S. HRG. 104–797

ASSESSING THE REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SAUDI ARABIA; LOOKING TO THE FUTURE IN COMBATTING TERRORISM; EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 1996

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

37–430 WASHINGTON : 1997

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-054222-7

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[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

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ASSESSING THE REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SAUDI ARABIA; LOOKING TO THE FUTURE IN COMBATTING TERRORISM; EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 1996

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:13 o'clock a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Specter, Lugar, DeWine, Kyl, Kerrey of Nebraska, Kerry of Massachusetts and Robb.

Also present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub, Minority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk.

Chairman SPECTER. We will proceed to the second of our planned hearings on the terrorist attack in Dhahran on June 25. We have three panels scheduled for today. And it was my hope that we might proceed with the balance of our hearing before about 12:15. We have votes scheduled at noon which will take a substantial part of the afternoon, and it may be that the witnesses have not been alerted to the specific timing so we will proceed as promptly as we can.

We are pursuing the hearings following yesterday's session of the Intelligence Committee and also the Armed Services Committee. And there are a good many questions which have been raised by the testimony yesterday. Secretary Perry, in his prepared statement, enumerated under the category of what went wrong, his comment, first of all, the security measures we introduced after the bombing of the Saudi National Guard facility were focused on a threat less powerful than actually occurred.

Secretary Perry had previously said that the bomb in the range of 3,000 to 5,000 pounds was tenfold what has occurred in the Mid-East before, which was arithmetically incorrect because of the experience in Beirut of a 12,000 pound bomb.

We've had the testimony of General Peay yesterday. Again on the issue of threat assessment which presumptively should have required more attention when General Peay said, "most—referring to terrorist groups—receive financing, weapons, and sanctuary from countries like Iran and Sudan." Recently we have seen growth in transnational groups comprised of fanatical Islamic extremists, raising the additional question as to whether, with that kind of

backing, there shouldn't have been an alert as to a bomb of greater intensity.

And General Peay said at page fourteen of his statement that in the months prior to the Khobar Towers bombing, there was a revelation of an increase in suspected surveillance.

The comments which General Peay made raise a number of questions. As one account reported, Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, said what is clear is that they did not kick it upstairs, referring to the request to move the perimeter back. And General Peay, though, refused to term that a failure. And the account says, should the fence have been moved further Peay asked? Yes. Were they working on it? I think they probably were. Should they have kicked it upstairs? I don't know, I just don't know. And the report says that Senator Lieberman said that he did know and that it should have been kicked upstairs. And General Peay was further quoted as saying that he had not questioned his base commanders because he did not want to interfere with the special commission set up to investigate the explosion, prompting Senator Warner to say it's almost two weeks since the incident, and you still do not know whether or not your subordinates appealed. All of these raising very fundamental questions as to the adequacy of what happened.

Yesterday, the threat was summarized, in effect, by Admiral Long, referring to the Long Commission Report, in 1983, that the Department of Defense is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. Much needs to be done on an urgent basis to prepare U.S. military forces to defend against any counterterrorist warfare. Now, that statement of 1983 is applicable to 1996 as well.

And this Committee is going to pursue our inquiry to make a determination as to what happened here. Whether it could have been prevented. What was the adequacy of the intelligence information. Secretary Perry said yesterday that the intelligence was present but could not pinpoint the size of the bomb or precisely what and when it would happen. The issue is whether you can expect intelligence to go that far. I yield now to my distinguished Vice Chairman Senator Kerrey.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

For my part, I'm most interested in hearing the panel particularly describe the current situation in Saudi Arabia, giving us an unclassified baseline from which we can operate as to the state of Saudi internal politics today, an inventory of the violent dissident movements opposed to the Saudi government, a review of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, and I do very much look forward to the panel, and look forward to your providing some information that can help us make decisions about how we organize our intelligence and how we write our laws so as to be able to give decision makers the information they need to make good decisions.

It is clear we are in a war time situation in Saudi Arabia. We are under attack, this is the second attack. And any evaluation of what went on in Saudi Arabia must be taken in the context that we are essentially coming in and we're second guessing battlefield commanders. How did you do? How did the battlefield commander do? Did the battlefield commander do everything that battlefield commanders should have done? And this is not just evaluating

some troops on the ground in Saudi Arabia. And establishes, in my mind, if that's what we are going to do, if in every single operation where there are casualties, we are going to go and bring that battlefield commander in and say you received a notification of a threat, why didn't you do more? I mean it may be the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia receives a threat of a nuclear attack. It doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to withdraw as a consequence of getting that. The idea is to try to measure the seriousness of the threat and take precautions to try and minimize the risk to our forces. So I do very much appreciate the difficulty of doing this task, and at yesterday's hearing I think we started moving forward to a point where we can make good judgments about how to organize our intelligence community so as to be able again, not just to give warfighters the information and intell they need, but policymakers as well, so they can measure risk and take necessary precautions. Not to eliminate risk altogether, which is impossible, even a peace time operation at home and a training operation you cannot eliminate risk altogether. But in addition to that we give policymakers an adequate baseline, and I look forward, as I said, to the unclassified baseline this panel intends to give us.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you Senator Kerrey.

Senator DeWine, would you care to make a comment?

In order of arrival, Senator Kyl?

Senator Robb?

Senator ROBB. I'll pass on the opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding the hearing. I think this will be a valuable opportunity to learn more about those who may be perpetrating the violence. And I think it is an appropriate place to begin.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Robb.

Senator Cohen has been unable to participate in these hearings because of his activity and meetings in Cairo with representatives of the Arab League Governments to discuss the fight against terrorism, the peace process and related security, political and economic issues. Before he left for Cairo he was briefed on the investigation of the recent bombing in Saudi Arabia and he may submit questions for the record for our witnesses.

We welcome today two very distinguished witnesses, Dr. Mary Jane Deeb, Editor of the Middle East Journal, and Professor of Middle East Politics at American University. Professor Deeb has had very extensive activity in studies of the Mid-East with very special insights into the matters in Saudi Arabia. She has numerous publications too lengthy to go into at this time.

She's joined by Dr. Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs. Dr. Haass was on the staff of the National Security Council from 1989 to 1993; was one of President Bush's key advisors and serves as Director of the National Security Program, and is a senior fellow on the Council of Foreign Relations.

We welcome you here, Professor Deeb, and we turn to you first.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARY JANE DEEB, EDITOR, MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, PROFESSOR OF MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Dr. DEEB. Well, I'll make my statement very brief.

Basically what I'm looking at, is who could have been responsible for the bombing in Khobar on the 25th of June. There are two sets of suspects in the case. The first, I think, includes home grown Islamic opposition groups and the other includes groups supported by outside powers or other Islamic movements.

In terms of the outsider theory, the attackers may be agents of external powers such as Iran, Libya, Sudan or Syria. Or they may be linked to one of the Islamic movements in countries like Pakistan or Afghanistan. And that theory applies, for instance, to one of the Saudi Islamic groups, namely the Committee for Advice and Reform, which is led by Usama Bin Ladin. This group has strong ties to many Islamic groups outside Saudi Arabia, groups which have been accused of terrorism, including the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, the National Islamic Front of Sudan, and this group has also ties with Afghani radical Islamic groups.

There is another group with strong ties to outside powers, and that is the Shiite community of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which has strong links to Iran and some religious ties to Syria as well. The Community is concentrated geographically in Hasa, on the Persian Gulf, very close to Dhahran and just across from Iran. It has felt discriminated by the Saudi Government for many years, and has sought support from Iran.

Then there are a variety of Islamic groups which emerged in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, and whose protest can be linked in a way to the war and to its consequences. Those groups include the Islamic insurgent movement led by two clerics, and are very, very fundamentalist. And then there is the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and the head of that Committee is in London and has links to an extremist group in Jordan, the Tahrir Group. Then there is the Islamic Reform Movement and that has split from the Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights. And then there is the Committee for Advice and Reform we just mentioned who has links to other Islamic groups.

What it is that they are objecting to, protesting to, basically they have been critical—they have sent, first of all, a number of the members and the founding members of those organizations have sent two petitions. One in May 1991 was sent to King Fahd and one in September 1992 was sent to the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. And what they've been asking in those two petitions was for reforms which focused primarily on religious matter, ethics in government, human rights, economic changes. But there were some demands which are relevant to issues we are discussing today.

One was the establishment of a majlis ash-shura or a council on which they would have a say, not only on domestic policies, but on foreign policies. The implication is that they were deeply critical of Saudi policy, Saudi foreign policy, and implied again, the relations of Saudi Arabia to the United States.

Another demand in those petitions was the establishment of a strong Saudi army, national army, which would be self sufficient in—first of all, would buy weapons from different sources and would even produce weapons internally in Saudi Arabia. The implication of that is that they were critical of the dependency of Saudi

Arabia on the United States for its weapons and for the defense and security of Saudi Arabia.

The third point that is relevant here in those petitions, is that they wanted Saudi Arabia to support Islamic causes and they were—they questioned the alliances of Saudi Arabia with other powers, meaning Western powers. Those alliances, they see, could be in their words, they could violate the sharia or Islamic law.

So I will stop here and leave the floor open for questions.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much Dr. Deeb.

We now turn to Dr. Richard Haass. Welcome Dr. Haass, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD HAASS, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND SENIOR FELLOW OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dr. HAASS. Thank you Senator, thank you Mr. Chairman. It's good to be back before this Committee.

I just have five points to make and I'll do it as briefly as I can.

