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SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE UN SECRETARIAT¹

SUMMARY

The Soviet Union is effectively using the UN Secretariat in the conduct of its foreign relations, and the West is paying for most of it. The 800 Soviets assigned to the United Nations as international civil servants report directly to the Soviet missions and are part of an organization managed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Soviets have gained significant advantage over the West through their comprehensive approach to the strategy and tactics of personnel placement and their detailed plans for using the United Nations to achieve Soviet foreign policy and intelligence objectives.

Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel use their positions to promote a broad range of foreign policy objectives in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. They gather information to provide early warning of possible UN actions and are involved in shaping conference papers controlling the flow of news to staff and delegations, influencing delegations seeking Secretariat advice, and aiding Soviet diplomats during conference and other deliberations. Western diplomats have protested specific instances of Soviet staff abuses, but no comprehensive effort has been undertaken by the United Nations to enforce UN Charter and Secretariat staff regulations that prohibit employees from acting on behalf of their government.

Soviet employees use the United Nations to support Soviet propaganda activities worldwide. Soviet Secretariat officials receive instructions directly from Moscow on propaganda placements for coverage in the Soviet media and to arrange for the UN Secretary General to make favorable reference to statements of Soviet leaders or announcements of the Central Committee. Documents supporting Soviet interests are entered into UN records and later presented as a UN document in Soviet propaganda placements.

Key Soviet personnel have been placed in UN offices responsible for UN relations with nongovernmental organizations and Soviet front groups. Nongovernmental organizations such as the World Peace Council participate in UN activities. Soviet interest in these groups stems from their ability to influence UN debate and the domestic political process in their own countries.

Approximately one-fourth of the Soviets in the UN Secretariat are intelligence officers and many more are co-opted by the KGB or GRU. All Soviets in the Secretariat must respond to KGB requests for assistance. The Soviet intelligence services use their UN

¹ This report was prepared for the Select Committee on Intelligence by elements of the U.S. intelligence community.

assignments to collect information on UN activities; to spot, assess, and recruit agents; to support worldwide intelligence operations; and to collect scientific and technical information of value to the USSR.

Soviet subversion of UN programs have been prevented on occasion by strong US protests and action by UN officials. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has thwarted some Soviet personnel moves, but he is dependent on Soviet support for UN diplomatic efforts. The Soviets will maintain a distinct advantage in the United Nations until their diplomatic and intelligence efforts are matched by systematic, long-term Western opposition.

Soviets in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, by organization in 1984

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Number of Soviets</i>
Total	773
United Nations, New York, Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, etc	469
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Vienna	69
International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], Montreal	20
International Labor Organization [ILO], Geneva	43
International Maritime Organization [IMO], London	8
International Telecommunications Union [ITU], Geneva	11
United Nations Development Program [UNDP], New York	4
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Paris	59
United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], New York	4
United Nations Institute for Training and Research [UNITAR], New York	1
United Nations Relief Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA], Beirut	1
Universal Postal Union [UPU], Berne	4
World Health Organization [WHO], Geneva	51
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Geneva	6
World Meteorological Organization [WMO], Geneva	17
World Tourism Organization [WTO], Madrid	6

SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE UN SECRETARIAT

“Members of the Secretariat shall subscribe to the following oath or declaration: I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in all loyalty, discretion, and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept any instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Organization.”

UN REGULATION 1.9

The Soviet Union is effectively using the UN Secretariat in the conduct of its foreign relations, and the West is paying for most of it. In contrast with Western members whose citizens normally work as international civil servants, Soviets in the UN system are part of a large and complex system designed to:

- Determine how to integrate UN activities with other foreign policy and intelligence efforts.
- Identify the specific positions in the UN system that can contribute to those efforts.
- Secure and keep targeted positions.
- Manage the work of Soviet citizens holding UN jobs.

The lines of authority for this system begin in Moscow with the Politburo and run through the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and GRU to the Soviet Missions in New York, Geneva, Paris, Vienna, and other cities with UN agency headquarters. The Soviet missions, in turn, directly control the 800 Soviet citizens employed by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In addition, the Soviets have direct control over third-country agents recruited by the KGB and have influence over the 200 Eastern Bloc employees. Thus, Western delegations face not only the large Soviet delegations and the Third World majority in the United Nations but also an organization of 800 people within its bureaucracy who have been placed by, are managed by, and are responsible to the Soviets and their allies.²

The Soviets' comprehensive approach to the strategy and tactics of personnel placement is unique in the UN system. Soviet personnel placements reflect overall Soviet objectives in propaganda, acquisition of Western technology, and intelligence activities. In the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Soviets seek positions from which they can protect or promote Moscow's broad political and intelligence objectives.

² See appendix A for details of the organization that controls Soviet UN Secretariat employees.

In addition to their comprehensive approach to placement, the Soviets maintain effective control over their citizens in the UN system. Most Western employees are career international civil servants on contract with the United Nations. Soviet citizens are first carefully selected for a specific function and often stay on that career track, rotating on short-term contracts among assignments in international organizations and related Soviet ministry slots. No Western state or group of states can match the combination of expertise and placement strategy of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the UN system.

Ninety percent of the salaries for Soviet personnel in the UN Secretariat is paid by the contributions from other member states. Moreover, the Soviets also net an estimated \$20 million in hard currency each year from kickbacks they require from their UN staff. These funds are used to finance other diplomatic, propaganda, and intelligence activities.

