

104

THE DAYTON ACCORDS

Y 4. IN 8/19: S. HRG. 104-690

The Dayton Accords, S. Hrg. 104-690...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE DAYTON ACCORDS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1996

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence



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THE DAYTON ACCORDS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1996

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen Specter (Chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Specter, DeWine, Kerrey of Nebraska, and Robb.

Also present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub, Minority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk.

Chairman SPECTER. The hour of 9:32 a.m. having arrived, we will proceed with the Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, and before proceeding to the subject matter of today's hearing, I think it appropriate to take a few moments to express our sympathy and regrets of all the Senators, and of all the Congress, for that matter, to the recent tragic death of Ms. Judith Goldenberg. Just 2 weeks ago Ms. Goldenberg traveled to Cairo on an official tour of duty for the Defense Intelligence Agency, where on July 12, 1996, just 12 days short of her 26th anniversary with DIA, she was brutally murdered in the lobby of her hotel in what has been described as a random act of violence. We express sympathies to Ms. Goldenberg's mother, brother, and to Director of DIA, General Pat Hughes and all of her friends and colleagues at DIA, with the acknowledgment that our prayers and thoughts and deepest sympathy are with everyone at the terrible murder of Ms. Goldenberg.

Our hearing today is on the implementation of the Dayton peace accords, and this hearing has been scheduled at the special suggestion of our distinguished Vice Chairman. That is not to say that he doesn't suggest many of our hearings, but he had made a special point of this one, and the committee thinks it is an excellent idea, as an important matter on the cutting edge where an evaluation of the success of intelligence may be instrumental in making the Dayton Accords themselves a success, and at this point, on July 24, where we have pending dates coming up, we may be able to focus on some areas to assist in the future planning of the United States, United Nations.

We have the September elections right around the corner, a real question as to what will occur there. With a bright spot, with the apparent withdrawal of Dr. Karadzic as president, a matter negotiated recently by Ambassador Holbrooke. The ultimate outcome remains to be seen.

We have the issue of United States withdrawal from the peace-keeping forces there. We note that this past weekend, the Vice President said that the timetable would be honored. We have noted a somewhat different statement by Secretary of Defense Perry on an assessment that the United States should stay. We don't want to be too definitive about any difference of opinion there, but those statements have been made with apparent different views.

We have the War Crimes Tribunal moving into a very critical stage. The success of the War Crimes Tribunal may well be judged largely by what happens with the leadership of Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic. They are the two top leaders who have been indicted. Our committee has been active in trying to assist the War Crimes Tribunal. I have made two personal trips there, and the full committee, the Vice Chairman as well as I, have been involved in that matter. Those indictments are outstanding and they ought to be brought to justice. And it is not an easy matter, with the U.S. position or the Dayton Accords position being that they will be taken into custody if the U.N. forces observe them or run into them so to speak, but an active effort will not be made to seek them out and take them into custody.

My own personal view is that they ought to be taken into custody by the requisite force necessary. This is something we face every day in domestic law enforcement. When I was district attorney we had a suspect and knew where he was, police were dispatched. If there had to be a siege or whatever had to be done, that was accomplished. I am not unaware that it is different in Bosnia, and it might impact on the implementation of other facets of the Dayton Accords and it might lead to military conflict. But in my personal view, to repeat, if the Dayton Accords are to have real meaning and the War Crimes Tribunal is to have real meaning, I think that is an indispensable thing to be done, at least at some stage.

We have the issues of economic development, of infrastructure, the educational system, we have the issue of the Islamization of Bosnia, the impact of Iran there, what the lingering aftermaths are there on the sale of Iranian arms to Bosnia, a subject which this committee has looked into and is close to publishing a final view on. Although it has been very difficult, candidly, to get all the pieces in place to finish our inquiry there.

But those are all very important subjects which we are going to have to look to, and we think that, as I say, the Vice Chairman's initiative, that this hearing may well shed some important light on that subject, and give us some guidance, nationally and internationally, as what to do in the future.

I am going to have to absent myself for a few minutes to make a quorum on the Veterans Affairs Committee, which convenes a little after 10 o'clock, because we didn't have a quorum last week and some bills didn't get passed out. This is part of a Senator's responsibility to be twins or triplets or more.

I now yield to my distinguished colleague, Senator Kerrey.

STATEMENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN KERREY

Vice Chairman KERREY. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I look forward to both panels, and I appreciate very much your willingness to schedule this hearing.

Many Americans, including thousands of American soldiers and many professionals in the Intelligence Community, are taking significant risks to fulfill America's NATO obligations in Bosnia, so I think it is appropriate to present a public intelligence estimate on the success of that effort to date, and to especially lay before the public the contribution that intelligence has played both in our capacity to get an agreement at Dayton and our ability to implement the terms and conditions of Dayton as well, and our capacity to evaluate where we are and where we might go from this particular moment.

Our focus has understandably been deflected very often from Bosnia to other topics in recent months. It is very difficult for that not to happen. But our policymakers are facing very important and major decisions about Bosnia in the months ahead, and hopefully this hearing and those of other committees will refocus public and governmental attention on Bosnia.

