

Responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 1: The role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) can differ from administration to administration.

- A. What guidance has President elect Trump provided you for the role of DNI?

I am honored that President Trump nominated me to serve in this role. If confirmed to serve as the Director of National Intelligence, I am committed to providing the President and policymakers with timely, independent, unbiased intelligence integrated and drawn from across the Intelligence Community (IC), to support informed decision-making.

- B. Do you anticipate your role to be a director, coordinator, or something else?

The DNI is the head of the Intelligence Community and the President's principal adviser on intelligence matters. The DNI, leads, oversees, and guides the development of, and monitors the implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program. The DNI also ensures that the IC elements comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States. As envisioned by the 9/11 Commission report, I anticipate that I will be integrating intelligence activities across all IC elements, identifying critical intelligence deficiencies, and ensuring that intelligence priorities reflect the Administration's national security priorities.

- C. How will you reaffirm the Intelligence Community's (IC's) apolitical role in furtherance of national security?

If confirmed as DNI, it is my intention and obligation to lead the IC with integrity and ensure that the IC provides objective, timely, and apolitical intelligence to the President, to policymakers, and to this Congress to inform decision-making and protect the American people. If confirmed, I will ensure that my workforce remains focused on preserving analytic independence and the mission of providing fact-based unbiased intelligence.

- D.** How do you see the DNI's relationship with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S))?

The DNI must work closely with both the Director of the CIA and the Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security (USW(I&S)) and I anticipate having a collaborative relationship with both Director Ratcliffe and Under Secretary Hansell. Such collaboration is necessary to effectively integrate intelligence activities across all IC elements, identifying critical intelligence deficiencies, and ensuring that intelligence priorities reflect the Administration's national security priorities. It is also critical in developing and overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program.

- E.** What do you see as the DNI's role in covert action vis-à-vis the CIA and the White House?

The President decides when to employ covert action to further national security objectives, and the CIA executes it. The DNI advises the President and provides oversight over ongoing and proposed covert action programs and ensures that CIA has the necessary resources, provides the necessary notifications, and acts within the confines of the law and Presidential direction.

- F.** Please describe your understanding of the following responsibilities of the DNI:

- 1.** Serving as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.

As the principal adviser to the President, NSC, and Homeland Security Council, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that policy makers receive timely, accurate, and objective intelligence to best inform their critical national security decisions.

2. Overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP).

Overseeing and directing the implementation of the NIP is a core responsibility of the DNI. The DNI is responsible for managing IC budgets, priorities, and activities to ensure that resources are allocated effectively, efficiently, and aligned with national security objectives. The DNI provides oversight to ensure that the NIP supports intelligence collection, analysis, and operational capabilities that address current and emerging threats. The DNI works closely with OMB to justify budget requests, ensure accountability, and report on the execution of NIP resources to Congress. The DNI also partners with the Secretary of War to develop the Military Intelligence Program to prevent redundancy, ensure strategic and tactical intelligence capabilities are complementary, and reduce duplication.

3. Managing the Office of the DNI (ODNI).

The DNI serves as the head of the IC and principal intelligence adviser to the President. In that role, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that ODNI effectively leads and supports IC integration, invests in the IC's future and innovation, and guides how the IC advances national security priorities. Ultimately, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that ODNI continues to play its indispensable role of integrating intelligence, establishing IC priorities, providing intelligence to senior policy makers, and ensuring the IC acts in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

QUESTION 2: What is your view of the role and responsibilities of the DNI in overseeing IC agencies and integrating them into an effective intelligence enterprise? Please answer separately for each of the following:

A. The Office of the USD(I&S) (OUSD(I&S)) and the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components.

The DNI shares responsibility for the defense intelligence components—NSA, NGA, DIA, NRO, and the intelligence component of the services—

with the Secretary of War and the Undersecretary of War for Intelligence and Security (USW(I&S)). Coordinating closely to make sure our efforts are integrated to meet the IC's needs is a fundamental role of the DNI.

B. The CIA.

The DNI has a statutory obligation to ensure that the CIA complies with the Constitution and laws of the United States, oversees CIA's execution of covert action, as well as CIA's execution of the National Intelligence Program. The DNI also integrates CIA efforts with the rest of the IC. The two agencies have been keystone partners since ODNI's creation with ODNI providing broad oversight and management of CIA and the IC, and CIA providing operational and analytical leadership and exquisite intelligence to policymakers.

C. The intelligence agencies that reside in other departments of the federal government.

The DNI is responsible for synchronizing and prioritizing collection, analysis, and counterintelligence efforts across Intelligence Community elements, including the IC elements within the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security. The National Security Act requires the head of the department or agency containing an IC element to consult with the DNI, and in many cases, obtain the DNI's concurrence, before appointing an individual to be nomination for such a position. The DNI has a statutory obligation to ensure that these elements comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States and effectively execute the National Intelligence Program in support of U.S. national security priorities.

QUESTION 3: If confirmed as DNI, what steps will you take to improve the integration, coordination, and collaboration among IC agencies?

Our nation faces unprecedented security challenges with adversaries challenging our role across the globe and threatening our critical infrastructure, American servicemembers in action in the Gulf, and international narcotics networks harming our citizens. Worse yet, the IC is confronting these challenges during an

unprecedented lapse of our most critical foreign intelligence authority, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

If confirmed, my top priority will be to swiftly consult our IC leaders on their needs to ensure that their elements are able to face the above challenges while maximizing IC integration, coordination, and collaboration. During those consultations, I want to understand what works and what can be improved, as well as how we can minimize the detrimental impact to our national security caused by the lapse in 702 authorities. I also want to hear from the IC workforce directly on how they recommend improving IC integration, coordination, and collaboration. From those conversations, I will seek the best ideas to securing greater transparency, enabling effective decision-making, and efficiently aligning resources.

QUESTION 4: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was an effort intended to improve the management and coordination of the IC to meet current and future national security challenges.

- A.** Does the DNI have sufficient legal authorities, budgetary and otherwise, to effectively execute the DNI's IC management role? If not, what are your recommended enhancements or changes to IRTPA's authorities?

IRTPA provides significant authority to the DNI to execute on the DNI's IC management role. If confirmed, I will employ those authorities to maximize IC mission effectiveness. If confirmed, I will have an opportunity to better understand how those authorities are exercised in practice and whether they have been effective. I look forward to engaging the Committee on this issue.

- B.** Do you believe that granting the DNI more control over the intelligence agencies' personnel, training programs, and business systems would accelerate the integration of the IC? What would be the downside to such a step?

If and until I am confirmed, I will not have the opportunity to review fully the different personnel, training, and business system challenges of the IC's 18 elements. If, after review, I realize that changes are needed to

properly execute ODNI's mission, I will work with the IC element heads and this committee to support those changes.

- C. What do you consider the highest priority leadership and management challenges facing the IC at this time? If confirmed, what will you do to address these challenges?

The single greatest leadership challenge in the IC is continuing to restore faith in the Community so that it can continue to earn back the trust of the American people. For the IC to be effective, the American people must understand and believe that the IC's role is to provide honest, apolitical analysis and assessments, regardless of whether it is convenient or expedient. If confirmed as the DNI, I will prioritize ensuring that the Intelligence Community operates with the utmost integrity.

Qualifications

The 2004 IRTPA requires that, "Any individual nominated for appointment as Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise." 50 U.S.C. § 3023(a)(1).

QUESTION 5: Please describe the specific experiences you have had in your professional career that will enable you to serve effectively as the head of the IC.

My extensive background in civil financial enforcement, combined with my experience as former Chairman of the SEC and the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of N.Y. has given me requisite national security experience. National security not only includes traditional areas like counterterrorism, defense of the homeland, and military and foreign affairs; but also, economic security, financial integrity, and the protection of our critical infrastructure; all areas where I have developed significant expertise. As U.S. Attorney, I oversaw a diverse portfolio that included terrorism, espionage, and financial crimes – cases with national security implications. At the SEC, I played a critical role in the regulation of prediction markets, a new and non-traditional but emerging national security issue. My leadership roles at the SEC and SDNY have also honed my ability to manage

complex issues, lead agile teams, and make strategic and impactful decisions, skills I believe are highly transferrable to the position of Director of National Intelligence.

QUESTION 6: Please explain how your background fulfills the requirement that a DNI nominee have “extensive national security expertise.”

The Director of National Intelligence should possess extensive national security expertise as well as the executive and operational skills necessary to run a large organization. Knowledge and experience in various other matters such as market dynamics and capital flows, communications, transportation, and diplomacy can substantially enhance performance.

During my time as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, I have gained substantial national security expertise, particularly in matters involving Foreign Terrorists Organizations, counterespionage, counterterrorism, money laundering, bribery, extortion, and the use of communication platforms and other conduits to encourage conflict and violence. I also have advised various government officials on legal and economic matters related to peace negotiations.

During my time as Chairman of the SEC, I engaged episodically in national security matters, including extensive efforts to maintain economic stability in advance of and during the COVID-19 shutdowns. I participated in a leadership role along with Secretary Mnuchin (who led our efforts) and various other government officials in our efforts to ensure that our vulnerabilities were minimized and could not be exploited by our adversaries. In addition, I periodically briefed national security personnel on specific and more general matters of market function, capital structures, and economic risks to companies, industries and markets.

An area of particular focus for me at the SEC was to bring greater attention to, and further address, the various risks associated with investing in China. I substantially participated in the preparation of the July 2020 Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets on “Protecting United States Investors from Significant Risks from Chinese Companies. My staff and I then worked with Senators John Kennedy and Chris Van Hollen on the technical and practical aspects of the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act. I also issued public statements in support of that Act and its implementation. In addition, I worked with various parties on the risks posed by the planned increase in the exposure of the Thrift Savings Plan to the

Chinese markets. In September 2023, while in the private sector, I testified before the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party in a hearing titled “Systemic Risk: The Chinese Communist Party’s Threat to U.S. Financial Stability.”

During my time in the private sector, including as a lawyer, as the Chairman of Apollo Global Management, as a Director and the Chair of the Audit Committee and member of the Risk Committee of American Express Corporation, I engaged in matters of national security frequently, including with officials from the Federal Reserve, the Department of Justice, and Congress.

In addition, I have come to believe that my interdisciplinary education, including degrees in Engineering, Law, and Economics has enhanced my ability to identify and address national security issues.

Regarding the executive and operational skills necessary to lead a large and important organization, I believe my experience and successes as (1) a manage of a large global law firm (management committee), (2) the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, (3) the Chairman of Apollo Global Management (est. \$800 billion of assets under management, (4) a board member of (and an advisor to) various large and midsize companies (e.g., American Express Corporation), and (5) U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, provides an invaluable mix of experience with personnel, systems, communications, strategy and execution to draw upon.

QUESTION 7: The DNI is one of the most important national security jobs in the U.S. government, overseeing 18 agencies with disparate capabilities, authorities, and workforces across six federal departments and two independent agencies, deployed around the globe, accountable to multiple committees of Congress.

A. What experience do you have running a federated enterprise?

Through my experience as former Chairman of the SEC and the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, I bring considerable experience managing federal offices and employees, communicating and coordinating with other federal agencies, state, local and tribal partners, and being an important voice regarding law enforcement and national

security issues. While DNI is a unique position in the U.S. government, the leadership principles I learned in my prior positions will guide me well in this new opportunity to serve.

B. What experience do you have leading and managing intelligence activities?

My experience as former Chairman of the SEC and the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has equipped me with the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively navigate the complex landscape that makes up the field of national security, which will serve me well in my role as Director of National Intelligence. Moreover, while I have not directly managed intelligence activities, these roles provided me with leadership principles that will enable me to bring new perspectives and fresh ideas to the DNI role.

Shape, Size, and Function of the ODNI

The DNI has three core responsibilities: serving as the President's principal intelligence adviser, leading the IC, and overseeing and directing implementation of the NIP. The National Security Act of 1947 also prescribes a number of other responsibilities, including with respect to budget requests and appropriations for the NIP, IC personnel, intelligence information sharing, and coordination of intelligence relationships with foreign governments. The Act also specifies a number of offices, officials, and centers, including the National Intelligence Council; National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and the National Counterterrorism Center.

QUESTION 8: Do you commit to executing these responsibilities and maintaining operation of all these functions and offices as prescribed in law?

Yes.

QUESTION 9: If confirmed, what goals do you have for the IC as its leader?

If confirmed as the DNI, I will prioritize ensuring that the Intelligence Community operates with the utmost integrity. I will seek to ensure that the IC provides independent, objective, and timely intelligence to policymakers across the

government. In doing so, the IC must remain innovative in its thinking, diverse in its approaches to its mission, and unmatched in its capabilities.

QUESTION 10: Will you commit to appearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for its annual Worldwide Threats hearing?

Yes.

QUESTION 11: There has been considerable debate in the past concerning the appropriate size, organization, and function of the ODNI.

A. What is your view of the ODNI's size, organization, and function?

The question of the ODNI's size is critically important, and this is not a partisan issue. Members of Congress and national security officials on both sides of the aisle have recognized that ODNI today is not functioning in the role as it was envisioned when Congress created this Office. As I do not have an inside view of day-to-day operations, I cannot say what the exact right size or strength of the office should be. That assessment requires a deep dive into the work that has already been done to right-size the agency, alongside a clear look at what more needs to be done. If confirmed, I will prioritize working with both sides of the aisle in Congress and the President to conduct a thorough review of the ODNI's roles, functions, and staffing. Our shared goal must be to ensure the office is streamlined, agile, and mission-focused.

B. If confirmed, what changes, would you make to the size, organization, or function of the ODNI?

If confirmed, I pledge to review the operations and effectiveness of the ODNI and work with this committee to communicate any needs the agency and IC community may face.

C. Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources or more personnel than required (including ODNI cadre and IC detailee personnel) to effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities?

If confirmed, I pledge to review the operations and effectiveness of the ODNI and work with this committee to communicate any needs the agency and IC community may face.

D. What in your view is the appropriate balance between the ODNI's community-management responsibilities and providing flexibility to the daily decision-making authorities of individual IC agency directors?

