facilities abroad and at home. The terrorist threat is more distributed and complex than ever before. We no longer have the luxury of focusing our attention on one group or on one region. You're being asked to lead our Nation's primary agency for integrating and analyzing all intelligence related to the terrorist threat and you do have your work cut out for you. This Committee will endeavor to provide you with the resources you need to address the threat and to keep our Nation safe. But the truth is that we're going to have to make some difficult choices in the years to come. NCTC is a capable organization with excellent people. I fully expect you to lead an effective agency, under our watchful eye. But I can also assure you that, moving forward, we're going to challenge you to improve the center to search for efficiencies. We're going to ask tough questions and we're going to push you to be better, and I look forward to you giving us direct and candid answers. I thank the chair and pledge on behalf of Vice Chairman Chambliss and this side of the aisle, Madam Chairman, that you can't move too fast on this nomination for us. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Would you stand, please, Mr. Rasmussen. Would you repeat after me: I, Nick Rasmussen, do solemnly swear that I will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God. TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, NOMINATED TO SERVE AS DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER Mr. Rasmussen. I, Nick Rasmussen, do solemnly swear that I will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the NCTC and designated staff when invited? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that the NCTC and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee on intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Consistent with past commitments from the Director of National Intelligence, will you promise to brief the Committee within 24 or 48 hours of any terrorist attack or attempted terrorist attack if requested by the Committee? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Please be seated, and we'd be interested in your opening statement. Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Madam Chair. Senator Feinstein, Senator Burr, and members of the Committee: Let me start by thanking you all very, very much for considering my nomination to be the next NCTC director. I also want to express my appreciation for the efforts of the Committee staff. I know there's a tremendous amount of work that goes into the preparation and review to support any confirmation hearing, and I'm very grateful. I'd also like to recognize and introduce my parents, Mary Jo and Gary Rasmussen, and my wife Maria Rasmussen. Their love and support means everything to me and I'm very glad they're here with me today. As you remarked, Madam Chair, I've briefed this Committee several times, as recently as last week, in closed session in my capacity as the Deputy Director of NCTC. But this is my first opportunity to appear before the Committee in open session and I truly welcome that opportunity. I'm honored by the President's trust and confidence in my ability to continue to serve in our national counterterrorism enterprise. Public service came naturally to me growing up in the Washington area, as I had to look no further than to my own family for example and inspiration. My father Gary and my mother Mary Jo moved to northern Virginia and Fairfax City from Wisconsin in 1962 so that my father could pursue a career in public policy. He was a career Federal employee, beginning at Department of Agriculture, working here on Capitol Hill for a short time as a junior staff member on the House side, and then retiring almost 40 years later as the most senior career official at the Department of Education. My mother was for a time a public school teacher in Fairfax County, while also playing an extremely active role in our local church and serving for over ten years on the board of the Northern Virginia Community College. Among my siblings, I have one who is an active duty military officer with two tours of duty in Afghanistan and another brother who proudly works in local government in Fairfax and volunteers in his church community. Again, everything I ever needed to learn about public service and public commitment I learned first-hand from my immediate family. I obviously have a long way to go before serving in government as long as my father, but I am currently on year 23 of my own public service career. I started my Federal Government career while I was a student at Wesleyan University, worked as an intern at the Department of Defense, working on the Korea Desk. After finishing graduate school at Princeton, I joined the Department of State as a Presidential Management Intern, a PMI, just as the United States was liberating Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. During my tenure at the State Department, I was given many, many extraordinary opportunities, whether it was working on efforts to dissuade North Korea from pursuing nuclear ambitions, establishing a formal structure to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, or, latest in my State Department career, working towards a lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But my career took a sudden turn in mid-2001 when I accepted a position on the National Security Council staff working on terrorism issues. My first day on