Open Hearing: Nomination of John P. Carlin to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice, and Nomination of Francis X. Taylor to be the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland…

[Senate Hearing 113-601] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 113-601 OPEN HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF JOHN P. CARLIN AND FRANCIS X. TAYLOR ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov ____________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 93-212 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015 ______________________________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202ï¿½09512ï¿½091800, or 866ï¿½09512ï¿½091800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ANGUS KING, Maine HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio ---------- David Grannis, Staff Director Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- FEBRUARY 25, 2014 OPENING STATEMENTS Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1 Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 2 WITNESSES General Francis X. Taylor, Nominee, Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security..... 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 John P. Carlin, Nominee, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Department of Justice................................ 11 Prepared Statement........................................... 13 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees--Taylor.... 32 Additional Prehearing Questions--Taylor.......................... 64 Letter dated February 21, 2014, from International Association of Chiefs of Police supporting General Taylor's Nomination........ 87 Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees--Carlin.... 88 Additional Prehearing Questions--Carlin.......................... 108 OPEN HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF JOHN P. CARLIN AND FRANCIS X. TAYLOR ---------- TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room SD-526, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, Wyden, Udall (of Colorado), Heinrich, King, Collins, and Coburn. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA Chairman Feinstein. We meet today to consider two intelligence positions, President's nominations for those positions. One is Mr. John Carlin, a very young-looking nominee to be assistant attorney general for national security in the Department of Justice; and the other is the slightly more mature General Frank Taylor, the nominee to be undersecretary of homeland security for intelligence and analysis. We have votes scheduled for 3:30, so my hope is we can be succinct to the point and be able to conclude this hearing within that time. But I'd like to begin by saying welcome to you both, and particularly to your family and friends who are here with you today. The two positions for which these nominees have been nominated were both created as a part of reform efforts in the past decade after major intelligence failures, including most specifically the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The assistant attorney general for national security in the National Security Division of the Department of Justice that Mr. Carlin would lead, if confirmed, is intended to bring together the counterterrorism, intelligence, and counterintelligence efforts within the Department of Justice. The National Security Division conducts oversight of FBI national security investigations and has the lead within DOJ for reviewing and approving requests to the FISA Court for surveillance activities. Increasingly important, the assistant attorney general must also ensure that when terrorists, proliferators, and spies against America come into our custody, our response strikes the proper balance between gathering intelligence from them and being able to prosecute them. Mr. Carlin is well-suited to the position, having served as the acting assistant attorney general since his predecessor, Lisa Monaco, went to the White House last year to become President Obama's top adviser for counterterrorism and homeland security. Mr. Carlin was previously the principal deputy assistant attorney and chief of staff for the National Security Division in 2011. He served in leadership positions at the FBI, including chief of staff to FBI Director Bob Mueller. He served in a variety of positions in the department between 1999 and 2007. Our other distinguished nominee, General Frank Taylor, has a long career in national security, starting with his 31-year career in the United States Air Force, most of which was spent in the counterintelligence field. In 2001, he was named the coordinator for counterterrorism, the senior-most counterterrorism position in the State Department, and then assistant secretary of state in charge of diplomatic security. He spent the past nine years in the private sector, during most of which time he was the chief security officer for General Electric. In that position, he has seen the government's national and homeland security functions from the outside, giving him an important perspective on the Department of Homeland Security's support to nonfederal positions, partners, and stakeholders--specifically, the private sector. General Taylor will have to put his leadership skills and experience to good use as undersecretary of DHS for intelligence and analysis. The office, like the department as a whole, has a large number of missions to accomplish, with a long history and precedent to rely on. I'm going to cut my remarks short and put the remainder in the record and recognize the distinguished vice chairman for his remarks. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA Vice Chairman Chambliss. Well, thanks Madam Chair, and to Mr. Carlin and General Taylor, I join the chair in welcoming you to this Committee and congratulating you on your nomination by the President. Mr. Carlin, since Congress created the National Security Division as part of the post-9/11 effort to tear down the walls between the criminal and national security worlds, NSD has taken on a key role in our nation's intelligence collection activities. In the wake of the Snowden leaks, I understand the administration may be making some changes, especially to section 702 of FISA that will negatively impact how our intelligence agencies collect and retain information. When Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act, we were careful to not put up walls or prohibit lawfully collected information from being used. I hope you'll be a strong voice against any policies that try to undo the intent behind the FAA and that make it harder for our intelligence agencies to do their jobs. When you and I met in my office, we had a good discussion about this administration's ongoing failure to come up with an interrogation and detention policy that would allow for the collection of real-time, actionable intelligence, without defense attorneys, Miranda rights, or judicial deadlines. As a prosecutor, you understand there is no requirement to give a terror suspect Miranda rights. It just means you can't use his statements at trial. Captured terrorists can be gold mines for information that we should need, and therefore we should not treat them like ordinary criminals. Unless we can get good intelligence from these detainees, we could fall behind the curve in preventing future attacks. That's the risk that should not be acceptable to anyone, regardless of any campaign promise. NSD is also at the forefront of terrorism and counterintelligence investigations throughout the country. While the criminal justice system clearly plays an important role in national security thesis, I believe we should do more to make our military commission system a success. Now is not the time to bring dangerous criminals, dangerous terrorists, into the United States and give them the benefits of our criminal justice system. There is simply too much uncertainty following an acquittal, as we recently saw with the unsuccessful prosecution of the Somali pirate in federal court, here in the district. General Taylor, we thank you for returning to government to take on this new assignment: one that promises to be as difficult as any in your career, as you and I discussed a little earlier. Census creation, nearly a decade ago, DHS I&A, has struggled to find an organizational identity to fit in with the Intelligence Community and to attain the level of professional competence that the American people are entitled to expect in their government. For some time now, Members of Congress, on both the House and the Senate, and on both sides of the aisle, have questioned the very existence of I&A and the work that it does. Their questions about the quality and necessity of much of INA's analysis, concerns about INA's ability to process and share information, questions about the size of the workforce in relationship to its level of production, and concerns about the potential for DHS to safeguard cyber and critical infrastructure. All of these questions come at a time when I&A is still clinging to a corporate notion that it is a new organization. My comments are not intended to disparage the professional men and women who work for DHS. There are an awful lot of very capable, very professional individuals involved there, many of whom have begun to ask these same questions. Rather, my concern lies with the inability of I&A as a whole to routinely demonstrate a unique contribution to the national security of the United States. General, if confirmed, you may be the last, best hope for the future of DHS I&A. It's unlikely you will be able to keep I&A aloft by maintaining the current course in hitting, so I would like your candid thoughts about what you plan to do over the next 12 months to fix I&A for the long term. I have great confidence in Secretary Johnson. Secretary Johnson has great confidence in you. Therefore, I transfer that confidence, myself, to you. I look forward to our discussion today, and working with both of you in the future, and I thank you Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. Gentlemen, would you stand and I'll administer the oath? [Witnesses comply.] Chairman Feinstein. Please affirm when I finish reading. Do you solemnly swear that you will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? [Witnesses respond affirmatively.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, you may be seated. And just a couple of questions--this is pro forma. Please answer yes or no. Do you both agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? [Witnesses respond affirmatively.] Chairman Feinstein. Do you both agree to send officials from your respective offices to appear before the Committee and designated staff when requested? [Witnesses respond affirmatively.] Chairman Feinstein. Do you both agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? [Witnesses respond affirmatively.] Chairman Feinstein. Will you both ensure that your respected offices and its staff provide such material to the Committee when requested? [Witnesses respond affirmatively.] Chairman Feinstein. Do you both agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of this Committee, of intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only the chairman and vice chairman? [Witnesses respond affirmatively.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. And if you would proceed and make your statements, and introduce your family or whomever you'd like to introduce in general, I'll go to seniority and ask you to speak first. STATEMENT OF GENERAL FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, NOMINEE FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS General Taylor. I'm honored and extraordinarily humbled to appear before you today as the President's nominee for the undersecretary for intelligence analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. With me today is my elder son Jacquis, sitting behind me, representing our family. My wife is now in London visiting our daughter, who is studying to be a solicitor, and could not join us--she had already had this trip planned. So she's with us in spirit. I talked to her this morning. During my last period of government service, I was privileged to have the opportunity to work with Governor Ridge and his team as they endeavored to establish this new department in 2003. The department has come a long way since those early days, especially I&A, as its mission and responsibilities have continued to evolve. This position, and the team that I would be privileged to lead if confirmed, is a crucial link between the federal government and the Intelligence Community, with our state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as the private sector that are on the front lines every day to protect our country and our citizens from an ever-evolving threat. As we learned in the aftermath of 9/11, security of this nation requires effective collaboration at every level of our country. Sharing information, both from the federal government as well as from our local partners to the federal government provides clear understanding of the nature of the threats that we face, and allow all levels to be on the same sheet of music. I remain haunted by the fact that at least one of the 9/11 hijackers were engaged by local law enforcement before the attack, and their potential action against that person could not be accomplished. That is why we strive to create--that I will strive to create, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen and improve the process of how this partnership works to identify and act on potential threats to our country and our citizens. If confirmed, I believe my 43 years of law enforcement, security intelligence, and crisis management experience provides the right skills to build on the significant work of my talented and dedicated predecessors. I've had the distinct honor to serve our country as a leader of two global investigative and security organizations, as a U.S. ambassador directing diplomatic counterterrorism efforts, and diplomatic security operations. I also had the privilege of serving as the chief security officer for a Fortune 10 global U.S. conglomerate, the General Electric Company. In each of these roles, I have been responsible for mission execution and mission success, and I believe my record indicates consistent successful results in these very different roles. I've had both line and staff roles, worked in policy, developed, and executed budgets at every level, and led operational activity to mitigate risk to our country both in the U.S. and abroad and, as well, to an American economic giant. I understand that the I&A mission is different from any of the--of my past responsibilities, and that I will have to endeavor to learn the organization, its customer requirements, its successes, and its opportunities for improvement. The good news is that my initial assessment after a week of briefings is very positive about where the organization is in its development, and that there will be a firm foundation upon which for me to build. I think there are three areas where we must focus. First, enabling the fusion centers to reach their potential with effective information sharing and from this--to and from this important institution. Sustaining DHS's contribution to the Intelligence Community with information analysis derived from state, local, and tribal partners, and from a unique D.H. information sources. And finally, to aggressively eliminate duplicative analysis that can more effectively be done by other federal organizations. In my view, what makes I&A unique in the Intelligence Community is its mission to link the U.S. Intelligence Community with first responders in our country. State and locally owned and operated fusion centers are critical to bringing the 18,000 police entities across our great country into the national counterterrorism fight. Caryn Wagner, as well as the current I&A leadership team, began that process with the aggressive deployment of I&A personnel to the fusion centers and the development of a program of analysis that will guide the future production of our analytical products. If confirmed, I will work relentlessly on executing these plans to ensure all understand the critical aspect of the I&A mission is the nature and