The question of how to balance the authority of the DNI vis-à-vis other IC element heads is critically important, and should not be a partisan issue. If confirmed, I will prioritize working with both sides of the aisle in Congress and the President to better understand what the right balance is. Our shared goal must be to ensure ODNI is streamlined, agile, and mission-focused on integrating the IC.

QUESTION 12: What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the following officers, and for each of them, how would you ensure that each officer is performing the mission required by law?

A. The General Counsel of the ODNI.

Section 103C of the National Security Act establishes that the ODNI General Counsel serves as the Office's chief legal officer. Their counsel is essential to the DNI's responsibility of ensuring that intelligence activities comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to ensure the ODNI and the IC are executing their statutory duties as required by law and consistent with the constitution.

B. The Inspector General of the IC.

Section 103H of the National Security Act establishes the IC Inspector General (IC IG). The IC IG: (1) creates an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI; (2) provides leadership and coordination and recommends policies for activities designed to

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of such programs and activities and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and activities; (3) provides a means for keeping the DNI fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI and the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and (4) ensures that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI and the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions.

If confirmed, I will seek to establish a strong working relationship with the IC IG to ensure they have adequate resources and support to conduct their important work.

C. The ODNI Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Officer.

Section 103D of the National Security Act establishes the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO). The CLPO: (1) ensures that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the ODNI and the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) oversees compliance by ODNI with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy; (3) reviews and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in the administration of the programs and operations of the Office and the DNI and, as appropriate, investigate any such complaint or information; (4) ensures that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (5) ensures that personal information contained in a system of records subject to the Privacy Act, is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in that section; (6) conducts privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and (7) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the DNI or specified by law. Among

those additional statutory duties is critical programmatic oversight of the IC's Section 702 program.

If confirmed as DNI, I will prioritize ensuring that the Intelligence Community operates with the utmost integrity and expect that the CLPO will play a vital role in that effort. The role is vital to showing the American people that the IC is committed to lawfully and responsibly using the tools and authorities provided to keep our country safe, while also safeguarding their civil liberties.

D. The individual assigned responsibilities for analytic integrity under Section 1019 of IRTPA (50 U.S.C. § 3024).

Consistent with Section 1019 of IRTPA, the individual or entity assigned responsibility for analytic integrity, commonly called the Analytic Ombudsman, shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence products or other analytic products by one or more elements of the Intelligence Community covering a particular topic or subject matter; shall be responsible for identifying on an annual basis functional or topical areas of analysis for specific review; and may draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.

E. The individual assigned responsibilities for safeguarding the objectivity of intelligence analysis under Section 1020 of IRTPA (50 U.S.C. § 3024).

Consistent with Section 1019 of IRTPA, the individual or entity assigned responsibility for analytic integrity, commonly called the Analytic Ombudsman, shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence products or other analytic products by one or more elements of the Intelligence Community covering a particular topic or subject matter; shall be responsible for identifying on an annual basis functional or topical areas of analysis for specific review; and may draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.

Management of the ODNI

QUESTION 13: What do you believe is the appropriate balance between government employees and contractor employees in the ODNI?

There is value to both government employees and contract employees working at ODNI. In striking the appropriate balance, first and foremost, there are legal and regulatory requirements, such as ensuring that inherently governmental activities are performed by government employees. If confirmed as DNI, I will examine ODNI's mix of government employees and contracting employees to ensure ODNI is properly staffed to perform its statutory responsibilities in the most efficient manner.

QUESTION 14: What do you believe is the appropriate balance between ODNI cadre employees and those on detail or assigned from other government agencies?

If confirmed as DNI, I am committed to reviewing ODNI's staffing to ensure that details are used in a thoughtful manner to bring highly skilled intelligence professionals into ODNI, to encourage collaboration and work among all the IC elements, and to provide professional development to grow the IC's expertise and future leaders. In conducting a review, I will also examine what the appropriate balance should be.

QUESTION 15: What is your view of the principles that should guide the IC in its use of contractors, rather than full-time government employees, to fulfill intelligence-related functions?

The primary principle is that inherently governmental activities should be performed by full-time government employees. In addition, enduring requirements are often best performed by government employees. Non-inherently governmental functions, particularly those of a temporary nature or where technical expertise is needed but difficult to obtain within the government may be best suited for contractors. These principles help ensure that the IC is using both government employees and contractors in the most efficient way to accomplish the IC's intelligence functions.

QUESTION 16: What do you believe is the appropriate proportionality in the ODNI between cadre employees and detailees from other government entities?

If confirmed as DNI, I am committed to reviewing ODNI's staffing to ensure that details are used in a thoughtful manner to bring highly skilled intelligence professionals into ODNI, to encourage collaboration and work among all the IC elements, and to provide professional development to grow the IC's expertise and future leaders. In conducting a review, I will also examine what the appropriate balance should be.

QUESTION 17: What is your assessment of the personnel accountability system presently in place both at the ODNI and within the other IC elements? What actions, if any, should be considered to strengthen personnel accountability as well as ensure fair process in the IC, including matters related to allegations of serious misconduct?

I strongly believe in accountability and the importance of holding IC professionals to the highest standards of integrity. But there also needs to be a fair process in the event of allegations of misconduct. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the personnel accountability systems of ODNI and the broader IC to ensure both accountability and fairness.

Relationship with the Congressional Intelligence Committees

QUESTION 18: What is your understanding of the obligations of the DNI under Title V of the National Security Act of 1947?

- A. What steps should the DNI take to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of the U. S. government involved in intelligence activities in general, and covert action in particular, comply with the reporting requirements?

Section 502 of the National Security Act charges the DNI with a responsibility to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities other than covert actions. Section 502 also requires the DNI to furnish the congressional intelligence committees with any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions requested by the committees to carry

out their responsibilities and to report significant anticipated intelligence activities or significant intelligence failures other than covert action. Section 503 places a similar responsibility on the DNI for covert action, subject to appropriate measures for the protection of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. Finally, Section 102A charges the DNI with ensuring all IC elements comport with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Together, these provisions charge the DNI with serving as a critical link between the IC and Congress, ensuring that intelligence activities are transparent, accountable, and aligned with U.S. law.

- B.** Under what circumstances do you believe notification may and should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees? In those circumstances, if any, what is the obligation of the DNI to subsequently notify the full membership of the committees as expeditiously as possible?

Notification should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees in the very limited circumstances where the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, as authorized by Section 503 of the National Security Act.

Barring the circumstances described in statute above, I pledge to inform all Members of the congressional intelligence committees equally.

- C.** The law establishes a separate category of notification for covert action. Given the specificity of the law, do you believe the Executive Branch could ever limit notification on matters other than covert action?

Given the construct of the National Security Act, I believe there is a presumption that the Executive Branch will generally notify the intelligence committees about all intelligence activities other than covert action. However, because I do not yet have an inside view of day-to-day operations, and, mindful of the President's inherent Article II authorities as Commander in Chief, I am not in a position to say that the Executive

Branch could *ever* limit such notification. Barring such extreme circumstances, I pledge to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities as appropriately required by law.

QUESTION 19: The IC can perform its mission properly only with close partnership with and accountability to Congress.

- A. What is the DNI's role in ensuring Congress is kept fully and currently informed, as required by law, including 50 U.S.C. § 3091 and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 112? How do you intend to fulfill those duties?

Section 501 of the National Security Act charges the President with a responsibility to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities. The DNI implements that responsibility through ICD 112. If confirmed as DNI, I will serve as a critical link between the IC and Congress, ensuring that intelligence activities are transparent, accountable, and aligned with U.S. law.

- B. Are there circumstances that would justify delaying notification of Congress of important intelligence assessments, or not notifying Congress at all? Do you believe the National Security Council (NSC) should play a role in these decisions? If so, what should that role be?

Consistent with the need to protect classified national security information, I am committed to ensuring that Congress can perform its oversight function and benefit from the IC's insight on national security matters. Thus, Congress should be notified of important intelligence assessments. The NSC plays a role in coordinating legislative engagement and national security policy across national security departments and agencies. However, the NSC would not determine the substance of the IC's intelligence analysis.

- C. Under what circumstances do you believe notification of Congress can or should be limited to the Gang of Eight? What should the role of the NSC be in determining what information should be limited?

Notification should be limited to the Gang of Eight in the very limited circumstances where the President determines that it is essential to limit access to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States. The NSC advises the President on that determination, but would not determine the substance of the IC's intelligence analysis.

Barring the circumstances described in statute above, I pledge to inform all Members of the congressional intelligence committees equally to the best of my ability.

D. If confirmed, do you commit to complying with statutory deadlines set forth in the Committee's legislation, specifically the Intelligence Authorization Act for each fiscal year?

Yes.

QUESTION 20: Will you commit to ensuring that all Committee staff are read into IC programs and assessments consistent with protecting sources and methods?

If confirmed, I would work with the Committee to accommodate its legitimate oversight needs while safeguarding the confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch, including the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence sources and methods

QUESTION 21: Would you consider a finished intelligence product to be "privileged" in any way such that you would not provide it to Congress? Please explain.

If confirmed, I would work with the Committee to accommodate its legitimate oversight needs while safeguarding the confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch.

QUESTION 22: Will you commit to provide the Committee intelligence reports, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DoD Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), National Security Agency (NSA) reports, and CIA Telegraphic Dissemination (TD) reports, in support of the Committee's intelligence oversight

duties, upon request? Will you commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees National Intelligence Council products, e.g., Major Issue Studies or National Intelligence Estimates, in support of their oversight duties?

If confirmed, I would work with the Committee to accommodate its legitimate oversight needs while safeguarding the confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch, including the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence sources and methods

QUESTION 23: If confirmed, will you fully support the Committee's Audits and Projects Team, and enable their access to the people and information throughout the IC that is required for their functions, upon the Committee's request?

If confirmed, I would work with the Committee to accommodate its legitimate oversight needs while safeguarding the confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch, including the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence sources and methods

QUESTION 24: Will you keep the Committee fully and currently informed of the personnel, resources, facilities and authorities from the NIP and MIP that are necessary to implement the DNI and Secretary of Defense memorandum designating the Space Force as the 18th member of the IC?

Yes.

QUESTION 25: How would you approach communicating IC analytic conclusions to the public if the analysis and conclusions did not align with the President's views and political objectives?

The IC provides the President and senior policymakers with analysis that is objective, apolitical, and meets IC standards of analytic integrity. If confirmed, any public disclosure decisions must consider national security interests and the need to protect sensitive sources and methods.

Intelligence Information Sharing

QUESTION 26: What is your view of the IC's current efforts to enable the IC to operate like a true "information enterprise," where information is accessible by all IC elements? If confirmed, how would you pursue this goal?

This IC and the nation learned the importance of ensuring that the right information gets to the right people at the right time from the September 11 attacks. If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail how the IC elements share and access information and ensure that they operate like a true "information enterprise," and working with IC subject matter experts on determining and implementing this critical mission.

QUESTION 27: What in your view are the appropriate steps that should be taken to allow for increased interagency access to sensitive intelligence information? If confirmed, how would you pursue these efforts?

If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail how the IC elements share and access sensitive information and working with IC subject matter experts on determining and implementing this critical mission.

QUESTION 28: Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3032) establishes the authorities of the Chief Information Officer of the IC (IC CIO), including procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the enterprise architectures of all IC components.

- A. What is your view of the authority of the IC CIO to create an integrated national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprise?

Section 103G of the National Security Act establishes that the IC CIO to assist the DNI in carrying out its information technology-related responsibilities and (1) manage activities relating to the information technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture requirements of the intelligence community; (2) have procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the enterprise architectures of all intelligence community components; (3) direct and manage all information

technology-related procurement for the intelligence community; and (4) ensure that all expenditures for information technology and research and development activities are consistent with the intelligence community enterprise architecture and the strategy of the Director for such architecture.

Separately, the National Security Act, the Federal Information Security Management Act, and Executive Order 12333 exclusively charge the DNI with: (1) overseeing agency information security policies for agencies that operate an IC information systems; (2) establishing common information security standards, protocols, and interfaces for the IC; (3) granting access to sensitive compartmented information to any officer or employee of any agency or department; and (4) managing appropriations for the National Intelligence Program.

Together, the DNI and IC CIO authorities above appear to provide the DNI with strong oversight and procurement approval authority over the IC information environment to fulfill the DNI's congressionally mandated duties. However, if confirmed, I will work with the IC element heads and this committee should these authorities need reforms.

B. If confirmed, how do you intend to achieve true integration of national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprises?

Integrating the national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprises in a way that protects vital national security information is a national security priority. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the IC CIO to explore how the IC integrates intelligence information and working with IC subject matter experts on determining and implementing this critical mission.

Cybersecurity

QUESTION 29: The National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command are currently led by a single uniformed military officer in a “dual-hat” arrangement, due to their intertwined missions, which has allowed them to share many of the same

resources and capabilities. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command should be dual-hatted?

Yes. I support President Trump's decision to nominate General Joshua Rudd for both positions and believe the combination has proven effective.

QUESTION 30: The ODNI has a central role to play in coordinating cybersecurity efforts, particularly with the respective roles of the Director of the NSA and the head of U.S. Cyber Command.

- A. Are there any changes that you would recommend for the DNI's and IC's roles within the nation's cybersecurity infrastructure?

If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the DNI's and IC's roles within the national cybersecurity infrastructure. I look forward to consulting with the Committee after my review.

- B. What should be the IC's role in helping to protect U.S. commercial computer networks? What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with U.S. private sector critical infrastructure entities to enable them to protect their networks from possible cyber-attack?

If confirmed as DNI, I will aim to facilitate vigorous data sharing and information exchange about foreign threats to U.S. cybersecurity between the Intelligence Community and the private sector to the maximum extent permitted by law and in accordance with the protection of classified information. However, I note that the IC's foreign intelligence focus is just part of the nation's broader cybersecurity efforts and would aim to partner with other federal, state, and local partners to ensure a whole-of-nation approach.

- C. What is your view of the role of the ODNI's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center within the national cybersecurity efforts?