The international effort to bring peace to Bosnia reminds me—it is a difficult metaphor, I appreciate—but it reminds me of a stroke victim who has become a hemiplegic. One side of the body, the military effort, is very strong and very successful. But the other side, the civil effort—the civilian effort to shore up Bosnian political and economic institutions, appears still shaky and weak.

There are a number of reasons for this to occur, for this imbalance to exist. The most important is that the U.S. military knows how to plan, and it applies the resources which it knows are necessary to ensure success. The military also knows how to task intelligence, a skill which I wish they would teach their civilian colleagues in the Government. And I mean that quite seriously. I think it needs to occur.

Last, it seems to me, in a military organization, it is very difficult to shirk responsibility. I have asked General Hughes on a number of occasions, do you feel you have the responsibility for X or Y or Z, and if you feel you have the responsibility, you say so, and you'll understand that the consequences of accepting the responsibility are that if the mission fails, you're the one that's going to take the credit for the failure. If successful, you'll take credit for the success as well.

Often times on the civilian side, there is not that kind of sense of responsibility, and you see it on tasks where somebody will say, well, no, that's not my job, that's so-and-so's job down at the office, no, that's so-and-so, and the next thing you know, nobody is in charge, nobody really has to worry about whether or not this thing is going to be successful in a similar fashion to that, General Hughes, you and other people who accept responsibility for various aspects of the mission.

I believe that good intelligence can make the difference in any activity, and I know it is paying off in force protection for IFOR troops, and I believe strongly that we need to extend its benefits to the civilian side of the Bosnian effort, because it is increasingly clear to me that peace will be achieved or lost due to the efforts of the civilian institutions.

The pride with which our soldiers will wear their IFOR campaign ribbons in future years may well hinge on how well a European civilian, Carl Bildt, does his job. That is why in my mind it is so im-

portant to publicly examine our effort in Bosnia, to examine the connection between intelligence and success, especially of the military effort, and to examine if there is anything that needs to be done to bring that capability to the civilian side so as to increase the possibility of success there as well.

Mr. Chairman, I join with you in your earlier acknowledgement of the service to our country of Judith Goldenberg. Her death in Cairo once again illustrates the risks that quiet, patriotic public servants who are outside the spotlight endure every single day of their service. I know General Hughes, you feel that very deeply. I visited—I have had occasion to visit many of these employees in the field and we all, as the Chairman said, we all share in that—in the suffering in the family, and we all praise and appreciate the terrific service and heroism of this great public servant.

Anyway, with that I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses and the panel.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey.

We begin today with the distinguished Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes.

General Hughes has an extraordinary record, beginning with his graduation from Montana State University in 1968, and his becoming a 2nd Lieutenant. In June of that year, his service as a platoon leader in the Vietnam War. A rise through command, with educational advancements, with a masters degree in business management from Central Michigan University, and a long list of major awards and decorations. He has been of great assistance to this committee with his very candid presentation, which is somewhat unusual, but very much appreciated.

General Hughes, we turn to you with the start.

If I may say first, General, I should have, the full statement will be made part of the record. I note the very excellent statements that have been submitted by the second panel as well as the first panel. We will ask you to summarize within the 5-minute limit so that we can devote the maximum amount of time to question and answer. We also have votes which are scheduled at 11 o'clock, which is not unusual these days in the Senate, which puts a very tight time constraint on our hearing.

So with that, we won't charge you with any of the previous time, General.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK M. HUGHES, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General HUGHES. Thank you.

On behalf of the Goldenberg family, and also on behalf of all the members of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I want to thank you for remembering Judith Goldenberg, and for your expression of sympathy. I really appreciate it. Thank you very much.

I am pleased to present the military intelligence perspective on developments in Bosnia and the challenges that face military intelligence in that region. In my testimony before this committee in February, I stated that the situation in Bosnia was likely to become more complex as the implementation of the Dayton Accords moved from the military phase into the civil phase. This has indeed occurred with economic revitalization, freedom of movement, refu-

gee repatriation, the handling of indicted war criminals and elections taking center stage.

The NATO Implementation Force, IFOR, has been a success. Through its execution of the military aspects of the Dayton Accord, IFOR is helping to establish viable conditions for the further implementation of the Accord. The former warring factions have generally complied with the cease-fire provisions and other elements of the settlement. Indeed, no significant military activity has been conducted by any of the parties since IFOR's arrival in December 1995.

The implementation of the military provisions of the Accord, along with IFOR's presence, have effectively rendered the forces of the former warring factions incapable of conducting significant military operations without considerable lead time.

Essentially, IFOR has overseen the withdrawal of Bosnian Federation and Bosnian Serb forces along the Zone of Separation, and the demobilization of those forces to nearly half of their wartime strength.

All former warring faction air defense radars have been shut down. There has been no significant air activity. Most prisoners of war have been released, although some do remain held by the warring factions.

IFOR has overseen the movement of forces and heavy weapons into designated cantonment areas.

There is some resistance, including attempts to hide weapons and other equipment. When faced, however, with determined IFOR resolve, the former warring factions have complied. However, compliance has become more selective, and foot dragging by the former warring factions has become more pronounced. This has required constant vigilance and a firm hand by IFOR.

