Calendar No. 106
118th Congress} { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 118-59
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024
_______
July 13, 2023.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 2103]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 2103) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2024 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 14,
2023, that the request for the National Intelligence Program
for Fiscal Year 2024 was $72.4 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of
public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 2024.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2024 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2024.
Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2024.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
Section 301. Post-graduate employment of Department of Defense Cyber
and Digital Service Academy scholarship recipients in
intelligence community
Section 301 enables recipients of a Cyber and Digital
Services Academy Scholarship to fulfill their post-award
employment obligations through service in Intelligence
Community agencies.
Section 302. Plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with
experience in financial intelligence and emerging technologies
Section 302 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
heads of human capital of the CIA, the National Security
Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a plan for the
Intelligence Community to recruit, train, and retain personnel
who have expertise and experience in financial intelligence and
emerging technologies in order to improve analytic tradecraft.
Section 303. Policy and performance framework for mobility of
intelligence community workforce
Section 303 requires the DNI to develop and implement a
policy and performance framework to ensure the timely and
effective mobility of employees and contractors of the Federal
Government who are transferring employment between elements of
the Intelligence Community.
Section 304. In-State tuition rates for active duty members of the
intelligence community
Section 304 allows officers employed in the Intelligence
Community to obtain in-state tuition benefits, consistent with
members of armed forces and the Foreign Service.
Section 305. Standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence
vulnerability assessments and surveys
Section 305 amends the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act
of 2002 to require the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center (NCSC) to develop standards, criteria, and
guidance that U.S. Government and private sector entities could
use to conduct their own vulnerability surveys.
Section 306. Improving administration of certain post-employment
restrictions for intelligence community
Section 306 provides the Intelligence Community with the
authorities necessary to effectively administer the post-
employment restriction requirements in the National Security
Act of 1947.
Section 307. Mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center
Section 307 amends the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act
of 2002 to establish the NCSC's mission to include organizing
and leading strategic planning for counterintelligence
activities of the U.S. Government.
Section 308. Prohibition relating to transport of individuals detained
at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Section 308 prohibits any IC element from chartering
private or commercial aircraft to transport any individual who
is or was detained at Guantanamo Bay.
Section 309. Department of Energy review of certain foreign visitors
and assignees to National Laboratories
Section 309 requires the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy to vet foreign national visitors or assignees to
National Labs from sensitive countries for counterintelligence
risks, notify a National Lab of its determination of whether a
visitor or assignee poses a counterintelligence risk, and make
a recommendation to the National Lab whether to grant or deny
access. Section 309 further requires quarterly reporting of
each instance where a National Lab granted access and the
respective recommendation.
Section 310. Congressional oversight of intelligence community risk
assessments
Section 310 requires the DNI, within 30 days of commencing
a risk assessment arising from the mishandling or improper
disclosure ofclassified information, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees copies of such documents and
materials within the committees' jurisdiction and provide a briefing.
Section 311. Inspector General review of dissemination by Federal
Bureau of Investigation Richmond, Virginia, field office of
certain document
Section 311 requires the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice to conduct a review of the actions and
events, including any underlying policy direction, that served
as a basis for the FBI Richmond Field Office's January 23, 2023
dissemination of the document titled ``Interest of Racially or
Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-
Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New
Mitigation Opportunities.''
Section 312. Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Section 312 prohibits employees of the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A) from engaging in the collection of information or
intelligence targeting U.S. persons, except when carried out by
I&A officials responsible for collecting information or
intelligence from state, local, or Tribal territory governments
or a private employer.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 321. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and
assets from unmanned aircraft
Section 321 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by
unmanned aircraft.
Section 322. Change to penalties and increased availability of mental
health treatment for unlawful conduct on Central Intelligence
Agency installations
Section 322 allows the U.S. Government to seek penalties
for violations of CIA regulations prohibiting certain conduct
on CIA installations, such as driving under the influence and
trespass, that are consistent with other federal and state
jurisdictions.
Section 323. Modifications to procurement authorities of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 323 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to ensure that the CIA's advance payment delegation
authorities conform to those of other U.S. government agencies.
Section 324. Establishment of Central Intelligence Agency standard
workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation procedure
Section 324 requires the Director of the CIA to establish
and implement a standard workplace sexual misconduct complaint
investigation procedure and provide annual reports to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding the number and
disposition of workplace sexual misconduct complaints brought
to each individual or office of the CIA.
Section 325. Pay cap for diversity, equity, and inclusion staff and
contract employees of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 325 requires the Director of the CIA to establish a
pay cap on the salaries of CIA Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
staff and contract employees at the same level as an officer of
the Directorate of Operations in the Clandestine Services
Trainee program.
TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
Section 401. Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of
atrocities of the People's Republic of China
Section 401 requires the DNI to designate an Intelligence
Community coordinator for accountability of atrocities of the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
Section 402. Interagency working group and report on the malign efforts
of the People's Republic of China in Africa
Section 402 requires the DNI to establish an interagency
working group within the Intelligence Community to analyze the
PRC's tactics and capabilities in Africa.