First, the problem of the security of American troops in Saudi Arabia is here to stay. There's no sign whatsoever that our stake in the country, or in the region is going to diminish for the foreseeable future. There's no way that I can think of to distribute the military burdens meaningfully so the American role can significantly go down. There is, if you will, a mismatch for the foreseeable future among our interests, the threats to those interests, and what friendly states in the region can do to contend with those threats in order to protect those interests. Only the United States can fill that gap for the foreseeable future. This problem, as a result, will not disappear.

Secondly, it will require a military presence in the region to deter attacks, to conduct Southern Watch, all talk of over the horizon presence will not be enough.

That said, we do want our presence to take into account legitimate Saudi concerns. The House of Saud, after all, does derive a good deal of its legitimacy from being the custodian of the two holy places. And we don't want to undermine Saudi security in the name of promoting Saudi security. And what that will mean is that we will need to keep our presence fairly small, low visibility, continue the idea of presence without stationing. Highly disciplined. If there's one thing we cannot afford in Saudi Arabia it's the equivalent of an Okinawa type incident, which would be a nightmare for the American presence. And we are going to need all sorts of flexibility. Such things as pre-positioning, an awful lot of lift, an awful lot of exercising. Again, capability with a minimum of stationing.

Thirdly, I think it is important to keep into account why the Saudis are worried. What their concerns are. They do have a large domestic opposition. We've just heard that. Clearly, orthodox Saudi Arabia, however orthodox it is, is still not pure enough for the domestic Islamic opposition. You are going to always have these radicals who will fill this ideological vacuum in Saudi Arabia. They will also derive some support from corruption. They will derive support from the fact you've got an awfully top heavy political and eco-

nomic system. You've got declining oil revenues on a per capita basis given the growth in the population and the leveling off of oil prices. You've got problems of underemployment, you've got a lot of people who have formal university educations but not a lot of content to those educations. The result is, again, an awful lot of underemployment. You've got the people coming back from Afghanistan. You've got external enemies who are more than willing to make mischief with these internal factors. So you do have problems in Saudi Arabia that will continue to be something of a breeding ground for terrorism.

I don't want to sit here and paint a picture that we've got a crisis in Saudi Arabia. It is not a country that is in, if you will, a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation, but there are real problems in that country which, again, will not go away any time soon.

What does this mean then for the United States? And let me make this my last point in the way of these brief remarks. I don't know of any way to eliminate the threat of terror in Saudi Arabia to the American presence. Particularly if someone is willing to die for their cause. That threat is going to continue to be with us. Even worse, it is my concern that the threat will probably grow worse over the years qualitatively. Up to now the principle threat has been, if you will, a fairly old fashioned one—which are car and truck bombs—using conventional explosives. I would think the truly frightening scenario is not simply more of these, though that is plenty bad enough, but will clearly be the qualitative evolution of the terrorist threat using external sources of support, and ultimately moving in to other forms—chemical and biological type agents—most worrying of all.

So I think over the future we can expect, not simply in Saudi Arabia, but throughout this region this type of a threat. Indeed, one of the lessons that was widely taken from Desert Storm is the one way not to take on the United States is with conventional weapons on traditional battlefields. That is what we are best at. And I would think that a lot of individuals and a lot of groups in this part of the world and elsewhere derived the lesson that the best way to take us on is unconventionally—not using traditional conventional weapons and not in what we think of as traditional battlefield situations.

What can we do to contend with that? Clearly a priority on intelligence. Not simply allotted it, but also human intelligence I would continue to think would be terribly important. Obviously all sorts of protective measures against bombs. The sort of things we've been talking about with perimeters and so forth.

Thirdly, reconfiguring of U.S. forces. One of the things we are going to have to think about is against the sort of concentrations, the sorts of efficiencies of scale, we often think about. Those make incredibly ripe targets. And one of the things we are going to have to think about in the future is more and more not having concentrated targets for these types of weapons. We are going to have to think about dispersing our forces, rather than necessarily consolidating them. And, of course, deterrence against state-sponsors of terrorism. I don't know of any political way to accommodate these terrorists. I think progress in the peace process is obviously

a good idea on its own merits. I think obviously reform of Saudi society, politically and economically, makes sense also on its own merits. And both of those, the peace process and reform, might do something at the margins to ameliorate this threat.

But we shouldn't kid ourselves. The objectives of these people can never be met by traditional political compromises, either in the Arab-Israeli peace process or on reform of Saudi society. There is no way they will ever be satisfied with the sorts of things we are willing to do and as a result I end where I began, that terrorism in Saudi Arabia and in the region is, if you will, a structural problem that will stay as long as American troops do.

Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Haass.

We've now been joined by Ambassador Walter Cutler, who began his work with the U.S. Foreign Service in 1956. Served as Staff Assistant to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Has extensive experience in the Mid-East having been Ambassador to Tunisia in 1982–1984, then Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 1984–1987 and following a year as Research Professor of Diplomacy at Georgetown, he was again appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1988. In 1989 Ambassador Cutler left the Foreign Service to take up his present position as President of the Meridian International Center.

Thank you for joining us Ambassador Cutler, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER CUTLER, PRESIDENT, MERIDIAN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA

Ambassador CUTLER. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I have a slight disadvantage of coming in late, and, I apologize for that. I have not heard the statements by my two colleagues here, so I will make mine particularly short. I just want to make two or three points.

I think we are obviously concerned and somewhat perplexed by what's been going on recently in Saudi Arabia. By that I mean the Dhahran bombing, but also the one that preceded it in Riyadh.

During my time in Saudi Arabia, which was a total of some five years, this kind of terrorist act would have been viewed as highly unlikely. The Iran/Iraq war was going on. We were all very security conscious. On the other hand, the Saudis have a long track record of guarding their country very well from the standpoint of controls and cooperation, I might say, with us. I want to emphasize that and I'll come back to it.

Nevertheless, terrorism, as we've all noted, can strike anywhere at any time. It's almost impossible to predict it. And so even during those days, when we felt safe there, we nevertheless were very alert to the possibility that something might happen. And thankfully it did not happen at that time.

Now what's happened most recently, I think, reflects a number of factors, and I won't cover them all. As you mentioned, I left Saudi Arabia in 1989. I have returned to the Kingdom at least once a year since then. I was there about six months ago.

The big factor since 1989 is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia's security and our reaction to it. And in the

wake of that, I think you've seen certain developments within the Kingdom. Certainly, the war continued the drain on the Saudi treasury. They paid out $60, $70 billion and more. And as Mr. Haass has mentioned, there have been economic problems.

But beyond that we've had, what I call the legacy of the end of the Cold War, and that's Afghanistan, where we and the Saudis and others, many others, worked very hard and very successfully to cause the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. But that left, as perhaps as has been noted here before I came, a fairly large corps of pretty well trained religiously oriented fighters in Afghanistan looking around for another Jihad. And I think we are now seeing that. I think three of the four who were involved in the Riyadh bombing had Afghan experience and I suspect that there are many, many more, not only in the Gulf area but throughout the Middle East.

Having said all that, I want to emphasize that despite Saudi Arabia's current problems—economic, financial, security—I do not regard the stability of Saudi Arabia as endangered. We've heard quite a bit of talk about that in recent days. We don't know how many people are involved in the current terrorist activities. I suspect there are not that many, and I suspect they are not that well organized. I also suspect that there's probably some outside involvement. I think particularly the Dhahran incident leads us to think in those directions. We will have to wait and see, obviously.

Another thing that has concerned me a bit, Mr. Chairman, and I think it is understandable, is the whole question of why can't we, the United States, do more to provide for our own security for our forces in Saudi Arabia. And this becomes a very complex political as well as security issue.

The reaction—I think the human reaction is "well look, if we can't count on the host government to provide all the security we need, let's do it ourselves." And I think there we have to be careful. In the first place, we are dealing with a sovereign government. And I'm concerned equally by the feeling that goes along with this "let's do it ourselves" attitude: that we are there to buttress the regime, we are there for Saudi interests. And I want to underscore and I think we must all realize, that we are there essentially for our own vital national interests. And I think that, as for any casualties we've taken, the families and the loved ones of those people should understand that it is, in fact, our interest that they are protecting. And this involves the continuing threat from Iraq—and I don't minimize that—or from other sources that would endanger our free access to oil.

Chairman SPECTER. Ambassador Cutler, let me begin the questioning if I might on that point. Were looking at, as I had said earlier, votes starting at noon, and we have a number of people to question, so we'll begin the questioning on five minute rounds now.

Ambassador CUTLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. We'll pick up at that point.

Ambassador CUTLER. Right.

Chairman SPECTER. We had some very interesting testimony yesterday, and it's not possible to really summarize it totally, but the thrust was that the United States-Saudi relationship is sort of on tenterhooks. The military does not know quite how to respond in

terms of pressing issues. And that there may have been a reluctance on the part of the military in charge of Khobar Towers to push as hard as they should have. Reluctance on the part of our government to push as hard as it should have on the questioning of the terrorist suspects, although there is some indication that they went fairly high into the Saudi government and we're going to have to pursue that. And recognizing U.S. interests, and recognizing our having saved them in the Gulf War and our continuing presence there is for their security, and we're there because we have an interest in being there, this is obvious.

The question comes up as to how we deal with the Saudis given their mentality. And you three experts have substantial knowledge in that field. And the issue is whether it's possible to establish a relationship where we have a reasonable amount of security because we can't be there, if we can't have a perimeter which reasonably protects our troops. Or if we can't have access to terrorists to prevent a future terrorist attack.

Now, one of the pieces of information which staff has provided to me, Ambassador Cutler, is your concerns about Saudi cooperation in the past, especially in the area of intelligence sharing. And I would like to begin my question to you on that specific point.

