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CONSIDERATION OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN, USN, TO BE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND TO HAVE THE  
RANK OF ADMIRAL WHILE SO SERVING

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APRIL 7, 1992.—Ordered to be printed

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Mr. NUNN, from the Committee on Armed Services,  
submitted the following

## REPORT

The Committee on Armed Services, having had under consideration the nomination of Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, USN, to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and to have the rank of Admiral while so serving, reports favorably thereon and recommends the nomination be confirmed by the Senate.

### COMMITTEE ACTION

On February 25, 1992, the Senate received from President Bush the nomination of Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and to have the rank of Admiral while so serving. Pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement on February 25, 1992, the nomination was ordered to be referred jointly to the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee held a public hearing with Vice Admiral Studeman on March 24 to consider his nomination for this important assignment. The Committee also held a hearing in closed session with the nominee on that same day for the purpose of receiving testimony necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national defense. On April 7, the Committee voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed by the Senate.

SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE'S REVIEW OF VICE ADMIRAL STUDEMAN'S  
NOMINATION

*1. Review of required submissions by the nominee and the executive branch*

*a. Committee questionnaire*

The Committee requires each nominee to complete a questionnaire relating to the nominee's qualifications and potential conflicts of interest. Vice Admiral Studeman's response to the Committee's questionnaire provided basic biographical and financial information and served as the starting point for the Committee's inquiry into his qualifications and suitability for the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Pursuant to its normal practice, the Committee Chairman submitted several advance questions to the nominee on March 11, 1992. Vice Admiral Studeman provided his responses to the Chairman on March 20, 1992. Vice Admiral Studeman provided several clarifications to his answers on March 23, 1992. The nominee's answers, as clarified, have been entered into the hearing record and are included as appendix A to this report. A transcript of naval service for Vice Admiral Studeman is presented as appendix B of this report.

*b. Financial disclosure and background materials*

As part of the confirmation process, the Committee received the letters on conflict of interest and related matters required of the nominee, the Office of Government Ethics, and the Deputy General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Based upon this information, the Committee concludes that the nominee is in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest.

*c. FBI summary memorandum on the background investigation of Vice Admiral Studeman*

The White House provided the Committee with the summary memorandum on the background investigation of the nominee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This document was reviewed by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member. The Committee also received the required letter from the Counsel to the President outlining the nature and scope of the FBI background investigation. The Committee concludes that there is nothing in Vice Admiral Studeman's background, as reflected in the FBI investigation, that would render him unfit to serve as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

*2. Committee proceedings*

On February 25, 1992, President Bush formally submitted to the Senate the nomination of Vice Admiral Studeman to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and to have the rank of Admiral while so serving. The nomination was jointly referred to the Armed

Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence on that date. The Committee met in public and closed sessions on March 24 to receive testimony from Vice Admiral Studeman. On April 7, the Committee completed its deliberations on the nomination.

#### QUALIFICATIONS OF VICE ADMIRAL STUDEMAN

##### *1. Roles of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence*

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is an extremely important position. The Deputy Director acts for, and exercises the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence during his absence or disability. Despite being a commissioned officer of the Department of the Navy, in the performance of his duties as Deputy Director, he is subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of Defense. Additionally, he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) with respect to the armed services, or any component thereof.

The primary responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, and thus of the Deputy Director, are to act as the primary adviser to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence; provide the President and other officials with national foreign intelligence; and to develop such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community as will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for foreign national intelligence.

##### *2. Committee's evaluation of the qualifications of Vice Admiral Studeman*

The Committee determined that Vice Admiral Studeman is well qualified to serve as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and to have the rank of Admiral while so serving. He is presently serving as the Director of the National Security Agency and has previously served as the Director of Naval Intelligence and in a variety of Navy and Defense Intelligence Assignments.

The Committee also viewed the assignment of an active duty intelligence professional, in the tradition of General Vernon Walters and Admiral Bobby Inman, as a positive development. The Committee was pleased with the responses of Vice Admiral Studeman to advance questions the Committee Chairman sent to him and with his testimony at the confirmation hearing. Of particular significance was his commitment, as a senior military officer, to provide, when asked, his personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power, and his commitment to report illegal and improper intelligence activities to Executive branch and Congressional authorities.