Section 403. Amendment to requirement for annual assessment by
intelligence community working group for monitoring the
economic and technological capabilities of the People's
Republic of China
Section 403 amends section 6503 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to ensure the DNI
provides a comprehensive unclassified list of PRC businesses,
academic and research institutions and other entities that
support the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese military, and
other Chinese government entities.
Section 404. Assessments of reciprocity in the relationship between the
United States and the People's Republic of China
Section 404 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, together with the DNI and other
appropriate Intelligence Community leaders, to submit an
assessment of critical areas in which the United States does
not maintain a reciprocal relationship with the PRC, and how
any lack of reciprocity provides advantages to the PRC.
Section 405. Annual briefing on intelligence community efforts to
identify and mitigate Chinese Communist Party political
influence operations and information warfare against the United
States
Section 405 requires the Director of the Foreign Malign
Influence Center to provide the congressional intelligence
committees with a briefing on the ways in which relevant
Intelligence Community elements are working to identify and
mitigate actions of Chinese entities engaged in political
influence operations and information warfare against the United
States (including U.S. persons).
Section 406. Assessment of threat posed to United States ports by
cranes manufactured by countries of concern
Section 406 requires the DNI to coordinate with the
Secretary of Defense and other heads of the Intelligence
Community as appropriate to conduct an assessment and submit a
report on the threat posed to the United States by cranes
manufactured by countries of concern and commercial entities of
those countries, including the Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy
Industries Co.
Subtitle B--Russian Federation
Section 411. Assessment of lessons learned by intelligence community
with respect to conflict in Ukraine
Section 411 requires the DNI to submit an assessment of the
lessons learned by the Intelligence Community with respect to
the war in Ukraine, including the quality and timeliness of the
United States' intelligence support.
Section 412. National intelligence estimate on long-term confrontation
with Russia
Section 412 requires the DNI to submit a national
intelligence estimate on the implications of the Ukraine war
with respect to a long-term United States and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization confrontation with Russia.
Subtitle C--Other Foreign Countries
Section 421. Report on efforts to capture and detain United States
citizens as hostages
Section 421 requires the DNI to submit a report on the
efforts of the Maduro regime in Venezuela to arrest, capture,
detain, and/or imprison United States citizens and lawful
permanent residents.
Section 422. Sense of Congress on priority of fentanyl in National
Intelligence Priorities Framework
Section 422 provides a sense of Congress that the
trafficking of illicit fentanyl from the PRC and Mexico should
be among the highest priorities in the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework.
TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES
Subtitle A--General Matters
Section 501. Office of Global Competition Analysis
Section 501 requires the President to establish an office
for analysis of global competition regarding United States
leadership in science, technology, and innovation sectors
critical to national security and economic prosperity and to
support related intelligence, policy development, and decision
making across the federal government.
Section 502. Assignment of detailees from intelligence community to
Department of Commerce
Section 502 provides the DNI with discretionary authority
to assign members of the Intelligence Community to be detailees
to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of
Commerce.
Section 503. Threats posed by information and communications technology
and services transactions and other activities
Section 503 requires the DNI to carry out threat
assessments of significant information and communications
technology and services transactions.
Section 504. Revision of regulations defining sensitive national
security property for Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States reviews
Section 504 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to
revise regulations for the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States in order to treat facilities and property of
elements of the Intelligence Community and National
Laboratories comparably to military installations.
Section 505. Support of intelligence community for export controls and
other missions of the Department of Commerce
Section 505 codifies authority for the DNI to collect,
analyze, and share information necessary to support the
missions of the Department of Commerce, including with respect
to the administration of export controls. Section 505 further
ensures that classified and sensitive information shared by the
Intelligence Community is protected in the course of civil
litigation challenging an action or finding of the Secretary of
Commerce.
Section 506. Review regarding information collection and analysis with
respect to economic competition
Section 506 requires the DNI to review open-source
commercial databases utilized by the Intelligence Community to
identify threats and gaps regarding economic competition with
foreign countries, including the PRC.
Subtitle B--Next Generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial
Intelligence
Section 511. Expanded annual assessment of economic and technological
capabilities of the People's Republic of China
Section 511 amends Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to expand the scope of
annual assessments of the economic and technological strategy,
efforts, and progress of the PRC to include next-generation
energy, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence.
Section 512. Procurement of public utility contracts
Section 512 extends the period of time to establish a
contract for public utility services to 30 years for any
executive agency that is, or has a component that is, an
element of the Intelligence Community.
Section 513. Assessment of using civil nuclear energy for intelligence
community capabilities
Section 513 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of
Intelligence Community facilities that have unique energy needs
to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of using civil
nuclear reactors to meet such needs.
