

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Prehearing Questions for
Matthew Kozma
upon his nomination to be the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security**

Role and Responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis

QUESTION 1: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which mandated I&A's responsibility for critical infrastructure analysis, terrorism, and the other missions of DHS more broadly. What is your understanding of the history and purpose, as established by Congress, of the office of the Under Secretary for I&A in DHS?

1. In the aftermath of the national tragedy of September 11th, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishing the Department of Homeland Security and what is now the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to protect America from further terrorist attacks. Primary functions established for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis include the collection, integration, assessment, and timely sharing of relevant information and other intelligence necessary to detect and analyze threats, mitigate vulnerabilities, and deter, prevent, preempt or otherwise thwart and respond to terrorist attacks against the United States of America. I&A serves a critical role in coordinating with partners and helping to prevent catastrophic harm against the American Homeland as a nexus between federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial Governments and Private Sector entities by engaging intelligence community, homeland security, defense, cyber, and law enforcement capabilities. In concert with both the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence, I&A's vigilance for analytical acumen and active information and intelligence sharing has been vital to ensure critical infrastructure protection, coordinated anti-terrorism action, and emergency preparedness and response assistance.

QUESTION 2: What do you understand I&A's current mission to be?

2. As the primary intelligence and analytical arm of the Department of Homeland Security, I&A's mission centers on enabling robust, relevant, timely, and corroborated intelligence and information sharing to the Department and its partner stakeholders, spanning from the President and Secretary down to local law enforcement officials, which is vital to keep our Homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

QUESTION 3: In your opinion, does I&A have a focused and well-defined mission consistent with the purpose Congress originally intended?

3. Although I am not fully privy to I&A's current mission scope and execution, should I be confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure alignment with the focused mission roles and responsibilities originally intended and entrusted by Congress for the protection of the American Homeland.

QUESTION 4: What should I&A's mission be in the present and into the future?

4. I&A's mission, now and in the future, must remain centered on preventing terrorism and catastrophic harm to the American citizenry and Homeland. Armed with analytical acumen, I&A's vital vigilance against those who would do us harm necessitates an agile ability to adapt to their malicious intent, methods, and actions regardless of tactic, technique, or technology.

QUESTION 5: Please describe the relative prioritization of I&A's national intelligence mission and its mission to support DHS? How should resource allocations, administrative structures, and long-term planning reflect that prioritization?

5. Uniquely positioned, charged, and empowered to enable both Department and national intelligence missions and to span across federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and private sector entities, I&A must ensure a balanced approach constantly assessing and optimizing available resources to maximize impact and effectiveness, particularly given the severity of impacts to mission failure. Should I be confirmed, resource allocation, management, and planning will be important areas to quickly assess and execute to ensure optimal application of assigned resources to meet both DHS and IC mission priorities.

QUESTION 6: How should I&A's role be distinct from the analytic role played by other members of the Intelligence Community (IC), such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)?

6. While I&A complements others' analytic capabilities and missions, I&A's distinct responsibilities to assess and actively thwart terrorist threats against the Homeland, protect critical infrastructure, and ensure information sharing particularly with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and private sector entities uniquely differentiate the office from other IC elements including the FBI and NCTC which are empowered with law enforcement and non-domestic counterterrorism analysis, assessment, tracking, coordination, and planning.

QUESTION 7: How will you measure and define the success of I&A analytic production? Is I&A currently meeting those standards?

7. Although not always publicly acknowledged or appreciated, I&A's mission success must be measured on the value of the analytic insights transformed into actionable information and intelligence applied to mission success, namely when terrorist plots are foiled and the American Homeland is protected. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to assessing to what analytic standards and production level I&A is currently executing against as we seek to further raise proficiency, timeliness, and effectiveness for Homeland Security.

QUESTION 8: Please describe areas in which you believe I&A's authorities are insufficient, unclear or exceed what is necessary or proper for I&A's mission.

8. From the onset, Congress has clearly defined the roles and responsibilities and authorities for I&A. Should I be confirmed, once in the position and equipped with direct insights, and should I identify any authorities that may appear unclear or insufficient, I look forward to seeking your guidance and, if necessary, requesting your assistance to enact a remedy suitable and necessary to lawfully execute I&A's mission.

QUESTION 9: If confirmed, one of the responsibilities you will have as DHS's Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) is to exercise leadership and authority over intelligence policy throughout the Department. This means you will have a role in the activities of other, non-NIP, DHS operational components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Coast Guard, and Secret Service, all of which have their own non-NIP intelligence functions.

- A.** Does the Under Secretary for I&A have the authority to integrate intelligence activities and analysis effectively from these various components?
- B.** What is your assessment of efforts to date to improve integration between I&A and the other components?
- C.** Should the positions of Under Secretary for I&A and CINT be separated?

9.

9a) Consistent policy led by the Department of Homeland Security's Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) is imperative to ensure synchronized operations and complementary implementation regardless of the source of each specific intelligence component's functions and funding. Presently, given my limited external insights, it appears that the CINT is entrusted with the requisite authority to develop and implement policy across the department under the direction of the President and the Secretary. Should I be confirmed, once in the seat and having had a closer look at the myriad of activities across the department and the resulting analysis effectiveness, I look forward to being able to report back to this Committee and Congress my assessment and any recommendations for your consideration.

9b) Presently, I can only submit my currently limited external perspective. My initial perspective is that there is always room for improvement and that continued efforts are always needed to further refine and strengthen effectiveness between and across all components. Given the severity of the threats against America, we must be vigilant always constantly adapting, adopting, and amplifying our approaches to enhance the Department's missions and protect Americans. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to assessing current efforts and inviting candid feedback on how to improve integration between I&A and the other components.

9c) No

Priorities and Performance

QUESTION 10: Have you discussed with the Secretary of Homeland Security her specific expectations of you, if confirmed as Under Secretary for I&A, and her expectations of I&A as a whole? If yes, please describe those expectations.

10. I have not yet discussed with the Secretary her specific expectations of me, should I be confirmed, or of I&A as a whole. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to discussing and exceeding her expectations of me and I&A to discharge the responsibilities entrusted by law and delegation to the position and organization in the defense and security of our American Homeland.