Ambassador CUTLER. It's not so much a concern about past performance, Mr. Chairman, as it is, what I believe to be a very important part of a cooperative effort to ensure the security of both U.S. and Saudi forces. It seems to me——

Chairman SPECTER. Well, the point comes up as to what has——

Ambassador CUTLER [continuing]. The idea is to pre-empt this sort of thing.

Chairman SPECTER. What has our experience been and what may we expect in the future besides generalized promises when it comes right down to getting their cooperation. You were there a long time.

Ambassador CUTLER. I was there a long time, and fortunately we did not face this kind of terrorist threat, as I mentioned. We had a lot of alerts. We had the usual number of calls to the Embassy threatening bombs and so on and while we suspected that they were quacks, we always took them seriously. My experience during the five years was we had very prompt and good cooperation from the Saudis. I cannot——

Chairman SPECTER. On intelligence matters?

Ambassador CUTLER. On intelligence matters as well as on follow-up. However, having said that, I might say that probably our intelligence experts—and I did not get into all the details of this of course—believe that our security can never be enough. And there are—as mentioned here I think yesterday, Mr. Chairman—there are certain differences of view that you find in other cultures. And you are dealing with an Eastern culture. And the sense of urgency, or the sense of timing, can often be very different. And I suspect that may have been a factor in what we've seen recently, but I can't speak to the details of it.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Deeb, let me go to you for just a moment. When you and I discussed this matter a few days ago, and you had started to outline the problems, or potential problems and stability of the Saudi government and had commented about three

groups of potential opposition. One, you characterized as the Saudi University Clergy who would like to replace the existing government with an Islamic Government. And you referred to a second group, leaders in London concerned about too much reliance on U.S. help, and then you talked about the issue of a third group, of the democratization of Saudi Arabia. All three being critical of the U.S. presence there. Taking that in its totality, how would you evaluate the stability of the Saudi Government today?

Dr. DEEB. I think the government is quite stable. However, we are seeing much more criticism, much more opposition than we've ever had before. The government is stable because of the structure of the government. It is based on a tribal structure. The defense, security, regional, local governments are controlled by the same clan and tribe, and the family is linked to the other tribes in the region by marriage. However, the change which has taken place since the Gulf War has been the outspokenness of the opposition. The fact that petitions were put forward openly, that they were published, that opposition leadership has emerged, is present, is vocal, in London, within Saudi Arabia and other things. And this is qualitatively different from what we have seen before the Gulf War.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Deeb.

My time is expired. And our practice after going to the Vice Chairman is to go in order of sequence of arrival. Senator DeWine, Senator Kyl, Senator Robb and Senator Lugar.

Senator Kerrey.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Cutler, just taking your foundation in general, as I see it, the U.S. interests are one, military presence to deter Iran and Iraq. Two, a military presence to fly very specific operations in the North and the South, to provide cover for the Southern Watch operations. And three, the economic issue of 8 million barrels of oil a day, rather significant and important impact upon our economy were some instability to develop in the region. I take the point that you make, I just want to reiterate that we have goals. U.S. policy has very precise goals for this military deployment. And I want to connect that with something Dr. Haass said which was that our opposition, our enemies have discovered from the Gulf War that it's not a good idea to take the United States on in a conventional fashion. Although I also think one of the lessons is so long as it gets over in a substantial hurry, so that it's not possible for second guessing to start to occur, and the unraveling of the public support which is one of the things that I, one of the reasons that terrorism is so effective. There is a response to terrorism. Congress is having all kinds of hearings on the issue. We heard yesterday, and I think quite accurately, that very often we will respond to a failure on the human intelligence side with changes in rules and regulations that make it then very difficult for us to accomplish the objective that these people are set out to do in the first place.

Thus the reaction plays in some ways, in some limited way, into the hands of our opposition. I mean, I think the terrorist, as I see it, and Dr. Haass, I appreciate your responding to it, if you could, what you think the ideal situation is from the standpoint of the terrorist. What would the terrorists like to see the United States do

in response both to the bombing in Riyadh and the bombing in Dhahran.

Dr. HAASS. A one word answer would be leave.

Vice Chairman KERREY. The first and most exciting outcome could be for us to cut and pull out of Saudi Arabia as a consequence of taking casualties.

Dr. HAASS. Sure. Beyond that, these groups are not simply against the United States per se, they are also, more than anything, against the local regimes which cooperate with us. And they look to one way to get at the local regime, at so-called moderates in the Middle-East, is to go after the United States, to weaken the connection between the United States and these regimes, both to embarrass them as well as to deny them important sources of support. And what we face, coming back to your original analogy, Senator, is almost a war of attrition on this front. And these attacks are going to come periodically.

Vice Chairman KERREY. So, if we were to react to this bombing in some way that would weaken the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, that would be a second objective and they would consider the bombing then to have been a success.

Dr. HAASS. Exactly.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Can you tell me, Dr. Deeb, what kind of reporting has gone on in Saudi Arabia? Has the bombing, first again in Riyadh and now in Dhahran, has it had any desired effect in terms of terrorist objective. Has it produced increased instability? Has it been regarded, from the standpoint of opposition, as a success?

Dr. DEEB. There were two reactions. One was, and I suppose it is representative of most people in Saudi Arabia, was shock. They did not expect that that could happen in Saudi Arabia. But the second reaction was expressed by El Muassari, the head of the Committee which is in London. And he said that he had received phone calls rejoicing about the bombing and about the success of the bombing.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Phone calls from Saudi Arabia?

Dr. DEEB. Phone calls from Saudi Arabia to him in London. Now he has reported that. He has of course an ax to grind so those who called him were probably his own supporters and people of his own group. But I would say that that's a very small group who would, who felt happy about it and felt it was successful. Running, leaving and running at this point would actually be the worst thing that one could do. It would strengthen the opposition groups and it might lead to an increase in terrorist activities. If those activities were seen to be successful in pushing U.S. forces out, then they will simply increase in number, not only in Saudi Arabia but in the rest of the Middle East. For the U.S. to leave at this point I think would not be appropriate.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Cutler, based on your own personal experience and also what you have read in regard to the recent tragedies in Saudi Arabia, I wonder if you could discuss for us, or reflect a little bit on what you think the relationship should be between the United

States and Saudi Arabia, but particularly in regard to our military commanders who are in place there.

And I want to read to you, just to kind of set the tone, from today's paper. Secretary Perry is quoted as saying the following, I'm sorry, it's not Perry, it's Peay said: "U.S. Commanders usually avoid pushing the Saudi host because of intense Saudi sensitivity to issues of the sovereignty and cultural differences. What seems to Americans to be foot-dragging actually reflects a balkanized bureaucracy committed to consensus seeking," he said, adding "that Saudis also have a different sense of time." At least a portion of that was similar to what you said. Reflect on that based on your experience. What has changed, if anything, and what should, what is the proper relationship when you as an Ambassador, or a military officer have men under your command and control and responsibility for them in this kind of cultural situation, or the differences.

Ambassador CUTLER. Well, it's not easy. You have two countries with very strong common interests here. Particularly the free access to oil. And two very, very different cultures. And I'm talking about almost every aspect of that culture. Yes. We have worked together in the military area. We've also had hundreds of thousands of American business people there. Many Saudis have had their higher education here. So in some ways there has been a coming together. And that should create greater understanding. Nevertheless, the problem for the Saudi leadership is that it is heading up the most fundamentalist of all Islamic states. And it has pressure, constantly, from religious conservatives, to be even more Islamically pure. And this is a very, very tough thing to accomplish when you are trying to develop and use Western technology and technicians and military assistance. So what you've got here is a potential culture clash.

Now how to handle that? Well I think it requires respect on both sides. And here, Senator—I don't think I'm alone in this opinion—if you go back five or six years to the Gulf War and you look at that phenomenon—a half a million so-called infidels coming over, occupying this most sacred of Islamic soil, the home of Mecca and Medina, and these infidels using that soil to attack a fellow Islamic state—this is a very, very difficult challenge for the leadership of Saudi Arabia.

And what struck me is that during that period, as brief as it was, there were so few cultural clashes between a half million American military and the Saudi populace. Why? Because both sides were extremely sensitive to each other's different cultures and different ways, even though we had a very strong common interest.

You've put your finger on really one of the most difficult aspects of the relationship. But it has worked over the years essentially. We've had a lot of problems. They've had a lot of problems with us. Nevertheless, the common interest here in so strong as that these problems have been minimized.

Senator DEWINE. The difficulty I see though, I think is obvious, and it's stating the obvious—and that is that if I have a son or daughter over there who is at risk, and I hear what I hear yesterday, from U.S. government officials, answers that may be reasonable answers, but certainly aren't going to sound to me very rea-

sonable—well, we would like to have done it, we tried to do it, we were in the process of doing it, but we have these cultural differences and things take longer over there—isn't there at some point when we've now gone to much higher risk—and everyone says we are at a much higher risk today—we are at the highest level of risk in Saudi Arabia for U.S. citizens. Highest level. Doesn't that mean we have to change something in that relationship as long as we have U.S. citizens over there?

Ambassador CUTLER. Certainly we need closer cooperation, Senator, and I think that the events of the last few weeks and months should—and I certainly hope will—lead to that. We have reason to expect it. On the other hand, I must reiterate what I said at the beginning, and that is that we are in Saudi Arabia not to protect Saudi interests, but our own. And we don't run the country. And the more we try to run security for the Saudis instead of with the Saudis, the more we are enlarging the very target that these Islamic zealots, and others perhaps seeking political power, are aiming it.