The main hazards facing IFOR remain: land mines, accidents, random acts of violence, and the threat of terrorism. The force must also guard against attacks by indirect fire weapons such as mortars. Such attacks remain a possibility.

Since I last testified before this committee, the threat environment for IFOR has increased slightly, primarily due to the steps taken to implement the civil aspects of the Dayton Accord. Pressure to remove indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic from power has succeeded in securing his resignation from both the presidency of the Republic of Srpska and the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party.

The status of indicted war criminals, however, is but one of several key issues affecting IFOR. The run-up to the country-wide elections scheduled for September 14, shows the primary nationalist parties which currently head their respective ethnic communities, are likely to hold sway. Complicating matter has been the issue of the participation of the Serbian Democratic Party in the election, with the SDS leadership likely to impede implementation of the Dayton Accords or engineer a popular Serb boycott of the elections, should it be banned from the ballot.

The Muslim Croat Federation remains a tenuous arrangement of grudging accommodation. As I stated in February, it was our belief that the Bosnian Croats would continue to work toward de facto integration with Zagreb. Bosnia Croat moves to retain their self-pro-

claimed state of Herzeg-Bosnia in violation of the Dayton Accords is indicative of the Bosnian Croat reluctance to cede real authority to the Federation.

The city of Brcko, in northeast Bosnia, the status of which was deferred at Dayton, remains a significant flash point. As you recall, retaining control of the Posovina Corridor was and remains the key strategic objective of the Bosnian Serbs. This corridor serves as the link between eastern and western halves of the Republic of Srpska and maintaining full control of Brcko, which straddles the corridor and its environs, is key to that objective.

The Bosnian government would also like to have access to and the use of the city of Brcko and the surrounding area.

There appears to be some, but precious little maneuver room, between the demands of both sides. Dissatisfaction on this key territorial issue could sow the seeds of future conflict in the area.

Under the freedom of movement provisions of the Accord, the desire of Bosnian Muslim refugees to return to their homes and to their home regions, either to visit relatives or grave sites, or to permanently relocate, has resulted in clashes between local Serbs and returning Moslems. On occasion, IFOR troops have had to intervene to prevent serious violence.

These examples illustrate the continuing challenge facing the international community and point to a trend toward de facto partition of Bosnia into at least two, if not three, parts. This trend has represented a slide rather than a rush toward partition, the results of which could potentially be confirmed by the up-coming election, unless more moderate political elements, which are currently weak and fragmented, are given a chance at challenging the three main political parties.

Chairman SPECTER. General Hughes, I don't want to push you unduly, but we are going to have a problem concluding by 11 a.m. if we don't stick fairly close to our time constraints.

General HUGHES. I will give up all the rest of my words here except for one final paragraph, if I may?

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you may summarize the balance as you consider those matters.

General HUGHES. I am almost at the end anyway, but I will summarize now.

Given the fact that the strategic goals of the main political protagonists have not changed, continued international engagement and pressure over some period of time will be required to proceed with the work of trying to establish a viable Bosnian state. Without such continued engagement, it is, in my opinion, likely the former warring factions will turn once again to violent conflict in an attempt to achieve their goals.

Thank you very much.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, General Hughes.

Your point on continued engagement will be my first question when we finish the panel on their direct testimony.

We now turn to the distinguished Deputy Director for Intelligence, Mr. John C. Gannon, who has an excellent academic background with a bachelor's from Holy Cross, and an MA and a PhD. from Washington University in St. Louis. He served as a Naval officer in Southeast Asia. He has been Deputy Director for Intel-

ligence since July 1995, and he is active in civic and political activity, being elected to the Falls Church, VA, city council, 1980 and 1982, and serving on the city's Economic Development Commission. I am not sure whether it is still political or just community and we don't have to pause too long on that. But we welcome you here, Mr. Gannon, and look forward to your testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN GANNON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Much has been accomplished since the Dayton Accords were signed December 14th in Paris. Although progress has been better than expected, many hurdles still must be leaped before we can be assured of long-term peace in the region.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE LARGE

IFOR's operations have gone surprisingly smoothly as the military deadlines stipulated by the agreement have generally been met. The cease-fire held through the winter and into the spring and summer, ending the bloodiest fighting in Europe since World War II. The warring parties withdrew from the territory they lost at Dayton, the armies have demobilized, and the weapons have been moved to cantonment sites. True, the de-mining of the country has proceeded too slowly, partly because of inclement weather and the luke-warm attitude of the former warring parties to clearing areas they were withdrawing from anyhow. Most recently, in June the arms-control agreement mandated by Dayton was signed in Florence in June after protracted negotiations.

With the apparent end of fighting, people are beginning to rebuild their lives and return to peacetime activities, thanks to the combined effort of 32 nations in IFOR.

New shops and cafes are springing up, goods are becoming widely available, people are repairing their homes, children will soon be returning to school. Tens of thousands of people, albeit temporarily, have crossed the line separating the Serbs from the Federation.

