

**OPEN HEARING:
NOMINATION OF JOHN L. RATCLIFFE
TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 15, 2025

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2025

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**OPEN HEARING: ON THE NOMINATION OF
JOHN L. RATCLIFFE, TO BE DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15, 2025

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Room SD-G50, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Cotton, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Cotton (presiding), Warner, Collins, Cornyn, Moran, Lankford, Rounds, Young, Rubio, Heinrich, King, Bennet, Gillibrand, Ossoff, Kelly.

PROCEEDINGS

Chairman COTTON. This hearing will come to order.

We are holding this hearing before President-Elect Trump's Inauguration, therefore, we have not yet received Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Procedurally, the Senate must receive a nomination before we can vote on and report it out of committee; and therefore we are having this hearing in expectation that the nomination will follow on Monday.

When formally nominated by the President after his inauguration, the Committee will convene a business meeting to vote on the nomination and report it to the full Senate.

As an initial matter, Committee rule 5.4 states that no confirmation hearing shall be held sooner than seven calendar days after receipt of the nominee's background questionnaire, financial disclosure statement, and responses to additional prehearing questions unless the time limit is waived by a majority vote of the Committee.

While the Committee received Mr. Ratcliffe's background questionnaire and responses to additional prehearing questions more than seven days in advance, the committee received a financial disclosure statement on January 14th. I therefore ask Members for unanimous consent to proceed with the hearing.

Hearing no objection, we have consent to proceed.

I want to remind all those in attendance that while they are welcome to observe today's hearing, I will not allow disruptions by the audience.

Audience members may not verbally or physically distract from the hearing, including by shouting, standing, raising signs, or making gestures that block the view of other members of the audience. Those who do so will be immediately removed from the room.

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the Committee to begin consideration of Mr. Ratcliffe's qualifications and to allow for our Members' thoughtful deliberation. To date, Mr. Ratcliffe has provided substantive written responses to more than 170 questions presented by the committee. Today, of course, Members will be able to ask additional questions and hear from Mr. Ratcliffe in both this open session and in closed sessions.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COTTON, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM ARKANSAS**

Chairman COTTON. I want to welcome everyone to this hearing on President Trump's nomination of Mr. Ratcliffe to be our next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Ratcliffe, welcome back to the Intelligence Committee. I also want to welcome your wife Michele and thank her and your daughters for the sacrifices they have made across a lifetime of public service.

Former Attorney General John Ashcroft is also back before the Senate. Mr. Attorney General, I am sure your being here makes you nostalgic for your own confirmation process a few years back. (Laughter.)

John, welcome. We look forward to your remarks.

I want to acknowledge also my predecessor, Vice Chairman Warner. Senator Warner and I have worked together collegially over the years even when we have disagreed strongly. I expect this spirit of comity to continue and not just between the Vice Chairman and me, but across our committee.

I also want to thank Senator Rubio for his service on the Committee. He remains a member of the Committee, but he is otherwise detained this morning at his own confirmation hearing. He has been a trusted colleague and respected leader on the Committee for years. We will miss him, but we also look forward to his distinguished service as our next Secretary of State.

I want to extend my special thanks to our Committee senior staff on both sides as well. They put in yeoman's work over the holidays to be sure we could promptly move forward Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination.

I want to begin with a few observations from my decade of service on the Intelligence Committee. The men and women of the intelligence community (IC) perform vital work to protect our Nation. They often serve in dangerous and squalid conditions. Their successes are seldom celebrated and even known. Unlike our troops, no one buys them beers in the airport. Sometimes their families don't even know what they do. So let me say to them today, on behalf of this Committee and a grateful nation: We respect you, we appreciate you, and we thank you.

But we also need more from you. In these dangerous times, our intelligence agencies haven't anticipated major events or detected impending attacks. In just the last few weeks, the members of this Committee and, I presume, the President, had no forewarning of the New Orleans terrorist attack or the collapse of the Assad tyranny in Syria. The same goes for Hamas's October 7th atrocity against Israel in 2023.

I could give other examples, but suffice it to say, we are too often in the dark. While this goes for the entire intelligence community, the problem is especially acute at the CIA which remains after all the “central” intelligence agency. The CIA needs to get back to its roots, but must overcome several challenges to do so.

First, the CIA has neglected its core mission—collecting clandestine foreign intelligence. Put more simply, stealing secrets. Intelligence collection is the main effort. Every other job is a supporting effort. If you don’t collect intelligence by, say, handling spies or hacking computers, you should ask yourself how you support those who do or how you harness and use what they produce.

I have seen way too many reports over the years with phrases like “according to,” “based on,” “judging by,” followed only by diplomatic accounts and press reports. In other words, not intelligence. And it has gotten worse over the last four years. Those sources are not unimportant, but without clandestine intelligence, we might as well get briefed by the State Department or a think tank or just read the newspaper.

Second, the CIA has become too bureaucratic. Now I realize that Allen Dulles probably had the same complaint just five years after the CIA was created. But this has also gotten worse in recent years, in no small part thanks to former Director Brennan’s so-called “modernization.” Lines of authority have grown blurry. Talkers have replaced doers and managers with no field experience have taken over operational roles, and more. Much like our military, the tooth-to-tail ratio at the CIA is badly out of balance.

Third, the CIA’s analysis and priorities have been politicized. Intelligence analysis all too often has aligned, curiously, with the Biden administration’s policy preferences: The Afghan army is strong and cohesive. Ukraine’s army will collapse within days of Russia’s invasion. Israel can’t possibly destroy Hamas or Hezbollah. Iran’s air defenses are mighty and fearsome. Time and again, the CIA has produced inaccurate analysis that conveniently justifies President Biden’s actions or as often his inaction.

Likewise, the CIA’s misplaced priorities have yielded too many reports on matters like the prospects for gay rights legislation in Africa or climate change. These topics may have their place in government, but it is not at the CIA.

And I certainly hope to never again see another video statement or social media post from the CIA about diversity or equity or inclusion. If you wonder why our intelligence Agencies struggle to collect intelligence, consider this fact: The CIA offered to pay diversity consultants three times as much as a new case officer. I am sorry, but if you feel like you need a diversity consultant or an affinity group or your pronouns in an email, maybe the CIA isn’t for you. This job isn’t about your identity or your feelings. It is about our Nation’s security.

Fourth, the CIA dabbles too much in questions of political judgment, even as it neglects its core mission of intelligence collection. Some of the blame, to be fair, lies with us. I hear questions from this Committee about some nation’s will to fight or if we do this, that, or the other thing, what will Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping do in response. These aren’t really intelligence questions but rather matters of statesmanship and political judgment or prudence—the

statesman's supreme virtue. I would observe that Lincoln and Churchill didn't have our vast, modern intelligence apparatus, but they were pretty good wartime leaders because they were great statesmen.

It is the CIA's responsibility to provide us and the President with timely, relevant secrets; for example, that Russia has mobilized multiple divisions on Ukraine's border at Christmastime and sent perishable fresh blood supplies to the front. It is our job to use that information to discern the inherent logic of events, not to defer passively to the intelligence community's judgment that it is a convenient conclusion that Putin hadn't yet decided to invade just days before the obviously impending invasion.

Fifth, the CIA needs to become bolder and more innovative in covert action. I have seen successful covert action programs. I have seen debacles. The latter are usually caused by ill-advised constraints by political leaders or when a President used covert action as a substitute for policy and not a supplement for policy. I will have to save more for our closed session, of course, but let's for now say the timid indecision that has characterized the Biden administration's overt actions extends to its covert actions.

Mr. Ratcliffe, you have a big job ahead of you. The Nation needs a strong, capable, and aggressive CIA. I believe the men and women you will lead want to serve in just that kind of Agency. They joined the CIA after all, not a church choir or a therapy session on a college campus. They and the Nation are counting on you to deliver badly needed reforms and on this Committee to ensure you do.

I will now recognize the vice chairman for his opening remarks.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA**

Vice Chairman WARNER. Mr. Chairman, first of all, congratulations on becoming Chair of what I think is the most important Committee in the Senate. And I look forward to working with you in the kind of traditions that we have maintained in the now close to 15 years that I have been on the Committee. So congratulations, Tom.

Mr. Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Congratulations on being nominated to be Director of the CIA. It was a pleasure to meet your wife. And I think you brought a great introducer in the former Attorney General Ashcroft. Pleasure to see you, sir.

Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you last month and hear your views. You previously served on the House Intelligence Committee and obviously as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), so you obviously have an appreciation for the work done by our intelligence community generally and more specifically, the CIA. If confirmed, I believe you will be the first person who actually has served as both as DNI and head of the CIA.

Echoing a little bit of what Chairman Cotton said, the Agency you have been nominated to is facing an unprecedented number of challenges which I believe as well requires a great deal of leadership. These challenges ranging from the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, competition with China especially with respect to artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies, the persistent

threat of international terrorist organizations, and a constant theme of cyber threats from nation-states and their actors attacking our critical infrastructure to, candidly, just run-of-the-mill criminal ransomware actors.

Adding to all this has been a focus of mine and I know so many of us on the committee, that the revolutions in technology from AI to synthetic bio to advances in energy require, I believe, fundamental changes in how we operate.

In effect, it is the very fabric of warfare in many ways that is changing. I believe very strongly that national security is no longer determined by simply who has the most powerful ships and tanks, but who also will lead in this technology competition from semi-conductors to drones to synthetic bio.

I believe—and we have made some progress on this, but I still think we have a long way to go—that the IC must continue to adapt to these challenges. In particular, it must be better organized to collect on the development and use of advanced technology by our adversaries, because they pose a dramatic threat to United States leadership. The truth is, if we are not staying ahead of that, their ability for these foreign nation-states to use technology to get us in a stranglehold could be a huge, huge challenge.

During such times it is also vital that we are able to recruit and retain the best possible talent for the IC. That starts with ensuring the workforce feels respected and valued. I am very concerned that the President-elect has continued to engage in undeserved attacks on the professional women and men of our intelligence agencies. These comments I do think affect the morale of these men and women who, as Senator Cotton said, they don't get the recognition or get their beer bought for them. They have to toil in anonymity. But they have, I believe consistently, regardless of which party is in power been willing to defend our Nation.

Unsurprisingly, particularly public comments from our leaders have a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of the talent of these critical men and women of the IC.

Mr. Ratcliffe, today is your opportunity to reassure the men and women of the CIA that they not fear reprisal for being willing to speak truth to power. The most critical role of the IC is speaking truth to power. I need your commitment that you will not fire or force out CIA employees because of their perceived political views and that you will not ask these employees to place loyalty to a political figure above loyalty to country. And I need to hear your plan on how you will reassure the CIA workforce on these issues.

Also on the personnel front, I am concerned that we continue to hear from CIA officers who have been victims of sexual assault at work as well as those suffering from the lasting effects of anomalous health incidents (AHI). I would like to hear your plan for ensuring that those who come forward about being hurt in the line of duty are taken seriously and provided the care and the attention they deserve.

Mr. Ratcliffe, if confirmed, you will be sitting at a critical intersection between intelligence and policymaking. Your job will be to give the President the best professional judgment of America's intelligence experts at the CIA, even when that judgment might be inconvenient or uncomfortable. I need your public assurance that

you will always seek to provide unbiased, unvarnished, and timely intelligence assessments to the President, to the Cabinet, to his advisers, and to those of us in Congress.

I need your assurance that this intelligence will represent the best judgments of the CIA, again, regardless of political implications or views.

And though we should not need to say it out loud, I will also need your assurance that you will work to appropriately protect our intelligence community's sources and methods.

Thank you again for your service so far. Thank you for providing what I know will be good testimony today, and I look forward to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Former Attorney General John Ashcroft kindly offered to introduce his former colleague when Congressman Ratcliffe was nominated to be the Director of National Intelligence in 2020, but COVID forced him to do so only by letter.

Fortunately, we have another chance to hear from him today. So I am pleased to recognize Attorney General Ashcroft for his introduction.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Good morning, Chairman Cotton and Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Members of the Committee: I want to thank you for your serious consideration and attention to the constitutional responsibility of confirming high ranking executive branch officials, and it is an honor for me to participate with you by my appearance here today.

Testifying and sharing my profound support for the nomination of the Honorable John Ratcliffe as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is something for which I am deeply grateful. Good national security decisions proceed from the combination of valid intelligence, information, and considered judgment. Integrity is an indispensable imperative for intelligence—the best friend of national security. National security is the singular—unfortunately, is the singular portfolio most allergic to the infection and devaluation that results from inaccuracy and distortion. For high-quality decisionmaking, sound intelligence must never be diluted or contaminated by personal bias or political predisposition.

John Ratcliffe's record of upholding the Constitution and enforcing the law, including his farsighted work in the intelligence field recommends him supremely to serve America as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have known and worked with John for almost decades. I know of no person—no person of a higher commitment to integrity. I have seen him speak the unvarnished truth to those he works with and those he works for, whether senior government officials or corporate CEOs.

As a Member of the Congress, Ratcliffe's career stands as an outstanding record of public service. He is consistently well prepared, tough, but he is a tough and fair interrogator, fundamentally focused on the Constitution, never involving himself in personal attacks.

John has served on the House Intelligence, Judiciary, Ethics, and Homeland Security Committees and as chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee.

In the Department of Justice, John served as a Federal prosecutor, first as an assistant U.S. Attorney and chief of anti-terrorism and national security for the Eastern District of Texas; then as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas, where he pursued more than 30 national security and terrorism related matters. After his service as U.S. Attorney, I had the privilege of working with John in the Ashcroft, Sutton and Ratcliffe law firm where he focused on government and internal investigations, homeland security, and foreign corrupt practices law.

In professional moments, both public and private, I have seen John's thoughtful, decisive, yet humble leadership. He is a careful and willing listener, skilled at proceeding and processing with different voices in complex situations. He is comfortable in being held to account, and he will require those in the Agency to be similarly accountable.

Over the past 15 years, he served in crucial roles as both a developer and consumer of intelligence. John therefore brings to the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency a relevant reservoir of experience as well as sound judgment on an array of issues related to national security. He understands that the intelligence community exists to secure the liberties and freedoms of Americans—liberties and freedoms that he holds in highest regard.

As a prosecutor, John dealt with national security and terrorism-related matters. This ranged from domestic and international terrorism to drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the transnational criminal organizations that threaten us in ways that we have previously not been accustomed to.

During recent decades of our Nation's most elevated concern regarding terrorism, John developed excellent relationships with the international intelligence sources in order to aid America. That experience will serve him well in fostering appropriate cooperation with the intelligence agencies of our allies.

Under John's leadership as Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, he forged policies and statutes which will strengthen and do strengthen our Nation's intelligence gathering capacity.

He is thoroughly conversant with a wide variety of national security topics with a focus on emerging and expanding cybersecurity threats. This includes investigating foreign cybersecurity interference, reviewing the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to secure government networks, evaluating the cyber threat intelligence integration center, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the continuous diagnostics and litigation program together with the interagency coordination on cybersecurity.

John enlisted bipartisan support to build a national cyber intelligence infrastructure to protect our country. President Obama signed a significant cybersecurity bill that John co-authored: The National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act which passed the House of Representatives with an overwhelming bipartisan vote.

His record reflects a commitment to continued building a forward-looking intelligence community that is integrated and coordinated. His experience signals his possession of the skills necessary to lead the intelligence community in effectively addressing proliferating national security threats.

John Ratcliffe is capable of and committed to delivering the most insightful, accurate intelligence and counterintelligence possible. He will supply decisionmakers with excellent information upon which they can base sound judgments safeguarding our national security.

Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, thank you for what I consider to be a privilege of communicating to you my unreserved endorsement of John L. Ratcliffe for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.

I understand that Mr. Ashcroft will now step away?

Mr. ASHCROFT. I will join the citizens.

Chairman COTTON. You are more than welcome to do so.

Mr. ASHCROFT. And observe from the high perch of citizenship the rest of the proceedings. And I pray God's blessing on this Committee. I am very, very pleased that the Committee is seriously considering the statement both of the vice chairman—we used to call that person the ranking member, but I think he is vice chairman now—and the chairman.

I am grateful to you. Thank you for allowing me to be here.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.

Mr. Ratcliffe, before we move to your opening statement, it is the custom of the Committee to ask a series of questions of all nominees. Nothing personal about you.

So first off, do you solemnly swear that you will give this Committee your full and truthful testimony today and in the future?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I do.

Chairman COTTON. Again, we have five standard questions. A simple "yes" will do. A "no" will require further explanation, if you needed help with the test.

First, do you agree to appear before the Committee here and in other venues when invited?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Chairman COTTON. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your agency to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Chairman COTTON. Third, do you agree to provide documents and any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Chairman COTTON. Fourth, will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such material to the Committee when requested?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Chairman COTTON. Finally, do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the chairman and the vice chairman?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Chairman COTTON. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Ratcliffe. The floor is yours for your opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN L. RATCLIFFE

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you very much, Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner, and distinguished Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee for the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have enjoyed meeting with each of you individually, and I look forward to answering your questions today.

Thank you to my friend and mentor former Attorney General John Ashcroft for being here today, and for his gracious and humbling remarks. Sir, I am forever grateful for your faith in me.

Thank you to Director Burns and your excellent team at the CIA for your commitment to a smooth and professional transition.

I would like to recognize my amazing family, my wonderful wife Michelle, our two daughters, Riley and Darby, my five brothers and sisters, and watching from above, my parents Bob and Kathie Ratcliffe. I simply have no words to adequately express my gratitude to all of you.

Finally, thank you, President Trump, for the great honor of nominating me to lead the world's premier intelligence agency. I am grateful for the opportunity to serve under you once again, and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help you protect the American people and advance America's interests.

Today, we face what may be the most challenging national security environment in our Nation's history. The Chinese Communist Party remains committed to dominating the world economically, militarily, and technologically. Transnational criminal organizations are flooding American communities with violence and deadly narcotics. The Russia-Ukraine war wages on, spreading devastation and increasing the risk of the United States being pulled into a conflict with a nuclear power. The Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies continue to export mayhem across the Middle East, and Iran is closer to nuclear breakout than ever before. North Korea remains a destabilizing force. Increasing coordination among America's rivals and adversaries threatens to compound the threats that they each pose to us individually. Numerous terrorist groups and other non-state actors, some of which have even crossed our southern border, still pose a persistent threat to our people and our homeland.

These threats converge at a time of rapid technological change. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing will define the future of national security, geopolitical power, and human civilization.

Ubiquitous technical surveillance is presenting unprecedented challenges to one of the CIA's core missions, collecting human intelligence. In short, the challenges are great and increase the necessity of confirming a CIA Director who is prepared on day one to take them head on.

For roughly a quarter of a century, I have devoted my professional life to U.S. national security. I served as the chief of antiterrorism and national security and then U.S. Attorney for of the Eastern District of Texas. As a Congressman, I was a Member

of the House Intelligence, Homeland Security, and Judiciary Committees. As Director of National Intelligence, I had the privilege of working closely with President Trump and oversaw the 18 agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community, including the Agency I now have the honor of being nominated to lead.

In each of these roles I served with fidelity to the Constitution and the strict adherence to the rule of law, and I have always prioritized American civil liberties, something I will continue to do, if confirmed to serve again.

Each of these experiences has shaped me as a leader and national security professional. Together they have prepared me to steer the CIA through a tumultuous time in the world and toward a future in which the CIA's mission will be both more difficult and more indispensable than ever before.

If confirmed, my leadership at CIA will focus on setting and communicating priorities and demanding relentless execution. Above all will be a strict adherence to the CIA's mission. We will collect intelligence, especially human intelligence, in every corner of the globe, no matter how dark or difficult. We will produce insightful, objective, all-source analysis, never allowing political or personal biases to cloud our judgment or infect our products. We will conduct covert action at the direction of the President, going places no one else can go and doing things no one else can do.

To the brave CIA officers listening around the world, if all of this sounds like what you signed up for, then buckle up and get ready to make a difference. If it doesn't, then it is time to find a new line of work.

We must be the ultimate meritocracy. I will unapologetically empower the most talented, hardest working, and most courageous risk takers and innovators to protect the American people and advance America's interests. And I will not tolerate anything or anyone that distracts from our mission.

It would be inappropriate in an unclassified setting for me to discuss in detail some of my views on intelligence collection priorities, but I am happy to do so in the classified hearing that will follow this one.

However, if confirmed, there are several organizational priorities that I plan to focus on that I would like to discuss here.

The first is talent. As you are all no doubt aware, the CIA has a remarkably low turnover rate among its workforce. This shows the CIA's success in attracting mission-focused public servants who find deep meaning and value in the unique work they are privileged to do every day. But in some cases, it also suggests that complacency is tolerated. High performers hate nothing more than mediocrity and nothing poisons a high-performance workplace culture than leaders who don't hold team members accountable when they don't meet expectations. The CIA must be a place that incentivizes and rewards meaningful contributions to our Nation's security and holds accountable low performers and bad actors who are not focused on our mission.

It has been said that the CIA's World War II predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), described its ideal recruit as "a Ph.D. who could win a bar fight." This sentiment is the essence of what today's CIA must recapture, but we must find that fighting

spirit in recruits whose talents, skill sets, and backgrounds are more varied than ever.

I will also work to develop pathways for mid-career professionals with highly sought after skills to fill gaps in the Agency's workforce and for CIA officers to do rotations in the private sector that broaden their perspectives.

I am committed to protecting and supporting CIA's workforce. We will fully investigate workforce health and wellness issues, including anomalous health incidents (AHI). Our officers must embrace a culture of toughness and resilience but we must also be clear that when they put themselves in harm's way we will make sure they are taken care of when they return home. We owe that to America's men and women in uniform, and we owe it to the silent warriors who risk their lives in the shadows as well.

Altogether, these talent strategies will be particularly important in addressing another organizational priority that I will focus on—technology. At the CIA technology is both a tool and a target. As a tool, technology is baked into nearly every facet of the Agency, from the spy gadgets imagined and created by the Directorate of Science and Technology and used by the Directorate of Operations, and the cyber capabilities deployed by the Directorate of Digital Innovation to the Directorate of Support using new technology tools to support our workforce and the AI-powered large language models used by the Directorate of Analysis. But over the decades, as technological innovation has shifted more and more from the public sector to the private sector, the CIA has struggled to keep pace. As a target, technology is more important than ever, whether it is understanding our adversaries' capabilities in AI and quantum computing or their developments in hypersonics and emerging space technologies or their innovations in counterintelligence and surveillance, the recent creation of the Agency's Transnational and Technology Mission Center was an acknowledgment of that fact, but much more has to be done because our adversaries, and one in particular, that I will discuss now, understand that the Nation who wins the race of emerging technologies of today will dominate the world of tomorrow.

Which brings me to the need for the CIA to continue in increasing intensity to focus on the threats posed by China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party.

As DNI, I dramatically increased the intelligence community's resources devoted to China. I openly warned the American people that from my unique vantage point as an official who saw more intelligence than anyone else, I assessed that China was far and away our top national security threat.

President Trump has been an incredible leader on this issue, and it is encouraging that a bipartisan consensus has emerged in recent years. The recent creation of the CIA's China Mission Center is an example of the good work that must continue.

In closing, the Agency must provide the President and U.S. policymakers with the best possible intelligence to inform their decisionmaking in hopes of preserving peace and spreading prosperity. This is our once in a generation challenge. The intelligence is clear. Our response must be clear as well.