Senator DEWINE. And I appreciate that very much. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. I just say that the answers were coming across, I think, to most Americans on last night's evening news are just totally unacceptable. That when we commit U.S. troops anywhere, and I understand the cultural differences, and I understand that they are there for our own purposes, we accept that, I just think the answers we were getting yesterday are just not going to be acceptable to the American people.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Haass, do you want to make a comment?

Dr. HAASS. Just very briefly on this. One of the things we learned during the Gulf War was that when we had something really important to press with the Saudis we often had to do it at the top level. And when General Peay yesterday was talking about delegation and letting the chain of command work, that's fine for normal situations and normal issues. But when you have slightly different situation which is what the U.S.-Saudi relationship is, and if terrorism is the priority that people are saying it is, I don't think then you can basically rely on standard operating procedures. You've got to kick these things to the political level and you've got to do it awfully high. It is a top heavy society and I think we have to adjust our behavior to take that into account.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine.

Senator Kyl.

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First let me thank all of the panelists. Dr. Deeb, I read your written material. It is very helpful. All of the survey that you have provided to us enhances our understanding of the situation and I do very much appreciate that.

One very quick question and then two that are slightly more substantive.

Did the Saudi people believe that they were actually threatened by Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait? Was there really an appreciation, of what, at least what most of us I think, believed was a real threat to Saudi territory and did they therefore feel jus-

tified in allowing the United States to enter their country on that basis?

Dr. DEEB. Yes, I believe that at least at certain levels in Saudi society there was an understanding that Iraq posed a major threat to the territory. What was not understood—and I believe this is one of the reactions that we are having now—what was not understood was that the Saudi Army could not protect the territory. Whereas, the government itself knew that they could not protect, the man in the street may not have understood that. And this is why the man in the street today is wondering why is the Saudi government having to spend so much on defense when it faces a threat it cannot protect and defend itself from.

Senator KYL. That really helps to understand the situation better.

How about the succession after King Fahd? How will it go? Who will it be? And what does it portend?

Dr. DEEB. It's Prince Abdallah. And he's a very serious prince and I think Ambassador Cutler knows him well. And he is also much more pious, or viewed as such in Saudi Arabia than a number of his predecessors. I don't think that that means necessarily that the policy of Saudi Arabia is going to change in any way. As was pointed out by my two colleagues, the interests of Saudi Arabia are so intricately linked to those of the United States that I don't think it will make any difference in policy.

However, domestically, Prince Abdallah has a great deal of respect for King Fahd's views and for what he stands for. But perhaps Ambassador Cutler should comment on this.

Ambassador CUTLER. I'd just add that Crown Prince Abdallah has run the National Guard for a long time—twenty-five or more years. And the United States is the principal military advisor to the National Guard. So he has a long tradition of working with our military people. And during my time, at least, a period of five years, that relationship was good. It was mutually compatible and productive.

As Dr. Deeb has mentioned, he's highly respected. He has strong religious credentials and he's well known in the Arab world. Perhaps he has had less experience outside the Arab World. But the thing about Saudi succession is that, in contrast to almost all other states in the area, you've got a road map. These are the sons of King Abdul Aziz and you can look ahead, at least for the next decade I'd say, and see pretty well how it's lined up. And this, I think, is a source of stability.

Senator KYL. One final question relating to our capability, particularly in the intelligence arena given that some perceive as a lack of people with familiarity to the Middle East, with the Middle East in particular, with languages for example, the sparse number of people who speak Farsi and other dialects that would be useful to us in that region. What is your assessment of that and what, if you are concerned about it, given the fact that we have to use Middle East specialists so frequently, what would you recommend that we try to do about that.

Ambassador CUTLER. Well, I think the language is always important in that part of the world. Even though at most levels of responsibility in the Saudi government you will find English spoken.

And even with some of the senior princes who do not speak English very well, when they are dealing with somebody who does speak Arabic—for example one of our own diplomats—they really prefer to use interpreters. But certainly we are turning out in our Foreign Service Arabic speaking officers. For a while after the 1967 war when we had to close up a number of our posts, we were not, but now we are.

I am concerned about Farsi speakers. Right now they have very few posts to go to. We don't have relations with Iran and it's kind of hard to keep an adequate language bank, if you will, in terms of Foreign Service officers at the ready. But at the same time, our military as perhaps you know, have a very active program of training, language training.

So it's important. But English, I might say, is more and more widely spoken. Not necessarily by those who are now more and more going to Islamic universities in the area. There was a time, Senator, when more than 10,000 Saudi students were annually coming to American universities. As a result of the development of their country, they've developed a very impressive system of their own universities. Which is to their credit. The down side for us, perhaps, is that they are not being exposed to us, to our culture, or to our language as much as before.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kyl.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Haass, in your comment that the United States in Saudi Arabia should stay, military presence is required—and I was just writing down quickly your comments—small, low visibility, minimum stationing and all, can you sketch in a little more detail in these ways. First of all, you indicated that our interests, the United States vital interests, were disproportionately great, as I understand, to the resources that were there to protect them without us. In other words, the rationale for our presence is simply that the interests are very large and they are unlikely to be tended to without our constant presence. And I agree with that.

But then I am intrigued by your thought that the military presence required ought to be small and perhaps even dispersed, at a minimum stationing leads me to believe that given the threat as you've posed it that there might be people scattered, maybe even living in houses in town, or what have you. Can you give a better idea? We all see the picture now of the 1,500 United States personnel in a high rise next to a perimeter and so forth. And that looks very vulnerable certainly in hindsight, and maybe in foresight for some. But how else do we do it? and how many people do we need to accomplish this mission?

Dr. HAASS. Senator Lugar, it's the toughest theater for American foreign policy. Unlike Europe and North East Asia where we have very strong allies and very clear fronts, if you will, the Gulf is the toughest theater, where the two most powerful local states are Iran and Iraq, we have hostile relationships with both. The countries we are working with are fairly weak in their traditional military strength and they've got the sort of domestic problems we've talked about today, which puts real limits on our ability to have the large presence that traditional military theory would argue that you need.

I don't know any neat solution to that dilemma. Because it really is a dilemma. What you need to do militarily works at cross purposes with problems of domestic security. So it means you've got to come up with a very different kind of presence which means an emphasis on pre-positioning, and emphasis on off-shore, an emphasis on frequent exercising. And again low visibility, highly disciplined troops.

But there is no solution to this problem. It is the reason that the Gulf, again, is the most difficult security challenge we probably face as one looks out over the next couple of decades.

Senator LUGAR. Well, tactically could this mean personnel will come and go, different people all the time, in other words, the American presence may mean 1,500 people come in for an exercise or they circulate through the country, they go out, a different 1,500 come in. In other words there is always a sense that Americans are close by. And a lot of activity is going on and that if needed, because of prepositioning of equipment or ammunition or what have you, we could bulk up the forces quickly under those circumstances.

Dr. HAASS. That's very much the strategy. We have to avoid anything that smacks of basing, and anything that smacks of permanent presence. If you remember President Bush repeatedly spoke about our commitment to pulling our troops out after the war. One of the ways we helped manage the popular opinion problem, the so-called Arab streak in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, was telling people we were not after bases, we were not after a permanent presence, we had no ulterior motives during the Gulf crisis. And that placed a real premium on pulling out. The problem is, as you correctly point out, we need to have the infrastructure so we can go in there quickly. And some of the ways in which Saudi bases are constructed and so forth, facilitate that, but there's always going to be a dilemma because there is nothing better militarily for purposes of deterrence or early war fighting capability than on the ground capability, and we just can't have a lot of that.

Senator LUGAR. Would you say this high rise at Al Khubar is basing? This looks like quite a position. How does that fit the strategy?

Dr. HAASS. I think those sorts of very high visibility focused targets are the sorts of things you want to avoid. The problem is, as we heard yesterday in the testimony, it's expensive to do something about it. It takes some time. And it's one thing to say rhetorically that anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism is a priority, it's quite a different thing to then put the dollars behind it and I expect that's going to be now one of the big questions for you all is to basically assess whether the rhetorical commitment is matched by the policy follow-up.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

We are going to be leaving momentarily to go for votes. As I have said we had expected them to start at 12:00 o'clock and there are going to be four more votes. I'm just doing the calculation. We have two more panels this afternoon. Looking to the future, we have Ambassador L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer who is now Managing Director of Kissinger Associates, Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terror-

ism in the 1986–89 period. And Mr. Brian Jenkins, of Kroll Associates, an international consulting firm, former Chairman of Rand Corporation's Political Science Department. And then we have former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. And I believe we will be able to begin those hearings at 1:30. So we will do that.

Before we go I would like to take just a moment or two more.

Dr. Haass you make a very important point about going to the top with the Saudis. And we had the testimony of General Peay before Armed Services that he was not going to do that. That he even had a doubt, questions raised as to whether he should have bucked up the request for a broader outer perimeter. And he said he didn't do that and didn't know if he should have done that. And still doesn't know if he should do that.

How do we really get the instruction, the policy, the training to have our people really prepared to push it to the top and then actually after getting it to the top, pushing it beyond. We now have some rosy general assertions from the Saudis, but the question remains as to whether they will deliver as they are now generalizing in the immediate aftermath of this tragedy.

Dr. HAASS. I think it will take a couple of things, Senator.

First is a very clear statement, if it hasn't already come, from the top levels of this Administration to people in the field that this is a priority. A very clear sense that if people encounter problems in the field, this ought to be bucked up sooner rather than later. That no one expects the local commanders to necessarily bear the full burden of this responsibility.