**CONCLUSION**

On April 7, 1992, by a vote of 18-0, the Committee on Armed Services approved a motion to report favorably the nomination of Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and to have the rank of Admiral while so serving with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed by the Senate.

## APPENDIX A

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, DC, March 20, 1992.

Memorandum for members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

From: Arnold Punaro, Staff Director.

Subject: Advance Questions for Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, USN.

Attached are answers submitted by Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, USN, to advance questions sent to him in connection with his nomination to be appointed to the grade of Admiral and to serve as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Vice Admiral Studeman's confirmation hearing will be held Tuesday, March 24, 1992, commencing at 9:30 a.m. in SR-222. Rick DeBobs of the Committee staff (4-7530) is the primary staff contact for this hearing.

Attachment.

### ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Several issues have traditionally arisen in connection with the confirmation of the Director of Central Intelligence. As the Deputy Director these issues are relevant for you both when you serve as the Acting Director and as second in command.

*Question.* Should the Director of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence perform a policy role within the Administration, in terms of making policy recommendations or becoming deeply involved in policy discussions, or should he be restricted to providing intelligence input and ensuring that the information being discussed and considered is accurate?

*Answer.* There is a role for the Director and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the policymaking of the U.S. Government and that role is to ensure that the policymakers are made privy to the best possible information based upon which to make their decisions. In order to do this, access to the policymaking process by the intelligence community is necessary to ensure that the information is directed at the right issues and requirements. The Director and the Deputy Director must have sufficient knowledge to ensure that should information and analyses conflict with policy direction, full recognition is given to the information by the policymakers.

*Question.* Do you think that it is appropriate for the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to make speeches in public fora that are designed to advocate specific policies of the Administration to power?

*Answer.* No, it is not appropriate for the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to support or advocate specific Ad-

ministration policies. It is not inappropriate to help illuminate the relevant issues to the extent that security considerations will allow. When speaking in public professional intelligence circles, it is acceptable to make reference to intelligence policy issues.

*Question.* What is your view as to the appropriateness of tailoring intelligence analysis to support the actual or perceived policy preferences of the Administration?

*Answer.* Tailoring the facts and conclusions to support administration policy, it is totally inappropriate. However, "tailoring" analysis and reporting to be responsive for the information requirements of the customer should be a primary tool in our intelligence information management. In this case, tailoring is defined to mean packaging intelligence output specifically for that customer so that he does not have to deal with material which is not of interest or relevance.

*Question.* What do you believe is the responsibility of the Director or the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence if he becomes aware of illegal or improper intelligence activities, including covert action activities, on the part of any agency or individual of the government?

*Answer.* The DCI and DDCI are responsible to ensure that legal and oversight protections are in place in the community to prevent the conduct of illegal and improper activities. Should illegal or improper activities occur, the DCI has the responsibility to report these activities to Executive Branch and congressional authorities in a timely manner, and to encourage and ensure appropriate agency heads do the same for such activities discovered in their own agencies. Bob Gates has gone to the extreme that he has authorized and encouraged the DDCI to go around him on reporting illegalities should the DCI be slow or reserved about reporting a given situation.

#### DUTIES

The law and Executive Order 12333 are essentially silent as to the duties of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, other than to provide that he shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability.

*Question.* Has Director Gates advised you as to the duties that he plans for you to perform?

*Answer.* Bob Gates and I have discussed the division of responsibilities. He expects me to be his alter ego, as such to have access to everything he has access to, and to be fully aware of the issues he faces as time and practicality permit. Having said this, Executive Order 12333 defines specific responsibilities for the DCI which the DDCI must share. These are a broad set of requirements for management of "inside" community issues. The DCI is also responsible for many "outside" activities. In a period of such radical change, both the DCI and DDCI will be required to focus on structural and process associated with change implementation. A good deputy not only provides back-stop and support but fills in those managerial gaps wherever they occur and for whatever reason. Bob Gates and I have very different experiential backgrounds which will also lead to some natural, yet complementary, division of interests and

effort. Bob Gates will clearly focus on substantive intelligence and analysis issues, policy, program and Congressional support, and be the lead agent for openness and improve customer evaluation. I will share in these issues, plus I will, for example, continue to have a continuing interest in the operation and management of intelligence community support, in areas related to support to military operations and intelligence technology and architecture, as well as improving overall strategic planning. We will mutually back each other up on the oversight of covert action and sensitive activities.