effectiveness of how we support our state, local, tribal, and public sector partners. Finally, I am acutely aware that no organization can live on its reputation or hide behind its mission statement. Organizations must continue to evolve and improve to meet changing environment that they must operate in. Mission assessment, the development of clear objectives, and rigorous metrics will help I&A stay focused on the present and the future. In my initial briefings, again, I am impressed by what I have seen as a baseline to set expectations and measure effectiveness. If confirmed, I plan to sustain these efforts and use these results as a basis for adjustments to the organization and mission execution. Madam Chairman, I'd like to submit the rest of my statement for the record and would conclude with those thoughts. [The prepared statement of General Taylor follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Feinstein. Excellent. Thank you, General Taylor. Mr. Carlin. STATEMENT OF JOHN P. CARLIN, NOMINEE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss, and distinguished Members of this Committee. It's an honor to appear before you today, and I thank you for considering my nomination. I'd like to thank the President for his confidence in nominating me, and the Attorney General for his support. Chairman Feinstein. Could you please introduce your family to us, because, there's one little girl that's through (ph) with expectation. [Laughter.] Mr. Carlin. She is. Thank you. I'd like to introduce them, and thank them for their love and support over the years--a few years, in one case: My wife Sarah and our daughter Sylvie; my parents, Roy and Patricia, who traveled here from New York City; and my mother in-law, Jura Newman. I also want to thank my wife for her countless sacrifices to allow me to pursue a career in public service; and to thank my parents who always taught my sister and me, both by lesson and by example, the importance of dedication, discipline and always doing what's right. With the support of all of my family and their selflessness, I've been able to choose the path that's led me here today. And I'd like to thank the people from the National Security Division in the department who've come here, along with friends, to show their support today. It's been a true privilege to spend my entire legal career with the Department of Justice and to witness a time of enormous transformation after the terrible events of September 11th. As with so many Americans, I and my family recall vividly the events of that day--the horror of senseless murder and the dark cloud of ash that hovered over New York City. My brother-in-law was across the street from the twin towers and my father was in the subway underneath. And I remember as our family called each other to determine that we were safe. We were lucky. Our core mission at the National Security Division is clear: to prevent future terrorist attacks, while preserving our civil liberties. And it's a special honor and privilege to be considered for a position charged with leading the division that Congress, and this Committee in particular, created to unite all the Department of Justice's national security elements to bring all tools to bear in the fight against terrorism and other threats to national security. Serving as the acting assistant attorney general for national security for approximately the last 11 months, I've been both humbled and driven by the responsibilities and mission entrusted to this position. For more than a decade, I've learned from and worked alongside some legendary public servants as the United States undertook fundamental changes in our approach to combating the threat of terrorism and other emerging national security challenges. In particular, working with FBI Director Bob Mueller as a special counsel, and later as his chief of staff, to help the bureau evolve from a law enforcement agency into a threat-based intelligence-driven national security organization. Here at NSD, we must apply and are applying those lessons, both to meet the growing national security cyber-threat and to continue to evolve to meet other changing national security threats. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I look forward both to continuing this important evolution and to working with this Committee in its essential oversight role. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and for your consideration, and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Carlin follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you both very much. We will proceed in our usual order, which is early bird regardless of party. Mr. Carlin, in your answers to the Committee's pre-hearing questions, you wrote the DOJ's National Security Division, quote, ``oversees all electronic surveillance and other activities conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.'' So I know you have direct experience with DOJ oversight provided to FISA activities. Based on that experience, I'd like you to run through and explain, so the public understands, the various layers of oversight that the programs authorized by FISA, such as sections 215 and 702 data collection programs are subject to. Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And there are different layers. I'll try to walk through the different functions that are performed. First, at the agency that performs the collection activity, there will be supervisory oversight and Office of Compliance. Next, there will be the general counsel of that agency who will be informed of what the rules are, depending on the applicable authority, and be responsible for teaching and enforcing those rules. Then there will be the inspector general for the particular agency involved. There will also be the inspector general for the Intelligence Community writ large, and the Office of the General Counsel for the director of national intelligence. The National Security Division plays an oversight role as well, conducting review of the use of the authority and, depending on the particular incidents of the use of the authority, overseeing the application to another oversight element, which is that of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Those are judges--just the same judges I appeared before literally in some cases when I appeared in criminal court, that have been tapped to appear in their Article III role, in addition to their normal duties as part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. And finally, there is this Committee in particular, and the intelligence committees in Congress who have a particular oversight role in these areas and are kept current--currently and fully informed of the activities under the FISA Act. Chairman Feinstein. OK. It's my understanding that NSD does not generally conduct oversight of CIA human intelligence activities; covert action; three, DOD military activities; or four, NSA intelligence collection outside of FISA. As I understand it, within the Department of Justice, only the Office of Legal Counsel weighs in on these matters and then even only when they're asked. So here's the question. Should NSD play a role in reviewing the legality of intelligence collection outside of FISA by CIA, NSA and others? Mr. Carlin. Thank you. I--the division does not have the, as you have stated, Madam Chairman, a formal oversight role for other particular authorities. But we were created to serve as a bridge between the Intelligence Community on the one hand, and the Department of Justice and the law enforcement elements on the other, to ensure that the wall came down in terms of sharing of information and that there was visibility into the activities of the Intelligence Community. There are areas where we have a particular expertise, such as FISA. We're also assigned a role in terms of the attorney general's approval of attorney general guidelines that would get issued by the relevant agency, but then to the Department of Justice for approval. And there, our role would be in particular protecting the rights and privacies of U.S. persons. So, I'd be happy to work with this Committee on areas where our expertise fits in, as we've discussed, to the general layers of oversight that otherwise exist within the Community, including inspectors general and general counsels. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. We will take you up on that. Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair. General Taylor, you have said that one of your top priorities is to enhance the level of service that I&A provides to its unique customers in the private sector and at state and local levels. I&A has had historically low analytic production. For example, in 2012, it produced fewer analytic products than its total number of employees. How do you plan to increase the number of high-quality analytic products that are available for INA's customers without being redundant with other Intelligence Community efforts? General Taylor. Senator, thank you for that question. I think it's not simple, but it's kind of focusing on what's the mission of I&A. And the mission of I&A is to collect information from our state and local partners and turn that into intelligence that can be used in the Intelligence Community; to work specifically with the Intelligence Community to get information back to our state and local and private sector partners. But I think also to use the unique information within the department to produce intelligence. That is where we're going to focus. It's my view that that's not all happening as much today as it needs to happen going forward. But I intend to focus on those products that meet those kinds of needs. I would also add that the analytical products that I think the Committee has seen in the past are not the only products that we get asked--that I&A is asked to deliver. So one of the metrics that I'm thinking of looking at is what is the totality of the product base that I&A delivers? Where does it go? What are the customers saying about it? And then coming back to the Committee with a better understanding, or better picture of the totality of the work done by I&A, except--rather than just analytical products. Vice Chairman Chambliss. As we all know, CIA has jurisdiction of intelligence collection outside the United States. FBI has jurisdiction of intelligence collection within the United States' borders. The relationship between I&A and the FBI has not been what it really should be. I understand you're a friend of Director Comey, who is starting off certainly in the right direction at the FBI. He's had vast experience at the Department of Justice. Can you talk about how you expect to develop that relationship between I&A and the FBI to make sure that we're doing the best job we can within the borders of the United States to not only collect intelligence, but also provide the right analysis of that intelligence? General Taylor. Yes, sir. I--in my 43 years of government service have worked closely with the FBI at every level. I would tell you that I am not a person that believes in competitive--working to compete against an agency. I believe in building partnerships that look to the strength of each agency in performing the mission. So I commit to you that I will work with Director Comey and his team to make sure that what I&A is doing is complementing what he's doing, and we're complementing what the FBI is doing in a synergistic fashion. There's just far too much for us to do to be competing with each other. We should be able to work collectively for the best interests of our country and for collecting intelligence that defends America. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Mr. Carlin, a number of groups and organizations have been making recommendations on how to fix FISA in response to Edward Snowden's leaks of classified information. Some of these recommendations have been good, but a lot of them seem to be unworkable, both from a legal as well as a practical standpoint, and would in fact damage our national security collection efforts. Number one, do you believe NSA's telephone bulk metadata collection program fully complies with U.S. law? Mr. Carlin. I do. Vice Chairman Chambliss. Three of the five members of the privacy and civil liberties oversight board have said that the plain text of FISA business records statute does not authorize this bulk collection--bulk meta data collection program. What aspects of their legal analysis do you find to be problematic? Mr. Carlin. Just say--Senator that--do believe that it is the correct interpretation of the statute and that it is Constitutional as have 15 FISA court judges and now two district court judges. There is one judge who has found to the contrary. We have taken that case--the Department has taken that case up on appeal and it's being litigated in the court system. Senator King. Well, all right I'll leave your answer at that then. Very loose answer though, Jim (ph). Let me just lastly--quickly ask you, in your experience with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court do you think it's been anywhere--anything like a rubber stamp? Mr. Carlin. I--no sir. I have not. It's--as I've said, today--but these are some of the same district court judges that I appear before in the criminal court. And they are respected jurists. They put us to our paces when I was a government lawyer appearing before them then. And they put us to our paces when they perform the same role in front of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. And I think some of the opinions in this unprecedented year of de-classifying thousands of pages of documents, I think some of the court opinions have shown the type of rigor that they've applied to their analysis. Senator King. OK, thank you. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Carlin I enjoyed very much visiting with you and as I indicated, if you're confirmed, you're gonna be responsible for overseeing a range of government surveillance activities and to be blunt, you're gonna have a lot of cleaning up to do. For years, the Justice Department has allowed the executive branch to rely on a secret body of surveillance law that was inconsistent with the plain meaning of public statutes in the Constitution. This reliance on secret law gave rise to a pervasive culture of information in which senior officials repeatedly made misleading statements to the Congress, the public and the courts about domestic surveillance. For example, officials from the National Security Division testified on multiple occasions that Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act was analogous to grand jury subpoena authority, which of course involves individual suspicion. The public can now see that this claim was extraordinarily misleading and the National Security Division's credibility has been damaged as a result. If you're confirmed to head the National Security Division, what are you going to do to end this culture of misinformation and ensure that statements made to the public, the Congress and the courts by the Department are accurate? Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Senator. I think it is of the utmost importance--and the attorneys I've worked with at the National Security Divisions share this view--that when we testify, whether it's before Congress or provide information to the courts or in other settings that we do our utmost to provide the full and complete and accurate information. If I may on the issue that arises in terms of 215 and grand jury subpoenas, it is of course in the statute itself the provision that the records that one can obtain through 215 need to be those records--similar to those records that one could obtain by a grand jury subpoena as it says in the statute or other court process. Two-fifteen is different than the issuance of a grand jury subpoena in part because of--one needs to apply to a judge prior to being able to obtain the authority. And I know that lawyers at the National Security Division and the department and elsewhere work to make sure that those portions at the time that were classified in terms of the applications of 215 were provided not just to this Committee as would be the normal course of business, but to ensure that, that interpretation of the law was made available to all Members of the Senate