

Department of State Intelligence and Research Mission and Resources

The Department of State's Office of Intelligence and Research (INR) conducts all-source analysis, coordinates with the Intelligence Community (IC) on intelligence collection, and conducts analytic outreach to the private sector, academia, and non-government organizations.

QUESTION 1: What do you believe are currently the highest priority national security and foreign policy issues for INR?

Bearing in mind that I am not currently working in INR, I see three key priorities in the context of overall Administration national security and foreign policy priorities: providing analysis to support policymaking in a time of growing rivalry with China; focusing more on our own near-abroad; and positioning to support a renewed emphasis on commercial diplomacy.

Although the United States remains the most powerful country in the international system, China now possesses the capability to contest U.S. interests across military, economic, technological, and diplomatic domains in ways that would have been difficult to anticipate a generation ago. State Department leaders must contend with expanding Chinese influence in international organizations, key regions, and critical sectors of the global economy. Understanding China has always been important; today, it requires sustained, forward-looking analysis of Beijing's military capabilities, strategic intent, internal political dynamics, and willingness to assume risk.

Second, consistent with the National Security Strategy, I believe it will be important for INR to strengthen its analytic capacity on Western Hemisphere affairs and if confirmed this will be a priority of mine. As the Secretary of State places increased focus on the Western Hemisphere, if confirmed I will work to see that INR ensures it is properly resourced and analytically prepared to provide timely, rigorous assessments that inform and support Department policy deliberations.

Finally, I believe INR should be prepared to support robust commercial diplomacy. At the heart of nearly every one of our most important political and military relationships is a commercial partnership. In many cases, those partnerships are undergoing profound changes. The State Department is at the forefront of some of this work. If confirmed I will focus on enabling INR to be ready to support it through economically and commercially savvy analyses.

QUESTION 2: What unique role does INR's analysis play, as compared to the analysis produced by other IC agencies?

In my view, INR occupies a distinctive role within the IC because of its size, structure, and institutional culture. Its relatively small analytic cadre, deep regional and functional expertise, close engagement with Department leadership, and long-standing tradition of alternative analysis collectively distinguish it from larger intelligence organizations.

INR's unique contribution lies in combining strategic perspective, close support to diplomacy, and disciplined analytic independence—providing the Secretary and the broader IC with insight that is both policy-relevant and intellectually rigorous.

QUESTION 3: If confirmed, how would you focus INR's resources to achieve the priorities listed in Question 1 and ensure that State Department policymakers have sufficient intelligence support?

If confirmed, I would begin by conducting a review of how INR's analytic resources are currently allocated across regions and functional issues.

My approach would be consultative but outcome oriented. I would also intend to work closely with Department leadership and the policy bureaus to ensure that INR's analytic output is responsive to evolving policy timelines without sacrificing independence or tradecraft standards. Understanding where policymakers perceive analytic gaps is essential to allocating resources effectively.

Finally, if confirmed, I would prioritize workforce development—ensuring that analysts have the training, subject-matter expertise, and cross-functional exposure needed to integrate political, economic, military, and technological factors. Given INR's size, flexibility and intellectual agility are critical advantages. Resource decisions should reinforce those strengths, rather than disrupt them unnecessarily.

My goal would be to align resources with mission requirements through careful assessment and measured adjustments, ensuring that INR remains both strategically focused and institutionally stable, while at the same time preserving continuity where possible.

QUESTION 4: If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure that INR analysts have access to all sources of information available to the IC?

Ensuring that INR analysts have appropriate access to the full range of IC reporting is essential to delivering rigorous and timely analysis and if confirmed that will be a priority of mine. Historically, access challenges have arisen from information technology constraints, evolving compartmentation structures, and the growing complexity of IC data environments. These challenges are not unique to INR, but they have expressed themselves in particularly acute ways.

If confirmed, I would make it an early priority to assess whether INR analysts have consistent, reliable access to the intelligence necessary to fulfill their mission, while fully respecting the need-to-know principle and the imperative to protect sources and methods. That assessment would include consultation with the rest of the INR leadership team, Department security officials, and relevant counterparts at ODNI and across the IC.