Section 514. Policies established by Director of National Intelligence
for artificial intelligence capabilities
Section 514 amends Section 6702 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to require the DNI to
establish policies for the acquisition, adoption, development,
use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial intelligence
capabilities.
Section 515. Strategy for submittal of notice by private persons to
Federal agencies regarding certain risks and threats relating
to artificial intelligence
Section 515 directs the President to develop a strategy to
more effectively enable private sector actors, commercial
users, and independent researchers to notify relevant U.S.
Government agencies of information security risks from
artificial intelligence systems.
TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS
Section 601. Submittal to Congress of complaints and information by
whistleblowers in the intelligence community
Section 601 establishes security officers and protocols to
facilitate Intelligence Community employees' and contractors'
submissions of complaints and information to Congress. Section
601 further clarifies the requirements for submitting
whistleblower complaints and information, and ensures
bipartisan notification of such materials.
Section 602. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity
as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and
contractors in intelligence community
Section 602 adds a prohibition on knowing or willful
disclosures that reveal an Intelligence Community employee's or
contractor employee's identifying information without consent,
so as to identify such employee or contractor employee as a
whistleblower, except as necessary during the course of an
investigation. Section 602 further establishes a private right
of action for an Intelligence Community whistleblower if such
disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the whistleblower for
bringing a complaint.
Section 603. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations
Section 603 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse
security clearance or access determination against a
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's
disclosure. Section 603 further establishes parity in the legal
standards applied to Intelligence Community whistleblower
matters.
Section 604. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and access determinations
Section 604 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal
with respect to the employee's or former employee's security
clearance or access determination.
Section 605. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements
Section 605 enhances the efficiency of whistleblower
notifications to the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023
CHAPTER 1--SHORT TITLE; DEFINITIONS
Section 701. Short title
Section 701 contains the short title for this subtitle.
Section 702. Definitions
Section 702 contains the definitions for this subtitle.
CHAPTER 2--GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REFORM OF THE SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
Section 711. Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification
Section 711 designates the DNI as Executive Agent for
Classification and Declassification with responsibility to lead
whole-of-government technological modernization of the
classification and declassification system.
Section 712. Executive Committee on Classification and Declassification
Programs and Technology
Section 712 establishes an interagency committee to provide
direction, advice, and guidance to the Executive Agent for
Classification and Declassification on matters relating to
classification and declassification programs and technology.
Section 713. Advisory bodies for Executive Agent for Classification and
Declassification
Section 713 designates several existing bodies, including
the Public Interest Declassification Board, as advisory bodies
to the Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification.
Section 714. Information Security Oversight Office
Section 714 codifies establishment of an Information
Security Oversight Office within the Executive Branch.
CHAPTER 3--REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION
Section 721. Classification and declassification of information
Section 721 authorizes the President to establish a system
for the classification and declassification of information,
subject to certain minimum requirements including with regard
to the scope of information that may be classified, the
duration of classification, and the processes for reviewing
classified records and materials. Among other things, it
provides that information may only be classified, or remain
classified, where the harm to national security reasonably
expected from disclosure outweighs the public interest.It also
sets the maximum period for classification at 25 years, grants
agency heads the authority to extend that period to 50 years,
and grants the President the authority to extend beyond 50
years in 10 year increments.
Section 722. Declassification working capital funds
Section 722 establishes working capital funds that are
funded relative to how many classified records an agency
generates. The proceeds of these funds may be used with the
concurrence of the Executive Agent for Classification and
Declassification to promote and implement interoperable
technological and automated solutions for automatic
declassification.
Section 723. Transparency officers
Section 723 codifies a requirement for privacy and civil
liberties officers to also serve as transparency officers to
assist agencies in identifying records of significant public
interest and prioritizing review of such records for public
release.
CHAPTER 4--PREVENTING MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Section 731. Security review of certain records of the President and
Vice President
Section 731 establishes a process for security review of
certain President and Vice-Presidential records to ensure that
records bearing classification markings are not improperly
categorized as personal records and removed from secure
facilities.
Section 732. Mandatory counterintelligence risk assessments
Section 732 requires NCSC to prepare a written risk
assessment following any mishandling or unauthorized disclosure
of classified information by certain senior government
officials.
Section 733. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat
programs
Section 733 requires each agency with access to classified
information to establish an insider threat program that meets
certain minimum standards, including establishing a capability
to monitor user activity on all classified networks.
CHAPTER 5--OTHER MATTERS
Section 741. Prohibitions
Section 741 establishes certain prohibitions applicable to
this subtitle, including with respect to withholding
information from Congress and judicial review.
Section 742. Conforming amendment
Section 742 contains a conforming amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947.
Section 743. Clerical amendment
Section 743 contains a clerical amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947.
Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023
Section 751. Short title
Section 751 contains the short title for this subtitle.
Section 752. Definitions
Section 752 contains the definitions for this subtitle.