*Soviet Objectives*³

Moscow has specific objectives and detailed plans concerning its participation in the UN system. The Soviets serving in the UN system have four basic objectives:

- Promote Soviet and allied interests in the United Nations.
- Spread Soviet propaganda.
- Use status to influence individuals and groups within member states.
- Undertake intelligence operations.

Geographical Distribution of UN Staff

In 1957 the admission of 20 new members to the United Nations prompted UN General Assembly consideration of the equitable distribution of positions in the UN Secretariat. The General Assembly recommended to the Secretary General that representation of new members be increased by giving preference in hiring to nationals of "underrepresented" countries and by increasing the number of fixed-term contracts, by which officials of governments are loaned or "seconded" to the United Nations for a fixed number of years.

The Secretary General responded by ordering publication of a report each year that shows the representation in the UN Secretariat by country and posts, including all political posts (P-1 and higher), and by developing a system of desirable ranges for specific countries and regions based on population, cultural tradition, political system, and UN contribution. From the beginning, the United States and Western Europe have been overrepresented, and the Third World and the Eastern Bloc have been underrepresented.

The trend of the last 20 years has been to increase the number and proportion of Third World and Eastern Bloc nationals. Since the UN Secretariat has increased in size, the number of Western Secretariat officials also has increased, but their proportion in the Secretariat and their dominance of the institution have decreased.

³ See appendix B for details on Soviet interest in UN components.

Promoting Soviet Interests

Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel in the UN Secretariat use their positions to promote Soviet and Eastern Bloc interests in all phases of UN action. Their efforts begin with gathering information to provide early warning of possible UN actions and do not end until the final report has been disseminated. Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel are involved in shaping conference papers, controlling the flow of news to staff and delegations, influencing delegations seeking Secretariat advice, and aiding Soviet diplomats during conferences and other deliberations.

The Kickback System

The Soviet Union receives about \$20 million per year in salary kickbacks from Soviet employees in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Although this sum does not cover the full cost of Soviet participation in the United Nations, it is a major subsidy for Soviet diplomatic and intelligence efforts.

The kickback system did not begin as a calculated scheme but rather as a Soviet Government response to the ruffled feathers of Soviet ambassadors jealous of the perquisites of their offices. In the early 1960s the Ambassador to Austria complained that young diplomats recently graduated from college and working for international organizations were getting three times his salary. Worse, the youngsters were buying Western cars. As a member of the Central Committee, the Ambassador got the support of his high-ranking colleagues, and the practice of salary kickbacks was begun.

An identical kickback system is at work throughout the United Nations. Each position in the UN Secretariat is assigned a rank and pay grade equivalent to that in the Soviet Mission, which is roughly comparable to an individual's diplomatic status. No matter his rank or grade, each Soviet employee is required to turn over his entire UN salary to a finance clerk in the Soviet Mission. The clerk then pays the Soviet Secretariat employee the standard hard currency salary paid to mission personnel of the same rank plus 10 percent. If the Soviet resides outside the Soviet compound, he also receives an apartment allotment. The payment usually does not meet the actual rental expenses. The hard currency contribution Soviets make to the UN pension fund is turned over to the Soviet mission when they leave the UN Secretariat.

Early Warning.—Each Soviet Secretariat employee has his UN work reviewed by the Soviet mission for analysis and comment. In addition, the KGB has access to some UN code cables, some of which are copied and sent to Moscow. Through these efforts, the Soviet mission is aware of the initiation of Secretariat actions and is able to intervene early on when the substance of the recommendations are more easily influenced. Early warning also gives Soviet diplomats longer leadtimes to prepare for a meeting.

Conference Preparation.—Groundwork for major UN conferences begins years in advance with the Secretariat's preparation of the basic documents for discussion. Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel are in a position to shape these documents to favor their governments' positions. Soviet employees directly influenced key conference documents for the UN Special Sessions on Disarmament in

New York and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Belgrade in 1983. The UNCTAD document was such an egregious distortion of Soviet-versus-Western aid efforts that it drew a sharp US protest.

News Service.—The Soviets have tried to gain control of the Political Information and News Services (PINS) established by the United Nations to provide Secretariat staff and member states with synopses of media reports. Supervision of PINS was assigned to the office of UN Secretariat Under Secretary General Viacheslav Ustinov, who delegated the editorial responsibilities to his special assistant, Viktor Andreyev.

Control of PINS gives the Soviets an opportunity to select and edit press items. Review of PINS products indicates an anti-US bias and an absence of unfavorable coverage of the Soviet Union. For example, during the US election in the fall of 1984, PINS used selective coverage from US newspapers to support the Soviet position that President Reagan's arms control proposals were motivated by campaign politics.

History of Soviet Presence in the UN Secretariat

Soviet activities since the founding of the United Nations in 1945 indicate that USSR participation has evolved through three phases:

- From 1945 to 1954. Moscow sent few of its people to serve in the Secretariat, and those sent tended to be senior officials responsible for monitoring UN activities.
- From 1954 to 1970. The Soviets established themselves in key Secretariat positions and developed tactics to shape Secretariat activities to meet their needs.
- From 1970 to the present. Moscow refined its system of personnel placement and control so that Soviets in the Secretariat function reasonably well as adjuncts of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and intelligence services.

