

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Mr. Christopher Fox upon his nomination to be
Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community**

In these questions, all references to the statutory authorities relating to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) are to Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §3033), as amended.

Qualifications

QUESTION 1: Section 103H(c) provides that the nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made on the basis of qualifications that include “prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security,” and “demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.” What qualifies you to perform the duties of the IC IG generally with respect to the oversight of intelligence programs and activities and, specifically, with regard to audit and investigation tools?

I believe I am qualified to serve as Inspector General of the Intelligence Community based on a career spanning operational, legal, and policy roles across the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector, along with formal academic training in law and policy. Across these roles, I have worked within and alongside intelligence agencies, gaining direct experience with the frameworks that ensure accountability. At ODNI, I am currently a Senior Advisor to the DNI and Acting Chief of the Information Management Office (IMO). Within the IMO, I oversee classification management, declassification, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act compliance, and records governance.

Prior to joining ODNI, I co-founded Vigilant Inc., where I led strategic planning, contracting, implementation of core systems, business partnerships, and fundraising efforts as the Chief Executive Officer. As a Judge Advocate, I’ve advised commanders on investigations, administrative actions, and compliance with law and regulation. At Two Six Technologies, I led operations supporting the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program, where I modernized its tip processing and internal reporting by establishing standard operating procedures and measures of effectiveness to ensure source protection and legal compliance. As a Covert Action Officer at CIA, I coordinated sensitive operations and worked closely with U.S. and foreign partners to advance national objectives. At Matrix International, I managed interagency teams and oversaw the global deployment of millions of dollars in specialized equipment.

At the Department of Justice’s National Security Division, I supported national security litigation and policy development within the Office of Law and Policy, which often coordinated directly with Congress. At the University of Southern California, I managed the Executive Program in Counterterrorism, coordinated campus events, and engaged in fundraising efforts. In the Air Force, I deployed multiple times as a Special Warfare Joint Terminal Attack Controller, integrating real-time intelligence into combat operations.

I hold a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and an MPA from the University of Southern California, and in both programs the majority of my academic effort was focused on national security, intelligence oversight, and congressional investigations. My oversight experience spans both public and private sectors and includes governance, risk management, and compliance functions. I approach oversight with impartiality, legal rigor, and a clear understanding of operational realities. By virtue of my diverse experience, I have not been captured by any agency’s culture and I bring no institutional bias. I have a proven record of advancing transparency, accountability, and the lawful use of authorities. If confirmed, I will prioritize the protection of whistleblowers and will keep the Congress fully and currently informed through specific oversight projects and appropriate congressional notifications.

Duties

QUESTION 2: Section 103(H)(b)(1) provides that the purpose of the IC IG is “to create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.”

- a.** Please describe your standards for “an objective and effective office” and how, if confirmed, you intend to establish an office that maintains those standards.

An objective and effective IC IG must embody the existing core values of integrity, independence, transparency, and accountability—not just in principle, but in practice. The IC IG must operate impartially, without fear or favor, and remain relentlessly focused on facts, fairness, and the law. If confirmed, I will ensure the office is grounded in the Council of

the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for investigations, audits, inspections, and evaluations. These standards will inform our policies and internal controls.

Beyond compliance, I will foster a culture of professionalism, moral courage, and intellectual honesty. I will also prioritize hiring and retaining personnel with both technical competence and the character required for this sensitive mission. I will ensure the presence of strong internal safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest or undue influence, and I will promote an environment where dissent is respected, whistleblowers are protected, and oversight is principled. Above all, I will lead by example and do my best each day to exemplify our core values.

- b.** If confirmed, how do you expect to fulfill the statutory obligation to be “appropriately accountable to Congress”?

If confirmed, I am committed to fulfilling the statutory obligation to be “appropriately accountable to Congress” by meeting all statutory reporting requirements. Consistent with 50 U.S.C. § 3033, I will ensure the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of violations of law or executive orders, as well as any significant problems or deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI. This includes proactive engagement through reports, briefings, and other appropriate means, and prompt notification of any particularly serious or flagrant issues.

- c.** What is your understanding of the scope of the term “programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence”?