Section 753. Findings and sense of the Senate
Section 753 contains findings and a Sense of the Senate
that the classification system is in urgent need of reform, and
classification should be limited to the minimum necessary to
protect national security while balancing the public's interest
in disclosure.
Section 754. Classification authority
Section 754 codifies the exercise of classification
authority by the President, Vice President, and other
officials. Section 754 also specifies how the authority is
delegated and the training required to receive delegated
classification authority.
Section 755. Promoting efficient declassification review
Section 755 requires agencies that identify records more
than 25 years old while processing requests pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act or mandatory declassification review
procedures to review and process such records for release by
the National Declassification Center.
Section 756. Training to promote sensible classification
Section 756 requires the head of each agency with
classification authority to conduct training to discourage
over-classification and promote sensible classification.
Section 757. Improvements to Public Interest Declassification Board
Section 757 allows members of the Public Interest
Declassification Board whose term has expired to continue to
serve until a successor is appointed and sworn in. Section 757
also authorized the Board to hire up to 12 staff members.
Section 758. Implementation of technology for classification and
declassification
Section 758 directs the Administrator of the Office of
Electronic Government to research and submit recommendations to
the President and Congress concerning technology-based
solutions to support classification and declassification that
are interoperable across the government.
Section 759. Studies and recommendations on necessity of security
clearances
Section 759 directs the head of each agency that grants
security clearances to conduct a study on the number and types
of security clearances and their justification. Section 759
also provides for independent review of each study.
TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE
Section 801. Review of shared information technology services for
personnel vetting
Section 801 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a review of the extent to which the
Intelligence Community can use information technology services
shared among the Intelligence Community for purposes of
personnel vetting.
Section 802. Timeliness standard for rendering determinations of trust
for personnel vetting
Section 802 requires the President, acting through the
Security Executive Agent and Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent, to establish and publish in the Federal
Register new timeliness performance standards for processing
personnel vetting trust determinations in accordance with the
Federal personnel vetting performance management standards.
Section 803. Annual report on personnel vetting trust determinations
Section 803 requires the DNI, acting as the Security
Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, acting as the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent, in coordination with the Security,
Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability
Council, to jointly make available to the public an annual
report on specific types of personnel vetting trust
determinations.
Section 804. Survey to assess strengths and weaknesses of Trusted
Workforce 2.0
Section 804 requires the Comptroller General of the United
States to administer a survey to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0
initiative.
Section 805. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to
classified information solely because of past use of cannabis
Section 805 prohibits the head of an element of the
Intelligence Community from denying eligibility for access to
classified information to an individual solely on the use of
cannabis by that individual prior to the submission of an
application for a security clearance.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Section 901. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by the
Central Intelligence Agency for qualifying injuries to the
brain
Section 901 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to allow flexibility of funding, if necessary, to pay
qualified individuals who apply for payments for certain
injuries.
Section 902. Clarification of requirements to seek certain benefits
relating to injuries to the brain
Section 902 clarifies that covered dependents, covered
employees, or covered individuals shall not be required to seek
any other benefit furnished by the U.S. Government to be
eligible for a payment for a qualifying injury to the brain
authorized under the Helping American Victims Afflicted by
Neurological Attacks Act of 2021 (HAVANA Act) (Public Law 117-
46).
Section 903. Intelligence community implementation of HAVANA Act of
2021 authorities
Section 903 requires each head of an element of the
Intelligence Community that has not already done so to issue
regulations and procedures to implement the authorities
provided by the HAVANA Act (Public Law 117-46).
Section 904. Report and briefing on Central Intelligence Agency
handling of anomalous health incidents
Section 904 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
handling of anomalous health incidents by the Agency.
TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY
Section 1001. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect
for Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2023
Section 1001 directs the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) to require that voting systems undergo penetration
testing as part of the standard certification process for such
systems. Section 1001 also directs the National Institute of
Standards and Technology to accredit entities that can perform
such testing and would direct the EAC to create a voluntary
vulnerability disclosure program for election systems.
Section 1002. Protecting Ballot Measures from Foreign Influence Act of
2023
Section 1002 makes it unlawful for a foreign national to
contribute money, either directly or indirectly, to a State or
local ballot initiative or ballot referendum.
TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS
Section 1101. Modification of reporting requirement for All-domain
Anomaly Resolution Office
Section 1101 amends section 1683(k)(1) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (as amended by
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023) to
ensure the Director of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office
(AARO) prepares the relevant reporting.
Section 1102. Modifications to notification on the provision of defense
sensitive support
Section 1102 permits the Secretary of Defense to notify the
congressional defense committees and, when appropriate, the
congressional intelligence committees after providing support
requiring time-sensitive support and extraordinary security
protections.
Section 1103. Modification of congressional oversight of special access
programs
Section 1103 amends Title 50 to ensure that annual reports
on Special Access Programs currently provided to the
congressional defense committees are also provided to the
congressional intelligence committees.