I am honored for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I thank you for your consideration of my nomination to be Director of the CIA, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of the witness follows:]

Ratcliffe Opening Statement

Thank you very much Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner, and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I enjoyed meeting with each of you individually and I look forward to answering your questions today.

Thank you to my friend and mentor, former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft for being here today and for his gracious and humbling remarks. I am forever grateful for your faith in me.

Thank you to Director Burns and your excellent team at CIA for your commitment to a smooth and professional transition.

I'd like to recognize my amazing family—my wonderful wife and daughters, Michele, Riley and Darby—my five brothers and sisters and watching from above, my parents Bob and Kathie Ratcliffe. I simply have no words to adequately express my gratitude to all of you.

And finally, thank you President Trump for the great honor of nominating me to lead the world's premier intelligence agency. I am grateful for the opportunity to serve under you once again and, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help you protect the American people and advance America's interests.

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Ubiquitous technical surveillance is presenting unprecedented challenges to one of the CIA's core missions: collecting human intelligence.

In short, the challenges are great, and increase the necessity of confirming a CIA Director who is prepared on Day One to take them head-on.

For roughly a quarter-century, I have devoted my professional life to U.S. national security.

I served as the Chief of Anti-Terrorism and National Security and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas. As a Congressman, I was a member of the House Intelligence, Homeland Security, and Judiciary committees. As Director of National Intelligence, I had the privilege of working closely with President Trump and oversaw the 18 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, including the agency I now have the honor of being nominated to lead. In each of these roles, I served with fidelity to the Constitution and a strict adherence to the rule of law. And I have always prioritized Americans' civil liberties – something that I will continue to do if confirmed to serve again.

Each of these experiences has shaped me as a leader and national security professional. Together, they have prepared me to steer the CIA through a tumultuous time in the world, and toward a future in which the CIA's mission will be both more difficult and more indispensable than ever.

If confirmed, my leadership at CIA will focus on setting and communicating priorities, and demanding relentless execution.

Above all will be a strict adherence to the CIA's mission. We will collect intelligence – especially human intelligence – in every corner of the globe, no matter how dark or difficult. We will produce insightful, objective, all-source analysis, never allowing political or personal biases to cloud our judgement or infect our products. We will conduct covert action at the direction of the president, going places no one else can go and doing things no one else can do.

To the brave CIA officers listening around the world, if all of this sounds like what you signed up for, then buckle up and get ready to make a difference. If it doesn't, then it's time to find a new line of work.

We must be the ultimate meritocracy. I will unapologetically empower the most talented, hardest working, and most courageous risk-takers and innovators to protect the American people and advance America's interest, and I will not tolerate anything or anyone that distracts from our mission.

It would be inappropriate in this unclassified setting for me to discuss in detail my views on intelligence collection priorities, but I am happy to do so in the classified hearing to follow.

However, if confirmed, there are several organizational priorities that I plan to focus on that I'd like to discuss here.

The first is talent.

As you all are no doubt aware, the CIA has a remarkably low turnover rate among its workforce. This shows the CIA's success in attracting mission-focused public servants who find deep meaning and value in the unique work they are privileged to do each day. But in some cases, it also suggests that complacency is tolerated – and in the worst cases, bad actors are not weeded out. High performers hate nothing more than mediocrity, and nothing poisons a high-performance workplace culture more than leaders who don't hold team members accountable when they do not meet expectations. The CIA must be a place that incentivizes and rewards meaningful contributions to our nation's security and holds accountable low performers and bad actors who are not focused on our mission.

It has been said that the CIA's World War II predecessor – the OSS – described its ideal recruit as “a Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.” This sentiment is the essence of what today's CIA must recapture. But we must find that fighting spirit in recruits whose talents, skill sets, and backgrounds are more varied than ever.

I will also work to develop pathways for mid-career professionals with highly sought-after skills to fill gaps in the Agency's workforce, and for CIA officers to do rotations in the private sector that broaden their perspective.

I am committed to protecting and supporting the CIA's workforce. We will fully investigate workforce health and wellness issues, including Anomalous Health Incidents. Our officers must embrace a culture of toughness and resilience. But we must also be clear that when they put themselves in harm's way, we will make sure they're taken care of when they return home. We owe that to America's men and women in uniform, and we owe it to the silent warriors who risk their lives in the shadows as well.

Altogether, these talent strategies will be particularly important in addressing another organizational priority I will focus on: technology.

At the CIA, technology is both a tool and a target.

As a tool, technology is baked into nearly every facet of the Agency, from the spy gadgets imagined and created by the Directorate of Science and Technology and used by the Directorate of Operations, to the cyber capabilities deployed by the Directorate of Digital Innovation, to how the Directorate of Support uses new tech tools to support our workforce, to AI powered large language models used by the Directorate of Analysis.

But over the decades, as technological innovation has shifted more and more from the public sector to the private sector, the CIA has struggled to keep pace.

As a target, technology is more important than ever, whether it's understanding our adversaries' capabilities in AI and quantum computing, or their developments in hypersonics and emerging space technologies, or their innovations in counterintelligence and surveillance.

The recent creation of the Agency's Transnational and Technology Mission Center was an acknowledgement of this fact. And the recently created position of Chief Technology Officer showed an effort to increase technological cohesion internally and to build bridges with cutting edge technologists externally.

But much more has to be done. Because our adversaries – and one in particular, which I will discuss now – understand that the nation who wins the race in the emerging technologies of today, will dominate the world of tomorrow.

Which brings me to the need for the CIA to continue – and increase in intensity – its focus on the threats posed by China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party.

As DNI, I dramatically increased the Intelligence Community's resources devoted to China. I openly warned the American people that from my unique vantage point as the official who saw more U.S. intelligence than anyone else, I assessed that China was far and away our top national security threat.

President Trump has been an incredible leader on this issue, and it is encouraging that a bipartisan consensus has emerged in recent years. The recent creation of the CIA's China Mission Center is an example of the good work that must continue. The Agency must provide the president and U.S. policymakers with the best possible intelligence to inform their decision-making in hopes of preserving peace and spreading prosperity.

This is our once-in-a-generation challenge. The intelligence is clear. Our response must be as well.

I am honored for the opportunity to appear before you today and I thank you for your consideration of my nomination to be the Director of the CIA. I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.

Colleagues, I will remind you that we will move on to questions now for five minutes each in order of seniority at the gavel. When we conclude this open session will have a 30-minute break and move directly into a closed session.

Mr. Ratcliffe, the Director of the CIA has four responsibilities under the law: No. 1, collecting foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence; No. 2, correlating, evaluating, and disseminating that intelligence; No. 3, directing and coordinating all human intelligence collection outside the U.S., and No. 4, performing other intelligence functions as directed by the President.

The way I count those four responsibilities, at least three of them are about collecting foreign intelligence. And I said in my opening statement that collecting foreign intelligence is the core mission of the CIA. Do you agree that it is the core mission of the CIA to aggressively and unapologetically collect foreign intelligence; which is to say, steal the secrets of our adversaries to protect this Nation?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I do, Senator. That is why in my opening I said we would go to every corner of the globe no matter how dark or difficult to do that. Look, I know this Committee knows as well that on this issue with regard to HUMINT, the collecting of human intelligence, we are not where we are supposed to be. And other agencies collect HUMINT, but CIA is the world's premier and must be the world's premier clandestine collector of human intelligence.

Yes, there are challenges. We talked about some of those—ubiquitous technical surveillance—but some of that, Senator, is an issue of making it a priority and focus and execution. You mentioned in your opening a former director once recently said that the CIA does not steal secrets, and I think that was demoralizing to the Directorate of Operations. So I am here to publicly say that if confirmed, that is exactly what the CIA is going to do.

Good decisions are hostage to good information and good intelligence, and the better we do at collecting human intelligence, the better decisions you all can make, the better analytic judgments analysts can make, and the fewer intelligence lapses or failures that you highlighted, Mr. Chairman, will occur, if we embrace that as a priority.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you.

With intelligence collection as the core mission of the CIA, then I presume you agree in my opening statement that the people who collect the intelligence are the main effort in the Agency, everyone else is a supporting effort—important jobs to be sure but a supporting effort; is that right?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Chairman COTTON. Do we need to increase the ratio of people in that main effort who are collecting intelligence to the people who are supporting and using it to harness its use?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. To the point of what the core mission is in increasing human intelligence one of the things if confirmed I will spend some time. I had an opportunity to go out to the Agency a few times as a nominee, but if confirmed, I do want to spend time looking at that, Senator, in terms of the ratios and how resources are being deployed, the structure in which those resources exist

currently, and whether or not that needs to change to improve our performance.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you. Let's talk a little bit about analytic objectivity at the CIA. That starts with you. You have a partisan background. We all on this dais have partisan backgrounds. We have thrown partisan punches as much as the next guy has. It also is not without precedent. Republican politicians have taken over this job before—George H.W. Bush or Mike Pompeo; Democratic politicians like Leon Panetta have taken it over. I think for the record all three of them were pretty good at the job. Can you assure the committee, your workforce at the Agency and the American people that despite your partisan background and politics, you will set aside those partisan views and you will be someone who can be effectively lead the Agency delivering the intelligence and analysis that the President and the Congress depends on?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I can, Mr. Chairman.

While I enjoyed my time in Congress, I enjoyed more my time as DNI and the opportunity to be apolitical, and look forward to, if being confirmed as CIA Director, to continuing to do that. It is absolutely essential that the CIA leader be apolitical.

As you know that when you walk in the building at the CIA, inscribed on the wall is the quote "and ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." That is a reminder to CIA officers when they walk in about the truth. Collecting the truth, intelligence, critical information, so that American people can be free. Freedom and liberty are dependent on the CIA doing that job and doing it in an apolitical way. So I am very much committed to that, and look forward to that if confirmed.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you.

Congress mandated by law the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman for Objectivity at the CIA. It requires the office to quote "conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the Agency." In your preparation for this hearing, have you had an opportunity to review the results of the most recent survey of that office?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I have had a chance to see a summary. I haven't seen in detail the results of the congressionally mandated survey. I do know, though, that looking at it, what I can tell you at the top line, the participation in the survey was not what it should be and it reflects that a significant percentage of the current CIA workforce does have concerns about the objectivity of the products that they are producing, and even cited that in specific instances to include the PDB, the President's daily brief, included some of those products that the workforce felt were not being objectively produced.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you. I am glad you saw and reached those conclusions. The office in that survey is a good way for the workforce to communicate to the leadership and to the Congress what is happening sometimes out of our sight, and I am hopeful that you will address that if confirmed.

Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Ratcliffe, thank you for your opening comments. I appreciate your comments about technology. I appreciate your com-

ments about independence in the workforce. I appreciate actually the Chairman asking this as well.

I want to come back to a couple of these topics, because there is concern in the community. I hear it, you may have heard it. When we hear statements by incoming administration officials, and occasionally even from the President-elect himself, attacking the intelligence community and threatening to replace long-term career civil servants if they are somehow deemed as not sufficiently loyal. You have addressed this but I want to address it again right now.

What assurances can you provide to this Committee and to the CIA workforce that you will resist efforts to fire or force out career CIA employees because of perceived political views or somehow their views of loyalty to the President?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I think the best example of that, Mr. Vice Chairman, is if you look at my record, and my record as DNI. That never took place. That is never something anyone has alleged and it is something that I would never do. So I would approach this position very much the same way and provide the same assurance.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Again, I think there has been—a lot has happened in the last four years since your prior service. There have been these comments.

I would emphasize again, if you are asked to remove personnel, to get rid of individuals based on this political litmus test, I would ask that you keep the committee informed of those requests.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I certainly will.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Same thing—and again, I appreciate the Chairman raising this as well. The most important job for you, for the folks at the CIA, is speaking truth to power. And I want to again reiterate the question Senator Cotton raised. We want to make sure your analysis is objective. It is not politically influenced. We have got to make sure it is timely. This willingness to speak truth to power, even if it is uncomfortable. I would like you to speak to that again.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Vice Chairman Warner, I appreciated the opportunity for you and I to visit. As you recall, this issue came up, and I was grateful then and will take this opportunity to talk about what my record is in terms of speaking truth to power.

If you recall, we talked about the fact that as a Member of Congress, I was the individual who was outside the Judiciary Committee in 2019 listening to the former FBI Director Jim Comey say that my line of questioning was political; that the idea that intelligence authorities at the FISA Court being abused couldn't possibly happen—was a bunch of nonsense. But I had reviewed those applications and I knew that I was speaking truth to power, and the inspector general and the subsequent FBI Director later confirmed that under oath.

To that point, Director Wray this week in his exit interview said that China was the defining threat of our generation. I wrote that and said that four years ago as DNI, and when I did I was accused of being political. But I wasn't. I was speaking truth to power. I wasn't outsizing the threat from China.

In 2020, when a chairman of an intelligence committee misrepresented that a laptop owned by then-candidate Biden's son was somehow a Russian intelligence operation and 51 former intel-

ligence officials used the imprimatur of IC authority to go along with that, I stood in the breach. I stood alone and told the American people the truth about that.

So I think my record in terms of speaking truth to power and defending the intelligence community and its good work is very clear. And what I can assure you is, those types of instances if I am in that position as CIA Director and have to do that again, as uncomfortable as that can be to be accused, you know, the truth will ultimately defend itself, and I think that intelligence will as well.

Vice Chairman WARNER. And the truth will defend itself even if that truth is counter to the views of the current administration. At the end of the day it has to lead back to the truth.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Correct.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Time for one last question. As you well know, our intelligence community is the best in the world, but we also receive an enormous amount of benefit from our partners around the world. We have got to make sure, and obviously the President has the right to declassify information; but we have seen that willingness to declassify in advance of Putin's brutal attack on Ukraine used effectively but if we look at the declassification particularly if it is done below the Presidential level, making sure we consider the sources and methods of our allies, there is no requirement that intelligence is shared. It is based on a trust relationship.

I'd like you to briefly speak to how we maintain that trust relationship with the very valuable information we receive from our allies and partners around the world.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, I agree completely. As DNI, I was able to experience what you just said. We do have the best intelligence enterprise in the world, but we have great partners around the world that we work with to do great things to improve not just our national security posture, but theirs. That is reliant upon mutual trust and respect for intelligence sharing between intelligence agencies.

And as CIA Director, if confirmed, I will understand that improving our national security posture and protecting the American people will be absolutely dependent upon maintaining those relationships and maintaining that trust.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thanks. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome. For the past nine years at least, anomalous health incidents also known as the Havana syndrome, have been a serious and persistent problem within the intelligence community. At first there was a robust effort to investigate the cause of these incidents and to support the possible victims. Along with other Senators on this Committee, I was one of the authors of the HAVANA Act to ensure that there was funding available for those who had been afflicted.

However, more recently, support for both investigative analysis and for victims within the CIA have decreased. Then we have had some interesting developments. On December 5th, the House Committee on Intelligence released an unclassified report finding that there was an increasing likelihood that a foreign adversary was responsible for at least some of the reported AHI cases.

Then on the 10th of January, the ODNI released an updated intelligence assessment of the AHIs that revealed that two intelligence agencies reported that they believed a foreign actor may have used some sort of novel weapon or prototype device to inflict AHI's on our personnel.

This is very disturbing to me. It raises questions of whether dissenting voices were suppressed in earlier analyses. And my basic question to you is this: What actions, if confirmed, will you take to ensure that the CIA aggressively and objectively investigates the causes of the AHIs including examining whether or not a foreign adversary is responsible for harming the men and women who are serving our country?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Senator Collins, thank you for the question, and I want to start by saying that I enjoyed the chance to visit with you. And as you recall, we talked about this issue from my perspective four years ago when I was the Director of National Intelligence and you were as concerned then as you are now about this issue, along with Senator Rubio.

I asked then-CIA Director Haspel to look into the issue four years ago. Having stepped away, I share your frustration that four years later we are very much in the same place in terms of trying to make an assessment and determination on the cause of this. I share your frustration in not being able to understand why. But, if confirmed, and have the opportunity to be briefed on all the assessments and intelligence, my pledge to you is that I will drill down and look carefully at that issue and work with you to see.

I read the unclassified report, the House report and the unclassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment. I have not had access to the—my understanding—very lengthy classified report. But I look forward to drilling down on that because as I talked about in my opening, the workforce has been affected by this and it has affected their morale because of this and it is why I highlighted that.

So the cause of it is one point, but the care of the CIA workforce that has been affected is another. But they are equally important to me. So my pledge is to look into it but to work with you to try and—obviously we need to know if we have an adversary that is using a weapon against our people, and I look forward to my ability to look at that intelligence for myself.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, and I look forward to working with you.

I have very little time left. The Chairman mentioned that the intelligence community for which I have the greatest respect has had some significant misjudgments lately.

For example, there was a misjudgment of how long the Afghan government would stand after the United States' hasty and ill-advised withdrawal. The IC missed early assessments on Ukraine's willingness to fight, projecting incorrectly how quickly the Russians would be able to take Kyiv. They did not warn or predict the Hamas mass attack against Israel. The IC was surprised at South Korea's martial law declaration, nor did they predict the rapid collapse of the Syrian regime.

My question to you—and I know the IC is not going to get it right every time. But when there is a pattern or even when there

is a miss, what should the IC do to review why these major intelligence changes were not identified or predicted?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Senator.

It is what I talked about I think in response to Chairman Cotton's question about this. The intelligence community is not always going to get it right. It hasn't always gotten it right. But we have had too many instances where you all as policymakers are finding out by watching news reports about some of these things that I think can be at least in some cases at least fairly characterized as intelligence failures or lapses.

We talked about what can we do, what do we need to do. Part of it is a technical thing in terms of improving our collection, addressing ubiquitous technical surveillance. I know I haven't been fully briefed on this but I am impressed by some of the things for instance that the Directorate of Science and Technology is doing to help us solve for X with regard to operating as human sources in an environment of UTS.

But I also think a bigger part of this that I am going to focus on, Senator, is to look at what is happening in terms of the focus and execution on core mission. Better—as I said, good decisions are hostage to good information and we all know that the human intelligence collection isn't where it needs to be. So, looking at the reasons why we have lost our focus there and some of those things are, you know, if you have a politically motivated bureaucratically imposed social justice agenda that takes up part of your attention, that can distract from the core mission of collecting human intelligence that matters and providing it to you in a timely way. My pledge to you is that I am as every bit as concerned, and I don't want those intelligence failures or lapses to happen on my watch, and I will do everything I can to ensure that it doesn't.

Chairman COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe, for the thorough answer. I know that you would be thrilled to stay here all day long to answer our questions. But, colleagues, try to move it along. I know there are four or other five hearings going on. Some of you may have to get to those hearings. Let's try to move quickly and stick to the 5-minute limit. We will have a chance to question Mr. Ratcliffe in the closed hearing, and I'm sure he will be happy to answer your questions for the record as well.

Senator KING.

Senator KING. I am hoping that quantum computing might solve the problem of having to be three places at once here after these hearings.

I first want to acknowledge a new Senator at the end of the dais, Senator Young, and welcome him to the committee. I am pleased he is joining us and I know he will make a great contribution.

Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you.

Senator KING. Welcome. It seems to me that you have an initial task that is a little unusual but also very important and that is to restore the confidence of the President-elect in the intelligence community. Before you could deliver the information that he needs to know, you need to get him to a place where he does have confidence in the judgments that are coming to him and he is notoriously skeptical of the intelligence community. Being skeptical is not

necessarily a bad thing. But I hope that is one of the first things that you can work with him on is to make him receptive to the information and the truth that you will be providing as a result of your position.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, thank you, Senator.

I think one of the reasons that I am having this opportunity for you all to consider me for confirmation is because President Trump knows and wants me to lead with integrity, wants me to carry out the duties of the CIA as director to follow the law and authorities as far as it will go and no further to protect America's national security.

Senator KING. I think that confidence he has in you is an important asset. I would suggest rebuilding his confidence in the community is an important task.

Let me move forward. Everybody has talked about telling the truth to power. Dan Coats, one of your predecessors at DNI, put it most succinctly and persuasively. He said the mission of the intelligence community is to find the truth and tell the truth. I think that is a very good way to look at it. We haven't talked much here today about why that is so important.

I recently reread David Halberstam's book "The Best and the Brightest," a comprehensive history of Vietnam.

It is heartbreaking about the intelligence failures and frankly, intelligence manipulation that led to a great deal of that tragedy. So that is why it is so important, because skewed intelligence can equal lives lost. And you have already committed and I won't make you say so again, but I think you understand how important this is.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I do.

Senator KING. Four years ago I asked you a series of yes and no questions and you answered them all correctly. I would like to run through them once more very briefly.

Would you ever ask, encourage, or support an intelligence professional adjusting his or her assessment to avoid criticism from the White House or political appointees?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. No.

Senator KING. Would you ever change or remove content in an intelligence assessment for political reasons or at the behest of political leadership?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. No.

Senator KING. Would you consider an individual's personal political preferences to include loyalty to the President in making a decision to hire, fire, or promote an individual?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. No.

Senator KING. And do you commit to exclusively consider professional qualifications and IC personnel decisions without consideration of partisan or political factors?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Senator KING. If you were to receive credible evidence as Director of the CIA that an individual was undermining objectivity and furthering a political agenda in the intelligence community, would you remove or discipline that person?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Senator KING. Will you or any of your staff impose a political litmus test for CIA employees?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. No.

Senator KING. Finally, if confirmed, will you reassure your workforce that loyalty tests are not allowed and not encouraged in the CIA?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I will.

Senator KING. Those were exactly the answers that you gave before. Thank you.

One other brief question. I believe that you are the author of an important statute on cybersecurity. And I have done extensive work in that area myself. I believe that one of the great failings in national policy is a lack of the cyber deterrent strategy that our adversaries, particularly China, feel that they can attack our telecommunications system, our electrical system or whatever with impunity. Do you believe it would serve the national interest to develop a declaratory cyber deterrent strategy similar to the strategy that underlies the rest of our national defense posture?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I do, Senator, and I know we share a similar view on the threat from cyber. There is so much focus on the integrity—the sovereignty and integrity of our territorial borders, but as you well know, it is invasion through our digital borders from half a world away and a few seconds and a few key strokes that can cause—

Senator KING. And it is happening every day.

Mr. RATCLIFFE [continuing]. So much damage. The deterrent effect has to be that there are consequences to our adversaries when they do that.

One of the things that I hope to do if confirmed as CIA Director is to work on the development of the types of tools that will be effective in allowing us to do those things. The deployment of those capabilities, of course, will be a policy decision for others to make. But I would like to make sure that we have all of the tools necessary to go on offense against our adversaries in the cyber means.

Senator KING. Thank you very much. I hope you will advocate in the councils of the national security apparatus of the administration. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe. I appreciate your testimony.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Lankford.

Senator LANKFORD. John, Michele, thank you for being here. Thanks for your leadership. Thanks for your sacrifice, and what you have already done to serve the Nation. We really appreciate that.

It is a tremendous sacrifice to serve in the intelligence community. As my wife has said to me a couple of times, we share everything about everything and talk about life together. But now there is a portion of my life I can't talk about with her, serving on the Intelligence Committee. You have had even more of that serving as DNI. So thanks for your sacrifice to serve.