My understanding is that the term “programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence” refers broadly to all intelligence programs and activities overseen, directed, funded, or coordinated by the DNI under Title 50 and related authorities. This includes not only the DNI’s own staff and offices within ODNI, but also National Intelligence Program (NIP) activities

conducted by all 18 elements of the Intelligence Community, insofar as they fall under the DNI's statutory responsibilities for resource allocation, strategic direction, oversight, and coordination.

QUESTION 3: If confirmed, what standards and procedures would you apply to ensure the appropriate timeliness and responsiveness of the IC IG's completion of inspections, audits, reviews, and investigations?

If confirmed, I will ensure that inspections, audits, reviews, and investigations are conducted in accordance with CIGIE Quality Standards. I will promote continuous training, strategic planning, operational efficiency, and a focus on actionable results. To have impact, our work should be relevant at the time of delivery, and aligned with the National Intelligence Priorities where possible. I also intend to leverage the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum to share best practices and adopt proven procedures from other OIGs where appropriate to improve timeliness and responsiveness of our activities.

Protection of Whistleblowers

Section 103H(g)(3)(A)(ii) provides that "no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such information to the Inspector General may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity."

QUESTION 4: What is your understanding of the formal policies and processes in place to inform employees of their right to provide information to the IC IG, and to detect and protect against reprisal for making complaints or disclosing information to the IC IG?

In addition to the statutory protections indicated by Section 103H and other provisions of law, policies and processes are in place to inform IC employees and contractors of their right to provide information to IC IG, including Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-19, "Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information," Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 120, "Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections," ODNI Instruction 20.04, "Whistleblower Protections and Review of Allegations of Reprisal Against Whistleblowers," and ODNI Instruction 10.34, "Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence

Community.”

QUESTION 5: If confirmed, what additional policies and processes will you establish to ensure compliance with this provision, and any related provisions that are applicable to elements of the IC, such as the provisions of the IC Whistleblower Protection Act?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a review of current policies and procedures established to comply with this provision and identify any deficiencies or gaps in the protection of whistleblowers. I will ensure that the IC IG remains committed to fairly reviewing and investigating all whistleblower reprisal allegations within ODNI and all whistleblower requests for an External Review Panel. I also intend to coordinate closely with other ODNI offices responsible for resolving workplace concerns, such as the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (CLPT) and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), to improve workforce messaging and consider potential opportunities for combined outreach and intake efforts.

QUESTION 6: Please describe your view of the IC IG’s role with regard to whistleblowers. Please address each of the following and provide specifics on actions you would take to improve performance, if confirmed as the IC IG.

IC IG maintains a robust whistleblower program within the Center for Protected Disclosures, which provides potential whistleblowers with several methods to disclose information in a confidential, secure, and lawful manner without fear of reprisal, while also protecting classified information.

- a. Outreach and training across the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Intelligence Community (IC) enterprise with regard to whistleblower rights and access to whistleblower protections;

IC IG is involved in the onboarding process of all new ODNI personnel and frequently engages in outreach efforts to the broader ODNI community. IC IG has hosted webinars, participated in town halls, and maintained outreach materials throughout ODNI facilities to increase awareness. If confirmed, I will continue such efforts and seek new opportunities for improvement.

- b.** Timely and thorough investigations of whistleblower complaints;

Through IC IG's Center for Protected Disclosures and IC IG's Investigation Division, IC IG is committed to the timely and thorough receipt, triage, and investigation of all whistleblower complaints. IC IG's Intake Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from each of IC IG's five oversight Divisions (Audit, Inspections & Evaluations, Investigations, Counsel, and Center for Protected Disclosures) regularly convenes to review incoming whistleblower complaints and ensure each complaint is properly addressed. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Intake Advisory Committee and review the entire workflow to make sure every complaint receives the attention and discretion it deserves.

- c.** Management of whistleblower caseloads within the IC IG.

As reported in IC IG's semiannual and quarterly hotline reports, the volume of IC IG Hotline contacts has continued to increase. Management of the rising whistleblower caseload within IC IG requires sufficient resources and staffing to meet mission requirements. If confirmed, I will conduct a zero-based review of IC IG's resourcing and staffing to ensure IC IG has the necessary number of qualified personnel and technology solutions to effectively manage whistleblower caseloads, from initial receipt of whistleblower information to the completion of investigations and required reporting.