QUESTION 11: Have you discussed with the Director of National Intelligence her expectations of the relationship between I&A and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other elements of the IC? If yes, please describe those expectations.

11. I have not yet discussed with the DNI her expectations of the relationship between I&A and ODNI and other IC elements.

QUESTION 12: What do you believe are the most critical analytic priorities for I&A today?

12. Should I be confirmed, I would be better informed to specifically address the current critical analytic priorities for I&A. Nevertheless, intelligence collection, exploitation, and analysis pertinent to counter terrorism against the American Homeland and other related malicious activities from any threat, foreign or domestic, that seek to incur destruction or devastation on critical infrastructure, as codified in law, must be top priorities for I&A just as are executing the President's agenda and Secretary's directives.

QUESTION 13: I&A has many customers competing for analytic capacity. Who are I&A's top five customers?

13. I would like to satisfy and exceed the expectations of every I&A customer and partner, not just the "top five." Should I be confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to optimally support and implement the President's agenda with analytic capacity as he is the #1 customer. Regarding all others, I will work with the Secretary to appropriately prioritize support for the Department's statutory missions, interagency activities, and other lawful policies and actions as directed by the Secretary.

Workforce

QUESTION 14: Do you have a human capital strategy to recruit and retain the “best and brightest” to I&A?

14. Having had the privilege of serving in and working across the Intelligence Community, mission execution always is a key factor to attracting and retaining talent. America benefits from analytic talent in a myriad of forms and is needed to dissect and solve often complex, time-sensitive, and threatening challenges. I feel that a successful human capital recipe includes identifying, training and equipping, and empowering talent at all stages – from new, young hires, through new team leaders and managers, and ultimately seasoned trainers, executives, and mentors who can help instruct, guide, and encourage the next generations of analytic talent when leading by example. We need a strong pipeline of talent with diverse analytic competency and networks that can access, integrate, correlate, and craft valuable, actionable intelligence. The underlying mission and approach to protect the American Homeland must be strong enticements to join DHS and, in particular, I&A.

QUESTION 15: Are there any reforms you plan to take to improve the skill set and experience profile of the I&A workforce?

15. As a life-long learner, I have a passion for knowledge and excellence. I feel it is imperative to always seek to advance and better oneself in every way possible. Continued education and training coupled with an openness to new ideas, approaches, perspectives, methods, and tools can only help advance and better oneself and mentor those around. One of my favorite examples is when I trained some newly minted 2 and 3 strippers in the Fast East. Their curiosity to learn, explore and then train others, simply with a bit of encouragement and openness to questions highlight the power that can be unleashed.

QUESTION 16: A significant portion of I&A’s budget has been used for contractor support. What are the appropriate roles for contractor staff within I&A and what, in your view, is the appropriate contractor-to-employee ratio?

16. When appropriate to augment civilian and military staff, contractors can be an amplifying workforce enabler contributing needed expertise, talent, or capacity to meet mission requirements. Presently, given my limited external insights that preclude specific day-to-day I&A operations imperatives satisfaction, I would suggest, reflecting back on prior experience, that contractors may be utilized to augment mission accomplishment as domain experts to further I&A analytical workflows. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to assessing the mix and value of contractors augmenting I&A’s total force team, and in consultation with the Secretary, making adjustments as necessary.

QUESTION 17: Do you believe that contractor staff should serve as intelligence analysts? If yes, under what conditions?

17. Yes, when appropriate to augment civilian and military staff, contractors can be an amplifying workforce enabler contributing needed expertise, talent, or capacity to meet mission requirements including serving as intelligence analysts. Since they support under time-bound, delineated duties per a contract's Statement of Work, their work capacity and obligations are limited and must always be performed per the contract terms and conditions with appropriate government oversight.

QUESTION 18: If confirmed, how will you manage the analysts' career paths to ensure that they have opportunities to serve in DHS or elsewhere in the IC at the senior-most levels?

18. Opportunity for employee career progression is a vital ingredient to attracting and retaining workforce talent. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the responsibility to encourage, educate, and escalate talented analysts, and other I&A employees, at all levels to higher positions with greater responsibility and accountability for further service at DHS, in the IC or elsewhere across the federal government.

QUESTION 19: If confirmed, do you plan to provide additional opportunities for I&A analysts to work directly with I&A customer groups to improve the level of collaboration between I&A analysts and the customers they serve?

19. Adequate I&A analyst manning and talent are critical to ensuring the Department's mission success. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary to ensure I&A manning is rightly sized and aligned to accomplish I&A mission requirements while optimizing customer engagement and collaboration. Although I presently don't foresee, given my current external vantage, any issue with promoting opportunities for I&A analysts to directly work and collaborate with I&A customer groups, I would suggest that ensuring I&A mission accomplishment first must be prioritized.

QUESTION 20: I&A has undergone frequent realignments since it was established. Are you satisfied with the current organization of I&A, or do you intend to reorganize the office? If the latter, how would you organize I&A, if confirmed as Under Secretary for I&A?

20. Understandably, organizational realignments may be implemented to meet changing mission requirements, employment conditions, or other factors necessary to optimize human capital contributions. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary to ensure the I&A's team is structured, equipped, and aligned to optimally execute her guidance for the department and adequately satisfy directives for I&A mission success.

QUESTION 21: Will you commit that, if confirmed, you will seek to recruit, attract, and retain a workforce based on principles of fairness and merit, and without consideration of personal political preferences?

21. I will recruit, attract, and retain a workforce in compliance with the Secretary's guidance and federal labor law.

QUESTION 22: Do you commit to consider professional qualifications in personnel decisions exclusively, without consideration of partisan or political factors?

22. I will ensure personnel decisions are made in compliance with the Secretary's guidance and federal labor law.

QUESTION 23: Would you ever consider an individual's personal political preferences, to include "loyalty" to the President, in making personnel decisions, such as to hire, fire, or promote an individual?

23. I will ensure personnel decisions are made in compliance with the Secretary's guidance and federal labor law.

QUESTION 24: If confirmed, what assurances will you provide to the I&A workforce that personnel decisions will be based exclusively on professional qualifications, performance, and needs and not on personal political preferences?

24. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to leading an office free of discrimination in accordance with federal labor law.

QUESTION 25: Will you impose a political litmus test for I&A employees? Is a political litmus test ever appropriate in determining who can or should work in I&A?

25. I will ensure personnel decisions are made in compliance with the Secretary's guidance and federal labor law.

Fusion Centers and Information Sharing

QUESTION 26: I&A provides support to state and local Fusion Centers, including with I&A representatives to the Centers.

A. Do you believe the current level of Fusion Center staffing by I&A is sufficient? How would you improve the current Fusion Center model?

B. How can Congress measure the effectiveness of Fusion Centers? How do you hold them accountable when each one is uniquely structured and operated by a particular state?

26.

26a) Given dynamic mission needs and priorities, it is highly likely that at any time there is at least one Fusion Center that would benefit from additional staffing and resourcing. Given my limited external perspective, at present, I look forward to the opportunity, should I be confirmed, to assess current Fusion Center staffing, collaboration strategies, and engagement models to realign, reinforce, or remove, as necessary I&A-supplemented resources. Given I&A's mission, and the Department's writ large, robust, reliable, and resilient resource support and engagement is critical to best support state, local, tribal, and territorial governments at and through these geographically aligned Fusion Centers.

26b) Fusion Center measures of effectiveness largely center on the fundamental premise of ensuring public safety and security. Since each Fusion Center is led by a state or municipality that has unique geographic, demographic, psychographic, and topographic characteristics, a one-size-fits-all approach for Congress to assess effectiveness will likely be challenging. However, common threads that promote synchronized command, control and communication, efficient operations, optimized human capital allocation and resource management, and, ultimately, public safety and security are all likely quality key performance and accountability indicators.

I&A's Management, Functions, and Resources

QUESTION 27: What do you believe are the most important management-related challenges facing I&A today?

27. As with any sizable and complex organization, the most important management-related challenges usually include human resource allocation, resource management, operational efficiency, and clear command, control, and communication. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to assessing and addressing all challenges facing I&A today; I anticipate that they will include challenges related to personnel, budgetary, and operational matters.

QUESTION 28: Does I&A tie budgets and financial planning to requirements through a defined and stable long-term budgeting, planning, and programming process? If so, do you have confidence that the process effectively serves its purpose?

28. I don't yet have any specific insights on the Department's, or more specifically I&A's contribution to the financial planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes. Given Congress's authorization, appropriation, and oversight responsibilities, it is imperative that I&A's requests for funding to address mission requirements and enable mission

execution are adequately documented and communicated. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary, this Committee, and Congress to ensure appropriate resources are secured to efficiently and effectively execute I&A's mission requirements.

QUESTION 29: Do you believe DHS I&A should have outcome measures for antiterrorism and intelligence-related programs consistent with those measures established by other government agencies? Please explain.

29. While similarities and overlaps in missions routinely occur across the federal government, a one-size-fits-all approach to metrics often results in misperception or misrepresentation of outcome. Given I&A's unique positioning and statutory responsibilities, as compared to other antiterrorism and intelligence-related programs, mandating exactly the same, or even similar outcome measures, may unfairly place I&A at a disadvantage. Necessarily metrics are important to gauge success, however, some tailoring may be warranted to best ensure alignment with the specific roles and responsibilities entrusted to I&A and the Department of Homeland Security, writ large.

QUESTION 30: How do you intend to measure financial and human capital processes as a part of I&A's performance measures?

30. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Management to ensure that I&A's financial and human capital processes align with and successfully accomplish the President's direction and the Secretary's guidance.

QUESTION 31: What is your view of DHS I&A's size and functions?

31. I&A is entrusted with an awesome responsibility to timely identify and mitigate threats to our American Homeland by ensuring that available information and intelligence is appropriately analyzed, shared, and actionable by all partners, particularly state, local, tribal and territorial, as statutorily authorized. Efficient allocation and application of human and capital resources is critical to optimize I&A contribution to both the Intelligence Community and, more specifically, the Department's mandate to thwart terrorist and other catastrophic threats to the United States.

QUESTION 32: Do you believe that DHS I&A has sufficient personnel resources to carry out its statutory responsibilities effectively? If not, where does I&A require additional personnel resources? If so, where should I&A streamline its personnel?

32. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to assess the current allocation and application of human and capital resources to determine what changes, if any, are needed to most appropriately execute the President's agenda, the Secretary's guidance, and statutorily-mandated missions.

QUESTION 33: What are your views on DHS I&A's intelligence budget in the short-, medium-, and long-term? In what areas should the intelligence budget be modified, and how?

33. I&A's budget must align to efficiently and effectively execute statutory and delegated missions. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Management and quickly assessing the current and proposed financial status to ensure that I&A is adequately resourced to execute the President's agenda and the Secretary's guidance.

QUESTION 34: What reforms are required to ensure that DHS I&A's personnel and resources are in line with I&A's value to the larger IC? Have you discussed these reforms with current IC Leadership?

34. As I am not yet confirmed, I have not yet spoken with the DNI or other IC leaders about any needs or proposals for any reforms relating to I&A.

I&A's Relationship with the Intelligence Community

QUESTION 35: I&A has responsibilities for disseminating information from within DHS to the broader IC.

- A.** What role should I&A play in disseminating information obtained from other elements of DHS to the IC?
- B.** What kinds of information should be so disseminated, and from what elements of the DHS?
- C.** What limitations should apply to such disseminations, if any?

35.

35a) As DHS's representative to the IC, I&A should be the conduit for all exchanges between DHS and other IC elements.

35b) A lack of information sharing across the IC catastrophically led to the vicious terrorist attack on America on September 11th. All salient information concerning threats to the American homeland and critical infrastructure ought to be made available and shared to ensure completeness, correctness, and corroboration in order to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats and activities. Regardless of source, I&A should be the nexus for all DHS exchanges with other IC elements, and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and private sector entities.

35c) Information concerning US persons must be relayed to the FBI and/or state and local law enforcement.

QUESTION 36: Please describe areas in which I&A requires assistance from other IC elements.

