Print[Senate Report 106-48]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
Calendar No. 108
106th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 106-48
======================================================================
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
May 11, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 1009]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the
original bill (S. 1009), which authorizes appropriations for
fiscal year 2000 for intelligence-related activities and
programs, the Community Management Account, the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
accomplishes other purposes, reports favorably thereon and
recommends that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
This bill will:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for
(a) U.S. intelligence activities and programs; (b) the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System; and (c) the Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September
30, 2000, for intelligence activities of the U.S.
Government and for the Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence;
(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence,
with Office of Management and Budget approval, to
exceed the personnel ceilings by up to two percent;
(4) Extend for one additional year the President's
authority to delay the imposition of proliferation-
related sanctions when
necessary to protect an intelligence source or method
or an on-going criminal investigation;
(5) Provide for appropriate U.S. Government access to
computers and computer data of Executive branch
employees with access to classified information;
(6) Allow the naturalization of certain applicants
for citizenship who have made important contributions
to United States intelligence;
(7) Expand the CIA's Central Services Program and
clarify the authorities for the Central Services
Working Capital Fund;
(8) Extend the Director of Central Intelligence's
authority under the Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Act of 1993 to offer separation
pay to employees;
(9) Impose a moratorium on, and require a net
assessment of, the Department of Energy's Foreign
Visitor Program;
(10) Expand the definition of ``agent of a foreign
power'' for foreign counterintelligence investigations
to include a person who assumes a false or fraudulent
identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; and
(11) Require the FBI to consult with Executive
departments and agencies concerning espionage cases at
an early stage of the investigation.
CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the Committee from disclosing the details of its
budgetary recommendations in this Report.
The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to this
Report, which contains (a) the classified annex to this Report
and (b) the classified schedule of authorizations, which is
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal
status as public law. The classified annex to this Report
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's action as
set forth in the classified schedule of authorizations. The
classified annex has the same status as any Senate Report.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. The President shall
provide for appropriate distribution within the Executive
branch.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee conducted a detailed review of the fiscal
year 2000 budget requests for the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) of the Director of Central Intelligence; the
Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense; and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) of the military services. The Committee's
review entailed briefings by and hearings with senior
intelligence officials, staff briefings, review of budget
justification materials, and responses provided by the
Intelligence Community to specific questions posed by the
Committee. The Committee monitors compliance with statutory
reporting requirements. The Committee scrutinizes each such report
and takes appropriate action.
In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the Committee is
including its recommendations on both JMIP and TIARA in its
public report and classified annex. The Committee has agreed
that JMIP and TIARA issues will continue to be authorized in
the defense authorization bill. The SASC has also agreed to
involve the Committee staff in defense authorization conference
meetings and to provide the Chairman and Vice Chairman the
opportunity to consult with the SASC Chairman and Ranking
Member before JMIP or TIARA issue is finally closed out in
conference in a manner with which they disagree. The Committee
looks forward to continuing its productive relationship with
the SASC on all issues of mutual concern.
In addition to its annual review of the Administrations's
budget request, the Committee performs continuing oversight of
various intelligence activities and programs. The Committee has
a dedicated Audit Staff that conducts in depth audits and
reviews of specific programs and activities identified by the
Committee as needing a thorough and concentrated scrutiny. The
Audit Staff also provides significant support to the
Committee's review of a number of administrative and
operational issues relating to the agencies of the Intelligence
Community. Most recently, the Audit Staff reviewed CIA's
contracting procedures and participated in the Committee's
China investigation by conducting a review of the Intelligence
Community's collection and analysis capabilities against the
People's Republic of China. The staff is currently conducting a
review of the authorities and administrative operations of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. These inquiries frequently
lead to Committee action with respect to the authorities,
applicable laws, and budget of the activity or program
concerned.
The Committee also established a Technical Advisory Group
(TAG) in 1997. The TAG is an independent panel of twenty-five
experts drawn from the private sector. Each member of the TAG
was selected by the Committee for their extensive expertise in
a particular discipline. The purpose of the TAG is to provide
the Committee an objective and comprehensive evaluation of
various intelligence programs and activities. Many of the TAG
members have never worked within the Intelligence Community and
therefore bring a fresh and independent perspective to
intelligence programs and activities. The results of these
examinations and the TAG will be discussed later in its report.
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
The vast majority of the Committee's specific
recommendations relating to the Administration's budget request
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities are
classified and are contained in the classified schedule of
authorizations and the classified annex. The Committee is
committed, however, to making its concerns and priorities for
intelligence programs and activities public to the greatest
extent possible consistent with the nation's security.