prior to the consideration of the 215. I--inclusion again, I believe it's very important to try to provide as accurate information, as complete information as possible to this Committee and to this body whether in classified or unclassified... Senator Wyden. If you're confirmed, I hope that will be accurate in the future, because I know when people heard those words, that this was analogous to a grand jury subpoena process, they said those kinds of processes involve individual suspicion. And, frankly, I don't know of any other grand jury subpoena that allow the government to collect records on this kind of scale. So I'm gonna move on. You've indicated that you are going to make a priority insuring that statements that are made, if you're confirmed, are accurate. In my view, that was not the case in the past. Let me ask you one other question, if I might. As the arguments in favor of bulk phone records collection have been crumbling, executive branch officials most recently have claimed that bulk collection allows the government to review phone records more quickly than would otherwise be possible. One official recently testified that it allows the government to do in minutes what would otherwise take hours. However, the Justice Department inspector general's January 2010 report, on requests for phone records, describes an arrangement in which communications companies were able to respond to requests immediately and provide records in a format that could be immediately uploaded onto FBI databases. While the inspector general found some problems with the-- with this particular arrangement, speed was not one of them. In fact, the report goes on to note that the FBI's counterterrorism division described this arrangement as providing near real time servicing of phone record requests. Would it be fair to say that this report--a Justice Department report--indicates that phone companies are actually capable of responding to individual record requests very quickly? Mr. Carlin. Senator, I'm not totally familiar with the details of that inspector general report or whether that arrangement still exists at the FBI. But it has certainly been my experience, in the context of some particular cases--investigations that I can recall with a particular telecommunications companies that we have served particular requests on the company and that they have been able to respond very, very quickly to the FBI. And that, that speed has been critical in having that national security investigations hold people to account or to prevent future terrorist attacks, and that speed is critical. Senator Wyden. Well I share your view that speed is critical, but what we have is a FBI in effect Justice Department inspector general report indicating that it's possible to get that speed that we need with the kind of approach with respect to phone records without collecting other kinds of--without other kinds of processes, and that's my point, is that we're told that without metadata collection, we're not going to get it in a timely way. This report indicates that it is possible to get it in a timely way. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. [Cross talk.] Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good afternoon, General Taylor. Good afternoon, Mr. Carlin. Mr. Carlin, let me turn to you for a series of questions. Last May, the White House formally announced that if a lethal operation will be considered against a U.S. person, that the Department of Justice--and I want to quote here--``will conduct an additional legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.'' Two questions: What's the role of the NSD in that kind of a review? And who in the DOJ is responsible for ensuring that the facts supporting the department's legal analysis are accurate? Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Senator. In--there's a process set up that involves input from each of the departments and agencies now, before such a decision of that magnitude is made. That's the policy process that's been set up by the President. In terms of the extra legal analysis might occur, a decision of that magnitude would be made at the highest level of the department. And I would expect that before such a decision would be made, that the National Security Division, among other components, would be consulted. On the second question, in terms of the accuracy of the information that's provided, the accuracy of the information is usually determined by the departments and agencies providing it. So there's the collectors and the analysts. And they would provide, then, that information to the department and that would be the basis for a legal review. Senator Udall. Over time, I'm going to want to drill more into those questions. Because this is, as you know, a life-and- death kind of process. But let me--let me turn to another question that's about accuracy. You wrote in your responses to the Committee that the decision to submit intelligence activities for legal review by the OLC is typically made by the Intelligence Community component that engages in that activity. Yet you also wrote that the NSD has the responsibility to ensure that the department's representations in court are accurate, and that, quote, ``the NSD attorneys must work diligently to understand the facts of intelligence activities and other national security- related matters that may be at issue in litigation or other matters for which they're responsible.'' Now, to me, those statements appear to conflict with each other. So in your view, how is the Justice Department supposed to ensure the accuracy of representations to the courts in criminal cases or FOIA litigation, I should say, and so on, without an independent review of the accuracy of Intelligence Community representations? And I ask that question in light of what former CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston's responses to my questions last year about the CIA's detention and interrogation program, where--and he wrote that the DOJ does not always have accurate information about the detention and interrogation program and that the actual conduct of that program was not always consistent with the way the program had been described to the DOJ, and that further, CIA's efforts fell well short of our current practices when it comes to providing information relevant to the OLC's legal analysis. Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Senator. Your question is important and it's important as officers of the court. And any attorney for the National Security Division when making a representation does everything that they can to assure that the representation is accurate. And also if they were to learn or discover that information is inaccurate or misleading, to take steps with the relevant agency in order to correct the record. There were several different decision-making processes that you've alluded to, some of which are more involved with than others. So in terms of representations before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, that is one where our attorneys would be working to make the representations; would be working with the relevant elements of the Intelligence Community in order to provide the necessary facts to the court. And as I described earlier to the chairman, there are a variety of mechanisms, including the attorneys, to try to ensure that accuracy, including the Office of General Counsel, the component of various inspectors general, and our oversight role and section. Senator Udall. I'm going to stay involved with you on this, as I am with the Intelligence Community itself. Let me--one last question. I want to talk about executive order 12333, with which you're familiar. I understand that the collection, retention or dissemination of information about U.S. persons is prohibited under executive order 12333, except under certain procedures approved by the attorney general. But this doesn't mean that U.S.-person information isn't mistakenly collected, retained and then disseminated outside of these procedures. So take this example. Let's say the NSA is conducting what it believes to be foreign collection under E.O. 12333, but discovers in the course of this collection that it also incidentally collected a vast trove of U.S.