Where gaps are identified, I would work collaboratively with IC partners to address technical, policy, or procedural barriers to access.

QUESTION 5: If confirmed, how would you ensure INR analysts provide independent analysis and assessments? How would you ensure that differing assessments are incorporated in final analyses?

INR's credibility rests on its reputation for independent, analytically rigorous assessments. If confirmed, I would regard protecting that tradition one of my core responsibilities. Leaders set the tone, and it is essential that analysts understand they are expected to present evidence-based judgments candidly, even when those judgments complicate decision-making.

To ensure independence, I would reinforce strong tradecraft standards, including clear sourcing, transparent reasoning, and appropriate confidence levels in analytic judgments.

With respect to differing assessments, policymakers are best served when legitimate analytic disagreements are clearly articulated. When evidence supports multiple plausible interpretations, those differences should be reflected, along with the reasoning and confidence behind each judgment. This can be done in a structured and disciplined manner—through confidence levels, alternative analysis, or clearly delineated dissenting views.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure analysts feel empowered to present uncomfortable facts and assessments when warranted, but understand that the purpose of intelligence is to provide clear-eyed analysis that enables policymakers to make informed decisions. A culture that encourages respectful, rigorous disagreement ultimately strengthens both INR and its relationship with its customers.

QUESTION 6: Whom do you consider to be INR's primary customers, and if confirmed, how would you direct INR's analytical resources to fulfill its mission to those different customers?

While daily priorities may vary, I believe INR's primary institutional responsibility is to support the Secretary of State and Department leadership with timely, policy-relevant intelligence. The Secretary and Department principals rely on INR to provide clear, forward-looking assessments that inform strategic decisions and diplomatic engagement. Ensuring that leadership receives high-quality intelligence support—through written products, briefings, and real-time analytic input—must remain INR's first priority.

At the same time, INR's customer base extends throughout the Department. Assistant Secretaries and other bureau leaders translate strategic guidance into operational policy, and they depend on detailed, grounded analysis to assess feasibility, risk, and timelines.

INR also serves desks and overseas posts. Frontline diplomats both benefit from intelligence-driven insight and contribute valuable context drawn from direct engagement with foreign counterparts. Strengthening this two-way exchange enhances analytic depth and ensures that reporting from the field informs strategic assessments.

Beyond the Department, INR plays an important role within the broader Intelligence Community. Its participation in interagency products and National Intelligence Estimates ensures that diplomatic insight is integrated into community-wide assessments. Resource allocation decisions should therefore account not only for Department needs, but also for INR's responsibility to contribute constructively to interagency analytic efforts.

In directing INR's analytical resources, if confirmed, my goal would be to balance these obligations—prioritizing senior leadership support while preserving sufficient depth across regional and functional portfolios to sustain high-quality analysis for the Department and the Intelligence Community as a whole.

QUESTION 7: If confirmed, how do you envision directing and resourcing INR offices to exchange analyses with the private sector to benefit the IC with outside expertise?

Engagement with academia and the private sector, conducted in accordance with law and with appropriate security safeguards, remains an important means of strengthening analytic rigor. Exposure to external scholarship, technical expertise, and market experience can help reduce intellectual insularity and improve the quality of intelligence assessments.

INR has historically benefited from structured outreach mechanisms that enabled responsible engagement with outside experts. Organizational approaches may evolve over time, but the underlying objective—ensuring analysts have access to diverse, high-quality perspectives—remains essential. If confirmed, I would work within existing authorities and in coordination with Department leadership to ensure that INR continues to engage responsibly with academic and private-sector experts in ways that enhance analytic quality while fully protecting sources, methods, and counterintelligence equities.

In areas such as emerging technologies, supply chains, and global capital markets, much of the most current technical and practical knowledge resides outside government. Carefully structured engagement—whether through conferences, wargames, cleared discussions, or other appropriate mechanisms—can help analysts better understand these dynamics. Such engagement must be disciplined, transparent, and consistent with security requirements.

My objective, if confirmed, would not be to recreate any particular organizational model, but to ensure that INR maintains robust, properly governed channels for analytic outreach. Done responsibly, such engagement is a powerful means of enriching analysis and improving the quality of the intelligence support we provide to policymakers.