I would think with the Saudis one of the things we are going to want to create if we haven't already is some special channel or mechanism for short circuiting this. It's not something the Ambassador necessarily has to deal with or the General who is in charge of Central Command, but I would think you would want to have someone who is sufficiently senior on both sides that they could short circuit the normal situation, not simply for sharing of information, but for then implementing projects pursuant to any sort of threat. But I think it will take something like that, something that is dedicated and sufficiently senior if we are not going to have this sort of problem on and on again.

Chairman SPECTER. A senior short circuit on both sides. What do you think Dr. Deeb if you have an opinion?

Dr. DEEB. I believe this is absolutely true. If it's a matter of the security of U.S. troops one has to go directly to the top and have someone who is going to be responsible to make the decisions for the U.S. and the counterpart.

Chairman SPECTER. Where's the top? Someone at the top. Where's the top?

Dr. DEEB. Well within the military command in Saudi Arabia.

Chairman SPECTER. The Colonel.

Dr. DEEB. I suppose if that——

Chairman SPECTER. The Colonel didn't get the job done. The General? One star, the Brigadier? Four Star General? Somebody higher? What do you think Ambassador Cutler? I'm asking unanswerable questions, Dr. Deeb, so that is why I am speculating with you a little bit.

Dr. DEEB. I can't answer you.

Ambassador CUTLER. Well, I think——

Chairman SPECTER. You have the last word, Ambassador Cutler.

Ambassador CUTLER. Well, my last word, Senator, would be there is a focus now on our U.S. military personnel. But let's not forget that we have a very, very large American civilian community out there.

Chairman SPECTER. 25,000.

Ambassador CUTLER. 25,000 to 30,000. And I expect that we'll see further efforts of terrorism directed at them. Nothing succeeds like success. However, having said that, I think that the Embassy should be working in the closest possible way with the military commander because we are talking about an entire American community, be it military or civilian, and we cannot exclude the civilians as a potential target. Sometimes, yes, you have to go pretty high.

Chairman SPECTER. How high?

Ambassador CUTLER. It depends. this is a judgment call, Senator. How important is it and there are ways of cutting——

Chairman SPECTER. As high as necessary.

Ambassador CUTLER. Yes, as high as necessary. And you go to the ultimate height which would be the King. And there are ways of doing that.

Chairman SPECTER. We don't have a king, Ambassador.

Ambassador CUTLER. I'm talking about out there, Senator.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, how about over here. We don't have much control anywhere, but probably more over here than over there.

Ambassador CUTLER. Yes. Well what you do is try to work through the established chains of command. And frankly, in my experience—I had 32 years of it—when the situation, when the problem was grave enough and you made your point strongly enough, it went up high.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you all very much.

[Thereupon, at 12:17 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman SPECTER. We will resume our Intelligence Committee hearing. We're just a little bit late in starting after the 1:30 time because we are now on the final vote, but I do not expect very extensive participation by the Committee in light of the delays and necessary rescheduling. So we will proceed at this time.

Our next panel will look to the future in combatting terrorism. We have two very distinguished experts on this subject: Ambassador L. Paul Jerry Bremer, who was Ambassador at Large for Counter-terrorism in the critical period from 1986 to 1989 and previous to that, Ambassador to the Netherlands; and also Mr. Brian Jenkins, Deputy Chairman of Kroll Associates, and former chairman of the RAND Corporation's Political Science Department, and also directed RAND's research on political violence.

Welcome, gentlemen, and we'll start with you, Ambassador Bremer.

STATEMENT OF L. PAUL "JERRY" BREMER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, FORMER AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE NETHERLANDS

Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just make a few brief comments, if I can.

I'd like to start with a couple of general points that apply not only to this incident, but it seems to me, the fight against terrorism. First of all, I think one has to have sympathy for the people in the field who are dealing with a welter of intelligence reports coming in, trying to separate out the wheat from the chaff. When I was in my job, we had a stack like this [indicating] every day and you had to figure out what you believed and what you didn't believe. And that is the first point.

Second, I think we also need to be realistic that there is no such thing as 100% security against terrorist attacks. It simply can't be done, whether it is a Federal building here in Washington or a military installation abroad.

Third, and more optimistically, it is important to remember that terrorism has nowhere in recent history been a strategic success. Nowhere has it strategically determined the outcome of a battle, and we need to be sure that that stays the case.

However, we got 19 Americans killed and a variety, hundreds wounded, and so something clearly has gone wrong. And it seems to me you have to address that question at both a tactical and strategic level. The Committee has already heard a lot on the tactical level. The questions, it seems to me, are, what was the security environment after the November attack. Second, what kind of intelligence came in after November to enrich that assessment? Was it good intelligence? How often did it come? Where was it from?

And third and most importantly, what was done in terms of the assessment of that intelligence.

These are matters that I think this Committee and other Committees on the Hill have heard testimony about in the last few days. I needn't go further into them. They do raise important questions about the military chain of command, the civilian chain of command, and also the questions about our relations with the Saudi Arabians.

I think the more important questions in many ways are the strategic issues, and I would there make, it seems to me, three points. First, I think, Mr. Chairman, that the jury is still out on who committed this attack. I know the—there is a general sense to believe that it was committed by domestic Saudi terrorists. I think that is possible and we will have to take the evidence wherever it leads us.

On the other hand, when you look at a terrorist incident, you need to look at both motive and capabilities, and I have to say, Mr. Chairman, when I look at those two questions—motive and capabilities—I would not exclude the possibility that an outside country was involved in this, and in particular I think one should bear in mind the possibility that Hizballah may have had something to do with this attack.

Second point then comes to the question, if the evidence leads us towards the possibility of a state sponsorship of this attack, what

are we going to do about it. And it seems to me here one of the problems is that the Administration has not paid enough attention to the problem of state sponsorship of terrorism, it has not been tough enough in its policy on the states, I think particularly in the case of Syria, which is, after all, a state which the Administration itself identifies as a terrorist sponsoring state. When the Secretary of State. Visits Damascus 21 times in three years, it sends a message that undercuts the concerns about terrorism, a message to the Syrians, to other state sponsors and to our allies.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you think the Secretary of State should not do that.

Ambassador BREMER. I do not think so. I think it shows a clear over—a clear sense that there is not a high priority to fighting terrorism. Unless the first thing he discusses each time with President Assad is Syria's continuing support for terrorism, which I very much doubt. I mean, I don't think—I have not been party to those conversations.

Chairman SPECTER. What is your assessment, Ambassador Bremer, as to the current evidence on Syria and terrorism?

Ambassador BREMER. I think the evidence is clear and compelling and has been for at least 10 years, that Syria is a sponsor of terrorism. More than 14 terrorist camps, as far as I know, are still located in the Bekkaa Valley of Lebanon,which is under Syrian military control. The headquarters of some half dozen terrorist groups, including many which condemn the peace process still have their headquarters in Damascus. I don't think there is any question Syria still encourages those groups. There is, as the American government says, apparently no evidence of direct Syrian government involvement in terrorism in recent years, but there is no question it is a state which supports terrorism. As this government itself admits.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you think that Syria has an obligation to clean out the Bekkaa Valley of terrorists?

Ambassador BREMER. Absolutely. It is a demand which I personally have made to the Syrians when I was in government, which the Secretary of State at that time directly made to the foreign minister of Syria on a number of occasions, including showing the Syrian foreign minister a map with the coordinates of the camps.

Chairman SPECTER. And what was the response?

Ambassador BREMER. The response was essentially non-responsive. Thank you very much.

But I don't mean to get off on Syria here, Mr. Chairman. I think the more general problem is we have identified some states in the area which are sponsors of terrorism. I think Iran is the more serious one. And I think we need to be prepared to be very much tougher on Iran directly and we need to put more pressure on it through our allies.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Ambassador Bremer, I raise the question as to whether the US Secretary of State is doing the wrong thing in going to Syria on a number of levels. One is, what he may be accomplishing on trying to push the peace process forward. That is the missing link in Mid East peace. Next, the quality of the evidence as to what Syria is doing, the realism of driving them out of the Bekkaa Valley.

Right after Pan Am 103 there was immediate more than speculation, preliminary judgment that Syria was involved in Pan Am 103. I happened to go to Syria right after that in January, I think it was January of 89——

Ambassador BREMER. Yes, the attack was in December of 88.

Chairman SPECTER. Of 88. And President Assad was very blunt, said you bring evidence that we did it, and I will act on it. I went back—on the Intelligence Committee at that time—looked hard. Finally it was found Syria was not involved. I was in Syria a year earlier and asked about the Bekkaa Valley and the terrorists there and the Ambassador there, I believe was Eagleton, at that time?

Ambassador BREMER. In 87, yes, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. And it's worth just a brief comment, there are few enough people in the hearing room, he said would you mind asking about the terrorists in the Bekkaa Valley, and I said sure, I was glad to do that. So I did. President Assad heard what I said and turned to the Ambassador in a loud angry voice, and said why are you expecting me to clear out the Bekkaa Valley. He knew exactly how the Edgar Bergen-Charlie McCarthy procedure was working in that situation, which I don't mind saying for the record.

And I heard—in my line, with juries, etc., gauge temperature a lot, and demeanor, and President Assad was genuinely outraged, annoyed. He is not a man who raises his voice very often, but he did on that occasion.

So I just put it all into the mix. But I think you raise a very important point about the Secretary of State not going to Syria on the terrorism line, if we really have the goods on Syria in terms of terrorism.