The first round of elections were held in Mostar without violence, and preparations for the September elections are in full swing. Forty-eight parties have registered to participate in elections, as well as numerous independent candidates for local elections. Over 30,000 candidates will be running for local, regional, and national elections. Polling also shows that a sizable majority of people across Bosnia believe the elections are important and intend to vote.

Even on the troubling issue of foreign forces, there has been substantial progress. After receiving the assurances of the Bosnian government that the foreign forces it knows of have departed, President Clinton recently certified the Bosnian government in compliance. The Administration has worked closely with the Bosnian government on this issue and will continue to do so.

MANY HURDLES REMAIN

Freedom of Movement. This issue will have significant influence on elections in the short run and the prospects for a multiethnic society in the long run. There has been some gradual improvement as the various parties have become more willing to allow other nationalities to cross the inter-entity boundary line to visit former homes or grave sites of loved ones. The problems arise when there is an attempt at a permanent return. All of the formerly warring parties have been guilty of this, have destroyed homes of the other ethnic groups, and otherwise harassed each other's nationals to discourage permanent returns.

War Criminals. The failure of the Croat and Serb ethnic groups to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal continues as a problem. The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to provide information through the Department of State to the War Crimes Tribunal to assist in identifying and bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes and atrocities in Bosnia. As of now, there are indictments against 75 (18 Croats, 3 Muslims, and 54 Serbs), but the Hague only holds six of them. A particular problem is that some of them persist in trying to remain politically active in contradiction of Dayton, which clearly states that anyone indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal cannot hold public office.

Karadzic and Mladic. They are the most dramatic illustrations of the problem. After Dick Holbrooke's mission last week, Karadzic on July 19 announced he was relinquishing the power of the Presidency of both the government and the party and would end his public appearances. As of 22 July, none of the media monitored by FBIS have carried any comments by or reports on Karadzic since the 19 July agree-

ment. This is a positive step, but still he must go to the Hague. Moreover, Ratko Mladic still remains free and in control of the army.

Karadzic and the nationalist SDS party he headed have clouded the prospects for free and fair elections and the long-term development of a democratic Bosnian state. The party leadership was used to intimidate potential opposition, such as the leaders of the Bosnian Serb Socialist Party, who have been purged from local government and state-run enterprises and whose homes and businesses have been vandalized. Predrag Radic, the Banja Luka mayor, was kicked out of the local party after he spoke against Karadzic and announced that he would head the Democratic Patriotic Bloc. This created a climate in which potential opposition figures felt too intimidated to voice dissent.

Elections. Even if his announced departure from the political scene announced last Friday is real, and it is too soon to tell, that is only the beginning of working for free and fair elections. New SDS party chief Buha in an interview published 22 July in *Der Spiegel* noted that Karadzic would still retain influence in his country's politics. In all of the camps, however, the forces of nationalism are still in the ascendancy. The departure of Karadzic and hopefully Mladic from the scene is not overnight going to build a Bosnian Serb desire to remain part of a multiethnic Bosnian state. Even the more moderate Bosnian Serbs prefer to be more closely aligned with Serbia than with Bosnia.

Moreover, lacking a democratic tradition, none of the leading parties for either the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are doing more than the minimal necessary to give their opposition parties an equal chance in the elections. Throughout Bosnia, denying access to the print and broadcast media is the norm as is the intimidation of opposition elements. Moreover, the opposition parties really lack the know-how to mount effective campaigns.

The Federation. Here too, the tendency toward separation rather than integration, particularly among the Bosnian Croats, remains strong. For example, the lengthy effort to arrive at a Federation defense law reflects the reluctance of the extremist elements on both sides to share power with the other ethnic group. The Federation defense law took months to reach despite offering the carrot of equip and train; even then key issues of chain of command were left unresolved and kicked farther down the road.

Brcko—a potential flash point. After the Dayton negotiations were unable to resolve the disposition of the Brcko corridor, the final agreement included provisions for its arbitration. This area is of vital strategic interest to both parties and was the scene of ethnic cleansing in the first part of the war. Both sides even differ over the scope of the arbitration, so finding a satisfactory resolution for all by the year-end deadline will be a challenge.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

In the short term the threat of war is low. Recent polling (USIA) reveals that the Bosnian people—Serbs, Muslims and Croats—are tired of war and are ready to rebuild their lives. Open confrontation and violent clashes have become the exception rather than the rule in resolving inter-community disputes—as evidenced by the recent election in Mostar.

Nonetheless, the Bosnian people face enormous challenges in devising ways to live with each other in peace and creating lasting democratic institutions, especially after IFOR has departed the scene.

After the elections in September, new institutions will be tested as they attempt to define their roles in relation to other entities and organization. There is a legacy of bitterness and a lack of democratic traditions to overcome. A key post-election test will be what happens if the absentee refugee and displaced person vote elects candidates in areas where the other ethnic group is now dominant. Will these elected officials be allowed to take their seats on municipal councils or cantonal sub-assemblies, power or will they become governments-in-exile?

Although an arms-control agreement was signed, the willingness of all sides—both in Bosnia and other involved states—to comply with the agreement remains untested. As long as they distrust each other, compliance may be a problem.