If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail the role currently played by ODNI's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.

QUESTION 31: Do you agree that the hacking of databases with large amounts of information on Americans, either controlled by the government or the private sector, poses a national security threat to the United States? If yes, how should the U.S. seek to strengthen the security of those databases?

Yes; I agree that this is a significant threat. My understanding is that this is a whole-of-government effort, with a significant role played by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the Department of Homeland Security. If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail how the IC can further contribute to this critical mission.

QUESTION 32: How do you intend to improve information sharing – in both directions – between the IC and the private sector?

If confirmed as DNI, I will aim to facilitate vigorous data sharing and information exchange about foreign threats to U.S. cybersecurity between the Intelligence Community and the private sector to the maximum extent permitted by law and in accordance with the protection of classified information. If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail current IC efforts in this space and recommending an effective path forward.

QUESTION 33: What types of cybersecurity intelligence information should be transmitted from the private sector to the government?

The private sector has unique insight and expertise on malicious activity occurring within its networks. Real-time integration of private sector and government data could lead to more effective prevention and mitigation outcomes. If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that we have a robust data sharing and information exchange relationship with the private sector as appropriate.

QUESTION 34: The private sector often has unique insights about network infrastructure and software that are potential targets of interest for foreign adversaries.

- A. Do you think that the IC should improve communications channels with the private sector in order to receive inputs that can help with foreign intelligence collection?

Yes, the strength of the U.S. private sector is one of the nation's strategic advantages that the IC must leverage. If confirmed as DNI, I will aim to facilitate vigorous data sharing and information exchange about foreign threats to U.S. cybersecurity between the Intelligence Community and the private sector to the maximum extent permitted by law and in accordance with the protection of classified information.

- B. If so, how will you do so?

If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail current IC efforts in this space and recommending an effective path forward.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 35: How do you assess the state of science and technology (S&T) activities within the IC? If confirmed, how would you improve S&T activities in the IC?

The last few years alone have demonstrated to everyday Americans how much we are in a time of change with AI advancements coming into all of lives. I believe it is necessary for the IC to have robust S&T activities to utilize these emerging technologies but also to identify threats to the United States if our foreign adversaries seek to use technology against us. If confirmed, I will examine the state of the IC's S&T activities and ensure that the IC's resources are used effectively for S&T.

QUESTION 36: If confirmed, what would be your top priorities with respect to research and development in the IC? What should be the appropriate size of the research and development budgets as a percentage of the total NIP?

If confirmed, I will examine the IC's research and development activities and the amount of resources for those activities so that I can assess whether their budgets are appropriate based on the intelligence needs.

Financial Intelligence

QUESTION 37: The IC's ability to investigate and disrupt the illicit financial and commercial networks that enable nefarious actors is central to addressing national and international security threats. Please describe your strategy for improving the IC's collection and analysis efforts regarding financial intelligence, including the use of open source and proprietary commercial information, and obtaining the cooperation of other countries.

Collecting and analyzing financial information and then using it to disrupt illicit financial and commercial networks is critically important to addressing threats to the United States. It is a complicated problem set requiring analysts with financial expertise, access to the right data, and the right tools. As the financial sector is global and interconnected, partnerships with our foreign allies and with the commercial sector are required to address and disrupt threats. If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to examining the IC's approach to this problem and ensuring that its resources are best used to develop financial intelligence.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Defense

QUESTION 38: Please explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of national and military intelligence consumers, specifically between establishing a unified national intelligence effort that includes intelligence elements housed within DoD with the continuing requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military commanders.

- A. What is your assessment of the national intelligence effort to satisfy the needs of military commanders for human intelligence collection, and what steps would you take to address any deficiencies?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with USW(I&S) and the IC Functional Manager for HUMINT to ensure that the IC is providing military commanders with the information they need to protect the United States.

- B.** What is your assessment of the military intelligence gathering effort, and what role do you see for the DNI in addressing programs funded by the MIP?

The National and Military Intelligence Programs need to work in concert to ensure that intelligence is provided in a timely and actionable fashion. As such, it is important for the IC and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) to maintain close and productive working relationships. The MIP is developed by DoW in consultation with the DNI. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this coordination and working closely with DoW to ensure our combined efforts are producing the intelligence that our Nation needs.

- C.** What should be the relationship between the ODNI and the OUSD(I&S) in the management and coordination between the NIP and the MIP resources?

ODNI and OUSW(I&S) need to maintain a close and collaborative relationship. ODNI is responsible for the National Intelligence Program and its resources, addressing national-level intelligence priorities, while OUSW(I&S) is responsible for the Military Intelligence Program and its resources, addressing operational and tactical military needs. If confirmed, I look forward to developing and sustaining a close relationship with OUSW(I&S).

- D.** What is your understanding of the different roles that the DNI and the Secretary of Defense should play with respect to intelligence elements within DoD?

The DNI and the Secretary of War both have important roles with respect to the defense intelligence elements. The DNI is the head of the IC and provides oversight and direction to defense intelligence elements for the activities conducted under the National Intelligence Program. The Secretary of War is the department head for the defense intelligence elements and provides oversight and direction for the activities conducted under the Military Intelligence Program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Secretary Hegseth to ensure that our respective

responsibilities are executed in a complementary fashion within the defense intelligence elements to support national and military requirements.

- E.** What is the relationship between the DNI and the heads of the individual intelligence agencies residing within DoD?

The heads of the DoW intelligence elements are members of the IC and critical members in DNI-led decision making processes. They participate in DNI strategic, policy, and budget decisions for the IC, and provide essential input in their areas of expertise and in addressing intelligence priorities.

- F.** Does the DNI now have visibility over the full range of intelligence activities conducted by DoD?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of War to ensure that I have the visibility needed into the intelligence activities conducted by DoW.

- G.** Are there additional authorities that the DNI should have regarding the full range of intelligence activities conducted by DoD?

If confirmed, I will review the DNI's current authorities and will seek additional authorities, in full coordination with Congress and the Executive Branch, as appropriate.

- H.** Is the USD(I&S) subject to the authority of the DNI? If so, to what extent?

OUSW(I&S) is not an IC element and is not subject to DNI authority. However, to fully align the NIP and MIP, the DNI and USW(I&S) must maintain a close partnership. To facilitate this, USW(I&S) is designated as the Director for Defense Intelligence (DDI) and serves as a principal advisor to the DNI on all matters relating to defense intelligence. If confirmed, I intend to strengthen the relationship with USW(I&S) so that we may jointly address the Nation's intelligence requirements.

QUESTION 39: What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the USD(I&S) regarding the different intelligence elements within the DoD?

My understanding is that the USW(I&S) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of War on intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. USW(I&S) also exercises the Secretary of War's authority, direction, and control over Combat Support Agencies, DoW Agencies, and DoW Field Activities regarding defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. Finally, the USD(I&S) fulfills the Secretary of War's statutory requirements related to the National Intelligence Program and serves as the Program Manager for the MIP.

QUESTION 40: If confirmed as DNI, what issues do you believe require the attention of the DNI and the Secretary of Defense regarding the role of the Office of the USD(I&S)?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of War regarding the role and functions of the USW(I&S) to ensure that ODNI and OUSW(I&S) work collaboratively to support the Nation's intelligence needs. In particular, I will work with the Secretary on issues of joint NIP/MIP concern, including cost sharing efforts, critical and strategic intelligence priorities, and the timely provision of intelligence to support DoW.

ODNI Relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency

QUESTION 41: What is your view of the DNI's responsibility to supervise, direct, or control the activities of the CIA?

- A. What do you see as the DNI's role in the supervision, direction, or control of the conduct of covert actions by the CIA?

Pursuant to E.O. 12333, the DNI oversees and provides advice to the President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action programs. However, the DNI does not have direct operational control. Within that oversight role, the DNI ensures that covert actions align with the President's directives, as well as intelligence priorities and strategies. In addition, the DNI, in coordination with OMB, engages with

CIA to ensure resources for new findings and to provide timely notification to Congress of the underlying activity and any requirements for additional resources.

- B.** What level of notification about covert action activities should the DNI receive?

The DNI maintains oversight over covert action activities and participates in the processes related to the approval or review of covert action findings, engages on resources and funding matters, and provides the President and NSC with advice, including how covert actions fit within intelligence strategies.

The DNI should receive timely notification of a new activity or a significant change to a covert action activity. If confirmed, I look forward to examining the specifics of the DNI's notifications and whether any additional notifications are needed.

- C.** What role should the DNI have with respect to the Director of the CIA's responsibilities to coordinate the relationships between IC elements and the intelligence and security services of foreign governments or international organizations?

In accordance with the National Security Act, the DNI is responsible for overseeing the coordination of the relationships between IC elements and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments and international organizations. If confirmed as the DNI, I expect to work closely with the Director of the CIA and provide oversight for CIA's role and responsibilities. That oversight should include ensuring that engagements align with national intelligence priorities and U.S. foreign policy objections, and reduce duplication of effort among the IC elements so that foreign relationships are managed in an efficient and effective matter.

- D.** What role should the DNI have with respect to the CIA's management of its national human intelligence responsibilities?

As the head of the IC, the DNI should provide strategic oversight and guidance, and establish the objectives and priorities for the production of all national intelligence, including human intelligence, as outlined in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). As part of that oversight, the DNI should ensure human intelligence efforts are resourced and conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

QUESTION 42: What is your view of the role of the FBI within the IC?

The FBI is an integral part of the IC, combining its law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities to address national security threats and to protect the nation and U.S. persons from attacks in the homeland and abroad. The FBI is uniquely positioned to support domestic partners and coordinate efforts in the domestic space.

Through the DNI Domestic Representative Program, executed by senior FBI personnel throughout the U.S., the FBI provides valuable insights on national security threats, partnering with Federal, State, Local and Tribal entities and the private sector to provide the IC with valuable insight regarding regional and nationwide threats.

QUESTION 43: What is your understanding of the relationship between the FBI and the DNI, particularly regarding collection priorities and information sharing?

The FBI is an element of the IC and fully participates in ODNI-led IC activities, to include IC committees and councils; FBI's participation in these activities provides valuable context and bridges the intersection between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. FBI is a key partner with State, Local and Tribal organizations, and engages with private sectors partners on matters including cyber security and election threats.

The DNI, through the National Counterterrorism Center, works closely with FBI to develop leads, support information sharing, and engage on counterterrorism efforts.

The DNI Domestic Representatives work closely with the DNI and facilitate Requests for Information from FBI partners in the field.

QUESTION 44: What is your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI, with respect to U.S. counterterrorism efforts?

The Director of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI have important and complimentary roles to support the nation's counterterrorism efforts, and must work together, with other federal, state, international and private partners, to successfully deter terrorism. The Attorney General leads the Department of Justice and the FBI in investigating and prosecuting violations of criminal law, including terrorism.

The DNI provides strategic direction and oversight on the IC's counterterrorism efforts, including the national security efforts of FBI. In addition, the DNI is charged with providing an IC-wide view of the terrorism threat. Under the DNI, the National Counterterrorism Center has a unique statutory responsibility to integrate all intelligence possessed or acquired by the federal government and provide all source intelligence analysis on terrorism threats to its customers.

QUESTION 45: What is your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI, with respect to U.S. counterintelligence efforts?

The Attorney General leads the Department of Justice and the FBI in investigating and prosecuting violations of criminal law, including counterintelligence crimes.

Under the DNI, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) serves as the head of the U.S. government counterintelligence activities, and in that role, sets strategic priorities, develops strategies and policies, and delivers the Counterintelligence Strategy for the United States to the President.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and other Departments of the United States Government

QUESTION 46: What is your view of how well the intelligence elements of the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy are integrated

within the IC? Do you believe that there are changes that should be made to the organization, mission, or resource level of any of these agencies?

As full members of the Intelligence Community, the intelligence elements of the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy play critical roles in supporting the broader IC and the nation's intelligence requirements, particularly in their specialized areas of expertise. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging quickly with these elements to determine how to strengthen their integration in the IC.

QUESTION 47: Please describe your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the DNI and the following officials, regarding the IC elements within their departments:

A. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget

The DNI and OMB oversee the resources and activities of the IC in distinct but complementary ways. The DNI provides intelligence-specific expertise and priorities, including the priorities for the use of NIP resources, while OMB assesses those priorities within the context of the overall federal budget. This collaboration ensures that both DNI and OMB can conduct their respective oversight responsibilities, while enabling the IC to receive the funds it needs to meet intelligence mission requirements, consistent with broader government and Presidential objectives and priorities.

B. The Secretary of Energy

The DNI and the Secretary of Energy have distinct roles in overseeing the IC elements within the Department of Energy (DOE). As the head of the IC, the DNI provides strategic guidance, sets priorities, and ensures that intelligence activities align with the broader goals of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and national intelligence strategies. The Secretary of Energy has the responsibility for ensuring the DOE IC elements comply with departmental requirements and effectively support departmental missions. The DNI works with the Secretary to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal requirements and that DOE

intelligence efforts contribute effectively to national security priorities, particularly in areas such as nuclear weapons proliferation and energy-related threats.

C. The Secretary of Homeland Security

The DNI and the Secretary of Homeland Security have distinct roles in overseeing the IC elements within the DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. As the head of the IC, the DNI provides strategic guidance, sets priorities, and ensures that intelligence activities align with the broader goals of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and national intelligence strategies. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the responsibility for ensuring the DHS IC elements comply with departmental requirements and effectively support departmental missions. The DNI works with the Secretary to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal requirements and that DHS intelligence efforts contribute effectively to national security priorities, particularly in areas such as terrorism, cybersecurity, and border security.

D. The Secretary of State

The DNI and the Secretary of State have distinct roles in overseeing the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) the IC element within the Department of State (DOS). As the head of the IC, the DNI provides strategic guidance, sets priorities, and ensures that intelligence activities align with the broader goals of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and national intelligence strategies. The Secretary of State has the responsibility for ensuring that INR complies with departmental requirements and effectively supports departmental missions. The DNI works with the Secretary to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal requirements and that DOS intelligence efforts contribute effectively to national security priorities, particularly in leveraging its expertise in foreign policy.