QUESTION 8: If confirmed, will you commit to reviewing the management of Department of State information technology networks for which INR is responsible?

Yes. If confirmed, I would continuously review the management and performance of the information technology systems for which INR has responsibility.

Reliable, secure, and interoperable information technology is essential to INR's analytic mission. Analysts must be able to access relevant intelligence reporting, collaborate effectively, and produce timely assessments without unnecessary technical barriers. At the same time, any IT modernization effort must fully protect classified information and comply with Department and IC security requirements.

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Department's Chief Information Officer, and relevant IC partners to assess current system performance, identify persistent gaps, and determine where improvements are both operationally necessary and fiscally responsible. My objective would be to ensure that INR's IT infrastructure supports analytic productivity, secure information sharing, and integration with broader IC systems.

QUESTION 9: What do you believe is the State Department's role in informing covert action?

The National Security Act of 1947 states that covert action must support U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. The Secretary is responsible for advising the White House on foreign policy – and as such, I believe State's role is to advise on the foreign policy implications of such actions.

QUESTION 10: If confirmed, what do you envision your role will be in ensuring that covert action activities undertaken by other elements of the intelligence community align with and advance U.S. foreign policy goals?

The Assistant Secretary for INR serves as the Secretary's principal intelligence advisor. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Secretary receives timely information relating to developments in both existing and proposed covert action programs. My objective would be to ensure the Secretary is well positioned to provide counsel to the White House on the implications of such programs for U.S. foreign policy.

Congressional Oversight

QUESTION 11: What do you understand to be the obligation of the Assistant Secretary of State to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities?

As the head of an Intelligence Community (IC) element, the Assistant Secretary for INR has an obligation to operate in accordance with the National Security Act, which requires that the congressional intelligence committees be kept "fully and currently informed" of intelligence activities, including significant anticipated activities, subject the applicable Executive Branch confidentiality interests.

If confirmed, I would work within established executive branch processes to ensure that INR fulfills its responsibilities consistent with that statutory standard. This includes supporting appropriate notification and engagement with the intelligence committees on matters involving INR's analytic contributions, participation in interagency intelligence products, and any activities that bear directly on congressional oversight responsibilities, subject to applicable Executive Branch confidentiality interests.

At the same time, I would ensure that all engagement with Congress is conducted in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other relevant IC partners, and the

Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs, consistent with classification requirements and the protection of sources and methods.

In addition to intelligence activities, I recognize that Congress has a legitimate oversight responsibility. If confirmed, I would be committed to maintaining communication with the appropriate committees, while fully respecting applicable legal authorities and security obligations.

Relationship with the Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 12: If confirmed, how would you manage and achieve INR's obligations to the Secretary of State, to the Director of National Intelligence, and to the broader IC, including disparate responsibilities for each obligation?

If confirmed, as Assistant Secretary for INR, I would be responsible for fulfilling three interrelated obligations: to the Secretary of State and Department leadership, to the Director of National Intelligence, and to the broader IC as a collaborative analytic partner.

First, INR's core mission is to provide the Secretary and Department leadership with timely, policy-relevant intelligence support. That includes delivering independent analysis, participating in policy deliberations, and ensuring that diplomatic realities inform intelligence assessments.

Second, as the head of an IC element, I would operate consistent with the authorities of the DNI as established in the National Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). That includes adherence to community-wide analytic standards, participation in coordinated products, compliance with reporting requirements, and support for IC priorities.

Third, INR has a responsibility to the broader IC as a contributor of unique diplomatic and regional expertise. I believe that INR strengthens the IC by integrating political, economic, and diplomatic insight to enhance the overall quality of Community analysis.

In practice, these obligations are likely to be mutually reinforcing, not contradictory. By working constructively within IC processes, respecting statutory authorities, and maintaining close engagement with Department leadership, the INR Assistant Secretary can help ensure unity of effort across the intelligence and diplomatic domains. Where tensions arise, they should be addressed through established interagency mechanisms and in accordance with applicable law.

QUESTION 13: If confirmed, what would be your role in mediating any differences that should arise between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of State regarding National Intelligence Program resource allocation?