*Question.* Will you function as a deputy in the sense of being involved in all matters that the Director handles or will you be assigned certain areas for your primary attention?

*Answer.* Bob Gates has assured me that our relationship will be one of very complete sharing of access to all DCI and CIA activities. I suspect that he, having operated as a Deputy himself on several occasions, is very sensitive to, and appreciative of, the need to keep a Deputy fully involved in the decision and management process. Because the overall sets of issues for the DCI/DDCI are so broad, I believe some areas of unique individual focus will take place, and that some responsibilities will also be pushed down to the next executive director level in the CIA and the intelligence community. This will put a premium on good communication and coordination at the top of the community leadership.

*Question.* Do you anticipate being assigned duties relating to the oversight of covert actions?

Bob Gates has specifically cited oversight of covert action as an area where both the DCI and DDCI will be fully and continually engaged together. This backstopping is required because of the sensitivity of these programs.

#### AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Under Executive Order 12333, the Director of Central Intelligence is given authority and responsibility for:

- (a) preparing and submitting the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, with the advice of the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other departments and agencies;
- (b) providing objectives, guidance, priorities, and tasking to the intelligence community;
- (c) producing and disseminating national intelligence and levying analytic tasks on the several intelligence organizations; and
- (d) monitoring, auditing, and evaluating budget execution and approving reprogrammings.

*Question.* In your opinion, are these authorities sufficient for effective coordination and management of the intelligence community? Do you believe that any additional grants of authority to the Director of Central Intelligence should be considered?

*Answer.* It is my impression that E.O. 12333 provides extensive responsibilities to the DCI beyond those main issues cited in your question. I have discussed this topic with the DCI and, at present, we believe the current DCI authorities are sufficient for him to effectively coordinate and manage the intelligence community. This could be subject to change as a result of the approval and imple-

mentation of change proposed as a result of the DCI task forces and special organizational panels. Where areas of authority are discovered to be disfunctionally limited for the future, the DCI will work with the Executive Branch and the Congress to address and strengthen those areas.

#### MANAGEMENT OF THE OVERALL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Traditionally, the primary role of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence has been to manage the various organizations within the several departments and agencies that constitute the national foreign intelligence community.

*Question.* (a) In your opinion, has community management been effective in the past? What factors contribute to effective management? Do you have any ideas for improving community management? Are major changes required to manage the community effectively?

*Answer.* I believe strongly in the concept of "community." Improvements in community management are required across the board, and these are being addressed in the ongoing DCI Task Force and special panel efforts which the DCI will discuss with Congress in detail in early April. Some changes will be required in both structure and process to improve overall community management.

*Question.* (b) What shortcomings do you believe Operation Desert Storm revealed in the ability of the national intelligence community to support the combatant commander, Commander in Chief, Central Command? What steps would you recommend to improve intelligence support to the combatant commands? Do you think that increased peacetime exercise support by national systems of the combatant commands would be beneficial?

*Answer.* There were many relevant lessons learned, both positive and negative, in Desert Shield/Desert Storm which are documented in extensive DoD and intelligence community reports, and are the subject to one degree or another of analysis and corrective action. The major areas of negative concern had to do with HUMINT collection, Imagery interoperability and dissemination, Bomb Damage Assessment, the crispness of Analysis Assessments, and issues related to information management. These problems did not, in my view, detract from an overall superior performance by intelligence, which included some areas of even brilliant achievement. Combatant commands have already pursued some of the necessary corrective actions, as have the Services, JCS, DoD and the national intelligence community. Peacetime exercises of all types, from simulation to actual operational field exercises, should be increased as DoD implements its new military support strategic for the future. The new CIA ADDO(M) is an effort by CIA to increase its support to military commands.

#### INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES

*Question.* What do you think our intelligence priorities should be in the post-cold war environment?

*Answer.* The Administration is currently doing a base-line review of intelligence requirements under the President's NSR-29.