Ambassador BREMER. It raises my third and final point, which is I think fundamentally this Administration has not put a very high priority on the fight against terrorism. In recent months, just for example, they held this so-called anti-terrorism summit at Sharm Al-Shaikh. At least it started as an anti-terrorism summit, but it was then subsequently called the Summit of the Peacemakers. Well, I have no objection to peacemaking, but if you are going to call it the anti-terrorism summit and it suddenly elides and becomes the summit of the peacemakers, it tells you again something about the priorities.

Just two weeks ago the President participated in a meeting of the G–7 in Lyons, France, where they signed a declaration in which they retro-fitted onto a previously agreed communique, words attacking terrorism and agreeing to fight terrorism.

My point is, terrorists are not very much impressed by words in diplomatic communiques. This is not a very effective way to deter any kind of criminal activity. There has to be more effective punishment for terrorism, and particularly for states which sponsor terrorism. And it seems to me, if, as a result of this Saudi incident, we find that the evidence leads us to one or another state, then the Administration will have to show that it is serious about counterterrorism by taking some very vigorous steps, including possibly non-peaceful steps, against the states responsible.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you think the evidence is sufficient to take non-peaceful steps against any states at this time?

Ambassador BREMER. No. No; no evidence that I have seen.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I have a number of questions for you, Ambassador Bremer, but I will not put them now. We will turn to Mr. Jenkins first.

The floor is yours, Mr. Jenkins, and thank you for coming here.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN JENKINS, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, KROLL ASSOCIATES, FORMER CHAIRMAN, POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, RAND CORPORATION

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you.

The Dhahran bombing underlines one of the current trends in terrorism. In the past, terrorism was largely symbolic violence. It still is symbolic violence, but it has become deadlier. Whatever self-imposed constraints that may have limited terrorism in the past seem to be eroding. Large scale, indiscriminate bombings are the new terrorist reality. These may take the form of large quantities of explosives to destroy buildings, or attacks in public places such as subways, busses or shopping malls.

The most dramatic manifestation of this trend is the car bomb or truck bomb, and let me give you some disturbing statistics. There have been 164 car bombings since the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. These have occurred in 35 countries. This is a world wide phenomenon. 30% of these attacks involved fatalities. In all, 870 persons were killed, thousands have been injured. Of those incidents with fatalities, the average number of deaths is 18—19 died in the Dhahran bombing, making it, in a sense, an average car bombing. The median number killed is six, which was the number killed in the World Trade Center bombing. The weights of the explosives involved in these attacks range from tens of pounds to thousands of pounds of explosives, with the median somewhere in the area of several hundred. But we have seen thousand pound plus bombs in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in the Middle East.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, from that line up, Mr. Jenkins, was it extraordinary or unusual to have a bomb of the size in Dhahran on June 25?

Mr. JENKINS. I don't think you can say it is extraordinary. As we have seen even in this country, it is possible for a relatively small group of individuals to fabricate in the case of Oklahoma City, a bomb that was in excess of 4000 pounds. This was 5000 pounds. So we are seeing more and more 1000 pound plus bombings.

The issue in a car bomb or in a truck bomb is not necessarily sophistication. The issue is quantity, not quality. And when you get up into ranges of explosives in those quantities, you are going to achieve major damage, major destruction, even if the device itself is relatively unsophisticated.

Indeed, since 1980, there have been over a thousand car bombs with over 4000 people killed.

As terrorists move in the direction of large scale indiscriminate violence, physical security becomes more difficult. It is difficult to protect public places, because they are public places. But we'll have to do more.

Security measures to provide a high level of protection against bombs greater than 1000 pounds are extremely costly, disruptive, and in many cases, not possible to implement.

The problem is in the past we have been able to tolerate—and I use that word in quote, tolerate—a certain level of terrorist violence relying on our ability to subsequently identify and apprehend those responsible, and our record is pretty good in that regard. However, as terrorists move towards massive violence and potentially in the future even weapons of mass destruction, our tolerance must decline.

Moreover, we have the problem that terrorists who are inspired by ethnic hatreds, racial supremicism, religious fanaticism, which are really the engines driving many of the terrorist campaigns in the world today, or those who are state sponsored, are not always deterred by the possibility of apprehension or even death. And this shifts the burden to intelligence.

In the case of the Dhahran bombing, we have to ask ourselves, number one, how good was our intelligence. Did intelligence pick up indications of an attack. Number two, did the analysis of the information we had lead to an accurate assessment of the threat and the level of security required. Three, was this guidance communicated to all of the potential targets. Four, on the basis of the guidance, were proposals made to bring security measures to the level perceived necessary. Five, were those proposals implemented. If not, why not. And six, if they had been implemented, would the results of the attack have been significantly different.

Now, these questions are not intended to suggest culpability, but rather to learn lessons from this attack. We must be realistic, we must recognize that the uncertainties in assessing terrorist threats and the difficulty of calculating the appropriate response.

As Ambassador Bremer has pointed out, intelligence about terrorism is usually fragmentary, the volume of noise is extraordinarily high, and most threats don't result in attacks. That makes assessing the terrorist threat extremely hard to do, especially when dealing—when not dealing with an identified terrorist group and an on-going terrorist campaign.

Deciding how much security is enough is difficult. Terrorists can do more things than defenders can protect against. Terrorists have an inherent advantage that is almost axiomatic. They can attack anything, anywhere, any time; we can't protect everything, everywhere, all the time.

Other factors will enter the calculations. Not just the threat, but the effects of security on operations, available resources, in some cases civil liberties issues, public disruption, even image. And we also have to keep in mind that physical measures do work in some areas. Commercial aviation, for example, we've been able to, by the imposition of extraordinary security measures, make attacks more difficult, and thereby reduce the number of attempts.

But physical measures by themselves don't defeat terrorism, they merely displace the risks. The risks will remain. There probably will be more attacks, and inevitably there probably will be further casualties.

Chairman SPECTER. One media account, Newsweek, July 15, claimed that the fire alarms could not be used to warn the soldiers

in Khobar Towers after the guards had determined that the building should be evacuated because they could lead the soldiers out of the building and towards the bomb.

Mr. Jenkins, is that a legitimate concern or could you address that with some sort of a signal, such as one bell means fire, two bells mean bomb threat? Would alarms have been helpful in Khobar Towers?

Mr. JENKINS. Well, I don't know about the accuracy of that report, but if it is accurate, it does raise some questions in my mind, as a former soldier. Soldiers are good at drilling, and soldiers are good at scrambling to firing positions or to their posts, depending on the alarm given. And there is, in some types of threats, it is reasonable to want to carry out an evacuation or a movement of the troops in such a way that it does not directly put them in harm's way. If we were talking about, for example, a large building with a bomb threat made against that building, in most cases if there were a bomb, it would be in a public area of the building, in a publicly accessible area of the building, and you would not want to evacuate people from comparatively safe work places into the great danger of being in public places when there was the possibility of a bomb going off.

However, the circumstances here were different. I think the circumstances of a large car bomb or truck bomb can be anticipated, and people can be clever enough to figure out a different set of signals, a different set of evacuation patterns so that you can get people out without putting them in danger's way.

Ambassador BREMER. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that all embassies that I am familiar with have exactly that pattern. That is to say, a certain signal means it's a terrorist attack, in which case you go under your desk. Another signal means it's a fire in which case you get out of the building and so forth. This is a standard procedure.

Chairman SPECTER. So you can make the signals determinative.

Secretary Perry yesterday testified about intelligence, and this is a summary of what he had said. That while intelligence information gathered after the November bombing had been voluminous, it was not specific enough to be able to project when and where another terrorist attack might occur, or in guessing the size of the bombs that would be used in the later attack. "The intelligence was not useful at a practical level. It didn't specify the nature of the threat or the timing of the threat, and therefore it was not what we might call actionable intelligence in terms of doing our planning," close quote.

Starting with you, Mr. Bremer, is it realistic to expect the intelligence to project when and where the terrorists are going to attack, or identify the size of the bombs?

Ambassador BREMER. No. In my experience——

Chairman SPECTER. It would be wonderful if it would, but is that realistic at all?

Ambassador BREMER. In my experience in dealing with counterterrorism, it's very rare that you have an intelligence report that is credible that tells you precisely when and where an attack will happen. Obviously when you see that kind, you react to it. Generally speaking, the intelligence that precedes a major attack

is exactly as Secretary Perry has described it, fragmentary and not very conclusive.

The question is, what kind of an atmosphere has been created out in the field to deal with what was obviously an increased security threat after the November attack. What kind of instructions have gone to the relevant commanders. What kind of impression do they have about how important this is to people in Washington. What kind of instructions did they have? What kind of messages came out from the Pentagon or from the Joint Chiefs? I have no idea what the answer it.

I can give you an example of how it worked in the Department of State when I was there. When I was Ambassador in the Netherlands, we had the truck bomb attack our embassy in Beirut. And Secretary of State Shultz sent a message to all ambassadors the world around that said the President and I hold you, Mr. Ambassador, responsible for the security of your embassy. You yourself. This is not a matter for you to delegate to your Regional Security Officer or to your deputy or your Station Chief. You are responsible. And that kind of message makes a big impression on somebody in the field. You take it seriously.

You get your people together and you say, okay, let's look at our intelligence, let's look at our defenses, let's figure it out. I don't know whether those kinds of messages—whether that kind of sense of urgency was conveyed in this case out to the field. But that's the kind of thing that has to happen. The intelligence will always be fragmentary. It will always be inconclusive.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Jenkins, is it possible to get the kind of specification that Secretary Perry testified about?

