

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Prehearing Questions
for
General David H. Petraeus
upon his selection to be
the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency**

Responsibilities of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

QUESTION 1: Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) shall serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); collect intelligence through human sources and other appropriate means; correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence; provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States; and perform such other functions related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) may direct.

- A. Has the President indicated the functions he expects you to perform, and goals you should attain, as the D/CIA? If so, what are these?

After the President asked me to serve as CIA Director, we had a very candid discussion of his expectations. The President expects to be provided timely, accurate, and un-biased intelligence assessments, and he also expects the Agency to provide the same to Congress. Obviously, accurate intelligence analyses also require the identification of what the Agency does not know, and the President expects the Agency to be very clear about gaps and uncertainties in assessments. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the President expects that, under my leadership, the Agency will discharge its duties and responsibilities in accordance with our nation's values, laws, and Constitution.

- B. Has the DNI indicated the functions he expects you to perform, and goals you should attain, as D/CIA? If so, what are these?

Although Director Clapper and I have not yet discussed his specific expectations, if confirmed, understanding his expectations will be one of my first priorities. That said, Director Clapper and I have a longstanding relationship that has been built over many years and, during recent conversations, we both agreed that all U.S. intelligence components need to work together as a team to ensure that U.S. intelligence capabilities are effectively fused through the DNI. Indeed, through my work in Iraq, at CENTCOM, and in Afghanistan, I have seen firsthand how important it is for the various intelligence agencies to work together (and with the military) to achieve our shared national-security objectives.

QUESTION 2: In what ways can a D/CIA achieve sufficient independence and distance from political considerations to serve the nation with objective and dispassionate intelligence collection and analysis?

- What is your view of the responsibility of a Director of the CIA to inform senior Administration policy officials or their spokesmen when the available intelligence either does not support or contradicts public statements they may have made?

In my view, the key to maintaining the requisite independence and objectivity is for the Director to ensure that a system is in place at CIA that consistently produces clear, unbiased, timely, and complete intelligence that is responsive to the information needs of the President and other senior officials within the Executive Branch. This effort would include resisting any possible attempts by policymakers to influence the analysis the Agency produces, and remaining vigilant to avoid political influence or other bias at all levels, from individual analysts up to the Director himself. The role of analysts is to work closely with policy makers to inform policy-making. It is not to tailor analysis to support a pre-determined policy choice. Fostering and reinforcing independent thought and alternative analysis within the CIA system helps alleviate such pressures, thereby allowing the Agency to produce objective and dispassionate products to inform senior Administration officials, which in turn serves to promote accuracy in the public statements of those officials and their spokesmen.

QUESTION 3: The National Security Act of 1947 provides, under a section entitled “Supervision,” that the “Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.” What is your understanding of the D/CIA’s responsibilities under this provision and how do you think the DNI should accomplish this supervision?

If confirmed, I intend to fully support the DNI in the execution of his and the CIA’s responsibilities. I will work to ensure openness with the DNI with regard to CIA activities consistent with the policies and procedures he has put in place. I have developed a strong relationship with Director Clapper during his recent assignments in the intelligence community. If confirmed, I expect that we will work together openly and constructively, particularly in regards to accountability and the allocation of funding.

CIA Culture and Lessons Learned

QUESTION 4: No institution in the American government is more of a learning organization than the U.S. military. When American soldiers, Marines, airmen and sailors are not in combat, they are in training, and studying. Even in combat, every engagement is followed by a lessons learned exercise.

- What are the institutions of learning at the CIA?

The formal institutions of learning are CIA University (CIAU) and the Directorate Schools; the informal institutions of learning include applied learning and lessons learned forums.

CIAU was established by DCI Tenet in 2002 “to equip CIA officers with the shared values, commitment to mission, knowledge and excellence in intelligence tradecraft and leadership needed to accomplish extraordinary tasks in service to our nation.”

CIAU’s core schools – the CIA Mission Academy, the CIA Leadership Academy, and the CIA Intelligence Language Institute – offer training that spans the entire Agency and provides opportunities for employees from multiple occupations to learn common principles in a classroom environment.

In addition, there are four Directorate schools that provide training specific to the mission areas of the respective Directorates:

- The Directorate of Intelligence Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis
- The National Clandestine Service Tradecraft Training Division
- The Director for Science and Technology George Methlie School
- The DS Mahoney Center for Support Tradecraft and Leadership

The CIA also has additional elements that focus on applied learning, such as the Center for Studies in Intelligence (CSI), which focuses on the Agency’s history, lessons learned, oral history, and emerging trends. The CIA uses the case study method to identify and distill lessons into training curricula, as well as to improve intelligence tradecraft.

- From what you have observed in working with the CIA, do you believe that the CIA is sufficiently a learning organization? Should it be more so?

Every organization should constantly strive to be a better learning organization, and I suspect that the Agency is no exception. Having said that, the Agency clearly seeks to improve performance by studying past successes — and past failures. For example, new instructors in the DI’s Career Analysts Program (CAP) use case studies to teach analysts the importance of questioning analytic assumptions. The CAP analysts also study the need for due diligence in vetting and validating information.

In the case of the suicide bomber at the base in Khowst, Afghanistan, e.g., the Agency conducted a thorough lessons learned process to identify the key takeaways from the tragedy, and the Agency has implemented a number of the recommendations that came out of that effort. I understand the Agency is conducting a similar review of the recent UBL operation to better understand the critical factors that led to the success of that endeavor.

Finally, CIA develops expertise among its employees by promoting experiential learning. For example, officers may serve on short-fuse “tiger teams” to generate solutions to vexing problems, to participate in an inter-agency task force, to rotate to other parts of the U.S. Government, or to learn about the legislative process by serving as a Congressional Fellow.

- What principles will apply to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of learning mechanisms at the CIA

The fundamental goal of learning at CIA is to prepare employees to excel in meeting mission requirements. Organizational and individual self-assessment, often through lessons learned activities, is a powerful tool in evaluating the success of learning mechanisms at CIA. After-action reviews are done with increasing frequency, and there is a regular training cycle that conveys continuously updated lessons to personnel. Moreover, CIAU and the Directorate schools incorporate such material in their coursework.

When I was the Commander of the U.S. Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, we spent significant time examining the lessons learned coming out of Iraq and applying them to the writing of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. We also reduced the timeframe for incorporating lessons learned into doctrine and training, making the Army a more effective learning organization. These experiences convinced me that lessons learned are powerful tools for helping institutions to adapt and to evolve to meet changing requirements. If confirmed, I

have every intention of using my experiences to further the CIA's culture of learning.

- On the basis of what you now know, do you foresee changing or expanding those mechanisms at the CIA?

The CIA is clearly investing in creating a learning environment that promotes self-assessment and knowledge transfer. If confirmed, I plan on encouraging these efforts, and I will consider expanding this capability once I have had an opportunity to observe – firsthand – the effectiveness of such programs.

QUESTION 5: In your view, what lessons should a new D/CIA draw from:

- The Khowst suicide bombing incident;
- The decade long search for Usama Bin Laden;
- The operation that resulted in his death; and
- The pre-Iraq war intelligence.