36. From prior experience, I anticipate that I&A would likely benefit from all available information and intelligence regardless of IC element source to ensure completeness, correctness, and corroboration focused on protecting the homeland and critical infrastructure from terrorism and other catastrophic and malicious activity. I would assume information and intelligence ranging from GEOINT, SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT, LEO, and Open Sources are needed to optimally execute missions.

QUESTION 37: If confirmed, will you commit to reviewing I&A programs to ensure that they are not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local, or private efforts?

37. Should I be confirmed, to maximize efficiency and effectiveness, I look forward to ensuring that there are no I&A programs contributing to unnecessary redundancy or duplication of effort.

QUESTION 38: How do you envision the relationship between DHS and FBI in providing intelligence support for law enforcement personnel?

38. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to strengthening I&A's operational partnership with the FBI. I&A must be a vital enabler supporting FBI's law enforcement activities; in turn, the FBI must be an enabler for relaying interdicted information and intelligence garnered through their investigations vital to thwarting terrorism and protecting the homeland and critical infrastructure. In short, the working collaboration must be two-way fostered by candor, trust, and sharing.

I&A's Relationship with State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and Private Partners

QUESTION 39: What role should I&A play in disseminating information obtained from other IC elements to state, local, tribal, territorial, and private partners?

39. Pursuant to law, I&A should be the focal point for all information and intelligence exchanges between DHS and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and private sector entities.

QUESTION 40: What is the proper role of I&A in framing requests for information from state and local law enforcement officials, as well as retaining such information and disseminating it to the IC?

40. Although I am not yet confirmed to have specific insights on the policies and procedures regarding Requests For Information (RFI) from state and local partners, I would anticipate that I&A be a systematic clearing house that can readily accept RFIs in a timely and responsive manner, when needed, to broker and amplify background or current intelligence necessary to amplify state and local operations. I would anticipate that, to the maximum extent possible, RFIs would originate through the nearest Fusion Center and, where possible, leverage on-site I&A personnel to triage and reachback to I&A and other IC Intelligence Community capabilities to amplify and further support as needed.

QUESTION 41: If confirmed, what measures would you take to improve the effectiveness of efforts to share information in both directions?

41. Should I be confirmed, I would actively engage with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, particularly through fusion centers, to enhance both professional engagements and IT systems and connectivity. From my vantage, one of the most significant challenges continues to be a lack of reliable, robust, and resilient communication channels to ensure timely, correct, and corroborated information flow, in both directions, that will benefit from both clear procedures for information sharing and the technical infrastructure to enable timely exchange.

QUESTION 42: What types of information (e.g. threat information, infrastructure vulnerability, etc.) are appropriate for sharing?

42. Information salient to countering threats and vulnerabilities should be shared to the maximum extent practicable. When appropriate, for selected individuals who have been granted clearances, and have the requisite need to know and ability to receive the classified information, select classified information may also be approved to be shared. At all times, sources and methods must be protected. Information pertinent to law enforcement operations must also be appropriately controlled and handled.

QUESTION 43: If you are confirmed, what steps will you implement to ensure that I&A private sector customers are provided with timely and relevant intelligence reports?

43. Should I be confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to strengthen the protective posture of America's critical infrastructure in partnership with our private sector partners. I look forward to accessing what is currently working, what could be improved, and then implementing information sharing procedures, communication channels, and safeguards to enhance the timeliness and relevance of intelligence reports. Private sector partners play key roles across a myriad of sectors necessitating vigilance and insights to prevent disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction.

QUESTION 44: Do you intend to work with I&A customers to determine training needs and requests?

44. If confirmed, I look forward to working with I&A customers to determine training needs and requests.

QUESTION 45: If confirmed, what assistance would you expect from state, local, tribal, territorial, and private partners?

45. If confirmed, I look forward to directly collaborating with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners drawing upon their unique field insights, direct engagements, and jurisdiction to help identify, alert, prioritize, and corroborate threats and vulnerabilities back to I&A and, in turn, serve as the primary conduit for promulgating forward critical information and intelligence to local law enforcement and other resources that wouldn't otherwise have awareness or access to thwart, and if necessary, recover from terrorist attacks and other catastrophic events.

I&A's Relationship within DHS Intelligence Enterprise and DHS

QUESTION 46: If confirmed, what assistance would you expect from the rest of DHS, and the other components of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise?

46. As with any team, it is important to benefit from the skill and expertise of others who have specific domain knowledge or competency that collectively add greater value to the sum of the parts. Should I be confirmed, I would expect that I&A be the beneficiary of assistance, when needed, from the rest of DHS and other components of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, just as I would expect I&A to support them. Collaboration benefiting from, but not limited to, technical acumen, human resource amplification, domain experience and other strengths is needed to ensure that DHS as a whole is optimally prepared and equipped to protect the American Homeland from terrorism and other catastrophic threats.

QUESTION 47: What do you believe are the key barriers to enhanced coordination and integration? If confirmed, what steps would you take to overcome these barriers?

47. Too often, I find that organizational success is limited by a lack of clear and concise guidance, a dearth of employee recognition, and antiquated procedures that unnecessarily stifle or inhibit action. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to removing barriers that inhibit coordination and collaboration, instead identifying and realizing workplace efficiencies and setting and promoting a mission-focused atmosphere necessary to vigilantly stay ahead of our adversaries.

QUESTION 48: Do you believe that each DHS component should retain its own law enforcement information gathering and analysis function, or would all DHS components be better suited by having I&A assume these efforts, given its role in facilitating the sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information?

48. Different organizational constructs are purposefully crafted and utilized to optimize operations at a given time to best address prioritized objectives. At times, one construct or another may be preferable. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary, with input from this Committee, to ensure that the most appropriate organizational model is implemented to successfully implement the President's agenda and the Secretary's priorities.

QUESTION 49: Some DHS components have their own individual, non-NIP, intelligence support units that provide operational support to their field elements. How does I&A uniquely augment these efforts?

49. Given my current limited external insights, I understand that I&A provides operational support, as requested and when needed, to augment field elements with specialized insights, expertise, reachback, and authorities to bolster the value, corroboration, and sharing of critical information and intelligence.