Mr. JENKINS. Sir, in more than 25 years of studying terrorism, I can't recall too many terrorist attacks that were accurately predicted in terms of the timing, the location, the target, the tactic and the scale of the attack. I don't think that is realistic.

Rarely in combat, in conventional combat, do you have that kind of accurate information and the information that you have about terrorism is usually a lot murkier than the type of intelligence that is available in a conventional war.

Chairman SPECTER. Let me turn now to the issue of accountability and the second question of preventability. We are really wrestling here with how to at least deal, in Saudi Arabia—it may be applicable other places—with some preventative measures. We had an Inspector General's report from CIA on the Aldrich Ames case, where Inspector General said that responsibility should be attached to former Directors of Central Intelligence for Ames, specifically Mr. Woolsey, Mr. Webster—Judge Webster—and Mr. Gates, even though they did not know specifically about Ames.

And, it was a theory of should have known. This problem is very serious. You know about generally. You've got to find out about it. You've got to take precautions to prevent it.

Now, here we have a colonel in the field and we have a general in the field, brigadier general, one star, who apparently have made requests to the Saudis twice to move the fence, and neither time was it agreed to. And there you have a bombing on November 13 in Riyadh, five Americans killed, four terrorists executed on May 31. No chance to interrogate by the FBI. Efforts made at a fairly

high level to get that done. Wasn't done. We don't see efforts made at a high level to get the perimeter removed.

You have General Peay testifying that he is not going to second guess his field commanders in a Senate hearing room. And his specific testimony is worth reading, as the news accounts. Senator Levin said, quote, "What is clear that they did not kick it upstairs," close quote. Peay though, refused to term that a failure. Peay then said, according to the news accounts, "Should the fence have been out further? Yes. Were they working on it? I think they probably were. Should they have kicked it upstairs? I don't know. I just don't know." But Senator Lieberman said he did know, and he answered in the affirmative.

Now, take the sequence in order. Did the colonel and the one star do the right thing? Did the four star say the right thing? Is there responsibility farther up the line in a climate where you just had four terrorists executed? And the installation is under closer surveillance. How do you evaluate the issue of responsibility in this texture? Not to punish people who have already acted or failed to act, but in order to establish a system for making the system work. Sort of putting the maximum amount of pressure on to get the job done next time. Not out of prior recrimination, but future prevention.

What do you think, Ambassador Bremer?

Ambassador BREMER. Well, I think it is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. Obviously—I find it—I find the explanation of what happened a bit contradictory. You can't on the one hand say the intelligence was fragmentary and we didn't know what to make of it, and yet at the same time, people in the field are saying there is enough of a threat here that we have to move the perimeter. I mean, there is something that disconnects there for me. And you know——

Chairman SPECTER. You know that, Ambassador Bremer, before you get any intelligence at all.

Ambassador BREMER. Right.

Chairman SPECTER. The fence is 80 feet away.

Ambassador BREMER. Right. And in fact, they made that decision before the intelligence—as I understand it, they reached that conclusion back in December.

It seems to me that somebody in the field who has gone through an assessment and concludes that his men are not safe, as this colonel did and this general did, and is turned down by the Saudis, must do one of three things. He must either report this up his chain of command to the Pentagon and ask for guidance and assistance at a higher level in the Saudi government. Or he must go laterally across the political side to the American Embassy and ask for their assistance with the Saudis since he seems to have believed he had a political problem with pressuring the Saudis. Or he should have concluded, my assessment is correct, there is a threat, I can't get the perimeter moved, I have an obligation to protect my men, and he should have moved his men. But none of these things, at least as far as I can tell from the news account have——

Chairman SPECTER. How about the four star?

Ambassador BREMER. Well, I can't—I go back to the point I made about what happened when I was serving as somebody in the field.

It seems to me that it is a question of tone. If a four star in the Pentagon is not interested enough to know what kinds of security measures are being taken in the field, then the brigadier general probably won't report back.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, is it too much to ask the four star to know what's going on in Dhahran?

Ambassador BREMER. Not at all.

Chairman SPECTER. Does he have too much under his command?

Ambassador BREMER. I would have thought not. I——

Chairman SPECTER. How about the Secretary of Defense?

Ambassador BREMER. Well, I think ultimately the Secretary of Defense is responsible, as I think the Secretary mentioned yesterday. He is responsible for the safety of those Americans overseas. Just as the Secretary of State is responsible for those in the embassies.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, the Secretary of State delegated it to you from the story you tell.

Ambassador BREMER. Well, he did, and he made it very clear at last—and I don't know whether it is similar kinds of——

Chairman SPECTER. Well, it made an impression on you to this day, and that was 13 years ago.

Ambassador BREMER. It sure did. It made an impression——

Chairman SPECTER. Your temperature is still high when you talk about it.

Ambassador BREMER. And I'll tell you, Mr. Chairman, we had a similar problem to this perimeter thing which if I have a minute, I'll tell you.

Chairman SPECTER. Go ahead.

Ambassador BREMER. We concluded as a result of this, that we were not secure against a possible car bomb in the embassy in the Hague. And we needed to have a barrier built. I asked the host government if they would allow me to build a barrier. The initial response was no. So the next day I had my administrative officer in and I said I want you to go out and find me six dumpsters and get them old and ugly, put them out there in front of the embassy where I want my barrier. He put them out there. The day after, we started getting complaints from the public at large to the unsightly dumpsters we had, and from the municipality. We referred the calls from the public to the municipality. Two weeks later, we had our barrier built.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Jenkins, what do you think about the answer to my question? I don't want to have to repeat it.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, you know, I understand that you heard from Admiral Long yesterday, and I had the opportunity to work with the Long Commission in 1984 following the bombing of the Marines in Beirut. And in that particular case, the report was blunt and harsh in terms of indicating that there was responsibility on up through the chain of command, up to the four star level. The Commission stopped short of the Cabinet, because a commission of former generals is probably going to stop short of the Cabinet. But certainly within the military structure indicated that there was responsibility in the chain of command.

Second, the Long Commission made another point, which I think reads as well today as it did many years ago, as it did 12 years

ago, and that was that terrorism had to be seen as an important part of the spectrum of warfare, and that the United States Armed Forces were inadequately prepared to defend against it.

Now, a lot of years have passed since the Long report, but we are still struggling, the Armed Forces are still struggling with the issue of how properly to defend against it. But there is no question but that the Long Commission indicated that this was now part of the military's responsibility.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, when the Long Commission made its report, there hadn't been a Long Commission report. So it is different today than it was then, because you have a Long Commission report. And Admiral Long read this sentence. It's a classic sentence. The Department of Defense is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. Much needs to be done on an urgent basis to prepare US military forces to defend against counterterrorist warfare.

Ambassador Bremer uses a sense of urgency, which I think is a classic phrase.

Now, you have this articulated. You have a Secretary of Defense who says the 3000 to 5000 pound bomb is ten-fold what was ever used in the Mid East. Not in Saudi Arabia, in the Mid East. That was his statement.

Where do we attach responsibility from this date forward? Somebody calls up—who makes the call to whom and says you are responsible, like Secretary Shultz did to you, Ambassador Bremer? Who makes the call and to whom?

Congress has some oversight responsibilities. We can make the call.

Ambassador BREMER. Well, I think that is a question that presumably needs to be answered as a result of your hearings, Mr. Chairman. It's obviously——

Chairman SPECTER. Do you want to be recalled? I don't understand. Are you prepared to answer that question or be subject to recall.

Ambassador BREMER. I am always subject to recall, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, why don't you think about it and let me know.

Mr. Jenkins, do you have an opinion today?

Mr. JENKINS. Well, not today. I would like to have more information in terms of the answers to the questions that I posed at the beginning. And then really see what happened. I mean, I have read a lot of reports in the press and I—before responding on the basis of those, I would like to see really a systematic investigation.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I would like you men to stay in touch with us and we will try to furnish you with reports. Customarily when we get classified information, we do know it perhaps 16 hours ahead of reading it in the Post or the Times.

Ambassador BREMER. Things have slowed down.

Chairman SPECTER. Whatever we hear in the afternoon, we usually read in the paper the next day. By the time it gets to us, it is already on the wires.

But I would like your expert judgment. I think we need to answer that question. Maybe that is a paraphrase of Howard Baker's famous statement, who—how did it go, who knew what and when?

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. What did the President know and when did he know it.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much. That concludes Secretary Eagleberger's testimony. [General laughter.]

The question is, who makes the call to whom.

Ambassador BREMER. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say two things. I think in the end clearly there has to be some accountability and responsibility along the chain of command here. It cannot be that nobody is responsible.

Secondly, let us not forget while we justifiably look at this question within our own government, that who is responsible for this whole thing is the terrorist. We also shouldn't lose track of the fact this was not committed by a general, this was not committed by Saudi noncooperation in moving the perimeter. The people who conducted this attack were terrorists, and we want to be sure we also bring them to justice or respond to their sponsors.

Chairman SPECTER. I think we can make that a bipartisan joint declaration that even the Article 3 officers might join in. Certainly Article 1 and Article 2 officers would join. Might even get a declaratory judgment from the Supreme Court on that.

Well, listen, stay in touch, follow it, let me know what you think, because we are—we really ought to come down with a definitive answer to that. If the Long Commission couldn't find any readers, maybe a Congressional finding can.

Thank you for your expertise, Ambassador Bremer and Mr. Jenkins.

I now call the distinguished former Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleberger.

Secretary Eagleberger, this is not an appropriate time to have testimony from a man of your stature and wisdom.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. You want me to come back later is what you're telling me, Senator?