the job was Monday, September 17, 2001, six days after the 9-11 attacks. Since that day 13 years ago, I have been singularly focused for every day of my career on the Nation's counterterrorism efforts. Those years include career positions at the White House under both Presidents Bush and Obama and at NCTC under Directors Brennan, Redd, Leiter, and of course Matt Olsen, who asked me to serve as his Deputy in June of 2012. Over those years, I've seen what I believe are vast improvements in our counterterrorism capabilities, structures, and policies. But that said, significant challenges remain and there is much, much work to be done. This is what makes the work of the men and women at NCTC so central to our national security. It's exactly why I would very much like the opportunity to lead them and to serve alongside them as their director. The U.S., the United States, working with our allies and partners, has made great strides in dismantling the Al-Qaeda organization that attacked us in September 2001, but the relationship threat we face continues to evolve, as both of you indicated in your opening remarks. As the President said in May at West Point, ``For the foreseeable future,'' quote, ``the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains terrorism.'' As the Committee well understands, instability in the Levant, the broader Middle East, and across North Africa has accelerated the decentralization of the Al-Qaeda movement. The movement's once global focus under Usama bin Laden is now increasingly being driven by local and regional conflict and factors. All across these unstable regions, we are confronting a multitude of threats to the U.S. and our interests, from longstanding, well-known terrorist groups, but also from newer and much more loosely connected networks of like-minded violent extremists who operate without regard to national borders or established organizational norms. This Committee, better than almost any audience I ever engage with, understands in great detail the diverse and multifaceted threat picture we face from Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates. That threat picture also includes other Sunni terrorist groups, to include ISIL. It also includes Shia- aligned groups like Hezbollah and Iran's Quds Force. It even includes home-grown violent extremists who live amongst us here inside the United States. So to sum up that threat picture, in my view we face a broader array of threats from a greater variety of terrorist groups and individual actors than at any point since 9-11. Further complicating this threat picture are, of course, our losses in collection as a result of unauthorized disclosure, the spread of extremist messaging via social media in new and different ways, and the need we face to balance technology-based analytic tools with people-focused, human resource-intensive, eyes-on analysis. If I'm confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working and helping the counterterrorism community overcome these challenges in the years ahead. Ten years ago, when Senator Susan Collins and Senator Joe Lieberman first put pen to paper in what would become the Intelligence Reform and Testimony Prevention Act of 2004, most in the country truly believed that a second large-scale catastrophic attack in the homeland was possible, perhaps even probable in the near term. Today the threat we face is quite different from then and I would argue that we are far better equipped to respond to it than we were perhaps in 2004. Earlier this year, as NCTC commemorated its tenth anniversary, we were very honored to host both authors of that landmark legislation in our auditorium. Senator Collins, you told the assembled workforce, quote: ``There's no doubt that information-sharing is far superior to what it was prior to the passing of the law in 2004, and there's no doubt that the talented workforce here at NCTC has made a huge difference.'' Unquote. Senator, I'm not sure that you could see the crowd very well through the stage lights at the auditorium there, but I can assure you that the members of our workforce at NCTC were beaming with pride when they heard your words. Ten years later, Senator Collins, I firmly believe that we can declare that your vision, that the Congress's vision for NCTC, has in fact taken hold. That vision called for an integrated and motivated NCTC workforce, fully empowered with access to the right information, and armed with the best training and tools. I believe that vision for NCTC is growing stronger every day. Yet, we all know this is no time for complacency, for self- satisfaction, either at NCTC or anywhere else in the CT community. We understand well that significant challenges remain. The terrorist adversaries we face are persistent and adaptive, and so we too must learn and change and get better and improve every day. We must match and exceed their determination to attack us with our own will to make certain that they don't succeed. In the current position I have as Deputy Director and now Acting Director, I'm reminded of 9-11 and the threat we face every single day. If confirmed by the Senate, I would bring the focus and urgency borne of that terrible day 13 years ago to everything I do as Director. I would aim to ensure the best and brightest continue to fill our ranks at NCTC and I would aim to ensure that they are equipped with the tools and the training they need to meet the terrorist threat. In my 23 years in