I have several questions I want to run through quickly on this. There are a group of folks in Oklahoma City. I can't name who they are because they are alive, but their lives were threatened on election day by an ISIS terrorist in Oklahoma City that was discovered initially by a 702.

That 702 authority is important. There are people in my neighborhood that are alive today because of that 702 authority. You have been outspoken on this. It has been much maligned in many ways, but it has been vital for intelligence collection around the world.

What is your position on 702 authority?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Senator Lankford, for the sentiment and for the question. FISA and particularly Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is an indispensable national security tool. There is no other way to get around that. I say that not as a matter of opinion, but as an informed judgment in my role as Director of National Intelligence being the President's principal intelligence adviser, advising the President in the Oval Office and understanding that a significant percentage—sometimes more than half of the actionable foreign intelligence that we provide to the President as the policymaker to act as Commander in Chief comes from FISA-derived or 702-derived action.

I will say I have supported FISA in that regard, but I also, as I outlined earlier, understand that it is an important indispensable tool but one that can be abused.

Senator LANKFORD. Right.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. And that we must do everything we can to ensure it has the appropriate safeguards, because it can't come at the sacrifice of Americans' civil liberties. So I have supported those reforms and called out those abuses when they have taken place.

Senator LANKFORD. I think the best way to do that is by actually enforcing. Those that have abused it, that they are actually called out and accountability is held for those individuals so everybody knows this is an indispensable tool. Don't abuse it. I think that becomes very clear. You have mentioned in your testimony, we cannot ignore CIA's critical counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in support of border security efforts. I think few Americans understand just south of our border is one of the most violent areas of the world. Today, there are murders, beheadings. There are aerial bombardments with one cartel fighting within itself fighting for leadership right now. It is an incredibly violent area just south of our border, not to mention the thousands of Americans that die with the narcotics they pump into the United States, and destabilize our economy and our families. That is a critical role for us in our national security. How do you perceive that?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, and it also ties in, Senator, to your question about the importance of FISA. So much of what the CIA has done and can do to support U.S. Government efforts to interrupt the drug trafficking rings and the places from which the precursor chemicals for those drugs come from, our disruptions are often as a result of FISA-derived information.

But you highlight an important point. We talk about the threats from China and Russia and other adversaries overseas, but I think we all know and understand and acknowledge that the failures and the integrity of our border has turned my home State of Texas as not only a border State but every State into a border State. We have to make sure, and one of the things, if confirmed, that I want to talk about and pledge is the understanding that in addition to drug trafficking I made the point about terrorists coming across

our border, that we not lose sight of counterterrorism as something that the CIA needs to be focused on as we talk so much about the threat from China and Russia and the great power competition.

Senator LANKFORD. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back 12 seconds to you. How about that for a gift?

Chairman COTTON. Thank you. Senator Bennet, please follow Senator Lankford's example.

Senator BENNET. Thank you. I will take Senator Lankford's 12 seconds. I'm just kidding.

I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on taking on this role, and I want to thank the Vice Chairman for your leadership on this Committee. I hope that we will continue with the standard that you set for all of us in terms of politics.

Congressman Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Thank you for your visit to the office.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. As well.

Senator BENNET. I know you are a student of history and a student of this Committee, know that this Committee came out of the series of reforms that Congress put together to deal with a really dark chapter in American history. Senator King from Maine talked about bad intelligence during Vietnam. There were instances of the CIA engaging in assassination plots abroad. It is hard to imagine today that that is even true.

That provoked bipartisan outrage, and the reason this Committee exists in part is not just to make the policy that you have been talking about and others this morning, but also to provide oversight on behalf of the American people and our colleagues who, as Senator Lankford was just saying, don't have access to the intelligence that the people on this Committee have.

I would just ask you to talk a little bit about your views on what the purpose of that congressional oversight is and what, if you are confirmed to this position, what your responsibility to this Committee will be?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Senator Bennet. I enjoyed the chance to visit with you and talk about a number of issues. As you know from my background, I came from Congress. I was on an Oversight Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. So I think it gives me a unique perspective, I brought that over as DNI and if confirmed, as CIA Director. I have the perspective of both the executive branch and the legislative branch.

I will confess that one of the things I was disappointed in was the fact that despite being on a congressional Oversight Committee over the intelligence communities, there was so much intelligence that I learned for the first time as DNI that I knew that no Member of Congress was aware of.

And I think that that sort of speaks to my approach and understanding, that I take seriously the obligation that I will have if confirmed as CIA Director to keep this Committee fully and currently informed on intelligence issues.

It is not that this Committee or any Intelligence Committee or any oversight committee in Congress needs to know everything, but you should at least know the topic exists.

Senator BENNET. So let's talk about that a little bit, Congressman. When the President gets his Presidential daily brief every

day. There is a very high standard for veracity for what is in that because he has to obviously make the most significant decisions that any human has to make about deploying our defense assets or the other things that a President does.

We don't have anything like that in Congress. And a lot of the time we are often, as you said, finding ourselves fishing around in headlines and sort of less well-organized intelligence materials that we are provided, with no assurance that it is a complete picture of anything. So I wonder what your conclusion about that is and what the obligation of the CIA or any intelligence agency is with your leadership to be able to provide a fuller picture, the picture that you are talking about that a Member of Congress who is on this Committee should actually know rather than be guessing about?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, my perspective is you have highlighted all the things that sort of reveal that our national security posture is impacted in a negative way when we are not communicating well between the branches of government, and particularly on sensitive national security matters.

I think a better informed Congress will allow for better national security decisions and keep the American people safe. I am open to a continuing dialogue about how—I won't stand on tradition. This is traditionally what the CIA does or shares. I am open to at the end of the day, we talk about the core mission of the CIA. It is to provide a decisive strategic advantage to you and to the President as policymakers. I don't view it as just informing the President. I view it as integral that I be informing you to provide that same strategic decisive advantage.

Senator BENNET. I am out of time but I appreciate very much of the fulsomeness of your answer. I want to observe that it is really easy for politicians to accuse the intelligence agencies of politicization and actually it is important that we do that when it is an the appropriate thing to do. But this is the place where that oversight is supposed to be provided. These are the people that are supposed to fix that problem. And it can only be done if we have people with integrity that are working at the heads of these agencies that can help us fix the problems, not just complain about it. And I hope we will be able to work together to do that. Thank you Mr. Ratcliffe. I look forward to working with you.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Rounds.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ratcliffe, thank you for your service to our country already, and to Michele, thank you for the sacrifice which you also offer in allowing him to do this particular job in the future.

I want to go back to the FISA Section 702 just a little bit. We are in an open session, and I think one of the opportunities that we have is to perhaps share with the American people with a little bit more clarity what 702 is really all about and what actually happens.

Can you kind of describe in an approach that—OK. It is coming up for renewal again in April of next year. And between now and then we are going to have to convince the American people and other Members of Congress that we have made significant improvements in the protections, but also we have done our best to try to

explain why this is such an important part of, as a tool, in our collection approach.

Can you talk a little bit about the mechanics so that as those who listen to you today, they understand what FISA 702 actually is and how it fits into the collection process?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Sure. Senator, thank you. I enjoyed the chance to visit with you. I know we, we are like-minded in terms of the importance of 702 as I talked with Senator Lankford and how I view it as an indispensable tool.

It is one that I used as a prosecutor. General Ashcroft talked about national security and terrorism related investigations. I have used it as a practical matter there. Like you as a legislator have seen it. But then the unique perspective as DNI and if confirmed here, the importance of it in fulfilling the core mission.

702 allows for foreign—collecting foreign intelligence on foreign persons, not on U.S. persons. The controversy, why some people think that FISA is, no pun intended, a four-letter word, that in the course of technical collection on foreign persons for foreign intelligence to make good decisions to keep our country safe, that sometimes U.S. persons are incidentally collected. In other words, they are having a conversation with a foreign person.

Senator ROUNDS. Look, we eavesdrop, don't we?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Senator ROUNDS. We are not eavesdropping on Americans. We are eavesdropping on people that are not American citizens and we are doing it outside of our country.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. That's right.

Senator ROUNDS. And in the middle of it, we have Americans that are sometimes caught up and maybe perhaps having a conversation with somebody outside the country.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. That's right.

Senator ROUNDS. At that point there may have been something collected inadvertently. Can we use that?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So there is, for instance, when the CIA collects intelligence, it is allowable to do a U.S. person query where you are looking for someone that might be communicating with some foreign person to do something bad to the United States.

What you can't have is accessing that or making the query for political reasons or for some reason other than protecting our national security. We have to have the safeguards to make sure that those kinds of abuses can't take place and be misused. And my pledge to you is, if confirmed as CIA Director, that that won't happen.

I will point out that I haven't been briefed on everything, but I am impressed with the CIA's compliance rate with regard to U.S. person queries is 99.6 percent, meaning they do a really good job of making sure that Americans who are swept up incidentally aren't having their civil liberties violated. Is it perfect? No. But—

Senator ROUNDS. But there were reforms made based upon practices that were not appropriate several years ago.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. That's correct.

Senator ROUNDS. As you are reporting it. But they have already been addressed.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. That's correct.

Senator ROUNDS. So you would be supportive of the renewal of 702 and perhaps there are some additional considerations, but at this point it is critical we get it renewed?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. It is critical. It is indispensable, and for critics of it, no one has offered a replacement. If, for instance, half of the actionable foreign intelligence comes from FISA 702, what are we going to replace that with? And the critics haven't provided any alternative to that. And so——

Senator ROUNDS. And look, and I agree and I thought it was important in this open setting that we there be a better understanding or a better clarification.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I mean.

Senator ROUNDS. How critical it is and what it really is. It is basically looking at things overseas and not in the United States.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I think it is going to be an iterative ongoing discussion and needs to be as it comes up for reauthorization again, and it will be incumbent on me if confirmed both within the administration and outside stress the things that you and I are talking about and make sure that people understand, and to dispel false narratives about how FISA is being misused or can be misused.

Senator ROUNDS. Correct. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Gillibrand.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe, for your service. Thank you for meeting with me. We had an excellent conversation about a number of our priorities on the committee, but mine specifically. Pandemic preparedness was one issue. AHIs which Senator Collins covered very effectively and sexual assault and harassment in the military. So I just want to address those so you can talk about them publicly.

As we discussed, we need to do a much better job in detecting and preventing and knowing the intelligence to prepare for the next pandemic. We didn't have the type of collaboration we needed to prepare for COVID. We had disagreements about how COVID began and we never really got resolution on that, which is a concern for me. But this idea of a one-health proposal is creating essentially a fusion center for the CIA, the NSA, the DoD, the Department of Agriculture, and HHS, so that you are in real time working collaboratively to detect this information. Because agriculture and science, they often share data and information, and we know with regard to the Wuhan lab that they were publishing data and information about the tests they were doing. The scientific community had access to that. The CIA, on the other hand, was looking into other intelligence. They might have been able to get the details about illnesses quicker than anyone else. But none of these groups were talking so the data wasn't shared in a timely basis, so we didn't really have the information we could have had if the CIA was talking to the medical community, the scientific community, and the agricultural community, in terms of research. So I just want your commitment that you will work with me on this very important issue because the CIA can play such a meaningful role in protecting our Nation from such other threats such as a pandemic or any use of a biological weapon or any use of that kind of harm to the United States.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Senator Gillibrand, I really did enjoy the chance to visit and talk about these issues. I agree completely. I do pledge to work with you on that.

You know, we go back to one of the worst incidents in our Nation's history, 9/11. It was a failure of communication. We had the intelligence. We just weren't sharing it with each other in a way that would prevent that. And you brought up COVID is the more recent example where maybe as many as 25 million people died worldwide and at least a million Americans as a result of that. And one of the things—when I came in as DNI—to your point, was I was surprised at the lack of coordination between for instance the intelligence community and health agencies like the CDC and NIH and the ability to—that channels were not open to share information like you are talking about. So many of these things can be if not prevented mitigated quickly if we are communicating and sharing intelligence better.

I completely agree with the sentiment that you have expressed and look forward to working with you to make sure that we are doing those things if I am confirmed as CIA Director.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. And I just want to associate myself with the comments of Senator Collins with regard to AHIs. I think it is essential, as I mentioned in our hearing, that you collaborate with the Department of Defense, with their intelligence agencies, to understand what the nature of these effects are, what causes them, and what type of adversaries can be using technology in a way to actually harm our servicemembers.

I really appreciate that you will commit to delving deep into this issue and really try to limit the siloing of information between the CIA and the DoD on this very topic.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I will. I look forward to it. The CIA is the premier intelligence agency in the world. And I am not saying that it should always be able to make an assessment about cause, but over time it is typically something we should expect and in some cases demand.

For instance, COVID. You brought up that. That is one issue. But AHI is another one. I am curious and look forward to reading the classified version of the AHI in terms of the assessments that were made or the inability to make an assessment on causation, and if I am not satisfied, will continue to look at that.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. And my last question—obviously, the scourge of sexual assault is problematic in every area of society. We want to make sure that the CIA is a safe place to work and that people who are being harassed or assaulted can come forward and demand justice. I just ask your commitment that you will work with this Committee to make sure all of our members of this community can work in a safe environment.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I will, Senator. I appreciate your leadership on this issue. I know it has been something you have highlighted. And as we talked about in our meeting, over the course of my career, I am grateful for what my record reflects in leadership positions I have had and organizations I have had in terms of not tolerating sexual assault and sexual abuse when I was U.S. Attorney, when I was DNI, when I was in Congress, all of those. And so I make that pledge to you gratefully.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to serve with you and other members of this Committee.

Mr. Ratcliffe, had a nice visit with you in the office. You answered many of my questions. What I will ask you here today will be familiar to you and build on that meeting.

Thank you again for your willingness to serve your country. You are prepared, I think, for this step, this position. You are qualified. I anticipate supporting your nomination. So we will begin with that.

You spoke in your testimony to the growing role of emerging technology and to advances being made by our adversaries. If confirmed, how will you direct the agency to analyze and respond to foreign threats that undermine, often overlook critical areas of our security and economic well-being, such as the food and Ag sectors?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So, thank you for the question. I did enjoy our visit, Senator Young, and enjoyed serving with you in the House of Representatives, and if confirmed, look forward to working with you from this perspective.

I was talking with Senator Gillibrand about COVID-19, the origins of that and the things that the intelligence community needs to do to be better. Part of that is to your point in embracing emerging technologies and making sure that one of the things that the CIA does is adapt to the technology curve. For instance, when we talk about utilizing artificial intelligence and machine learning, there is so much data that's out there in this great technological age that we live in, that sometimes the intelligence community spends so much time sifting through the data that they can't find the signal for the noise. And one of the things that technology allows us to do is to find the signal in all of that noise. In other words, so that we can find the intelligence, spend more time using the intelligence, and less time looking for it. You brought up different issues where that can be valuable and where that can be helpful.

One of the things that I know you are interested in and we have talked about was the biosecurity and the biointelligence issues and how the CIA needs to expand its authorities in that regard. And its relationships with scientists and researchers to be on the leading edge of information as it is coming out and develop early warnings to some of the problems that we are talking about in that space.

Senator YOUNG. I am encouraged that you are thinking critically about this topic, and it is clear to me you are. You should know as you are likely aware, but all others who are watching this should know, that there has been commissioned by Congress a National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, and that commission is charged with looking at the national security implications of our current biotech leadership but also making recommendations to make sure that the United States can stay ahead of our adversaries, in particular China.

So we will produce those recommendations in the spring timeframe. I am chairman of that commission currently. And some of those will implicate very directly our intelligence community. And so I would just ask that you, your staff, review that report when

it is published and work with this Committee and others on some of its recommendations.

Do you commit yourself, without having seen the report, but to be attentive to its recommendations and findings?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I absolutely do and I appreciate your leadership on that issue and as we talked about, and we will talk about more. I look forward to supporting and collaborating your efforts in that regard.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. Time is winding down and I am the new guy, but one other quick question here. Would you like to volunteer any particular approaches that you might want to lead the agency in to delay or degrade the threats posed by foreign nations using emerging technologies like AI or biotech?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I think we can talk about some of those things in the classified session, Senator. I think that what I would say in this setting is that when it comes to technology, we have so much concern about what China and Russia and our adversaries, what they are doing and how we need to counter them. I have absolute confidence that we can and will. There is only one country in the world that can parallel park a 200-foot rocket booster. The Chinese can't do it. The Russians can't do it. We do it, and we do it in part because of the great collaboration we have and can have and need to deepen between the private sector where there is so much innovation and ingenuity in the space of emerging technologies, and I am committed as CIA Director if allowed, to expanding upon that.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Ossoff.

Senator OSSOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your service to the country and congratulations to your family. I enjoyed our engagement a few weeks ago. It is a useful opportunity for me to learn more about your views and your plans for CIA.

I want to begin with a matter that impacts Georgia.

On election day 2024, there were a series of bomb threats issued against polling places in DeKalb County, Georgia, principally. Predominantly Black, predominantly democratically leaning precincts that disrupted election operations and the ability of folks to vote on the afternoon of election day. Our State election officials attributed those threats to Russian actors.

What assurance can you give my constituents in Georgia that CIA will sustain collection to identify threats to voting rights and election administration in the United States?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I enjoyed our visit as well. I can give every assurance. As you know, the CIA doesn't have domestic authorities. When we talk about election security issues, the FBI and DHS are the agencies that provide that protection. Where the CIA plays a role is if we have bad actors who want to influence or impact our elections, as you have related in this case. I haven't seen that specific intelligence, but, for instance, if Russia—Russian actors were behind those threats, those are the kinds of things that the CIA not only should do but must do and, frankly, do better in terms of collecting intelligence on how our adversaries intend, whether it is through physical means or through a cyber means of disrupting or influencing elections. And the CIA's

role should be to identify those threats over there before they come over here.

Senator OSSOFF. Thank you for that commitment to sustain that collection. I appreciate it.

I want to give you the opportunity to provide some clarifying information about events that have attracted some scrutiny in September of 2020 when you sent a letter to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee that declassified certain intelligence about Russian analytic products that had been collected by the intelligence community and which pertain to events four years past, during the 2016 election and the controversy over alleged links between the Trump campaign and the Russian Government. And my purpose is not to interrogate or to relitigate that ancient history from 2016 but to understand why you chose to send that letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee declassifying intelligence on that day, September 29?

You will no doubt recall that that was the same day as the Presidential debate, yes?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I don't recall that it was that date, but it may be.

Senator OSSOFF. You don't recall? Your testimony is that you are not aware that that letter was sent to the Judiciary Committee by you on the same day as the Presidential debate.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I don't recall that it was on that date, but I will take you at your word. The dates will reflect what they are. But to your question—

Senator OSSOFF. I want to drill down on that. Because my purpose is not to suggest some kind of political intent, but you made it very clear that avoiding politicization of the intelligence community's activities is a high priority for you; is that correct?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Correct.

Senator OSSOFF. It strikes me that in releasing politically sensitive intelligence that you'd think carefully about the timing of that; that you might consider that doing so on the day of a Presidential debate, when this was intelligence collected four years in the past, might reasonably draw the question of whether or not there was some political impetus. Is that reasonable?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. It is reasonable for you to ask that, and if I can, you asked me to clarify, if I can do that. You are correct, it was my decision, but it wasn't my process.

To your point, that effort was actually the request of this Committee during my confirmation hearing as DNI, was to go back and look at the intelligence from 2016 and 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment. I also received separately a request from the Attorney General and from then special counsel to declassify certain intelligence relating to that in support of what would be a public report from the special counsel.

I in addition to that received what I would call requests or what I would call demands from other Senate committees to include the Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Government Accountability—whatever the title of that committee is, for information related to that. That took place over a course of several months. And the process, just so you are clear, was an iterative, collaborative process that included the Attorney General,

the CIA Director, the Director of the NSA, myself as DNI, and again, an iterative process that resulted in a highly redacted product to protect sources and methods, but yet to respond to these requests or demands to put that information out. So I take——

Senator OSSOFF. That is useful information and my time is running short, but we can discuss further in the closed session if we need to. I appreciate you and enjoyed our recent meeting.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank you for that.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ratcliffe, I think I have the distinction of having known you longer than anybody else on this Committee. I remember when you were——

Mr. RATCLIFFE. They call that misfortune.

Senator CORNYN. [continuing]. When you were the mayor of Heath, Texas. How many people live in Heath, Texas?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Around 7,000.

Senator CORNYN. You still live there with your wife?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I do. It is a great community.

Senator CORNYN. It is.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I say hi to all the Heathans out there. (Laughter.)

Senator CORNYN. Absolutely.

So I have every confidence that you will do an outstanding job as the next Director of the CIA. And I say that advisedly, because as I said I have known you for a long time and watched your career from the private sector to U.S. Attorney, acting U.S. Attorney for a while, to Member of Congress. And I had the privilege of introducing you to the committee at your previous confirmation hearing as Director of National Intelligence. So I don't really have any doubt about your qualifications.

I do want to talk about a couple of subjects, and one is, I know people have heard the discussion of FISA and Section 702, and I appreciate the clarity which you explain how essential this tool is. I think part of the problem we have had with reauthorization is that people don't trust the people actually implementing that tool, because they have seen the abuses by Members of the IC, including the FBI, particularly dating back during President Trump's administration. So they figure, well, everybody must misuse these tools.

But I thought you had a great analogy when we discussed this on the phone. You said, well, you probably have a bunch of steak knives in your kitchen, and they can be used for useful and beneficial purpose but they can also be misused. And I think that was a pretty good analogy.

But I want to ask you about one of the quote "fixes" that some people have suggested to the current state of the law, and that is to require a warrant to query lawfully collected FISA information. You have properly identified the fact that these are directed at people overseas—overseas—foreigners overseas not Americans. But you are a former U.S. Attorney and a pretty good lawyer, and you understand what probable cause requires. To be able to establish probable cause in front of a judge you need to have evidence. And if all you have is a FISA query of a foreign target that happens to mention an American citizen or a U.S. person, is there any way for

you to go to court and establish the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in order to query that data?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, Senator, you know the answer to that better than I do because you are a better lawyer and were an Attorney General. But the answer is no, because the danger there is that you really don't have the information to obtain the warrant. And the process of obtaining the warrant, we are talking about national security issues where sometimes minutes matter and the ability to disrupt or interdict the bad actors or to act upon the intelligence that you can gain from that. So the process of even getting a warrant, the time that it takes, much less the fact that as you say you won't have a probable cause basis to get there.

Senator CORNYN. Well, I think there is a lot of misunderstanding and misinformation about how FISA works. And, admittedly, I have to periodically go back and refresh my own memory because it does get to be fairly convoluted sometimes. But the fact of the matter is it is illegal to use this tool to spy on American citizens, and there are protocols in place to lessen the likelihood that that could ever possibly occur. But I think basically what has happened is there has been a lack of trust in the people who had access to those tools in the recent past, and I hope you will help restore that trust. I also think you are going to need to share your experience and wisdom with the nominees for FBI and Director of national security, because we have had these conversations as well, and I think there is some confusion about whether a warrant should be required or not.

I think you are absolutely right, and that is I think is not the answer. Thank you.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Kelly.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations on your new job. I look forward to working with you on this Committee. And Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations to your nomination for this position. And congratulations to your family as well.

I want to follow up on what Senator Ossoff was referring to, the intelligence that was released prior to the 2020 election. That intelligence was rejected. First of all it was before I was on the committee, but my understanding that it was rejected by Democrats and Republicans on this Committee as having no factual basis that put Russian disinformation into the public sphere.