QUESTION 50: What process is in place to ensure that I&A does not duplicate the efforts of these intelligence support units?

50. Since I am not yet confirmed, I cannot remark on what process, if any, exists to minimize unnecessary duplication of efforts. Nevertheless, as a proponent of efficiency, I look forward to verifying, should I be confirmed, that roles and responsibilities are clearly delineated for all stakeholders to maximize operational effectiveness, minimize unnecessary duplication and resource expenditure, and enhance total contributions to mission success.

Protection of U.S. Person Privacy

QUESTION 51: Please describe any and all intelligence roles I&A and other, non-NIP, DHS components perform, other than analysis.

51. I&A and other DHS components are responsible for a myriad of activities besides analysis. Of note, I&A is charged with establishing collection priorities and strategies, consulting and engaging with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, including law enforcement entities, and private sector entities, enabling and participating in information sharing with the proviso of ensuring protection from unauthorized disclosure and that material is handled and used only for the performance of official duties, coordinating with the Chief Information Office to ensure secure reliable and interoperable information technology infrastructure, communications, and tools, and

protecting and preparing critical infrastructure from attacks. Other responsibilities across DHS include but are not limited to supporting border protection, immigration and customs enforcement, enabling preparedness and response, and promoting prosperity and economic security.

QUESTION 52: What policies should govern I&A's use, retention, and dissemination of U.S. person information? How should these policies differ, if at all, from other IC elements?

52. I&A must be guided by and in line with US law, EO12333 and subsequent revisions including EO 13470, and NARA standards. Acknowledging select exceptions for circumstances including lawful retainment pursuant to court order, Congressional inquiry, or other exceptions approved by the DNI, retainment should align with NARA standards. As a unique IC member, I&A's mission is to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats and activities and serve as the statutory interface with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. The policies for use and sharing are guided by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, as appropriate.

QUESTION 53: What limitations exist with regard to the collection, retention, and analysis of information related to First Amendment-protected freedoms of speech, association, and religion?

53. In conjunction with US law, the courts, particularly the US Supreme Court, have ruled on exclusions and limitations to protected First-Amendment protected freedoms. EO 12333 and subsequent revisions including EO 13470, DNI, and department policies frame collection, retention, and analysis of information, regardless of source, particularly applicable to DHS's charge to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats and activities.

QUESTION 54: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it is appropriate for I&A to conduct custodial debriefings of U.S. persons?

54. Since I&A is not empowered as a law enforcement authority, it would be improper for I&A to conduct custodial debriefings of US persons. In rare circumstances, I&A specific domain knowledge or expertise could be made available to a law enforcement authority conducting and leading a custodial debriefing that must be requested by that law enforcement authority, appropriately coordinated, and approved prior to I&A providing support, if any.

QUESTION 55: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it is appropriate for I&A to collect (overtly or through publicly available sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate information or intelligence on U.S. persons, where such information or intelligence does not constitute "foreign intelligence"?

55. Given the lawful mandate by Congress to I&A “to identify and mitigate threats to homeland security,” particularly to collect, analyze, and share information related to domestic security threats, including terrorism, it may be appropriate for I&A to collect overtly or through publicly available sources, analyze, produce, and disseminate information or intelligence on malicious actors and terrorists, including those actors and terrorists that are US persons, to ensure that we protect “against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” In those cases, I expect that I&A would collaborate with and hand-off to the FBI or other law enforcement authority to handle and prosecute as necessary.

QUESTION 56: What is the role of I&A in producing analysis on “domestic violent extremists” who have no foreign affiliations but who are looking to engage in potentially criminal behavior in the name of a political ideology?

56. Political ideology is sadly but one catalyst for terrorism. Given the lawful mandate by Congress to I&A “to identify and mitigate threats to homeland security,” particularly to collect, analyze, and share information related to domestic security threats, including terrorism, it may be appropriate for I&A to collect overtly or through publicly available sources, analyze, produce, and disseminate information or intelligence on malicious actors and terrorists, including those actors and terrorists that are US persons, regardless of catalyst, to ensure that we protect “against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” In those cases, I expect that I&A would collaborate with and hand-off to the FBI or other law enforcement authority to handle and prosecute as necessary.

Open Source Reporting

QUESTION 57: What do you believe are the appropriate metrics for determining the value of I&A’s Open Source Intelligence Reports?

57. Any reporting, including Open Source Intelligence Reporting, should be measured by the operational value it brings to bear, in a timely manner, to identify and interdict perceived, potential, or actual threats, and if necessary, aid with recovery to minimize damage and impact. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to work with I&A stakeholders to further increase the value of I&A reporting ensuring continued improvement through enhanced timeliness, comprehensiveness, and corroboration, candid customer feedback, correlation to mission success, and consistency for report crafting and appropriate sharing.

QUESTION 58: What specific substantive expertise should I&A’s open source collectors have?

58. In addition to having an ability to recognize and extract valuable nuggets of information vital to assembling coherent evidence, finding pieces of a trove of seemingly unrelated puzzles and assembling them together, open source collectors and analysts must possess and demonstrate two important abilities. They must both exercise discretion regarding how to properly handle and

share the collected information and also be able to clearly, concisely, and expeditiously package, protect, and communicate the information and intelligence to optimize value to mission success.

Analytic Quality

QUESTION 59: How would you assess I&A's analytical tradecraft, analyst training, editing, quality control measures, approval procedures, and independence from political considerations?

59. Facts are facts. I&A production must be able to succinctly answer the W5H - Who? What? When? Why? Where? and How? Clear, concise, and timely information and intelligence analysis and dissemination is critical to combating threats and ensuring protection of the American Homeland. The goal must always be to reduce and eliminate bias and noise to ensure that signal transmitted for receipt is clear, crisp, and communicated.

QUESTION 60: How does I&A ensure that all I&A analytic reports meet welldefined IC analytic tradecraft standards prior to production of intelligence that is disseminated to the IC?

60. As I am not yet confirmed and don't have specific insights to I&A procedures for quality assurance, I would presume that there is tiered managerial oversight and checks for product quality assurance to ensure standards conformance, including security review, prior to release and dissemination. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to reviewing, and if necessary, correcting or implementing any procedures requisite to ensure analytical excellence and meet product standards.