Therefore, the Committee has included in this report
information that is unclassified.
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Customer satisfaction with intelligence collection and analysis and
production
The Committee is encouraged by the progress of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
(DDCI/CM) and the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence
(ADCIs) for Collection and Analysis and Production in defining
the Community's Strategic Direction and looks forward to
further refinements in those strategies. Nevertheless, the
Committee is recommending that several additional actions be
taken to further enhance these ongoing efforts.
The Committee recommends that the DCI direct the ADCIs for
Collection and Analysis and Production, working with the
Intelligence Community's collection and analysis and production
managers, to conduct a comprehensive annual review or customer
satisfaction. Each review should: (a) evaluate the performance
of the Community's collection and analysis and production
programs in responding to consumer requirements; (b) address
the Community's ability to fill key gaps in collection and
analysis; (c) describe significant successes and failures of
the collection and production communities in responding to
consumer requirements; (d) review the allocation of resources
across the collection and production communities to evaluate
whether consumer requirements are being met; and, (e) make
recommendations for improvement. The DCI should provide the
ADCIs with the means necessary to conduct these assessments,
and provide written reports of these reviews to the
Congressional intelligence committees. Further, the DCI should
direct all participating agencies to provide information as
required by the ADCIs for this purpose.
The DCI should provide the first of these written reports
to the Congress no later than September 30, 2000.
Future imagery architecture
The Intelligence Community is proceeding with the Future
Imagery Architecture (FIA) to modernize imagery collection to
meet the challenges of the next century. The National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has developed a comprehensive set of
requirements and challenges the National Reconnaissance
Office's system will have to meet. The FIA focuses on
collection and pays relatively less attention to the tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions necessary
to a coherent and comprehensive end-to-end architecture. The
Intelligence Community has not developed the FIA's latter
features or analyzed the cost.
The classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999 imposed a cap on FIA. Congress believed
that the measure would ensure that other aspects of the imagery
collection cycle as well as other activities within the
National Foreign Intelligence Program could be funded at
fiscally responsible levels and that the Director of Central
Intelligence had program flexibility to meet future
intelligence challenges. The FIA contract is currently being
negotiated. It is imperative that the cap remain in place until
the contractors can define what requirements can be met within
the cap and whether the Intelligence Community may need
additional resources. Accordingly, the Committee, sustains the
cap on the Future Imagery Architecture as it is in the
Classified Annex.
Furthermore, the Committee strongly urges the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency to identify those imagery
requirements that can be met by commercial provides so that
funds can be targeted for the purchase of commercial imagery.
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
The Committee believes the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) has made much progress since 1996 when NIMA was
authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal
Year 1997. The Director of NIMA and his staff deserve credit
for their dedicated efforts. While great strides have been made
toward the goal of seamless provision of imagery, imagery
intelligence and geospatial information to policy makers and
war fighters, much remains to be accomplished.
One of NIMA's objectives has been greater use of the
commercial sector for production of geospatial information. The
Committee supports NIMA's efforts but believes the transition
to greater reliance on the private sector can be accelerated.
To help achieve this goal, the Committee recommends a reduction
in Geospatial Production of $75 million and an increase in
acquisition of commercially-provided geospatial data of $25
million.
In 1998, NIMA moved into new facilities in St. Louis,
Missouri. The rationale for this move was cost savings. The
previous facility was much older and more expensive. Budget
projections, however, do not account for the savings the
Committee believes can be attained. Therefore, the Committee
recommends a reduction in Mission Support of $25 million.
Joint SIGINT avionics family
Last year, in an effort to expedite delivery of this
capability, the Committee reviewed an accelerated production
effort. Based on briefings from the Air Force and the
contractors, the Committee found that the delivery schedule
could be accelerated up to three years in the case of the U-2,
and two years for other platforms, simply by requiring that
platforms be equipped with JSAF components at their next
periodic depot maintenance (PDM) cycle following a JSAF
production decision. No additional program risks are involved
in this acceleration.
Under the plan submitted to Congress last year, both low
and high band subsystems were scheduled to begin delivery to
the Armed Services in fiscal year 2001 and conclude delivery in
fiscal year 2007. During that period, some aircraft would
complete a PDM cycle and not have the new components installed
even though the components would have been readily available.