I just want to understand. So, in hindsight, knowing what you know now, and this is four years removed from that and we have had another election and, obviously, we have got challenges we face with Russian, Chinese, Iranian disinformation in our politics. So, in hindsight, are there any changes that you would make to the way you handled that information?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Senator, I appreciate the question. You know, I certainly—looking back, having the opportunity to change certain things might do that. I don't know in this case. For instance, Senator Ossoff raised the point that the declassification occurred on the day of a Presidential election. I don't recall that. Obviously, that is when it did.

Senator KELLY. I think he said debate.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Debate, I am sorry. I wasn't aware of that. I certainly don't think I did everything perfectly in terms of making decisions about every issue that relates to—I am talking generally. But I talked about my record in terms of how I approach these things and how in terms of speaking truth to power which sometimes includes declassifying information. Most of the things that I have done, Senator, aged very well, and I think others will continue to.

For instance, on COVID origins, I think that ultimately I believe there will be an assessment that is consistent with the position that I have taken.

Senator KELLY. It is hard to get this stuff exactly right. I get that. This is complicated. In this case, you know, it did become rather political and I appreciate your willingness to look back.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. The other thing I want to say is, part of my answer to your question is classified, and I look forward in the classified session to talk to you about one of the things this Committee asked me to do that did influence my decision was to look at the 2018 Intelligence Community Assessment. And in not only looking at that, what I did—so to be clear. I requested a briefing from the CIA from some members of the team that were involved in that. And I am not sure that that information or that intelligence has been shared with this Committee. So I look forward—

Senator KELLY. Let's follow up on that.

I got a few more things to cover here and I got about maybe 90 seconds left here.

In your response to the committee, you indicated—this is a different topic.

You agreed with the Trump administration's 2017 assessment that the Assad regime used chemical weapons, including in Douma, killing hundreds, injuring hundreds more. The U.S. intelligence community had a similar assessment that these weapons were used.

If you are serving or when you are serving as the Director and the DNI asks you to explore evidence that Douma or other attacks were staged or that analysis indicating the use of chemical weapons is incorrect or there is some kind of similar situation, what would you do?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, look at the intelligence. So you are right, I did include that. That was based upon the intelligence that I was able to review during my time as DNI. And I think the intelligence was clear. I think the assessments were, I forget if they were with high confidence, but I believe that they were. What I haven't seen is any intelligence in the last four years that I wouldn't have access to. So I would look at that. But I would be surprised if there is intelligence that would change my initial assessment but I certainly go back and look at that.

Senator KELLY. Could I just very briefly just have a few more seconds here? I just want to get your commitment to work with me, focusing on transnational criminal organizations on the other side of the border. It is a big problem. It affects my State in a big way.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. And my State.

Senator KELLY. Yes.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I absolutely make that pledge in working with you to address that threat.

Senator KELLY. Thank you.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Moran.

Senator MORAN. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciate our conversation in the office. I particularly appreciate the indication of your transparency with this Committee, your forthrightness, telling us the truth. It has been difficult from time to time to know what the true story is, and there is certainly—there are opinions about truth but we ought to be trying to find the truth.

I want to ask you about statements that you have made. I agree with you that China is the greatest threat facing our country. I rate Russia as our second-greatest threat and believe it is the most acute threat today.

Will you describe the scope of the threat as you see it, and the importance of countering the Kremlin?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. The question, the threat from Russia?

Senator MORAN. Threat from Russia. You indicate China is the first and greatest threat.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Absolutely. So Russia is very clearly an adversary of the United States. The threat, it courses a country with a very large nuclear stockpile. The thing that separates the threat from Russia from China in my mind and why I put them even though we include them in the great power competition is that the United States is the largest economy in the world. China is the second largest. Russia has an economy that is roughly the same size as my home State of Texas. So what it means is that the Russians have to decide where they are going to compete with the United States, and so they have chosen areas like hypersonics and other areas. But that comes with a cost. I think we saw some of the costs in terms of troop readiness as they engaged in their aggression against Ukraine. So, a dangerous lethal adversary who in many respects is, because of the limitations that I have talked about is focused on areas where there are great equalizers, and one of those is cybersecurity.

Countries that can't compete with the United States in terms of kinetic firepower across the board can do so through cyber means. In other words—and we see that with Iran and North Korea and other countries who can't compete with us kinetically focus on cyber means to cause us harm. Russia certainly falls into that category as well in terms of where a lot of their focus is and my assessment of them in terms of the malign activities that they take across, against the U.S.

Senator MORAN. Certainly invasion of another country has significantly complicated the security of our allies and perhaps the United States. I would point out that you are the first Texan I have ever met that belittled the State of Texas. (Laughter.)

In your answers to the committee's questionnaire you state regarding Russia that you "believe." I am quoting you. You believe "we cannot let our adversarial relationship boil over into unintended wars." And you go on to say "I will advise the President when there are opportunities to work toward mutually beneficial outcomes with Russia."

You did not make a similar commitment for China, Iran, or North Korea. What is the difference?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I don't recall, like the context of the question why there would be a difference.

For instance, I think what I was referring to there, Senator, was for all of the things that I talked about in terms of Russia as a threat and the things where they challenge us with malign activity, there are areas where we, for instance, countering terrorism. Some of the same threats that we face from terrorist groups are threats that they face. So there are occasions where information or intelligence can be shared or things can be done in our mutual—to the mutual benefit of our countries and those types of things.

That would be true with China as well. You know. I think President Trump's approach from a policy standpoint is to not look for conflict with anyone, including our adversaries, but to provide a strong deterrent effect to their malign activities through America's strength—peace through strength.

I think Iran may be different in the sense that it is a terrorist State, a terrorist regime, and has been designated by the Trump administration. So I would put that in a different category.

Senator MORAN. In addressing the importance of analytical objectivity and speaking truth to power, you state that as the DNI you represented the IC's analysis to policymakers faithfully, including dissenting views even when the full analytical picture was unpopular.

Could you give me an example?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Sure. In connection with the 2020 Presidential election, assessment was made as to whether China was trying to undermine President Trump's re-election efforts, and there was a split between the community.

A majority opinion was that China was not doing that and wouldn't do that for a number of reasons. The minority opinion was that they were. I agreed with the minority opinion. But what I did was not try to substitute my judgment for the community. I wrote a dissent that would be public and people could see the reasons for that and in the process supported a whistleblower, one of our leading cyber officers, in support of that position.

I will say that 15 months later, FBI Director Wray held a press conference talking about the exact things that I was saying China had engaged in that they were doing. And so the opinion that China would never engage in those kind of activities proved to be false, and I think that my dissent aged well.

Senator MORAN. Not only did you speak out against the majority but you turned out to be right.

Thank you.

Chairman COTTON. Senator Heinrich.

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman.

On July 21, 2020, you sent a letter to this Committee stating that while you agreed to appear at the committee's Open Worldwide Threat hearing as DNI, as Director of National Intelligence, that you would not take any questions in open session. And you wrote that letter while committing twice in your confirmation hearing that you would appear and answer questions.

Obviously, this position is one that requires congressional oversight. I don't think any of us up here would ever ask you to answer questions in a way that revealed anything that was classified or was more appropriate for closed session. I want to ask you why you thought that was appropriate, and today, can you commit that, if confirmed, you will appear at this Committee's annual Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats and take questions from the Committee itself?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Senator, thanks for the question. I think there was a slight mischaracterization.

I didn't refuse. I made a proposal about how to handle the worldwide threats hearing. I did that for a number of reasons. First of all, I didn't at that time as DNI—which, as you know, the DNI speaks for the entire intelligence community.

My proposal was actually a reflection of multiple leaders across the intelligence community who shared my opinion that other countries don't hold public hearings like that where we discuss sensitive national security information.

The problem isn't in terms of you asking questions about classified material. The issue comes up in terms of being put on the spot to provide an answer where sometimes you might inadvertently provide information that is classified because you don't recall at what level or if it is classified at all. That is the danger, and that has happened.

That explains how I approached that issue.

What I would say is this. I am being considered for the CIA Director which is not the head of the intelligence community. I understand notwithstanding my opinion about how the worldwide threat assessment hearing should take place, that the committee—and I learned from that the committee disagreed and didn't want that proposal. So that would not be an issue if I am confirmed as CIA Director.

Senator HEINRICH. So you will come.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Senator HEINRICH. And take appropriate questions.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Senator HEINRICH. Let me ask you and you answered Mr. Ratcliffe this question in writing but I think it is important for the American people and frankly for the world to hear your answer in an open hearing as well.

Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 prohibited the use of any interrogation technique that was not authorized in the Army Field Manual. Will you abide by this law?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Yes.

Senator HEINRICH. In your answers to the committee questions you wrote that the CIA must, and this is a quote from you: "The CIA must help rebuild public confidence in the intelligence community in the wake of prior abuses." End quote.

You reference that on a number of different occasions in your answers. I, frankly, never have been one to shy away from criticizing either the IC or the CIA when I felt it was appropriate. But I think most of us up here can agree that on the whole that CIA's men and women produce the finest intelligence in the world with a great

deal of objectivity and integrity, and if there is a lack of public confidence, it is because it has become too easy for some elected officials to throw around terms like the "Deep State."

If you are confirmed, what precisely would you do to help rebuild public confidence in the agency, and where do you see that necessary and appropriate?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I think it is the things we have talked about already and some of it you may not have been present for, but in terms of leading by example if confirmed as a CIA Director. I went through a series of examples where I talked about speaking truth to power and the importance of that and setting the right example in connection with that. So I think that is essentially how I would go about it, is to lead by example.

Senator HEINRICH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COTTON. I believe the vice chairman has a follow-up question.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also quickly want to mention. I appreciate your answer to Senator Heinrich's question about appearance here. I think we do have a unique situation in America where we have public congressional oversight. I think it is critically important to help restore that trust, and I appreciate your commitment to appear and testify.

This is a topic I am going to raise in closed, but I wanted to also at least get you on the record in the open session and I think you will concur. Senator Cotton pointed out a number of times, the Chairman pointed out when the IC didn't get it right in recent times. And I think—I am not sure we are ever going to get an all-seeing IC, but one particular area I have been concerned about is the ability for the IC to monitor technology advancement. I think historically that has not been the case. We have told our spies to go spy on the military or foreign governments, but we see repeatedly as we think about this technology competition, particularly with China. And I can cite chapter and verse from CIA getting it wrong about how slick it was going to be to move to lower level semiconductors or to move to smaller conductors or smaller semiconductors, area after area.

I think Director Burns current administration we moved the enterprise some. I think we still have a lot more to do. But I did want you in this public setting to weigh in on how it is absolutely critical that the CIA is able to not only look at our adversaries in terms of government and military presence but clearly in this technology competition and how we have to up our game in terms of collection?

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I agree 100 percent completely. You talked about it, Senator, earlier in terms of military threats are one thing, but, as you know, I believe for instance, the NSA, we have the best code makers and code breakers in the world, but if China gets to quantum computing before we do, that causes a real problem. We have got to win the war, the race on technology to stay ahead of the technology curve. Part of that is, when we talk about technology as a tool and a target is, we have to disrupt. CIA has to play a really important role in disrupting our adversaries' technologies in terms of trying to get ahead of us.

You mentioned semiconductors. We all know that the issue that relates to Taiwan and that 95 percent of advanced semiconductors are there and we are trying to address those supply chain issues. But we can do things and CIA must do things to disrupt how our adversaries are dealing with their supply chain issues in regard to that. That is just one example.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COTTON. For the information of Senators, we intend to hold a Committee vote on Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination as soon as possible, most likely on Monday afternoon; therefore, any Member who wishes to submit questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by close of business tomorrow.

Mr. Ratcliffe, I presume we can expect you to provide your replies even more promptly.

Thank you all. The open session of this hearing is adjourned.

We will reconvene in closed session in 30 minutes. That will be at 12:37 p.m. Thank you.

(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:07 p.m.)

December 18, 2024

The Honorable Mark R. Warner, Chairman
The Honorable Marco Rubio, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
211 Hart Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio:

I am enclosing a completed Committee Questionnaire for Presidential Nominees. I look forward to appearing before the Committee.

Sincerely

JOHN L. RATCLIFFE SIGNATURE REDACTED

Enclosure

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION
BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. FULL NAME: John Lee Ratcliffe
OTHER NAMES USED: None
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH:
October 20, 1965, Chicago IL
CITIZENSHIP: USA
3. MARITAL STATUS: Married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Michele Addington Ratcliffe
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: Michele Dawn Addington
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

REDACTED

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
Univ. of Notre Dame	1983-1986	B.A.	May 1986
Southern Methodist Univ.	1986-1989	J.D.	May 1989

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT).

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
Ray Trotti Hemphill & Finfrock, P.C.	Law Clerk/Attorney	Texas	1987 – 1990
Maloney & Smith, P.C.	Attorney	Texas	1990 – 1991
Holmes Millard & Duncan	Attorney	Texas	1991 – 1993
Texas Wesleyan Univ. (now TX A&M)	Adjunct Professor (Part Time)	Texas	1991 – 1995

Sifford & Anderson, LLP	Attorney	Texas	1994 – 2000
Tucker & Ratcliffe, LLP	Attorney	Texas	2000 – 2004
City of Heath	City Council	Texas	2001 – 2004
Southern Methodist Univ.	Adjunct Professor (Part Time)	Texas	2002 – 2004
City of Heath	Mayor	Texas	2004 – 2012
U.S. Dept of Justice	First Asst. U.S. Attorney	Texas	2005 – 2007
U.S. Dept of Justice	U.S. Attorney E. District of Texas	Texas	2007 – 2008
Ashcroft Sutton Ratcliffe, LLP	Partner	Texas	2009 – 2014
U.S. House of Representatives	Member of Congress (TX-4)	Washington DC	2015 – 2020
ODNI	Director of National Intelligence	Washington DC	2020 – 2021
America First Policy Institute	Co-Chair Center for American Security	Washington DC	2021 – present
Heritage Foundation	Visiting Fellow	Washington DC	2021 – present
Pacific Specialty Insurance Company	Board of Directors	Anaheim, California	2022 – present
Oberheiden P.C. (Law Firm)	Of Counsel	Dallas, TX	2023 – present
Blackstone	Consultant	Washington, DC	2024 – present
All World Holdings, LLC	Consultant	Las Vegas, NV	2023 – 11/30/24
U.S. Trinity Energy Services	Consultant	Denton, TX	2021 – present
Perot Jain LP	Consultant	Dallas, TX	2022 – present
Paradigm Operations LP	Board of Advisors	San Francisco, CA	2022 – present
Shield AI/Martin UAV	Consultant	Dallas, TX	2021 – 2022
American Global Strategies, LLC	Senior Advisor	Alexandria, VA	2022 – present
ArcTop, Inc.	Advisory Board	Los Angeles, CA	2023 – present
ROC Energy/Drilling Tools International	Consultant	Houston, TX	2021 – 2024
Latent AI, Inc.	Advisory Board	Menlo, CA	2022 – present
Article I, LLC	Consultant	Bakersfield, CA	2024 – present
Pacific Cap Acquisition Fund LLC-Coherent Logix, Inc.	Advisory Board	Sherman Oaks, CA	2024 – present

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8).

See Above, Question 8.

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

As the sixth Director of National Intelligence (DNI), I served as the leader of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and principal intelligence adviser to President Trump. In that role, I managed the National Intelligence Program priorities and budget. Specifically, I led a shift in U.S. intelligence community priorities to better position the U.S. for success in the great power competition with China, and designated space as a priority intelligence domain by adding the U.S. Space Force as the 18th member of the intelligence community.

In my six years as a member of the House of Representatives, I legislated on national security and intelligence issues while serving on the Homeland Security, Intelligence, and Judiciary Committees. As Chairman of the Homeland Cybersecurity Subcommittee for four years, I authored and passed bipartisan national security and cybersecurity bills signed into law during both Democratic and Republican

Administrations. As a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I authored bipartisan election security legislation and gained considerable knowledge of sensitive intelligence issues and programs through the Committee's oversight of the IC.

While in the Department of Justice from 2005 to 2008, I served as the chief of anti-terrorism and national security, overseeing district-wide terrorism, international drug trafficking, human smuggling, and immigration investigations and cases for the Eastern District of Texas. This includes time as the U.S. Attorney from 2007 to 2008. In addition to handling a docket of 34 separate terrorism and national security related investigations, I also served as the federal coordinator to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force with responsibility for conducting quarterly 315 case reviews of international terrorism matters, including the use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorities.

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT).

- Daily Memorial Academic Scholarship University of Notre Dame 1983 – 1986.
- Adjunct Professor of the Year 1992 Texas Wesleyan University School of Law.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – Dallas Division – 2008. Presented to John L. Ratcliffe, United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice Eastern District of Texas, "With deep appreciation for your leadership, partnership, and support of the Dallas Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 23, 2005 – May 9, 2008."
- United States Attorney's Office – Eastern District of Texas – 2008 (est.). Presented to John L. Ratcliffe, "For your extraordinary service and remarkable leadership as United States Attorney."
- United States Secret Service – 2008. Presented "in appreciation to John Ratcliffe, United States Attorney Eastern District of Texas for outstanding assistance and support on behalf of the investigative and protective responsibilities of the United States Secret Service."
- Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation – Dallas Field Office – 2008. Presented to John Ratcliffe, United States Attorney, "in recognition of outstanding service and cooperation in support of the mission of the IRS Criminal Investigation Dallas Field Office."
- Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal – 2020.
- National Security Medal – 2020.
- Department of Homeland Security – Distinguished Public Service Citation 2020.
- Distinguished Alumni Award – Carbondale Community High School 2023.

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICE HELD</u>	<u>DATES</u>
Texas Bar Association	Member (License # 16560500)	1989 – Present

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED

MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO). IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO?

Please see Annex A for a comprehensive list of speeches and op-eds.

PART B – QUALIFICATIONS

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY)

My time as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in the U.S. House of Representatives, and in the Department of Justice has greatly prepared me to serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). In particular, my experiences grappling with the most sensitive intelligence matters and national security threats, such as those posed by China, and my collaboration with then DCIA Haspel provided me with an understanding of and deep appreciation for CIA's mission. I am particularly proud of my leadership in managing federal civil servants and budgets in pursuit of national security objectives while upholding legal and constitutional protection. These experiences have provided invaluable preparation for this position.

In Congress, I passed legislation that dealt with integrating, coordinating, and sharing of information and intelligence to protect against threats to our national security. My keen interest in intelligence oversight underscores my ability and commitment to direct the critical role of CIA in that mission. My leadership and oversight roles in Congress have also given me an excellent understanding of how CIA operates and the importance to inform Congress of intelligence matters as allowed in an accurate and timely fashion.

Finally, I believe my ability to lead, manage, integrate, and coordinate across multiple branches of government to drive solutions in a nonpartisan manner makes me well qualified to serve as DCIA, and in doing so, to advocate, elevate, and augment the vitally important efforts of the men and women working at CIA.

PART C – POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS).

Ratcliffe for Congress (principal campaign committed) (FEC ID C00554113)

Lone Star Liberty Fund Political Contributions (FEC ID C0062766)

Special Guest Speaker, Trump/Vance 2024 fundraiser May 2024, West Palm Beach, Florida

Special Guest Speaker, Trump/Vance 2024 fundraiser September 2024, New York City, NY

Please see Annex B for political contributions made personally and through PACs.

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE).

Candidate for Council Member 2001, 2003 (unpaid/nonpartisan)

Candidate for Mayor, Health, TX 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 (unpaid/nonpartisan)
Candidate for U.S. House of Representatives, Texas's 4th District: 2014, 2016, 2018

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

- A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No.

- B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No.

- C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

- D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

None. I have never been a registered lobbyist or engaged in lobbying activity. As a partner in Ashcroft Sutton Ratcliffe LLP, I provided legal services at various times between 2009 – 2014 to a U.S. born expatriate Bill Browder relating to efforts by the Government of Russia to extradite him through Interpol Red Notice issuances. Those legal services were a result of retaliatory efforts taken against Mr. Browder as a result of his efforts to support passage of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012.

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION,

INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

None.

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes.

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

I have no deferred income arrangements relating to any of my business/employment activities. Any compensation will only be for work performed on or before confirmation date.

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

I have no formal or informal agreements or understandings for future employment with any person or entity.

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

None.

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

Yes, my spouse is employed as an estate planning attorney at Lamberth Ratcliffe Covington, PLLC in Rockwall, Texas. No, my spouse's employment is not related in any way to the position for which I have been nominated.

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

In addition to those entities listed in #8, see below:

REDACTED

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

None

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

Please see my nominee OGE Form 278e.

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

None.

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

The following chart lists all taxable income during the last five years, as reported in the U.S. income tax

returns filed jointly with my wife and as reflected further in my nominee OGE Form 278e.

REDACTED

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes, subject to advice of counsel.

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

Texas.

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

No.

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

I am licensed to practice law in the State of Texas since 1989 (License #16560500). I have served as Of Counsel to Oberheiden, P.C. since October 2023 but have not actively practiced law or billed clients for legal services performed within the past 5 years.

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

I have no current plans to create a blind trust but will abide by any agreement negotiated with the Office of Government Ethics.

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS

YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS?

N/A

PART E - ETHICAL MATTER

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

Yes. Please see the below and attachment.

1. Civil action filed in Dallas County, Texas in 2002 against my wife, me and our law firm (Tucker & Ratcliffe, LLP) by another law firm where we had both worked previously but which we had departed to start our own firm (Tucker & Ratcliffe, LLP). The dispute was over responsibility for case files. The other firm alleged that we had taken case files without the authority of the clients. Both clients provided testimony that we did in fact have express authority to handle the matters in question, and a Take Nothing Judgment in our favor was signed and entered by Judge Karen Johnson in the 95th Judicial District Court on January 13, 2004 (Copy provided – Please see Annex C).
2. Civil action filed in Dallas County, Texas in 2002 by Steger Towne Crossing, LP against SMJM, Inc and Ratcliffe Enterprises, Inc. From 1998 – 2001, my wife and I were sole shareholders of Ratcliffe Enterprises, Inc, a corporation which owned an Athlete's Foot franchise store in Rockwall, Texas. Ratcliffe Enterprises entered a landlord-tenant lease agreement with Steger Towne Crossing, LP, which managed the shopping center where the store was located. In May 2001, Ratcliffe Enterprises sold the store to SMJM, Inc., which was approved as sublessee on the lease agreement. SMJM, Inc. later defaulted on the lease for nonpayment of rent. Ratcliffe Enterprises, Inc. was named in the suit as the original lessee. SMJM, Inc. subsequently reached an agreement with Steger Towne Crossing, LP on outstanding rent due. All claims against Ratcliffe Enterprises, Inc. were dismissed by an Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice signed by Judge Sally Montgomery in County Court at Law #3 on March 1, 2024 (Copy provided – Please see Annex C).

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

Yes. I have testified before the House Judiciary Committee regarding my proposed balanced budget amendment (July 2017). I also testified before the House Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic regarding the origins of COVID (April 18, 2023). In addition, I was subpoenaed and testified before two federal grand juries on April 13, 2023 in connection with investigations and indictments brought by Special Counsel Jack Smith; the indictments were later dismissed.