The early returns would indicate that we will end up with a broader set of requirements than previously existed under Cold War circumstances. This clearly derives from the now fully global scale of requirements sets associated with military, political, economic, sociological, technical, environmental and health issues. For simplicity sake, I tend to reflect these requirements and priorities for supporting military operations on the one hand, and general global access on the other. The instabilities in the CIS make it a continuing intelligence priority. Issues associated with regional, religious, tribal, ethnic conflict and transnational requirements associated with counternarcotics, technology development and proliferation, terrorism, unfair economic practices remain high on the priority list. Global support to military operations (SMO) must be improved, and these requirement sets are rigorous and complex as demonstrated by such recent crises as Just Cause (Panama) and the Persian Gulf conflict.

#### ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

As a member of the Military Intelligence Board in your capacity as Director of the National Security Agency, you have had an opportunity to witness the implementation of the legislation in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 relating to management of the General Defense Intelligence Program and the authorities and responsibilities of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

*Question.* In your view, has the process mandated by that legislation been working well?

Answer. The following represents my personal view on the issues addressed in the "Intelligence Matters" section of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-92 and FY-93. On the controversial matter of "authority, direction and control": SECDEF/DEPSEC-DEF directed that ASD(C3I) exercise "authority, direction and control" over DIA consistent with the authority ASD (C3I) exercises over DMA, DISA, Defense Investigative Service, Defense Courier Service, etc. ASD (C3I) has only "staff supervision" of NSA because it is a national vice exclusively a defense agency. If I were the Director of DIA, I would like to continue to have day-to-day operational control over my own resources. I believe the current policy is to allow Director, DIA to exercise day-to-day operational control even after the period specified by the Authorization Act has terminated. I think it is unfortunate that this issue has existed since it has unnecessarily caused polarization in the DoD and with the Congress. I would leave DoD to work out the solution, since there is no question regarding the Secretary of Defense's basic authority.

On GDIP management: I have witnessed in my years in the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) three different models of GDIP management reflecting close DIRDIA supervision of the GDIP, a more autonomous GDIP staff arrangement, and management by ASD (C3I). Any or all of these management methodologies can be made to work successfully. The GDIP contains the budgets of DIA and the service intelligence activities. If the objective is to enhance the role of DIA in managing the macro aspects of defense intelligence, then giving them authority to manage the GDIP via the functional

managers can be an effective way to achieve that goal. It is important, however, to ensure that the DIA share of the budget pie does not become disproportionate to that of the services in the process.

On the transfer of certain S&T centers to DIA: I have no views per se, but caution against a longer term temptation to transfer all service S&T centers to DIA. This is absolutely not desired, since the strength and issues of the service S&T centers are drawn from the concerns, interests and issues raised by the services themselves and tend to be unique to the form of warfare (i.e., naval, air, ground) involved.

#### BIFURCATED CHAIN OF COMMAND

As Director, National Security Agency, you are the head of a Defense Agency and under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. However, as the head of an element of the intelligence community, you are subject to the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence.

*Question.* Has this bifurcated chain of command caused problems for you in fulfilling the functions of the Director of the National Security Agency?

*Answer.* NSCID-6 designated the SECDEF as the Government Executive Agent for the conduct of SIGINT activities and NSA is subject to SECDEF's "authority and control." While the SECDEF may delegate in whole or part, authority over the Director NSA to an office within OSD, as previously stated, ASD(C3I) has only "staff supervision" of NSA. This is because NSA is a "National" agency and produces intelligence beyond strictly the defense requirements. The DCI provides objectives, requirements, and priorities and exercises the budget authorities referenced in E.O. 12333. In addition, E.O. 12333 gives NSA the responsibility to execute the responsibilities of the SECDEF as the executive agent for COMSEC. DCI establishes policies for foreign cryptologic liaison relationships. NSA's third mission is OPSEC training, provided under the authority of National Security Decision Directive 298. In this capacity, NSA "assists" Executive Departments and agencies, specifically including DoD and CIA. Even given this complexity of mission and senior relationships, I have had no untoward chain of command problems associated with being the Director of NSA.

*Question.* Do you believe that a bifurcated chain of command is inappropriate for the National Security Agency?

*Answer.* Given the complexity of NSA's missions, both national and defense, and the relationship that I enjoy with various Executive Branch constituencies, I see no inappropriateness in the current chain of command. It will by definition be complex but comfortably executable, in my personal view.