In practice, these issues are highly contextual. However, based on my understanding, under the IRTPA, the DNI has responsibility for developing and determining the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget, while Department heads execute funds within their respective elements. If confirmed, as Assistant Secretary for INR, I suspect my role would not be to independently

arbitrate disputes, but to represent INR's mission requirements clearly and constructively within established budget processes, subject to the direction of the Secretary and Executive Branch interagency processes.

Operational Support to Policymakers

QUESTION 14: Do you believe that INR has the structure and resources necessary to support United States foreign policy and Department of State policymakers? Upon what factors do you base your answer?

Until confirmed I will not have operational details on INR, but I believe INR has long been recognized for its analytic excellence, deep expertise, and efficient structure. Its relatively small size encourages breadth of perspective and strategic perspective, and its analysts have consistently delivered high-quality, policy-relevant intelligence support to the Department and the broader IC.

That said, the international environment has evolved significantly over the past three decades. Strategic competition, geoeconomic statecraft, technological change, and shifts in military posture require continuous reassessment of analytic focus and resource alignment. If confirmed, I would review whether current structures and portfolio assignments optimally reflect today's national security challenges.

With respect to resources, I believe INR's strength lies in its people. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Bureau retains and develops top-tier analytic talent is essential. I would examine whether existing career pathways and promotion structures adequately reward high performance and subject-matter depth, and whether additional professional development or senior analytic tracks could enhance retention and mission effectiveness.

Ultimately, if confirmed, my approach would be evolutionary rather than disruptive—i.e., building on INR's institutional strengths while ensuring that its structure and workforce remain aligned with contemporary foreign policy demands.

QUESTION 15: Please describe what you believe should be INR's role in supporting United States Chiefs of Mission?

I understand INR plays an important role in supporting United States Chiefs of Mission (COMs) by providing timely, policy-relevant intelligence analysis that informs diplomatic engagement and protects U.S. personnel and interests abroad.

As the President's senior representative in-country, I understand that a COM is responsible for coordinating U.S. government activities overseas and advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives. INR supports that mission by delivering forward-looking political, economic, military, and strategic assessments tailored to the needs of posts. Effective support requires sustained engagement between Washington-based analysts and relevant embassy sections—to ensure analysis reflects local realities and evolving conditions.

On the security front, INR complements the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's tactical threat assessments by contributing broader strategic context. While DS focuses on immediate threats to personnel and facilities, I believe INR can integrate regional dynamics, political trajectories, and escalation risks into a longer-term outlook that helps inform resource allocation and risk management decisions.

Support to COMs is not one-directional. Embassy reporting and on-the-ground diplomatic engagement provide invaluable insight that strengthens INR's analytic work and contributes to the broader IC. Encouraging structured feedback loops between posts and analysts enhances both analytic rigor and policy relevance.

If confirmed, I would prioritize strengthening these connections, including exploring opportunities for analysts to gain field experience through temporary duty assignments, consistent with mission needs and available resources. Deep familiarity with in-country dynamics enhances the quality of analysis provided to COMs and Department leadership alike.

QUESTION 16: Is Chief of Mission concurrence required for intelligence activities, such as certain signals intelligence and cyber operations, which affect the country in question but may not be conducted by members of the U.S. mission? What should be the role of INR in ensuring that Chiefs of Mission are aware of these activities?

Although I am not confirmed and unable to comment on sensitive operational matters, I feel it appropriate to note that this is a long-standing question that may involve overlapping authorities, including military elements operating under Title 10, IC elements operating under Title 50, and Chief of Mission (COM) personnel operating under COM authority. That noted, in most instances, COM concurrence would be required for intelligence activities under the "unity of command" principle. INR has a role to play in keeping Department leadership and our Chiefs of Mission overseas informed of developments in this area, in accordance with established legal and bureaucratic practices.

QUESTION 17: Should INR have a role in resolving any disagreements that arise between Chiefs of Mission and the Department of Defense? If so, please describe.

Though not now involved in these operational matters, in my opinion INR is an analytic organization and does not have an operational or adjudicative role in resolving disputes between COM and the Department of War (DoW). Such matters are governed by established statutory authorities and interagency processes.