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No.

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

N/A.

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No.

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No.

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, RESPECTIVELY, IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

As a former Member of Congress who served on oversight committees as well as a former cabinet member, I know firsthand how critical robust congressional oversight of the executive branch is. The law requires the President, and by extension the Intelligence Community, to keep the congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of its activities (50 U.S.C. §§ 3091- 93), which it does through a variety of means, including its annual budget submission,

hearings, briefings, and both formal and informal congressional notifications. The congressional intelligence committees, in turn, oversee and examine the intelligence and intelligence-related programs and activities of the U.S. Government to ensure those activities are in conformity with the Constitution and U.S. law. Through a combination of legislation, hearings, investigations, reviews, analysis, the confirmation process, and regular engagement, the Congress, led by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, oversee proposed or ongoing intelligence programs and activities to ensure they conform to the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States. If confirmed, I would fully support the congressional intelligence committees' oversight of CIA.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

CIA is unquestionably the world's premier spy organization with the critical mission of enhancing our national security through the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. That mission includes providing overall direction for the collection of national intelligence through human sources, and performing other functions related to intelligence affecting national security as the President may direct, including covert action. The Director leads the Agency in each of these endeavors and must ensure that CIA personnel have the proper budget, structure, and authorities to carry out the mission assigned to CIA through statute and by the President. Famously etched into the marble wall in the lobby of the CIA's headquarters are the words of John 8:32: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The sincere, uninhibited, unafraid search for truth is the heart of CIA's mission. There is nothing more imperative than maintaining the integrity and objectivity of intelligence analysis and information. The Director must ensure that the Agency's integrity remains resolute, that it recruits and retains the best employees, that it speaks truth to power, and that it is innovating to meet the latest national security threats from the foes of the United States.

AFFIRMATION

I, **JOHN L. RATCLIFFE**, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE.

12/18/24
(Date)

JOHN L. RATCLIFFE SIGNATURE REDACTED

NOTARY SIGNATURE REDACTED



TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

In connection with my nomination to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

JOHN L. RATCLIFFE SIGNATURE REDACTED

Signature

Date: 12/18/24

ANNEX A: Public Speeches and Op-ed/Publications

John Ratcliffe Public Speeches

- 1/12/15: 2015 Heritage Conservative Policy Summit
 - [Conservative Policy Summit - Sen. Ted Cruz, Rep. Jim Jordan, New Congressmen](#) (1:30:34)
 - [Conservative Policy Summit - Sen. Ted Cruz, Rep. Jim Jordan, New Congressmen](#) (1:59:14)
- 02/06/16: 2016 Heritage Conservative Policy Summit
 - [2016 Conservative Policy Summit](#) (5:13:29)
- 06/16/16: A Better Way to Defend the Constitution
 - [A Better Way to Defend the Constitution](#) (24:55)
- 10/29/16: Weekly Republican Address (Obamacare Repeal)
 - [Weekly Republican Address](#) (Full Video)
- 10/27/17: Palo Alto's Ignite Conference
 - [Congressman John Ratcliffe, "Ignite 2017"](#) (2:30)
- 11/02/17: NVIDIA Tech Conference
 - [GPU Technology Conference Live Stream Rep. Ratcliffe](#)
- 11/07/17: International Trademark Association 2017 Leadership Meeting
 - [U.S. Representatives Ted Deutch and John Ratcliffe Address INTA Members at Leadership Meeting](#) (Full Transcript)
- 05/31/18: Texas-Israel Cybersecurity Chamber of Commerce Event "Securing Our Critical Infrastructure"
 - [Texas-Israel Chamber \(Speech Clip 1\)](#)
 - [Texas-Israel Chamber \(Speech Clip 2\)](#)
- 12/10/22: America First Policy Institute: "Ending Putin's Invasion: Defining the Direction of U.S. Assistance (as of day 231 of the invasion)"

John Ratcliffe Op-Eds/Publications2015

- Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 26, Issue 1, Art. 3
 - [The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA Act \(1/1/12\)](#)
- Washington Examiner, February 15, 2015, Cybersecurity
 - [OPINION: Cybersecurity and the threats we cannot ignore](#)
- The Hill, March 9, 2015, Cybersecurity
 - [Cybersecurity legislation needed to safeguard personal information](#)
- Herald Democrat, May 3, 2015, Environment
 - [JOHN RATCLIFFE: Floodplain executive order could cost taxpayers millions in Grayson County](#)
- Washington Times, July 30, 2015, Economy
 - [Abolishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau](#)
- The Fannin County Leader, November 6, 2015, Veterans
 - [Congressman John Ratcliffe: Veterans Day Editoria](#)
- Washington Times, November 11, 2015, Energy
 - [The dirty business of clean power](#)
- Herald Democrat, November 22, 2015, Homeland Security
 - [JOHN RATCLIFFE: Syrian refugees: Security, compassion, and fighting this problem at the source](#)

2016

- Clarksville Times, January 5, 2016, Healthcare Gaining Ground in the Fight Against Obamacare
- Politico, February 24, 2016, Cybersecurity
 - [Obama's big mistake on cyber](#)
- Fair Tax, April 22, 2016, Taxes
 - [The Fair Tax-A Tax System that Americans Rightfully Deserve](#)
- Texarkana Gazette, May 29, 2016, Defense
 - [Ratcliffe: RRAD an indispensable component of our national defense](#)
- Fox News, June 7, 2016, Economy
 - [Sen. Hatch, Rep. Ratcliffe: It's time to restore accountability to our runaway bureaucracy](#)
- The Hill, June 21, 2016, Judiciary
 - [Separation of Powers Restoration Act key to rebalancing government](#)
- Red State, July 11, 2016, Judiciary
 - [Taking Back Powers Usurped by Unelected Bureaucrats](#)
- Washington Examiner, July 11, 2016, Judiciary
 - [Restoring the courts' proper role in dealing with federal agencies](#)
- Forbes, July 12, 2016, Judiciary
 - [How To Fight The Fourth Branch of Government](#)
- Rockwall Herald Banner, September 16, 2016, District Outreach
 - [Ratcliffe Staying Engaged](#)

- The Paris News, September 18, 2016, District Outreach
 - [Listening to the voters](#)
- Fox News, October 14, 2016, Law Enforcement
 - [Rep Ratcliffe- Our police are being targeted, let's give them the equipment they need](#)
- Forbes, November 7, 2016, Economy
 - [After Election, America Needs to Focus on Innovation](#)
- Herald Democrat, November 14, 2016, Healthcare
 - [A better way to fix health care](#)
- Jerusalem Post, December 1, 2016, Cybersecurity
 - [The US and Israel: Our mutual cybersecurity innovation](#)
- Rockwall Herald Banner, December 23, 2016, District Outreach
 - [Ratcliffe End of Congress Address](#)

2017

- Fannin County Leader, January 3, 2017, District Outreach
 - [Rep John Ratcliffe New Year Op-Ed](#)
- Herald Democrat, March 11, 2017, Healthcare
 - [JOHN RATCLIFFE: Obamacare repeal-replace](#)
- The Paris News, March 12, 2017, Healthcare
 - [Lawmakers look to rebuild healthcare](#)
- The Hill, April 5, 2017, Judiciary
 - [Strengthening Children's Safety Act closes loopholes in existing laws](#)
- The Daily Caller, June 2, 2017, Homeland Security
 - [Congress Must Act to Halt the Spread of Islamic Extremism](#)
- The Hill, June 6, 2017, Cybersecurity
 - [National Computer Forensics Institute: Providing law enforcement with top training resources](#)
- Herald Banner, June 30, 2017, Immigration
 - [Ratcliffe speaks on Sanctuary Cities](#)
- Dallas Morning News, October 19, 2017, Healthcare
 - [Health care system for our veterans still isn't good enough](#)
- The Hill, October 25, 2017, Cybersecurity
 - [Improving our country's cybersecurity posture by assisting local state officials](#)
- Four State News, November 8, 2017, Proper care for veterans must be a priority
 - [Proper care for veterans must be a priority](#)
- Washington Times, November 21, 2017, Cybersecurity
 - [Closing the cyber skills gap](#)

2018

- Washington Times, January 28, 2018, Cybersecurity
 - [Safeguarding American's data in federal agencies](#)

- Washington Times, March 12, 2018, Budget
 - [Toward a balanced budget](#)
- Texas Tribune, March 16, 2018, Judiciary
 - [Breaking the link between forced drug use and human trafficking](#)
- Wired, July 1, 2018, Technology
 - [It's Time to Modernize Government Websites](#)

2021

- Wall Street Journal, December, 2, 2020, National Security
 - [China Is National Security Threat No. 1](#)
- Jerusalem Post, May 27, 2021, National Security
 - [Ex-US intel chief to 'Post': Biden is surrendering to Iran – opinion](#)
- Fox News: games, August, 2, 2021, National Security
 - [China Olympics 2022 – COVID cover up by country's leaders means they should forfeit](#)
- America First Policy Institute, August, 3, 2021, National Security
 - [China Olympics 2022 – COVID cover up by country's leaders means they should forfeit games](#)
- Foreign Policy, August 18, 2021
 - [After the Debacle: Six Concrete Steps to Restore U.S. Credibility](#)
- Fox News, September 11, 2021, National Security
 - [US faces new threats 20 years after 9/11 thanks to disastrous Afghanistan exit](#)
- Fox News, December, 21, 2021, National Security
 - [Wall Street and Silicon Valley must stop bankrolling communist China](#)

2022

- The Federalist, March 3, 2022, National Security
 - [Fear Of Donald Trump Kept Putin from Invading Ukraine. Here's How Trump Pulled It Off](#)
- Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2022, National Security
 - [How Do Drag Shows Advance U.S. National Security?](#)

2023

- Fox News, 9 March 2023, National Security
 - [Is Biden silencing the world's premier spy agency over COVID?](#)

ANNEX B: Political Contributions

	Date	Amount	Recipient
1	10-25-2002	\$250	LAUBENBERG, JODIE
2	11-17-2005	\$2000	HALL, RALPH
3	11-21-2005	\$1000	PERRY, JAMES RICHARD
4	06-19-2006	\$500	MCCALLUM, TIM
5	10-20-2006	\$250	ABBOTT, GREG
6	11-04-2009	\$1000	DEWHURST III, DAVID H.
7	06-24-2011	\$1000	ROMNEY, MITT
8	09-30-2011	\$500	BROOKS, SUSAN
9	02-29-2012	\$250	PRUITT, JIM
10	04-23-2012	\$250	TURNER, SCOTT
11	09-28-2012	\$500	TURNER, SCOTT
12	03-13-2013	\$2500	SULLIVAN, MIKE
13	06-21-2013	\$500	WHITAKER, MATT
14	10-02-2013	\$250	PAXTON JR, KENNETH (KEN) W.
15	10-10-2014	\$250	ROCKWALL COUNTY REPUBLICAN MENS CLUB RCRMC
16	07-18-2016	\$1500	HANAWAY, CATHERINE L.
17	01-18-2018	\$500	TEXAS REPUBLICAN PARTY
18	07-20-2018	\$325	ROCKWALL COUNTY REPUBLICAN WOMEN
19	01-14-2020	\$3000	ROCKWALL REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
20	01-17-2020	\$2500	REPUBLICAN PARTY OF COLLIN COUNTY
21	02-15-2020	\$300	REPUBLICAN PARTY OF COLLIN COUNTY (R)
22	02-15-2020	\$300	REPUBLICAN PARTY OF COLLIN COUNTY
23	02-15-2020	\$55	REPUBLICAN PARTY OF COLLIN COUNTY
24	05-14-2020	\$250	ROCKWALL COUNTY REPUBLICAN MENS CLUB RCRMC

ANNEX C: Civil Litigation

Please see question 41 and the following order of judgment and order of dismissal.

Defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
95th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

On the 13th day of January, 2004, came to be heard the above-entitled and numbered cause. The parties have appeared by and through their attorneys of record. The Court hereby


ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Plaintiff Sifford, Anderson, Vice & McFarlane, L.L.P., formerly known as Sifford & Anderson, L.L.P., a Registered Limited Liability Partnership, including Professional Corporations, take nothing for its claims against Defendants John L. Ratcliffe, Michele Ratcliffe, John L. Ratcliffe, P.C. and Tucker & Ratcliffe, L.L.P. and such claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

The Court further ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant John L. Ratcliffe take nothing for his counterclaims against Plaintiff and such claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.


The parties each shall bear their own costs and attorneys' fees. All relief not expressly

granted is denied.


SIGNED this 13th day of January, 2004.


JUDGE PRESIDING

APPROVED:


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Attorney for Defendants

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TUCKER & RATCLIFFE

005

CAUSE NO. 02-12805-C

STEGER TOWNE CROSSING II, L.P.	§	IN THE COUNTY COURT
a Texas Limited Partnership,	§	
	§	
Plaintiff,	§	
	§	
V.	§	AT LAW NO. 3
	§	
RATCLIFFE ENTERPRISES, INC.,	§	
a Texas Corporation, and	§	
SMJM, INC., a Texas Corporation	§	
	§	
Defendants.	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

AGREED ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Came to be heard the Agreed Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice filed on behalf of all the parties. The court having considered the Agreed Motion to Dismiss prior to disposition on the merits finds that the Motion should be GRANTED. It is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that the above-styled and numbered cause including any and all cross claims, counter claims and/or third party claims be, and are hereby dismissed with prejudice to the refiling of same in any form by any of the parties.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that court costs be paid by the parties hereby incurring same.

SIGNED this 1 day of March, 2004.

Sally J. Montgomery
JUDGE PRESIDING

AGREED ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PAGE 1

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



Additional Prehearing Questions for

John L. Ratcliffe

Upon his nomination to be

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Role and Performance of the D/CIA in Senior National Security Leadership

QUESTION 1: Briefly describe how you see your role and responsibilities in relation to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Secretary of State, and the President's National Security Advisor. What would you bring to these relationships, and how would you change your role, if at all, to improve the effectiveness of these relationships, if confirmed?

If confirmed as CIA Director, I would collaborate closely with other members of the Intelligence Community, and in coordination with the DNI, I would help align interagency intelligence efforts to prevent overlap and ensure cohesiveness. I would take my role as a member of the National Security Council's Principals Committee seriously and bring to the interagency process insights into foreign activities and threats to help inform policy decisions and craft strategy. In consultation with the President and National Security Advisor, I would direct CIA operations and analysis in support of White House goals.

Functions and Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency

QUESTION 2: What guidance has President-elect Trump provided you for the role of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?

Having previously served as DNI during the first Trump Administration, I am confident that President-elect Trump expects me to lead the CIA with integrity and in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and I can state unequivocally that I intend to do so. I expect to provide President-elect Trump with the best possible analysis and insights to help inform his decisions, as I did when I was DNI.

QUESTION 3: What do you consider to be the most important missions of the CIA (e.g., collection of foreign intelligence information, all-source analysis, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, covert action, etc.)?

CIA's missions to collect foreign intelligence on our foreign adversaries, produce all-source analysis for the President and other senior customers, protect our security through robust counterintelligence, and conduct covert action at the President's direction and in accordance with federal law are all critically important

for US national security. Cumulatively, these missions are focused on allowing policymakers the timely understanding, context, and warning to make the most informed decisions, and to provide these decision makers with covert options in pursuit of national security objectives. CIA must also help rebuild public confidence in the Intelligence Community in the wake of prior abuses.

A. How well do you think the CIA has performed recently in each of these missions?

I want to be clear that I am only starting to get read into everything that CIA does to advance its mission. I have been very impressed by what I have learned so far, and I am grateful to those CIA personnel who have briefed me on their programs and operations. I have a lot to learn still, and it would be premature for me to assess any part of CIA's performance.

That said, it is essential for CIA to focus on the successful pursuit of its core mission, including the collection of foreign intelligence, the conduct of all-source analysis, carrying out covert action operations, and engaging in counterintelligence collection and operations. CIA must avoid distractions to its core mission and help rebuild confidence in the Intelligence Community. I also want to be sure that, when possible, key policymakers are not first hearing of critical national security developments via the news media, on social media, or from other sources. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing how the Agency is doing business, and I am committed to supporting the men and women of the CIA in accomplishing that core mission.

B. If confirmed, what missions do you expect to direct the CIA to prioritize over others?

First, and as an initial matter, my role as CIA Director would be to oversee the conduct of operations and the pursuit of mission in accordance with the priorities set by the President of the United States. In addition, and as noted above, I am only beginning to get read into the CIA's operations and its pursuit of mission. It would be premature for me to define specific priorities for the organization at this stage.

That said, based on my time on HPSCI, as DNI, and my review of open-source reporting for the past several years, I think that CIA will have to focus resources on emerging technology, such as AI, on the People's Republic of China, and on rebuilding public confidence in the Intelligence Community. We also cannot ignore CIA's critical counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in support of border security efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the whole of CIA's mission, its collection of foreign intelligence, production of all-source analysis, pursuit of covert action, and counterintelligence efforts, to better understand how we can focus our efforts on core mission and supporting the priorities articulated by the President.

- C. Has the President-elect indicated whether he expects you to focus on any particular functions or missions? If so, what functions or missions?

I cannot comment on the specific details of conversations I have had with the President-elect, but I can tell you that he expects me to lead the CIA with integrity and in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. I can state unequivocally that I intend to do so.

QUESTION 4: What principles should govern the division of responsibilities between the CIA in the conduct of covert action under Title 50 and the Department of Defense in the conduct of any similar or related activities under Title 10?

Title 10 and Title 50 are complementary tools for the President to use in protecting our national security. As such, the President must determine, within the parameters of the law, which tool is better suited for a particular situation. In making such a determination, the President might consider which organization is capable of most effectively and efficiently accomplishing his directive, consistent with the statutory authorities and limitations that govern activities under Title 10 and Title 50. In some cases, it may be appropriate for complementary activities to be conducted under both Title 10 and Title 50. No matter which authorities are ultimately relied upon, communication, coordination, and deconfliction between CIA and the Department of Defense are essential, as is timely reporting to Congress regarding the use of such authorities.

QUESTION 5: In what ways can the Director achieve sufficient independence and distance from political considerations to serve the nation with objective and dispassionate intelligence collection and analysis?

I believe it is vital for the Director of the CIA to help rebuild public confidence in the Intelligence Community. To do so, it is essential for the Director of the CIA to set an example for the workforce of pursuing the collection, analysis, and dissemination of unvarnished, fact-centric intelligence that advances national security. That means intelligence that is independent, timely, and objective, and that is not weaponized against political opponents. I am also committed to reducing overclassification by increasing transparency when possible. I am committed to leading those efforts, unshaded by distractions from CIA's mission.

Relationship with Congress and Congressional Oversight

QUESTION 6: If confirmed, how will you seek to ensure that intelligence activities conducted by the CIA are notified to Congress?

The National Security Act of 1947 requires me to keep the Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, including covert action. Based on my time serving as a member of HPSCI, I have seen first-hand how fulfilling this obligation adheres to the benefit of the Intelligence Community and the American people. I take this requirement very seriously and if confirmed, I will commit to working with CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs and senior personnel, including the General Counsel, to ensure that CIA meets its obligations to keep Congressional oversight fully and currently informed of intelligence activities.

QUESTION 7: What is the appropriate relationship between the CIA and Congress in sharing information? What, if any, information collected or analyzed by the CIA, or about the CIA, do you believe should not be shared with the congressional intelligence committees?

As noted in Question 6, I take the obligations to keep Congress informed of intelligence activities seriously, in accordance with the law and Intelligence Community regulations. I will ensure that I am briefed early in my tenure on provisions in the current and past Intelligence Authorization Acts for specific notification requirements.

In doing so, and in accordance with the National Security Act, I will be thoughtful about also protecting our most sensitive sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure. If confirmed, I look forward to better understanding how the CIA has shared our most sensitive information with oversight—such as through Gang of 8 notifications on the most sensitive covert action matters or compartmented briefings—but can commit that I will ensure Congress has access to the information necessary to perform its essential oversight function.

QUESTION 8: Please describe your understanding of the obligation to provide to the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities or covert actions, including their legal basis, which is requested by either of the intelligence committees.

The National Security Act of 1947 requires the CIA to provide to the Congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities and covert action, including the legal basis under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted. This obligation must be carried out consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of certain national security information. Based on my experience as a member of HPSCI, in exceptional circumstances where the protection of national security information limited what information could be provided or how, committee leadership would often work with Executive Branch leadership to resolve the matter. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that Congress has access to the information necessary to perform its essential oversight function.

QUESTION 9: In your opinion, should the White House have any role in determining whether, or to what extent, the Intelligence Community (IC) responds to Members of Congress? If so, please describe what you believe that role should be.

Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 establishes an obligation on the part of the President to ensure that the Congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including an obligation to ensure that any illegal intelligence activity is promptly reported along with any corrective action that has been taken or will be taken in connection with that activity. With respect to covert action in particular, Section

503 of the National Security Act specifically requires the President to meet certain notification requirements upon the establishment of a new covert action finding, a significant change to an existing covert action, or a significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding. The law therefore contemplates a role for the President in ensuring that the Congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed. As noted above, however, the notification must be carried out “consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure” of certain national security information and allows for some flexibility in the manner of notification.

I am committed to ensuring that the Congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed in accordance with the law, and I understand the importance of the Congressional intelligence oversight function. I look forward to further discussing the role of the White House in this next administration further in consultation with the White House, the White House Counsel’s office, and CIA’s Office of General Counsel.

QUESTION 10: What is the responsibility of the CIA to correct the record if it identifies occasions when inaccurate information has been provided to the congressional intelligence committees?

I am committed to ensuring that CIA meets its obligation to keep the Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed, and that includes taking steps to ensure the accuracy of any information provided. If confirmed, I will commit to correcting the record on any occasion on which inaccurate information has been provided.

Post-Modernization and the Future of the CIA

QUESTION 11: The CIA underwent a major reorganization several years ago. Mission Centers were created to reinforce a “team approach” and put the focus on growing well-rounded Agency officers. Since then, how we collect intelligence has evolved. Do you believe that the CIA should remain focused on clandestine collection? Moreover, how will you maintain objective analysis as a central function of the CIA under this construct? How should the conduct of these activities be balanced and prioritized in the future at the CIA?

As I understand CIA's 2015 reorganization, the goal was to advance CIA's mission by co-locating and pulling together analytic, operational, and other directorates focused on a common mission to ensure better collaboration and efficiency across the many Agency units. As I understand it, the new Mission Centers were intended at least in part to emulate those centers that were already operating in an integrated environment, such as the Counterterrorism Center, or CIA Field Stations that bring together the many areas of tradecraft expertise across the Agency to achieve a common goal.

From my meetings with Agency officers, the after-effects of the reorganization are still felt in some corners of the Agency, but I am careful not to draw conclusions on the impact of the reorganization at this point – such significant changes to a workforce can take a full generation to take hold. I will review the Agency's structure to ensure that CIA remains focused on its core mission sets, in particular on clandestine collection, and avoids distractions from its core mission. I will also work to ensure that the Agency's analysts and its analytic workflow are structured so as to minimize any bias from concurrently supporting operational efforts. If needed, I will not hesitate to make changes to the structure to ensure the CIA is most effectively accomplishing its mission.