Section 1104. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena
Section 1104 prohibits funds authorized by this Act from
being used for activities involving unidentified anomalous
phenomena protected under any form of special access or
restricted access limitations that have not been briefed to
appropriate congressional committees, congressional leadership,
and the Director of AARO. Section 1104 also requires any person
currently or formerly under contract with the Federal
Government that has material or information relating to
unidentified anomalous phenomena protected by any form of
special access or restricted access to make the material or
information available to the Director of AARO.
Committee Comments and Direction
Civil Nuclear Technologies
Our national security depends on ensuring we innovate and
deploy civil nuclear power ahead of our adversaries. The
Committee is concerned that the Administration has not
appointed a Civil Nuclear Coordinator to develop and implement
a cohesive policy for building, operating, and deploying civil
nuclear power at home and abroad. The last two Administrations
both had such positions. Appointing a Civil Nuclear Coordinator
is especially critical now, as our adversaries invest heavily
and attempt to market competing civil nuclear reactors in
regions of substantial geopolitical and economic importance. A
Civil Nuclear Coordinator would ensure that necessary framework
agreements and controls relating to civil nuclear materials and
technologies are in place for competitive domestic and
international licensing and deployment, and coordinate with
U.S. industry and allies abroad to ensure that the United
States remains competitive in the development, deployment, and
export of civil nuclear technologies as compared to our
adversaries.
CIA Policies and Processes for Managing and Evaluating the Performance
of Agency Personnel
The Committee is concerned that the policies and processes
used by the CIA for managing and evaluating the performance of
CIA personnel are not being implemented in a manner that
provides minimum safeguards consistent with CIA regulations. In
addition, the Committee is concerned that these processes yield
inconsistent results, which for any given matter may either be
too harsh or too lenient. Therefore, the Committee directs
CIA's Office of Inspector General to examine whether CIA's
policies and processes for managing and evaluating the
performance of Agency personnel are effective and applied
consistently throughout the Agency, and whether there may be
systemic problems or deficiencies in those areas for which
corrective action may be appropriate.
Strategic Counterintelligence and Offensive Counterintelligence
The Committee is concerned that the U.S.
counterintelligence enterprise is not currently postured to
confront the whole-of-society foreign intelligence threat
landscape facing the country today. In particular, the
Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community has not
taken steps to address ambiguity around the meaning of
fundamental terms, including ``offensive counterintelligence''
and ``strategic counterintelligence.''
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination
with other elements of the Intelligence Community as
appropriate, to adopt definitions for ``offensive
counterintelligence'' and ``strategic counterintelligence.''
The Committee directs the DNI to provide the congressional
intelligence committees, not later than 120 days following
enactment of this Act, with notification of definitions adopted
for the terms ``offensive counterintelligence'' and ``strategic
counterintelligence.''
In addition, the Committee further recommends that the DNI
adopt the following language in defining roles and
responsibilities for the government-wide counterintelligence
mission:
``For purposes of carrying out the
counterintelligence activities of the United States
Government, the term `offensive counterintelligence'
means clandestine counterintelligence activity
conducted for national security, strategic, and
counterintelligence purposes against a target having
suspected or known affiliation with a foreign
intelligence entity to counter clandestine activities
that threaten the United States or the national
interests of the United States.''
``For purposes of organizing and leading strategic
planning for counterintelligence activities of the
United States Government, the term `strategic
counterintelligence' means the process and product of
developing the context, tradecraft, capabilities,
knowledge, and understanding of the strategic
environment, including the intentions and capabilities
of foreign adversaries and the national resources
necessary to engage in counterintelligence activities,
to support United States national security interests,
policy development, and planning processes.''
Improving the Quality, Transparency, Impartiality, and Consistency in
the Clearance Appeals Process
The Committee continues to be concerned with the quality,
transparency, impartiality, and consistency in government
processes that allow civilian, military, and contractor
personnel to appeal decisions to deny or revoke access to
classified national security information. Personnel, regardless
of status or agency, deserve an appeals process that exhibits
these characteristics. Recent memos by the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence & Security) indicate
internal debates over how best to achieve these goals at the
Department of Defense, the single largest granter of security
clearances.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, as the
government's Security Executive Agent, in coordination with the
interagency Performance Accountability Council, chaired by the
Office of Management and Budget, to provide Congress with a
report, within 180 days after enactment of this Act, on the
number of appeals filed in the previous year, the reasons
appeals were filed, and the rates by which decisions to deny or
revoke a clearance was made. Further, the Committee directs the
DNI, in this report, to identify best practices for departments
and agencies in considering appeals to deny or revoke accesses
to classified national security information.