#### MANAGEMENT OF IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

*Question.* What drawbacks or problems do you believe there are with single discipline intelligence czars with responsibilities that include collection tasking and analysis?

*Answer.* In my personal opinion, there are many benefits and few drawbacks to having a single or focused manager for specific intelligence disciplines such as signals intelligence (SIGINT). NSA

management of the Unified United States SIGINT System (USSS) is viewed as a successful model for such a czar. Under the disciplinary czar concept, only a preliminary phase of analysis is generally conducted. The czar is responsible and accountable to the all-source analyst in National Intelligence Council (NIC), CIA(DI) and DIA, service and theater intelligence organizations and the various scientific and technical intelligence centers which conduct fusion of data from all disciplinary sources and methods. The benefit areas for an intelligence IMINT czar include: imposition of national, theater and tactical level technology and architecture standards and interoperability, single accountability, unified policy, planning and resource focus, enhanced customer support and interaction, maintenance of covert training and education, oversight, and legal standards to name a few. Drawbacks only arise from poor management, customer relations, and the myopia which can arise from the undisciplined focus of the monolith. Accountability and multidisciplinary interaction tend to keep these possibilities from arising.

*Question.* What other imagery management concepts do you believe should be considered?

*Answer.* The alternative to a more centralized and monolithic management concept being proposed is maintenance of some form of decentralized management. Another alternative would be a phased implementation of centralized imagery management to allow the DoD and the intelligence community to realign its diverse and multi-agency imagery resources over time. Under this concept, addressal of imagery lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war would still proceed as a matter of priority.

#### RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The law essentially provides that an active duty military Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is to be independent of the supervision, control, restrictions or prohibitions of the Department of Defense.

*Question.* Will this pose any problems for you in connection with your relationship with the civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense?

*Answer.* I believe that the senior civilians in OSD, and the senior military in JCS, the services and at the CINC level fully understand the obligation of a military DDCI to be independent of defense supervision, control, restrictions or prohibitions as reflected in the National Security Act of 1947. These officials are used to this situation based on previous and frequent relationships and interactions with DCI's and DDCI's, whether military or civilian. If they are unaware, they can be quickly educated.

#### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

*Question.* Do you believe that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should rely on a non-DoD organization for their current intelligence assessments?

*Answer.* I'm not quite sure I understand the intent of this question. The SECDEF and CJCS will currently accept intelligence from any source, DoD or otherwise. These senior defense officials would not be happy relying exclusively on non-DoD organizations

for current intelligence. Past experience has shown that non-DoD organizations are not aware or sensitive to the defense issues and problems. Past experience has also demonstrated that even the most experienced and well supported DoD current intelligence organization has difficulty anticipating or responding to the exceedingly complex range of substantive and threat issues which can arise continuously from the OSD or JCS principals, and their senior staff.

#### DECLASSIFYING THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET

*Question.* What are your views on the advantages and disadvantages of declassifying the aggregate intelligence budget?

*Answer.* The advantage of declassifying the aggregate intelligence budget is that conveys the Nation's appropriate investment in collecting, analyzing and producing intelligence in support of our far-flung global interests. An aggregate set of numbers reside now in the public domain on a speculative basis. The disadvantage is that such disclosure is generally believed to be the first step in overall effort to second and third steps designed to describe intelligence programs in ever increasing detail. This could create unintended security problems on the one hand, and would not necessarily lead, in my personal view, to enhanced public understanding of current intelligence budget rationale/justification. For those in the public who wish to know more about intelligence, there is a qualified or inferential richness of detail already available for study, albeit still somewhat appropriately shrouded so as to protect sources and methods.

#### COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS

You have written that "deep penetration" of the right intelligence targets renders the issue of competitive analysis "somewhat less critical."

*Question.* Can we hope to achieve a level of "deep penetration" over the broad class of intelligence targets and issues that will significantly reduce the importance of competitive analysis?