QUESTION 12: Since the modernization and reorganization effort in 2015, there have been numerous efforts to improve the CIA's management of the workforce. There have also been efforts to address training and care for officers and their families to improve the readiness of the organization. What areas of an officer's preparedness and readiness would you focus on as Director of the CIA?

In terms of readiness, I will focus on ensuring that all CIA officers are fully trained and maintain their respective tradecraft skills while upholding the culture of objectivity and speaking truth to power. We ask a lot of CIA's workforce and the mission demands on the officers and their families can take a heavy toll. I will seek to continue and bolster the efforts to support families overseas and domestically and build on the efforts to improve all aspects of readiness, whether that be physical, mental, financial, behavioral, or spiritual.

QUESTION 13: The CIA is operating in a growing number of environments subject to foreign adversary ubiquitous technical surveillance measures. These

measures threaten – and may jeopardize – the clandestine nature of CIA operations. Please explain how you would address this pressing challenge.

CIA must continue to evolve tradecraft to ensure the safety of our officers and assets without losing the ability to conduct high-impact clandestine operations in challenging environments. Rather than hide from ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS), we must develop new and creative tradecraft to mitigate this threat while using UTS to our operational advantage against our adversaries. Tradecraft should be tailored to specific threats to operations, measuring calculated risk appropriately. CIA's multi-directorate effort to research, develop, and validate new technologies, techniques, and training will help evolve this tradecraft. The Agency has also coordinated with partners from across the IC to infuse innovation into CIA's approach to tradecraft challenges. The Committee has my commitment to further support and invest in these initiatives while also increasing public-private partnerships.

HUMINT Role of the CIA

QUESTION 14: What is the appropriate division of responsibilities for human intelligence (HUMINT) between the CIA and the various components of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? As the National HUMINT Manager, how would you improve sharing of HUMINT between elements within the IC, and how would you seek to improve the collection of HUMINT within the IC?

As the Director of CIA and National HUMINT Manager, I will ensure a clear division of responsibility as established through respective authorities and focused against foreign or domestic collection. Pursuit of HUMINT must abide by these established authorities, with CIA focused against foreign plans, intentions, and capabilities; DOD focused on the warfighting mission; and DHS and FBI maintaining a domestic nexus. In instances where HUMINT pursuit has dual domestic and foreign elements, I would reinforce participation in the collaboration practiced in multi-agency forums for deconfliction and coordination.

As National HUMINT Manager, I will ensure each IC element is accountable to report appropriate information at the lowest possible level while still protecting sources, methods, and future collection. I will look into existing mechanisms for reporting HUMINT and determine what improvements can be made to ensure our distribution of intelligence is optimally aligned for those with a need to know.

I will promote Community HUMINT as the interface for the National HUMINT Enterprise to guide and align broad HUMINT collection requirements against the President's highest intelligence priorities. Through Community HUMINT I will propose strategic synchronization, deconfliction, and collaboration among IC collectors so that our resources are appropriately aligned, pursuing what each organization should based on training, authorities, and capability. I will streamline IC collection efforts to ensure effective allocation of resources to achieve what Congress, the President, and the American public expect. We cannot afford duplication of effort, unevaluated risks, nor unintended negative consequences to our actions.

QUESTION 15: As a former DNI, what are your views on the working relationships of the FBI, DHS, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and other elements of the IC and the CIA? How could these relationships be improved at the working level, and how would you make this work as Director of the CIA?

Based on my time as DNI, I have seen first-hand the value in the Intelligence Community's collaborative approach, integrating collection across intelligence disciplines and relying on each agency to execute its core mission in order to ensure that policymakers have access to the best, most timely, and most accurate information. If confirmed as Director, I look forward to being briefed on the current state of CIA's relationships across the IC and how CIA currently fulfills its role in the collaborative environment of the US Intelligence Community.

QUESTION 16: What role do you see for the CIA in paramilitary actions? How do you distinguish between the appropriate roles of the CIA and the United States Special Operations Forces in paramilitary actions?

Based on my time at HPSCI and as the DNI, I am aware that CIA is charged with the conduct of covert action as authorized by the President, except for under certain circumstances. I am not yet fully read into CIA's current programs, but I

look forward to learning more about the role CIA's paramilitary officers play in conducting covert action operations at the direction of the President.

In terms of distinguishing between the appropriate roles of the CIA and DOD, including the Special Operations Forces, I have not yet had a detailed briefing on how CIA and DOD coordinate and deconflict their operations, but I am aware that CIA and DOD have developed a close partnership and work cooperatively in many areas of the world, and I look forward to continuing that partnership.

The CIA and Cybersecurity Posture

QUESTION 17: How would you improve the cybersecurity posture of CIA systems? What are your top priorities for cybersecurity and technical counter-cyber espionage protections at the CIA in the near term?

I have not yet had an opportunity to be briefed on CIA's cybersecurity posture, but I have significant experience related to cybersecurity based on my time as a member of Congress, including four years as Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee's Cybersecurity Subcommittee. While in Congress, I authored several bipartisan national security and cybersecurity bills that were enacted into law, and I believe the CIA cannot continue to be the preeminent intelligence apparatus in the world if it is unable to secure its networks and communications.

If confirmed, I will be focused on understanding how CIA is positioned defensively from a cybersecurity standpoint and how we can meet the rapidly evolving threats posed by cyber operations and cyber espionage. I also believe that recruitment and retention of a highly skilled cyber workforce will be essential to continuing to stay ahead of our adversaries, as will a robust exchange of information with private-sector and academic cybersecurity experts, as well as our foreign liaison partners. We must leverage the expertise of the private sector and share actionable threat information to support network defense and resilience.

Analytic Integrity

QUESTION 18: How would you protect and improve the quality of CIA analytic products?

The demand for quality CIA analysis has never been higher as the challenges we face as a nation have never been more globally complex. If confirmed, I will work closely with CIA's Directorate of Analysis (DA) leaders to make sure that CIA's analysis is objective, thorough, relevant, accurate, and rigorous. CIA analysts will need to avoid distractions from their core mission and help rebuild confidence in the Intelligence Community.

QUESTION 19: How do you view the importance of intelligence analysts' freedom to present their assessments objectively to decision makers in both the executive and legislative branches, regardless of what a particular policy might be, even if their assessments may be unwelcome or inconvenient?

Objectivity in all that the Agency does, from how it collects information to how it assesses and disseminates it, is a core value of CIA. It is foundational to CIA's tradecraft, regardless of mission function. As a top consumer of intelligence analysis when I was the DNI and a member of Congress, I fully understand that policymakers in the executive and legislative branches need a clear-eyed picture of the short and long-term threats facing our nation. The Committee has my promise to support the Agency's value of maintaining objectivity.

QUESTION 20: What is your view of the place and importance of challenging existing assessments, especially when new intelligence reporting is inconsistent with such assessments?

It takes courage and humility for analysts to acknowledge any biases, challenge firmly held assessments, and change their judgements when there are compelling, objective reasons to do so. As DNI, I had many conversations with IC experts to understand the reporting underpinning assessments and to hear directly from them on how they came to their analytic conclusions, especially when I saw issues differently. I also respectfully discussed any concerns I had with the analysis when I believed an assessment didn't take on new or relevant intelligence reporting.

The questions CIA faces on a daily basis are complex and the information that its analysts have at their fingertips is often overwhelming in volume yet incomplete. It is my understanding that the DA has taken positive steps to reinforce the importance of challenging existing assessments in its tradecraft. I believe that more can be done in this space, especially to ensure analysts do not engage in the

politicization of intelligence, and I look forward to working with Agency leaders on this priority if confirmed.

QUESTION 21: How do you propose enhancing the CIA's objectivity and independence to maintain its insulation from political influence? How would you ensure that bias among the analytic cadre does not impair their analysis?

If confirmed, I would work closely with Agency leaders to maintain an apolitical, objective approach to all that the CIA does. On a day-to-day basis, I would reinforce my expectation to CIA officers that they avoid the politicization of intelligence by providing their best assessments and ideas without consideration of political leanings and policy preferences. I would represent their views faithfully to the White House and other senior officials.

QUESTION 22: If confirmed, would you ever request, encourage, or support an intelligence professional's adjusting his/her assessment to avoid criticism from the White House or political appointees? Would you ever change or remove content in an intelligence assessment for political reasons, or at the behest of political leadership? Would you ever condone such actions by anyone on your staff?

If confirmed, I will ensure that CIA does everything possible to ensure that its analytic products reflect the highest tradecraft standards and are grounded in facts. I would not change or remove content for political purposes nor tolerate politicization or weaponization of analysis.

QUESTION 23: If intelligence agencies or analysts are discouraged from providing objective foreign intelligence reporting or analytic assessments, how would this harm national security?

As a top consumer of intelligence reporting and analysis as the former DNI and a member of Congress, I have seen firsthand how analysis that does not follow the highest tradecraft standards can lead to poor decisions or inaction with dramatic ramifications. This was a notable finding in both the 9/11 Commission and in the aftermath of CIA's analysis of WMD in Iraq. Flawed or biased reporting and analysis and the weaponization of intelligence erodes policymaker and public trust in the CIA and undermines CIA's integrity.

QUESTION 24: What recourse should intelligence analysts have if they believe their objective assessments have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled? How would you ensure that career CIA professionals have protected channels to address their concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled?

The Committee has my promise that I will work closely with CIA's Deputy Director for Analysis to ensure clear communication, transparency, and training for CIA's analytic workforce, including emphasizing the paramount importance of objectivity and depoliticization in the Agency's assessments.

QUESTION 25: Do you believe the Director of the CIA has an obligation to address analysts' concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled, because a peer or a policy maker may disagree with the analysis or conclusions being presented? Please provide examples from your career of times when you have told the truth, even when that position was uncomfortable or unpopular.

Yes. I take seriously the responsibility to ensure objectivity in CIA analysis and avoid the politicization and weaponization of intelligence.

There were many occasions as a prosecutor where I was asked or even pressed to exercise prosecutorial discretion with favor to political positions or personal relationships, and I never did. As a legislator, there were many times on record in proceedings of the House where I have spoken on a range of issues that were unpopular with my colleagues or when the situation was uncomfortable, including on intelligence matters. As the DNI, I represented the IC's analysis to policymakers faithfully, including dissenting views, even when the full analytic picture was unpopular.

QUESTION 26: How would you approach communicating CIA analytic conclusions to the public if the analysis and conclusions did not align with the President's views and political objectives?

As the DNI and the head of the Intelligence Community, it was a distinct responsibility to ensure that the IC was accountable to the public and to declassify analysis and information accordingly, in accordance with the protection of sources and methods. This ranged from declassifying and publicizing standardized ODNI

analytic products, such as National Intelligence Estimates, to presenting the public with insights into issues of national security concern, such as election security. It is generally not the role of the CIA Director to initiate what analysis is communicated to the public—a distinction from my previous role as the DNI.

QUESTION 27: If confirmed, do you intend to provide, and do you intend for the CIA to provide, timely and objective analysis that is independent of political considerations, based on all available sources of intelligence and implemented in accordance with analytic tradecraft standards?

Yes, as stated in previous questions, CIA should provide timely and objective, apolitical, all-source analysis in accordance with tradecraft standards.

QUESTION 28: Is it ever appropriate for the Director of the CIA, or senior leaders, to substitute their own analytic assessments for those of career analysts in the CIA? Why or why not?

The CIA Director or senior Agency leaders should draw clear distinctions when there are areas of disagreement so that the President is receiving the full range of views to make the best decision.

My record as the DNI shows that I understand how to approach these situations. In the fall of 2020, career intelligence analysts produced a work product regarding PRC election interference with which I disagreed, and which I believed downplayed the threat of PRC election interference. The IC's Analytic Ombudsperson to the IC later wrote in a letter to the Committee that "these analysts appeared hesitant to have their analysis on China brought forward because they tended to disagree with the [then Trump] Administration's policies." I did not believe it was appropriate to alter the career analysts' work product, but I chose to attach my disagreement as a distinct addendum based on my view of the entirety of the IC's reporting on China.

QUESTION 29: Do you commit, if confirmed, to notifying the congressional intelligence committees if you, or senior leaders outside the Directorate of Analysis, substitute their own analytic assessments for those of career analysts in the CIA?

If confirmed, I will support the Agency's Ombudsperson for Objectivity's work to fulfill the mandatory reporting requirements to the intelligence committees as required by law.

QUESTION 30: Do you commit, if confirmed, to providing this committee with the results of the annual objectivity survey, as required under the law?

If confirmed, I will continue to provide SSCI and HPSCI with the results of the annual objectivity survey as required by law.

Classification & Declassification

QUESTION 31: In a May 2020 report the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) found that "[t]here is widespread, bipartisan recognition that the Government classifies too much information for too long, at great and unnecessary cost to taxpayers. This problem is getting worse, as the volume of classified information grows at an increasing rate. Current policies, practices, and technologies for managing classified information must be modernized for the digital age." Do you agree with the PIDB's findings? If confirmed, what steps will you take to reform the classification system?

I recognize that the overclassification of US Government information is a serious concern, and if confirmed, I would explore potential reforms that could modernize classification and declassification processes, while ensuring appropriate protections for intelligence sources and methods.

Detention, Interrogation and Rendition

QUESTION 32: Will you commit, if confirmed, not to permit the CIA to use any interrogation technique or approach or treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by the Army Field Manual?

Yes. CIA activities concerning any detention, interrogation, and transfer practices should comply with the law in all respects. Federal law provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. Executive Order 13491 contains a similar requirement. Both of those requirements apply to CIA. I commit to following the law.

Accountability

QUESTION 33: If confirmed, will you review the accountability review process at the CIA to ensure that it addresses systemic problems and holds accountable the officers responsible for those problems?

I believe that accountability must be encouraged at both the organizational and individual level. If confirmed, I would be eager to familiarize myself with the accountability review process and consider any improvements or changes to the process that could further foster a culture of accountability at the Agency.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) permits the government to conduct targeted surveillance of terrorists and other foreign adversaries who are located outside the United States. Unless Congress acts, Title VII of FISA, including Section 702, will expire on April 20, 2026.

QUESTION 34: Please describe your understanding of the value of Section 702, including to the President's Daily Brief.

As the DNI, I was responsible for briefing the President on the most important intelligence matters. Each day, I had the opportunity to see first-hand the immense value of Section 702. It is an indispensable tool for deconflicting intelligence, filling gaps in intelligence, informing analysis, and identifying opportunities to disrupt adversaries' actions that threaten our country and our interests. I understand that information derived from Section 702 was included in about 60 percent of President's Daily Brief (PDB) articles, and supported about 70 percent of CIA's successful weapons and counterproliferation disruptions from 2018 to 2022.

QUESTION 35: Do you support the reauthorization of Section 702?

As noted in my public statements in the leadup to the 2024 reauthorization, I see Section 702 as one of the most critical tools the Intelligence Community has at its disposal and continue to support reauthorization. In 2024, Congress implemented several critical reforms designed to enhance compliance and oversight mechanisms, including limitations on FBI, as well as enhanced congressional oversight of FISA Court proceedings. I remain open to additional oversight mechanisms that preserve the core national security value of the program.

QUESTION 36: What amendments, if any, to Section 702 or other provisions of FISA do you believe are necessary?

As a congressman and a member of the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, I supported past efforts to reauthorize FISA authorities that are critical to our national security and the IC while also ensuring civil liberties are protected and proper protocols and accountability are established throughout FISA. In the leadup to the 2024 reauthorization, I joined with other members of the first Trump Administration to support concrete improvements designed to enhance compliance and correct prior abuses. I look forward to working with Congress, the Attorney General, and the IC to identify additional reforms that ensure FISA's operational effectiveness while strengthening U.S. personal privacy protections.

QUESTION 37: The *Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act* (RISAA) amended FISA to enhance the collection of foreign intelligence concerning the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned.”. Do you support this amendment? What are your views on how this amendment will support IC's counternarcotics mission?

I support the amendment, which officially recognizes illicit drug trafficking as the national security threat Congress has known it to be for decades. In establishing the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors” as “foreign intelligence information” under FISA, RISAA paved the way for the US Government to seek, and for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to approve, a certification focused on countering this national security threat outside

US borders, enhancing foreign based and foreign focused operations, and ensuring deadly shipments of fentanyl and other illicit drugs never reach our borders.

QUESTION 38: The FBI’s use of U.S Person queries was the subject of debate during RISAA’s drafting and reauthorization. As a result, RISAA enacted many reforms on query procedures and requirements. What is your position on whether warrants should be required before an agency undertakes a U.S. Person query?

As noted in my public statements leading up to the 2024 reauthorization, I support more concrete mechanisms designed to counter prior abuses of the authority and enhance protections, but I believe a warrant requirement may not achieve its intended objectives and could hinder current national security efforts. I understand that requiring a warrant to query lawfully collected information would cause unreasonable delays in what are often extremely time-sensitive and complex national security matters.

QUESTION 39: If a U.S. Person’s selector is queried against FISA Section 702 information, and it reveals terrorist connections, what additional steps do the IC and Department of Justice need to take before they can target the U.S. Person’s communications?

A US Person cannot be targeted under Section 702 – period. Furthermore, targeting a non-U.S. Person to obtain information about a U.S. Person, also known as “reverse targeting,” is not permitted. Therefore, any efforts to target a US person must be accomplished using a lawful collection authority other than Section 702. Such decisions would be fact-specific and require substantial evidence, and in most instances, those decisions will be made by the Department of Justice. The Intelligence Community would need to obtain a probable cause-based order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to collect intelligence on an individual with the objective of thwarting a terrorist attack or dismantling a terrorist organization, demonstrating that the individual was an agent of the terrorist organization. Such legal barriers and procedures are designed to ensure any decisions to target US persons in connection with national security matters are consistent with the US Constitution.

QUESTION 40: There is a lot of misinformation about incidental collection as it pertains to FISA Section 702. Please clarify this term and discuss its importance to national security.

Section 702 targets must be non-US persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and must be expected to possess, communicate, or receive foreign intelligence information. Section 702 collects communications by Section 702 targets with other Section 702 targets, but it also collects communications between Section 702 targets and individuals who are not targeted under Section 702. The communications of individuals who are not Section 702 targets, are referred to as “incidental collection.”

Incidental collection may involve innocuous contact with family or friends, or it may, for example, constitute foreign intelligence information that must be acted upon to prevent harm. In the latter case, the incidental collection might be with a witting participant, an unwitting participant, or a potential victim. Identifying these incidental contacts assists the IC in determining which operational acts are necessary to protect national security, warn, or protect an individual from further harm.

The IC mitigates the privacy impacts of incidental collection through the application of FISA Court-approved Section 702 minimization and querying procedures. These procedures contain detailed rules regarding who can access Section 702 collection, the length of time collection can be kept by the government, and when information about US persons can be shared and with whom.

QUESTION 41: Please describe the extent of oversight mandated to ensure that the IC is compliant with FISA procedures and requirements.

Implementation of the statutory provisions and the procedures of FISA is subject to extensive oversight by Congress, the courts, the Department of Justice, and the agencies themselves.

Congress must be kept fully informed on the implementation of Section 702 through Semiannual Reports and Joint Assessments provided to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees by DOJ and ODNI. Every year, the Attorney

General and Director of National Intelligence submit to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court certifications that specify categories of foreign intelligence that the IC can use Section 702 to collect. Targeting, minimization, and querying procedures are also submitted. Every year, the FISC reviews these certifications and procedures in conjunction with the record of compliance history to ensure they comply, both on their face and as implemented, with FISA and the Fourth Amendment.

The IC dedicates significant resources to the court-approved Section 702 program, using training, technology, policy controls, and internal oversight to protect privacy and civil liberties and ensure the program is implemented in compliance with governing law and policy. DOJ reviews IC compliance with Section 702 targeting, minimization, and querying procedures. DOJ also reviews 100 percent of all Section 702 tasking sheets. DOJ reports all identified compliance incidents to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Congress. In addition to declassified and publicly released statements and FISC opinions, the IC publishes an annual report with statistics on how national security authorities, such as Section 702, are used.

Whistleblowers & The CIA Inspector General

QUESTION 42: Do you support a strong Inspector General of the CIA to provide independent oversight for the CIA? Will you ensure that the Office of Inspector General is resourced and staffed in accordance with the CIA IG's requests?

I fully support a strong Inspector General of the CIA and its mission to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency by providing timely, independent, and objective oversight, and by detecting and deterring fraud, waste, and abuse.

As a former Member of Congress and the DNI, I know from experience that the integrity and independence of the Inspector General is invaluable both for Congressional oversight and for agency leadership. Should I be confirmed as CIA Director, I look forward to supporting a strong Inspector General and I will ensure that its resource request is sent to OMB as presented to me.

QUESTION 43: Do you support the statutory rights of whistleblowers and intend to honor the anonymity of whistleblowers who come forward? Are there aspects of the CIA whistleblower statute with which you disagree?

I fully support the rights of whistleblowers under the law. I commit to ensuring that any whistleblower complaint is handled in accordance with all legal requirements and Agency regulations, and that whistleblowers are afforded all legal protections. I recognize the function that whistleblowers play in identifying waste, fraud, and abuse.

QUESTION 44: If a whistleblower follows the law in seeking to report a matter to Congress under the IC Whistleblower Protection Act, will you commit to ensuring his or her submission is delivered to Congress within seven days, as the law requires?

Yes, as CIA Director I will follow the law.

QUESTION 45: Will you commit, if confirmed, to protect the identity of CIA whistleblowers who seek to remain anonymous?

Yes. I fully support the rights of whistleblowers under the law. I commit to ensuring that any whistleblower complaint is handled in accordance with all legal requirements and that whistleblowers are afforded all legal protections.

QUESTION 46: CIA whistleblowers have a statutory right to provide their complaints directly to Congress. The law states that whistleblowers must obtain from the Director of the CIA, through the CIA IG, “direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.” Do you agree that this provision does not permit the Director of the CIA to deny that direct access to Congress altogether?

I believe that whistleblowers should receive all rights and protections to which they are entitled under the law. I don’t know how that provision has been interpreted as a matter of law—and if confirmed I would consult with CIA’s Office of General Counsel to understand how it is applied in practice—but I commit to following the law.

QUESTION 47: Do you believe Edward Snowden is a lawful whistleblower whose disclosures were in the public interest?

I believe whistleblowers need to follow the law and the authorized, established processes. Based on my time as DNI, I am aware that the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act establishes a means by which IC employees may report to Congress complaints or information pertaining to urgent concerns, including classified information. With respect to Mr. Snowden, I defer to the Department of Justice and policymakers regarding whether or not he was a whistleblower and the extent to which the disclosure of the information at issue was in the public interest.

QUESTION 48: Do you support dropping all charges against Edward Snowden? Please explain.

Whether or not the charges against Mr. Snowden should be dropped is a decision for the Department of Justice.

QUESTION 49: Do you support IC employees disclosing classified information outside the process established by the IC Whistleblower Protection Act or other authorized means?

I believe whistleblowers need to follow the law and the authorized, established processes. Based on my time as the DNI, I am aware that the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act establishes a means by which IC employees may report to Congress complaints or information pertaining to urgent concerns, including classified information, without concern for reprisal. Layered on top of that statute are subsequent legislative provisions and policy documents that provide further protection from retaliation such as adverse employment actions.