The powers of hatred and the still-fresh memories of the horrors of the war will be hard to overcome. The trend toward separation among the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats remains strong and will be difficult to reverse in the near future. As in the case of West European recovery after World War II, economic reconstruction and outside assistance that promotes economy integration will be the key to long-term peace and regional stability.

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. GANNON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; it's a pleasure to be here.

Progress has been better than expected since the signing of the Dayton Accords in Paris last December 14th, but many hurdles remain. The chart to my right and of which you have 8x11 copies, shows eight areas of compliance, with the color green indicating full compliance, blue indicating progress toward compliance, pink signifying noncompliance, and yellow indicating conflicting information with regard to compliance.

As you can see from that chart, the Bosnian Serbs remain the principal under-achievers in the effort at compliance.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Mr. Gannon, can I interrupt you?

Mr. GANNON. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman KERREY. You left off the Brcko termination, the deadline for Brcko. Is there a reason for—

Mr. GANNON. Well, we are doing this each week and we don't do the same ones each week.

Vice Chairman KERREY. OK.

Mr. GANNON. We will have that for you the next time.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Sorry to interrupt you.

Mr. GANNON. Yes, sir.

IFOR's operations have gone surprisingly smoothly. The military deadlines stipulated by the agreement have generally been met. The cease-fire held through the winter and into the spring and summer, ending the bloodiest fighting in Europe since World War II. The warring parties withdrew from the territory they lost at Dayton, the armies have demobilized and the weapons have been moved to cantonment sites.

The de-mining of the country, of course, has proceeded too slowly, partly because of inclement weather and the lukewarm attitude of the former warring parties to clearing areas from which they were withdrawing.

In June, the arms control agreement mandated by Dayton was signed in Florence after protracted negotiations. With the apparent end of fighting, people are beginning to rebuild their lives thanks to the combined efforts of 32 nations and IFOR. New shops and cafes are springing up, goods are becoming widely available, people are repairing their homes, children will soon be returning to school. Tens of thousands of people, albeit temporarily, have crossed the lines separating the Serbs from the Federation.

The first round of elections were held in Mostar in June without violence. Preparations for the wider September elections are in full swing. Forty-eight parties have registered to participate in elections, as well as numerous independent candidates for local elections. Over 30,000 candidates will be running for local, regional, and national elections. Polling also shows that a sizable majority of people across Bosnia believe the elections are important, and intend to vote.

Even on the troubling issue of foreign forces, there has been substantial progress. After receiving assurances from the Bosnian government that the foreign forces have departed, President Clinton recently certified the Bosnian government in compliance. The Ad-

ministration has worked closely with the Bosnian government on this issue.

Yet many hurdles remain. First, freedom of movement. There has been gradual improvement in freedom of movement as the various parties have become more willing to allow people to cross the inter-entity boundary line to visit former homes or grave sites. But as the chart to which I referred you shows, this is the area of widest noncompliance among all the parties. Problems arise when people attempt to stay permanently. All of the formerly warring parties have been guilty. They have destroyed homes of the other ethnic groups and otherwise harassed each other's nationals to discourage permanent return.

War criminals. The failure of the Croat and Serb ethnic groups to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal continues. The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to provide information through the Department of State to the War Crime Tribunal, to assist in identifying and bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes and atrocities in Bosnia. As of now, there are indictments against 75 people—18 Croats, 3 Muslims, and 54 Serbs. The Hague holds only six of them.

A particular problem is that some of them persist in trying to remain politically active in contradiction of Dayton, which clearly states that anyone indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal cannot hold public office. Of course, Karadzic and Mladic are particular problems.

After Dick Holbrooke's mission last week, Karadzic, on July 19, announced he would relinquish the Presidency of both the government and the party and would end his public appearances. As of 22 July, none of the media monitored by FBIS had carried any reports on Karadzic after 19 July. Still, Karadzic and the nationalist SDS party that he heads, have clouded the prospects for free and fair elections and the long-term development of a democratic Bosnia. The party leadership intimidated opposition such as the leaders of the Bosnian Serb Socialist Party, who have been purged from the local government and state-run enterprises, and whose homes and businesses have been vandalized.

Predrag Radic, the Banja Luka mayor, was kicked out of the local party after he spoke out against Karadzic and announced that he would lead the Democratic-Patriotic bloc.

Even if Karadzic stays off the political stage—and it is too soon to tell if he will—that would be only the beginning of free and fair elections. New SDS party chief Buha in an interview published 22 July in *Der Spiegel* noted that an unseated Karadzic would still retain influence in his country's politics. In all of the camps, moreover, nationalism is still ascendant. No matter what happens to Karadzic and Mladic, even the more moderate Bosnian Serbs would still prefer to be aligned with Serbia rather than Bosnia.

Leading parties of the Serbs, Croats and Muslims are all doing only the minimum necessary to give their opposition parties an equal chance in the election. Throughout Bosnia, denying access to the print and broadcast media is the norm, as is intimidation of opposition groups.

In the Federation, too, the tendency toward separation rather than integration, particularly among the Bosnian Croats, remains strong.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Gannon—

Mr. GANNON. Yes, sir?