Before 1954 the Soviet Government considered the United Nations a pro-US organization and was unwilling to commit resources to it. The government also feared that giving Soviet citizens the status of international civil servants would lead to defections. Consequently, only a few well-screened Soviet officials were employed in the UN Secretariat, and only a handful of KGB officers were under UN cover.

In 1955 Nikita Khrushchev recognized that the trend toward decolonization would mean the admission of a large number of newly independent states to the United Nations, which would transform the character of the organization. The Soviet Foreign Ministry responded with new interest to the United Nations by enlarging its Department of International Organizations and creating new sectors to deal with disarmament and international economic organizations. A Khrushchev demand for a more equal representation in the Secretariat caused a push for UN positions, which initially were staffed by poorly qualified individuals.

As the Soviets gained more UN posts, the pool of qualified people with UN experience increased. More acceptable candidates were provided for vacancies, and the KGB became increasingly subtle in seeking advantageous positions for its officers. The 800 Soviets cur-

rently employed in the United Nations reflect this focus on increasing the quality and influence of Soviet placements.

Influence on Other Delegations.—Secretariat staff officials are often asked for advice and assistance, particularly by Third World delegations. Such exchanges allow the Soviets in the Secretariat to influence the presentation of positions of friendly Third World delegations. Soviets in the Secretariat also use third-country nationals to sound out Third World or Western countries on proposals the USSR wants to introduce. By taking these soundings through third-country nationals and then having a client sponsor the initiative, the Soviets avoid some the disadvantages of Soviet sponsorship.

Support for Meetings.—Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel also use their positions to assist their delegations attending UN meetings. These efforts provide small but significant advantages. For example, the Soviet-dominated Office of Conference Services gives Soviet diplomats the advance copy of speeches that are prepared for the interpreters. The Soviets also receive advance copies of documents prepared for the official record of UN meetings, which facilitates their preparations.

Soviet Secretariat staff members do not hesitate to manipulate UN procedures to favor the Soviets and their allies. During the 1968 UN General Assembly (UNGA) debate on China's representation in the United Nations, Viktor Lesiovskiy, who was serving as a special assistant to Secretary General U Thant, drew a formal protest from the US Mission when he put the United States in a disadvantageous position on the speakers list.

Decorum does not preclude Soviet UN officials from providing advice to Soviet delegates during UN proceedings. At the January 1962 debate on the Congo issue, the Soviet Under Secretary General passed five penciled notes to Soviet representative Valerian Zorin, drawing complaints from non-Communist delegates that the action was highly improper.

Soviets in the Secretariat provide internal UN budget information directly to the Soviet representative on the UNGA's Fifth Committee, which is responsible for the budget. In technical conferences, Soviet Secretariat officials have been assigned directly to the Soviet delegation.

Obtaining UN Resources. Soviets in the UN Secretariat are instructed to get back as much as possible of the USSR's contribution to the United Nations. Some of the activities include getting the United Nations to sponsor conferences in the USSR and to publish Russian UN documents. In the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Soviets are diverting programs to the USSR intended for underdeveloped countries.

Soviet Tactics for Securing UN Jobs

The Soviet Government accomplishes its personnel objectives in the United Nations through a combination of long-range planning and dogged persistence. The Soviets usually begin their efforts to secure slots through the formal UN personnel systems, but they also use a variety of other tactics to gain their ends. One ploy is to remain geographically underrepresented in the Secretariat to improve their chances of securing desired posts. If the Soviets are particularly interested in a specific position, they will present a well-

credentialed, outstanding candidate for the post. This method was used in securing the directorship of the Dag Hammarskjold Library at UN headquarters in New York. When a qualified person is not available, a resume is falsified. Political pressure also is used to gain personnel concessions. For example, the USSR has blocked the transition of the UN Industrial Development Organization into a specialized agency to make sure a deputy director general position is reserved for the Eastern Bloc countries.

The Soviets also achieve their objectives by ignoring or manipulating the UN vacancy notice system. As Director of Personnel in Geneva, Gely Dneprovsky used his authority to hire locally on temporary contract without approval from New York. He moved Soviets or their allies into key positions as temporary appointees so that they could subsequently apply as internal candidates. The Soviets have also used friendly third-country nationals to protect their slots. For example, when a KGB agent who was filling a senior political officer slot returned to the USSR on leave for a year, a Spanish national working under Soviet supervision as a manual laborer was shifted to fill the slot ad interim. The Soviets have also been known to exclude highly qualified third-country candidates from consideration to make their own nationals look better and have intervened at the highest levels to protect incompetent Soviet officials.

Propaganda Placement

The Soviets use the United Nations to support Soviet propaganda activities worldwide. Secretariat officials receive instructions directly from Moscow on placing materials or staging propaganda events for coverage in the Soviet media. Communist Party groups in the secretariats of international organizations concentrate on the use of UN posts for Soviet propaganda.

Soviets in the Secretariat are instructed to arrange for the UN Secretary General to make favorable reference to the statements of Soviet leaders or announcements of the Central Committee. The Soviets circulate these statements and a wide variety of decisions and announcements of the Soviet Government as UN documents, which are then reported in Soviet media as having been acknowledged by the United Nations. As a matter of practice, the United Nations allows documents of any delegation to be entered in the record and circulated as official UN documents. The fact that the documents have been circulated in the United Nations is used by the Soviet press and other media in a way that gives the Soviet propaganda placement more credibility.