Allegations of Sexual Assault and Harassment Among the Workforce

QUESTION 50: In 2023, the Committee requested the CIA Inspector General to examine the Agency's policies and practices for responding to allegations of sexual assault and harassment among the workforce. In addition, we worked with our

counterparts on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to enact legislation, as part of the Fiscal Year 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act, to reform CIA's handling of such allegations, including through the establishment and implementation of easily comprehensible CIA policies. In particular, that legislation required that CIA establish and implement policies for "appropriate mitigation and protection measures for individuals who make allegations of a sexual assault or sexual harassment to be put in place while an investigation proceeds" and "appropriate employee consequences to be imposed based on the findings of an inquiry or investigation into a substantiated allegation of sexual assault or sexual harassment." Many of these concerns were specifically identified in the Inspector General's report, issued in May of 2024, which also contained recommendations for corrective measures. Do you commit to take immediate action to establish, implement, and clearly communicate to the workforce the policies required by the Fiscal Year 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act and to ensure the corrective measures recommended by the CIA Inspector General are fully implemented?

I am grateful for the efforts of the intelligence committees and the Inspector General on this critical issue. I understand that many of the required reforms are underway but that there is more work to do. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with Committee members to implement the IAA, address the Inspector General's recommendations, and communicate clearly to the workforce. I will take whatever steps are necessary to eliminate sexual assault and harassment, discipline bad actors, and build trust and confidence with our workforce. As Director, I will make clear that I will not tolerate sexual assault or harassment in our workforce, and I will hold perpetrators accountable.

Anomalous Health Incidents

QUESTION 51: Do you commit to taking a fresh look and an objective approach to the question of whether anomalous health incidents (AHIs) can be attributed to a foreign actor and deliberate external mechanism?

Should I be confirmed as CIA Director, I will review all existing information and analysis and pursue all leads that provide insight into the cause and origin of AHIs and all medical incidents with a CI nexus. I will ensure that, under my leadership, CIA will pursue this issue aggressively, objectively, and with total analytic

integrity. I will also ensure that all Agency personnel are provided the care necessary to address health issues which result from any condition while in the performance of their duties.

QUESTION 52: Do you commit to providing the congressional intelligence committees with ongoing and timely written and verbal updates on the AHI investigation as well as any SSCI inquiries on the topic?

If confirmed, I commit to providing the committees with timely updates on relevant insights and information related to AHIs.

QUESTION 53: The Committee has issued a report on CIA's efforts to provide medical care and compensation to employees, dependents, and contractors who had reported an AHI. This report found that, while CIA had taken steps to establish facilitated medical care and benefit programs, many AHI reporters struggled to access these programs.

A. Do you commit to ensuring that CIA retains facilitated medical care programs and benefit programs for AHI reporters?

Should I be confirmed as CIA Director, I look forward to learning more about the specific programs and authorities that are available to meet the medical needs of CIA's workforce. Under my leadership, CIA will be laser-focused on ensuring that our workforce gets the care and benefits they need, deserve, and are entitled to under the law.

B. Do you commit to ensuring that these programs remain reasonably accessible to AHI reporters, including through the establishment of clear policies and criteria to govern such access?

I commit to ensuring that our workforce continues to get the care and benefits afforded to them through these programs and that policies and criteria are clear to the workforce.

FBI Background Investigations

QUESTION 54: Should the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conduct background investigations of all Presidential nominees for positions within the executive branch of the federal government to ensure that those under

consideration for positions of significant authority and responsibility will not misuse the power of their offices and do not have vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to coercion by our adversaries?

I believe there should be appropriate vetting of cabinet nominees but am not in a position to comment on the necessity of background investigations for all presidential nominees across the executive branch.

QUESTION 55: Have you undergone, or will you undergo, an FBI background investigation as part of the process associated with your nomination?

Yes, I have undergone an FBI background investigation as part of my nomination process.

QUESTION 56: Do you agree to provide the results of your FBI background investigation to the Chair and Vice Chairman of this Committee for review?

I will adhere to historical practice.

National Security Threats and Challenges Facing the CIA

QUESTION 57: What in your view are the principal threats to national security with which the CIA must concern itself in the next five years? In the next twenty years?

The Chinese Communist Party is the greatest threat to America today, and the greatest threat to democracy and freedom worldwide since World War II. Beijing intends to dominate the US and the rest of the world economically, militarily, and technologically. I believe this is a multi-generational competition and must remain CIA's principal focus now and in the coming decades.

Relatedly, the revolution in technology, while carrying significant benefits to society, also presents tremendous threats to our national security from adversaries who intend to weaponize everyday and breakthrough technology against us.

QUESTION 58: What are the highest priority questions that the CIA should address in its collection activities and assessments?

CIA's main collection and analysis effort must be focused on the capabilities, plans, and intentions of the Chinese Communist Party. Specifically, CIA should prioritize intelligence collection and analytic capabilities to uncover and track China's programs in emergent technology, which is likely to be decisive in determining the global balance of power. At the same time, CIA must leverage foreign partners and new collection and analytic techniques to remain vigilant against other global threats, to include other hard targets and the enduring threat of terrorism.

QUESTION 59: In your opinion, how has the CIA performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats? How will you further adjust?

From my initial briefings, I have been impressed by CIA's agility in realigning its resources and strategic focus toward countering Beijing, most notably by standing up the China Mission Center. If confirmed, under my leadership, CIA will move forward on refocusing its main strategic efforts to combating the multifaceted threats to US interests and US national security posed by the CCP. This will include the following:

- Shifting more of the CIA's workforce to the PRC target, including building broad and deep expertise on the target and growing the number of officers with language capability in analytic and operational roles.
- Integrating cutting-edge technologies such as AI, machine translation, and data analytics that will enable the workforce to tackle the PRC challenge much more efficiently.
- Increasing collection and placing more emphasis on understanding and countering the PRC's efforts in the cyber and advanced technology domains, with an emphasis on blunting the PRC's efforts to gain advantages through illicit acquisition of US intellectual property and cutting-edge research.
- Working with partners to identify and counter the PRC's global covert influence efforts.

- Expanding work with partners in the Indo-Pacific region to blunt the PRC's regional ambitions and discourage aggressive military actions toward Taiwan.

China

QUESTION 60: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)?

I believe the PRC is and will remain the greatest national security threat to the United States, and the CIA must develop a suite of capabilities to better understand and counter this threat. However, my role as Director of CIA would be to present the President the best possible intelligence to make policy determinations and to ensure the CIA is well positioned to execute his desired approach.

QUESTION 61: On April 24, 2024 the President signed the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act into law. The Act prohibits the distribution or maintenance of "foreign adversary controlled applications" and effectively requires Chinese divestment from TikTok. The law was recently upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In connection with that litigation, the ODNI assessed that "TikTok pose[s] a potential threat to U.S. national security." Do you agree with ODNI's assessment? Why or why not?

I would need to review ODNI's assessment in detail and review any classified intelligence to provide an informed view on the national security risks.

QUESTION 62: Do you agree with the assertion that China's Confucius Institutes are an instrumentality for propagating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence on the campuses of America's educational institutions?

Yes.

QUESTION 63: Do you agree with the assertion that Beijing uses nominally private civic organizations like the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation to sway public opinion and build influence in the United States?

Yes.

QUESTION 64: Do you agree with the assertion that China's using nominally independent third-party organizations to act as the primary agents for funding and managing lobbying efforts on behalf of the CCP represents a deceptive and dangerous form of influence laundering?

Yes.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

QUESTION 65: Should the U.S. continue to provide weapons and other lethal and non-lethal support to Ukraine?

I defer to the President on U.S. policy toward Ukraine. As Director of CIA, it will be my responsibility to provide timely insight on the Russia-Ukraine conflict so that the President can make the best decision.

QUESTION 66: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Russia?

I defer to the President on U.S. policy toward Russia.

During my time as DNI, I flagged the increasing threat of great power competition with Russia and China and that threat has only grown in the intervening years. Russia is increasingly cooperating with other adversaries to continue the war in Ukraine and amplify threats to American interests, for example signing a defensive treaty with North Korea. As Director of CIA, I will make sure that we are using our authorities to the fullest extent to degrade these efforts.

At the same time, I believe we cannot let our adversarial relationships boil over into unintended wars. As Director of CIA, I will alert the President when the Russians are seeking to harm U.S. interests, but I will also advise the President when there are opportunities to work toward mutually beneficial outcomes with Russia.

Syria

QUESTION 67: Following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, a number of factions are vying for control of Syria. What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Syria?

At this point, just weeks after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, it is not clear to me if the conflict will descend into a sectarian morass or if the rebels who seized power have forsworn terrorism and moderated their views to create an inclusive governing coalition. The United States maintains enduring interests in stability and preventing Syria from becoming a terrorist safe haven. However, my role as Director of CIA will be to present the President with the best possible intelligence to set the course for US policy toward Syria and to ensure that CIA maintains the capabilities to execute his desired approach.

QUESTION 68: Do you continue to support the presence of U.S. forces in Syria?

The situation in Syria is extremely fluid and the incoming President will need to evaluate the threat to U.S. troops in what, for now, is a factionalized Syria. However, my role as Director of CIA will not be to recommend specific policies to the President, but I will ensure the Agency presents the President with the best possible intelligence to make a policy determination whether to maintain U.S. forces there.

QUESTION 69: In 2018 the Trump Administration put out a statement that “The United States assesses with confidence that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in the eastern Damascus suburb of Duma on April 7, 2018, killing dozens of men, women, and children, and severely injuring hundreds more.” As recently as 2024, the IC continued to assess that Syria, under Bashar al-Assad, used chemical weapons. Do you believe these assessments? Why or why not?

I agree with the then-Trump Administration’s assessment that the Assad regime used chemical weapons based on my understanding of the clear intelligence underpinning that assessment.

Iran

QUESTION 70: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Iran?

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terror and principal source of instability in the Middle East. During my time as the DNI, I warned about the dangers that Iran and its proxies posed to our allies in the Middle East and U.S. forces across the region and particularly in Iraq and Syria. While Israel has taken steps to expose, disrupt, and degrade the dangers that only grew since I left office, it is concerning that Iran continues to take steps toward potentially developing a nuclear weapon and that the regime's proxy groups continue to operate freely. However, my role as Director of CIA will not be to recommend specific policy to the President, but I will ensure the Agency presents the President with the best possible intelligence to make those policy determinations and develops the right capabilities to implement his desired approach.

Israel, HAMAS, and Hezbollah

QUESTION 71: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be with respect to the conflicts between Israel and HAMAS and Israel and Hezbollah?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the CIA presents the Administration and Congress with insights and intelligence on the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. The President-elect has made it clear the U.S. will seek to neutralize HAMAS and Hezbollah and bring the hostages home, and if confirmed, I would direct the CIA to support those efforts at his direction.

North Korea

QUESTION 72: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward North Korea?

Since my time as DNI, North Korea has grown its capacity to threaten U.S. interests. Pyongyang has advanced its military and strategic nuclear weapons programs, bankrolling these efforts in part through its support for ransomware attacks. I am particularly alarmed by North Korea's growing ties to Russia. However, my role as Director of CIA will not be to recommend specific policy to

the President, but I will ensure the Agency presents him with the best possible intelligence to make those policy determinations and develops the right capabilities to implement his desired approach.

Venezuela

QUESTION 73: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Venezuela?

Broadly, I believe the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela has fueled the world's largest migrant crisis and has provided a beachhead for malign Iranian, Russian, and PRC influence in the Western Hemisphere. My role as Director of CIA will be to present the President with the best possible intelligence to make policy determinations, and to develop the right capabilities to implement his desired approach.

Election Security

QUESTION 74: Do you commit to maintain detecting and preventing foreign interference in U.S. elections as a top priority for the CIA?

CIA will continue to support partner federal agencies on election security—including ODNI, DHS, and FBI. CIA's primary roles on this topic are to collect intelligence and conduct analysis on foreign efforts to interfere in our country's ability to hold elections or influence our elections' outcome. I will ensure that CIA continues to follow the intelligence priorities set by the President.

QUESTION 75: How would you ensure efforts to detect and prevent foreign interference in U.S. elections are appropriately resourced?

I anticipate foreign adversaries will continue their attempts to undermine U.S. democratic processes, as I warned about when I was the DNI. In that role, I worked closely with IC leaders and the IC Chief Financial Officer to ensure that the IC had the appropriate resources to address these threats.

I understand that the CIA maintains a mission manager responsible for ensuring that the Agency speaks with one voice and marshals all relevant resources on foreign malign influence and interference efforts related to election security. The

mission manager coordinates efforts across CIA Directorates and Mission Centers and serves as CIA's primary interlocutor with other federal agencies and components on this topic. If confirmed, I will review the role of CIA's mission manager to ensure the role can effectively contribute to the IC effort to track and prevent foreign malign influence and interference in U.S. elections. More broadly, I will ensure that our Mission Centers are equipped to collect on our adversaries' malign influence efforts globally, including partnering with FBI and other agencies to ensure domestic threats are appropriately handled.

QUESTION 76: How would you ensure our intelligence efforts on election security remain apolitical, and avoid the perception or reality of political influence?

As mentioned in my responses to other questions from the Committee, objectivity in all that the Agency does is a core value at CIA, one that will continue to be held in high regard during my tenure if confirmed. I will treat malign influence issues as I would any other key intelligence challenge and ensure that our tradecraft is consistent and that we analyze threats to our election security in an apolitical, objective way. Analytic integrity is critical to the organization.

QUESTION 77: Do you commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees with complete and timely information regarding foreign threats to U.S. elections?

CIA's role in regard to foreign malign influence is to provide timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to the White House, Congress, and our interagency partners—in particular ODNI, FBI, DHS, CISA, and other departments and agencies that are in charge of securing our elections. We will continue to partner with these organizations and follow ODNI's lead in keeping the intelligence committees informed while safeguarding against the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence, sources, and methods.

QUESTION 78: Do you believe Russia, China, or other foreign adversaries interfered, or attempted to interfere, in the 2016, 2020, or 2024 U.S. presidential elections in any way? If so, how?

I believe that foreign adversaries attempted to influence our U.S. elections, but the IC saw no indications that any foreign actor successfully interfered in the conduct of U.S. elections in 2016, 2020, and 2024.

I believe Russia has used foreign malign influence techniques, including covert social media campaigns, in the last three U.S. presidential elections to try to shape public perceptions of the candidates, amplify societal divisions, and undermine the democratic process. Russia's goal remains to create and exacerbate divisions among Americans.

My views on Chinese interference are also clear. Based on my experience on HPSCI and as the DNI, I believe that the CCP is interested in and attempting to influence U.S. elections. The IC's declassified assessment in October 2024 said that China seeks to denigrate American democracy and may be more willing to meddle in certain Congressional races. Even if the IC concluded that the PRC did not intend to change the outcome of the U.S. Presidential elections in 2020 or 2024, we cannot take our eye off of China when it comes to election interference.

Similarly, the threat from Iran has grown during the preceding years since I was the DNI. The IC assessed that Iran carried out a multi-pronged covert influence campaign in 2020 and 2024, tried to undermine public confidence in the electoral process and U.S. institutions, and wants to exacerbate societal tension in the U.S. The IC's declassified assessment notes that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps actors were aware of unspecified information on U.S. voters in 27 unnamed states available for download on a website, which, if acquired, could be used to target voters with disinformation.

QUESTION 79: Do you believe Russia, China, or other foreign adversaries presents a continuing interference threat with respect to the U.S. political system?

I believe these actors' aspirations to interfere in the U.S. political system will remain a persistent threat, and I agree with the IC's declassified assessment that China, Iran, and Russia are better prepared to exploit opportunities to exert influence in the U.S. general election after the polls closed on Election Day due to lessons drawn from the 2020 and now the 2024 election cycle.

QUESTION 80: Do you commit to immediately notifying policymakers and the public of foreign attempts to meddle in U.S. democratic processes, to include our elections?

Under my leadership, the CIA will continue to provide finished intelligence to policymakers on foreign actors' attempts to undermine U.S. democratic processes.

The CIA will follow the ODNI-led process for notification to the public and others regarding foreign malign influence and interference operations targeting U.S. elections. This process ensures that notification decisions are consistent, well-informed, unbiased, and appropriately coordinated across the Executive Branch.

Workforce Protection

QUESTION 81: Will you commit that, if confirmed, you will seek to recruit, attract, and retain a workforce based on principles of fairness and merit, and without consideration of personal political preferences?

Yes.

QUESTION 82: Do you commit to consider professional qualifications in CIA personnel decisions exclusively, without consideration of partisan or political factors?

Yes, personnel decisions should be made exclusively on professional qualifications. I believe that the CIA needs to be staffed with the best and most capable officers, and each officer's unique skills, job performance, and mission accomplishments will determine his or her success in the organization. We should advance officers based on their ability to achieve the CIA's mission.

QUESTION 83: Would you ever consider an individual's personal political preferences, to include "loyalty" to the President, in making personnel decisions, such as to hire, fire, or promote an individual?

No, I would not make personnel decisions based on personal political preferences.

QUESTION 84: If confirmed, what assurances will you provide to the CIA workforce that personnel decisions will be based exclusively on professional qualifications, performance, and needs and not on personal political preferences?

I will communicate clearly to the workforce that personnel decisions are based on merit and that politics has no place in the Agency.

QUESTION 85: If you receive credible allegations that CIA employees or others in the executive branch are seeking to fire or force out CIA employees because of their perceived political views or loyalty to the President, will you commit to informing the congressional intelligence committees and immediately stopping such efforts?

In such a case, I would stop any such effort in CIA to fire or force out employees based on their perceived political views and work with the General Counsel and the Inspector General to ensure that any such effort is addressed appropriately.

QUESTION 86: Will you impose a political litmus test for CIA employees? Is a political litmus test ever appropriate in determining who can or should work in the CIA?

No, a political litmus test would be highly inappropriate at the CIA for any reason.

Security Clearance Reform

QUESTION 87: If confirmed, what steps will you take to reduce the time it takes to process security clearances for new hires?

I commend Director Burns for working to expedite security processing and sharply reduce the time to onboard new officers. If confirmed, I commit to working with my team to further review the hiring process to recruit the best talent and compete with the private sector.

QUESTION 88: If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve security clearance reciprocity between CIA and other IC elements?

I am not familiar with current policies regarding security clearance reciprocity among IC elements. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing CIA's security processing procedures while bearing in mind the unique sensitivities of CIA sources and methods.

QUESTION 89: On Sep. 29, 2020, you sent a letter to the Chairman of the Senate

Judiciary Committee declassifying information obtained by the IC about internal Russian intelligence analysis relating to Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential

campaign. As you acknowledge in the letter, “the IC does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.”

A. Why do you believe the public interest in disclosing this information outweighed the need to protect it?

The IC’s responsibility to keep the public informed of foreign efforts to influence and interfere in our democratic processes and institutions was not only a key tenant guiding my time as DNI but continues to this day with regular ODNI-led public releases of information around our elections, much of which is statutorily required. This brings public awareness to adversary efforts and helps render these malign operations less effective. Consistent with that duty, I used my authority to declassify more intelligence about what the IC knew about Russia’s efforts related to the 2016 election, which resulted in more information making it to the American public. I also made sure that I provided Congress with the more sensitive insights from our reporting and analysis, as I promised I would do in my 2020 DNI confirmation hearing.

B. Why did you choose to declassify this information 35 days prior to the 2020 U.S. presidential election, as opposed to after the election?

Election security updates to the public should be provided with some regularity. For example, in this recent election, I understand that the ODNI pushed out election security updates to the public up to its final update just 15 days before the election.

C. Did anyone in the IC advise you that you should, or should not, declassify this information? If so, what did they advise?

To ensure that I appropriately protected sources and methods in any declassification, I always consulted with experts across the IC, including the CIA Director, which resulted in some modifications to proposed declassifications including the use of summaries, redactions, or holding back reports where appropriate. To my knowledge, no source, method, or reporting stream was compromised.

I can provide additional details in the classified portion of my confirmation hearing.

D. Are you aware of whether declassifying this information harmed intelligence sources and methods, impaired our ability to collect against Russian intelligence, or otherwise damaged national security?

No, I am not aware that any harm was caused by this declassification.

E. Why was the letter addressed to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee rather than the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence?

SSCI's Chair and Vice Chair were provided the letter at the same time. The letter was addressed to the Senate Judiciary Chairman because he made the request. If confirmed, I intend to be appropriately responsive to other Senate committees with oversight of national security issues.

Questions from Senator Wyden

Russia

QUESTION 90: The January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) judged that Russian President Vladimir Putin's goals in influencing the 2016 U.S. presidential election included "denigrat[ing] Secretary Clinton, and harm[ing] her electability and potential presidency." The ICA further assessed that "Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump." The IC had high confidence in these judgments. After a thorough review of the underlying intelligence, the Committee unanimously supported these judgments.

During your confirmation to be DNI, you were asked whether you agreed with the Committee's conclusion. You responded that you "have not seen the underlying intelligence to render an informed opinion on that specific issue" and that, "if confirmed, I will study this issue and will provide my feedback to the Committee as expeditiously as possible." Having had the opportunity to review the underlying

intelligence, do you agree with the Committee's conclusion and the ICA's judgments? If not, why not?

I agree with the Committee and the ICA's judgment that Russia's goal was to undermine confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and sow division among the American people. I also agree there is no evidence that any votes were changed or that any voting machines were manipulated. In reviewing the assessments, I would note that Russian social media campaigns included efforts to both support and criticize candidate Trump as well as candidate Clinton, further suggesting an overarching goal of promoting discord. Moscow has long used active measures—including disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks, and covert influence operations—not only against the United States but also against other Western democracies.

Competitive advantage

QUESTION 91: According to the CIA's policies and procedures related to signals intelligence:

"The collection of foreign private commercial information or trade secrets is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States or its partners and allies. It is not an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to collect such information to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially. Certain economic purposes, such as identifying trade or sanctions violations or government influence or direction, shall not constitute competitive advantage."

A. Do you agree that these limitations should also apply to CIA's nonSIGINT activities?

The national security imperative encompassed within the limitations generally outlined in the above language reflect broader Executive Branch norms on intelligence collection that have been in existence for several decades. If confirmed, I will review CIA's policies on this topic and evaluate if they should be modified or updated.

B. What would you do if requested by the administration to modify this policy?

If the Administration requested that CIA modify this policy, I would request that the Administration consult with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other elements of the Intelligence Community to reach a uniform policy and then I would update CIA's policy accordingly.

C. Since this is a public policy, will you commit to informing the public of any modifications?

Yes, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

D. How would you guard against the use of the CIA's collection or analytic capabilities to afford a competitive advantage to particular companies or business sectors?

In the first instance, I would expect CIA personnel to follow, and CIA managers to enforce, the policy outlined above. I also would expect CIA components with legal, compliance, and oversight responsibilities, such as the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, and the Office of the Inspector General, to provide training and guidance on, and to monitor compliance with, such policies.

E. What would you do if the CIA received an explicit or implicit request from a member or political ally of the administration to direct CIA capabilities against commercial competitors? Will you inform the Committee of any such request?

I would consult with the Office of General Counsel on the legality of any such request and always follow the law. I commit to keeping the Committee fully informed of CIA's intelligence activities as required by law.

F. How will you ensure that authorized economic intelligence activities (e.g., identifying trade or sanctions violations or government influence or

direction) are not undertaken in such a way as to advantage certain companies over others?