Intelligence Community Employment Protections
The Committee supports Intelligence Community employment
policies that bolster the professionalism and independence of
the workforce. This support is complicated, however, by the
lack of transparency with regard to the protections currently
granted employees by different Intelligence Community entities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, working with the
heads of each of the Intelligence Community entities, to
provide the Committee a report within 90 days of the reporting
of this bill. The report should describe: (1) the statutory
basis for the rules governing employment protections for each
Intelligence Community entity; (2) how each of the Intelligence
Community entities categorizes its employees according to the
competitive and excepted service and schedules associated with
the excepted service; (3) how each of the Intelligence
Community entities applies employment protections to personnel
in each of those categories; and (4) what limits, if any, exist
within each of the Intelligence Community entities to the
involuntary transfer of employees from one category to another
so as to diminish those protections.
Committee Action
On June 14, 2023 a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2024, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc fifteen
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to require the DNI, within 30 days of
commencing a risk assessment arising from the mishandling or
improper disclosure of classified information, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees copies of such documents
and materials within the committees' jurisdiction and provide a
briefing; (2) an amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored
by Chairman Warner, to improve the security of voting and
election systems; (3) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to
prohibit any Intelligence Community element from chartering
private or commercial aircraft to transport any individual who
is or was detained at Guantanamo Bay; (4) an amendment by Vice
Chairman Rubio to ensure that annual reports on Special Access
Programs currently provided to the congressional defense
committees are also provided to the congressional intelligence
committees; (5) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, and
cosponsored by Chairman Warner, to prohibit contributions and
donations by foreign nationals in connection with State or
local ballot initiatives and referenda; (6) an amendment by
Senator Gillibrand, and cosponsored by Senators Cornyn, Rubio,
and Rounds, to prohibit funds from being used for activities
involving unidentified anomalous phenomena protected under any
form of special access or restricted access limitations that
have not been briefed to appropriate congressional committees,
congressional leadership, and the Director of AARO; (7) an
amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by Chairman Warner
and Senators Moran, Wyden, Collins, King, Rounds, Heinrich,
Lankford, and Casey, to reform the classification system; (8)
an amendment by Senator Bennet to require the Secretary of the
Treasury to revise regulations for the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States in order to treat facilities
and property of elements of the Intelligence Community and
National Laboratories comparably to military installations; (9)
an amendment by Senator Bennet to codify authority for the DNI
to collect, analyze, and share information necessary to support
the missions of the Department of Commerce, including with
respect to the administration of export controls; (10) an
amendment by Senator Casey to require the DNI to review open-
source commercial databases utilized by the Intelligence
Community to identify threats and gaps regarding economic
competition with foreign countries, including the PRC; (11) an
amendment by Senator Bennet to modify Section 401, regarding
designation of an Intelligence Community coordinator for
accountability of atrocities of the PRC; (12) an amendment by
Senator Wyden to modify Section 306 to retain the current law's
application to contractors and the requirement of a written
agreement requiring reporting on post-service employment with
foreign governments; (13) an amendment by Senator Lankford to
require Inspector General review of the dissemination of a
certain document by the FBI's Richmond field office; (14) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, and cosponsored by Senators
Cotton and Lankford, to require the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy to vet certain foreign national visitors or assignees to
National Labs; and (15) an amendment by Senator Warner, and
cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, to require a strategy to
enable private sector actors, commercial users, and independent
researchers to notify relevant U.S. Government agencies of
information security risks from artificial intelligence
systems.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc nine
amendments to the classified annex.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden, King,
Heinrich, Cornyn, Bennet, Casey, Moran, and Rounds to implement
classification and declassification reforms, with Vice Chairman
Rubio and Senator Cotton recorded as noes.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to vote on a
second-degree amendment by Senator Ossoff to an amendment by
Vice Chairman Rubio, and to vote on Vice Chairman Rubio's
original amendment as filed and cosponsored by Senators Risch
and Lankford. Senator Ossoff's second-degree amendment required
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to
undertake a review of DHS I&A. Vice Chairman Rubio's amendment
prohibited I&A from engaging in the collection of information
or intelligence targeting U.S. persons, except when carried out
by I&A officials responsible for collecting information or
intelligence from state, local, or Tribal territory governments
or a private employer. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the
Committee did not adopt Senator Ossoff's second-degree
amendment. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--
aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator
Ossoff--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no;
Senator Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no;
Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no. By
a vote of 10 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted Vice
Chairman Rubio's amendment. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no;
Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no;
Senator Bennet--no; Senator Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no;
Senator Ossoff--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--
aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator
Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator
Rounds--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to vote on a
second-degree amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, which
substituted for his original-filed amendment and permitted
Intelligence Community employees to opt out of the ``gender
identity and inclusiveness''' initiatives put forth in
Intelligence Community Directive 125. The second-degree
amendment substitute did the same and added a clause to ensure
current legal protections remained intact. Senator Lankford
offered a separate second-degree amendment to require sex-
segregated restrooms and locker rooms in Intelligence Community
agencies, and withdrew it pending future Committee
consideration. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee
did not adopt Vice Chairman Rubio's second-degree amendment
substitute. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:
Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no;
Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no;
Senator Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no;
Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--
aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--
aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
Senator Wyden offered an amendment that prohibited the head
of any U.S. Government agency from denying an individual's
eligibility for access to classified information based solely
on the individual's cannabis use prior to submitting a security
clearance application, and withdrew it pending future Committee
consideration.