The Soviet delegation exploits UNESCO for propagandizing Soviet achievement in agriculture, science, culture, and education and the advantages of the Soviet way of life. The Soviets use the organization's programs, international forums, information and publication activities, and its audiovisual services.

The party committees in the Soviet communities in New York, Geneva, Paris, and Vienna are actively involved in Soviet propaganda activities. The party structure is made up of the Soviets in the embassy, consulate, the trade mission, and groups from the secretariats of each international organization. Each group has a propaganda committee that meets to discuss practical steps for at-

taining Soviet propaganda objectives. One or more representatives of each committee attends the main propaganda committee meeting once a month. The main committee meeting is chaired by the Ambassador, who is assisted by the Party Secretary, whose instructions come from the Central Committee.

The Ambassador holds periodic meetings to review the progress of the propaganda program and to discuss plans for increasing the effort. Occasionally, an official of the Cadres Abroad Department of the Central Committee visits the UN representing himself as a member of a delegation to an international organization or conference, but actually his mission is to discuss the propaganda activities conducted within the secretariats of international organizations.

Support of Soviet Interests Outside the United Nations

Soviet Secretariat employees use their positions to influence not only the diplomatic activity within the United Nations but also the groups and individuals within member states. To accomplish this objective, they are focusing particularly on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) associated with the United Nations and Soviet front groups.

NGOs.—Groups such as the World Peace Council participate in a wide variety of UN activities to bring nonofficial views and information to member states. NGO representatives may attend conferences as observers; submit papers, which become part of the official record; and at times speak at meetings. The NGOs are targets because of their potential to influence UN debate and because of their interaction in the political processes of their countries.

International Year of Peace

Preparations under way for the 1986 International Year of Peace (IYP) are an example of the ability of the Soviets in the Secretariat to influence organizations outside the UN system. The UNGA proclaimed 1986 as International Year of Peace and invited member states to participate in its observance. Soviet Under Secretary General Ustinov was assigned responsibility for the project. His UN staff is soliciting funds for the project and organizing regional meetings of nongovernmental organizations. In this way, individuals and groups will participate in a UN project without suspecting that the effort is managed by a Soviet.

The Soviets have key personnel in offices responsible for UN Secretariat relations with nongovernmental organizations. In New York, Anatoly Mkrtychyan heads the External Relations Division of the Department of Public Information. At UNESCO, Assistant Director General Sema Tanguiane personally approves the list of invitees to UNESCO nongovernmental meetings. In Geneva, Political Officer Vladimir Soloviev is in charge of seminars and relations with NGOs in the Information Service.

Front Groups.—The KGB and the Central Committee actively promote the connection between UN and Soviet front organizations such as the World Peace Council (WPC). Soviet Secretariat employees also attempt to get high-level UN representation at meetings and conferences sponsored by front organizations. When WPC President Romesh Chandra visits the United Nations, Soviet per-

sonnel in the Secretariat are instructed from Moscow to coordinate the visit and arrange meetings with the UN Secretary General and the presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The Soviets use the UN imprimatur and funds to lend credibility and prestige to Soviet front organizations involved in Moscow's peace offensive in the Third World and Western Europe. The front organizations participate in the meetings of major UN committees, subordinate organizations, regional commissions, and specialized agencies. They are in contact with the Secretary General and departments of the Secretariat.

Intelligence Operations

Approximately one-fourth of the Soviets in the UN Secretariat are intelligence officers. Moreover, many other Soviets are co-opted by the KGB and GRU. All Soviets in the UN system must respond to KGB requests for assistance.

In the early years of Soviet participation in the United Nations, Moscow placed a few intelligence officers in New York, but they were not very successful in collecting information. The KGB and GRU initially used UN positions only as a cover for intelligence activities. Over time, Soviet intelligence services have become experienced in the use of the UN system and its personnel and program resources to support their efforts. They now use their UN assignments and the organization itself to collect information on UN activities; to spot, assess, and recruit agents; to support worldwide intelligence operations; and to collect scientific and technical information of value to the Soviet Union.

No Kid Stuff

The Youth Forum, sponsored by the National Swiss Commission for UNESCO, is a tradition. Since 1953, 500 schoolchildren from the four corners of Switzerland and bordering French regions have assembled in Geneva once a year to "play" United Nations. As in the General Assembly, the young people are grouped by the countries represented in the United Nations and debate a specific topic for three days.

For 25 years, the Forum was held in the Palace of Nations, an official UN building, which gave the event an added sense of authenticity. But since 1978, following an interesting and revealing incident, the forum has been held at the International Conference Center, which belongs to the city of Geneva.

The topic of the Forum that year was "The Charter of the United Nations and the Human Rights Declaration." On the afternoon of the first day, a young boy "representing" the United Arab Emirates motioned for the elimination of the two seats occupied by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics, which are an integral part of the USSR. He considered it unfair that the Soviets had three votes in the General Assembly—which has been the case since the United Nations was established in 1945—when they are the greatest violators of human and civil rights. The motion was adopted.