E. The Secretary of the Treasury

The DNI and the Secretary of Treasury have distinct roles in overseeing the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), the IC element within the Department of the Treasury. As the head of the IC, the DNI provides strategic guidance, sets priorities, and ensures that intelligence activities align with the broader goals of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and national intelligence strategies. The Secretary of Treasury has the responsibility for ensuring that OIA complies with departmental requirements and effectively supports departmental missions. The DNI works with the Secretary to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal requirements and that OIA intelligence efforts contribute effectively to national security priorities, particularly in countering financial threats and protecting the integrity of the global financial system.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

QUESTION 48: Section 102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)(4)) provides that the DNI “shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the [CIA] and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the [IC] through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.”

- A. What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?

The IC cannot perform its mission without the trust of the American people and their elected representatives. Compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States is fundamental for the IC and the DNI is expressly charged by the National Security Act with ensuring that the IC complies with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

If confirmed, I will ensure that ODNI continues to assess civil liberties and privacy compliance across the IC and that the IC has the tools, resources, and support it needs to always place the protection of privacy and civil liberties at the forefront of our mission.

- B.** What do you understand to be the obligation of the DNI to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed about matters relating to compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States?

The DNI has a clear statutory obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed about all intelligence activities, including the IC's compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. This responsibility includes an explicit requirement to report illegal intelligence activities.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)

QUESTION 49: If confirmed, will you ensure that the IC fully cooperates with the PCLOB, both with regard to the Board's formal reviews and its informal exchanges with the IC? Will you commit to ensuring that the PCLOB is provided full access to any information it requests?

Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure the PCLOB gets the support it needs to execute its critical oversight functions consistent with the law.

Security Executive Agent

The DNI is designated by law to serve as the U.S. government's Security Executive Agent.

QUESTION 50: What is your view of the effectiveness of the governance framework for personnel and credentialing vetting reform established by the OMB-led Performance Accountability Council?

If confirmed as DNI, I will be one of four members of the Performance Accountability Council (PAC), which is led by the Deputy Director of OMB. I believe the PAC is a critical function for ensuring strategic governance across the entire U.S. federal government. It is an effective vehicle for ensuring interoperability between the IC, the Department of War, and the entire Executive

Branch of the U.S. Government, particularly in the security clearance arena. If confirmed, I would work within this governance structure to ensure that reforms continue to prioritize efficiency, fairness, and adaptability, while safeguarding national security. I would also advocate for leveraging advanced technologies to further modernize the process.

QUESTION 51: Do you believe the Trusted Workforce 2.0 personnel vetting reforms are prudently scoped? Would you seek to modify them? How would you accelerate reforms?

I understand the Trusted Workforce 2.0 personnel vetting reforms are effectively scoped and have been successful. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about its continued implementation and making recommendations for improvement as appropriate.

QUESTION 52: How would you improve reciprocity in the recognition of clearances across the government?

If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the current process to determine what and where improvements need to be made. Standardized clearance policies and procedures, streamlined data sharing, continuous vetting, and accountability are essential tenets of an integrated intelligence community.

QUESTION 53: What are your views on the interagency security clearance process? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you seek to make to this process?

My understanding is that the Trusted Workforce 2.0 effort, which is a whole of government effort, has driven much needed transformational change across the entire vetting process in the U.S. government. However, further reforms are needed to streamline the process and ensure timely and consistent adjudications across agencies. It simply takes too long to adjudicate a security clearance, and the IC loses access to critical talent because of it.

If confirmed, I would work with the National Security and Counterintelligence Center and the IC elements to continue to identify ways to gain efficiencies in this process. I would encourage leveraging advanced technologies to modernize and automate the process to the maximum extent possible while continuing to safeguard national security.

QUESTION 54: If confirmed, what steps will you take to reduce the time it takes to process security clearances for new hires?

If confirmed, I will prioritize reducing security clearance processing times by encouraging further acceleration on the adoption of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 framework, which incorporates continuous vetting and automated tools to streamline investigations. I would also encourage further use of advanced technologies to automate routine checks, improving clearance reciprocity across agencies, and ensuring adequate resources for investigative agencies. Additionally, I commit to study the IC's progress in this space and, if necessary, establishing clear metrics to monitor progress, identify bottlenecks, and enhance accountability.

QUESTION 55: What priority will you give to security clearance reform, and how will that be reflected in ODNI's efforts as a whole?

If confirmed, security clearance reform will be a top priority, as an efficient, fair, and modernized clearance process is essential to ensuring the IC attracts and retains the best talent while safeguarding national security.

QUESTION 56: Do you believe that cannabis use should ever be the basis for denying an individual eligibility for access to classified information?

An individual's overall judgment, reliability, and ability to safeguard classified information are the overarching considerations in granting a security clearance. As cannabis laws evolve at the state level, the IC must balance adherence to federal law with an understanding of societal changes to ensure the IC attracts and retains the best talent while safeguarding national security.

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)

QUESTION 57: The NIPF guides priorities for the IC. Do you believe there is adequate interagency participation in the development of the President's Intelligence Priorities? How would you change or update the current procedures?

Yes, I believe the current procedures are appropriate.

Whistleblowers & The IC Inspector General

QUESTION 58: Do you support a strong Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) to provide independent oversight for the IC? Will you ensure that the Office of the ICIG is resourced and staffed in accordance with the ICIG's requests?

Yes; the ICIG provides a critical service to the DNI, the greater intelligence community, and the nation. I will support its statutory mission to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of intelligence activities. If confirmed, I will establish a strong relationship with the ICIG, urge that ICIG recommendations are addressed appropriately, and ensure the ICIG office is sufficiently resourced and staffed.

QUESTION 59: If confirmed, how would you ensure the IC's IGs maintain their independence?

The ICIG's independence is essential to ensure oversight and accountability in

the IC. I will empower the IG and ensure that ODNI leadership cooperate with ICIG efforts regardless of the political or institutional implications of any audits or investigations.

QUESTION 60: Do you support the statutory rights of whistleblowers and intend to honor the anonymity of whistleblowers who come forward? Are there aspects of the IC whistleblower statute with which you disagree?

If confirmed, I commit to ensure that ODNI handles every complaint to the ICIG in accordance with the law and that whistleblowers receive all legal protections.

QUESTION 61: If a whistleblower follows the law in seeking to report a matter to Congress under the IC Whistleblower Protection Act, will you commit to ensuring his or her submission is delivered to Congress within seven days, as the law requires?

Yes. In accordance with the requirements in law, I commit to transmitting reports of “particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to programs and activities” within the DNI’s responsibility and authority to the congressional intelligence committees within seven days.

QUESTION 62: Will you commit, if confirmed, to protect the identity of IC whistleblowers who seek to remain anonymous?

Yes.

QUESTION 63: IC whistleblowers have the statutory right to provide their complaints directly to Congress. The law states that whistleblowers must obtain from the DNI, through the IC IG, “direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.” Do you agree that this provision does not permit the DNI to deny that direct access to Congress altogether?

Yes, I agree.

Anomalous Health Incidents

QUESTION 64: Do you commit to taking a fresh look and an objective approach to the question of whether anomalous health incidents (AHIs) can be attributed to a foreign actor and deliberate external mechanism?

Yes; I commit to continuing the administration's important work in this area.

QUESTION 65: Do you commit to providing the congressional intelligence committees with ongoing and timely written and verbal updates on any IC analysis concerning AHIs as well as any specific inquiries on the topic from this Committee?

Yes.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) permits the government to conduct targeted surveillance of terrorists and other foreign adversaries who are located outside the United States.

QUESTION 66: Please describe your understanding of the value of Section 702, including to the President's Daily Brief.

Section 702 accounts for 63% of President's Daily Brief (PDB).

Beyond the PDB, the value Section 702 provides in protecting this nation is immense. Section 702 contributed to over 90% of the CIA-enabled synthetic drug disruptions in 2025. Every day, professionals across the IC rely on Section 702 to thwart terrorist activities, safeguard the homeland, protect critical infrastructure and keep our troops safe. It's a critical tool in our fight against the cartel drug trade, which has devastated our communities. Just recently, the administration declassified the fact that Section 702 helped the IC prevent a planned mass casualty terror attack on a sold-out Taylor Swift concert in Vienna, Austria, keeping tens of thousands of individuals out of harm's way. Section 702 of FISA is an indispensable foreign intelligence tool towards understanding the formidable foreign threat environment facing our nation.

QUESTION 67: Do you support the reauthorization of Section 702?

Yes. Section 702 of FISA is a foreign intelligence tool that is critical in understanding the formidable foreign threat environment. It can only be used to target non-U.S. persons, outside the United States, and never a U.S. person anywhere in the world. I fully support Congressional reauthorization of Section 702 and will work tirelessly with my IC partners to implement Section 702 in ways that are consistent with the Constitution and statute.

QUESTION 68: The Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) amended FISA to enhance the collection of foreign intelligence concerning the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned.” Do you support this amendment? What are your views on how this amendment will support the IC’s counternarcotics mission?

I strongly support the provision, which officially recognizes illicit drug trafficking as the national security threat Congress and the American people have known it to be for decades. In establishing the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors” as “foreign intelligence information” under FISA, RISAA paved the way for the U.S. Government to seek, and for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve, a certification focused on countering this national security threat outside US borders, enhancing foreign based and foreign focused operations, and ensuring deadly shipments of fentanyl and other illicit drugs never reach our borders

QUESTION 69: The FBI’s use of U.S. Person queries was the subject of debate during RISAA’s drafting and reauthorization. As a result, RISAA enacted many reforms on query procedures and requirements. What is your position on whether warrants should be required before an agency undertakes a U.S. Person query?

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against *unreasonable* searches and seizures, shall not be violated” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).

As the plain meaning of the amendment makes clear, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Therefore, the key question in determining whether a warrant should be required before an IC element queries, or searches, through

lawfully collected information already in its possession, is whether such a practice is reasonable. Both the FISC and the FISC-R, independent courts composed of duly appointed and confirmed Article III judges, have considered that question and concluded that such a search is not unreasonable. That conclusion aligns with the practice in criminal law. No prosecutor in SDNY, or anywhere in the nation, needs to obtain a second warrant or seek judicial review to review information already in their lawful possession. As a result, I do not believe a warrant requirement is necessary or appropriate.

While I do not believe that a warrant is constitutionally required, I plan to regularly review the IC's use of Section 702 and ensure that sufficiently protects the privacy and civil liberties of the American public if confirmed as DNI. I expect I will support all reforms necessary to make the IC accountable to the FISC, Congress, and the American in a way that also enables the IC's critical national security work. However, I do not believe that the IC should be subject to a warrant requirement that would restrict it beyond similar restrictions on law enforcement.

QUESTION 70: If a U.S. Person's selector is queried against FISA Section 702 information, and it reveals terrorist connections, what additional steps do the IC and Department of Justice need to take before they can target the U.S. Person's communications?

As you know, the IC cannot target U.S. persons under Section 702. Furthermore, targeting a non-U.S. person to obtain information about a U.S. person, also known as "reverse targeting," is unlawful. Therefore, in rare cases where the IC targets a U.S. person, it must rely on a legal authority other than Section 702. Most often, the IC would need to obtain a probable cause-based order from the FISC and convince the judiciary that the individual was an agent of the terrorist organization before collecting intelligence on a U.S. person. Such legal barriers and procedures are designed to ensure any decisions to target U.S. persons in connection with national security matters are consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

QUESTION 71: There is a lot of misinformation about incidental collection as it pertains to FISA Section 702. Please clarify this term and discuss its importance to national security.

Section 702 targets must be non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and must be expected to possess, communicate, or receive foreign intelligence information. Section 702 collects communications by Section 702 targets with other Section 702 targets, but it also collects communications between Section 702 targets and individuals who are not targeted under Section 702. The communications of individuals who are not Section 702 targets, are referred to as “incidental collection.”

Incidental collection may involve innocuous contact with family or friends, or it may, for example, constitute foreign intelligence information that must be acted upon to prevent harm. In the latter case, the incidental collection might be with a witting participant, an unwitting participant, or, as is most often, a potential victim. Identifying these incidental contacts assists the IC in determining which operational acts are necessary to protect national security, warn, or protect an individual from further harm.

Just recently, the administration declassified the fact that Section 702 helped the IC prevent a planned mass casualty terror attack on a sold-out Taylor Swift concert in Vienna, Austria, keeping tens of thousands of individuals out of harm’s way. In that case, Ms. Swift, an American, was not a 702 target. However, the IC incidentally collected information about Ms. Swift through valid Section 702 targets. That information was not Ms. Swift’s emails, phone calls, or other private electronic communications as is often portrayed. Instead, it was foreign terrorist discussing an attack on her and her fans. That information allowed the IC to take steps to keep them safe.

The IC mitigates the privacy impacts of incidental collection through the application of FISA Court-approved Section 702 minimization and querying procedures. These procedures contain detailed rules regarding who can access Section 702 collection, the length of time collection can be kept by the government, and when information about U.S. persons can be shared and with whom.

QUESTION 72: Please describe the extent of oversight mandated to ensure that the IC is compliant with FISA procedures and requirements.

Section 702 is one of – if not the most – scrutinized intelligence programs conducted by the U.S. Government. In fact, all three branches of government play a major role

in overseeing Section 702 to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the American people.

Since its original enactment in 2008, Congress has regularly amended the authority with updated safeguards and restrictions to ensure compliance with the Constitution. It also regularly receives and reviews compliance-related incidents and numerous reports regarding how the authority is being implemented. No instance of 702 non-compliance information is kept from Congress.

From the judicial branch, an Article III court—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and the U.S. Supreme Court— annually reviews the program. The courts must be satisfied that the 702 program meets all constitutional and statutory requirements before the IC can leverage the tool. Like Congress, the IC notifies the courts of every instance of 702 non-compliance.

Within the executive branch, each of the agencies that utilize Section 702 authorities have robust training and compliance programs overseen by attorneys and compliance professionals to ensure that authority is used lawfully. Moreover, the statute requires ongoing legal and programmatic oversight by ODNI and DOJ.