A key lesson from the December 2009 terrorist attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman is that CIA officers must always exercise strong security awareness. At the same time, to accomplish their mission, they must engage with potentially dangerous people in situations involving a high degree of ambiguity and risk. Based on what was known at the time, Hummam al-Balawi (who carried out the suicide attack) had to be met. The information he reportedly had was too important to ignore. Having said that, and while recognizing that a certain level of risk is unavoidable, I would also note that the Agency task force that conducted a comprehensive CI and Security review of the Khowst attack identified several key findings designed to mitigate those risks to the greatest possible extent.

- Those findings include the need for robust documentation and communications, a strong CI capability to help challenge existing assumptions, a work force with the training and experience necessary to handle the unique challenges of War Zone operations, careful management of liaison operations, and strong coordination between operational and security elements.
- I understand that improvements in these areas are already being made even as CIA maintains a high operational tempo against terrorist targets.

CIA learned several lessons from the 10-year hunt for Usama Bin Ladin that will assist in its efforts to hunt down other elusive high-value terrorists.

- First and foremost, identifying and locating Bin Ladin's primary facilitator was the key to finding him. Analysts and targeters spent years whittling down the list of Bin Ladin's trusted aides until they were finally able to zero-in on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who was Bin Ladin's caretaker and courier in Abbottabad.
- We were again reminded that history matters and that whoever was protecting Bin Ladin probably had known him for years. This key assumption compelled the Agency to systematically and repeatedly review historical intelligence reporting to develop new leads.
- We must not forget that our foes are adaptable. We could not be wedded to old stereotypes of Bin Ladin hiding in caves and moving frequently under the protection of large Arab security details. As it turned out, Bin Ladin had located in an affluent neighborhood where his profile was almost nonexistent.
- Finally, it is clear that once a trail goes cold – as it did following Bin Ladin's escape from the mountains of Tora Bora, Afghanistan in December 2001 – it is very difficult to reacquire. Difficult, however, must never be seen as impossible. The success in finding Bin Ladin showed that tenacity and ingenuity should never be underrated.

CIA also learned several important lessons in planning the raid that resulted in Bin Ladin's death, and these lessons will be instructive when considering other high-risk intelligence-based operations:

- It is essential to devote sufficient resources to effectively exploit opportunities that arise during the pursuit of high-value targets.
- We must always strive to be clear and explicit in differentiating facts from analysis, identifying intelligence gaps, and articulating risks associated with potential courses of action.
- CIA's Counter Terrorism Center seamlessly integrated different streams of collection to offer policymakers the most complete intelligence picture

available in this operation, highlighting the benefits of close teamwork across CIA and with other agencies.

- Finally, CIA's close work with military partners in planning the raid was vital; the Agency provided tactical and strategic intelligence and analysis to help ensure mission success.

There was no single cause behind the Intelligence Community's failure to accurately characterize the state of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. In fact, uncovering the contributing factors required an intensive, objective, bottom-up review of all relevant raw intelligence as well as NIC and DI-related products. The group identified the following lessons, which apply well beyond the pre-war Iraq WMD intelligence issue. If confirmed, I will ensure that efforts that are already underway to address these issues are continued.

- First, a continuing commitment to searchable records and archives – of raw data as well as finished intelligence products – as well as the development of new tools is key if analysts are to be able to detect shifting analytic lines and confidence levels, extract key insights from large data sets, and glean new insights from large, disparate sets of raw intelligence information.
- Second, increased transparency into the reliability and quality of sources is key in producing more reliable intelligence assessments.
- Third, rigorous tradecraft that underpins strong analysis requires an organizational commitment to continuous learning as well as constant self-awareness and scrutiny.
- And finally, analytic outreach is important if analysts are to challenge their assessments by seeking diverse, nonwestern views and outlooks that can provide different perspectives and help mitigate group think.

QUESTION 6: In your long career and your many foreign deployments to theaters of conflict, you have had many opportunities to observe and work with the CIA. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, your commands have worked very closely with the CIA. In answering these questions about organizational culture, please include observations about command or leadership structure, approaches to dissent, accountability for correcting errors, among other matters that you deem relevant to understanding potential difference between the CIA and the U.S. military.

There are certain core cultural values that characterize the Agency as a whole: excellence, integrity, knowledge, and creativity. Agency employees are also proud, skeptical, critical, and analytical. But foremost among the Agency's core values is dedication to mission and a "can do" spirit that permeates all of the Agency's organizations. Whether it relates to collecting information, producing timely analysis, or conducting covert actions, all Agency employees rightly take pride in their extraordinary responsiveness to the needs of their "customers." It is not in the Agency culture to say "no" to a request for help from a battlefield commander or a national policymaker.

CIA also has organizational cultures within the Directorates – the culture of the NCS is different from the culture of the DI, and both are different from that of the DS&T and the DS. These directorates developed somewhat independently of one another and have distinct characteristics. NCS officers, for example require a distinct set of skills that are understandably different from those required by DI analysts. In addition, there is a distinct difference between the culture of the field – where one-quarter of the Agency's employees reside – and that of Headquarters.

- How would you characterize the difference between the CIA culture and the military culture?

As a general rule, it appears that the Agency is more informal and less rank conscious. Intellectual rigor and experience tend to trump rank, and I appreciate the creativity that can generate. The Agency has a flatter chain of command and tends to give its officers somewhat more discretionary authority, especially in the field, and this often leads to impressive organizational agility. The attrition rate is very low at the Agency and its employees tend to stay on board for 25 years or more.

- Is the CIA culture today well-suited to the challenges CIA faces, and will face under your direction should you be confirmed?

Yes. However, I would also make the following points. I believe there are three key ingredients to creating and maintaining a culture of success at CIA. First, CIA needs to rely upon cross-component and cross-discipline collaboration. I would point to the countless examples where success has come from the integration of operational skill, analysis, technology, and support services. Second, the Agency needs to continue to learn from its past efforts and to share that knowledge with those who can benefit from it. And third, with roughly half of the Agency's

employees hired since 9/11, we must provide new employees with the skills and experience they will need to carry out the Agency's missions in the future. The Agency is its people; we must invest in them and their development.

Central Intelligence Agency: Strengths and Weaknesses

QUESTION 7: A fundamental goal of the CIA is to prevent an adverse "strategic surprise" from threatening the United States.

- In your opinion, what would be the most likely source and nature of a "strategic surprise" to the United States?

I share concerns that the U.S. could face strategic surprise as states hostile to our interests acquire weapons of mass destruction. While this might not be the most likely strategic surprise, it would present the most serious threat to the security of the U.S. and our allies. The examples of Syria's covert reactor and Iran's underground uranium enrichment plant show that countries are willing to pursue secret nuclear programs despite the consequences of their discovery. Identifying leadership decisions to begin such activities is among the hardest of intelligence challenges, and the Agency's goal has to be to discover those illicit efforts as early as possible. The Agency also has to be focused on helping to prevent terrorists from gaining access to these development efforts and to stockpiles of weapons in countries with mature programs.