-person information. That U.S.-person collection should not have FISA protections. What role does the NSD have in overseeing any collection, retention or dissemination of U.S.-person information that might occur under that executive order? Mr. Carlin. Senator, so generally, the intelligence activities that NSA would conduct pursuant to its authorities under 12333 would be done pursuant to a series of guidelines that were approved by the attorney general, and then ultimately implemented through additional policies and procedures by NSA. But the collection activities that occur pursuant to 12333, if there was incidental collection, would be handled through a different set of oversight mechanisms than the department's by the Office of Compliance, the inspector general there, the general counsel there, and the inspector general and general counsel's office for the Intelligence Community writ large, as well as reporting to these committees as appropriate. Senator Udall. So you don't see a direct role for the NSD in ensuring that that data is protected under FISA? Mr. Carlin. Under FISA, no. Under FISA, we would have a direct role. So if it was under--if it was collection that was pursuant to the FISA statutes, so collection targeted at U.S. persons, for example, or collection targeted at certain non- U.S. persons overseas that was collected domestically, such as pursuant to the 702 collection program, that would fall within the scope of the National Security Division. That's information that--and oversight that we conduct through our oversight section, in conjunction with the agencies. And we would have the responsibility in terms of informing--working with them to inform the court if there were any compliance incidents and making sure that those compliance incidents were addressed. Senator Udall. Thank you. My time is obviously expired. But I think you understand where I'm coming from here. One is to make sure that DOJ and you in your capacity have the most accurate information so that you can represent the United States of America and our citizens in the best possible way. And secondly, that you have a role to play in providing additional oversight. Those are all tied to having information that's factual, based on what happened. And again, I'm going to continue to look for every way possible to make sure that that's what does happen, whether it's under the auspices of the IC or the DOJ. You all have a joint responsibility to protect the Bill of Rights. Thank you. [Cross talk.] Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman. General Taylor, I spent many years as either the chair or the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee. And my greatest disappointment in the last Congress is that we did not enact a cyber security bill since I believe we're extremely vulnerable to attacks. And indeed, we know that every day, nation-states like China, Russia, Iran are probing our computers, leaving behind malware. Transnational criminal gangs also are invading our--our computer systems, and terrorist groups also have that as a goal. I know that you served as chief security officer at General Electric. I'm interested in what you believe I&A, which has the special responsibility to share information with the private sector, to be the recipient of information from the private sector, and disseminate that to governments at all levels. What particular improvements would you like to see when it comes to information sharing? General Taylor. Thank you, Senator Collins. I would say that in my eight-and-a-half years at GE, I was not always happy with the quality and the consistency of information I received on threats that would impact our company writ large, and particularly cyber issues. I think that has begun to improve. And my focus will be on ensuring that--I think I--well, two things. I think the department plays a critical role from NPPD in reaching out to the private sector. And indeed, many companies have now joined in partnership with DHS around the NPPD and critical infrastructure protection and exchanging information on a continuous basis. I think that has to continue. But I think we've got to do a better job on the I&A side of developing the intelligence that helps companies--and not-- companies the size of GE have the resources to kind of look into these things more thoroughly than many, many other American companies. Those are the companies that need to understand what the risk is; understand how they're being had. And I think we can give them that through analysis from I&A, both from the IC and from our components within DOD--within DHS. Senator Collins. Well, I hope we'll see more analytical reports, as the ranking member pointed out. There's something really wrong when there are more employees and contractors than there are--there are analytical reports being issued. I am very impressed with what is going on at the NCIC and I hope that you'll invite Members of this Committee, as well as the Homeland Security Committee, to come out and let them see the real-time monitoring that's done of government computers because that's an important vulnerability as well. But the fact that we still are not sharing critical threat information, particularly with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is just unacceptable in this day and age. And I hope that should you be confirmed, that you will make that a priority. General Taylor. Senator, if confirmed, that will be a top priority for me. I lived that for eight-and-a-half years and want to see what I can do to help us close that gap. Senator Collins. Mr. Carlin, according to news reports, the charges against Ali Mohamed Ali for his alleged role in a 2008 pirate attack near Yemen have been dropped after he was partially acquitted by a jury last year. This raises the whole dispute once again of how foreigners who are brought to this country or arrested here should be handled, and whether it should be in military tribunals or in regular criminal courts. We now have the bizarre situation where the failure to successfully prosecute a suspected terrorist, pirate in federal court has now resulted in his seeking asylum so that he can stay in this country. What's your reaction to this case? And what does it say as far as our ability to ensure that those who pose a threat to this country--foreigners who pose a threat to this country should be handled--prosecuted in federal courts versus military tribunals? Mr. Carlin. Well, Senator, without commenting on a particular individual's application, that as you say that was a piracy case. After the increased incidence of piracy in 2011, there were a number of prosecutions of pirates. I think we did obtain convictions in 25 or 26 of those cases, and that piracy, not just due to that effort, but other international efforts, has decreased in that region, but continues to be a threat. In general, we need to use an all-tools approach where the Article III option is one of the tools in the toolkit, but that we look at all tools whenever we face a particular case. And we look first to obtain the maximum amount of intelligence, speaking now not so much about piracy, though it's true there, particular in terrorist acts or terrorist cases, and to look to gain--obtain intelligence first, to try to prevent terrorist attacks. That needs to be our first priority. And we also need to look to deter and disable the threat that a particular individual or group may pose. And if confirmed, I will advocate and attempt to provide as many options as possible when we're trying to make those decisions. Senator Collins. Thank you. [Cross talk.] Senator Coburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman. General Taylor, first of all, most people don't know you didn't have to do this. And the fact that you're coming back to serve again is highly admirable, and I want to thank you for that. You said you'd read the report that Senator Levin and I put out on fusion centers. And I have to agree with a lot of what Senator Chambliss had to say. My assessment when I talked to the people receiving