government service, I've worn a number of hats, working in a number of difficult government organizations. No label means as much to me personally over that time as the label ``member of the counterterrorism community.'' Every day I'm privileged to work with truly outstanding friends and partners all across that CT community-- at FBI, at CIA, NSA, the Defense Department, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, with our State and local partners around the country, with our international partners, at the White House, and here on Capitol Hill, with you and with your staff. The job for which I've been nominated demands very much, but I'm thankful for the loving support of my family, my wife Maria, my parents; and I'd like to take this rare opportunity to thank her and to thank them publicly today. They've always been there to support me as I've pursued my career. Madam Chair, I've been part of the NCTC family since its inception in 2004. Even when serving President Bush and President Obama for several years on the NSC staff at the White House, I still felt very personally connected to the remarkable organization at NCTC, its vital mission, its uniquely qualified workforce, and its terribly critical place within the intelligence community. There's no place in government where I would rather serve. Chairman Feinstein, Senator Burr, Senators, thank you as always for your steadfast support for the women and men who work every day at NCTC and for considering my nomination to be its next Director. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Madam Chair. [The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. That was excellent. Thank you very much. Mr. Rasmussen, in your written statement for the record you wrote, and I quote: ``Attacks, either linked or inspired by ISIL, in Belgium and Canada, recent arrests in Europe and Australia, demonstrate that the threat beyond the Middle East is real, although thus far limited in sophistication. However, if left unchecked, over time we can expect ISIL's capabilities to mature and the threat to the United States homeland ultimately to increase.'' Could you expand on NCTC's view of the threat from ISIL to the extent you can here in an unclassified setting, please? Mr. Rasmussen. I'd be happy to, Madam Chair. I tend to think of the threat ISIL poses currently as being somewhat in concentric circles. Because their capability is greatest in Iraq and Syria right now, I think our personnel there are potentially greatest at risk, particularly in Iraq, where our embassy security is, of course, as you know, a serious concern. In the front-line states around Iraq and Syria--Jordan, Turkey, Syria--Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia--there also we worry that ISIL has the capability and ability to potentially carry out attacks, to identify and mobilize personnel who could engage in attacks against U.S. personnel and interests. Beyond that, the next ring, the next outer ring I would look at, is into Western Europe, where the very language that you cited in your question indicates that ISIL looks at Europe as a potential theater of operations where it may carry out attacks against Western interests. Then lastly, the homeland, where we certainly believe that ISIL has aspirations over time to develop the kind of capability it would need to carry out a homeland attack. At this point, though, we assess that we're far more at risk presently of attack from an individual home-grown violent extremist who may be inspired by, but not necessarily directed by, ISIL here in the homeland. Then the point about if left unchecked; we worry that the longer ISIL is left unchecked and is allowed to pursue and develop a safe haven, the more that capability is allowed to grow to carry out attacks in each of those theaters that I mentioned. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. I saw in your responses to our pre-hearing questions that you wrote that'll be hiring more than 40 officers this year. It's my understanding that, in addition to these 40, NCTC still has many vacant positions it needs to fill. So the question is, with respect to contractors, which we have some concerns about, how do you plan to fill the vacant spots at NCTC? Mr. Rasmussen. First of all, thank you, Madam Chair. The support NCTC receives from this Committee in our efforts to maintain the best possible workforce could not be better. We're very grateful for that. Chairman Feinstein. We'll keep it going. Mr. Rasmussen. The numbers you cite of 40 individuals who we're looking to hire this year reflects what we call ODNI cadre, people who are hired and work in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. As you know and as most of the Committee knows well, NCTC has a blended workforce which includes permanent cadre employees, but also detailed personnel from other intelligence community, and not just intelligence community, but other government organizations as well. To me that is the real lifeblood of NCTC, the expertise, the talent that we get from other departments and agencies. Chairman Feinstein. Well, will the 40 be essentially transfers? Will they be a mix, and if so---- Mr. Rasmussen. 