An unexpected regime change in a region of instability probably is more likely to present a strategic surprise, even if the outcome may not be as dire as undetected nuclear proliferation. Such shifts can be difficult to predict because even the foreign actors themselves often have not carefully planned the course of action they will take as a crisis unfolds. Looking at the ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, intelligence analysts may not be able to predict precisely how and whether another government might fall, but they can identify trends and potential outcomes. And they certainly can track and report indicators of possible change.

- Do you believe that the CIA is properly organized to counter this threat?

My experience has been that intelligence can *minimize* the risk of surprise, but never fully *prevent* it, because there are simply too many unknowns in periods of upheaval. To minimize surprise, the CIA has to constantly revise its analytic

judgments, identify the signposts that portend change, and work with collectors to focus intelligence gathering. My early impression is that the Agency is organized reasonably well to anticipate strategic surprise. On counterproliferation, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and Iran, analysts and operators are co-located, increasing the Agency's effectiveness in analysis and operations. I think that sort of collaboration would be useful on the other issues, as well.

QUESTION 8: What do you believe the role has been and should be for all-source analysis at the CIA?

CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has a fundamental mission to provide objective, all-source analysis to those who make and execute policy, including the President and his national security team. The DI is the U.S. government's only all-source analytic unit that does not reside in a policy department, and it is one of only a handful of analytic units that are all-source (many others focus on a single discipline of intelligence). This role is vital, and I see no reason to change it.

- Based on your prior experience with CIA, what are the strengths and weaknesses of all-source analysis at the CIA?

I have seen firsthand and benefited from the strengths of all-source analysis from the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence is respected throughout the Intelligence Community for its analytic depth and breadth of expertise, the rigor of its analytic tradecraft, and its close ties to the National Clandestine Service, which provides ground truth on key issues and insight into the quality of HUMINT collection. The DI has understandably needed to focus its resources on the highest priority issues (counterterrorism, counterproliferation, China, Iran, the Middle East, etc.), and the Agency is perhaps not as deep on other important but lower priority issues as it should be. As we have seen, threats and opportunities for U.S. National Security interests can emerge across a growing spectrum of countries and issues, and the DI, along with the entire Agency, must be prepared to "cover the globe" like never before.

- If confirmed, how will you address the weaknesses and maintain the strengths of all-source analysis within the CIA?

Based on the initial briefings I have received, the DI – as part of a broader Agency initiative – has a game plan to advance its global coverage mission and address the challenges created by a world where threats and opportunities can emerge from unexpected places. I agree with this effort and, if confirmed, I will work to

strengthen it. For example, I have personally seen the value of getting analysts into the field and developing firsthand knowledge of a country, its people, and its challenges in order to better serve senior U.S. policymakers and warfighters. As Director, I would look to expand these efforts and enhance their value. I also recognize that speed matters in this fast-paced world, and threats and opportunities for U.S. policymakers can and do arise quickly. Although the DI has done well in meeting the demand for quick turnaround products, the pace of world events and the exponential growth in potentially useful data will only increase, and the technologies, systems, and tools we have in place for collecting and exploiting information and producing insightful intelligence today will likely be insufficient tomorrow. At that same time, we will need to take into consideration that we cannot sacrifice quality in our quest for speed. Moreover, we need to continue to ensure that alternative analytic views are being considered and respected, and that procedural measures are maintained to safeguard against politicization and “group-think.”

- How should the analytic workforce of the CIA be developed and deployed?

From my experience over the past decade, it is clear that the DI places high priority on the development of its analytic workforce. The DI maintains robust onboarding and continuing education programs to develop deep substantive expertise, reinforce tradecraft, and boost analytic rigor; enhances both its relevance and working relationships through a system of rotational opportunities across the policy, intelligence, and law enforcement communities; and seeks to expand analytic capabilities and insight through language training and overseas service opportunities. Although the majority of the DI workforce is based in Washington, DC, where it can be close to its primary customers, nearly 10 percent of the DI analytic workforce is now stationed overseas, with many more officers deploying for shorter stints in support of key initiatives. DI officers in the field provide direct support to the State Department, the U.S. military, CIA operators, and U.S. policymakers. I strongly support the DI's overseas presence – as well as its programs for continuing education, language training, and outreach – as an essential part of building the strongest possible analytic cadre.

- What role should the analytic workforce of the CIA have in ensuring there is sufficient attention to long-term strategic intelligence analysis, rather than intelligence analysis on issues of immediate concern, within the IC?

The distinction between long-term strategic intelligence analysis and intelligence analysis on issues of immediate concern is often an artificial one. The analytic

workforce needs to invest in long-term strategic analysis and expertise-building in order to be able to put issues of immediate concern into context for the President and his national security team. Making that investment can be a challenge, particularly in light of the pace of world events and the heavy demand from policymakers for daily intelligence support. The DI has been a leader within the Intelligence Community in making that investment, including providing extensive support for academic training and taking analysts “off-line” to focus on strategic issues and provide stand-back analyses.

QUESTION 9: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA in clandestine operations and the collection of intelligence from human sources respectively?

- How will you address the weaknesses and maintain the strengths with respect to each of these activities?
- How should the conduct of these activities be balanced and prioritized in the future at the CIA?

Every leader coming into a new organization faces the challenge of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of that organization and determining what its priorities should be and what changes, if any, need to be made. I have not been briefed in extensive detail on all CIA clandestine operations, paramilitary activities, and HUMINT and technical collection. If confirmed, I will focus significant attention on such an assessment of the CIA’s mission, capabilities, and activities – and not just on its clandestine operations and HUMINT collection – as well as on determining the appropriate adjustments to the Agency’s priorities. To be sure, I will share my assessments with the Committee.

QUESTION 10: How do you view the responsibilities of the CIA to collect and analyze both tactical intelligence to support military operations in theaters of war and strategic intelligence for policymakers?

- What do you see as the current prioritization and resource allocation for these two efforts, and do you believe them to be appropriate?

Since its establishment under the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA has by mandate both collected and analyzed information relevant to military developments and operations. While the CIA’s charter assigns the Agency primary responsibility for providing strategic intelligence for policymakers, the CIA has for decades increasingly also been supporting military operations in

theaters of war. I believe CIA's primary mission and resources should be dedicated to the organization's core responsibility to provide the best possible strategic intelligence for the nation's most senior policymakers. Having been a combat commander in wartime theaters, I also value the Agency's commitment and ability to apply these same resources in support of our warfighters in harm's way. Moreover, the best strategic assessments often come from a thorough tactical knowledge of the situation in these war zones – which often derives from time spent in these operational theaters and from interaction with our military personnel on the ground. In short, I see these two efforts – support to policymakers and support to the warfighters – as complementary rather than contradictory.

QUESTION 11: What role do you see for the CIA in paramilitary-style covert action?

- How do you distinguish between the appropriate roles of the CIA and the United States Special Forces in paramilitary-style covert action?
- Are there measures that should be taken to improve coordination between the CIA and elements of the DOD, including in operational planning and execution, and in informing chiefs-of-mission and congressional intelligence committees?

I have not yet been briefed in detail on all CIA covert operations, paramilitary activities, and HUMINT collection. That said, as a commander in various theaters I have worked with the CIA and understand the need for cooperation and deconfliction of military and intelligence activities. My personal experience in coordination in the field has been positive. If confirmed – moving from the DOD side to the CIA side of this situation – I would like to think that I can bring a perspective that may improve cooperation even more.