If confirmed, I would ensure that INR remains focused on delivering rigorous analysis while respecting the statutory roles of Chiefs of Mission, the DoW, and the National Security Council.

Diplomatic Reporting

QUESTION 18: Section 1.8 of Executive Order 12333 tasks the Secretary of State with transmitting reporting requirements and advisory taskings of the IC to Chiefs of Mission and

disseminating reports received from U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. What should INR's role be in identifying intelligence gaps that could be addressed through diplomatic reporting, conveying taskings and ensuring the dissemination of diplomatic reporting, conveying taskings and ensuring the dissemination of diplomatic reporting throughout the Department of State and the IC?

While I am not now involved in this operational issue, in my opinion, INR should engage relevant entities that govern HUMINT work to ensure alignment between our national intelligence strategies and our diplomatic and national security objectives. While I understand that the IC cannot task the Department, INR does advocate for diplomatic reporting that can help fill information gaps not only for State policymakers, but in service of interagency goals as well. If confirmed, I will continue INR's role in championing diplomatic reporting for the benefit of the entire USG.

With respect to distribution of diplomatic reporting, I understand there are well established mechanisms in the Department and the IC to distribute the Department's diplomatic reporting to those who need to see it. While I believe responsibility for the distribution of diplomatic reporting lies outside of INR, if I am confirmed and become aware of problems with distribution, I would certainly seek to resolve them.

Personnel and Management

QUESTION 19: If confirmed, what modifications (if any) do you envision for INR personnel, in terms of hiring, structure, promotion, and retention?

INR's greatest strength is its people. For a relatively small bureau to provide global, cross-domain analytic coverage in support of the Secretary and Department leadership, it must consistently attract, develop, and retain exceptional talent. If confirmed, I would focus on three personnel priorities: career development, recruitment and skills alignment, and workforce support.

First, I would examine whether current promotion structures adequately reward analytic excellence. Ensuring upward mobility for top-performing analysts is essential to retention and institutional continuity.

Second, I would review hiring practices to ensure that INR is recruiting analysts with the mix of regional, economic, technological, and military expertise required to understand today's strategic environment. Workforce planning should reflect evolving mission priorities while preserving depth in enduring issue areas.

Third, retention is directly affected by the work environment. Analysts must have reliable access to information technology systems and the tools necessary to perform their duties efficiently. Addressing persistent IT challenges and improving system interoperability are not only operational priorities, but also important signals that the work of analysts is valued.

My overall approach would be evolutionary—building on INR’s strong analytic culture while ensuring that personnel policies, professional development pathways, and workplace infrastructure remain aligned with the Department’s mission and the expectations of the IC.

QUESTION 20: Please describe any specific goals you would have to improve INR.

If confirmed, I would focus on three goals to strengthen INR’s long-term analytic excellence: deepening subject-matter expertise, enhancing structured engagement with outside expertise, and strengthening recruitment and retention of top analytic talent.

First, I believe sustained expertise is built through disciplined, in-depth research in addition to responsive, current intelligence production. INR must continue to provide timely support to policymakers, but it should also create space for analysts to pursue longer-term research projects that deepen regional, economic, military, and technological understanding. Encouraging a diversity of analytic products—including longer-form assessments—strengthens tradecraft, sharpens judgment, and ultimately improves the quality of shorter, policy-driven products. A strong foundation of deep expertise enhances both warning and strategic analysis.

Second, structured engagement with academia and the private sector—conducted within appropriate legal and security frameworks—can inject fresh thinking and help analysts refine their understanding of complex issues, particularly in areas such as economics, emerging technologies, and global markets. My goal would not be to recreate any specific past organizational model, but to ensure that INR maintains disciplined and secure mechanisms for analytic outreach that strengthen its intellectual rigor.

Third, retention and recruitment are critical. INR’s mission depends on attracting highly qualified analysts with diverse regional and functional expertise. I would examine whether current career development pathways, compensation structures, and professional opportunities sufficiently reward high performance and subject-matter depth. Enhancing upward mobility for senior analysts and recruiting talent from academia and relevant private-sector fields—particularly in the economic and trade domains—would help ensure that INR remains a leader in the IC.