- d.** Notification to Congress regarding whistleblower complaints and acts of reprisal.

If confirmed, I will notify Congress regarding whistleblower complaints and any other matters where required by law and, at my discretion, where otherwise appropriate even if not required by law. I look forward to engaging with Congress to better understand any key areas of interest that may fall within IC IG's discretionary activities. Particularly with respect to alleged matters of "urgent concern," I will continue to operate in a way consistent with IC IG's core values to ensure Congress remains currently and fully informed.

QUESTION 7: Do you see any need for additional actions, policies, or processes to protect whistleblowers?

If confirmed, I intend to question any previous assumptions and thoroughly evaluate the need for additional actions, policies, or processes to protect whistleblowers. In addition to the legal requirements to protect whistleblowers against reprisal or threat of reprisal, protecting the identity of whistleblowers is essential to the willingness of whistleblowers to engage with IC IG. Building this trust will pay dividends in the long run by encouraging other potential whistleblowers to come forward with information that could improve the effectiveness or efficiency of the intelligence community.

QUESTION 8: What is your view of the role of the IC IG in managing and investigating whistleblower complaints made by employees of ODNI? What is your view of the role of the IC IG with regard to complaints made by IC employees outside ODNI?

IC IG has the statutory authority to receive complaints “from an employee of the Intelligence Community” (whether or not in ODNI) regarding activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI. *See* Section 103H(g)(3).

IC IG endeavors to investigate allegations of wrongdoing reported by ODNI employees. As previously mentioned, IC IG’s Intake Advisory Committee ensures that whistleblower information is appropriately assigned or referred to the correct oversight function, whether it is internal to IC IG or external to another OIG. IC IG works collaboratively with other partners in the IC when receiving complaints made by IC employees outside ODNI or relative to an issue outside ODNI. If confirmed, I will continue and improve upon these efforts.

QUESTION 9: What role do you believe the IC IG has in setting investigative standards and ensuring consistency in whistleblower investigations across the IC?

The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community serves as the Chair of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, which is established in Section 103H(h) and serves as “a mechanism for informing its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest,” resolves issues about jurisdiction or access to employees, or access to other materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than one of its members. If confirmed, I intend on leveraging the Forum to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of

investigative standards, while respecting the roles and responsibilities of those independent offices, and following applicable standards, such as CIGIE's *Quality Standards for Investigations*.

QUESTION 10: To your knowledge, have you ever been the subject of a whistleblower complaint? If yes, please provide dates and a brief summary of each complaint of which you are aware?

No.

QUESTION 11: What are your views of a whistleblower's ability to communicate with Congress?

Section 103H(k) provides a process for any member of the Intelligence Community to bring a matter of Urgent Concern to the congressional intelligence committees. IC IG plays an important role in this process. This process does not require an agency's consent for a matter of urgent concern to be provided to the congressional intelligence committees. If confirmed, I will ensure IC IG fully executes this important statutory responsibility.

Access to Information

Pursuant to Sections 103H(g)(2)(B) and (C), "[t]he Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General" as well as "direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs and activities[.]"

QUESTION 12: Please describe how, if confirmed, you would address a situation where an agency, U.S. official, or a government contractor refused to provide statutorily-required access, including what remedies you would pursue in addition to those described in Section 103H(g)(2)(E).

Ensuring IC IG has "direct access" to employees and information pursuant to Section 103H includes building and maintaining trust with those organizations providing such access. IC IG relies heavily on this authority to ensure it can provide efficient and effective oversight. In doing so, it is incumbent upon IC IG to also foster ongoing relationships with other governmental organizations inside

and outside of ODNI. If confirmed, I will ensure that IC IG continues to strengthen these relationships to ensure a situation such as this does not arise in the first place. I will make it clear to these organizations that IC IG will always act with transparency, accountability, and integrity regarding any information for which IC IG obtains direct access.