Both U.S. Special Forces and the CIA must remain available resources for the President in executing any paramilitary-style covert action. He must have the flexibility to select that element best suited to the goals of any specific mission. U.S. Special Forces and CIA paramilitary personnel bring capabilities to the table that can differ in small but materially-important ways. Among other issues, factors such as the size of the force, materiel needed for a mission, and availability in light of competing missions would play a role in the selection of the personnel and authorities to use.

QUESTION 12: What is your understanding of the respective roles of the Executive Office of the President and the CIA in the formulation and implementation of covert action programs?

The CIA carries out covert action on behalf of the President. It is the President, his national security staff, or other members of the executive branch that propose ideas for covert action programs that will support the national security objectives of the U.S. CIA then develops a plan for carrying out the program, including the preparation of a draft Presidential Finding or Memorandum of Notification (MON) and supporting paperwork. The CIA then submits that plan to the National Security Staff, after coordination with the ODNI and the Intelligence Community, as appropriate. The proposed Finding or MON is reviewed by the National Security Staff and then sent to the President for approval. Once approved, and after required notification to the two intelligence committees, the President typically will direct the CIA to implement the program. Once implemented, the Agency itself, as well as the NSC and the intelligence committees of Congress, review the conduct of the program on an ongoing basis.

- What actions would you take if directed to undertake covert action activities that you believed to be illegal, ineffective, or not well suited with respect to CIA capabilities and resources?

If confirmed as Director of the CIA, I would refuse to carry out any activity that I believed to be illegal. As outlined above, the CIA has an active role in the development of any covert action program, and I intend to be a strong voice for the CIA in that process. If I assessed that a covert action proposal would be ineffective or otherwise unsuited to the Agency's capabilities, I would recommend against such a program, and, if necessary, raise my concerns directly with the President.

- What principles should govern the apportionment and reconciliation of responsibilities of the CIA in the conduct of covert action under Title 50 and the Department of Defense (DOD) in the conduct of any similar or related activities under Title 10?

The key principles that have guided CIA and DOD in the allocation of responsibilities between covert activities and traditional military activities are: (1) optimizing the accomplishment of U.S. national security objectives through the most effective use of collective CIA and DOD capabilities; (2) ensuring related DOD and CIA activities are well coordinated and designed to advance both the

military and intelligence missions; (3) complying with applicable statutes with respect to authorities and prohibitions; and (4) keeping Congress appropriately notified of these activities, whether undertaken by CIA under Title 50 or by DOD under Title 10. I believe these are appropriate and will be guided by them if I am confirmed as Director.

QUESTION 13: What role do you see for the CIA in the collection of intelligence from human sources within the United States?

- What do you understand to be the legal and policy authority and limitations on this collection and the coordination that is required with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)?

CIA's role is in the collection of *foreign* intelligence from human sources within the United States. Foreign intelligence collected domestically contributes to and enhances the foreign intelligence product. CIA's authority to collect foreign intelligence from within the U.S. is governed by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949, and Executive Order (E.O.) 12333. CIA's interaction and collaboration with U.S. persons in furtherance of CIA's foreign intelligence responsibilities is governed primarily by E.O. 12333 and internal Agency regulations. Pursuant to this authority, the CIA collects information of foreign intelligence interest from non-U.S. persons and cooperating U.S. persons. The CIA also has the authority to collect information of foreign intelligence value pertaining to U.S. persons; however, CIA is not authorized to collect on the purely domestic activities of U.S. persons. The 2005 CIA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding provides the guidelines for coordination, collaboration, and deconfliction between CIA and FBI both here in the United States and abroad.

QUESTION 14: With respect to operational activities, what do you believe are the main issues that the CIA clandestine service addresses, or should address, in working with the personnel of the following entities:

- The FBI (to the extent not answered in response to Question 12);

With respect to working with our partners in the Intelligence Community and with our other partners – be they in local, state, tribal, or federal government I am aware from my DoD experience that the main issues usually involve: (1) deconflicting operations that may involve the same target; (2) coordinating operations so that national requirements are met and duplication of effort is avoided; (3) concerns over sharing information that reveals especially sensitive sources and methods; and

(4) responding to questions concerning the respective legal authorities of the agencies involved. I believe that we are able to effectively deal with these issues in most cases; however, if confirmed, I will work with the DNI to determine where problems exist and work with my counterparts – at the FBI, DOD, and elsewhere – to resolve them expeditiously.

With regard to specific organizations, my understanding is that the CIA and the FBI, under the leadership of Director Robert Mueller, have enhanced their working relationship, both inside the U.S. and abroad. I am aware of historic rivalries and past “turf battles,” but my impression is that there has been improvement in resolving them since 9/11, in particular. I understand that the CIA and FBI have taken specific steps to establish a closer working relationship. For example, FBI agents are now granted slots in the Agency’s training programs, and CIA and FBI analysts work side-by-side to analyze counterterrorism intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center. Although FBI has an intelligence mission, it also, of course, has a law enforcement mission that is ever present. That dual mission should always be kept in mind by CIA/NCS and addressed with FBI when sharing information between the organizations, engaging in joint operations, using a joint asset, and addressing the authorities to be used in any joint operation. To some extent, there are, and should always be, efforts to balance between intelligence interests and equities and law enforcement interests and equities.

- The National Security Division at the Department of Justice;

I understand that CIA has a good relationship with DOJ/NSD, and I respect the need for close cooperation in coordinating law enforcement and intelligence equities.

- Other law enforcement agencies;

At this time, I am not aware of any problems in the working relationship between CIA and other law enforcement agencies, whether they be federal, state, local, or tribal authorities.

- The National Security Agency (NSA);

As a consumer of both SIGINT and HUMINT over the past decade, I have appreciated the solid working relationship between the CIA and NSA.

- Other elements of the DOD?

The fusion of inter-agency intelligence has been a particular focus of mine. I have personally observed the results of effective Title 10 and Title 50 coordination. The relationship between CIA and DoD is strong – particularly due to the personal efforts of Director Panetta and Secretary Gates. I am confident that the relationship between CIA and DoD will only grow stronger.

QUESTION 15: What is your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the accountability system that has been in place at the CIA and what actions, if any, should be taken to both strengthen accountability and ensure fair process at the CIA?

- Explain your responsibilities, if confirmed, in making decisions on recommendations concerning the accountability of officials of the CIA with respect to matters of serious misconduct.

The leader of any organization is responsible for establishing the necessary climate and processes for ensuring appropriate performance and behavior by the organizations' members. I am confident that the CIA has a culture of high standards and the necessary regulatory processes for managing wrongdoing or misconduct. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that these processes are managed efficiently and fairly. Beyond supervising internal processes, if confirmed, I will stand prepared to exercise the authority granted by the National Security Act of 1947 to terminate the employment of a CIA employee or officer should I deem it necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.

- What is your view of the role of the CIA Inspector General and how would you utilize the work of the Office of the IG in managing the operations of the CIA if confirmed?