Maintaining the older systems when they could be replaced would
increase support costs. In an effort to deliver capability
sooner and save $44 million in program costs, the Committee
recommended an accelerated delivery schedule consistent with
platform PDM schedules.
Unfortunately, since the Committee made those
recommendations last year, there have been cost overruns and
schedule slippages based on poor performance by the contractors and by some
unforeseen technical difficulties. Under the current
development schedule, barring any further problems with the
contractors' performance, the earliest that a procurement
decision can be made in May 2001.
Recent contractor performance, however, leads the Committee
to believe that this schedule is now optimistic. Barring
further delays in system development, a May 2001 decision to go
forward with production potentially pushes delivery of the
first production units into fiscal year 2003 and perhaps
beyond.
As a result of the JSAF program cost growth, the
Administration's budget request is underfunded by a minimum of
$12 million in fiscal year 2000. The Committee recommends an
authorization for appropriations of an additional $12 million
in Air Force RDT&E for JSAF Advanced Sensors.
Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle
The Global Hawk is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and is
the air vehicle component of the High Altitude Endurance
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) System. The HAE UAV System is
comprised of two components, the Global Hawk air vehicle and
the ground control station, or Common Ground Segment (CGS).
The program began as an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), and, in 1998, the program was transferred
to the Air Force from the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). The Military Utility Assessment (MUA) of Global
Hawk was to begin in April 1999. Unfortunately, the MU test
vehicle, known as Air Vehicle Number Two, crashed in early
April 1999. Resultant program delays, combined with unforseen
manufacturing difficulties experienced by the contractor, have
caused substantial cost growth in the program. The following
charts compare the program as contained in the Administration's
budget submission with current program projections.
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year--
-----------------------------------------------------------
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's Budget.................................. 48 65 58 96 98 100
Estimated Shortfall................................. 31 58 67 54 110 156
Estimated Requirement............................... 79 123 125 150 208 256
Air Vehicles........................................ 0 1 1 1 2 2
Common Ground Segment............................... ........ ........ 1 ........ 1 ........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee strongly supports giving unmanned aerial
vehicles a greater role in performing many intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well as, early
warning missions, airborne communications relay missions and,
potentially, boost phase intercept missions in support of
Ballistic Missile Defense. The Committee believes that the
original Global Hawk design for the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) was too limited.
The goal of the ACTD was delivery of an air vehicle with
sensor payload for $10 million, while at the same time
delivering an air vehicle capable of 40-hour flight duration.
This was a worthy goal for fiscal reasons, but was potentially
shortsighted for reasons of military utility. The program cost
constraints limited the size of the air vehicle, which in turn
limited the size of the payload.
For example, weight and payload capabilities of the current
Global Hawk design rule out the potential for configuration of
one air vehicle for collection of both Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) data during the
same mission, as well as ruling out growth to other missions
such as those currently performed by the Joint Surveillance
Target Acquisition Radar System (Joint STARS), the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), or the RC-135 Rivet Joint,
Combat Sent and Cobra Ball missions.
In an effort to prevent further delays and additional cost
overruns, the Committee recommend an authorization for
appropriations of an additional $31 million for the Global Hawk
program.
U-2 polarimetric kit
The Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System
(SYERS) began service with the U-2 in 1988. Since that time,
the Air Force and Congress have supported several upgrades to
SYERS. In an effort to counter the growing threat of camouflage
and denial and deception practices, the Committee recommends an
authorization for appropriations of $9 million to acquire,
field, and test a polarimetric upgrade kit on a SYERS system.
Outrider tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
In 1999, the Army restructured its tactical UAV acquisition
program. As a result, the $45.8 million requested in
procurement funds for fiscal year 2000 cannot be obligated. The
funds, however, are required in RDT&E for continuation of
source selection efforts. The Committee recommends that $45.8
million requested for procurement be authorized for
appropriations in RDT&E.
Dark Star unmanned aerial vehicle termination
The Department of Defense has terminated the Dark Star UAV
program. The $6 million requested for fiscal year 2000 is no
longer needed. The Committee recommends a reduction in the
authorization for appropriations for Dark Star of $6 million.
RC-135 Rivet Joint quick reaction capabilities
As a result of delays in the JSAF program and changes in
the threat, Quick Reaction Capabilities modifications to the
RC-135 Rivet Joint fleet are underfunded by $12 million in
fiscal year 2000. The Committee recommends an authorization for
appropriations of an additional $12 million to address Quick
Reaction Capability shortfalls in Fiscal Year 2000.