Protecting American's constitutional rights would be my first duty if confirmed as DNI. Therefore, I will never be passively satisfied with the complex oversight mechanisms described above. As DNI, I will regularly review whether the statutory and policy construct of 702 is sufficiently designed to ensure the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons and the American people and will inform this committee if I believe further reforms are necessary.

FBI Background Investigations

QUESTION 73: Should the FBI conduct background investigations of all Presidential nominees for positions within the executive branch of the federal government to ensure that those under consideration for positions of significant authority and responsibility will not misuse the power of their offices and do not have vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to coercion by our adversaries?

I believe there should be appropriate vetting of nominees for cabinet positions, but I am not in a position to comment on the necessity of background investigations for all presidential nominees across the executive branch.

QUESTION 74: Have you undergone, or will you undergo, an FBI background investigation as part of the process associated with your nomination?

Yes, I am undergoing an FBI background investigation as part of my nomination process.

QUESTION 75: Do you agree to provide the results of your FBI background investigation to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee for review?

I have no objection to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee being briefed about the results of my FBI background investigation.

Workforce Protection

QUESTION 76: Will you commit that, if confirmed, you will seek to recruit, attract, and retain a workforce based on principles of fairness and merit, and without consideration of personal political preferences?

Yes. I believe it is important that the IC retain its professional and nonpartisan nature.

QUESTION 77: Do you commit to consider professional qualifications in personnel decisions exclusively, without consideration of partisan or political factors?

Yes.

QUESTION 78: Would you ever consider an individual's personal political preferences, to include "loyalty" to the President, in making personnel decisions, such as to hire, fire, or promote an individual?

No.

QUESTION 79: If confirmed, what assurances will you provide to the IC workforce that personnel decisions will be based exclusively on professional qualifications, performance, and needs and not on personal political preferences?

The IC must be trusted as a nonpartisan entity, dedicated to providing timely and accurate intelligence information to its customers. This advances U.S. interests and provides the best information for policy makers to use in their decision making. I will provide clear assurances to the IC workforce that personnel decisions will be based on skills and qualifications, performance, and work ethic, and will be made to support the needs and requirements of the IC, without regard to personal political preferences.

QUESTION 80: If you receive credible allegations that IC employees or others in the executive branch are seeking to fire or force out IC employees because of their perceived political views or loyalty to the President, will you commit to informing the congressional intelligence committees and immediately stopping such efforts?

Yes. Seeking to fire or remove IC employees because of their perceived political views impacts the integrity of the IC, degrades mission, and will not be tolerated.

QUESTION 81: Will you impose a political litmus test for IC employees? Is a political litmus test ever appropriate in determining who can or should work in the IC?

No. The IC must retain its nonpartisan nature and focus on providing the best intelligence to policy makers.

Classification & Declassification

QUESTION 82: In a May 2020 report the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) found that “[t]here is widespread, bipartisan recognition that the Government classifies too much information for too long, at great and unnecessary cost to taxpayers. This problem is getting worse, as the volume of classified information grows at an increasing rate. Current policies, practices, and technologies for managing classified information must be modernized for the digital age.” Do you agree with the PIDB’s findings? If confirmed, what steps will you take to reform the classification system?

I agree that overclassification is a problem that needs to be addressed. Information should only be classified when necessary, consistent with the applicable Presidential policies and requirements. Overclassification can inhibit information sharing and cost the taxpayers more and more every year. If confirmed, I will examine the IC's classification policies and practices, and determine where reforms are necessary and appropriate in order to modernize the IC's practices and ensure consistency with Presidential direction in the handling of classified information.

QUESTION 83: Please explain your understanding of Section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(g)(1)(G)), which directs the DNI to establish and implement guidelines for the classification of information, and for other purposes.

A. If confirmed, how would you implement this section of the law?

If confirmed, I will ensure that there are guidelines regarding the proper classification of information, consistent with Presidential direction, that promotes the protection of national security information but prevents the overuse and misuse of classification markings. Further, I would examine whether guidelines sufficiently address declassification, where information no longer requires classification protection, in order to encourage transparency of IC activities. Finally, I would ensure there are sufficient oversight mechanisms to examine classification practices comply with requirements and guidelines.

B. What approach would you take to the systematic review and declassification of information in a manner consistent with national security, including the annual disclosure of aggregate intelligence appropriations?

If confirmed, I would ensure that the IC reviews and declassifies information, where appropriate, including when in the public interest and to increase public trust and transparency. I believe developments in AI create opportunities for the IC to streamline some of its declassification processes and will encourage IC elements to explore the possibilities of

this new technology to increase transparency. I will also prioritize the timely annual disclosure of aggregate intelligence appropriations.

QUESTION 84: How would you work to prevent the abuse of classification authorities?

If confirmed, I commit to strengthening oversight and accountability mechanisms so that abuse of classification can be detected and addressed, and the IC can focus on ensuring that classification is properly used for the information that requires protection. I will also encourage IC elements to follow the Principles of Intelligence Transparency.

National Security Threats and Challenges Facing the IC

QUESTION 85: What in your view are the principal threats to national security with which the IC must concern itself in the next five years? In the next twenty years?

The United States continues to face many national security threats including threats of terrorism, strategic competition with other nation states, global economic challenges, and cybersecurity threats. The IC must continue to develop intelligence and provide information to disrupt these threats, while adapting to new technologies. New technology provides both an opportunity for the IC to provide information faster and more efficiently to decision makers, but it also creates risks to national security. Therefore, the IC must continue its work addressing current and near-term threats, while looking ahead and remaining agile to address future challenges.

QUESTION 86: What are the highest priority questions that the IC should address in its intelligence collection activities and analytic assessments?

The highest priority for the IC is to develop the information and intelligence that policy makers need for their decision making. Therefore, it is critically important for ODNI to continue its work to identify for the IC intelligence priorities to ensure that even in a changing world, the IC remains agile and adjusts to the needs of its customers.

QUESTION 87: In your opinion, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats? How will you further adjust?

If confirmed, I will assess the current policies, resources, planning, training, and programs to determine if they are properly aligned to address the highest priority threats. Part of that assessment will be determining where the IC puts its efforts and resources and where we can realize efficiencies to produce critical intelligence that supports the highest national security needs.

Election Security

QUESTION 88: Do you commit to maintain detecting and preventing foreign interference in U.S. elections as a top priority for the IC?

Yes.

QUESTION 89: How would you ensure efforts to detect and prevent foreign interference in U.S. elections are appropriately resourced?

If confirmed, I will evaluate the personnel and resources the IC applies to foreign interference in the U.S. elections and determine if those efforts are appropriately resourced.

QUESTION 90: How would you ensure our intelligence efforts on election security remain apolitical, and avoid the perception or reality of political influence?

Foreign interference in a U.S. election is an apolitical issue, and all Americans should be concerned with a foreign nation's attempts to impact our elections. If confirmed, I will ensure that the IC continues to provide timely and accurate intelligence to its customers on this issue.

QUESTION 91: Do you commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees with complete and timely information regarding foreign threats to U.S. elections?

Yes.

QUESTION 92: Do you believe Russia, the PRC, or other foreign adversaries presents a continuing interference threat with respect to the U.S. political system?

Foreign adversaries represent a continuing threat to the United States and our political system. Our political system should be free from foreign adversaries.

QUESTION 93: Do you commit to immediately notifying policymakers and the public of foreign attempts to meddle in U.S. democratic processes, to include our elections?

If confirmed, I commit to providing as much information as possible, consistent with classification requirements and the protection of intelligence sources and methods. I will work to ensure that as much information as possible is available to the American people regarding any foreign attempts to meddle in U.S. democratic processes.

Detention, Interrogation and Rendition

QUESTION 94: Will you commit, if confirmed, not to permit the CIA to use any interrogation technique or approach or treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual?

Yes, if confirmed, I commit to exercising the DNI's oversight authorities to ensure all IC elements, including CIA, follow U.S. law and policy, including with respect to interrogation as described in the U.S. Army Field Manual.

Analytic Integrity

QUESTION 95: How would you protect and improve the quality of IC analytic products?

The IC's responsibility is to produce intelligence, and as such the quality of IC analytic products is of vital importance so that policy makers have the best information available for their decision making. If confirmed, I will examine existing IC policies and the resources and training available to IC analysts to determine where there may be issues and how we can best enable our IC analysts to produce the highest quality products.

QUESTION 96: Do you believe 50 U.S.C. § 3024(g) and ICD 203 (regarding analysis and analytic standards) need to be strengthened and its implementation made more vigorous? In what ways?

I believe the authorities provided to the DNI regarding oversight of IC analysis and the principles and standards found in ICD 203 provide a solid foundation for the IC to produce timely and accurate intelligence. If confirmed, I will look deeper into IC analytic processes and determine if any policy updates are needed to strengthen those analytic processes and the production of analysis.

QUESTION 97: How do you view the importance of intelligence analysts' freedom to present their assessments objectively to decision makers in both the executive and legislative branches, regardless of what a particular policy might be, even if their assessments may be unwelcome or inconvenient?

I believe it is critically important to enable analysts to utilize their skills and expertise to provide the best and most accurate intelligence to decision makers. They should be enabled to do that without any fear or concern regarding the popularity of that opinion. Instead, they should use their knowledge, skills, and training to produce the best and most accurate intelligence, consistent with the analytic requirements found in ICD 203.

QUESTION 98: What is your view of the place and importance of challenging existing assessments, especially when new intelligence reporting is inconsistent with such assessments?

I believe it is vital that the IC can continue to develop information and determine if past assessments remain accurate or not, especially if those assessments are still being used for policy decisions. A structure built on static analysis, that once made can never be questioned, is not sustainable in the production of intelligence. Instead, the IC must analyze new information and determine if that new information supports a prior assessment or raises questions and that require an adjustment or a new assessment.

QUESTION 99: How do you propose enhancing the IC's objectivity and independence to maintain its insulation from political influence? How would you ensure that bias among the analytic cadre does not impair their analysis?

The IC should continue to follow its processes and the requirements of ICD 203, and ensure that its analysts are trained, equipped, and enabled to develop products based on facts and IC analytic techniques and requirements. By focusing on processes and training, as well as encouraging the analytic community to debate and express opposing views, the IC can mitigate potential bias and ensure that products have taken into account various views in order to develop the best possible intelligence.

QUESTION 100: If confirmed, would you ever request, encourage, or support an intelligence professional's adjusting his/her assessment to avoid criticism from the White House or political appointees? Would you ever change or remove content in an intelligence assessment for political reasons, or at the behest of political leadership? Would you ever condone such actions by anyone on your staff?

No. The IC is charged with developing intelligence and presenting it to policy makers. To be effective, IC analysts must be free to provide their assessment, consistent with analytic standards, without fear of political pressure. It is up to the policy makers to decide what to do with the information. I believe it is vital that the IC enable its analysts to continue to provide accurate and reliable intelligence.

QUESTION 101: If intelligence agencies or analysts are discouraged from providing objective foreign intelligence reporting or analytic assessments, how would this harm national security?

Policymakers depend on the IC for its focus on providing objective, unbiased intelligence assessments. Discouraging analysts from following the standards inherent in the profession would have a profoundly negative impact on national security by preventing our senior-most leaders from taking decisions that impact the wellness and security of all Americans based on verifiable, objective facts.

QUESTION 102: What recourse should intelligence analysts have if they believe their objective assessments have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled? How would you ensure that career IC professionals have protected channels to address

their concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled?

The Analytic Ombudsman serves as a confidential resource and provides protected channels for analysts to address their concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled. The Ombudsman works closely with the Inspector General, who also has protected channels in which analysts, or any member of the IC, can raise similar concerns.

QUESTION 103: Do you believe the DNI has an obligation to address analysts' concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled, because a peer or a policy maker may disagree with the analysis or conclusions being presented? Please provide examples from your career of times when you have told the truth, even when that position was uncomfortable or unpopular.

Yes. The DNI has an obligation to address analysts concerns if objective assessments are being dismissed or altered due to disagreement or external pressures and I commit to taking such allegations seriously. I have demonstrated a commitment to the truth, even if that message was uncomfortable or unpopular, throughout my professional career. I recognize that such actions are among the most challenging that our IC professionals must make every day and I commit to ensuring that they have the freedom to do so.

QUESTION 104: How would you approach communicating IC analytic conclusions to the public if the analysis and conclusions did not align with the President's views and political objectives?

The IC informs senior policy makers, not the public. However, whether a public disclosure is necessary should be based solely on the importance of informing the American public of critical national security matters and the need to protect sensitive sources and methods.

QUESTION 105: If confirmed, do you intend to provide, and do you intend for the IC to provide, timely and objective analysis that is independent of political considerations, based on all available sources of intelligence and implemented in accordance with analytic tradecraft standards?

Yes.

QUESTION 106: Is it ever appropriate for the DNI, or senior leaders in the IC, to substitute their own analytic assessments for those of career analysts? Why or why not?

No. Career analysts possess the expertise, tradecraft training, and access to intelligence necessary to produce objective, high-quality assessments.

QUESTION 107: Do you commit, if confirmed, to notifying the congressional intelligence committees if you, or senior leaders who are not career analysts, substitute their own analytic assessments for those of career analysts?

Yes, and I further commit to take all necessary steps to ensure that this does not occur.

Questions from Senator Warner

QUESTION 108: What do you understand to be the DNI's role in domestic law enforcement investigations into election-related activity?

I understand that the DNI, as head of the Intelligence Community, has substantial statutory authority to address national intelligence threats to U.S. elections. In particular, the Director is responsible for the integration of national intelligence, which may include foreign intelligence threats to U.S. election activity. I also understand that Intelligence Community elements are authorized to cooperate with and provide appropriate intelligence and technical support to law enforcement agencies and that as head of the Intelligence Community, the DNI has oversight of those activities.

QUESTION 109: If confirmed, will you commit to provide the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community with final approval of all personnel decisions, except for security-based determinations, concerning personnel assigned to the Office of the Inspector General, as required by 50 USC § 3033(j)(3)?