By a vote of 10 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Senator Wyden that prohibited the head of any
Intelligence Community agency from denying an individual's
eligibility for access to classified information based solely
on the individual's cannabis use prior to submitting a security
clearance application. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator
Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye;
Senator Ossoff--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--
no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--
no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--
no.
Senator Cotton offered an amendment that prohibited
additional hiring by the CIA's Directorate of Analysis until
CIA staffed each of the Directorate of Operations' authorized
full-time equivalent positions, and withdrew it pending future
Committee consideration.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Senator Cotton to establish a pay cap on the
salaries of CIA Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion staff and
contract employees at the same level as an officer of the
Directorate of Operations in the Clandestine Services Trainee
program. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:
Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no;
Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--no;
Senator Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no;
Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--
aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--
aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
Senator Lankford offered an amendment to limit the
availability of funds authorized by this Act to change the
section of the Questionnaire for National Security Positions
that pertains to association record, and withdrew it pending
future Committee consideration.
By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by
Senator Wyden to the classified annex, with Senator Wyden
recorded as an aye.
Votes to report the committee bill
On June 14, 2023, the Committee voted to report the bill,
as amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Vice
Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye;
Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye;
Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 22,
2023, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN WARNER
I am pleased that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has again reported an Intelligence Authorization
Act by a unanimous vote. The Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 reflects the Senate Intelligence Committee's
continued, bipartisan commitment to ensuring America's
intelligence agencies have the resources they need to protect
our country. In addition, the bill addresses many of my
oversight priorities, including technological and economic
competition with China, reform of the classification and
declassification system, election security, and security
clearance reform.
Notwithstanding my strong support for the bill, I write
separately in order to express my opposition to two provisions
of the bill that were added as amendments during the
Committee's markup. First, by a vote of 9-8 the Committee
adopted an amendment that would cap the pay for any staff
employee or contractor of the CIA whose duties include certain
diversity-related functions at that of the most junior officers
in the Clandestine Service. This amendment will handicap the
efforts of the CIA to build a diverse workforce that reflects
the Nation the agency serves. In 2015, a CIA-commissioned study
found that the Agency lagged behind other employers in
maintaining a diverse workforce, especially at the senior
leadership ranks. In the wake of that study, the CIA, with the
support of this Committee, instituted numerous reforms, which
have benefited the Agency's mission by enabling it to draw upon
the wide range of talent, abilities, and backgrounds unique to
this country. This amendment imperils that progress. Moreover,
while I oppose the intent of the amendment, its drafting is
cause for addition concern. By its terms the amendment would
cap the pay of every CIA employee whose duties include
``developing, refining, and implementing diversity, equity, and
inclusion policy,'' which certainly includes the senior
leadership of the Agency, up to and including the Director, if
not a significant portion of Agency workforce.
Second, by a vote of 10-7 the Committee adopted an
amendment that would prohibit DHS I&A from engaging in the
collection of information or intelligence targeting U.S.
persons, except when carried out by I&A officials responsible
for collecting information or intelligence from state, local,
or Tribal territory governments or a private employer. I share
the concerns of many of my colleagues regarding the activities
of DHS I&A, particularly as they relate to the challenges the
Office appears to face in consistently producing intelligence
reports that meet analytic standards. Nonetheless, this
amendment is not the solution. The amendment will fundamentally
alter the mission of DHS I&A in ways the Committee has not
taken adequate time to understand. Moreover, the Committee is
hastily imposing these changes before the Committee has had an
opportunity to fully explore the causes of DHS I&A's
difficulties or whether the Office's current leadership is
succeeding in instituting needed reforms. The Committee will
continue to vigorously oversee DHS I&A and hold the Office
accountable for its actions, but this amendment needlessly
limits the authorities of an important component of the
Intelligence Community, with concerning implications.
Mark R. Warner.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO
During the markup of the fiscal year 2024 Intelligence
Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee voted on an amendment to
prohibit the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) from collecting, overtly or
through publicly available means, information and intelligence
on U.S. persons. The amendment was adopted by a bipartisan vote
of 10 to 7 and is Section 312 of our IAA.
Congress created I&A as a part of the Department of
Homeland Security in 2002 and it is charged with numerous
responsibilities geared toward bridging the gap between the
federal government and the Intelligence Community (IC) on one
hand, and state and local governments and the private sector on
the other, in order to detect, identify, understand, and
prevent another act of terror on the U.S. homeland. This
remains a critical government function. The problem, however,
is that I&A uses its authorities to collect--overtly or through
publicly available means--information and intelligence on U.S.
persons who have no affiliation with foreign intelligence or
foreign adversaries. This has resulted in potential abuses of
I&A's authorities.