Rivet Joint theater airborne warning system
The Committee has supported development and fielding of a
theatre airborne warning system (TAWS) for the RC-135 Rivet
Joint fleet to detect and track the launch of tactical
ballistic missiles. The Committee recommends an authorization
for appropriations of $17 million to continue this effort.
Gulf States initiative
The Committee is concerned by the growing threat posed to
the United States both domestically and internationally by
transnational threats. Transnational threats include, but are
not limited to, the following: terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, organized crime and the proliferation of chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons or agents. The Committee
believes that a concerted effort on the part of federal, state
and local entities is required to address transnational
threats.
The model U.S. response to transnational threats can be
found in the Gulf States Initiative (GSI), which is a part of
the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program (DISTP)
within the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). The GSI
was established by congressional direction in fiscal year 1992.
Formerly known as the Gulf States Counterdrug Initiative, GSI
formalized Defense Department support to Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana in the effort to combat narcotics trafficking.
Georgia was added to GSI in fiscal year 1997.
One of the critical features of GSI has been the
establishment of state-run command, control, communications,
and computer (C4) capabilities that have facilitated the flow
of information from federal entities to state and local law
enforcement agencies (LEA). Based upon the success of GSI,
Congress directed that the activities of GSI be broadened to
include counter-terrorism. The Committee believes that GSI can
be expanded beyond its traditional focus on combating narcotics
trafficking and its more recent involvement in counter-
terrorism to form the ``backbone'' of a national capability to
combat the spectrum of transnational threats. Therefore, the
Committee recommends an authorization for appropriations of an
additional $15 million in fiscal year 2000 to expand the Gulf
States Initiative.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
Over the past nine years, the Committee repeatedly has
highlighted its deep concern about the adequacy of the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Counterintelligence Program and
the national security impact of the DOE's wide-ranging
programs, including its Foreign Visitors Program. During that
time, the Committee has directed that a number of assessments
of the DOE's counterintelligence practices be conducted. Each
has reinforced the Committee's view that the DOE's
counterintelligence program in riddled with systemic
weaknesses.
Beginning in 1990, the Committee has matched its concerns
with recommended increases in the size and effectiveness of
DOE's counterintelligence program. Specifically, the Committee
increased resources in this area in 1991, 1992, 1995, 1997,
1998, and 1999. This year, the Committee, in its markup of the
Administration's Fiscal Year 2000 budget request, has
recommended that spending for cyber counterintelligence be
increased by $30.0 million. These additional resources would
allow the DOE to install computer intrusion detection devices
and monitor e-mail at virtually all of its facilities. The
absence of this capability today is a counterintelligence
weakness.
The Committee is encouraged by the steps now being taken by
the DOE to address its counterintelligence programs.
Nevertheless, the Committee's longstanding fears have been
confirmed in recent months.
While the Foreign Visitors Program incurs risks, it
produces real benefits. To the Committee's knowledge, however,
there has been no assessment that would provide policymakers
with the facts necessary to judge the overall efficacy of the
Visitor's Program.
Section 504 of the Bill therefore requires a net assessment
of the Foreign Visitors Program. The Committee intends that the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation appoint an independent panel of
experts, similar to that which was appointed to assess the
Intelligence Community's performance on the 1998 Indian Nuclear
Tests, to perform a net assessment analysis of the DOE's
Foreign Visitors Program. In carrying out its assessment, the
panel should work in cooperation with the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). To the extent feasible,
such report shall be unclassified and made available to the
public. Such report shall be supplemented as necessary by a
classified report or annex, which shall be provided separately
to the President and the congressional intelligence committees.
In the interim, the Committee believes that we must ensure
the integrity of the U.S. National Laboratories and believes
that a moratorium on the Foreign Visitors Program must be
imposed at certain facilities until the Department fully
implements a comprehensive, fully effective, and sustained
counterintelligence program. Accordingly, Title V of the
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 also establishes a
moratorium on the Department of Energy's Foreign Visitors
Program and requires background checks on all foreign visitors
to national laboratories. The moratorium applies only to
individuals from countries on the DOE's sensitive country list.
The term ``background checks'' is intended to mean the
consultation of all available, appropriate, and relevant
intelligence community and law enforcement indices and data
bases.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The Committee understands that polygraphing is employed as
a tool by the CIA, FBI, and DOE for counterintelligence
purposes, Polygraphing has been described as a ``useful, if
unreliable'' investigative tool. Given the potential
unreliability of the polygraph system, the Committee believes
that alternatives to the polygraph should be explored. The
Committee understands that alternatives to polygraphing exist
and have been explored by several agencies, including the CIA
and the FBI.
Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation jointly shall
conduct an assessment of alternative technologies to the
polygraph for use in counterintelligence programs. The DCI and
Director of the FBI shall report their findings to the
Committee not later than 90 days after the enactment of this
Bill. The report should include the three most viable
alternative technologies, along with detailed cost projections
for 25, 50, and 100 examinations per year. The report also
should include a brief description of the contribution each
technology might make over and above continued employment of
polygraph procedures.
TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP (TAG)
In 1997, the Committee empaneled a Technical Advisory Group
(TAG) composed of scientists, former senior military officers,
and industry leaders to review various complex systems
engineering efforts within the Intelligence Community (IC); the
task organization of components of the IC to accomplish their
missions, and myriad other highly technical issues designated
by the Committee for review. During the first session of the
106th Congress, the TAG was asked to review U.S. capabilities
with regard to measurements and signatures intelligence
(MASINT) and the future of U.S. imagery intelligence (IMINT).
The collection of MASINT depends upon a wide range of
technologies and phenomena. It includes detection of nuclear,
chemical, and biological effluvia, images within the
electromagnetic radiation spectrum, not visible to the human
eye, and processing and exploitation of radar phase history
data collected by synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The MASINT
TAG was asked to study both the IC organizational structure for
MASINT issues as well as the technologies themselves. The IMINT
TAG reviewed the Future Imagery Architecture, the requirements
underpinning the architecture, and our tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) capabilities.
Both groups reported their findings and recommendations to
the Committee on April 21, 1999. Most of their findings and
recommendations are classified and are addressed in the
Classified Annex accompanying this Report.
ENCRYPTION
The Committee believes that export restrictions on
encryption are necessary to protect our national security.
Export restrictions on encryption and other telecommunications
products are essential to the IC's signals intelligence
mission. Signals intelligence assists the national and military
policymaking customer by providing information on foreign
governments, militaries, and nonstate actors. SIGINT also is
instrumental in protecting our citizens and military from
military actions, terrorist attacks, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, and other
threats to our national security.
Over the past four years, the Administration has
significantly loosened restrictions on the export of
encryption. Nevertheless, legislation has been introduced in
Congress that would further relax restrictions on encryption
exports. The Committee believes further precipitous and
inappropriate loosening of encryption export restrictions may
severely damage the Intelligence Community's ability to perform
its SIGINT mission. Therefore, the Committee intends to look
very closely at any legislation regarding encryption export
policy.
ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTORS GENERAL
The Committee has been concerned for a number of years
about the capabilities and independence of the administrative
Inspectors General within the Intelligence Community (IC). The
administrative Inspectors General within the IC include those
at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National
Security Agency (NSA) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The
classified annex accompanying the Conference Report on the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requested
that the quality control review being conducted by the
statutory Inspectors General from the CIA and the Department of
Defense (DoD) include recommendations for improving the
authority and effectiveness of the NRO Office of Inspector
General (IG).
The results of the CIA/DoD quality control review of the
NRO IG were delivered to the Committee in January 1999. The
report makes several recommendations relating to the NRO IG
that this Committee believes should apply to all administrative
IGs within the Intelligence Community. These recommendations
include: a separate budget line item and personnel
authorization for the IG; sole authority, within applicable
laws and regulations, for the IG to manage its authorized staff
and appropriate funds; and, the ability to obtain legal
services from the appropriate agency General Counsel, the DoD
or CIA Offices of Inspectors General, or to employ his or her
own counsel.
The Committee understands that the NRO is attempting to
implement the above recommendations. However, the NRO's lack of
its own personnel system results in a situation where a 1995
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the CIA and NRO
stipulates that NRO IG employees must be hired on staff reserve
appointments that equate to temporary five year contracts.
Also, the MOU does not clearly state the extent of the IG's
authority to promote his or her staff. These limitations have
inhibited the NRO IG's ability to recruit and retain qualified
personnel and threaten the Office's independence and
effectiveness. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the DCI
ensure that the NRO Director and CIA Executive Director work
together to revise the 1995 MOU to allow the NRO IG to
establish, manage, and administer his or her own career
service.