This nonconsequential play acting sparked a high-level Soviet response. A Soviet official of the UN press service happened to see the proceedings and reported them to the Soviet Ambassador. The

next morning, Ambassador Zoya Mironova woke the director of the Palace of Nations and demanded that he terminate the Forum. The director, Luigi Cottafavi, explained that the assembly entailed no commitment for the United Nations, but, when the young people arrived at the Palace about 9 a.m., they found the doors locked. The decision has been made by the official in charge of conference services, Vladimir Lobachev, a Soviet, without consulting the director of the Palace. The young people had lost. They left the Palace and never returned to disturb the peace and quiet of the diplomats.

Cover.—UN staff assignments are used as cover for operations directed at the host country and third countries. UN Secretariat status provides intelligence officers with the opportunity to travel unencumbered by restrictions imposed on Soviet diplomats. Furthermore, UN identification does not disclose nationality, which allows Soviet UN employees to attend professional, academic, or political meetings and to develop contacts without revealing their nationality.

One example of Soviet use of UN cover involves Anatoliy Andreyev, an intelligence officer who worked as a UN librarian. In 1973 Andreyev met a civilian employee of the US military at a librarians conference on Long Island. After a year of exchanging unclassified documents, Andreyev offered to help the military employee financially in exchange for specific classified documents. Andreyev left the United States after a quiet protest from the UN mission.

Another GRU officer, Kirill Chekotillo, worked in the UN Office of Political and Security Council Affairs for the Soviet Under Secretary General. During that time, Chekotillo also traveled around the United States visiting various research institutes. Using the coverage of a German working for the United Nations on Law of the Sea negotiations, he was able to gather information on the status of US oceanographic research. When the United States pointed out these clandestine activities to the Secretary General, Chekotillo resigned and returned to Moscow.

Recruitment.—The prestige and importance of a UN post for European and Third World diplomats provide an excellent opportunity for the Soviets to meet and develop long-term intelligence sources and agents of influence. In New York, Geneva, and Vienna extended contact with Africans and Asians does not arouse the suspicion it would in the diplomats' home capitals, where Soviet officers may be under heavy surveillance.

The United Nations is fertile ground for Soviet recruitment efforts. Soviets working in the UN personnel system use their access to personnel records for spotting and assessing possible recruits. UNESCO, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UNCTAD, and other UN agencies sponsor seminars and conferences in the Soviet Union, and the Soviets in the secretariats control or monitor the invitations to these events. In the Soviet Union, the attendees are targets for Soviet intelligence officers.

Soviets in the UN personnel system also help their agents get UN jobs. These posts may be used to enhance the political or diplomatic career prospects of an agent of influence or UN employee as an enticement or reward for service. The Soviets can be as effective

in a negative way; they prevent promotions and make working conditions unpleasant for uncooperative UN employees.

Third-Country Operations.—Soviet intelligence officers use the headquarters of UN international organizations to support their third-country operations. Meetings are planned for New York, Geneva, Vienna, or Paris, although the agent's travel and business have nothing to do with the United Nations. UN conferences held in these cosmopolitan cities allow Soviets extended contact with agents with whom it would be difficult to meet in their home countries. A recent case involved Arne Treholt, a prominent member of Norway's UN delegation from 1980 to 1982. The Norwegian State's attorney accused Treholt of obtaining NATO classified information and passing it to the Soviets. He met his KGB case officer at the UN Library in New York.

Scientific and Technical Collection.—The USSR also takes advantage of its positions in international organizations to acquire scientific and technical information and equipment. A large portion of the individuals who come to the UN Secretariat from the State Committee for Science and Technology and related academic institutions are KGB or GRU personnel, or have been co-opted by the intelligence services. Soviet tactics vary from simply taking hardware and shipping it to Moscow to arranging for international organizations to conduct or support research that fills gaps in Soviet technological knowledge.

The Soviets use the UN copying facilities and have shipped boxes of technical literature back to the USSR at no cost to the Soviet Government. As the Soviets have assumed more responsible positions as directors of research programs, they have been able to establish data bases of specific interest to the Soviet Union, again at UN expense.

The Soviets began using the UN in their scientific and technical collection effort at the International Atomic Energy Agency in the late 1950s. Positions acquired in IAEA libraries and research offices gave them legitimate access to Western equipment and publications, computer systems, software, and data bases.

Chernenko the UN Delegate

In 1974 Konstantin Chernenko, then Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's General Department, visited the United States as a member of the Soviet delegation to the UN Special Session on Raw Materials. He was interested in how the UN Secretariat worked and what kind of technical services were provided. He also was interested in familiarizing himself with US automated data-processing systems.

Chernenko's trip to Washington included a tour of the a US Government computer center. In the briefing, he was introduced to The New York Times Data Bank system. The system was queried for information on Chernenko, and to his surprise and amusement two separate press items came up. The news items were printed and given to the visitor. The next week the wife of the KGB Resident assigned to the New York Soviet Mission to the United Nations began using the UN computerized Data Bank Service to tap into The New York Times Data Bank.

APPENDIX A

Soviet Organization in the United Nations

Soviet ability to use the UN Secretariat as an instrument of its foreign policy depends on a large organizational structure capable of managing the 800 Soviet and the Eastern Bloc citizens working in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The process begins with the selection of personnel. The Foreign Ministry, the KGB, other ministries, and the party Central Committee apparatus all are involved in the process. The Soviet missions to the various UN organizations are the focal points for managing and evaluating the Soviet employees in the UN system. Finally, the specific plans and instructions for actions in the United Nations are formulated and approved in Moscow by the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the Central Committee.