Yes.

QUESTION 110: If confirmed, will you ensure that intelligence analysts and other intelligence professionals are protected from adverse personnel actions for producing intelligence analysis that you, or other policy makers, may disagree with?

Yes.

QUESTION 111: If confirmed, will you commit to notify the congressional intelligence committees of criminal referrals to the Department of Justice before notifying the media?

If confirmed, I commit to keeping the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities in accordance with Title V of the National Security Act and in accordance with investigative needs.

QUESTION 112: If confirmed, will you commit to provide security guidance to whistleblowers who have notified you of their intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly within seven days of receiving such notice?

If confirmed, I commit to affording all protections required by law to IC whistleblowers.

QUESTION 113: If confirmed, will you commit to notify the congressional intelligence committees of any declassification of information or intelligence pursuant to section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 before public release of the information or intelligence?

If confirmed, I commit to keeping the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities in accordance with Title V of the National Security Act.

QUESTION 114: If confirmed, will you commit to maintaining robust governance of artificial intelligence applications in the intelligence community, including full compliance with 50 USC 3334m and complementary provisions in Public Law 119-60?

Yes.

QUESTION 115: If confirmed, will you commit to implementing a robust test and evaluation regime for artificial intelligence applications in the Intelligence Community, particularly for context where an output from an AI model serves as the primary basis for decisions or actions with significant effect on privacy, civil liberties, or loss of life?

Yes; consistent with applicable law and policy.

QUESTION 116: If confirmed, will you commit not to penalize or otherwise retaliate against providers of artificial intelligence services based on the political or ideological viewpoints of the provider or its employees?

Yes; consistent with applicable law and policy.

QUESTION 117: How important is the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to ensuring that the DNI's role as the Security Executive Agent (SecEA) is implemented regarding security clearance reform for the Intelligence Community? What are its key functions in your view?

I understand that the National Counterintelligence and Security Center provides the important staffing and expertise necessary to enable the DNI's role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) and advance the DNI's security reform priorities. In reviewing the SecEA's responsibilities, I understand the key functions to involve policymaking and oversight of personnel security programs to ensure U.S. Government departments and agencies develop and maintain efficient, effective, and secure programs for determining and maintaining personnel eligibility to access to classified information or hold a sensitive position.

QUESTION 118: If the NCSC were to be disestablished or significantly reduced in size, how would this affect the ability of the ODNI to perform its SecEA functions? Is there any other element of the IC that would be able to fulfill these functions?

If confirmed as DNI, I will take a close look at how to optimize the agency's organization and the performance of its functions, including the SecEA functions.

QUESTION 119: How important is Security Clearance reform, including the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative and the National Background Investigative Services (NBIS) system, to the IC's ability to rapidly vet, clear and hire IC talent, as well as to ensure the nation's secrets are secure?

I understand that the U.S. Government's security reform efforts, including Trusted Workforce 2.0, intend to modernize the personnel security vetting process, including by integrating systems and introducing continuous vetting. It is critical that the Intelligence Community, and the rest of the U.S. Government with cleared personnel, have the capabilities, information, and processes in place to enable a speedy, but thorough hiring process. The Intelligence Community needs agility and efficiency in its hiring processes, including personnel security vetting, in order to meet evolving mission needs and compete with the private sector for talent, while ensuring a thorough and reliable check so that our classified national security information and other sensitive information is not jeopardized by insider threats. I understand that the security reform efforts already underway advance these objectives and if confirmed as DNI, I commit to continuing to support improvements.

Questions from Senator Bennet

IC Independence

QUESTION 120: How will you ensure intelligence assessments remain objective and free from political influence – especially when the assessments conflict with the current Administration's messaging/policy?

The IC operates on the principles of objectivity, integrity, and independence. Ensuring that intelligence assessments are free from political influence is essential to upholding these values. Analytic objectivity is the cornerstone of effective intelligence. Analysts must be empowered to provide their assessments without fear of reprisal or pressure to align with policy preferences. This objectivity ensures decision-makers in both the executive and legislative branches are equipped with unvarnished facts and well-reasoned assessments. As such, I commit that intelligence assessments should remain rooted in the facts and must function to advance and protect U.S. national security interests.

QUESTION 121: How will you specifically protect leaders in the IC from political blowback for contrarian assessments?

The IC must remain apolitical to fulfill its essential national security function. If confirmed as DNI, I will cultivate an environment where leaders understand that their integrity, independence, and professionalism are needed to carry out the IC's mission objectively and effectively.

Iran

QUESTION 122: According to credible press reports, some senior U.S. officials may have accepted Israeli assessments about how a war with Iran would evolve – to include the likelihood of regime change – and appear to have disregarded what, in retrospect, were reportedly far more accurate and nuanced assessments by the U.S. intelligence community. What measures would you implement as DNI to ensure sufficient scrutiny of foreign intelligence assessments going forward?

If confirmed, I would ensure that significant foreign-partner assessments are explicitly evaluated for sourcing, access, assumptions, and potential bias, and that analysts clearly distinguish between what an ally assesses, what the United States can independently verify, and where the IC's own view differs. I would review whether existing interagency procedures are sufficient to vet foreign intelligence used in major policy deliberations, and would reinforce a culture in which analysts are expected to challenge outside assessments, including those from close partners, when the evidence warrants it.

QUESTION 123: Do you concur with the U.S. IC assessment that Iran was complying with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at the time that President Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the agreement in May 2018?

I have not personally seen the underlying intelligence to render an informed opinion. If confirmed, I will study this issue and provide my feedback to this Committee once I can provide an informed response.

Asia

QUESTION 124: How do you intend to improve intelligence integration between the IC and operational military intelligence organizations, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to ensure decision-makers receive timely actionable intelligence during a crisis, and our troops as well as our strategic intelligence entities are operating on the most up to date information?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with OUSW(I&S), the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and the White House to ensure that the IC is exploring available mechanisms for providing military commanders and warfighters with the information they need to protect the United States and to provide decision-makers with a strategic advantage during a crisis.

QUESTION 125: What lessons from U.S. intelligence support to and work within Ukraine can be applied to deterrence and coalition-building in the Indo-Pacific?

If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about what insights the IC has developed from the conflict in Ukraine and working with the relevant experts within the IC to explore which of those lessons could be applied to efforts to deter conflict and build coalitions in the Indo-Pacific.

QUESTION 126: What is your understanding of the IC's assessment as to how the war with Iran has affected perceptions of the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrence vis-à-vis China?

Though I have not yet had the opportunity to examine the IC's classified assessments on this issue, if confirmed, I look forward to gaining a deeper understanding of the IC's assessment of the global perceptions of the Iran conflict.

QUESTION 127: How can the IC better support multilateral initiatives such as the Quad and AUKUS?

By statute, the DNI provides strategic oversight and ensures coordination of the IC's relationships with foreign intelligence and security services. The DNI, as head of the IC, ensures that these engagements align with national intelligence priorities and broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, to include support to

multilateral initiatives such as the Quad and AUKUS, avoiding duplication or conflicting efforts across IC elements.

In addition, the DNI and the Secretary of State collaborate to ensure that intelligence activities within the Department of State (DOS), particularly through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), align with national security priorities. Through alignment of INR as part of the IC, the DNI is able to assist in ensuring that INR's intelligence efforts are effectively coordinated with other IC elements, enhancing the IC's ability to address global threats and support U.S. diplomatic initiatives.

Europe

QUESTION 128: Do you commit to ensuring that Ukraine has the intelligence support required to apply sufficient pressure on Russia to achieve U.S. national security goals?

If confirmed as DNI, my priority would be to ensure that the President has the critical information he needs to support his efforts toward Russia and Ukraine ending the war. My role as DNI would be to arm the President, other national security policy makers, and – to the extent directed by the President – foreign partners like Ukraine with critical information and analysis that accurately illuminates Russia's plans and intentions.

QUESTION 129: How do you see Ukraine as contributing to U.S. and European deterrence of Russia?

While I have not had the opportunity to examine the Intelligence Community's classified assessments on this issue, I credit the views expressed in the IC's Annual Threat Assessment released publicly earlier this year, which stated that NATO and EU member states are eager to see the war in Ukraine resolved in a way that not only preserves Ukrainian sovereignty, but also deters future Russian aggression in Europe. I further understand from the Annual Threat Assessment that a durable settlement to the war in Ukraine could open the door for a thaw in U.S.-Russia relations and an improved bilateral geostrategic and commercial relationship.

IC Workforce

QUESTION 130: What is your assessment as to the operational and national security implications, including to mission readiness, resulting from the workforce reductions (including terminations, early retirements, buyouts) carried out during DNI Gabbard's tenure?

I am not in a position to assess the operational and national security implications resulting from the workforce reductions at ODNI at this time. I do not have access to the organizational review that provided for the reductions, nor have I had the opportunity to assess the implications of the reductions. As such, I would be careful not to draw conclusions on the impact of workforce reductions at this point; large changes to a workforce can take a significant amount of time to take hold. If confirmed, I will review the workforce reductions to ensure they support the ODNI's core mission.

QUESTION 131: How would you react if the Trump Administration sought to further reduce the IC workforce?

I do not currently have an inside view of the IC's workforce. If confirmed, and if the President sought to further reduce the IC workforce, I would review the IC's staffing needs. That review would consider the IC's mission requirements, statutory responsibilities, and the need to recruit and retain a highly capable workforce, as well as the impact of any such proposals on the IC's ability to carry out its mission effectively.

DNI Role in U.S. Elections and Foreign Efforts to Influence and Interfere in U.S. Elections.

QUESTION 132: What lessons has the IC learned from past foreign efforts to influence U.S. elections? How would you apply those lessons to protect the upcoming midterm elections in November 2026? What more do you believe needs to be done?

If confirmed, I will review the IC's work on foreign influence in prior U.S. elections to determine how the IC can be optimally postured for the November 2026 midterms.

QUESTION 133: If confirmed, how would you ensure the public remains informed about efforts by foreign actors to influence or interfere in U.S. elections? For example, would you continue the practice of past DNIs issuing public statements informed by objective IC analysis of credible intelligence reporting?

It is critical that the public has faith in the U.S. election system, including that it is free from interference from foreign actors. If confirmed, I will continue to keep the public informed, as appropriate, while protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods, including by leveraging existing outreach and notification frameworks.

QUESTION 134: What do you see as the DNI's role in supporting CISA and the security of our homeland?

The DNI, as head of the IC, is responsible for leading the IC in collecting, analyzing, producing and disseminating intelligence on foreign threats to critical infrastructure. If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to working closely with CISA and the IC on foreign threats to critical infrastructure, and how best to provide intelligence to non-IC partners while protecting sources and methods. CISA plays an integral part in protecting our nation's critical infrastructure via its coordination between the government and private sector.

QUESTION 135: Please explain your understanding of the DNI's role as pertains to the administration of U.S. elections.

As head of the IC, I understand the DNI to be responsible for serving as the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters related to national security and integrating information to provide timely, objective national intelligence to the President, Executive Branch leadership, and to other appropriate recipients. These key responsibilities extend to national security threats to the administration of U.S. elections. I understand that this may include addressing foreign government interference and foreign malign influence in the conduct of elections, physical and cyber threats to U.S. election campaigns and infrastructure by foreign powers and international terrorists, and vulnerabilities of election infrastructure to exploitation by such foreign adversaries.

QUESTION 136: Do you agree it would be inappropriate for a DNI to comment publicly about unsubstantiated claims regarding mail-in-ballots and election fraud?

If confirmed as DNI, any representations I make to the public, including about elections, will be informed by timely, objective national intelligence.

AI

QUESTION 137: What do you see as the role of AI in intel collection? Intel analysis? Intel use?

This Administration is focused on accelerating the responsible adoption of AI in mission areas where it can enhance effectiveness. If confirmed, I would approach the use of AI with discipline and caution. In my view, AI has the potential to be a significant force multiplier for intelligence collection and analysis. However, AI tools can reflect bias, generate hallucinations, or create a false sense of confidence if they are not rigorously tested, validated, and continuously evaluated. Used appropriately, AI can help process, triage, and tag large volumes of information, identify patterns and anomalies, surface relevant connections across datasets, and flag developments that may otherwise be missed in a fast-moving threat environment. Effective use of AI enables analysts to concentrate on their highest priority requirements and produce sound assessments for policy and decisionmakers.

From my perspective, AI should be viewed as an aid, not a replacement for insight, experience, and sound tradecraft that human analysts bring to the mission. If confirmed, I would support the responsible use of AI where it can improve speed, scale, analytic capability and ensure that it is implemented in a manner consistent with law and policy, protective of civil liberties and privacy, and anchored in human accountability.

QUESTION 138: How do you plan to bring the IC IT and administrative systems up to speed with AI?

AI is one of the most transformative technologies to emerge in recent decades. If confirmed as DNI, I will continue to build on and encourage the work the IC elements have done to determine how AI can best be leveraged to enhance and

integrate core IC functions, while enabling its secure and efficient adoption across the IC Information Environment.

Questions from Senator Wyden

Expansion of the ODNI

QUESTION 139: Do you believe that the ODNI should be expanded by establishing offices in agencies and departments that are not elements of the Intelligence Community? If so, which agencies and departments?

If confirmed as DNI, I would examine the IC's capacity to provide sufficient intelligence support to departments and agencies without IC elements. I believe it is important for the national intelligence capabilities of the IC to be deployed to address the national security threats faced across the Executive Branch, and would seek to understand whether existing models of support are adequate or need to be replaced through the establishment of additional offices in agencies or departments.

QUESTION 140: The January 20, 2025, Executive Order ("Protecting the American People Against Invasion") directs that Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) be established in every state and that they "shall include representation from any other Federal agencies with law enforcement officers, or agencies with the ability to provide logistics, intelligence, and operational support to the HSTFs." What role, in any, do you believe the Intelligence Community should play in the HSTFs, and which elements of the IC do you believe should play that role?