40 will be new cadre direct hire. At the same time, in parallel we're pursuing an accelerated effort to try to get our detailee numbers up, for exactly the reason I just said: We need the talent that comes from other intelligence community partners. All of those partners are willing and very strong, strong supporters of NCTC as an enterprise. The challenge comes year in and year out as you try to keep the numbers up. They have their own staffing needs. In a period of budget uncertainty, they themselves sometimes struggle to meet their own internal efforts to staff themselves. So it's a constant dialogue with them, as I would say, it's a very positive dialogue with them, to make sure we can get talented officers from places like FBI, CIA, and other partners in the intelligence community. Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Thank you. Senator Burr. Senator Burr. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Nick, the Committee, as you know, is charged with providing vigilant oversight. A couple of questions that really go in line with what the Chairman had you rise and raise your hand and swear to. Would you agree that the Committee, to conduct effective oversight, that we should have access to the intelligence products produced by the intelligence community and in some cases be provided with the raw reporting that contributed to that analysis? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, I believe that in some specific cases it would make sense to have access to that reporting. Senator Burr. Will you commit to providing the Committee complete and timely access to all NCTC products, reporting, and staff, if necessary, to assist in our oversight responsibility? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes. Senator Burr. I won't get into staffing because I think you covered that with Senator Feinstein. Earlier this week, the Institute of Economics and Peace released its 2014 Global Terrorism Index. The report indicates that the deaths from testimony are at an all-time high. Significantly--specifically, the number of deaths attributed to terrorism is five times higher than it was in 2000, and we've witnessed a 61 percent increase in the last year alone. Would you agree that the threat from terrorism is at an all-time high? Mr. Rasmussen. I think as measured in the array, variety, and dispersion of terrorist threats across many different regions, the answer is certainly yes. Senator Burr. What is NCTC as the executive agent for our Nation's strategy against terrorism going to do about it? Mr. Rasmussen. The role that NCTC plays in carrying out strategic operational planning in support of the government is one that has us tied very closely to the National Security Council staff and the policy development percent for pursuing strategies on counterterrorism. We work with the National Security Council staff to develop whole of government plans to address our counterterrorism concerns in each of the theaters around the world, not just one single theater. As you would well expect, Senator, the effort to develop strategies against ISIL is at a particularly energetic pace right now. But our strategic operational planning capability is also brought to bear on the whole array of CT challenges we face in Africa, in Asia, in South Asia, every region you can think of. So I would consider our job at NCTC to make sure that we aren't leaving any holes in that fabric of strategy as we look out across all of the different CT challenges that we face, while at the same time prioritizing where effort needs to be most energetically directed. That of course right now would argue for a lot of effort to be directed at the challenges we're facing in Syria and Iraq. Senator Burr. Are you confident that NCTC can discover and are enabled to disrupt plots here in the homeland? Mr. Rasmussen. I would say that our ability to detect and potentially disrupt a plot involving a complex objective with a number of terrorist actors and a fair amount of communication, I would assess our odds as being very, very good at being able to detect and disrupt that, that kind of plotting. The more the plotting looks like what you and Chairman Feinstein talked about in terms of being an individual lone wolf actor, perhaps with no direct connection or even indirect connection to an overseas terrorist group, perhaps only a self- radicalized individual working alone on the Internet to develop his own capabilities, that decreases pretty dramatically our ability to use traditional CT tools to detect and potentially disrupt. So it's hard to guarantee you or give you extreme high confidence that we would be able to detect and deter, disrupt, that kind of attack. Senator Burr. Do you think the administration and-or Congress should do more publicly to let the American people know the threat from terrorism and the fact that it's growing, not declining? Mr. Rasmussen. I would certainly agree with you, Senator Burr, and that's one of the reasons why this hearing being in open session I think is such a good thing. The 9-11 Commissioners during the past year, as they reviewed where we are this many years later, one of their calls was on the policy community to speak more often, more publicly, more forthrightly about the threat environment that we face. I would certainly look to contribute to that in my own way from NCTC. So much of what we do is necessarily in closed session and with you, with your staff, but there are certainly opportunities where we can speak more directly, particularly to the homeland aspects of the threat, which I referred to a minute ago, and the presence of home-grown violent extremists and the threat they pose to our communities. Senator Burr. Nick, last