In sum, my goal would be to preserve INR’s reputation for timely, policy-relevant analysis while investing in the deep expertise and talent development necessary to meet the demands of an increasingly complex international environment.

QUESTION 21: How do you intend to protect whistleblowers, ensure that their complaints are treated appropriately, and that they are protected from reprisals?

I believe the protection of whistleblowers is both a legal obligation and an essential component of institutional integrity. The IC operates under statutory and executive protections designed to ensure that employees and contractors can raise concerns about wrongdoing, waste, fraud, abuse, or legal violations without fear of retaliation. If confirmed, I would undertake three actions:

First, I would ensure that all INR personnel are aware of their rights and of the proper channels for reporting concerns, including the Department of State Inspector General and the Intelligence Community Inspector General. Employees must understand that protected disclosures are lawful and respected.

Second, I would make clear through both policy and practice that retaliation against whistleblowers will not be tolerated. Managers at every level must understand their obligations under applicable law, including protections against reprisal. Allegations of retaliation must be taken seriously and referred to the appropriate investigative channels.

Third, I would support full cooperation with Inspectors General and oversight bodies in reviewing whistleblower complaints. Transparency within established legal frameworks strengthens institutional credibility and public trust.

A healthy organization encourages lawful reporting of concerns and addresses issues promptly and fairly. Protecting whistleblowers is not only about compliance; it is about reinforcing a culture of accountability and integrity within the Bureau.

Professional Experience

QUESTION 22: Please describe your past experiences and interactions with other IC all-source elements.

Throughout my career, I have had extensive engagement with multiple all-source IC elements across analytic, policy-support, and interagency coordination roles.

Early in my career at NSA, I served as a representative to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) on China-related issues, participating in interagency coordination sessions and representing NSA perspectives in all-source settings. I later completed two details to the NIC. As a NIC East Asia Fellow, I served as a primary drafter and coordinator for more than a dozen Community products, leading coordination sessions with representatives from CIA, DIA, NSA, INR, and other IC agencies. During this period, I supported the transition from the DCI to the ODNI structure and helped prepare briefing materials and background papers for senior intelligence leadership participating in the Principals and Deputies Committee processes.

In a subsequent NIC assignment under the Exceptional Analyst Program, I worked in the Long-Range Analysis Unit, where I conducted research on nuclear proliferation decision-making and East Asia security dynamics and contributed to the Global Trends report. These assignments deepened my experience in community-wide strategic analysis and alternative analytic perspectives.

I was later detailed to the National Security Council as an embedded analyst under ODNI, where I provided direct intelligence support to the East Asia and Strategic Planning directorates. In that capacity, I engaged closely with multiple IC elements and participated in discussions related to

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) collection priorities in the foreign policy domain.

My experience at INR as a China-Taiwan military analyst further strengthened my familiarity with interagency coordination processes, including participation in NIC products and Presidential Daily Brief coordination.

Outside the analytic sphere, I served as a Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Special Agent. While focused primarily on criminal investigations, I also led an intelligence fusion cell at U.S. Embassy Kabul, coordinating information sharing across interagency partners in a complex operational environment.

I left DSS in 2020 to return to join the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—the Army’s service intelligence center. During my time at NGIC, I authored detailed studies on militancy and intrastate conflict in Asia. In that role, I worked regularly with elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise as well as other partners, including INR and CIA. I also maintained close coordination with Five Eyes counterparts.

Since January of 2025, I have served as the Vice President’s advisor for Asian Affairs and WMD Policy. During my time at the White House, I have had the opportunity to work closely with the all-source analytic community as a consumer of intelligence. Consequently, I have gained a new appreciation for the challenges policymakers face, as well as insight into how analysts can ensure a strong, mutually beneficial relationship with policy customers.

Collectively, these experiences have given me a comprehensive understanding of how all-source elements interact, coordinate analytic judgments, support policymakers, and manage community processes across both strategic and operational contexts.