The IC should play a critical role in supporting the Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) in the counter-cartel fight. In my role as U.S. Attorney, I have seen firsthand the vital efforts of federal law enforcement agencies to address foreign drug trafficking cartels and gangs. These organizations are complex, evolving threat actors, and it is imperative that the U.S. Government use all the tools at its disposal to degrade and disrupt them. The IC must continue to provide foreign intelligence support to the HSTFs and ensure that intelligence information can be shared and actioned by law enforcement partners. I support Director Gabbard's direction to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to stand up an NCTC Interagency Fusion Cell to further this work by leveraging law enforcement and IC

information to identify and assess Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) cartel and gang actors and provide leads to operational agencies. The acute, relentless threat to Americans from fentanyl and other synthetic opioids trafficked by these violent groups is a national security priority. If confirmed, I look forward to seeking out additional ways the IC can support the HSTFs.

QUESTION 141: In December 2025, then-NCTC Director Joe Kent testified that the NCTC Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC)’s “main goals” are sharing information among law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community (IC) on FTO-designated cartels and gangs, to include identifying, vetting, and providing “an intelligence driven prioritization of high-impact targets” and providing “new operational leads for law enforcement as discovered via correlated data analysis.” Do you agree with this level of involvement by NCTC in domestic law enforcement? What limits, if any, do you believe elements of the Intelligence Community should adhere to with regard to domestic law enforcement?

I support the NCTC Interagency Fusion Cell providing intelligence support with a foreign nexus to help disrupt and degrade FTO cartels and gangs. These nefarious organizations’ illegal activities have killed thousands of Americans in recent years. NCTC was stood up in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the gravest act of terrorism on our shores. NCTC must continue to focus on the threat posed by international terrorist groups that threaten Americans and U.S. interests, from al-Qaeda, ISIS, HAMAS, Hizballah, IRGC, Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, Tren de Aragua, and others. For these efforts, and more broadly across the IC, it is important to draw a distinction between intelligence support, such as providing intelligence leads on threat actors with a foreign nexus, and engaging in domestic law enforcement activities, which is the role of law enforcement agencies. If confirmed, I will ensure the IC’s intelligence support to law enforcement is conducted with respect for the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans.

Classification, Declassification and Transparency

QUESTION 142: Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities, but is inconsistent with the public’s understanding of the law?

I commit to share significant interpretations of law in accordance with Section 510 of the National Security Act of 1947.

QUESTION 143: If confirmed, will you ensure that the March 17, 2026, FISA Court opinion related to Section 702 is declassified and released to the public prior to congressional action on reauthorization?

I understand that the government has already made the full unredacted opinion available to all members of Congress for their consideration during the reauthorization process. I also understand that the government is working arduously to expeditiously declassify the opinion in a way that responsibly protects sources and methods and, if confirmed, commit to continue efforts towards its declassification.

QUESTION 144: Attorney General-approved procedures and guidelines for Executive Order 12333 are currently posted online. Do you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to making public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations?

Yes.

Detention, Interrogation and Rendition

QUESTION 145: Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 prohibits the use of any interrogation technique or approach or any treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the Intelligence Community and the President?

I believe you are referring to Section 2000dd-2(a)(2) of Title 42. I would defer to appropriate legal experts on this specific section, but my general understanding is that this provision is binding on the IC and the President.

QUESTION 146: Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention facility except to hold people “on a short-term, transitory basis.” Do you support this prohibition? If yes, how would you define “short-term” and “transitory”?

The specific definitions of “short-term” and “transitory” require careful consultation with legal and policy experts to ensure compliance with the Executive Order and alignment with national security objectives as well as the United States’ commitment to lawful and ethical detention practices. If confirmed, I would consult the ODNI General Counsel and other IC and government-wide legal subject matter experts to ensure that careful balance is met.

QUESTION 147: The United States recognizes its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, not to “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

- A. To what extent should written “diplomatic assurances” be required for extraditions and renditions?
- B. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established records of committing torture?
- C. What responsibility does the Intelligence Community have to not provide support to operations conducted by other elements of the United States Government that violate this obligation?

I understand that the necessity and reliability of written “diplomatic assurances” must be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis, particularly when dealing with countries with records of torture. If accepted, such assurances should be subject to rigorous verification and monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture. The U.S. Government as a whole, not just the IC, has a shared obligation under the Convention Against Torture. The IC will support our federal counterparts in line with that obligation.

QUESTION 148: Do you agree that Intelligence Community officers should not participate in interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know of, or otherwise suspect the torture or mistreatment of detainees?

Yes.

QUESTION 149: Section 1045 states that “[t]he head of any department or agency of the United States Government shall provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and prompt access to, any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or effectively controlled by a department, agency, contractor, or subcontractor of the United States Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies.” Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the Intelligence Community and the President?

I believe you are referring to Section 2000dd-2(b)(1) of Title 42. I would defer to appropriate legal experts on this specific section, but my general understanding is that this provision is binding on the IC and the President.

QUESTION 150: The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with the Army Field Manual applies to any individual “in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict.”

- A. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee is in the “effective control” of any officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government.
- B. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is “detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department of agency of the United States.”

The terms “effective control” and “owned, operated, or controlled” involve legal and operational considerations that are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the degree of authority or influence exercised by U.S. personnel and the nature of the facility’s management. These determinations require careful legal analysis to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and international obligations. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ODNI General Counsel and other legal experts at relevant agencies to ensure any actions involving detainees align with U.S. laws, policies, and ethical standards.

Counterterrorism

QUESTION 151: In a September 22, 2025, Executive Order, Donald Trump purported to designate “Antifa” as a “domestic terrorist organization.” Do you agree that there is no basis in law for designating “domestic terrorist organizations”?

Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State may designate a foreign organization as an FTO if it engages in terrorist activity that threatens the United States. While I agree there is no statutory corollary for designating domestic organizations as terrorist groups, I understand the President’s designation of Antifa in that Executive Order of 22 September 2025, which directed all relevant executive departments and agencies to utilize all applicable authorities to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle any and all illegal operations by or on behalf of Antifa, was done pursuant to his authorities under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.

QUESTION 152: In November 2025, the Department of State designated “Antifa Ost, along with three other violent Antifa groups” as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The Secretary of State’s announcement stated that the designation “supports President Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-7,” which is titled “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.” Please describe your understanding of how the foreign “Antifa” designation “supports” domestic terrorist investigations. Do you believe that the intelligence tools, programs and authorities available to the government in the international counterterrorism context can be used against suspected domestic terrorists?

Domestic terrorism is a domestic law enforcement concern, not a foreign intelligence matter. I understand the Secretary of State designated Antifa Ost, Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front, Armed Proletarian Justice, and Revolutionary Class Self-Defense as FTOs that threaten the United States by directing, enabling, or inspiring U.S.-based actors to engage in acts of terrorism. If confirmed, I will look further into the threat posed by these FTOs and how they may interact with domestic groups such as Antifa.

QUESTION 153: If confirmed, to what extent would you prioritize counterterrorism operations against cartels and gangs designated as FTOs, as compared to more traditional terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al Qa’ida? To what extent do you believe counterterrorism resources and personnel should be shifted toward the designated cartels and gangs?

The illicit narcotics and other drugs that FTO cartels and gangs traffic into the United States kill thousands of Americans. I fully support the President’s direction for a whole-of-government effort to degrade and disrupt these organizations. I also understand the President expects the IC to remain laser-focused on the threats of other terrorist actors such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, HAMAS, Hizballah, and the IRGC. While our counterterrorism efforts over the last 25 years have been exemplary and, no doubt, prevented American deaths, we cannot be complacent in the face of terrorists who seek to harm Americans. If confirmed, I will prioritize the counterterrorism fight as needed to protect the Homeland and U.S. interests.

Surveillance

QUESTION 154: Former NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person or certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under Executive Order 12333 “normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after a finding of probable cause.” Should the same requirement apply to the U.S. person queries of other data collected and retained under the Executive Order by other elements of the Intelligence Community? If not, why not?

Under Executive Order 12333, IC elements must operate in accordance with Attorney General-approved procedures that set forth the circumstances and limits under which elements may lawfully collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons. It is my understanding that, among other things, these guidelines were drafted to ensure that lawful intelligence activities are carried out in a manner that provides protection for the privacy and civil liberties of Americans while also accounting for the individual mission sets and authorities of each of the 18 IC elements. If confirmed, I would work with DOJ and IC element heads to ensure that IC elements comply with these Attorney General-approved procedures. In doing so, I will have the opportunity to consider how NSA’s SIGINT-focused procedures work in practice, whether any additional requirements

or other changes would be appropriate, and whether similar requirements should be placed on other intelligence disciplines.

QUESTION 155: Do you agree that the Intelligence Community cannot request that a foreign entity conduct any activity that the IC is not authorized to undertake itself? If yes, do you agree that this prohibition applies to requests from administration officials outside the Intelligence Community as well as to implicit or indirect (including via public statement) requests?

Yes.

QUESTION 156: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of FISA. He responded: “As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse-targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about a Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have occurred.” How would you ensure that this fact specific analysis is applied to the nomination of Section 702 targets?

I am not familiar with how the IC identifies incidents of reverse targeting.

My general understanding is that regular oversight conducted by DOJ and ODNI of 702 activities includes fact-specific examinations of whether reverse-targeting may have occurred, and that if and when any reverse targeting is identified, it is reported to the FISC and Congress consistent with applicable law. If confirmed, I will ensure that ODNI remains closely involved in these oversight activities, to include reporting potential violations. If I encounter such issues, I will work with the appropriate departments to identify root causes and implement effective solutions.

Lethal Operations

QUESTION 157: Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?

Even if rare, targeting or knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation is a grave action that raises serious constitutional, legal, and policy implications. If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that such actions adhere to Constitutional due process guarantees. Consistent with the need to protect classified or otherwise sensitive information, I would advocate for maximum public transparency about such operations to both build public trust about such actions and safeguard national security.

Commercially Available Information

QUESTION 158: Do you believe that the Intelligence Community can or should collect U.S. location information pursuant to EO 12333 authorities? If no, how should the IC ensure that it is not obtaining the information through incidental collection? If yes, should there be any limitations on the Intelligence Community's use, retention, or dissemination of the information?

The IC must comply with all applicable U.S. law and policies regarding the collection, retention, dissemination, and use of information about U.S. persons. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the current laws and policies regarding location information and what limitations are necessary to protect the privacy of U.S. persons while enabling the national security mission.

QUESTION 159: Do you support Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum (ICPM) 504 (01) ("Intelligence Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information"), updated February 6, 2025? Please elaborate on any aspects you do or do not support.

Yes.

QUESTION 160: Do you commit to keeping the Committee fully and currently informed of the Intelligence Community's procurement of, access to, or collection of Sensitive Commercially Available Information?

Yes.

QUESTION 161: Section (g)(3) of ICPM 504 (01) requires the ODNI, in coordination with relevant Intelligence Community elements, to provide a report to the public every two years regarding the Intelligence Community's access to and collection, processing, and safeguarding of Sensitive Commercially Available Information. Do you support this requirement? If confirmed, do you commit to providing these reports to the public, starting no later than February 2027?

I understand that ODNI already provided Congress with the first classified report and commit to providing public reports as required by ICPM 504(01).

Chief of Mission Authorities

QUESTION 162: 22 U.S.C. § 3927 states that: "Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country...." Absent direct intervention from the President or the National Security Council, is the Intelligence Community obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not limited to collection activities, covert action and liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of mission?

I understand that Chiefs of Station are required to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently informed about any and all IC programs and activities carried out in their countries of accreditation, with very limited exceptions. Should an intelligence activity not have the approval of the Chief of Mission, but continue to be supported by the Chief of Station, my understanding is that that activity is referred back to Washington for resolution.

Encryption

QUESTION 163: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote: "Mandating mechanisms to bypass encryption or privacy technologies undermines user security, privacy, and trust, and poses significant risks of exploitation by malicious actors." Do you agree? If confirmed, would you support mandated

mechanisms to allow the government to bypass encryption or other privacy technologies?

I agree with Director Gabbard's statement.

Whistleblowers

QUESTION 164: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote: "Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring accountability and oversight within the IC, and they must have clear, protected channels to report concerns, including the unauthorized transmittal of classified information to appropriate entities such as Members of Congress, Inspectors General (IGs), and other authorized recipients." During her confirmation hearing, Director Gabbard was asked if she agreed "that IC whistleblowers must have a clear path to this committee and that they don't need permission from agencies to talk to [the committee]," to which Director Gabbard responded, "the answer is clearly yes." Do you agree?

Yes; the IC Whistleblower Protection Act provides the means for reporting "urgent concerns" to Congress with appropriate protections for classified information.

QUESTION 165: Do you agree that any monitoring of Intelligence Community personnel for purposes of detecting insider threats must protect the confidentiality of protected whistleblower communications? If yes, how should that protection be assured?

Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing ODNI whistleblower procedures and protections, in order to determine whether any changes are necessary or appropriate.

QUESTION 166: Do you believe that appropriately cleared attorneys representing Intelligence Community whistleblowers should have access to classified information related to the complaint and that, as a general matter, whistleblowers should have access to cleared attorneys?

I agree that whistleblowers should have access to cleared counsel where appropriate and consistent with due process and applicable laws and regulations.

The extent to which cleared counsel may receive classified information related to their complaints will necessarily be fact-specific.

Inspector General

QUESTION 167: Will you ensure that the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG) has full access to the activities, programs and operations of the Intelligence Community? Will you ensure that the ICIG is notified of new programs and policies or significant changes in existing programs and policies?

I will ensure the ICIG has access to all information necessary permitted by the National Security Act of 1974 to enable their activities.

Workforce protections

QUESTION 168: Will you commit to submitting to the Committee all ODNI guidelines and regulations relating to employment status and protections and any modifications thereto, as well as any CIA guidelines and regulations that apply to ODNI personnel pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m)?

If confirmed, I will determine what guidelines and regulations fall within the scope of the Committee's request and can be appropriately provided. I will work in good faith to ensure the Committee receives responsive information.

QUESTION 169: Do you believe the DNI can ever take adverse actions against personnel without regard to such guidelines and regulations? If yes, do you commit to notifying the Committee whenever doing so?