Chairman SPECTER [continuing]. Again, with respect to time, to the extent you can summarize, we would appreciate it.

Mr. GANNON. Yes, sir.

The likely effort to pass a Federation Defense law this month reflects the reluctance of the extremist elements of both the Muslim and Croat sides to share power. Brcko remains a flashpoint. Both sides differ over even the scope of arbitration, so finding a satisfactory resolution by the year-end deadline will be a heavy challenge. And looking to the future, in the short term, it is our judgment that the threat of war is low. Recent polling by USIA reveals that Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats are all tired of the war and want to rebuild their lives. Violence has become the exception rather than the rule in resolving inter-community disputes, as evidenced by the recent election in Mostar.

Nonetheless, the Bosnian people face enormous challenges in devising ways to live with each other in peace, especially after IFOR departs the scene. The destructive influence of hatred and the still-fresh memories of the horrors of the war will be hard to overcome. The trend toward separation among the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats remains strong and will be difficult to reverse in the near future. As in the case of the West European economy after World War II, economic reconstruction and outside assistance that promotes economic integration will be the key to long-term peace and regional stability.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Gannon.

We now turn to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis, Department of State, Mr. Thomas Fingar; has a very distinguished academic record. A bachelor's from Cornell in 1968, a master's and Ph.D. from Stanford. Began his work in the field as early as 1970. German translator, intelligence analyst with intelligence headquarters of the Army in Europe, and has an extraordinary list of books and monographs, extensive publications.

Mr. Fingar, we welcome you here and look forward to your testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS FINGAR, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Chairman Specter, Senator Kerrey, thank you for this opportunity to provide an assessment by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the implementation of the Dayton Accords and the challenges intelligence analysts face in supporting policymakers working on Bosnia. As this is an open hearing, I limit my remarks to the unclassified level, focusing on an analysis of how the Balkan parties are implementing their commitments to civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords. I leave to my colleagues questions relating to military implementation.

DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

The goal of the Dayton meetings was to establish a framework for peace and stability in Bosnia; the Dayton Accords are formal commitments by the Balkan parties to accept that framework, as well as a timetable and process for achieving that goal. A critical first stage in implementing that framework was delineating and enforcing zones of separation for the belligerent forces, which IFOR has successfully accomplished. Dayton also involved a broad range of other commitments and programs,

labelled "civilian," but also requiring, to varying degrees, an environment of public security. Implementation by the parties of Dayton's civilian programs has proven to be much more problematic than the military aspects.

I will comment briefly on the current status of Dayton's civilian programs. Though interconnected, the specific actions prescribed by the Dayton Accords have different timeliness and can usefully be examined in terms of three categories of urgency, going from the least immediately critical to the most urgent—with the latter requiring intensive monitoring and analysis for the next 3 months. The first category subsumes humanitarian conditions and relief, and economic reconstruction. These are long-term foreign assistance concerns and not a source of current confrontation among the parties. The second category covers refugees, displaced persons, and repatriation, and freedom of movement and residence. The issues grouped in this category are closely linked and, though an on-going source of sporadic local clashes, are likely to play out over a period of several years. The third category has the shortest time horizon; indeed the issues in this group—war crimes and elections and future political structures—are sources of current acrimony, with potential for fueling civil unrest and affecting the September elections.

As Ambassador Holbrooke noted last week, implementation is "a long and very bumpy road." Summary judgments about compliance are both difficult and, in some respects, premature. The three parties directly involved—the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosnian Croats—have generally, albeit often grudgingly, met their Dayton obligations with respect to separation of forces; compliance with civilian requirements has required repeated diplomatic intervention and can best be described as imperfect. All aspects of civilian implementation are still greatly affected by mistrust among the factions, sporadic violence and threats, and skepticism by local and national level officials about the future of cooperative arrangements. This is not something IC analysts discovered after the Accords were signed—we understood well before the Dayton meetings that civilian implementation would be protracted and extremely difficult to manage.

With that as background, I will now comment briefly on the three analytical categories and each of six inter-related aspects of civilian implementation.

A. Long Term Assistance Concerns

(1) *Humanitarian conditions and relief.* Living conditions for many Bosnians, particularly within the Federation, have improved over the past few months, with more reliable supplies of electricity, water, and food. Conditions vary within Bosnia, with some enclaves, such as Gorazde, still without electricity. Most Bosnians, particularly those displaced, will likely remain highly dependent on relief agencies for at least another year. Relief agencies kept many Bosnians alive during the war and they will continue to play a central role in civilian implementation; continued protection for their operations after IFOR leaves will be an important long term security concern.

(2) *Reconstruction.* Financial and technical assistance has been slow in coming and most Bosnians still do not foresee any significant, tangible benefits from pledged foreign assistance. The future success of such international efforts will depend on the timely dispersal of funds in the context of adequate public security, re-established commercial networks, and protection against corruption. While not an immediate factor in Bosnia's peace and security, reconstruction efforts are fundamental to the region's long term stability.