Throughout my military career, I have relied heavily on the work of Inspectors General to provide objective assessments of the performance of the organizations I have led. If confirmed, I expect to use the CIA's Inspector General similarly, particularly in areas that by their nature warrant assurance and areas that I might deem problematic.

- What is your understanding of the role of accountability boards at the CIA?

It is my understanding that for disciplinary and corrective matters, the D/CIA may convene an accountability board composed of senior CIA officers to conduct

inquiries, weigh facts, and issue recommendations. This is one of several mechanisms at the D/CIA's disposal for strengthening accountability and ensuring that the Agency learns from its failures and successes.

- Please describe your views on informing the CIA workforce about accountability decisions, including the basis for them, and also informing the intelligence committees.

I believe that keeping all of the members of an organization informed is a critical leadership responsibility, particularly on matters that pertain to workforce management. And, I also support keeping the intelligence committees fully informed of significant Agency developments.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 16: An important component of the CIA is the Directorate of Science and Technology.

- What do you believe is the proper role of science and technology (S&T) activities within the CIA?
- If confirmed, how do you intend to improve S&T activities in the CIA and improve recruiting and retention of the best available S&T talent?
- What would be your top priorities for S&T in your first year in office?
- What qualities are most important to you in your top S&T official, the Director for Science and Technology, and what role and priorities would you assign to this S&T leader?
- What is your philosophy of the role of Research and Development (R&D) in the CIA and what are your top priorities with respect to R&D in the CIA?

I have not yet been briefed on the specific activities of the S&T Directorate. However, I know well the benefits of science and technology in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. Moreover, I understand the requirement for recruiting, training, and retaining high quality personnel to employ that technology, to conduct research, and to develop new and innovative products to meet the CIA's unique needs. If confirmed, I would assess the CIA's S&T

activities to determine where it should place its priorities and what resources and talent the Directorate might need.

QUESTION 17: The Committee's Technical Advisory Group (TAG), a volunteer group of nationally recognized national security S&T leaders, plays a key role in advising the Committee on high priority S&T issues every year.

- If confirmed, will you fully support Committee TAG studies and allow the TAG members to have access to the people and information required for their studies upon the Committee's request?

Yes, I recognize the value of the TAG and, if confirmed, I will support their efforts.

Cyber Security and Information Assurance

QUESTION 18: The issues of cyber security and computer operations are of particular concern to the Committee.

I, too, am concerned about cyber security. If confirmed, I will make cyber security a priority. At CIA, we must protect the secrets entrusted to us while ensuring we are collecting, analyzing, and sharing the intelligence required by this nation's network defenders. Moreover, I will work together with other community elements to ensure that we are effectively pursuing the foreign threats to our nation's networks, while also emphasizing world-class protection of our own information and networks.

- What role do you envision for CIA in providing for the cyber security of the nation?

CIA's first role in cyber security is to collect the actionable intelligence this nation requires to better prevent, defend, and mitigate against threats, and, when necessary, to recover from threats and attacks against our nation's networks. I would note that the CIA's effectiveness relies upon excellent teamwork to leverage and support the activities of other Intelligence, Defense, and Homeland Security organizations. Examples of this teamwork abound from our experiences in Iraq and in the fight against Al Qaeda.

- What is your assessment of how effectively CIA and elements of the Department of Defense cooperate with respect to cyber security?

CIA has long had solid working relationships with DoD and other departments and agencies in sharing information assurance concepts and other cyber capabilities. CIA is heavily engaged in efforts to improve this nation's cyber security and cyber-counterintelligence capabilities and capacity, contributing in areas ranging from policy to implementation. Despite ever-growing cooperation, differences of opinion reportedly do arise occasionally, and we will always need to resolve these. During my tenure, if confirmed, I will ensure CIA's cyber security cooperation with DoD and others continues to increase.

- What are your top priorities for cyber security in your first year in office?

As stated previously, if confirmed, I will strive to ensure that CIA is positioned to continue improving protections against cyber threats to our own information and networks. In addition, as one of the CIA's enduring missions, I will focus on CIA's efforts to collect intelligence on foreign cyber threats.

- How should CIA incorporate cyber operations into its core missions?

Cyber and cyber-enabled technologies permeate the globe. Ubiquitous in virtually all aspects of life – communications, social interactions, commerce, government, military – these technologies are transforming the world. Likewise, the business of espionage is also transforming. CIA will continue to blend proven clandestine HUMINT tradecraft with use of state-of-the-art technology to maximize access to the information we seek – taking advantage of opportunities to leverage cyber-enabled technologies to the maximum extent possible. In sum, cyber is woven throughout all that the Agency does.

QUESTION 19: If confirmed, how would you manage, and what priority would you give to addressing the following issues:

- The vulnerability of CIA information systems to harm or espionage by trusted insiders?

A trusted workforce lies at the very heart of our security systems. We thoroughly and thoughtfully vet individuals initially and continuously for access to classified information using robust personnel security screening practices. To support the

continuous evaluation of cleared personnel, CIA uses state-of-the-art technical measures to monitor and audit on-line activities.

The CIA's Insider Threat Detection Program is considered to be the IC's "gold standard" and it continues to evolve. By policy, the Agency ensures all data is protected by default with a tightly managed network, which allows only a restricted class of users to remove data from the classified network. CIA's success stems from a strong partnership between its Office of Security and its Counterintelligence elements to identify and investigate anomalies on CIA's information systems. The Agency must remain alert to opportunities presented through emerging technologies and capabilities and adjust programs accordingly. Unfortunately, there will always be spies among us, and the Agency's goal must be to quickly identify and isolate the trusted insider who is misusing access.

- The vulnerability of CIA information systems to outside penetration;

Any information system connected to the internet is vulnerable to penetration and possible exploitation. Additionally, the inter-connectivity of IC networks, operating at various protection levels, presents another avenue for penetrating and exploiting CIA networks. As with the insider threat issue, CIA has a robust information assurance and Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) program to monitor and investigate incidents but must still remain alert to vulnerabilities presented through emerging technologies and capabilities.

- The readiness of CIA to maintain continuity of operations;

It is my understanding that the CIA has robust procedures and programs in place designed to maintain continuity of operations, including procedures that ensure CIA systems will be available to support the Mission Essential Functions of the Agency during a crisis. Plans and procedures call for strategic deployment of key personnel to alternate locations during a crisis to ensure command and control, and, if confirmed, I will certainly be involved early on in exercises to assure myself that CIA can meet its obligations in a crisis.

- The ability of CIA to adopt advanced information technology efficiently and effectively;

Through creative venues, such as In-Q-Tel, private sector outreach, and partnerships with the interagency and a few key foreign partners, CIA is well-

positioned to identify, adopt, and integrate advanced information technology into the Agency's core capabilities.

- The CIA's recruitment and retention of skilled information technology professionals.

Like all U.S. Government agencies, I am certain CIA has to work hard to hire and retain qualified information technology employees given the competition from private industry. I am also certain, though, that CIA is a very attractive employer and competes very well, and, if confirmed, I will certainly work to ensure it remains so.

Information Sharing

QUESTION 20: The sharing of intelligence information has been a topic of considerable concern for many years.

- What is your general assessment as to how well the Intelligence Community is sharing information?