My understanding is that because of the unique nature of the agency and the inherent sensitivity of working with classified information, the DNI has certain broad authorities with respect to personnel, including the authority to terminate the employment of an employee when necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. My understanding is also that such authorities may, in at least some circumstances, be exercised without regard to procedural steps otherwise set forth in agency regulations.

I am committed to ensuring that ODNI meets its obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed.

QUESTION 170: Will you commit to notifying the Committee when exercising authorities to convert positions in the competitive service to the excepted service or create new excepted service positions under 50 U.S.C. § 3024(u)?

I am committed to ensuring that ODNI meets its obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed.

Congress

QUESTION 171: In December 2024, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General released “A Review of the Department of Justice’s Issuance of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and Members of the News Media.” The OIG concluded that the Department’s actions “implicated the constitutional rights and authorities of a co-equal branch of government.” It further stated:

“[W]e believe that using compulsory process to obtain such records when based solely on the close proximity in time between access to the classified information and subsequent publication of the information—which was the case with most of the process issued for non-content communications records of congressional staff in the investigations we examined—risks chilling Congress’s ability to conduct oversight of the executive branch because it exposes congressional officials to having their records reviewed by the Department solely for conducting Congress’s constitutionally authorized oversight duties and creating, at a minimum, the appearance of inappropriate interference by the executive branch in legitimate oversight activity by the legislative branch. Moreover, even non-content communications records—such as those predominantly sought here—can reveal the fact of sensitive communications of Members of Congress and staffers, including with executive branch whistleblowers and with interest groups engaging in First Amendment activity.”

- A.** Do you agree with the OIG’s concerns that the collection of communications records of congressional Members and staff raises constitutional concerns, particularly when, as in this case, the collection

was based solely on those Members' and staff's exercise of their constitutionally authorized oversight duties? If yes, how would you respond to a proposal to collect such records in a similar situation?

Separation of powers is one of the bedrock principles of our Constitution, and I agree with the OIG's concerns that collecting congressional Members and staff communication records based solely on their exercise of their oversight duties raises constitutional concerns. As I've demonstrated during my time serving as a U.S. Attorney, the executive branch's use of law enforcement authorities and use of compulsory process should be used carefully and judiciously, and in a matter consistent with the Constitution, to protect the roles and independence of our co-equal branches in the government.

- B.** Do you support the policy changes described in the OIG Review? Do you believe further policy changes should be made?

Yes, I support policy changes meant to ensure that such Constitutional concerns are considered and respected.

- C.** Do you agree that Congress should be notified prior to any such collection? If yes, who in Congress should be notified?

Yes, I believe that Congress should be notified, when appropriate; although the details of who will be notified and when will depend on the nature of the investigation.

- D.** Do you agree that the government should inform the judge issuing an order for compulsory process or a non-disclosure order that the targets are congressional Members or staff so that the judge can consider the constitutional implications?

Yes, I agree it is important to inform the judge issuing an order of the pertinent facts, including if targets are congressional Members or staff and whether the information sought involves their official duties so that the judge can consider the Constitutional implications of such an order.

Watchlisting

QUESTION 172: During her confirmation process, DNI Gabbard wrote:

“Ensuring fairness and protecting civil liberties in watchlisting programs is critical to maintaining public trust while safeguarding national security. To prevent misuse, I would advocate for clear, evidence-based criteria for watchlisting American citizens, robust oversight mechanisms, and regular audits to ensure no one is listed based on First Amendment-protected activities like free speech or political affiliation. Additionally, I would work to enhance the redress process by improving the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) to ensure timely and transparent resolution of complaints and exploring independent review panels to provide impartial oversight and due process. These measures would ensure watchlisting programs balance national security concerns with the protection of individual rights and provide fair avenues for redress.”

Do you agree, and do you commit to the same reforms?

Yes.

Espionage Act

QUESTION 173: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote:

“In my book, I expressed concerns about aspects of the Espionage Act that could be interpreted as overly broad or vague, potentially infringing on First Amendment rights and due process protections under the Constitution. These concerns primarily relate to its application in cases involving whistleblowers and journalists, where the Act may criminalize the dissemination of information in ways that could suppress legitimate public discourse or accountability. The Espionage Act also does not allow for due process and the right of an American to defend themselves against such charges in a court of law.”

During his confirmation process, ODNI General Counsel Dever agreed with Director Gabbard’s concerns. Do you also agree?

I agree with Director Gabbard's general concerns about infringing on constitutionally protected rights. However, I have full confidence that the U.S. judicial system can properly adjudicate those concerns.

Competitive Advantage

QUESTION 174: The October 7, 2022, Executive Order 14086 on Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities states:

"It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private commercial information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage to United States companies and United States business sectors commercially. The collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States or of its allies or partners."

A. Do you agree with these limitations and should they apply to non-SIGINT activities?

Yes, I support the principle that the IC should focus its collection efforts on national security objectives.

B. Since this is a public policy, will you commit to informing the public of any modifications to the policy?

I understand that amendments to Executive Orders would very likely be made public. With respect to any modifications to other IC element implementing policies, those modifications should be communicated to Congress and, when consistent with national security interests, the public.

QUESTION 175: How will you ensure that authorized economic intelligence activities (e.g., identifying trade or sanctions violations or government influence or direction) are not undertaken in such a way as to advantage certain companies over others?

If confirmed, I would enforce strict adherence to the existing legal frameworks that limit collection and dissemination of intelligence to meet national security objectives, such as Executive Order 12333 and Executive Order 14086. I will also

have the opportunity to consider whether current oversight mechanisms are adequate, and will consider whether any additional requirements are necessary. Finally, I would ensure that the ODNI continues to support and maintain clear policies governing the IC's unbiased intelligence mission, and would prevent any activities that unfairly benefit specific companies or sectors.

QUESTION 176: How would you guard against the use of the Intelligence Community's collection or analytic capabilities to afford a competitive advantage to particular companies or business sectors?

If confirmed, I would enforce strict adherence to the existing legal frameworks that limit collection and dissemination of intelligence to meet national security objectives, such as Executive Order 12333 and Executive Order 14086. I will also have the opportunity to consider whether current oversight mechanisms are adequate, and will consider whether any additional requirements are necessary. Finally, I would ensure that the ODNI continues to support and maintain clear policies governing the IC's unbiased intelligence mission, and would prevent any activities that unfairly benefit specific companies or sectors.

Foreign National Fugitives

QUESTION 177: A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded that "Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United States to Avoid Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process." If confirmed, will you make Saudi efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial process a collection and analytic priority?

If confirmed, I would support making this a priority where the facts justify it and in consultation with the President, while ensuring that intelligence is shared appropriately with those agencies responsible for law enforcement, diplomacy, and accountability.

QUESTION 178: Section 6715 of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act required the FBI Director, in coordination with the DNI, to complete a review for declassification of any information relating to whether any foreign government official has assisted or facilitated any citizen or national of their country in departing the United States while the citizen or national was under

investigation or awaiting trial or sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United States. Upon completion of the review, the FBI Director shall make appropriately declassified information available to the public. The statute requires that the review be completed this month. If confirmed, will you ensure that the IC's contribution to the declassification process is completed within a month and will you report to the Committee on any hold-ups in making the information public?

If confirmed, I will ensure the FBI Director receives timely and effective support from the IC with respect to this effort, and will keep this Committee informed of any obstacles related to public disclosure.

Jeffrey Epstein

QUESTION 179: On November 14, 2025, Donald Trump posted that he would be asking Attorney General Bondi and the Department of Justice to investigate what he referred to as the "Epstein Hoax, involving Democrats, not Republicans" and listed a set of names and institutions. The Attorney General responded by thanking Trump and stating that she had asked you to "take the lead" in the investigation.

A. Please detail your role in the investigation.

At this time, I was serving as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, where I have continued to serve, and this position reports to the Deputy Attorney General. Longstanding Justice Department policy and practice prevent me from confirming or denying the existence or status of an investigation.

B. Who were the specific targets of the investigation and did they correspond with the names listed by Donald Trump?

As stated above, I cannot comment on the existence or status of an investigation.

C. What is the current status of the investigation?

As stated above, I cannot comment on the existence or status of an investigation; while working at DOJ, however, I have consistently welcomed engagement with the victims and their counsels.

QUESTION 180: Please describe your connections to Leon Black, through Sullivan & Cromwell or Apollo Global Management. Black paid Jeffrey Epstein \$170 million over five years, purportedly for tax and estate planning advice, and an additional \$62.5 million as part of a settlement to avoid criminal prosecution in the U.S. Virgin Islands related to his dealings with Epstein. As U.S. attorney, did you initiate or participate in any investigations into Leon Black regarding his dealings with Jeffrey Epstein?

Longstanding Justice Department policy and practice prevent me from confirming or denying the existence or status of an investigation.

QUESTION 181: Please detail your role in the public release of Epstein file documents.

A. Please describe specific decisions to release or withhold documents and your reasons for those determinations.

The Department of Justice detailed the bases for redactions and withholdings in letters from Deputy Attorney General Blanche to Congress on January 30, 2026, and February 14, 2026. I respectfully refer the Committee to the information there.

B. What role, if any, did you play with regard to the public release of documents that included identifying information on victims?

I cannot comment on the deliberative process involved in particular document redaction decisions. While working at DOJ, however, I have consistently welcomed engagement with the victims and their counsels and worked alongside DOJ professionals to protect them. Numerous updates were provided to the presiding District Judge in *United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell*, 20 Cr. 330 (PAE), which were publicly filed in the interest of full transparency and public disclosure.

QUESTION 182: In January, you argued that a judge lacked the authority to appoint a neutral expert to oversee the public release of documents related to Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell. What were your reasons for opposing such an appointment?

I cannot comment on the deliberative process.

U.S. Elections

QUESTION 183: With regard to recent elections in California, you stated: “On the integrity side, we’re doing an absolutely terrible job, and the American people are right to question it.” Do you have any evidence of fraud related to the elections? If not, do you consider it appropriate to encourage Americans to question the integrity of elections that are not fraudulent?

Upholding the integrity of our elections is of paramount importance. If I have the honor of being confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the IC’s mission to thwart election threats is upheld.

QUESTION 184: You have been critical of mail-in voting, asserting that it presents an “opportunity for fraud,” even when no fraud has been demonstrated. You have also said: “Is mail-in voting being used by one group and not another, whether it’s being used honestly or dishonestly? It’s a question now everyone is asking and it’s a question that can be eliminated.” Do you have any evidence that mail-in voting is “being used by one group and not another” in a fraudulent manner? If not, do you believe it is appropriate to encourage Americans to question the integrity of elections that are not fraudulent?

Upholding the integrity of our elections is of paramount importance. If I have the honor of being confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the IC’s mission to thwart election threats is upheld.

QUESTION 185: Do you believe DNI Gabbard’s appearance at the FBI’s January raid of the Fulton County, Georgia, election office was appropriate?

As U.S Attorney, I know that application of law is often fact-specific, so I do not have enough information to speak directly to how ODNI’s authorities applied to that occasion. If confirmed as DNI, I commit that any of ODNI’s work to address the national security threats to our election infrastructure will be conducted in close coordination with the Office of General Counsel and in full compliance with applicable law.

QUESTION 186: Director Gabbard testified that President Trump directed her to appear at the Fulton County raid. If you are confirmed and President Trump directs you to participate in or or attend a raid of a local election office, will you do it?

I'm not going to speculate on a hypothetical situation. But I reaffirm the commitment I've demonstrated throughout my career to the Constitution and the rule of law.

QUESTION 187: Who won the 2020 U.S. presidential election?

Joseph Biden was certified as President by the electors presenting before Congress in January 2021.

QUESTION 188: Do you believe it was appropriate for DNI Gabbard to obtain and examine voting machines from Puerto Rico?

As U.S. Attorney, I recognize that these questions are often fact-specific, and I do not want to speculate on the authorities ODNI previously invoked to engage in specific activities. If confirmed as DNI, I commit that any of ODNI's work to address the national security threats to our election infrastructure will be conducted in close coordination with the Office of General Counsel and in full compliance with applicable law.

The "Settlement Agreement"

QUESTION 189: You have stated that the "Settlement Agreement" in *Trump v. IRS*, and specifically the decision to immunize Donald Trump and his family from a tax audit, was "pretty good for the government." Do you see the decision as fair to American taxpayers, who do not enjoy any such immunity?

As I understand it, there is ongoing activity in that litigation regarding a pending motion to reopen the case. Consistent with longstanding Justice Department policy, it would be inappropriate for me comment on the case under these circumstances. In general, though, nobody should have their tax records inappropriately and illegally disclosed and should have recourse available to them.

QUESTION 190: Do you believe it was appropriate to create a \$1.8 billion fund for payments, including potentially to people convicted of crimes related to the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol?

As noted above, there is ongoing activity in that litigation regarding a pending motion to reopen the case. Consistent with longstanding Justice Department policy, it would be inappropriate for me comment on the case under these circumstances. I do not condone attacks on law enforcement.

QUESTION 191: Do you support President Trump's decision to pardon individuals convicted of assaulting law enforcement officers on January 6, 2021?

I have not reviewed the evidence in those cases.

Other

QUESTION 192: What was your position with regard to the firing of Maurene Comey and what actions did you take, if any, with regard to the firing?

I will not disclose private Executive Branch deliberations. However, if confirmed as DNI, I commit to you and the IC workforce that I will exclusively consider professional qualifications in all personnel decisions.

QUESTION 193: What role did you play, if any, in deciding to prosecute former New York City Comptroller and congressional candidate Brad Lander for allegedly blocking an elevator while seeking access to immigrant detention facilities?

Mr. Lander and a group of others were issued citations by Federal Protective Services for said violation; the Justice Department offered everyone involved the same disposition: If they would agree to not commit a federal crime on federal property for a period of six months, the citation would be dismissed. Everyone except Mr. Lander agreed. Instead, he proceeded to trial, as is his right. We respect the findings of the Court and we are proud of the professionalism and care that the women and men of this Office take with every single case, every single day.