the analysis from I&A and homeland security is it's not on time, it's not late, and it's not accurate. And half the time, it's old information that was collected not through the Intelligence Community, but is published data. And so the quality of the work in many instances actually is very, very poor. And so, when you--when you go and talk to people who receive them, they don't even read them. Because they think they have no value. There's no incremental increase in the value of what is being put out. So, given that, as you look at this and see whether or not there's a capability there that we really need, I don't disagree with you about sharing threats downward. I have yet to see much information come from any fusion center into I&A, and that then comes that is both timely and accurate and not repetitive. So, I guess my question is, is if it is seen by you, after looking at this, that it's redundant and irrelevant, would you agree that maybe it ought to be minimized to where it's mainly a conduit down, and when we do get some information that needs to be forward, we can do that, rather than duplicate what's already going on? General Taylor. Senator, first of all, thank you for your comments about my service. You may know that I began my career at Tinker (ph) Air Force Base in Oklahoma, some 43 years ago, and that was a--quite a launch place to get me here. So, I'm excited to be here to be able to serve again. I read the report. I have heard from our stakeholders, both at the state and local level, and within the IC, and within the department. What I would commit, sir, is to a thorough analysis of what the mission is. Because I think there's some confusion in terms of the elements of I&A, in terms of what the actual mission is with regard to the fusion centers. I think it is our core responsibility. No one else in the government has this responsibility to link the locals to the IC. So, I'd like to evaluate that, develop the metrics around what we're supposed to be producing, and then, if we are able to produce those things, come back to the--to you, sir, and to the SSCI and present those results. I think there is value, here, but I haven't had enough time to really get my arms around it, but I--if confirmed, I would expect, in very short order, to be able to do that and come back with a plan of action to implement the mission we've been assigned. And if it's not there, to not do it. And to come with that recommendation based on the facts that we find in--in a mission analysis. Senator Coburn. Well, I appreciate, and I have a lot of confidence that you're the right man for this job at this time, and my hope is that we get some clarity as to what can be done and effectively done. One of the things that's happening, we're seeing some improvement in homeland security in a lot of areas, and like Senator Collins, we need a cyber-security bill. We know that. I think the President did a good job in terms of his executive order, but we still have a ways to go there, and it's important that the intelligence and analysis that's carried out has value, because--and the problem maybe, right now, it may be improving in value, but nobody's paying any attention to it because it hadn't had any value in the past. So, my hope is, is that you'll have Godspeed in making that assessment and truly using metrics, your customers, of whether or not it has value. General Taylor. Senator, you have just outlined my leadership philosophy, and that's how I've approached every mission I've been given, and I also believe it's important that as we take this journey, that we're in lockstep with this Committee in terms of what the expectations are, so I intend to spend a significant amount of time with the staff and with the Members to get feedback on what we're doing. I believe in full transparency. I believe in metrics, and if the facts take us in a way that we don't like, the facts are the facts, and we'll have to make decisions from this. Senator Coburn. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Coburn. Senator Heinrich. Senator Heinrich. Thank you Madam Chairman. Mr. Carlin, General Taylor, welcome to you both. Mr. Carlin, you and I had the opportunity to talk a little bit last December, and I just wanted to follow up on one of the issues that we talked about when you came to my office. As you know, in October of 2013, after months and months of discussion and debate in which you and the NSD were involved, DOJ adopted a new policy by which federal prosecutors would inform defendants when they were intended to--when they intended to offer evidence informed, obtained, or derived from intelligence collected under 702 of FISA. And when you and I met in December, you informed me that that policy had not yet been reduced to a formal written policy, and so, Mr. Carlin, I wanted to ask: is that process done yet, and has that policy been finalized, and if so, has it been disseminated in--in a written form? Mr. Carlin. Thank you Senator, and thank you for having taken the time to meet prior to this hearing. Just in terms of the question. I--it is my understanding that it was the practice of the policy of the department to inform a defendant in a criminal case and give notice if there was 702 information that was going to be used against them prior to--prior to this change in practice. The change in practice had to do with a particular set of circumstances when there was an instance where information obtained from one prong of the FISA statute 702 was used and led to information that led to another prong of FISA, Title I FISA, being used, and that when the notice was given to the defendant, that notice was referring to one type of FISA but not both types of FISA, and that is the practice that we reviewed and changed, so that now, defendants are receiving notice in those instances of both types of FISA. The review of cases affected like that--affected by that, continues, but we have filed such notice, now, I believe in three criminal matters, including the case of Muhamad Muhamad (ph), the individual convicted by a jury of attempting to use an explosive device on the Christmas tree lighting ceremony. In reference to that case, we have now filed--there's a filing in that case that we should provide to your staff while we lay out what our practice is, and I will ensure--I will ensure that filing is distributed to U.S. attorneys' offices across the country so they know exactly what our position is on that issue. Senator Heinrich. That's helpful. And so you'll share with--that with the Committee as well? Mr. Carlin. Yes sir. Senator Heinrich. Great. Let's move on then to declassification real quick. I have a quick question on that front. And, in your response to Committee questions, you indicated that you and others within NSD meet regularly with ODNI personnel on multiple issues, and among those that you listed were classification - sorry, declassification and transparency matters. On December 29th of 2009, the President signed Executive Order 13526, which directs, among other things, that in no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agencies, or prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security. What's NSD's role and responsibility in determining whether something is properly declassified--sorry, properly classified, particularly as it relates to that Executive Order 13526? Mr. Carlin. Thank you Senator. NSD really does not play a role in that executive order in determining whether the information is properly classified in the first instance. That would be a decision that's made by the relevant agency or department would have expertise with the particular sources and methods and would be reviewed. Assume, ultimately, if there was a dispute by their general council or inspector general, we have played and do play a role in the ongoing review in terms of coordinating the declassification, particularly of FISA related pleadings or court opinions, and we've been playing an ongoing role in that review that has led to the declassification by the director of national intelligence and thousands of pages of documents, and I would expect we would continue to play a role in that if confirmed. Senator Heinrich. That's very helpful, Mr. Carlin, and I want to thank you both for being here today. Thank you Chairman. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Heinrich Senator King. Our wrap-up questioner. Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Carlin, the President made a speech on January 17th on national security policy. He called for the creation of panels of advocates to assist the FISA court. This Committee passed an amendment as part of our bill that created an opportunity for the court to appoint amicus assistants in that process. Do you have any insight on what the President had in mind in that statement, and was what we did along the lines of what the President intends? Mr. Carlin. Not sure, Senator, I can speak ultimately to where the administration position is, but I have stated before that I think it would be helpful in certain instances if the FISA court needed additional assistance or briefing on a complicated interpretation, that they'd be able to tap such a panel, and your bill would provide the ability for them to do so, and to hear that amicus--amicus view. Senator King. Thank you. I understand that one of the responsibilities that you all have at the division is oversight, and that you're developing a training program for IC personnel. Could you tell us where that stands? Is it happening? Will it--is it mandatory for all IC personnel? Does it deal with the Fourth Amendment and those kinds of principles? What's the nature of that program? Mr. Carlin. I'm not sure I'm familiar with this specific program that you're referencing, but we do work with, for instance, the NSA in the development of training programs, particularly those programs that are on the procedures, the compliance procedures that would be ordered by the court, such as minimization procedures. We would help in the development of that curriculum. And then I know our attorneys also go and train, in particular, on those issues. And we also help provide similar training, I know, to the FBI. Senator King. Does the IC personnel generally regularly, routinely receive training that reflects the values embodied in the First Amendment? Because this is--the business that they're in is finding that right balance on a day-to-day basis. Is this part of the entry process for somebody coming into the NSA or the FBI or the CIA? Mr. Carlin. I'm not sure I'd have the expertise to speak writ large as to the training programs for every element of the Intelligence Community. Having spent time at the FBI, I know for the FBI, that is part of their training programs. And I know it's--these issues and issues in terms of privacy and protection of U.S. persons are definitely a part of the training program at the NSA. And I expect that each who is subject to attorney general-approved guidelines in terms of the protection and handling of U.S. person information would receive training as part of the curriculum on those protected procedures. Senator King. Thank you. General Taylor, you have a very important responsibility. And I, like Senator Coburn, appreciate your willingness to step forward once again, and undertake service to your country. We spend approximately $75 billion a year on intelligence between military and civilian. That is a lot of money. And it's increased dramatically, as you know, since September 11th. So, the role of communicating and sharing, but at the same time, not duplicating, is really essential. And I hope that you will take seriously the comments and questions of Senator Coburn. And I want to associate myself with them. And here's my question. If you, who are starting with a blank sheet of paper to set up a system to share information among intelligence and law enforcement, would you--what would you come up with? Would it be the fusion centers, or would it be some other--some other kind of entity? General Taylor. Well, thank you, Senator, for your comments about my returning to service. I am looking forward to working with this Committee, and certainly with our colleagues at DHS. My sense, Senator, is--the institutions exist. It's connecting the institutions appropriately. So, I wouldn't start with a blank slate. I'd figure out where the nexus (ph) are between the institutions that are currently working these issues. Take fusion centers, for instance. Governors--adjutant generals love them because it's all source, all hazard. And so, why not use that capacity? It's already looking at all source, all hazards to help inform the Intelligence Community, which is really the sweet spot for I&A. And if we--if we do our job properly, we won't be duplicating any work that's done by the FBI and the JTTF. We don't do investigations, we don't do overt--we don't do clandestine collection of intelligence, we take information from our partners and try to turn it into information that's useful. And also, take information from the IC (ph) just to send it back. I should say I&A does. If confirmed, I will be a part of that great team. But I think it's making sure that the mission is clear, the objectives are linked, and the outcomes meet the expectations of our customers and partners, as opposed to kind of doing what we were--what we did before we came to the--to I&A, for instance. When we came out of the IC, (ph) we did it a certain way. If we came out of the FBI, we did it another way. Senator King. Well, I understand the IG is looking at some of the activities and at the GAO report. And I hope--I think you used the term--this term, Senator Coburn, and that is ``value,'' and determine the value achieved versus the cost-- what the proper cost-sharing relationship should be with the states and localities. Because--you know, every hearing I go to is--we've partially removed the cloud of sequestration for a year or so, but it's not gone. And I think it's safe to say, we're going to be in a budget-constrained attitude for some period of years. And therefore we have to constantly be thinking about how do we achieve the same or greater value at the same or lesser cost? So, I commend that mission to you, sir. General Taylor. Yes, sir. Well, one of my marching orders from the secretary is to do just that--to eliminate duplication where it exists, and to improve the efficiency of our mission execution within I&A. And I intend, if confirmed, to follow those instructions, as well as your instructions, sir. Senator King. Well, if you are successful in eliminating some duplication around here, I'll put in a bill to build a statue of you in the courtyard. [Laughter.] Thank you very much, General. General Taylor. Yes, sir, thank you. Senator King. I appreciate it. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator King. It looks like we will be able to make this vote. I just want to say one thing to both of our nominees. You both occupy points of great interest to this Committee. And I will hope that you will be coming before us singly within the nest six-month period. I think, General Taylor, we really want to delve into more detail on your mission as you see it--the reduction of contractors within your organization, and the increase of fresh, bright, new intelligence. So we will do that. Mr. Carlin, your division is very important to this Committee. It is a very vital part of the oversight role. And I think you, too, might want to give some additional thought to it, and come before the Committee. And I think we should talk a little bit about it. And I see a very beautiful young lady I happen to have some Senate lollipops for in the front row. So, I'm going to say one thing about questions from the Members. We'd like to have them in by close of business on Friday so that we can move--take our vote and move these nominees as soon as possible. If we get them in, we'll schedule the vote for next week. So, thank you both. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. And the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] Supplemental Material [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]

Committee Leadership

Tom Cotton

Mark Warner

All Committee Members

Recent Legislation Activity

Hearings & Meetings

Reports & Publications

Committee Resources