The Personnel Selection Process

Soviets do not apply directly to the United Nations for employment. They are nominated by Moscow and "seconded" or loaned to the United Nations as Soviet Government employees. The Office of Personnel Administration in the Foreign Ministry has an International Organization Section that acts as the clearinghouse for appointments to the UN Secretariat. The UN Information Office in Moscow does the paperwork for the application. Although the office is a formal part of the UN Secretariat, it is staffed and controlled by the KGB.

The Office of Personnel Administration of the Foreign Ministry manages a pool of ministry professional and clerical employees whose specialty is international organizations, and receives nominations from other ministries and institutions in the Soviet Union. This office maintains contact with the UN Office of Personnel and the permanent missions of the USSR to the various UN institutions. The Foreign Ministry notifies the other ministries of anticipated UN openings and prepares the formal nominations for the Central Committee. Over the years a quota system has emerged, and various ministries have come to regard particular jobs in the United Nations as their property.

The Foreign Ministry provides the largest number of employees for UN assignments. Foreign Ministry candidates for UN posts are drawn from three main sources: the substantive offices that deal with the United Nations, foreign service officers on rotational tours, and schools sponsored by the Foreign Ministry, such as the Institute of International Relations.

The KGB and GRU provide the second group of candidates. The Office of Personnel Administration is in constant touch with the KGB. The paperwork is done by the Foreign Ministry. The forms, which are submitted to the Cadres Abroad Department of the Central Committee, provide the fictitious backgrounds developed by the KGB for its personnel.

Other ministries, state committees, and academic institutions also provide candidates to the UN system according to their functions. For example, the State Committee for Science and Technology contributes scientists to carry out its role in acquiring Western

technology, and the Health Ministry provides doctors to the World Health Organization.

The Communist Party Central Committee apparatus from time to time provides personnel for particular UN jobs. The key offices are the International Department, headed by Boris Ponomarev, and the International Information Department, headed by Leonid Zamyatin. Stanislav Menshikov of the International Department served in the Economic and Social Department of the UN Secretariat in New York in the 1970s.

In addition to the formal procedures for personnel selection, an extensive network of personal contacts influences the process. The Permanent Representatives in New York, Geneva, and Vienna have considerable influence in nominating proteges for key posts. Prominent party and Foreign Ministry officials find jobs in the United Nations for their relatives and friends. In 1983 three children of high-level Foreign Ministry officials worked in the UN Secretariat in New York.

Bureaucratic contests also become a factor in the process if a UN job attracts the attention of more than one ministry. When KGB officer Viktor Lesiovskiy was invited by Secretary General U Thant to be his assistant, the KGB was given the right to nominate his successor over the objections of the Foreign Ministry. Disputes of this sort are resolved at the highest level of the respective ministries. Sometimes the Politburo has been required to resolve conflicts between the KGB and the Foreign Ministry.

The Central Committee approves all candidates for UN jobs. Once the nominations are made and the KGB has done a background investigation, the credentials are submitted by the Foreign Ministry to the Central Committee's Cadres Abroad Department for further screening. The nomination for UN Under Secretary General, the senior Soviet position in the United Nations, is submitted to the Politburo.

Role of the Mission

When a Soviet citizen reports for work at a UN office in New York, Geneva, Vienna, or elsewhere, he has already checked in with his boss in the Soviet mission to the UN organization. The Soviet mission instructs him, supervises his work, evaluates his performance, monitors his loyalty, and reports his activities to Moscow. The Soviet mission is the link between the Soviet citizen and the Communist Party and Soviet Government.

The USSR ambassador to a UN organization is the formal head of the Soviet organization and is responsible for the overall operations of the mission. He reports through diplomatic channels to the Foreign Ministry. The regular diplomatic work of the mission is organized by divisions and sectors that parallel the UN committees and Secretariat offices. The key managers for diplomatic activity are called issue referents. They usually are foreign service officers and handle all the mission activity related to substantive issues, such as disarmament, or to functional specialities, such as personnel. KGB and GRU officers from the mission and Secretariat are also assigned to these sectors for cover purposes and are theoretically required to spend one-third of their time on diplomatic work.

The Communist Party organization constitutes the second major control mechanism. Each Soviet in the UN Secretariat belongs to a party group. The party secretary ensures that all decisions of the Central Committee are brought to the attention of the Soviet community abroad. He also is responsible for assuring that the Soviets in the UN Secretariat use their UN jobs to promote current propaganda and front activities directed by the Central Committee.

The third mechanism for controlling Soviets in the Secretariat is the mission Security Officer, who is a member of the KGB. His job is basically counterintelligence. Assisted by other KGB officers and informants in the various offices, he monitors the activities of all Soviets in the mission and the Secretariat.

The fourth set of links to Soviets in the Secretariat involves the individual's home organization, ministry, state committee, or component. The lines of communication of ministries, which only occasionally send people to international organizations, are generally weak and informal, but control mechanisms can be extremely strong, as in the case of the KGB.

THE KGB has a separate chain of command and communications outside the mission referent system that links directly to Moscow. The standard Soviet practice is to place a KGB officer as the second senior Soviet official in a Secretariat office. He is then in a position to free other KGB and GRU officers under his supervision in the United Nations for their intelligence activities. Individuals are managed by the Resident through the KGB structure. Other Soviets, including their Soviet non-KGB supervisors, have little knowledge of the activities of these officials and exert no authority over them.