*Answer.* My personal intelligence philosophy states that the first obligation of all intelligence officers is to achieve deep penetration of targets that count. Deep penetration or penetration to any level is a complex concept which has broadly based implications for management, operations and technology. When significant penetration is achieved, analysis, even in major uncertainty areas, becomes less contentious. Deep penetration is not possible in all requirement areas, although all areas should be continuously assessed for unexplored deep penetration possibilities. The worst intelligence analysis situation is when little or no real target data is available to resolve a customer's implied or explicit intelligence requirement. In this situation, the analyst must resort to utilizing his/her training and target background data to speculate on directions or outcomes. In areas where real intelligence is lacking or conflicting, I personally prefer the following approach:

State the known data and its related credibility; you might also need to express what is specifically not known.

Provide the consumer with a range of estimates built around best case, worst case and nominal case outcomes, providing logical rationales for each case. These cases can be derived from competitive analysis. Careful attention should be paid to avoiding consensus outcomes, since such outcomes occasionally tend to suppress original or unique ideas.

While all the above is going on, continuously press for improved target penetration, particularly if the issue has some near term or significant importance.

*Question.* Do you believe that centralizing intelligence analysis at the national level would increase the dangers that competitive analysis has been intended to avoid?

*Answer.* In my view, intelligence analysis is not being centralized at the national level. Analysis still occurs at the service, theater, and tactical or force level, and is also done within diverse departments and agencies (all representing differing perspectives) at the national level. My experience has been that competitive analysis (or expressions of alternative views of situations based on limited facts) occurs periodically and is most frequently manifest between or among the various agencies which are members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Where these unresolved differences of opinion exist, they are always reflected in the body of the intelligence estimate as an alternative view or a footnote. The DCI is strengthening the estimative process to ensure that diverse views are sought and presented.

*Question.* What are your views on the benefits and drawbacks of retaining a close organizational relationship between intelligence consumers and producers?

*Answer.* As I noted in my testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, we in the intelligence community are obligated to understand the interests and needs of our customers. This implies far more than just receiving their prioritized requirements. It necessitates a full understanding of the roots of the requirement, including how the information is to be put to use. At NSA, despite our reputation for anonymity, we have aggressively sought to move into a fully symbiotic relationship with our customers, particularly via the vehicle of NSA support and liaison elements continuously collocated with major customer sets. The benefits to our customers, to NSA, and most importantly to our national security, have been enormous. I am encouraging this approach throughout the defense intelligence community and would continue to espouse this position as the DDCI. The drawbacks of well managed close relationships are minimal in my view. In particular, the dangers of espousing the customers' desired intelligence outcome is rarely, if ever, a factor in most close contemporary intelligence support situations.

#### INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS

*Question.* You have written that the linkage of the national intelligence community with its customers is not satisfactory at all levels. Would you explain what you meant by this statement?

*Answer.* In the DoD, intelligence and counterintelligence support exists organizationally at virtually every significant level of com-

mand. The interaction between military intelligence personnel and military strategists, plans and policy personnel, and operators is generally continuous and robust, and the average military commander can be a highly discerning and demanding consumer as well as supporter of intelligence. National intelligence support to non-defense U.S. Government departments and agencies is generally less robust than the successful DoD model. It is, therefore, my personal view that a larger number of national intelligence personnel, mostly from CIA, should have tours outside CIA in national agencies. I have discussed this view with Bob Gates, and will explore this option more aggressively if I am confirmed for the DDCI position.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

*Question.* Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and to provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefs and other communications of information from the Intelligence Community staff and from Central Intelligence Agency personnel are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to ensure that information and briefings on current events and activities are provided as requested by this Committee?

Answer. Yes. There may be sensitive information related to sources and methods, particularly details of HUMINT operatives, which will not be shared with the Committee due to security reasons. This would be the only category of disclosure limitation which I could envision.

## APPENDIX B

### NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

[As in executive session, Senate of the United States, February 25, 1992]

*Ordered*, Pursuant to the order of the Senate of February 25, 1992, that the following nomination be referred jointly to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services:

Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and to have the rank of Admiral while so serving.

\_\_\_\_\_, 1992.

Reported by Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,  
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL,  
*Washington, DC, February 26, 1992.*

In reply refer to 00F.

Hon. SAM NUNN,  
*Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President, under the provisions of Section 601, Title 10, United States Code, has submitted to the Senate the nomination of Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of admiral.

Vice Admiral Studeman is presently serving as Director, National Security Agency and Chief, Central Security Service. He will be assigned as Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency. He is 52 years of age.