For example, I&A collected U.S. journalists' social media
posts reporting on civil unrest in Portland, Oregon, during the
summer of 2020. Analysts used that collection to craft
intelligence reports on these journalists and circulated them
internally. One of these journalists filed a lawsuit against
the federal government which is still in litigation. Most
recently, a news story from March 2023 exposed a troubling I&A
practice of conducting custodial debriefings of individuals--
including American citizens--without those individuals having
any representative counsel present. Lastly, I&A regularly
publishes unclassified assessments of domestic violent
extremists who have no foreign affiliations looking to engage
in potentially criminal behavior in the name of a political
ideology, and often I&A will cite these domestic extremists'
use of online platforms in those products.
These are issues for law enforcement, not the IC. We
strongly support federal, state, and local law enforcement
investigating domestic violent extremism in its many
manifestations. When there are threats of violence, or
incitement to violence, the perpetrators should be prosecuted
to the fullest extent of the law. The FBI already has the
authorities, operational tools, and resources to undertake such
collection, and I&A should not be devoting intelligence
resources to collect information on Americans with no
connection to foreign intelligence or adversaries. Domestic law
enforcement is not a job for the IC.
Section 312 prohibits I&A from collecting, overtly or
through publicly available means, information or intelligence
on any U.S. person. In addition, the provision excepts from
this prohibition the collection of information from state and
local governments and the private sector, preserving I&A's core
function of ensuring that critical information about potential
threats to our homeland is shared between the federal
government and state and local governments and the private
sector. We were pleased the amendment was approved in a
bipartisan fashion and voted out unanimously as part of our
Committee-reported IAA.
Marco Rubio.
James E. Risch.
Susan M. Collins.
Tom Cotton.
John Cornyn.
Jerry Moran.
James Lankford.
M. Michael Rounds.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN AND MORAN
The Fiscal Year 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act
includes historic legislation addressing the chronic and long-
standing problem of overclassification while reforming the
Federal Government's broken classification and declassification
system. Among the provisions of this legislation is a reform
that we put forward in 2020--the designation of the Director of
National Intelligence as the Executive Agent for Classification
and Declassification.
There is unanimous agreement that the current system is
obsolete and in need of technical modernization. As has been
documented in numerous reports by the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Public Interest
Declassification Board (PIDB), as well as by the DNI herself,
the onslaught of new classified digital records has overwhelmed
an archaic declassification system, the result being that an
ever-increasing number of records that should be declassified
are never actually released to the public. Fortunately, there
are technical solutions to this problem; they just require
someone to promote and guide strategic investments in
modernization technology across the Federal Government.
The DNI is uniquely situated to carry out this role. She
already has a statutory responsibility to develop information
technology systems while protecting sources and methods. The
DNI is also tasked with providing guidance on budget priorities
across agencies.
Technical solutions must be inter-operable and must be
implemented across the Federal Government if they are going to
work at all. Systems that are stovepiped among different
agencies impede efforts to locate records and prevent
coordination on their declassification. The DNI already serves
as the Security Executive Agent, a role in which she develops
policies related to security clearances that apply to the whole
of Government and not just the Intelligence Community. This
experience is directly relevant to the role of Executive Agent
for Classification and Declassification.
Government-wide solutions are necessary not only to fix a
broken declassification system but also to protect the
information that remains classified. Records originating in
dozens of agencies, departments and offices traverse the
Federal Government at the speed of light. A modernized system
that tracks these records is necessary both to ensure eventual
declassification and to identify and resolve weaknesses in how
currently classified records are protected.
Ron Wyden.
Jerry Moran.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Fiscal Year 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act
includes a number of provisions that strengthen national
security while promoting democratic oversight. First among
these provisions is historic declassification reform
legislation which I have addressed in separate Additional Views
with Senator Moran.
As was the case last year, the Committee passed my
amendment prohibiting the denial of security clearances based
solely on the past use of cannabis. As more states legalize
cannabis, it becomes less and less tenable to deny security
clearances to those who have used it. The amendment, which was
co-sponsored by Senators Heinrich and Bennet, will help the
Intelligence Community recruit the qualified personnel needed
to protect the country.
The bill also includes whistleblower provisions I have
secured in previous years, including provisions that ensure
that whistleblowers' security clearances cannot be revoked as a
pretext, remove the damages cap for reprisals, ensure that
whistleblowers can come straight to Congress, and prohibit
public disclosure of a whistleblower's identity as a reprisal.
Finally, I am pleased that the Committee agreed to include
in its public report direction to the Director of National
Intelligence to report on how Intelligence Community personnel
are or are not protected by virtue of their employment status.
The American people expect the employees of the Intelligence
Community to speak truth to power, to dissent when appropriate,
and to be fully candid with Congress, all without fear of
retaliation. Any current or future employment policies that
would permit arbitrary or politically motivated firings risk
placing that professionalism and independence in jeopardy. It
is imperative that Congress act to address any vulnerabilities
that might allow for such a contingency.
Ron Wyden.
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