However, in the event this situation arises, I would first attempt to understand the basis for the refusal and attempt to reconcile the situation directly. If a direct resolution is unsuccessful, then I would work with ODNI General Counsel to identify potential solutions to address the basis of the refusal while also reinforcing IC IG's authority for direct access. If such efforts were unsuccessful, I would then elevate the matter to the appropriate component or agency head, including the DNI. If the matter remained unresolved, then I would consider one or more congressional reporting provisions in Section 103H(k) and begin coordination with committee staff members regarding this issue.

QUESTION 13: Section 103H(g)(5) provides authority for the authorization and enforcement of subpoenas for the production of information that is necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. What is your view of the appropriate use of this subpoena authority?

I believe subpoenas are an important tool available to IC IG. However, my understanding is that subpoenas are rarely used in the performance of the Inspector General's duties because information can typically be obtained by other means.

Sources of Complaints

Pursuant to Section 103H(g)(3)(A), "[t]he Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate ... complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety."

QUESTION 14: If confirmed, what steps would you take to inform individuals, within or outside of the U.S. Government, including contractors, of their opportunity to provide such complaints or information to the IC IG?

As noted above, IC IG provides the ODNI workforce with information about the whistleblower process and whistleblower protections via new employee orientation, websites, posters, anonymous ‘drop boxes,’ and periodic outreach events. If confirmed, I will continue these initiatives and consider expanding these programs in conjunction with other offices within the ODNI and other IC elements that provide similar reporting channels. Additionally, IC IG provides information in the publicly-available Semiannual Reports.

Relationship to Other Inspectors General

Section 103H has several provisions on the relationship of the IC IG to other inspectors general with responsibilities in or for elements of the IC, including Sections 103H(h)(1)(A), 103H(j)(4)(C), and 103H(l). To facilitate resolution of questions between or among inspectors general, Section 103H(h)(2) establishes in statute the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, for which the IC IG is to serve as chair.

QUESTION 15: What is your understanding of these provisions on potentially overlapping responsibilities of inspectors general? Please describe your priorities, if confirmed, for the work of the Office of the IC IG in relation to the work of other Inspectors General with responsibilities concerning intelligence programs and activities.

As noted in my answer to question 9, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community serves as the Chair of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established by Section 103H. If confirmed, I intend to leverage the Forum to address interagency and cross-jurisdictional oversight issues within the Intelligence Community. I intend to use the Forum as a means to facilitate a whole-of-IC approach to sharing best practices and lessons learned, and to achieve gains in efficiency and effective allocation of limited resources.

QUESTION 16: Please describe your understanding of the IC IG’s leadership role vis-a-vis other inspectors general within the IC? How will you engage this leadership role?

I understand Section 103H(h) to demonstrate Congressional intent that the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community lead the Forum. While the IC IG does not

have any “administrative authority” over other Forum IGs, and must respect their independence, the IC IG is expected to set the priorities of the forum and facilitate cooperation among the Forum to address the matters arising before it.

QUESTION 17: Please describe your goals, if confirmed, concerning the work of the IC IG General Forum and any measures you would recommend to improve its functions, if warranted.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the effectiveness of the Forum and seek input from other Forum IGs to improve its functions. The Forum, with its various committees and sub-committees, represents a tremendous opportunity to gain and maintain oversight efficiencies, such as developing potential legislative or policy solutions and identifying beneficial innovations in technology and process. If confirmed, I will leverage the Forum to the greatest extent possible to improve IG performance.

QUESTION 18: Section 103H(j)(4)(C) provides that “[t]he Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence community and in coordination with that element’s inspector general ... conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, audit, or review of such element[.]” What is your understanding of this provision, particularly pertaining to the “coordination with that element’s inspector general”?

I understand this provision to be consistent with IC IG’s broad statutory authority and jurisdiction to conduct investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI, while also recognizing the need to properly coordinate with the impacted element’s IG. This coordination is necessary to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort across IGs and to provide an opportunity for the impacted element’s IG to make the IC IG aware of any special equities.

Independence

QUESTION 19: Section 103H(c)(3) provides that “[t]he Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.” Please describe your understanding of both elements of this provision: “report directly to;” and “under the general supervision of the Director

of National Intelligence.”