Questions From Senator Warner

QUESTION 23: In 2025, the State Department underwent a reorganization that impacted every bureau, including INR. Furthermore, in July 2025, the State Department implemented a reduction in force (RIF). The Committee has not received responses to its requests for information on the effect of these events on INR’s staffing and mission. If confirmed, do you commit to providing thorough and timely briefing to the committee on staffing and mission changes at INR, to include fulfilling outstanding requests for information on the reorganization and RIF?

Yes. If confirmed, I commit to providing thorough and timely briefings to the Committee regarding staffing, organizational structure, and mission impacts affecting INR, consistent with applicable law and established executive branch processes.

QUESTION 24: In your responses the questions in the Committee’s background questionnaire, you stated that you currently serve as “Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary for Policy.” The

State Department's public website does not identify such a position. Please identify the Undersecretary for Policy and describe their duties and responsibilities.

My apologies, but that was an error in my submission. I intended to write Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs. I am sorry for any confusion.

QUESTION 25: In your responses to the questions in the Committee's background questionnaire, you stated that you were involved in a "lethal-force encounter" in the District of Columbia in 2014. You also provided a letter from the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, dated November 6, 2015, which states that the United States Attorney's Office "reviewed the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged use of excessive force" associated with this encounter and that the office "declines criminal prosecution." The letter refers the matter to the Department of State for "administrative action." Please provide the Committee with the facts and circumstances associated with this encounter that were reviewed by the United States Attorney's Office. Please also specify any administrative action taken by the Department of State.

On March 18, 2014, while serving as a Diplomatic Security Service Special Agent and Special Deputy United States Marshal assigned to the Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force, I participated in a warrant service operation in Washington, D.C. The operation involved the attempted apprehension of a homicide suspect.

I was assigned, along with a Metropolitan Police Department homicide detective, to secure the rear of the target residence in support of the entry team. At approximately 6:30 a.m., an adult male exited the rear of the residence. My partner directed the individual to return inside. The individual then produced a firearm and discharged it in my direction. My partner and I returned fire. The individual was struck and later pronounced deceased at the scene.

The incident was investigated by the Metropolitan Police Department's Internal Affairs Division and reviewed by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. I refer you to the Department for information about those matters.

In accordance with Department of State procedures, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security conducted an administrative review. I was informed at the end of that review that it had concluded that my actions were consistent with applicable law, Department policy, and my training. Consequently, no disciplinary action was taken.

Questions From Senator Wyden

QUESTION 26: Is the IC obligated to cease intelligence activities that do not have the concurrence of the Chief of Mission, absent presidential direction?

Although I am not confirmed and unable to comment on sensitive operational matters, I feel it appropriate to note that this is a long-standing question that may involve overlapping authorities, including military elements operating under Title 10, IC elements operating under Title 50, and Chief of Mission (COM) personnel operating under COM authority. That noted, in most

instances, COM concurrence would be required for intelligence activities under the “unity of command” principle.

Lethal Force Encounter

QUESTION 27: In your questionnaire, you wrote: “While serving as a law enforcement officer, I was involved in a lethal-force encounter in DC in 2014. An initial agency review determined the shooting was justified and I was returned to duty shortly after the incident. DC prosecutors formerly closed their investigation on November 6, 2015.” Please provide the Committee with copies of any final reports on the incident as well as any Department of Justice letters of declination beyond the 2015 letter already provided.

I do not possess a personal copy of the final administrative investigative report conducted by the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. At the conclusion of the administrative review, I was informed that my actions were consistent with applicable law, Department policy, and my training, and that I was cleared to return to full duty. I was not provided a copy of the final written report.

Upon receiving the Committee’s request, I contacted the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs to determine whether a releasable copy of the final administrative report could be provided to the Committee consistent with applicable privacy, law enforcement, and security considerations. I refer you to the Department for further information.

I was also not provided with any communications from the Department of Justice at that time. I refer you to the Department for this information.

Europe

QUESTION 28: In your article “Greenhouses and Stones: Confronting Europe’s Soft Authoritarianism,” you wrote that “thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of political prisoners rot in the jails of Western Europe.” a. Please provide sources for this data. b. You wrote that “the United Kingdom is a country where people are literally in jail for expressing views the UK government doesn’t like.” Please provide sources for this assertion. c. You wrote of an “illiberal” Europe “ruled by petty bureaucratic elites more interested in retaining power than serving the native populations of the Continent.” What are the “native populations of the Continent”?