If confirmed as Director, I am committed to maintaining CIA's focus on its core mission and will insist that CIA conducts intelligence activities only for legitimate objectives.

Transparency

QUESTION 92: Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities, but is inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law?

If I were to identify a substantial disconnect between the public's understanding of a law and the Agency's interpretation of that law, I would support additional transparency to bridge that gap, consistent with my statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods. Should the need to protect sources and methods limit the extent to which information can be released publicly, I would nonetheless ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are aware of the CIA's interpretation of law, as required by the National Security Act, which requires CIA's General Counsel to notify the congressional intelligence committees of any significant legal interpretations.

QUESTION 93: On July 21, 2020, you sent a letter to the Committee stating that, while you agreed to appear at the Committee's open worldwide threat hearing as Director of National Intelligence, you would not take any questions in open session.

A. What was the justification for your refusal to answer questions in public?

I am committed to keeping the committee fully and currently informed of intelligence activities as required and appropriate. I recognize that at times meeting this responsibility can be completed through unclassified briefings, while other times it will require a classified setting. My interest as DNI, which continues now, was to remain cognizant of protecting our sources and methods by delivering information in the most secure and appropriate setting to preserve our foreign intelligence collection. I will continue to work with the Committee to find the right balance of transparency and discretion to

protect our intelligence while providing appropriate visibility to those who have entrusted us with preserving U.S. national security.

B. How do you square this refusal with your commitment at your confirmation hearing to appear and testify at the hearing?

As DNI, I conducted both unclassified and classified briefings on intelligence matters, consistent with statutory requirements. I will continue to testify in front of the committee whenever asked or when the intelligence demands enhanced awareness, as I did proactively as the DNI.

C. Under what circumstances would you again refuse to answer questions from the Committee in open session?

My chief consideration is to ensure I am delivering the most relevant and transparent information necessary to enable Members to exercise their critical oversight role. Answering some questions in an open session, at times, creates restrictions to that ability and creates risks to the intelligence itself; however, I am committed to meeting Committee requests to brief in open sessions whenever possible.

D. Do you believe that unclassified questions and unclassified responses should be hidden from the public?

As DNI, I collaborated extensively with my colleagues across the IC to make intelligence information and assessments available at the lowest classification as appropriate and to keep the public apprised as possible. As an example, I participated in a public-facing briefing with the FBI Director and the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to promote awareness of foreign malign influence in our democratic processes. I look forward to working with the Committee to ensure you receive the information you need to do your important work while protecting intelligence and enhancing public awareness.

Whistleblowers

QUESTION 94: 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii) states that a whistleblower who wishes to contact the intelligence committees directly shall furnish to the Director,

through the Inspector General, the complaint and follow, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the committees directly. How will you ensure that this process: (1) does not compromise the anonymity of the whistleblower; (2) result in reprisal; (3) result in the complaint being delivered to a subject of the complaint; or (4) delay the whistleblower's provision of the complaint to the committees by more than 7 days?

If I am confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Inspector General to review the Agency's policies and procedures implementing this statute in more detail, and to make any necessary improvements. I intend to rigorously protect whistleblowers from reprisal in accordance with the law.

QUESTION 95: Do you agree that any monitoring of CIA personnel for purposes of detecting insider threats must protect the confidentiality of protected whistleblower communications? If so, how should that protection be assured?

Ensuring the confidentiality of protected disclosures by whistleblowers should be a priority for the Agency. Again, if I am confirmed, I look forward to reviewing how the Agency currently manages whistleblower procedures and protections, in order to determine whether any changes are necessary or appropriate.

QUESTION 96: Do you believe that appropriately cleared attorneys representing Intelligence Community whistleblowers should have access to classified information related to the complaint and that, as a general matter, whistleblowers should have access to cleared attorneys?

I agree that whistleblowers should have access to cleared attorneys where appropriate and consistent with applicable law and regulations. The extent to which cleared counsel may receive classified information related to their complaints will be fact-specific.

Inspector General

QUESTION 97: Will you ensure that the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has full access to the activities, programs and operations of the Agency? Will you ensure that the OIG is notified of new programs and policies or significant changes in existing programs and policies?

Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that CIA's Inspector General has access to all of the information required by law.

Saudi Arabia

QUESTION 98: In 2019, Congress passed legislation requiring the ODNI to submit an unclassified report identifying those who carried out, participated in, ordered or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi.

A. Why did you not comply with that law while you served as DNI?

The report required by the NDAA included highly sensitive assessments derived from classified sources. To comply with the law while ensuring that we protect sources and methods, a meticulous review was necessary to identify which portions of the intelligence could be safely declassified and released in an unclassified report. This review was not completed until after I left office.

B. When asked about the legislation during your confirmation hearing, you stated that, if confirmed, you “want to look myself at the information to make sure that that information has been classified properly.” Do you believe the DNI or CIA Director can override an act of Congress to require a public report?

The DNI and CIA Director have obligations to protect intelligence sources and methods when complying with public reporting requirements. Failure to make these determination risks inadvertently harming ongoing operations and endangering the lives of our officers and assets. Additional care must also be taken to ensure declassification does not undermine US foreign policy objectives.

C. The report was released to the public in February 2021 by a new DNI. Do you believe that any of the information in that unclassified public report was released inappropriately?

I do not know. I was not serving as DNI to oversee the final declassification review.

QUESTION 99: A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded that “Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United States to Avoid Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process.” If confirmed, will you make Saudi efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial process a collection and analytic priority?

Uncovering any and all evidence of foreign meddling in U.S. institutions, including our judicial process, should be an intelligence priority.

Workforce protections

QUESTION 100: If confirmed, will you commit to submitting to the Committee all CIA guidelines and regulations relating to employment status and protections and any modifications thereto?

Yes. I will commit to providing all relevant Agency regulations and Agency guidance issuances to the Committee.

QUESTION 101: In 2023, now President-elect Donald Trump stated: “We will clean out all of the corrupt actors in our National Security and Intelligence apparatus, and there are plenty of them... The departments and agencies that have been weaponized will be completely overhauled so that faceless bureaucrats will never again be able to target and persecute conservatives, Christians, or the left’s political enemies.”

A. Do you believe there are individuals in the CIA or elsewhere in the Intelligence Community who have “target[ed] and persecute[d] conservatives, Christians, or the left’s political enemies”?

B. Do you believe there are “corrupt actors” in the CIA or elsewhere in the Intelligence Community? If yes, do you believe there are “plenty of them”?

C. Do you believe the CIA or the Intelligence Community has been “weaponized”? If yes, please elaborate.

D. Do you believe there are “corrupt actors” in the CIA or elsewhere in the Intelligence Community who should be “clean[ed] out.” If yes, please elaborate on how you believe that would be done.

E. Do you believe the CIA or the Intelligence Community should be “completely overhauled”? If yes, please explain how you believe that would be done.

Answer for A-E:

While serving on HPSCI and as the DNI, I had regular interaction with CIA officers and found them to be skilled professionals who were driven by mission—not by political or ideological bias. Since my nomination, my interactions with CIA officers so far have left me with the impression that little has changed—that the CIA workforce remains committed to its mission.

As the nominee for CIA Director, I do not believe I am in a position to respond to quotations that have been attributed to President-elect Trump and for which context may be lacking. That said, CIA must continue to cultivate an environment that is apolitical and objective. Biases, prejudices, and partisanship cannot be tolerated, as they erode public trust and impair CIA’s ability to provide unvarnished intelligence to the President and senior government officials. As Director, I will do everything in my power to ensure that intelligence is never used as a tool that is weaponized, but rather a product that reflects the informed assessments of a professional, objective workforce.

QUESTION 102: 50 U.S.C. 3036(e) grants the CIA Director the authority to terminate an employee when the Director deems it “necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”

A. Under what circumstances do you believe the CIA Director should exercise these authorities?

B. Under what circumstances do you believe the CIA Director should exercise these authorities without regard to existing internal regulations related to notice, appeals or other due process protections?

Answers to A and B:

It is my understanding that for the most part, all Agency employee termination actions – whether based on organizational reasons, as in the case of a workforce restructuring, or on reasons specific to the individual, such as misconduct, performance, or national security – are accomplished pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 3036(e). I understand the Agency implements this termination authority with an internal regulation, which includes robust and detailed procedures generally granting employees due process and the option to appeal depending on the circumstance of the action.

I further understand that the regulation preserves the Director’s authority granted by 50 U.S.C. 3036(e) to summarily terminate an employee, and that such actions have been rare in the past. I believe it is appropriate for the Director to continue to maintain this authority and execute it when needed.

C. Do you commit to notifying the Committee whenever these authorities are exercised and providing an explanation to the Committee as to why the termination was “necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States”?

I commit to keeping the Committee informed of CIA’s intelligence activities as required by law.

FISA

QUESTION 103: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of FISA. He responded: “As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person,

but little reporting about the Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have occurred.” If confirmed, how will you ensure that this fact specific analysis is applied to the CIA’s nomination of Section 702 targets?

My understanding of how the Intelligence Community makes reverse-targeting determinations is consistent with the response that Assistant Attorney General Demers provided during his confirmation process. I understand that determinations as to whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse-targeted are fact-specific and require the evaluation of a variety of factors. Although I am not aware of how this determination is specifically made at CIA, I understand that both internal and external oversight mechanisms evaluate whether Section 702 nominations, queries, and disseminations comply with the law and Court-approved procedures that require that Section 702 only be used to target non-U.S. persons located overseas.

If confirmed, I will review the matter and, if I become aware of instances of reverse targeting, I will ensure they are reported to Congress and the FISC and that the individuals responsible are disciplined appropriately.

Executive Order 12333

QUESTION 104: “Central Intelligence Agency intelligence Activities: Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333” is currently posted online. Do you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to making public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations?

Consistent with the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the IC, I commit to ensuring that the IC provides appropriate transparency that enhances the public’s understanding about the IC’s mission; the laws, directives, authorities, and policies that govern the IC’s activities; and, the framework that ensures intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with applicable law.

QUESTION 105: Former NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person or certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under Executive Order 12333 “normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after a finding of probable cause.” Should the same requirement apply to the CIA’s queries of its holdings collected pursuant to the Executive Order? If not, why not?

No. Based on my time as DNI, I am aware that elements of the IC are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning U.S. persons only in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General. Each element of the IC has its own Attorney General-approved procedures, consistent with the unique responsibilities and mission of each element, and I am aware that the Attorney General has recognized that the CIA's collection responsibilities and mission are different than NSA's.

QUESTION 106: At the Committee's open hearing on March 8, 2023, then-CIA Director Burns testified that the CIA would require written, auditable justifications for U.S. person queries across all of the CIA. Do you make the same commitment?

If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about CIA's documentation requirements for conducting U.S. person queries.

QUESTION 107: Do you believe that the CIA can or should collect U.S. location information pursuant to EO 12333 authorities? If no, how should the CIA ensure that it is not collecting the information through incidental collection? If yes, should there be any limitations on the CIA's use, retention, or dissemination of the information?

The CIA must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policies regarding the collection, retention, dissemination, and use of information concerning U.S. persons. I understand that the CIA's authorities are more limited within the United States. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the current laws and policies concerning location information.

QUESTION 108: Section 6.2.1(b) of the CIA's Attorney General-approved EO 12333 guidelines requires exceptional handling requirements (related to storage, access, queries, and destruction) for unevaluated information that is anticipated to contain US person information that is "significant in volume, proportion, or sensitivity." How would you define, quantity, or otherwise characterize each of these three considerations?

The CIA Attorney General Guidelines call for a designated official to determine whether a data set is anticipated to contain U.S. person identifying information that is significant in volume, proportion, or sensitivity. I imagine such officials would consider all of the facts and circumstances in light of their professional judgment

and experience. They might consider, for example, whether a data set is anticipated to contain such an unusually high volume or proportion of U.S. person identifying information, or U.S. person identifying information of such a sensitive nature in light of privacy and other considerations, that it should be subject to the same handling requirements as nonpublic telephone or electronic communications.

QUESTION 109: Do you agree that the CIA cannot request that a foreign entity conduct any activity that the CIA is not authorized to undertake itself? If yes, do you agree that this prohibition applies to requests from administration officials outside the CIA as well as implicit or indirect (including via public statement) requests?

Yes, I agree that the CIA cannot request that a foreign entity conduct an activity that the CIA is prohibited to conduct itself by U.S. law, executive order, and the Constitution.

Data purchases

QUESTION 110: Do you support the Intelligence Community's May 2024 Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information? Please elaborate on any aspects you do or not support.

I have not reviewed the IC's Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information, but if confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the framework.

QUESTION 111: Section G(1) of the Framework requires IC elements to report to the ODNI on the procurement of, access to, or collection of Sensitive Commercially Available Information on an annual basis. Will you commit to fulfilling this requirement?

Yes, I commit to reporting to ODNI on the CIA's procurement of, access to, and collection of Sensitive Commercially Available Information on an annual basis, in accordance with Section II.G.1. of the Policy Framework.

QUESTION 112: Do you commit to providing the Committee fully and currently informed of the CIA's procurement of, access to, or collection of Sensitive Commercially Available Information?

Yes.

QUESTION 113: Section G(2) of the Framework requires the ODNI, in coordination with relevant IC elements, to provide a report to the public every two years regarding the IC's access to and collection, processing, and safeguarding of Sensitive Commercially Available Information. Do you support this requirement? Will you commit to cooperating with the ODNI in providing information related to CIA activities for public release to the greatest extent possible?

Yes, I am supportive of this requirement and commit to cooperating with ODNI, in accordance with Section II.G.2. of the Policy Framework.

Chief of Mission authorities

QUESTION 114: 22 U.S.C. 3927 states that “Under the direction of the

President, the chief of mission to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country....” Absent direct intervention from the President or the National Security Council, is the CIA obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not limited to collection activities, covert action and liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of mission?

It is my understanding that Chiefs of Station are required to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently informed about any and all CIA programs and activities carried out in their countries of accreditation, with very limited exceptions. This engagement is a vital aspect of CIA's relationship with the Department of State. I further understand that should an intelligence activity not have the approval of the Chief of Mission, but continue to be supported by the Chief of Station, that activity is referred back to CIA and the Department of State for resolution.

Classification and declassification

QUESTION 115: Executive Order 13526 states, “In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security”

A. Do you commit to fulfilling both the letter and spirit of these prohibitions?

Yes.

C. What role do you believe IC Inspectors General should play in investigating possible violations of these prohibitions?

As with any law or Executive Order, suspected violations of the prohibitions in Executive Order 13526 should be promptly referred to the Inspector General and/or the Department of Justice, as appropriate, for review. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 directs the CIA Inspector General to conduct investigations of the Agency's programs and operations to ensure that they are being conducted in accordance with applicable law and regulations, and to keep the Director fully and currently informed of any identified violations of such law and regulations.

D. What accountability do you believe is appropriate for violations of these prohibitions?

Executive Order 13526 sets forth appropriate sanctions for knowing, willful, or negligent violations of the order, which may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.

Interrogation, Detention and Rendition

QUESTION 116: Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 prohibits the use of any interrogation technique or approach or any treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the CIA and the President?

Yes, this provision of law is binding on the United States Government, including the CIA.

QUESTION 117: The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with the Army Field Manual applies to any individual “in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict.”

A. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee is in the “effective control” of any officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government.

As is the case with interpreting any statutory language or standard, I would review the specific facts and relevant statutory language with the General Counsel. My team and I, in consultation with the General Counsel, would look at a number of factors, which in most cases would include whether the U.S. controls access to the detention facility in question, owns the land on which the facility is located, manages the operations of the facility, controls the disposition of detainees, and/or has the authority to discipline or fire the personnel running the facility.

B. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is “detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department of agency of the United States.”

As is the case with interpreting any statutory language or standard, I would review the specific facts and relevant statutory language with the General Counsel. My team and I, in consultation with the General Counsel, would look at a number of factors, which in most cases would include whether the U.S. controls access to the detention facility in question, owns the land on which the facility is located, manages the operations of the facility, controls the disposition of detainees, and/or has the authority to discipline or fire the personnel running the facility.

QUESTION 118: Section 1045 states that “[t]he head of any department or agency of the United States Government shall provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and prompt access to, any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or other agent of the United States

Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or effectively controlled by a department, agency, contractor, or subcontractor of the United States Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies.” Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the CIA and the President?

Yes, this provision of law is binding on the United States Government, including the CIA.

QUESTION 119: Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention facility except to hold people “on a short-term, transitory basis.” Do you commit to adhering to this prohibition? If yes, how would you define “short-term” and “transitory”?

Yes, I would adhere to this prohibition. I would define the terms “short-term” and “transitory” consistent with their plain meaning.

QUESTION 120: Do you agree that CIA officers should not participate in interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know of, or otherwise suspect the torture or mistreatment of detainees?

Yes, I agree that CIA officers should not participate in a liaison service’s debriefings of detainees if CIA officers have witnessed the liaison service torture or mistreat a detainee, or if the CIA receives credible information that detainees in custody of that service are subjected to torture or mistreatment.

QUESTION 121: The United States recognizes its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, not to “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

A. To what extent should written “diplomatic assurances” be required for extraditions and renditions?

Diplomatic assurances, and consulting with the Department of State or Chief of Mission of the relevant Embassy in assessing the reliability and credibility of assurances obtained in connection with an extradition or rendition, are important considerations in determining whether the legal standards for an extradition or rendition have been met and that detainees will be treated humanely.

B. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established records of committing torture?

My team and I would need to assess the reliability and credibility of any assurances offered by a country on a case-by-case basis, in light of all relevant factors and information known to CIA at the time. This assessment would include not only the practices and record of compliance of the country that provides the assurances, but also the reliability and credibility of the individuals and organizations that would be responsible for ensuring the safety of any individual.

Lethal Operations

QUESTION 122: Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?

The US Government takes matters of use of force very seriously, particularly in the exceptionally rare instance when a US person has taken up arms against the United States. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the National Security Council, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community colleagues to ensure that the use of force by the U.S. Government against a U.S. person is contemplated only in the most narrow of circumstances and is within legal authorities. I will work with U.S. Government partners to provide as much transparency to the U.S. public as appropriate.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



Post-Hearing Questions for the Record for

John L. Ratcliffe

Upon his nomination to be

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Question from Chairman Cotton

QUESTION 1: For decades the United States retained primacy in space. However, over the last several years, both China and Russia have made great strides and now could be considered near peer competitors. They are both actively militarizing space by putting space weapons on orbit. The Intelligence Community needs to talk more about this threat and publicize their bad behavior.

- A. How do you see the Russian and Chinese space threat?
- B. If confirmed, do you commit to making this a point of emphasis in the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment?

Questions from Vice Chairman Warner

QUESTION 2: Should the U.S. be more pro-active in undertaking offensive cyber actions against state and non-state adversaries who are using cyber, including ransomware, to target critical U.S. infrastructure?

QUESTION 3: Do you believe that deterrence is achievable in cyberspace?

QUESTION 4: What are the potential risks of escalation in cyberspace – and how vulnerable are we to adversarial retaliation and what can we do about it?

Questions from Senator Wyden

QUESTION 5: In December 2024, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released “A Review of the Department of Justice’s Issuance of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and Members of the News Media.”

- A. While Director of National Intelligence (DNI), were you aware of any efforts to collect communications records of congressional Members and staff? If yes, please describe your role.
- B. The OIG concluded that the Department’s actions regarding congressional Members and staff “implicated the constitutional rights and authorities of a co-equal branch of government.” It further stated:

“[W]e believe that using compulsory process to obtain such records when based solely on the close proximity in time between access to the classified information and subsequent publication of the information—which was the case with most of the process issued for non-content communications records of congressional staff in the investigations we examined—risks chilling Congress’s ability to conduct oversight of the executive branch because it exposes congressional officials to having their records reviewed by the Department solely for conducting Congress’s constitutionally authorized oversight duties and creating, at a minimum, the appearance of inappropriate interference by the executive branch in legitimate oversight activity by the legislative branch. Moreover, even non-content communications records—such as those predominantly sought here—can reveal the fact of sensitive communications of Members of Congress and staffers, including with executive branch whistleblowers and with interest groups engaging in First Amendment activity.”

Do you agree with the OIG’s concerns that the collection of communications records of congressional Members and staff raises constitutional concerns, particularly when, as in this case, the collection was based solely on those Members’ and staff’s exercise of their constitutionally authorized oversight duties? If yes, how would you respond to an effort to collect such records in a similar situation?

- C. Do you support the policy changes described in the OIG Review? Do you believe further policy changes should be made?
- D. Do you agree that Congress should be notified prior to any such collection? If yes, who in Congress should be notified?
- E. Do you agree that the government should inform the judge issuing an order for compulsory process or a non-disclosure order that the targets are congressional Members and staff so that the judge can consider the constitutional implications?

QUESTION 6: While DNI, were you aware of any efforts to collect communications records of journalists? If yes, please describe your role.

QUESTION 7: In July 2021, the Department of Justice announced a policy restricting use of compulsory process to obtain reporter information. In October 2022, the Department formalized and expanded those protections. Do you support this policy? Do you believe it should be modified in any way?

QUESTION 8: Based on your observations as DNI, what would be your priorities for declassification if confirmed? To the extent details are classified, please provide a detailed classified response.

QUESTION 9: Do you agree that Salt Typhoon represents a serious threat to U.S. national security? If yes, would you use your voice in the Cabinet and at the National Security Council to advocate for legislation to strengthen the cybersecurity of the telecommunications industry?

QUESTION 10: You testified that you would tell “truth to power.” Please provide examples where you declassified intelligence or articulated a disagreement with an intelligence assessment in such a way that your actions were in conflict with the positions of the President.

Questions from Senators Heinrich and Wyden

QUESTION 11: You testified that, while you would accede to the Committee’s requests to answer questions in open session, it was still your preference not to. You also stated that other countries do not require intelligence leaders to testify in public.

- A. Do you appreciate the critical importance of open hearings to the oversight responsibilities of Congress under the U.S. Constitution, as well as to the American principle of democratic accountability?
- B. You testified that one of your goals if confirmed would be to reestablish public trust in the Intelligence Community. Do you see public appearances and responses to questions as part of that trust-building effort?
- C. You expressed concern about being “put on the spot” in open session. For many decades, U.S. intelligence leaders have testified in open session and

negotiated the line between classified and unclassified information. Are you less capable than your predecessors in this regard?

Question from Senators Heinrich, Ossoff, and Wyden

QUESTION 12: The Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) that reauthorized Section 702 of FISA included an expanded definition of electronic communications service provider. According to the Department of Justice and the Committee leadership, this language was intended only to encompass the kind of provider at issue in a FISA Court/ FISA Court of Review case, the opinions of which were authorized for public release on August 23, 2023.

The Committee passed language in the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence Authorization Act that would have narrowed the RISAA language to bring it into conformity with its actual purpose, as articulated by the Department of Justice and Committee leadership. Do you support the Committee's effort to ensure that statutory FISA authorities are consistent with their national security purpose and not unnecessarily broad?

Question from Senator Ossoff

QUESTION 13: Do you believe it is appropriate to conduct intelligence activities, including collection and covert action, to influence or interfere in the elections of our NATO or other democratic allies? Will you commit to keeping the Committee fully and currently informed of any such effort?