I understand the provision “report directly to” to be consistent with other requirements in Section 103H that IC IG keep the DNI fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of programs and activities within the DNI’s responsibility and authority, and the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. Section 103H(c)(3)’s requirement that IC IG be “under the general supervision” of the DNI describes the organizational relationship between the IC IG and ODNI consistent with other provisions of Section 103H, including those relating to the independence of the IC IG’s activities: (1) the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is nominated by the President without regard to political affiliation; (2) only the President may remove the IG; (3) the IC IG is required to prepare semi-annual reports to Congress; (4) the IC IG has specific authorities concerning budget and personnel management; (5) the IC IG is required to initiate and conduct “independent” investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews; (6) there are specific provisions in Section 103H(f) regarding any limitations the DNI may place on IC IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review; (7) the IG is required to appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General, who shall report to the IG, or otherwise obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another inspector general; and (8) there are congressional reporting requirements if the IC IG is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the IC IG.

Based on my understanding of the “general supervision” provision, when read in concert with other applicable provisions of Section 103H and related case law interpreting the Inspector General Act of 1978¹, the DNI does not have the authority to direct that the IC IG initiate, conduct, complete, or dictate the outcome of, any particular investigation, audit, review or other IG activity. However, the IC IG can and should maintain a close relationship with the DNI to ensure that IC IG discretionary actions are supportive of the DNI’s priorities, where appropriate. If confirmed, I will be committed to enhancing the relationship with the DNI to ensure the IC IG’s recommendations are actionable and likely to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ODNI and the IC, while also protecting the independence of the IC IG’s activities.

¹ See *United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Federal Labor Relations Authority*, 25 F.3d 229 (4th Circ. 1994).

QUESTION 20: Section 103H(k)(3) provides that in the event that the IC IG is unable to resolve any differences with the DNI affecting execution of IC IG’s duties or responsibilities, the IC IG shall immediately notify and submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees. If confirmed, in addition to this reporting responsibility, please describe what actions you would take if a senior official of the IC sought to prevent you from “initiating, carrying out, or completing” any audit or investigation within the jurisdiction of the Office of the IC IG.

If confirmed, and in such a situation as described, my actions would be based upon the unique facts and circumstances of the case. In general, I would first attempt to discuss, understand, and resolve the concern at the lowest possible level. If unsuccessful, I would attempt to engage with ODNI General Counsel. If this does not resolve the difference, I would attempt to engage at the component level. For interagency issues, I would also leverage the IC IG Forum to the extent practicable. If these efforts were still unsuccessful, I would attempt to resolve the issues directly with the DNI or agency head in good faith prior to making any determination that the difference is unable to be resolved, at which point the Section 103H(k)(3) reporting requirement would be triggered and I would notify Congress as required by law.

QUESTION 21: What is your view on the importance of independent hiring authority and contracting authority to ensure the independence of the IC IG?

This provision is important because it ensures that the IC IG is able to develop and maintain a cadre of oversight professionals who represent IC IG’s core values and also have sufficient experience, training, and expertise to execute IC IG’s oversight mission. This is necessary for the IC IG to be efficient and effective in its oversight mission, and to conduct its activities independently.

Inspector General Work Plan

Section 103H(g)(2)(A) provides that the IC IG shall make such investigations and reports relating to the administration of programs and activities within the DNI’s authorities and responsibilities as are “in the judgment of the Inspector General, necessary, or desirable.” This requirement is subject to certain limitations in Section 103H(f), which provides that, subject to congressional notification, the

DNI may prohibit the IC IG from carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review that “is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.”

QUESTION 22: Please describe your understanding of these provisions, and, specifically, the IC IG’s role vis-à-vis the DNI.

My understanding of these provisions is that, if confirmed, I will be authorized to exercise independent judgment to pursue a particular investigation, audit, or review. However, Section 103H(f) provides a limitation for such discretion if the DNI determines such limitation is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.

QUESTION 23: If confirmed, how will you determine the investigations and reports that are “necessary or desirable” to complete each year?

If confirmed, I intend to leverage the IC IG’s existing Annual Work Planning process to identify the oversight projects that are “necessary or desirable” to complete each year, when evaluating other statutory requirements, the Intelligence Community’s Top Management and Performance Challenges, IC IG resources, and National Intelligence Priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure the Annual Work Planning process is effective and efficient, and I will continually seek ways to improve the process.