QUESTION 61: Should I&A be an intelligence aggregator or a value-added provider of analysis? If confirmed, how will you ensure that I&A reflects your vision?

61. I&A should be both an aggregator of all available information and intelligence and be a valued-added analytical force. Given I&A's unique insights and capabilities, nexus across partners - including homeland security, IC, law enforcement, defense, state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners, and other key domestic and international partners - and critical mission responsibilities, I&A must always be an active producer of clear, correct, comprehensive, and corroborated intelligence. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to further challenging our I&A team to consistently be the recognized analytic leader not only for the IC, but for our Nation.

Congressional Oversight

QUESTION 62: Under what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate to brief the Chairman and Vice Chairman and not the full Committee membership?

62. Congressional oversight is critical to ensure appropriate checks and balances. Although the preference is always to communicate with the full Committee membership, there may be times where security warrants communication directly with the Chairman and Vice Chairman only.

QUESTION 63: If confirmed, do you pledge to provide all of I&A's unclassified and classified intelligence products to this Committee?

63. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee and providing all salient products.

Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

QUESTION 64: Please describe the actions you will take, if confirmed, to prevent, detect, and report unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

64. Protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure is vital to ensure national security. Active prevention through regular and routine training, spot checks, and visual reminders can help foster a security-conscious workplace environment. Despite best intentions, training, and reminders, unauthorized disclosure occurs. To detect and remedy unauthorized disclosure as quickly as possible in order to isolate the distribution and limit potential or actual harm from the unauthorized disclosure, I expect that I&A will not only implement office-specific precautions, tools, training, and assessments, but I also anticipate that I&A will, if not already, partner with other entities, including but not limited to, CISA, the IG, the DNI/NCTC, and other security-focused entities to candidly check and report back to me any perceived or actual anomalies for immediate correction. Should unauthorized disclosure occur, the Committee will be notified as soon as practicable.

Executive Order 12333

QUESTION 65: Executive Order 12333 provides the leader of I&A with the authority to “collect (overtly or through publicly available sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate information, intelligence, and counterintelligence to support national and departmental missions.” Do you believe I&A should use this authority to collect information, intelligence, and counterintelligence on Americans, where such information, intelligence, or counterintelligence does not constitute “foreign intelligence”?

65. Pursuant to EO 12333 and subsequent revisions including EO 13470, DNI, and department policies, I&A should be free to use granted authority to collect information, intelligence, and counterintelligence on any individual seeking to incite or conduct terrorism in line with its charge to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats and activities.

Counterterrorism Mission

QUESTION 66: How does I&A's counterterrorism mission differ from the counterterrorism mission of the National Counterterrorism Center?

66. I&A and NCTC are complementary to counter terrorist threats to the United States. Per EO 13354 and later IRTPA, NCTC is responsible for integrating analysis, maintaining the authoritative database of known and suspected terrorists, information sharing, and strategic operational planning in direct support of the President. I&A, as a contributor, recipient, and partner with NCTC, is responsible for identifying priorities for and mitigating threats and vulnerabilities regarding terrorist and other threats to America's homeland security and DHS missions. I&A is a key source to enable operational and tactical planning and protection and mission execution, particularly across DHS missions and in support of state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and public sector partners.

FBI Background Investigations

QUESTION 67: Should the FBI conduct background investigations of all Presidential nominees for positions within the executive branch of the federal government to ensure that those under consideration for positions of significant authority and responsibility will not misuse the power of their offices and do not have vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to coercion by our adversaries?

67. Background investigations are an important part to help ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of any individual under consideration for being granted a security clearance. The FBI is only one of several entities entrusted with the responsibility to conduct background investigations.

QUESTION 68: Have you undergone, or will you undergo, an FBI background investigation as part of the process associated with your nomination?

68. Having previously undergone a series of reinvestigations and maintained a clearance for many years, this most recent reinvestigation to support my nomination by the President was conducted by the FBI; I understand that the Senate should already have been informed of this latest FBI reinvestigation.

QUESTION 69: Do you agree to provide the results of your FBI background investigation to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee for review?

69. Yes, I understand that the Senate should already have been informed of this latest FBI reinvestigation.

Questions from Senator Warner

Legal Compliance

QUESTION 70: If confirmed, will you commit to expend the funds authorized and appropriated by Congress for I&A and to formally notify Congress and obtain approval for any recessions or deferrals, in accordance with the law?

70. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management, and the DHS Management to ensure that funding and resources are available and expended to meet mission requirements.

QUESTION 71: If confirmed, will you commit to ensure that all personnel actions taken by I&A are carried out in strict accordance with the law?

71. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management, and the DHS Management Directorate to ensure that I&A personnel actions conform to law.

QUESTION 72: If confirmed, will you commit to comply with all duly issued court orders or other rulings, even if you disagree with the court's decision?

72. If confirmed, I will comply with all lawful court orders.

Department of Government Efficiency

QUESTION 73: If confirmed, will you commit not to accept direction from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) on any personnel or other matters relating to I&A?

73. For personnel and other administrative matters, should I be confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Management and seek their guidance.

QUESTION 74: If confirmed, will you commit to prevent DOGE from accessing I&A systems?

74. As with any IT system, I will ensure that only those with the proper clearance and need to know can access I&A systems.

Protecting Classified Information

QUESTION 75: Should any employee of the Intelligence Community be granted access to classified information if they have not been determined to be eligible for access under Executive Order 12968 based upon a favorable adjudication of an appropriate investigation of the employee's background?

75. No individual should have access to classified information without having been granted a security clearance and need-to-know.

QUESTION 76: Do you agree that all personnel granted access to classified information have a lifetime obligation to protect that information, including after they leave government service?

76. Yes, those entrusted with a security clearance have a lifetime commitment to protect.

Ethics

QUESTION 77: Federal ethics laws, to include 10 U.S.C. §208, prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they, or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain relationships, have a financial interest. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties, family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as influencing your decision making?