Chairman SPECTER. No, I don't, but I may have you subject to recall when you have a better audience.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. No, this is fine. As long as you are here, Mr. Chairman, that's all I need.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, it will be part of our record, obviously, and you and I have talked about this preliminarily, and I very much appreciated your coming back from being out of town this morning so you could be here, and what you say will be a part of our record and some will hear it and I will quote you and repeat it, so the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE EAGLEBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll do this very quickly.

Let me start—I wasn't going to start here, but having heard this testimony, let me start where the two gentlemen preceding me left off. The responsibility, in the end, rests with the Secretary of Defense. To me, there is no question about that. And I'll talk about it in a minute as to why I come to that conclusion.

But there is a tendency in this government to provide to most Cabinet officers the Pontius Pilate solution, which is, I wash my

hands of the whole affair, and its somebody else's problem. And at least from now on, as you asked the question, at least from now on, with regard to issues relating to the military and military security against terrorist attacks, there is no question in my mind where the responsibility ought to rest—it ought to rest with the Secretary of Defense. But let me come back to that in just a minute.

Let me start by saying, I don't know how many lessons we have to learn or have before we come to the conclusion that there are certain things that are givens. And it seems to me we should have known, without any intelligence at all, that there were car and truck bombs available, relatively easily, that could have destroyed the facility that in fact was destroyed, so long as the fence was where it was I cannot believe that people really thought because there had only been a small event some months before, that that was all that was going to be available the next time.

And you don't, in a case like this, it seems to me, if you are careful at all, you don't start with an assumption of the least worst case. You have to start from the other end. What is it we know is possible, and what would be the consequences of using that kind of a truck bomb. And the answer was there without any intelligence whatsoever. So I don't think there is an excuse for that.

I think there may well be some mitigating circumstances in terms of the Saudis not being willing to move the fence and so forth, but that's a different issue.

The second point I would make is now that this has happened, I think we have to be very, very careful not to do anything in the way of withdrawing troops from Saudi Arabia or anything that gives the terrorist evidence that they have succeeded. Let me say, for example, I thought we made a very bad mistake when we pulled troops out of Somalia as we did after the tragic event there, not that we should have been in that situation in the first place. But when we react that way to a terrorist attack, we are simply telling every terrorist around the world the way you get the US to react is you kill some Americans. It's an open invitation. I think we have to be very careful, therefore, how we react.

Now, that doesn't mean that you can't change the positioning of the troops that are in Saudi Arabia.

But now I am going to lead to the next question, and this is in the back of my head and has been for some time, and I want to be very careful how I say it. But I am more and more coming to the conclusion, or at least am very concerned about the fact that in this world today we are not taking a hard enough look at how many troops we have abroad and why they are there, and whether we really need as many as we have.

Let me give you an example, totally unrelated to this. I am convinced in my own mind that our time in Okinawa is not terribly much longer. The reactions in Okinawa itself are such that I think it is likely over time the relationship continues to sour, and we are going to be faced with the question of whether we can adequately maintain those troops there.

Now, I happen to think that for the security of the Pacific and of Japan, we need to be there. But I think it is also clear that if we are going to deal with an Okinawa type problem, we have to

be very careful how many troops we have there and we have to cut to a minimum so that the exacerbation of the problem is as little as possible. I think that is also true in Saudi Arabia. I think it was this morning that Mr. Haass said that one of the things that was clearly on the mind of President Bush when we went into the Kuwait-Iraq mess was that we couldn't use this as an excuse to stay with large numbers of troops.

I can't answer the question of whether we have too many troops in Saudi Arabia to complete the missions that are necessary. I know we have the sorties every day and so forth. But I do think that this Senate, this Administration, and the Pentagon, ought to now be taking a very hard look around the world at whether we don't have too many troops there in particular places where we have concerns about the relationship with the host.

And in the Saudi case, clearly they are uncomfortable with us. Whether they should be or not is another question. But I think that is a case where we need to take a hard look at whether we have too many people.

The second part of that is, and this, it seems to me, is very clear, whatever number we decide we have to have, we should have before and we certainly now ought to do what we can to remove them from the day to day life of the Saudis, where there is a question of exacerbating the relationship. I know that sounds tough, but if we are going to maintain any kind of a relationship with the Saudis that isn't exacerbated day by day by these kinds of contacts, I think at least we need to take a hard look at that.

Now, having said that, that is not to say I want to take it easy on the Saudis. I think the fact that they did not respond is probably inexcusable, or certainly bureaucratic in the extreme. I think it is also very clear, however, that wandering around with this question of whether you kick this issue upstairs or not indicates that whatever the culpability of the Saudis, we are at least equally culpable.

And that leads me back to my first point. What bothers me about this issue of responsibility is not whether the Secretary of Defense or somebody else stands up and says, yeah, I'm responsible and I am glad he said it yesterday, two weeks after the event, but it is an issue of—what is very clear to me is that throughout this whole period—and I think it was Secretary Bremer that made the point—there is clearly—there has clearly been a lack of sufficient emphasis from the very top down, to the concerns over terrorism and how to deal with it.

And the evidence of this, it seems to me, is very clear when you have a general that says he doesn't know whether he should have kicked this issue upstairs or not. He ought to have been dealing in an atmosphere where, from the very top down, it was clear that this was a major concern of the Secretary of Defense, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, every four star general or admiral around, and that by God, if things weren't getting done, it was his responsibility to move to a higher level as fast as he could to get it done. Or as Ambassador Bremer said, go to the Embassy or something.

But what is fairly clear to me from all of this is that the atmosphere was a fairly relaxed atmosphere of this particular question.

And in my judgment that—the responsibility for that rests at the top.

So I come back to saying to you what I said at the beginning. Whether you want to hold the Secretary of Defense responsible for this past act or not, I hope that everybody would understand that he's responsible for anything that happens from now on, and that as a part of that there is a major change in the way in which this Administration talks to its people about the concerns about terrorism.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that's a profound circle, Secretary Eagleberger. And it is one we are going to have to analyze, dissect, and reconfigure. We do not want to impose something on the Secretary of Defense as an office or Secretary Perry as an individual, which is unrealistic, which he can't be fairly said to manage. You do have the precedent of what the CIA Inspector General has done on the Captain of the Ship Doctrine responsibility because it is so important and there ought to be notice generally, and somehow the Director of Central Intelligence ought to find out about an Aldrich Ames, although nobody says how you find out about an Aldrich Ames, but the Inspector General said that's his duty, to find out about an Aldrich Ames. And the three former DCI's wrote back a stinging letter in reply, disagreeing very sharply, and I am still studying it. I am still thinking about it. And I don't know what the answer is with the Secretary of Defense.

Go ahead.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. Mr. Chairman, just one point here, with all respect. It is one thing to hold the Secretary of Defense responsible for not knowing about the details of this particular case, and I am not arguing that. I am arguing, however, that by all appearances at least, there was less than the sort of serious concern about the effect—the possibilities of terrorism against American forces wherever they might be, much less in the Middle East, and that as a result you had this peculiar situation of generals not knowing what they were supposed to do if it wasn't working.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, if generals don't know what they are supposed to do, that's a matter of training, isn't it? We had a bit of that yesterday afternoon. It is the Secretary of Defense's responsibility for policy, for training, for setting the guidelines. If you have a country like Saudi Arabia where there is an attitude of walking on eggs, we're afraid to do something because the Saudis will not like it because of the cultural differences, does that put the Secretary or the Pentagon more on notice. Or you have the executions, the beheading of these four men on May 31 and then you have the extra surveillance, should there be a little more attention.

It's true the Secretary has lots of installations around the world, but only a few in Saudi Arabia right on the brink of this sort. Maybe your characterizing—you used the word concern. Maybe it is a climate of concern that has to be evidenced. Ambassador Bremer talks about this Administration not doing enough on terrorism generally.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. I think that is also true.

Chairman SPECTER. And specifically, as he illustrates it, with the Damascus shuttle.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. I don't want to let the Secretary off the hook. I guess I had better be very specific about it in the sense that, by God, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for what happens in his department, and if the department is not clear enough to all of its subordinate commands that this issue of terrorism is high priority, and by God, general, you will do what you have to do to make sure it works, then I have to say to you in the end the buck stops with the Secretary of Defense.

I am not trying to blame him for this particular——

Chairman SPECTER. You will do what you have to do to make it work.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. Yes.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, is it humanly possible to do that?

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. No, but it's humanly possible to try to do your damndest and I don't think they did.

Chairman SPECTER. You must try your damndest to do what you have to do to make it work.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. Uh-huh.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, we clearly are not on the right track, when you have a 1983 Long Commission report spelling it out and nobody follows it. That sign is up there, foursquare. And you keep coming back to the Secretary of Defense saying you have a 3000 to 5000 pound bomb which is ten fold what was ever used in the Mid East—not in Arabia, but in the Mid East, in the face of a 12,000 pound bomb.

And the Secretary of Defense Perry took responsibility, he said that he's responsible, but it has to be more than words.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. That's right.

Chairman SPECTER. There has to be some pragmatic way of getting it done.

Mr. Secretary, you've been very helpful. I may ask you to come back. We may have some other former Secretaries. I have talked to quite a few in the last week trying to figure out what you fellows do over there and how it works in the Cabinet and how you run these massive organizations. I had a chance to talk to Secretary Baker, James Baker. I had a chance to talk to Secretary Shultz. And I've got calls in to all the other Secretaries. We're going to find them and we're going to try to figure it out.

Thank you very, very much.

Secretary EAGLEBERGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you.

[Thereupon, at 2:31 o'clock p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

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ISBN 0-16-054222-7