The Committee also recommends that the Directors of NSA,
NIMA, and DIA take the appropriate steps to create a separate
budget line item and personnel authorization for their
respective administrative IG offices, and ensure that their IGs
have all the authorities required to independently manage these
resources. These authorities should include the ability to hire
and retain appropriately skilled personnel, and the option to
retain independent legal counsel. The Committee requests that
the Directors of the NRO, NSA, NIMA, and DIA provide a written
response on the status of these initiatives by no later than
July 31, 1999.
The Committee is also concerned about its insight into the
administrative and operational activities of the administrative
IGs. In order to improve its oversight of these offices, the
Committee directs that the Inspectors General from the NRO,
NIMA, NSA, and
DIA shall provide the intelligence committees of both Houses
with an annual report, in conjunction with, but separate from
the Congressional Budget Justification, that details the fiscal
and personnel resources requested, and the plan for their use.
This report also should include the programs and activities
scheduled for review during the fiscal year, comments on the
office's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel, and
any other concerns relating to the independence and
effectiveness of the IG's office.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements
of the U.S. Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-
related activities the Act authorized appropriations for fiscal
year 2000.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for the
entities listed in section 101 for fiscal year 2000 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the
Act by this section.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2000 to exceed the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed 2 percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under
section 102. The Director may exercise this authority only when
necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions or to the maintenance of a stable personnel force,
and any exercise of this authority must be reported to the two
congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account
Section 104 provides details concerning the amount and
composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$171,672,000 for fiscal year 2000 for the staffing and
administration of various components under the CMA.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 348 full-time
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2000 and
provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the U.S.
Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed to the
Community Management staff on a reimbursable basis, with
certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the Director
of Central Intelligence to transfer the $27,000,000 to the
Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the
authority of the Attorney General and subject to section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$209,100,000 for fiscal year 2000 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the
conference reports for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the conference report shall not be deemed to
constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
Sec. 303. Extension of application of sanctions laws to intelligence
activities
Section 303 extends until January 6, 2001, the authority
first granted by section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for the President to delay the
imposition of an economic, cultural, diplomatic, or other
sanction upon his determination that proceeding with the
sanction could compromise an ongoing criminal investigation or
an intelligence source or method. This authority was extended
until January 6, 1998, by section 304 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, until January 6, 1999,
by section 304 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998; and again until January 6, 2000 by section 303 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. There
is continuing need for this authority in the event that an
automatic or immediate imposition of sanctions would seriously
jeopardize a criminal investigation or sources and methods of
intelligence collection.
Sec. 304. Access to computers and computer data of executive branch
employees with access to classified information
Section 304 authorizes investigative components like the
FBI (and internal Intelligence Community investigative or
security units) access to computers of individuals handling
classified data.
The provision requires the government to obtain consent, which,
in turn, would place the computer information within the
already existing ``consent'' exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The definition
of ``computer'' is drawn from the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(18 U.S.C. 1030), with some minor modifications.
Sec. 305. Naturalization of certain persons affiliated with a Communist
or similar party
Section 305 applies to certain applicants for
naturalization (1) who are within the class described in
section 313(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
because of past membership in or affiliation with the Communist
Party or any other totalitarian organization, and (2) who meet
all other statutory requirements for naturalization except for
the requirement that they be free for at least ten years from
such membership or affiliation. This provision authorizes the
naturalization of these individuals otherwise eligible for
naturalization, if the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization determine the applicants have made a
contribution to the national security or the intelligence
mission of the United States. These determinations will be made
prior to the filing of the applicant's naturalization petition.
When making a determination in these cases, the Director of
Central Intelligence will be acting in his capacity as head of
the U.S. Intelligence Community but will, in advance, reach
consensus on the merits of each case with the heads of all
other Departments and agencies of the U.S. Intelligence
Community.
Unlike section 316(f) of the INA, this new section 313(e)
does not provide for expedited naturalization. Although
individuals covered by this new provision must have made a
contribution to the national intelligence mission, generally
few will have made a contribution of such an extraordinary
nature as to merit U.S. citizenship after only one year of
lawful permanent residence and without regard to any prior
Communist Party membership, as is already provided under
section 316(f) of the INA. Nevertheless, after having taken
great risks in furtherance of the U.S. intelligence mission,
these individuals should not be penalized from obtaining U.S.
citizenship at the otherwise allowable time because of their
former Communist Party membership or affiliation.