QUESTION 24: If confirmed, would you make it a practice to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of these activities? If so, how would you ensure that you execute this obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed?

Yes. IC IG must be appropriately accountable to Congress and keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed. If confirmed, I will also consider new ways to improve and enhance transparency and accountability with the congressional intelligence committees.

Referrals to the Department of Justice

QUESTION 25: Please describe your understanding of the authority and responsibility of the IC IG to report matters to the Department of Justice

concerning possible criminal conduct, including the conduct of current or former officials described in Section 103H(k)(3)(A)(iii).

Section 103H(k)(6) require IC IG “expeditiously report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General relating to violations of federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General[.]” I also understand that IC IG must notify the DNI of any such reporting. If confirmed, I will ensure IC IG properly reports matters to DOJ, and notifies the DNI and Congress as required.

QUESTION 26: In your view, what should be the role, if any, of any other office or official, including the Office of General Counsel, in making referrals to the Department of Justice?

I understand that the roles of other offices or officials, including the Office of General Counsel, in referring matters to DOJ are prescribed by other statutory or policy provisions, or through other agreements with DOJ. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI General Counsel, the IC IG counsel, and other responsible offices on these referrals.

Consultations about Reports

QUESTION 27: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the IC IG to consult with other ODNI officials, or other officials of an IC element outside an office of an Inspector General, before issuing a report, regarding the findings and recommendations in the report?

Consistent with CIGIE standards, it is common practice for OIGs to obtain the views of responsible officials of the entity subject to an oversight requirement. This practice ensures reports are fair, complete, and objective. It is within the IC IG’s discretion to consider their input and make appropriate changes, if warranted, to ensure the accuracy of a report. If confirmed, I intend to continue this practice.

QUESTION 28: To the extent that you believe such consultation is appropriate, what steps, if any, do you believe the Inspector General should take to keep a

record of the consultation and record the results in the text of the report?

In accordance with CIGIE standards, the practice of IC IG is to request a formal written response from the component containing the comments on the draft report. The final report typically includes a copy or summary of the component's formal comments. If confirmed, I intend to continue this practice.

QUESTION 29: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the IC IG not investigate or review a particular matter?

Section 103H(f) provides a limitation on IC IG's authority to exercise independent judgment regarding a particular investigation, audit, or review if the DNI (but not any other senior official) determines such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.

QUESTION 30: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the IC IG not issue a report on a particular matter?

Section 103H(f) provides a limitation on IC IG's authority to exercise independent judgment regarding a particular investigation, audit, or review in the circumstance in which the DNI (but not any other senior official) determines such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. My understanding is that this limitation also includes the issuance of a report.

QUESTION 31: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the IC IG change findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a particular matter?

Pursuant to CIGIE standards and the current practice of the IC IG, it is appropriate to provide responsible officials the opportunity to review and comment on draft report findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This process may not be used to attempt to unduly or improperly influence the content of the report, alter conclusions, or otherwise abdicate the IC IG's statutory responsibility to make independent findings and recommendations. However, comments may provide helpful or necessary context, and in some cases may be included in the final report.

Major Challenges, Problems, and Priorities

QUESTION 32: In your view, what are the major challenges facing the Office of the IC IG?

In my view, a major challenge facing IC IG is ensuring it has sufficient resources, including technology and personnel, to execute its mission, including the requirement for IC IG to conduct discretionary oversight work. If confirmed, I will conduct a zero-based review to determine whether resourcing is a major challenge, and if so, determine how to best resolve the issue.

QUESTION 33: If confirmed, how will you address these challenges and what priorities, including for the selection of subjects for audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews, would you establish to address these challenges?

I understand one of IC IG's strategic goals is currently to strengthen the foundation of the office by 'recruiting, developing, and retaining a premier workforce[.]' A zero-based review will determine whether this should continue to be a strategic goal, and if so, will reveal ways to address these challenges without disrupting existing activities.

Personnel and Budgetary Resources of the IC IG's Office

Section 103H(j)(2)(B) provides that the Inspector General shall ensure that personnel shall have the required training and experience to enable the IC IG to carry out the duties of the IC IG effectively. Section 103H(j)(2)(C) provides that the IC IG "shall create...a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General."