I have seen firsthand over the past decade the strides that the Intelligence Community has made in increasing both the amount of information that is shared and the number of consumers having access to the information. In fact, I believe information sharing by the IC is at an all time high. The DNI has made information sharing a top priority and has made great progress in implementing processes and procedures to ensure that information is shared with those who need it to accomplish their missions. Those of us in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen the results on the battlefield, where intelligence that was shared with the military and our coalition partners enabled successful targeting of top Al-Qaida and Taliban leaders. I understand that the IC is also beginning to extend its sharing efforts by reaching out beyond the Intelligence Community to State, Local, Tribal, and private sector partners, as appropriate.

But as the imperative for information sharing continues and as the IC works to securely automate need to know and need to share principles, the IT infrastructure challenges become increasingly complex. This is particularly true for the most sensitive intelligence, where the value to national security is the greatest. The IC has made great strides in information sharing, but it still has challenges to overcome.

- Is the Intelligence Community striking the right balance between “need to know” and “need to share?”

I believe the IC is closer to achieving the right balance between need to know and need to share than it has ever been. The DNI has been clear in his guidance to all 16 elements of the Intelligence Community on the need to strike this balance. The right balance is not a fixed formula, but one that requires constant consideration of the relationship between the sensitivity of the data and national security needs. What may be the right balance today may not be the right balance tomorrow. Wikileaks highlighted the risks of the delicate balance between sharing and protecting information. But it can be done, and the most impressive example of achieving this balance was the successful targeting of UBL.

- If confirmed how will you achieve and maintain the right balance between “need to know” and “need to share” for CIA data?

I have not been briefed in detail on CIA’s specific efforts to achieve this balance. As I previously mentioned, however, that balance is critical. To CIA’s credit, I understand that the Agency is an IC leader in the development of technology, tools, and practices that help to continuously balance the risks to sources and methods while sharing more information. If confirmed, I will examine resources, capabilities, policies, and risks associated with this issue. I will continue to push for the development of technology to enable secure and responsible information sharing. I will review current policies and implementation of those policies and identify gaps or issues preventing CIA from striking that balance. I will work to better understand the needs of our consumers, while ensuring due diligence to protection of sources and methods.

- If confirmed, how will you improve CIA’s progress in making all information collected and all analysis produced by CIA available for discovery by automated means by authorized IC personnel, as directed in Intelligence Community Directive 501.

I have not yet been fully briefed on CIA's progress in this area, but I know firsthand the value of CIA's information to decision makers and war fighters. If confirmed, I am committed to making available for secure discovery and sharing as much of the information collected and analysis produced by CIA as is possible, while ensuring sources and methods are protected from compromise. I understand

that CIA has made excellent progress in meeting requirements for discovery and access for the phased implementation of ICD 501. Nonetheless, automation presents complex challenges, especially for discovery and access to the Nation's most sensitive intelligence. Working on behalf of the DNI, CIA has been a leader in developing solutions to move to the next phase of ICD 501 implementation, and if confirmed I will continue to strongly support those efforts.

QUESTION 21: To what degree and in what circumstances should operational details concerning CIA sources or methods be disseminated to individuals in the Intelligence Community outside the National Clandestine Service?

- Under what conditions should Intelligence Community analysts with valid clearances and a need-to-know not have access to pertinent information contained in operational cables?

The NCS has moral, operational, and legal obligations to protect its human intelligence sources and, simultaneously, to provide its consumers with the fullest context for the intelligence it provides them. When the operational details of the intelligence have real analytic value, such as for assessing the credibility of the information being reported, these details should be made available to the analysts – with appropriate safeguards. How this is handled should depend on the sensitivity of the operational information at issue.

HUMINT in the Intelligence Community

QUESTION 22: What do you understand to be the responsibilities of the Director of the CIA as national HUMINT manager?

- What is your view of the strengths and weaknesses of the elements of the Intelligence Community other than the CIA to collect the HUMINT necessary to protect national security?

Over the past ten years, I have been a consumer of much HUMINT-derived intelligence, including that coming from agencies other than the CIA. If confirmed as Director of CIA, I will work as National HUMINT Manager to capitalize on the strengths of all the HUMINT mission partners to ensure the most effective and efficient combination of capabilities necessary to protect our national security.

- Is it appropriate for the Director of the CIA to continue to be the National HUMINT manager?

Yes. CIA has a historic and ongoing role as the center of HUMINT collection in the IC. Its resources are vast and its capabilities unparalleled. Leveraging this expertise, CIA has long been the IC's leader in training on HUMINT collection. For these reasons, it is the obvious and correct agency to act as the IC's HUMINT Community manager.

- In your view, does the National HUMINT manager have the authorities necessary to set and enforce national standards for all HUMINT training and operations, including those of the FBI and DOD?

The National HUMINT manager does, in my view, have sufficient authority to set and enforce national standards for HUMINT training and operations. Standards have been established and promulgated as National HUMINT Manager Directives (NHMDs) for the following areas: training, requirements and intelligence report format, source validation, technical operations, and operational coordination. Additional standards under some of these categories continue to be developed and issued as annexes to the basic NHMDs. All standards are developed collaboratively, via a broad spectrum of stakeholders from across the community, and approved by the HUMINT Enterprise Board of Directors and Board of Governors. There is a comprehensive training validation program for assessing training standards. Performance metrics for other areas are under development.

QUESTION 23: What do you consider to be the appropriate division of responsibilities for HUMINT between the CIA and the various components of the Department of Defense? Please explain specifically for the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Special Operations Command, and the Military Departments.

While CIA's HUMINT collection produces wide-ranging intelligence consumed throughout the government, it does not meet all of the Defense Department's requirements. DIA and each of the military services have specialized intelligence elements that are responsible for collecting against their own requirements. I believe this historic division of labor is appropriate. However, as I understand it, DOD HUMINT elements operate under the national-level requirements that are coordinated by CIA. EO 12333 gives the DNI the charter to establish procedures for the deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization of IC activities with "activities that involve foreign intelligence and security services, or activities that involve the use of clandestine methods, conducted by other United States

Government departments, agencies, and establishments.” The National HUMINT Manager has the responsibility to develop, promulgate, and oversee implementation of these procedures, pursuant to delegation from the DNI.

Relationship to Congress

QUESTION 24: Explain your understanding of the obligations of the D/CIA under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947.

I believe that it’s important to state at the outset that the statutory language is only one facet of the relationship between the D/CIA and Congress. I would like to emphasize that if confirmed, I will seek to continue the good relationship that Director Panetta and the CIA have built with this Committee, and Congress as a whole, through briefings, notifications, hearings, reports, and informal discussions.

It is my understanding that the statute provides for the following: As the “head of an . . . agency . . . of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities,” the D/CIA, pursuant to section 502, keep the two intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of the Agency’s activities – other than covert action – including any “significant anticipated activities” and any “significant intelligence failure.” The Director is obligated, by law, to inform the committees before CIA undertakes significant activities and to report significant developments. Section 502 also directs that notice to the two committees shall be in a manner consistent with the protection of sources and methods. This language does not provide blanket authority to the D/CIA to withhold notice from the committees. Rather, I understand this language as providing the D/CIA with some level of latitude, regarding the timing and manner in which CIA provides notice. Section 502’s language allows for D/CIA to make necessary accommodations with the committees so that they may perform appropriate oversight, while protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods and while respecting applicable executive branch privileges. Section 502 also requires the Director to provide any information or material in his custody or control, including the legal basis for the activity, that the committees request in order to carry out their responsibilities. The “sources and methods” provision also serves as a condition on this obligation.