Sec. 306. Infrastructure and quality of life improvements at Bad
Aibling and Menwith Hill Stations
Section 306 extends through the end of FY 2001 the
authority granted the Army in the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998 for infrastructure and quality of life
improvements at Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill Stations. With
respect to Bad Aibling Station, this authority is requested as
an interim measure for contingency maintenance pending any
final decision on the status of the Station.
The Army became the Executive Agent for Bad Aibling Station
in FY 1995 and Menwith Hill Station in FY 1996. Without
congressional action, the Army is prohibited by 31 U.S.C.
Sec. 1301 from using appropriated funds to support these field
sites, notwith-
standing that the Army is the Executive Agent for them. The
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1998 provided the
necessary flexibility to allow the Army to transfer or
reprogram up to $2 million in FY 1998 O&M and $2 million in FY
1999 O&M funds for necessary maintenance at these stations.
However, sufficient funding has not been available to allow the
Army to meet all of the stations' needs, given financial
constraints and increasing operational tempo. Consequently, in
order to continue addressing infrastructure and quality of life
needs at Menwith Hill Station and to be able to meet
contingencies on an interim basis at Bad Aibling Station, the
Army's flexible transfer and reprogramming authority is
extended through the end of FY 2001.
Sec. 307. Technical amendment
Section 307 makes a technical correction to Section
305(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997. Section 305 of that Act authorizes the expedited
naturalization of spouses and children of a deceased alien
whose death resulted from an intentional and unauthorized
disclosure of classified information. Section 305(b)(2)
references ``subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section
243(h)(2)'' of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
describes the categories of aliens who are ineligible for
expedited naturalization or asylum (i.e., those who have
participated in the persecution of any person; have been
convicted of a particularly serious crime, thus constituting a
danger to the U.S. community; have committed a serious
nonpolitical crime outside the United States; or are regarded
as a danger to the security of the United States).
The Immigration and Nationality Act was amended extensively
(by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, which was Division C of Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law 104-208, September 30,
1996) at about the same time that section 305 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 was
enacted. Section 305 makes the necessary technical correction
to Section 305(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 by deleting the no longer current or accurate
Immigration and Nationality Act reference.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modification to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program
Section 401 of the Act makes a number of changes to the
Central Intelligence Agency's Central Services Program.
First, section 401 expands section 21(a) of the CIA Act to
authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to provide items
and services under the Program to nonappropriated fund
entities, such as the Northwest Federal Credit Union and the
Employee Activities Association, which are affiliated with the
Agency.
Second, section 401 clarifies that the Central Services
Program Working Capital Fund may retain and use proceeds from
the sale or exchange of equipment or property of a central
service provider, as well as amounts collected in payment for
loss or damage to such equipment or property. Third, the
amendments made by section 401 also clarify that the fee central service providers are
authorized to impose and collect under section 21(f) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act may be levied and used by
existing central service providers already in the Program to
acquire or improve their equipment and systems, that is, to
recapitalize and modernize, in order to remain competitive and/
or expand their business operations (within the limits of
subsection (a) and other parts of section 21). It is the
committee's intent and direction that the costs of such
recapitalization and/or modernization by central service
providers not be considered or included as ``other expenses''
within the meaning of section 21(c) of the CIA Act. These two
clarifications address and are intended to resolve concerns
raised by the Agency's Inspector General in its most recent
annual audit report on the Central Services Program and its
Working Capital Fund.
Finally, section 401 extends to March 31, 2005 the
scheduled sunset or expiration date for the Program, which
otherwise would occur as of March 31, 2000. While the Agency's
Program has shown considerable promise and potential to improve
the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the Agency's
administrative and/or support activities, it would not be
appropriate to consider making the DCI's authority to run such
a Program permanent until a somewhat longer track record and
experience base can be evaluated.
Sec. 402. Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act
Section 402 amends section 2(f) of the CIA Voluntary
Separation Pay Act, Public Law 103-36, 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note, to
extend the Agency's authority to offer separation incentives
until September 30, 2000. Without this amendment, the Agency's
authority to offer such incentives would expire on September
30, 1999.
CIA's separation incentive has been an effective workforce
reduction tool. However, due to rapid and worldwide
technological change and increasingly divergent intelligence
collection requirements, the Agency must continue to address
skills mix issues, to include reducing or eliminating outdated
professions. Therefore, it is critical that the CIA separation
incentive authority be extended to provide the Agency greater
flexibility in addressing its skills mix requirements.