QUESTION 34: Please describe how, if confirmed, you would create the career cadre sufficient to satisfy these statutory obligations and what, in your view, is necessary to meet these obligations.

If confirmed, I intend to create a career cadre by prioritizing the recruitment, development, and retention of a highly-qualified and highly-motivated workforce. I will work closely with the Assistant Inspector General for Mission Support to identify ways to improve IC IG's recruitment, development, and retention of its premier workforce, and ensure new hires have a clear path to grow in their careers within IC IG.

QUESTION 35: If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you expect to consider or make in the present Office of the IC IG, with regard to organization, staff qualifications, training, budget, or other features relevant to the effective performance of the duties of the office?

If confirmed, I will evaluate what changes, if any, would need to be made with regard to organization, staff, qualifications, training, budget, or other features relevant to the effective performance of the duties of the office. I will conduct these evaluations in conjunction with each IC IG division so I can make informed, deliberate decisions.

QUESTION 36: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that the use of contractors to perform such functions is appropriate?

I believe the majority of IC IG's requirements are more appropriately performed by government personnel. However, if confirmed, I intend to leverage many of the dedicated and talented contractors working with IC IG to enable its critical oversight mission.

QUESTION 37: In your view, are there any barriers or disincentives, including any created by personnel policies, which impede the recruitment or retention of qualified IG personnel? If so, please describe them, as well as how, if confirmed, you would address these impediments.

My understanding is that a significant barrier to recruitment is the lengthy pre-employment security process. I intend to work with the IC IG leadership team and ODNI's Chief Operating Officer to find ways to address this barrier so that, if confirmed, I can sufficiently recruit, develop, and retain a career cadre of IC IG professionals in a timely manner.

Oversight of Acquisition Programs and Contracts

QUESTION 38: What role, if any, do you believe the IC IG should play in achieving acquisition reform?

IC IG has an important role in promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in IC-related procurement and

acquisition activities. If confirmed, I will work with IC IG leadership and the IC IG Forum on IC-related acquisition matters that may be appropriate for further IC IG action.

QUESTION 39: What is your view of the role the IC IG should play in advising the IC and the Congress on the sufficiency of management controls in acquisition programs and the impact that legislative and regulatory proposals could have on such management controls?

IC IG should play a significant role in advising the IC and Congress on the sufficiency of management controls in acquisition programs and the impact that legislative and regulatory proposals could have on such management controls. I understand that IC IG already executes several oversight requirements regarding financial and budgetary controls within the IC. If confirmed, I intend to consider other ways to strengthen these oversight efforts.

QUESTION 40: What is your view of the role the IC IG should play in oversight, audit and investigation over contracts in the IC?

IC IG has an important role in these oversight requirements. If confirmed, I intend to work with IC IG leadership and the IC IG Forum to evaluate ways to strengthen and expand this role where appropriate.

Professional Experience

QUESTION 41: Please describe specifically how each of your professional experiences will enable you to serve effectively as the IC IG. Please include within each response a description of issues relating to the position that you can identify based on those experiences.

As noted in my answer to question 1, I have served in many different leadership roles across several departments and agencies. I have also held positions in the private and non-profit sectors. I have taken an oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States many times, in and out of uniform, and I have held a security clearance for nearly twenty years. I have led small teams in combat, crafted whole-of government policies, authored provisions of regulations, managed interagency teams of intelligence officers, provided legal advice to commanders, overseen information management at a department level, and led a successful

technology company.

In all of these professional experiences, I have relentlessly embraced new challenges and taken extreme ownership of my duties. I have been and will continue to be committed to the truth, and I have a proven track record of making decisions that “do good” regardless of whether they “feel good.” If confirmed, I will take my responsibilities as IC IG very seriously. I will be committed to following the law, protecting the innocent, holding the IC and my own office accountable for our actions, and keeping America safe by supporting improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of the IC.

Question from Senator Warner

QUESTION 42: Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033(j)(3), the IC IG has “final approval of . . . the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of the Inspector General; and . . . all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.” Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the Director of National Intelligence to terminate the employment of personnel within the IC IG’s Office other than pursuant to a security-based determination?