A) In the essay, I used the phrase “thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of political prisoners” to underscore what I viewed as a significant and growing pattern of criminal enforcement actions related to expression in certain Western European jurisdictions. The precise number of individuals incarcerated for speech-related offenses across Western Europe is not publicly known. Available data are fragmented, vary by country, and often distinguish between arrests, prosecutions, and custodial sentences. Because there is no consolidated dataset that

categorizes detainees under a uniform definition of “political prisoner,” the exact figure cannot be determined with precision.

That said, publicly available reporting indicates that the scale of enforcement activity is substantial. For example, Freedom House’s *Freedom on the Net 2025* report cites a 2025 freedom of information inquiry reported by *The Times* indicating that more than 12,000 individuals were arrested in 2023 under section 127 of the UK Communications Act 2003 and section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, including arrests related to social media posts. Approximately 10 percent of those cases reportedly resulted in sentencing. Freedom House and other organizations have likewise documented prosecutions in additional Western European states, including Germany, involving online expression, including sharing memes.

Because comprehensive cross-national incarceration data are not available, it is not possible to state with certainty how many individuals are serving custodial sentences for expression-related offenses at any given time. The phrase was rhetorical and intended to highlight the scale of enforcement activity under speech-related statutes across multiple European jurisdictions, not to assert a verified aggregate incarceration count.

My commentary was written in a personal capacity as an opinion essay. It does not diminish my view of Europe as a critical U.S. ally and intelligence partner. Over the course of my career, I have worked closely with European counterparts and have deep respect for the importance of transatlantic cooperation.

B) The United Kingdom has enacted and enforces statutes that criminalize certain forms of expression — including online communications deemed “grossly offensive” under the Communications Act 2003 and speech deemed likely to stir up racial or religious hatred under the Public Order Act 1986 — even absent a direct call to violence.

Individuals have received custodial sentences under these laws for social media posts and for other speech that would be considered protected in the United States. For example, the U.S. Department of State’s *2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* for the United Kingdom cited the case of a man sentenced to eight weeks’ imprisonment for posting a meme alleging a link between migrants and knife crime. The same report highlighted the conviction of an individual for engaging in silent prayer within a legally restricted “safe access zone” near an abortion clinic.

Those examples were included in the Department’s discussion of “credible reports of serious restrictions on freedom of expression.”

I want to stress that my views regarding civil liberties trends in the United Kingdom do not diminish my recognition of the UK as one of the United States’ closest allies and most important intelligence partners.

C) In that passage, I was referring to the longstanding political communities of European democratic states — the citizenries whose governments derive their legitimacy from them.

Questions of national identity are complex and have been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. Most serious scholarship recognizes that identity is multidimensional and historically contingent. It encompasses civic membership, shared political institutions, cultural traditions, language, and collective memory.

My own experience has reinforced that understanding. Although my ancestors came from Britain, when I lived there as a graduate student, it was immediately clear to everyone I encountered that I was not British. I was unmistakably American in my speech, my tastes, my humor. That experience underscores for me that national belonging must be rooted in shared civic and cultural life.

The point I was attempting to make in the essay was that democratic institutions must maintain legitimacy and responsiveness across the political community as it exists at a given time. In most cases, the cultural communities of the Continent are the product of centuries of connection with a place and with a civic community. I was not advancing an exclusionary or ethnically defined conception of citizenship, but rather emphasizing the importance of democratic accountability and the protection of social cohesion in historical, cultural communities.

Chief of Mission Authorities

QUESTION 29: 22 U.S.C. § 3927 states that “Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country...” Absent direct intervention from the President or the National Security Council, is the Intelligence Community obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not limited to collection activities, covert action and liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of mission?

Although I am not confirmed and unable to comment on sensitive operational matters, I feel it appropriate to note that this is a long-standing question that may involve overlapping authorities, including military elements operating under Title 10, IC elements operating under Title 50, and Chief of Mission (COM) personnel operating under COM authority. That noted, in most instances, COM concurrence would be required for intelligence activities under the “unity of command” principle.