CIA has worked hard over the past decade to streamline and
refocus its workforce to address critical, cutting-edge
national security issues. The Agency has reduced significantly
the size of its employee population and begun reengineering
business processes in order to hire personnel with new skills,
expand the diversity of the Agency workforce, and acquire new
technologies.
The net impact of the six CIA early out exercises thus far,
along with normal attrition and reduced hiring, has been a
significant drop in the Agency's on-duty strength since the
separation incentive program began in FY 1993. However, rapid
worldwide technological change and increasing concern about
such diverse issues as international terrorism, drug
trafficking, and political instability require the Agency to do
more to address the skills mix of the Agency population.
The Agency must continue to reduce or eliminate outdated
professions, accelerate the transfer of resources from support
to mission-critical work, and hire people with state-of-the-art
skills. Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay authority--used for specific,
targeted populations--will help the CIA achieve those goals
without resorting to involuntary separations in certain
occupational categories. The incentive pay would be targeted
principally at individuals in outdated occupations and skill
categories who would not be separating via regular attrition or
switching to another work area after retraining. Incentive pay
also helps to provide a ``soft'' landing for Agency employees
in outdated or surpluses occupations, and thus mitigates the
counterintelligence risk associated with a reduction in force.
Without an incentive authority, there would be a decline in
separation rates. This would, in turn, limit the Agency's
ability to keep pace with the rapidly expanding technologies
and dynamic geopolitical realities central to the Agency's
changing mission. Incentive authority through fiscal year 2002
will help enable the Agency to ensure its workforce has the
right skills in the right areas at the right times.
The Committee notes that the Departments of Defense and
Energy have agency-specific voluntary separation pay incentive
authority through 30 September 2001 and until 1 January 2001,
respectively.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 502 establishes a moratorium on foreign visitors to
classified facilities at Department of Energy (DOE) National
Laboratories. The moratorium applies to citizens of nations on
the DOE ``sensitive countries list.'' Section 502 also provides
for a waiver of this moratorium on a case-by-case basis if the
Secretary of Energy justifies the waiver and certifies that the
visit is necessary for the national security of the United
States.
Section 503 requires that the Secretary of Energy perform
background checks on all foreign visitors to the National
Laboratories. The term ``background checks'' means the
consultation of all available, appropriate, and relevant
intelligence community and law enforcement indices and data
bases.
Section 504 requires a report to Congress on the
counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories and
a net assessment of the Foreign Visitors Program at the
National Laboratories to be produced by a panel of experts. The
required report shall include a recommendation as to whether
the moratorium (Section 502) should be repealed.
Section 505 defines ``National Laboratory'' to include the
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National
Laboratories and defines the ``sensitive countries list'' to
include countries on a list by that name maintained by the
Secretary of Energy.
TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS
Section 601 amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1802, et seq. (FISA) to expand the
definition of an ``agent of a foreign power'' to include a
person who, for or on behalf of a foreign power, knowingly
enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity
or, while in the United States and for or on behalf of a
foreign power, knowingly assumes a false
or fraudulent identity. The definition is intended to include
the classic illegal spy, who comes to the United States with a
false identity and can remain hidden for many years before
being tasked by his or her foreign master. The definition would
also include the person who, for or on behalf of a foreign
power, is in the United States under a fraudulent identity,
which could be accomplished by changing letters or characters
in a name or adding or deleting parts of a name. The fact that
a person, for or on behalf of a foreign power, enters or is in
the United States under these circumstances is, in the
Committee's view, dangerous enough to the national security of
the United States to allow application of the FISA.
Section 602 amends Section 811 (a)(c)(2) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995 by deleting the words
``after a report has been provided pursuant to paragraph
(1)(a)''. The deletion makes it clear that the FBI's obligation
to consult with departments and agencies concerned begins
before a report has been provided, if, for example, the FBI has
knowledge of the activities from other sources or as a result
of its own investigation.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On May 5, 1999, the Select Committee on Intelligence
approved the Bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.
ESTIMATE OF COSTS
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying
out the provisions of this Bill, for fiscal year 2000, are set
forth in the classified annex to this Bill. Estimates of the
costs incurred in carrying out this Bill in the five fiscal
years thereafter are not available from the Executive branch,
and therefore the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to
paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, to include such estimates in this report.
EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) rule XXXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the
provisions of this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In the opinion of the Committee it is necessary to dispense
with the requirements of section 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the business
of the Senate.
Senate Intelligence Committee Releases Bipartisan Report Detailing Foreign Intelligence Threats
WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Vice Chairman Marco...