77. Pursuant to law, if confirmed, I will adhere to my Ethics Agreement and ensure any potential conflicts of interest are immediately addressed in coordination with the Office of the General Counsel guidance.

QUESTION 78: Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from participating in any relevant decisions regarding that specific matter?

78. Pursuant to law, if confirmed, if a conflict of interest arises, I will recuse myself for that specific matter.

QUESTION 79: Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to decisionmaking on the merits and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit?

79. As a public servant entrusted with special authority and responsibilities, if confirmed, I will ensure decision-making is in the public interest and security, not for personal benefit.

Domestic Activities

QUESTION 80: What unique role should I&A be performing, if any, with regard to countering violent extremism in the United States?

80. I&A must be focused on detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting all sources of terrorism, foreign and domestic, against the United States of America by collecting, analyzing, and sharing information related to homeland security threats.

QUESTION 81: What is your understanding of the differences, if any, between the terms “domestic terrorism,” “domestic violent extremism,” and “homegrown violent extremism”?

81. Terrorists seek to incite fear, exploit vulnerabilities, and inflict damage and harm. Regardless of how they may be nuanced, characterized, or otherwise differentiated, terrorists are evil people and must be stopped. We vow to protect the Constitution of the United States “against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” and in doing so, pledge to “form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”

QUESTION 82 What is your view of the threat posed by Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE)?

82. America at times can be unnecessarily strained due a myriad of factors. Our First Amendment protects American citizens’ rights to the “free exercise” of religion, “freedom of speech,” and “peaceably to assemble.” Regardless of impetus or ideology, even ones for which I may not

agree, those rights ought to be protected; however, those freedoms can't be used as an excuse or abused when actively threatening, intimidating, or harming others.

QUESTION 83: What is your view of the appropriate level of I&A resource allocation toward the RMVE threat?

83. I&A resources should be utilized to assess all credible threats to ensure homeland security and in support of the President's agenda and Secretary's guidance.

QUESTION 84: On December 24, 2024, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis issued updated, comprehensive guidance on I&A's Field Intelligence Program, formerly known as the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program. Have you reviewed this guidance? Do you agree with it? Do you have any intention to modify or rescind it?

84. I am unfamiliar with the document referenced issued at the very end of the last administration. Should I be confirmed, at the very least, I will need to review the document and anticipate that I will likely have to revise or rescind the document to ensure compliance with this Administration's policies and Presidential Executive Orders.

Questions from Senator Wyden

Open Source Collection

QUESTION 85: On June 26, 2024, Under Secretary Ken Wainstein testified that I&A "can only collect publicly available information and cannot misrepresent themselves to access certain chatrooms or types of communications." Do you agree?

85. Regardless of a remark made by a prior administration official, to ensure compliance with this Administration's policies and Presidential Executive Orders, there may be scenarios that necessitate alternative representations for I&A assigned or detailed personnel in order to access information critical to thwarting terrorism or other attacks against America.

QUESTION 86: With regard to any open source information, but in particular with regard to social media, how should I&A guard against the collection, use and dissemination of misinformation or otherwise inaccurate content? Please be specific about fact checking policies.

86. Foundational digital ontology, chain of custody, and corroboration are critical to help ensure factual discovery and promulgation. Facts are facts. All reporting is unfortunately biased in some manner or another. The goal must always be to reduce and eliminate bias and noise to ensure that signal transmitted for receipt is clear, crisp, and communicated.

U.S. Person Dossiers

On January 6, 2021, DHS’s Office of the General Counsel released its “Report on DHS Administrative Review into I&A Open Source Collection and Dissemination Activities During Civil Unrest; Portland, Oregon, June through July 2020.” The review documented how I&A prepared “operational background reports” (OBRs), which “essentially amounted to dossiers” on U.S. persons.

QUESTION 87: Under what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for I&A to compile OBRs on U.S. persons? Should OBRs on U.S. persons be compiled based on First Amendment protected speech?

87. Given the lawful mandate by Congress to I&A “to identify and mitigate threats to homeland security,” particularly to collect, analyze, and share information related to domestic security threats, including terrorism, it may be appropriate for I&A to collect overtly or through publicly available sources, analyze, produce, and disseminate information or intelligence on malicious actors and terrorists, including those actors and terrorists that are US persons, to ensure that we protect “against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” I&A must be vigilantly focused on detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting all sources of terrorism and other threats to homeland security by collecting, analyzing, and sharing information relevant regardless of source or content.

QUESTION 88: Regardless of why an OBR is compiled on a U.S. person, do you believe it is appropriate for it to include First Amendment protected social media activity and other speech?

88. I&A must be vigilantly focused on detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting all sources of terrorism and other threats to homeland security by collecting, analyzing, and sharing information relevant regardless of source or content.

QUESTION 89: Do you believe it is appropriate for I&A to compile and disseminate OBRs that include the subjects’ social media friends and followers?

89. I&A must be vigilantly focused on detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting all sources of terrorism and other threats to homeland security by collecting, analyzing, and sharing information relevant regardless of source or content.

QUESTION 90: Under what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for I&A to compile OBRs on U.S. persons that include non-public information from other elements of DHS, the Intelligence Community or other parts of the U.S. Government? Do you believe the Privacy Act or other statutes establish guardrails around such efforts? If yes, please elaborate.

90. I&A must be vigilantly focused on detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting all sources of terrorism and other threats to homeland security by collecting, analyzing, and sharing information relevant regardless of source or content.

Data Purchases

QUESTION 91: In September 2023, CBP announced that it would no longer use commercially sourced smartphone location data. As Chief Intelligence Officer, do you agree with this limitation, based on either policy or constitutional considerations?

91. The policies of and the decision by the prior administration in September 2023 to not utilize commercially sourced smartphone data should not unnecessarily limit President Trump's Administration from lawfully prosecuting illegal activities and threats to our national sovereignty and the safety and security of United States citizenry.

QUESTION 92: If an element of the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise were to purchase U.S. location data, would you promptly inform Congress?

92. I commit to informing Congress, as required, of relevant intelligence activities.

QUESTION 93: Do you agree that the sale by data brokers of location data collected from the phones of U.S. government employees can threaten U.S. national security, particularly if such data is sold to foreign adversaries?