KGB use of Soviet Secretariat employees is managed directly by the KGB officers in the Secretariat or from the mission. In the majority of cases, the KGB simply asks the Soviet for information concerning specific intelligence requirements on the political or economic conditions in countries of UN diplomats or third-country Secretariat employees. Sometimes the Soviet is required to initiate contact and report the information. The KGB also directs Soviet Secretariat officials to obtain employment in the United Nations for individuals recruited by the KGB.

Soviets in the Secretariat also use the Secretariat employees from Eastern Bloc countries and client states. Eastern Bloc employees routinely check with Soviet supervisors when they are unsure of the Soviet line and need guidance on how to handle their UN work. When an Eastern Bloc employee is favorably placed to accomplish a Soviet objective, he is given direct instruction from Soviet supervisors in the Secretariat.

Reporting and Work for the Mission

The divisions and sectors within the mission parcel out their work to the Soviets in the Secretariat. Using Secretariat research and library facilities, the Secretariat employees draft contributions to mission cables. Soviets in supervisory positions in the United Nations use their non-Soviet employees to support their mission-related projects.

The Soviet Secretariat employees form an integral part of Soviet mission operations. On each issue or project, the potential Secretar-

iat contribution is considered at the outset. Soviets in the Secretariat sometimes take the initiative in suggesting strategy and tactics for the use of Secretariat resources and the UN mantle of legitimacy in support of Soviet objectives.

Each Soviet in the Secretariat has reporting requirements beyond the scope of his response to specific KGB requests or his regular input through the mission sector. The Soviets in the United Nations must report every contact with foreigners including work-related meetings and social occasions. To avoid being seen and having to complete a report, the Soviets make a point of not meeting Western friends in the restaurants or coffee shops in UN buildings.

Evaluation

The Soviets in the UN Secretariat are within the personnel evaluation system of the Soviet Government. The mission and local party committee provide the standard personnel evaluation reports on Soviet Secretariat personnel. The KGB and GRU prepare a separate evaluation report to which the Soviet supervisors in the United Nations or the mission make pro forma contributions. The mission's evaluation includes several parts, including a description of the job and an evaluation of performance. The substantive part is provided by the sector or division chief in the mission. The party secretary and KGB security officer in the mission also add comments, and the Soviet supervisors in the Secretariat report on the employee's work in the United Nations.

In addition, each Soviet employee is required to complete an annual report of his activities within the Secretariat. The report contains an estimate of the value of the particular UN slot to the Soviet operation and of the strengths and weaknesses of the organizational setup and provides suggestions for improvements. The senior Soviets report on the overall operations of their offices, or, in the case of the Under Secretary General, on the whole Soviet operation in the UN Secretariat. The analysis of these reports by the Personnel and Finance Sector in the Department of International Organizations in the Foreign Ministry provides the basis for the long-range plans for allocation of Soviet personnel in the UN Secretariat.

Instructions From Moscow

Soviet Secretariat employees regularly visit the mission to get instruction from their supervisors. As a general rule, the Foreign Ministry instructions to the Soviet mission are sufficient to guide the conduct of Secretariat employees. The Foreign Ministry usually assumes that these instructions will also initiate specific action by Soviets in the Secretariat. Foreign Ministry personnel in the Secretariat occasionally receive specific instructions requiring them to contact particular foreign diplomats with whom they have close relationships to gather information or lobby on a specific issue. The Foreign Ministry and KGB communication systems are used by the International Department of the Central Committee, headed by Boris Ponomarev, to send instructions by special cable to Soviets in the Secretariat concerning UN support for Soviet-controlled front organizations.

Leonid Zamyatin of the Central Committee's International Information Department is concerned with propaganda, and the Cadres Abroad Department manages the party mechanism within the Soviet delegations abroad. Both of these Central Committee offices use the Foreign Ministry and KGB communications systems and sometimes send cables to the exclusive attention of particular Soviets in the UN Secretariat.

The KGB and GRU maintain a communications system separate from Foreign Ministry channels. KGB headquarters instructs the Resident, who deals directly with KGB officers in the UN Secretariat.

APPENDIX B

Soviet Interest in UN Components

Over the past 20 years, the Soviets have developed a strategic approach to the placement of their personnel within the UN system. Analysis of the functions of UN offices and evidence of Soviet interests by the placement of personnel reveal the following motives and interest in particular UN offices.

The UN Secretariat in New York

The Executive Office of the Secretary General provides staff support to the Secretary General, manages his personal activities, and has direct access to any office in the UN system in the Secretary General's name. This has been a KGB slot since Viktor Lesiovskiy became an assistant to U Thant. Today, Guennadi Yevstaf'iev monitors these activities and has access to all personnel records and applications for UN employment.

The Department of Political and Security Council Affairs is responsible for assisting the Secretary General in his relations with the Security Council and has a broad mandate to deal with political issues. According to Trgyve Lie, in 1946 the Big Five powers agreed that the top post would be held by a Soviet national. The Under Secretary General in charge of that department has always been a Soviet. Under Secretary General Ustinov first served in the United Nations in the late 1950s. The department has 15 Soviets and has been the primary focus of political influence and intelligence operations in the Secretariat in New York.