Section 503 requires that the Director keep the two intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of all covert action in which the CIA is involved, including any “significant failures.” The obligation to provide the committees with initial notice of a covert action program (by means of a Finding), and with

subsequent notice of a significant change or a significant undertaking (by means of a Memorandum of Notification), rests with the President rather than with the Director. Section 503 also requires the Director to furnish any information or material in his custody or control, to include the legal basis that the committees request to carry out their oversight responsibilities. The “sources and methods” provision also serves as a condition on both of the obligations in Section 503.

- Under what circumstances do you believe notification may be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees?

The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010 allows the CIA, in extraordinary circumstances, to withhold notice to the full committees or delay notice until the particular sensitivity passes. This limited notification process should, however, be the exception, not the rule. There are very limited circumstances in which I could foresee having to confine disclosure, for example, if wider dissemination could put lives at risk or compromise the success of a specific operation. The President can also make such determinations. However, in these cases, I would reach out to the leaders of the two committees and attempt to reach agreement on how the information at issue would be shared with their respective committees.

- In those circumstances, what is the obligation of the D/CIA to notify subsequently the full membership of the committees as expeditiously as possible?

As stated in the latest amendments to the statute, any limited notification requires reconsideration not later than 180 days from the date of the original limited notification. The statutory changes recognize that the President may continue to restrict broader dissemination of the information at issue where extraordinary circumstances affect vital interests of the United States.

- Please describe your understanding of the obligation to provide to the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities or covert actions, including their legal basis, which is requested by either of the intelligence committees.

I view this obligation as further refinement of the general obligation in the National Security Act prior to the amendments. The CIA, as with other intelligence agencies, must balance the need to satisfy the legitimate needs of oversight bodies, to include Congress, with the need to carry out its mission effectively and preserve

sensitive Executive branch equities. This language serves as the common reference point for arriving at an accommodation that enables the committees to perform appropriate oversight functions effectively, while protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods and respecting applicable Executive branch interests and privileges. As I stated above, I believe that the statutory language is but one element of the overall relationship, and if confirmed I look forward to building on Director Panetta's commitment, transparency, and cooperation.

Treatment of U.S. Person Information

QUESTION 25: What principles, in your view, should govern rules pertaining to the collection and retention of U.S. person information by U.S. intelligence agencies?

I strongly agree with the obligation set forth in Executive Order 12333 that, “[t]he United States Government has a solemn obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by federal law.”

CIA must adhere to the Constitution and statutes of the United States. Specifically, the CIA must be vigilant in its protection of the civil liberties and privacy interests of U.S. persons, wherever they are located. To ensure this, the CIA must maintain strict accountability standards for all CIA officers.

- Are there any special rules or exceptions necessary for the collection and retention of U.S. person information by the CIA? Please explain.

It is my understanding that Executive Order 12333 authorizes elements of the Intelligence Community to collect, retain, and disseminate U.S. person information only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency and approved by the Attorney General. CIA regulations specify not only the kinds of information that CIA may lawfully seek to obtain on U.S. persons, but also what may be retained and disseminated outside the Agency.

Detention, Interrogation, and Rendition Issues

QUESTION 26: In answering the following, please include your understanding of the obligations of the United States under U.S. law and international law, as applied to the Intelligence Community, with respect to the detention and interrogation of detainees and also with respect to access to them by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- What principles should govern the detention, interrogation, and rendition practices and policies of the Intelligence Community, and in particular the CIA?

Detention, interrogation, and rendition practices and policies of the Intelligence Community are governed by several entities. These policies and practices must fully comply with the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and with the policy set by the President. Regarding the latter, the President's January 22, 2009, Executive Order directs all U.S. agencies to use Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the minimum baseline for the treatment and interrogation of persons detained in any armed conflict. The Executive Order also states that agencies must notify the International Committee of the Red Cross of such detainees and provide the Red Cross access to them, and that interrogations must comply with the standards of the Army Field Manual. With respect to renditions, the Intelligence Community must comply with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, including obligations under Article 3, which prohibits rendition to a country where it is more likely than not he will be subjected to torture.

- Should there be uniform rules for military and intelligence interrogations? If not, what differences do you believe would be justified? To the extent that any difference may be justified, what fundamental requirements should be constant?

The Executive Order 13491 Task Force's 2009 final report to the President made clear that CIA did not seek interrogation techniques beyond those in the Army Field Manual – the same set of rules used by U.S. military debriefers (and given the force of law by Congress). CIA stands by that representation and does not currently seek techniques beyond those currently used by the U.S. military. CIA also notes that the interagency High-Value Interrogation Group (HIG), which was created pursuant to the Task Force's recommendation, is currently conducting additional research into the science of interrogation in order to potentially develop new and more effective lawful interrogation practices, approaches, and strategies. If the HIG's research identifies and/or proposes techniques not covered by the

Army Field Manual, but that are otherwise consistent with U.S. law, CIA, in coordination with other HIG participants, would consider them and, at that time, would evaluate and discuss with legal authorities and Congressional leaders whether a variance from the Army Field Manual would be appropriate.

- What is the appropriate use, if any, of contractors within the Intelligence Community in the interrogation of detainees?

I believe the debriefing of detainees should be conducted under clear guidance, close supervision, and strict accountability. There should always be a clear chain of government responsibility. Most optimally, interrogations would be conducted by a cadre of very skilled, government intelligence officers. But in the rare case that a specific expertise is required, such as a special language or dialect, use of a contractor may be warranted. However, this should be an extremely rare exception to the rule.

Law Enforcement Proviso

QUESTION 27: The National Security Act of 1947 (Section 104A (d)(1)) states that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency “shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.”

- Explain your understanding of this proviso, including the manner in which it governs the allocation of responsibilities between the FBI and the CIA.

I understand this language was originally included in the National Security Act of 1947 in large part to ensure that CIA did not, either intentionally or inadvertently over time, come to use its extraordinary authorities and capabilities for internal security or law enforcement purposes. I believe the principle underlying this proviso – that CIA should maintain its focus on foreign intelligence matters – remains as valid today as it was in 1947.

The proviso means that CIA cannot itself exercise police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. CIA cannot execute arrests, seize or collect evidence for law enforcement purposes, or conduct general law enforcement activities in the United States.

However, the proviso does not preclude CIA and law enforcement authorities from sharing information of common interest or concern; nor does it prevent CIA from

providing other types of appropriate assistance to law enforcement, including technical assistance and expertise. This collaboration has proved invaluable, particularly in counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters.

The proviso also does not, as I understand it, prohibit CIA from taking appropriate security steps to protect its employees and facilities. As the Committee is aware, in cases where CIA acquires information indicating that a violation of federal law has occurred or may occur, CIA is required to provide that information to the Department of Justice.