93. Sale of location data, particularly to foreign adversaries, of any phones, not just ones used by US government employees, is a threat to privacy and national security.

QUESTION 94: Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 504 (01) promulgates the Intelligence Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information. Do you support the Policy Framework, or are there aspects with which you disagree?

94. Without access to Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 504 (01), I am unable to offer any opinion at this time.

QUESTION 95: As Chief Intelligence Officer, would you promote policies and reporting requirements among elements of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise in line with the Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information?

95. Without access to Intelligence Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information, I am unable to offer any opinion at this time.

Priorities

QUESTION 96: Do you agree to provide the Committee with the Intelligence Enterprise Intelligence Priorities Framework, and updates thereto?

96. I will provide all intelligence information relevant to the Committee.

January 6

QUESTION 97: Please familiarize yourself with the December 12, 2024, Department of Justice Inspector General review, which concluded that none of the FBI's confidential human sources (CHSs) who were in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021, "was authorized by the FBI to enter the Capitol or restricted area or to otherwise break the law on January 6, nor was any CHS directed by the FBI to encourage others to commit illegal acts on January 6." Do you have any reason to doubt that conclusion?

97. Inspectors General are entrusted with unique responsibilities among which include conducting independent audits, investigations, and inspections and directly informing Congress of any deficiencies or potential problems identified from their oversight work. While I am currently not, nor have I ever been, either an IG or privy to the "materials [they] reviewed or the testimony [they] received," based on the heavily redacted and declassified Confidential Human Source Policy Guide 1018PG Part 01 (Final), Effective Date 2019-05-21, Review Date 2022-05-21, [\[https://vault.fbi.gov/confidential-human-source-policy-guide-1018pg/Confidential%20Human%20Source%20Policy%20Guide%201018PG%20Part%2001%20%28Final%29/view\]](https://vault.fbi.gov/confidential-human-source-policy-guide-1018pg/Confidential%20Human%20Source%20Policy%20Guide%201018PG%20Part%2001%20%28Final%29/view) under Section 2.3, FBI personnel are prohibited from "Authoriz[ing] a CHS to participate in an act of violence." (p 9). As such, the statement in the December 12, 2024, Department of Justice Inspector General review seems reasonable to conclude that the remark aligns with that documented policy guidance. Nevertheless, the report's note that at least "three of those CHSs had been tasked by FBI field offices" introduces a potential complexity with the prior remark that "none of these FBI CHSs was authorized by the FBI to enter the Capitol or a restricted area" given a lack of specification or clarity as to whether or not "tasking" also constitutes "authorization," at least in this case.

Information Security

QUESTION 98: Please review the article “Here Are the Attack Plans that Trump’s Advisors Shared on Signal” (*The Atlantic*, March 26, 2025) and the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chat messages included in the article. You served as Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC-CIO). Based on that experience, do you believe that any of the messages were or should have been classified?

98. I am not, nor previously was, an original classification authority nor am I privy to any plans, discussions, proposals, or other actions or inactions reported or referenced. As such, any comment or remark would be sheer personal conjecture and unwarranted without additional context, findings, and insights.

QUESTION 99: In December 2024, in the wake of the 2024 Salt Typhoon hack of U.S. telecommunications companies, CISA issued public guidance recommending that highly targeted individuals, including senior government officials, “use only end-to-end encrypted communications” tools for their unclassified communications. As the former IC-CIO, do you agree with this CISA guidance?

99. Encrypted communications continue to be a foundational and evolutionary art and science to help ensure American security. Since Revolutionary times with then General George Washington and the Culper Spy Ring, to now with the National Security Agency and other partners, use of encrypted communications should always be preferred. At times, mission imperatives and risk assessment necessitate defaulting to less-than optimal communication channels or methods; but even in those cases, precautions to minimize interception, manipulation, and decryption ought to be taken, as best possible, to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and availability. No cipher is 100% secure; the goal of encryption is to make it untenable and unprofitable to seek to intercept a channel and decrypt transmitted information. Attacking and exploiting global telecommunications channels strikes at the foundational trust and security of nearly all data transfers.

QUESTION 100: Do you agree that both government-issued and personal devices and accounts belonging to senior U.S. Government officials are prime targets for exploitation?

100. Unfortunately, all Americans, not just senior officials, and their communications and data are targets of malicious actors ranging from national state-sponsored exploiters to cyber criminal syndicates to illicit hackers utilizing a myriad of cyber criminal activity and theft.

QUESTION 101: In 2021, your successor at the IC-CIO confirmed that, consistent with the recommendations of CISA and NSA, the IC had implemented enterprisewide ad blocking, to protect unclassified IC computers from cyber threats delivered through advertising. Do you agree that internet-based ads can be used as a vector for cyber threats, and that it is prudent for organizations to block ads to protect their employees' computers from spyware and other malicious content?

101. Malicious cyber activity threatening our networks and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical data and communications takes many forms, not just internet-based advertisement vectors. Given that unclassified IC computers are only a very small portion of the vast quantity of compute devices utilized across the US Government, any recommendations, guidance, or directives by my predecessors or successors ought to be issued with regard to optimally mitigating current or known threats and applying all reasonable countermeasures to optimally secure information technology infrastructure and hosted data. Not only across the IC, but across the Whole of Government, it is imperative to continually strive to secure, access, and counter the ever-changing threat matrix, including malicious code purposefully introduced through deceptive internet advertisement links or content.

QUESTION 102: In response to press reports that the United Kingdom has sought to force Apple to add backdoors to its iCloud backup service, Director of National Intelligence Gabbard has stated that such a backdoor "would be a clear and egregious violation of Americans' privacy and civil liberties, and open up a serious vulnerability for cyber exploitation by adversarial actors." Based on your experience as IC-CIO, do you agree with Director Gabbard's assessment?

102. By default, from my experience, "back doors" introduce additional, unnecessary threat vectors that can be exploited. Apple is a US-based company subject to the laws and regulations of the United States. Attempts by the United Kingdom, or any foreign country for that matter, that seek relief that would otherwise impose upon Americans' lawful privacy should not be entertained or allowed.