The Department of Conferences Services contains the largest contingent of Soviets in New York. A high proportion of KGB and GRU officers serve in this department. The Soviet translators are together in one Russian-language section, where the Soviet supervisors can free the KGB officers to do their "other work," as it is called in the United Nations. The Soviets are also interested in the Dag Hammarskjold Library because it provides an opportunity to acquire US technical publications and lets KGB and GRU officers travel throughout the United States to meet people with access to vast collections of technical literature.

The KGB is vitally interested in the Office of Personnel for access to personnel files and applications for UN employment. This gives the Soviets considerable leverage over applicants and provides information on possible character weaknesses and financial difficulties of current employees. The office also maintains informa-

tion on personnel disputes within the Secretariat and deals with disgruntled employees.

The Financial Services Office helps the extremely cost-conscious Soviets to keep UN expenses and contributions under control. The Ministry of Finance puts experts on budget planning and accounting in this office to aid Soviet delegates on the UN budget committee. The KGB is interested in monitoring how the Soviets in the Secretariat spend their money to assure that the USSR gets every penny of hard currency kickback from its UN employees.

Soviet participation in the Department of Legal Affairs is designed to control from within the Secretariat attempts to expand the UN mandate. A Soviet has held the Directorship of the Codification Division since 1965; particular interests are the Law of the Sea negotiations and the review of the Antarctic Treaty. A defector reports that the office also deals with legal questions pertaining to employment regulations and procedures for promotions and has information on private monetary, marital, and employment difficulties of UN employees, which are of interest to the KGB.

The Department of Public Information is a focal point for propaganda and intelligence efforts. Anatoly Mkrtchyan is Director of the External Relations Division and handles relations with nongovernmental organizations and the program that brings graduate students from all over the world for a UN work-study program. These activities are important to the KGB and the Central Committee for recruitment and for supporting their front organizations. The department as a whole has relatively few Soviets at present but it is a high priority for future Soviet placements because it manages the UN information offices worldwide, maintains contacts with journalists and the media, and publishes much of the UN promotional literature.

Geneva, Vienna, Paris, and Nairobi

Soviet activities in the New York component are only part of the overall effort in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Since the 1920s the Soviets have been active in technical and scientific organizations. In 1956, when they joined the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Soviets began their concerted effort to provide staff to international organizations with access to Western technology.

Geneva.—The Geneva office of the United Nations is the center for research and discussion of North-South issues and is the site of more than a dozen specialized UN agencies and affiliated bodies in which the Soviets disseminate propaganda and collect technical information.

A Soviet national, Gely Dneprovsky, was particularly successful in placing personnel in the UN Geneva office. In spite of press publicity regarding his alleged KGB connections, Dneprovsky was appointed chief of personnel in 1978. By the end of his tenure in 1983, he had worked effectively behind the scenes to oust Westerners and to put UN personnel functions in Geneva in the hands of the Soviets and their allies. Disregarding UN personnel rules, he gave the largest division—Conference Services—to a Soviet.

Soviet staff members try to discredit Western aid programs, promote Soviet ideological doctrine on economic issues, and present

the Soviet domestic economy in a favorable light, while protecting the USSR from Third World criticism and demands for aid. This has been accomplished through prepublication censorship of official UN documents, alteration of statistics, and pressure on Western or Third World UN employees to follow the Soviet line. The Soviets also take advantage of the vast array of technical information in the technical libraries of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Soviet employees routinely photocopy documents on behalf of the Soviet Mission.

Vienna.—The Soviet Union and the Western nations have shared a mutual interest in nonproliferation issues. International Atomic Energy Agency participation gives the Soviets a chance to monitor some aspects of nuclear programs in the West and developing countries as well as to try to acquire Western technology. The Soviets have high-level posts staffed by people technically and politically qualified to exploit the information available in the institution.

The Soviets use the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) not only to acquire technology through participation in the work of the organization but also to try to circumvent US and COCOM controls on technology transfer to the Soviet Union. The Soviets attempt to get UNIDO to sponsor development projects in client states that use advanced computers and industrial processes. The purchase of the equipment through UNIDO and shipment to Eastern Europe allow the Soviets to obtain US technology and get the United Nations to pay for it.

Paris.—Moscow has effectively and consistently exploited UNESCO programs in education, science, and communications. UNESCO is tailor-made for Soviet initiatives designed to influence media content, particularly in the Third World, to establish contact with influential persons in UNESCO-interested fields, and to gain specific technical information. The Soviets have developed contacts with Secretariat officials responsible for publication and broadcasting and have targeted UNESCO information services as a vehicle for disseminating Soviet propaganda.

The senior Soviet in the Secretariat, Assistant Director General Sema Tanguiane, is a tough bureaucrat in his third tour in UNESCO. Tanguiane has great influence over the employment process in the Education Sector and approves lists of individuals invited by UNESCO to represent nongovernmental organizations at all UNESCO meetings.

Nairobi.—The UN office provides staff for the UN Environment Program and the UN Center for Human Settlements. The Soviets have the largest delegations to the UN institutions, and their presence contains a high proportion of KGB officers. The Soviets take frequent trips to other African countries.

The senior Soviet in the UN Center for Human Settlements, Sergei Stepanov, sees his real job as initiating and developing UN projects for "like-minded socialist countries."