This action will not cause the Department of the Navy to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of admiral because Title 50, United States Code, Section 403 exempts the incumbent of this position from flag ceilings.

For the information of the Committee, I am enclosing a career resume on Vice Admiral Studeman which includes a summary of his joint duty assignments.

Most respectfully,

R. J. ZLATOPER,  
*Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy.*

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM OLIVER  
STUDEMAN, U.S. NAVY

January 16, 1940—Born in Brownsville, Texas.

April 10, 1962—Enlisted, U.S. Naval Reserve.

October 28, 1962—Reported for active duty.

March 8, 1963—Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve and continued on active duty.

September 8, 1964—Lieutenant (junior grade).

September 1, 1966—Lieutenant.

March 17, 1967—Augmented in the U.S. Navy.

February 1, 1970—Lieutenant Commander.

October 1, 1976—Commander.

October 1, 1981—Captain.

July 1984—Designated Rear Admiral (Lower Half) while serving in billets commensurate with that grade.

October 1, 1985—Rear Admiral (Lower Half).

August 1, 1988—Rear Admiral.

December 1, 1988—Designated Vice Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade. Service continuous to date.

#### ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES

NABTC, NAS Pensacola, FL (DUINS), from March 1963 to July 1963.

Pacific Fleet Operational Intelligence Training Center, NAS Alameda (DUINS), from August 1963 to October 1963.

Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 23, from October 1963 to August 1966.

Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence School (DUINS), from August 1966 to June 1967.

Staff, Amphibious Group ONE, from June 1967 to July 1969.

COMFAIR MED/COMASWFORCE SIXTHFLT (Air Intelligence Off./Operational Intelligence Off.), from July 1969 to July 1972.

Naval War College (DUINS), from August 1972 to July 1973.

Office of CNO (Deputy Head, Collection Operations Management Div.) (OP-009), from July 1973 to December 1974.

Staff, Naval Intelligence Support Center, Washington, DC (Soviet ASW Analysis Team), from December 1974 to July 1975.

Office of CNO (EA to the Director of Naval Intelligence) (OP-009A), from July 1975 to August 1976.

CINCLANTFLT (OIC, CINCLANTFLT FOSIC DET.), from August 1976 to May 1978.

COMSIXTHFLT (Asst. C/S for Intelligence), from June 1978 to July 1980.

National War College (DUINS), from July 1980 to June 1981.

Office of CNO (EA to the Vice CNO) (OP-09X), from June 1981 to June 1982.

CO, Navy Operational Intelligence Center, Washington, DC, from June 1982 to August 1984.

Office of CNO (Director, Long Range Planning Group) (OP-09X), from August 1984 to September 1985.

Office of CNO (Director of Naval Intelligence) (OP-092), from September 1985 to August 1988.

Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, Fort Meade, MD, from August 1988 to date.

#### MEDALS AND AWARDS

Distinguished Service Medal.

Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars in lieu of subsequent awards.

Meritorious Service Medal.

Navy Commendation Medal.

Navy Achievement Medal.

Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star.

Meritorious Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star.

National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star.

Vietnam Service Medal with two Silver Stars.

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.

French Order of National Merit (Commander Rank).

Brazilian Order of Naval Merit.

#### SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

BA, University of the South, Sewanee, TN, 1962.

MS (International Affairs), George Washington University, 1973.

Graduate of Naval War College, 1973.

Graduate of National War College, 1981.

Language Qualification: None of record.

#### PERSONAL DATA

Wife: Gloria Diane Jeans of London, England.

Children: Kimberley Diane Studeman (daughter). Born: June 14, 1965; Michael William Studeman (son). Born: September 10, 1966; Kathryn Suzannue Studeman (daughter). Born: August 31, 1971.

#### SUMMARY OF JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

##### *Assignment, dates, and rank*

\*Office of the CNO (Executive Assistant to Director of Naval Intelligence), from July 1975 to August 1976—LCDR.

\*Commander SIXTH Fleet (Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence), from June 1978 to July 1980—CDR.

\*Office of the CNO (Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations), from June 1981 to June 1982—CDR/CAPT.

\*Director of Naval Intelligence, from September 1985 to August 1988—RDML.

Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, Fort Meade, MD, from August 1988 to date—VADM.

\*Joint Tour Equivalent.