B. On-going Localized Conflicts

(3) *Refugees, displaced persons, and repatriation.* Almost half of Bosnia's pre-war population of 4.4 million was forcibly displaced. Despite efforts by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, very few have returned to their homes—and almost none to areas now under the firm control of another ethnic group. While circumstances vary greatly, many displaced persons are settling into the homes of others who have been displaced; as time goes on, they will be harder to dislodge and relocate under a formal repatriation program. Most refugees living outside of the former Yugoslavia have not shown a desire to return soon; European governments have been postponing deadlines for their mandatory repatriation. The return of refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons will be a continuing source of local tensions and a logistical burden on relief agencies for several years.

(4) *Freedom of movement and residence.* The number of trips by individuals across inter-entity boundary lines (IEBL) in Bosnia has steadily increased. Although Bosnians are engaging in more day trips and are undertaking more cross-boundary commercial activities, few people are resettling in their old homes. The vast majority of organized efforts by groups of displaced persons to visit their home communities has been rebuffed. All parties, particularly Bosnian Serbs, have consistently ob-

structed efforts by groups to visit their old neighborhood. Ethnic minorities who have remained in areas now under the control of other ethnic groups—including Serbs in the Sarajevo suburbs—continue to be harassed and threatened. These obstructions, often orchestrated by local officials, are deliberate attempts to dissuade repatriation and solidify ethnic segregation.

C. Immediate Threats to Stability

(5) *War crimes.* The prosecution of war criminals is critical to achieving long-term peace and justice in Bosnia. The War Crimes Tribunal has indicted 74 war criminals in the former Yugoslavia, including former Bosnian Serb president Karadzic and Bosnian Serb army commander General Mladic. Despite Tribunal efforts—including public hearings, field investigations, and grave excavations—compliance, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, has been poor. Sixty-eight inductees are still at large, 50 of whom are in the Republika Srpska.

I would also briefly note that the Intelligence Community is committed to assisting international efforts to prosecute war criminals. Toward this goal, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State have established a War Crimes Unit housed within INF. This unit will provide appropriate information support to the Tribunal's Office of the Prosecutor in keeping with U.S. policies and measures to protect sources and methods.

(6) *Elections and political structures.* The OSCE-supervised elections are now entering the period of active campaigning. In our judgment, Mr. Karadzic's removal from public office will defuse political tensions and create a more stable basis for democratic institution-building in the Republika Srpska, but many security and logistical challenges must be addressed during the next 2 months—and beyond. The establishment of democratic processes and the institutions needed to sustain them in such a war ravaged and bitterly divided country will require continued international support well after the elections.

The Mostar elections show how complicated the electoral process is in Bosnia and the likelihood of results being contested by the competing parties, but they also show that elections can proceed under acceptable conditions. Work on building the Federation continues, albeit slowly. Passage of the Federation defense law on July 9 was an important milestone, though disagreements over fundamental questions of command are not yet entirely resolved. Arbitration of the crucial Brcko territorial compromise has not yet begun; this, too, will likely involve a contentious and drawn out series of negotiations.

ANALYTICAL CHALLENGES

The other issue the committee asked me to address was the challenges intelligence analysts face in supporting our customers on Bosnia. I will limit myself to INR and its customers, who are primarily policymakers in the Department of State.

Balkan-related issues are fast-paced, with numerous diplomatic initiatives, and multifaceted, with a range of on-the-ground developments from human rights atrocities to food deliveries. The intense policy interest has generated a high demand for reporting and analysis. INR's small team of a half dozen analysts cover all aspects of the Balkan war; they have maintained 7 days a week coverage throughout the Dayton process. We report and analyze intelligence on developments in and relevant to implementation of the Dayton Accords in the *Secretary's Morning Intelligence Summary*, and a variety of other products, including updates, briefs, and assessments disseminated via Intelink.

It is the analysts' job to transform a large volume of raw data into meaningful and concise information. The complex issues involved in Dayton implementation are made even more so by the frequent political maneuverings of key Balkan actors. We go beyond just monitoring these daily events by also trying to provide insightful commentary, which is not easy because it goes to an audience that knows a great deal about the subject. Our best "value added" analysis identifies and assesses significant events and impending developments. INR's analysis, in addition to serving State Department policymakers, provides a political context for assessing the military intentions and objectives of the parties.

INR has met the twin demands of reviewing extensive amounts of data and high consumer expectations by relying on our own small team of analysts and the DCI's Balkan Task Force. That we have done as well as we have in meeting the demands of State Department principals and in producing finished analysis in quantities disproportionate to our small size testifies to the success of the division of labor with and cooperative approach of the Balkan Task Force. Collectively, I believe we have risen to the challenge of providing policymakers with objective, timely, and useful products, but that judgment ultimately rests with them.

I would be happy to elaborate as best as I can on any of these points in closed testimony.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS FINGAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. FINGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to complement the analyses presented by my two colleagues. I will try to do that, to complement, not repeat.

Compliance with civilian requirements of the Dayton Accords has required repeated diplomatic intervention, and can best be described as imperfect. All aspects of civilian implementation are still greatly affected by mistrust among the factions, sporadic violence and threats, and skepticism about the future of cooperative arrangements.

Though interconnected, the specific actions prescribed by the Dayton Accords have different timeliness. Some, specifically those focused on humanitarian conditions and economic reconstruction, are long term foreign assistance concerns, and not a source of current confrontation among the parties.