I believe that Section 103(j)(3) empowers the IC IG to have final approval of the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with IC IG and over all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the IC IG office. The DNI maintains authority over security-based determinations. If confirmed, I will rely on IG counsel to ensure that IC IG Office can fully exercise this authority and maintain the Office’s independence.

Questions from Senator Wyden

Whistleblowers

QUESTION 43: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote: “Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring accountability and oversight within the IC, and they must have clear, protected channels to report concerns, including the unauthorized transmittal of classified information to appropriate entities such as Members of Congress, Inspectors General (IGs), and other authorized recipients.”

During her confirmation hearing, Director Gabbard was asked if she agreed “that IC whistleblowers must have a clear path to this committee and that they don’t need permission from agencies to talk to [the committee],” to which Director Gabbard responded, “the answer is clearly yes.” Do you agree?

I agree with the Director on this matter. Section 103H provides a process for any member of the Intelligence Community to bring a matter of urgent concern to the congressional intelligence committees. IC IG plays an important role in this process. This process does not require an agency’s consent for a matter of urgent concern to be provided to the congressional intelligence committees. If confirmed, I will ensure IC IG fully executes this important statutory responsibility.

QUESTION 44: How would you protect the anonymity of whistleblowers and ensure that they are not identified to personnel who may reprise against them or identified publicly as whistleblowers?

Pursuant to Section 103H(g)(3)(A), the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of individuals who provide information to the IG without the consent of that individual, unless the IG determines that the disclosure unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken. This statutory protection ensures the anonymity of whistleblowers. If confirmed, I will continue IC IG’s efforts in protecting the identity of whistleblowers and ensure that the exceptions to this protection from disclosure are used only when absolutely necessary.

QUESTION 45: Do you agree that compromising the identity of a whistleblower is, or should be, prohibited? If yes, what criminal, administrative, or other sanctions should apply to individuals who compromise the identities of whistleblowers?

Yes. I agree that compromising the identity of a whistleblower is prohibited, with the specific exceptions I noted in my answer to the previous question. If confirmed, I will work with IC IG leadership and the IC IG Forum to identify ways to enhance whistleblower confidentiality.

Independence

QUESTION 46: 50 USC § 3033(i) establishes that the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall

report to the Inspector General or obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another inspector general or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis. Do you agree that the IC IG must be counseled and advised independently on OIG-related legal matters by attorneys who are answerable only to the IG?

Yes.

QUESTION 47: 50 USC § 3033 (j)(3) states that: “Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General has final approval of the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of the Inspector General; and all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.”

- a. How would you ensure the independence of IG employment decisions?

My understanding is that the IC IG currently relies on outside offices for some onboarding and security processing, but most of the employment processes for IC IG personnel are handled exclusively by the IC IG’s Mission Support Division. If confirmed, I will review existing processes to determine whether it would be appropriate for the IC IG to also handle those processes currently handled by outside offices. In general, I will leverage the personnel authorities in Section 103H(j) to ensure the independence of the IC IG’s activities.

- b. How would you protect OIG personnel from firing, transfer or involuntary administrative leave not approved by the Inspector General?

If confirmed, I will rely on the personnel authorities in Section 103H(j) to protect IC IG personnel from these actions.

Information Management

QUESTION 48: Please review the article “Here Are the Attack Plans That Trump’s Advisors Shared on Signal” (The Atlantic, March 26, 2025) and the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chat messages included in the article. Since April,

you have served as Senior Advisor to the Director of National Intelligence and Acting Chief of the Information Management Office.

- a.** Do you believe that any of the messages were or should have been classified, based on your experience with classification and on the Security Classification Guides of the relevant agencies and departments? If yes, which messages?

The Secretary of Defense, who is the original classification authority of the information, has publicly confirmed the messages were not classified.

- b.** Do you believe that any of the messages included any national defense information, as codified pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 - 798? If yes, which ones?

No.

- c.** Regardless of classification, do you believe that the information included in the messages was appropriate for an unclassified channel, particularly given the timing?

The original classification authority of the information confirmed the messages were not classified.

- d.** Do you agree that unclassified phones used by national security officials are likely targets of foreign adversaries and that, as such, should not be used to convey classified information?

Yes. Unclassified phones should not be used to convey classified information.