question. In your response to the Committee's pre-hearing questions, you indicated that big data was one of NCTC's biggest challenges. The IC and the United States Government as a whole are really struggling with that challenge. At NCTC, however, the correlation of big data is a life and death matter. I'm concerned that this issue doesn't receive the proper attention and resources at NCTC. Can you assure us that you'll make this a top priority and that this effort will get the attention it needs? Mr. Rasmussen. Senator, you're right to point to this issue as being one of our biggest challenges, and I can commit to you wholeheartedly to embrace this as one of my top priorities. On his way out the door, during his last couple of months of service at NCTC, Matt Olsen directed the creation inside NCTC of an office, of a new office, an Office of Data Strategy and Innovation, to do a better job than we thought we were doing of organizing our short, medium, and long-term vision in terms of how to make best possible use analytically of the data we have access to. Some of that will also involve developing new technological tools, taking advantage of broader efforts by the DNI, by Director Clapper, to create a new architecture for terrorism and for intelligence information for the entire intelligence community. We hope to leverage NCTC's work as an early benefactor of that work to create a more cloud-based architecture for intelligence information across the IC. Senator Burr. I thank you for that and I hope you'll keep the community updated on the progress that we make on that. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman. First of all, congratulations on your appointment, which I think is an excellent one. I appreciate very much that the President chose to put a career expert in this vital position and I thank you very much for your generous comments about the role that former Senator Joe Lieberman and I played in creating the NCTC. I do hope that you'll let this Committee know if you encounter difficulties in getting detailees who are well qualified and experienced to come work at NCTC. I know it's very hard for other components of the intelligence community and the FBI to let go of some of their most talented analysts, but for NCTC to be fully effective in these very dangerous times it is essential that we achieve that goal of jointness by having those detailees. So please do not hesitate to come to the Chairman, Ranking Member, any of us, if you do anticipate problems in that area. Mr. Rasmussen. I will. Thank you. Senator Collins. One of the findings of the 9-11 Commission was that border security and immigration were not seen as national security concerns prior to the attacks on our Nation on 9-11-01. The 9-11 Commission specifically found that 15 of the 19 hijackers could have been intercepted through more diligent enforcement of our immigration laws. As the Acting Director of the NCTC, were you or any of your staff asked to scrub the President's proposals for immigration changes that he will be announcing tonight? Mr. Rasmussen. To my knowledge, NCTC or any of the personnel at NCTC were not involved in any effort? I'm not aware of whether there was elsewhere in the intelligence community such an effort, but not at NCTC, ma'am. Senator Collins. When President Obama created the 2009 Guantanamo Review Task Force to evaluate which detainees could be transferred or released from Guantanamo, as I recall the head of NCTC was the executive director of that task force; is that correct? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes. In prior service, Matt Olsen held that position as chair of the task force. Senator Collins. Matt Olsen has told me that when the decision was made to exchange what have become known as the Taliban 5 for the release of Sergeant Bergdahl, that NCTC was not consulted in that decision. To your knowledge, was anyone at NCTC consulted? Mr. Rasmussen. My understanding is that in the context or in the process of moving to the transfer of those detainees there was a request for an intelligence assessment from the ODNI, from the intelligence community, and such an assessment was in fact prepared. It was prepared by another element of the ODNI, not at NCTC. Senator Collins. And that was despite the fact that the NCTC was acting as the executive director for the commission? Mr. Rasmussen. Well, I would---- Senator Collins. Or for the task force. Mr. Rasmussen [continuing]. Matt had that role in a previous, at a previous time. In the current processes that the administration is following for considering transfer of detainees, NCTC is being asked typically to produce threat assessments of what impact on security the potential return of a detainee may have. That did not happen in the case of the issue you're referring to, madam. Senator Collins. I just want to be clear on this. So the normal process is for NCTC to be involved in putting together the package that is used by decisionmakers on how to classify the detainees; is that part correct? Mr. Rasmussen. That's correct. Senator Collins. But in the case of the Taliban 5 the NCTC was not asked to put together a new analysis that went beyond the previous analysis, which according to press reports found that these detainees were too dangerous to be released; is that correct Mr. Rasmussen. Again, we did not have direct involvement in the production of the intelligence assessment. Senator Collins. Thank you. Again, I want to thank you for your willingness to serve in what is a 24-7 very demanding job, and I think we're very fortunate to have someone with your background and expertise. Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator. Senator Collins. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. It looks like this is going to be a tough vote. Senator Rubio. Senator Rubio. Thank you. I too want to---- Chairman Feinstein. For TV, I was jesting. Senator Rubio [continuing]. Thank you for your service to our country and congratulations on your appointment, and we look forward to moving forward quickly. Let me ask you a number of questions that are of interest to me and I think to everyone on the Committee. The first has to do with the planned reduction in U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and the growing concern that that would have implications on our ability to conduct effective counterterrorism operations in the region. There's been one success in all of this has been the ability to erode core Al- Qaeda's presence, for example in the FATA. If we lose territory in Afghanistan back to the Taliban, we could very easily be once again in a position where many of those elements reconstitute strength in an ungoverned space somewhere in Afghanistan. If the government is no longer capable of exercising presence in that region and with less of a U.S. commitment, that could be accelerated. What are your thoughts on the current plans to draw down forces in Afghanistan and the impact it would have on our counterterrorism efforts? Mr. Rasmussen. As an intelligence community, we also are concerned about what potential effect the drawdown of U.S. forces may have on the ability of Al-Qaeda to regenerate capability, particularly in the northeastern parts of Afghanistan. The effort to train and equip a competent Afghan national security force is an important part of the effort to make sure that there is a capability to disrupt potential activity inside Afghanistan. We of course will maintain as robust as possible an intelligence collection framework to allow us to continue to monitor, track, and if necessary disrupt Al-Qaeda resurgence in that part of Afghanistan or certainly in Pakistan. But it will be a more challenging and more difficult collection environment than we face today. Senator Rubio. My second question has to do with Iran. There's been a lot of talk about some sort of deal with regard to their nuclear ambitions and the relaxation of sanctions against them. What has not been discussed enough is that Iran is the world's leading sponsor of terrorism as a state, and certainly any economic growth and prosperity that would come about as a result of the relaxation of sanctions I believe would have an impact on their ability to fund and expand their already robust sponsorship of terrorism around the world. I was hoping you could share some thought with us, not just about what Iran does now, but what they might be able to grow and do if in fact these sanctions are relaxed and they have more access to global capital, more money basically, to sponsor these operations. Mr. Rasmussen. The willingness and ability of Iran to support various Shia terrorist groups has always been very, very high on the list of concerns of the counterterrorism community and the intelligence community. One of the pathways to addressing that challenge has been to try to get Iran out of the business of thinking that carrying out those kind of acts advances their national interest, and ultimately they would see that as self-defeating and not advancing their interests. So I guess, speaking personally, in my own personal analysis anything that puts us in a position where we are more effectively dealing with Iran in a normal way would reduce the incentive for them to use that proxy network of Shia terrorist groups that they do in fact have at their disposal. There's no doubt, Senator, you're absolutely right, the capability of the terrorism apparatus sponsored by Iran is something that is threatening to the United States, not just in the region, in the Middle East, but all around the world and even potentially here at home. So I would place a priority in trying to, not necessarily seek to defeat that terrorism apparatus on the battlefield, as we have in our efforts against Al-Qaeda, but in effect trying to take them out of the business in some other fashion. That's how I would think about it. But there's no question, as we watch and worry about how Sunni-Shia tensions in the Middle East play out and how our interests in the region are put at risk by Shia-sponsored terrorist groups. But the focus on Iranian intentions will continue and be a very high priority. Senator Rubio. Your statement about putting them out of the business of sponsoring terrorism, it calls to mind the potential that any sort of sanctions relaxation perhaps should be linked not just to a nuclear program, but to their sponsorship of terrorism, as a leverage point to get them to abandon those sorts of things. Mr. Rasmussen. I can't speak to the policy context in which we would relax sanctions. Senator Rubio. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Rubio. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Rasmussen, I have been to your office, I've been to the CIA, I've been to the Pentagon, and have traveled recently, and the one major conclusion I have taken from those visits is the incredible quality of the people that we have working for us. They're patriotic, idealistic, smart, and capable. And you're Exhibit A today, and I just want to thank you, and I'm honored to serve this country along with you and your colleagues, and I hope you'll take that word back. Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator. I really do appreciate that. Senator King. We've talked about this before. Here's my concern, and I urge you--I know that in the day to day work you're focusing on threats and attacks and dealing with fires around the world, and that's your basic mission. But we have to be thinking more strategically and long-term, it seems to me. We cannot simply kill these people and call that the solution to the worldwide terrorism problem. I'm looking--I remember from the fifties we had the containment strategy of George Kennan, that really worked with the Soviet Union. It took a long time, but it worked. And it was a strategy. It was a conscious, deliberate, well-developed strategy. I urge you to work with your colleagues, with the think tanks, with Rand Corporation or Brookings, whoever, to really work on a strategy for dealing with this problem other-- in addition to the military response. Do you have any thoughts on that? Mr. Rasmussen. It's a terrific suggestion, Senator, and obviously the expertise about how to carry out effective counterterrorism policy does not reside only within the government. As you alluded to, research organizations, think tanks, not just in Washington, but all around the country and all around the world, have a role to play in helping us get this right. The strategies that we try to help produce at NCTC in support of the National Security Council staff in my answer to Chairman Feinstein are typically whole of government strategies, not just relying on our intelligence capabilities or our military capabilities, but also trying to take advantage of the abilities, the resources we have across the government, to try to produce the conditions that would over time eat away at support for terrorism in some of these conflict locations overseas. At the same time, we all go into it understanding well that those efforts will ultimately take years, if not decades, to play out and for us to reap the benefits of those kinds of strategies, and in the mean time you're left to manage a very difficult threat environment. Senator King. I just want to be sure that we're not simply putting out the fires. We've got to put out the fires, but we also have to be thinking long-term, it seems to me. Otherwise we're in for a 100-year war. Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly right, sir. Senator King. This morning at a hearing at the House Intelligence Committee, an open hearing, I should mention, NSA Director Rogers said: ``There shouldn't be any doubt in our mind that there are nation states and groups out there that have the capability to forestall our ability to operate our basic infrastructure, whether it's generating power or whether it's moving water and fuel.'' How concerned are you about terrorist groups using their own capacity or what I call hackers for hire to attack our infrastructure? How serious is the cyber attack threat? Mr. Rasmussen. I would agree with the NSA Director in what he said this morning. I think, as I understand it, the threat he's referring to is more acute from state actors at present than from individual terrorists or established terrorist groups. Senator King. Well, ISIL has shown a pretty good capability with the Internet. Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly, and it's certainly a capability they aspire to develop and exercise. So, knowing that, we're looking for ways to be ahead of them, both in our ability to defend our infrastructure, but also in our ability to detect key individuals who are engaged in that kind of activity and disrupt their activities. Senator King. Edward Snowden, you alluded to this. You didn't use the word. Isn't it true that we've lost a lot of capability in terms of tracking some of these groups because they have gone dark, in part based upon their awareness that was given to them by the Snowden revelations, and that's compromised our ability to protect ourselves? Mr. Rasmussen. I would agree with you. Not just the Snowden disclosures, but other disclosures of classified information and our collection capabilities, have caused our terrorist adversaries to adapt, to look for new ways of doing business, to find new platforms, to go dark in some cases, or just simply, as I said, find new ways in an attempt to keep us in chase mode as they move from potential platform to potential platform. This is an ongoing challenge for the intelligence community. I know our colleagues at NSA are particularly focused on this. But you're absolutely right, sir. Senator King. And it's a particularly serious danger because, in my view, with the terrorist threat intelligence is the first line of defense. These aren't people that we can line up the Army or the Navy and shoot. We need to know where they're coming and when, and intelligence is really--that's why it's so absolutely critical. Mr. Rasmussen. I would agree with you, sir. Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. And thank you, Senator. Senator--I was going to say ``Warner''--Heinrich. Excuse me, Martin. Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Rasmussen, I want to thank you for being here today and for all of your public service. As you can see, you have an enormous amount of respect from this body. I wanted to ask you. Given your experience with the National Counterterrorism Center really going back to its inception, it's clear that there are few in the Federal Government with your knowledge of the NCTC and its mission. In your responses to unclassified questions from the Committee, you talk a little bit about that unique role, particularly of NCTC analysis as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as well as the mission objectives assigned to NCTC through the DNI's national intelligence strategy. I want to dig a little deeper, if I can, into the unique nature of the analysis that NCTC does relative to that done by a number of other intelligence community agencies. As you know, even though NCTC is effectively the primary U.S. Government organization tasked to analyze terrorist organizations, there are several other agencies within the IC track and they analyze terrorists as well. Can you articulate for us, how is the analysis conducted by NCTC truly unique compared to that done by these other agencies Mr. Rasmussen. One element that puts NCTC in a unique position to carry out the best possible analysis of terrorism information is our access to the full body of that terrorism information. That was the unique insight of the IRTPA, the effort to bridge the domestic-foreign intelligence divide. So an analyst sitting at NCTC will have access to whatever is available to the U.S. Government in terms of intelligence reporting from overseas collection efforts, as well as from domestic law enforcement investigations here at home, and that is not true of every other element of the intelligence community. So that puts NCTC, I would say, in a uniquely advantaged position. Now, that obviously plays out, that advantage, plays out more profoundly when you're talking about homeland threats, where the bridge between domestic and foreign intelligence matters so much. I would not quibble at the talent, capability, or insight that analysts from most of my intelligence community partners could bring to the analytical effort on some of our key challenges overseas. During the period of--I'll just give one example. During the period of our extended military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and their intelligence analysts were doing terrific work, most of it informed by time on the ground, and I would never do anything to suggest otherwise. But to answer your question, I think it's access to information that makes that critical difference. Senator Heinrich. Would you characterize the most unique thing as being able to see a bigger picture from multiple sources, and particularly when we're talking about a combination of foreign and domestic? Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, I would. Senator Heinrich. In your response to questions from the Committee, you also discussed the growing importance of monitoring social media and exploiting big data in tracking terrorist threats and conducting analysis. In your comments you mentioned that technology could help, quote, ``implement privacy and civil liberty protections beyond the current basic safeguards that are already in place.'' Could you elaborate a little bit on what you mean by that, and also sort of describe for us the shortfalls as you see them in the privacy and civil liberties safeguards that are currently in place? Mr. Rasmussen. I wouldn't so much describe it as shortfalls as much as--I guess what I was referring to with that answer, Senator, was the more we can do to automate and make happen technologically segregation of information, deletion of information, all of the things we commit to do as part of our adherence to the Attorney General guidelines, the more we can take the human element of that, where a human makes a mistake and inadvertently sees something, retains something, holds onto something that they did not have authorization to do, the more we can automate that process through technology and give ourselves the ability also to audit ourselves more effectively and therefore train more effectively, that's what I was trying to get at with that. Senator Heinrich. So it's more about technology and implementation effectiveness than any sort of change in authorizations? Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly, because on those rare occasions when we have had something go awry in terms of handling of information, we have found that it has almost universally been a matter of human error rather than any intent to mishandle, misuse, or not protect information. Senator Heinrich. Thank you again. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. I believe this completes the questions. I would like members to know that it's my intention to vote on this nomination as soon as possible when the Senate returns. It may be off the floor after Thanksgiving. Any member should submit questions for the record by next Monday so we can have the answers by the time the vote is taken, please. And we will do our level best to move this just as quickly as we can, Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen. Well, I'm very grateful for that, Madam Chair, and we'll commit to getting every answer back to you as quickly and as expeditiously as possible. Chairman Feinstein. That's fine. Can't do better than that. So thank you very much for being here. Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]

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