Management of the CIA

QUESTION 28: Please describe in detail how you intend to fill key positions in the Office of the Director, and elsewhere within the CIA, in order to ensure that those individuals who are part of your management team have significant and appropriate intelligence experience.

I believe that getting the right people into the critical leadership positions of an organization is vital to that organization's success. These individuals must be consummate professionals with the right expertise and experience for the job. I believe CIA has a solid and effective management team right now. Indeed, the heads of the Agency's four main directorates are all career intelligence professionals. And if confirmed, I intend to ask them all to remain at their current post for the time being.

QUESTION 29: Drawing on your most recent command experiences, please describe in detail your management philosophy and how you envision it might need to be modified, if at all, in leading a civilian organization such as the CIA.

My management philosophy is to determine the proper strategic vision – the big ideas that guide our work – and to communicate that vision frequently and consistently throughout the organization; to work as a team to implement that vision; and most importantly, to continuously refine the vision based on lessons learned and best practices. My career leading military personnel and defense civilians shaped this philosophy, and I anticipate that it will also be a useful approach at the Agency.

If confirmed, I anticipate focusing primarily on the broader vision and goals for the Agency, while remaining up to date on any significant operations or analyses that

we have in train, especially operations involving serious risk or analysis of key issues that are expected to be contentious. The Deputy Director, other senior leaders, and I will collaborate on significant decisions affecting the Agency.

QUESTION 30: Sexual harassment in the workplace remains an issue of concern in both government and private sector organizations. In the past, there have been allegations that sexual harassment at the CIA has been overlooked and ignored, including in decisions regarding appointments to high-level management positions.

- How do you believe the handling of sexual harassment cases affects the morale and mission performance of an organization?

The immediate and effective handling of all cases of discrimination and harassment, including sexual harassment, is essential for the morale and mission of any organization. Moreover, a diverse workforce is a critical enabler for the Agency and is an increasingly important factor in future success. The nature of the Agency's mission and the way we must conduct our business if we are to be effective require that each employee be able to develop and exercise his or her strengths to the fullest. Demeaning words and acts inhibit people from contributing freely and affect us all.

- How will you address sexual harassment cases within the CIA should you be confirmed?

The Agency has to embody and reflect the highest values of our Nation. Thus, the CIA must have zero tolerance for harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, genetic information, sexual orientation, or status as a parent. To that end, if confirmed, I will reinforce the Agency's policy of Zero Tolerance for Harassment and Discrimination and accompanying Agency regulations.

If confirmed as Director of the CIA, I intend to hold managers at every level accountable for the working environment in the units they lead. Every Agency employee – supervisor and non-supervisor alike – has a shared responsibility to ensure that the CIA is an equitable, harassment-free place in which to serve, grow, and excel.

Professional Experience

QUESTION 31: For each of the following, please specifically describe how your experiences will enable you to serve effectively as the Director of the CIA:

As the Commander of International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, I command both operational and tactical intelligence assets, coordinate closely with Agency personnel on day-to-day operations, review daily military and Agency intelligence reports, and develop comprehensive campaign plans to integrate all assets with other instruments of national power. As a result of this experience, I have become familiar with the primary threats facing our nation – particularly from transnational terrorists – and with the Agency’s capabilities. Additionally, I have had numerous opportunities to work with Director Panetta and Director Clapper, and I meet routinely with Agency personnel in Kabul to synch our operations. I have also participated in the review of National Intelligence Estimates, and I have seen the importance of timely and accurate intelligence assessments for the civilian and military leadership.

- Commander, U.S. Central Command;

As Commander U.S. Central Command, I was responsible for an area of operations that comprised 20 nations. My responsibilities included overseeing a variety of efforts, promoting bilateral and multilateral relationships, responding to crises, deterring state and non-state aggression, and overseeing the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to carry out these duties, I developed a strong relationship with Director Panetta and the Agency personnel whose insight was critical to understanding the region. Specifically, as a member of the Counterterrorism Board of Directors, Director Panetta and I – and other leaders – met quarterly to discuss ongoing initiatives, coordination opportunities, and ways to refine intelligence collection.

- Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq;

As Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq, I had similar responsibilities to my current position, and, as such, commanded operational and tactical intelligence assets. Additionally, I engaged firsthand with myriad intelligence personnel, and intelligence reports significantly shaped many of the important decisions that I had to make in Iraq.

One of the critical lessons I learned about intelligence while in Iraq was the importance of considering different analyses from different intelligence agencies.

When the National Intelligence Council was conducting its National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in the summer of 2007, I invited intelligence leaders to come see the conditions on the ground firsthand and to meet with the MNF-I intelligence officials. Although each agency retained its independence, this coordination and competitive analysis sharpened the products of all members of the intelligence community and led to the best possible input for the President and for the Congress.

- U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth;

As Commander, U.S. Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, I was charged with the overall integration of substantial parts of the U.S. Army's doctrine, training, organization, leader development, and other systems so that the Army could confront current challenges while preparing for the future. This experience helped me see how ideas drive organizations and how important education and training systems are for long-term effectiveness.

For example, when I was Commander of the Combined Arms Center, my Marine Corps counterpart (General Jim Mattis) and I worked together on examining the principles of counterinsurgency and codifying them in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. This was significant, not just because of the manual itself, but because of the wide discussion and debate that accompanied that effort, and because of the way in which the counterinsurgency concepts changed the way that the Army, the Marine Corps, and, to some extent, all of government operated.

Also at Fort Leavenworth, I contributed to the Army's system of doctrine, training, education, leader development, and other functions that are essential to preparing Army leaders for the future. We called the overall group of organizations we oversaw the "Engine of Change," and it was critical in the Army's preparation of its leaders and units to confront the challenges that they were to face in the future. We also developed the Army's leadership manual and the field manual that now has the force of law on the conduct of interrogations of detainees.

- Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq;

As Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, I was charged with developing the organization responsible for building the Iraqi Army and Police force under extremely difficult circumstances. This experience was particularly helpful since I

learned a great detail about recruiting, training, and equipping foreign forces, and about building the infrastructure and institutions that support those forces. If confirmed, I anticipate that my experience at MNSTC-I will help me examine Agency programs that support host nation forces, as well as the science and technology programs that make CIA the effective, cutting-edge organization it is today.

- Deputy Commander of JIATF Justice Assured and the U.S. Joint Counter-Terrorism Task Force-Bosnia.

As the Deputy Commander of JIATF Justice Assured and the U.S. Joint Counter-Terrorism Task Force-Bosnia, I was tasked to oversee operations intended to bring persons indicted for war crimes to justice, and, after September 11, 2001, to target affiliates of al Qa'ida and other extremists operating in Bosnia.

Given the scope of the mission, I learned the importance of working with a variety of partners to achieve a common purpose. Specifically, the mission required us to integrate a number of diverse agencies from the Defense Department, the intelligence community, the State Department, special operations forces, conventional units, the FBI, and other law-enforcement agencies, as well as elements from other nations. Additionally, immediately after September 11, policies, laws, and procedures had not been fully developed for confronting the different security challenges, so we worked very carefully within the existing laws and policies while identifying areas that needed to be improved or where we needed additional guidance or authorities.