A second category covers such matters as refugees, displaced persons, repatriation, and freedom of movement and residence. The issues in this category are closely linked and, though an on-going source of sporadic local clashes, are likely to play out over a period of several years.

A third category has a much shorter time horizon. Indeed, the issues in this group—war crimes, elections, and the future political structures—are sources of current acrimony with the greatest potential for sparking civil unrest.

Let me turn briefly to each of these groups.

Living conditions for many Bosnians, particularly within the Federation, have improved over the past few months, with more reliable supplies of electricity, water, and food. But most Bosnians, particularly those displaced, will likely remain highly dependent on relief agencies for at least another year. Relief agencies kept many Bosnians alive during the war, and they will continue to play a central role in civilian implementation.

Most Bosnians still do not see tangible benefits from pledged foreign assistance. The future success of such international efforts will depend on the timely disbursement of funds in the context of adequate public security, re-established commercial networks, and protection against corruption.

While not an immediate factor in Bosnia's peace and security, reconstruction efforts are fundamental to the region's long term stability.

The category of mid-term concerns. Almost half of Bosnia's pre-war population of 4.4 million was forcibly displaced. Very few have returned to their homes, and almost none to areas now under the firm control of another ethnic group. Many displaced persons are settling into the homes of others who have been displaced. As time goes on, they will be harder to dislodge and relocate under a formal repatriation program. Most refugees living outside the former Yugoslavia have not shown a desire to return soon.

The return of refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons will be a continuing source of local tension and a logistical burden

for relief agencies. Bosnians are engaging in more day trips, more cross boundary commercial activities, but few people are resettling in their old homes. The vast majority of organized efforts, like groups of displaced persons to visit their home communities, have been rebuffed. All parties, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, have consistently obstructed efforts by groups to visit their old neighborhoods.

Immediate threats to stability focus on war crimes and the elections and the creation of political structures. As noted, the War Crimes Tribunal has indicted 74 war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. Despite tribunal efforts, including field investigations and grave excavations, compliance, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, has been poor.

The OSCE supervised elections are now entering the period of active campaigning. In our judgment, Mr. Karadzic's removal from public office will defuse political tensions and create a more stable base for democratic institution building. But it is going to take a great deal of time and effort and continuous involvement, to rebuild institutions and the political confidence necessary to sustain them.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fingar.

General Hughes, I begin with you on your concluding statement about continued engagement. Are you saying flatly that the mission of the Dayton Accords and the mission of the United Nation and the United States will not be accomplished, and that hostilities are likely to resume if IFOR, including the United States, do not remain in Bosnia after December of this year?

General HUGHES. I am not stating it in quite that way. In my view, the continued presence of a Western, or a force from NATO and other countries, is a requirement for continued stability in Bosnia.

Chairman SPECTER. A requirement for continued stability in Bosnia.

General HUGHES. That's correct.

Chairman SPECTER. So that means that if the United Nation is not there, there will not be continued stability in Bosnia.

General HUGHES. Once again, I hate to put a name like NATO or the United Nation or the United States on this force, but some force, and I think it would probably have to come under some international coalition—

Chairman SPECTER. I think it is important that it be definitive and explicit so that it is understood—continued stability of Bosnia requires some force, right?

General HUGHES. It does; in my view.

Chairman SPECTER. OK.

Now, from your intelligence sources, what is the likelihood of having a force there if the United States is not a participant?

General HUGHES. I would say in general terms that continued participation of the United States in some fashion is a precondition by many countries for their continued involvement. So I would say that if the United States was not present, the prospects for a viable international force would be much reduced.

Chairman SPECTER. Would they be likely at all?

General HUGHES. Yes. I think you could say that it would be likely—depending upon the conditions and the nature of the force and what it was supposed to do.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, if the United States participates.

General HUGHES. If the United States did or did not participate, there is still a high possibility for a force to be there of some kind. But the nature of it would probably depend upon the circumstances, which I cannot foresee at this time.

Chairman SPECTER. So you think the United States could withdraw and still have the kind of a force necessary to maintain stability in Bosnia?

General HUGHES. It is possible that that could come about, but the countries of NATO especially, would probably have to change their current position in order to do that.

Chairman SPECTER. So the current position of the NATO countries is—which we all know, they are not going to stay if the United States is not there.

General HUGHES. That is their public position, and it may indeed be the truth.

Chairman SPECTER. Public position, and it may even be the truth.

General HUGHES. Yes. Sometimes a negotiating position is used to try to get the United States to continue to participate.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, without deciding the wisdom of the United States staying there, doesn't it pretty much boil down that if the United States doesn't stay there, there is not going to be the requisite force and there's not going to be stability in Bosnia.

General HUGHES. I personally do not necessarily believe that's absolutely the case. I mean, it is possible that the—

Chairman SPECTER. Not absolutely the case.

General HUGHES. That's right. It's possible that the NATO nations—

Chairman SPECTER. Possibly the case?

General HUGHES. It could be. But it—

Chairman SPECTER. Likely the case? Probably the case?

General HUGHES. I wouldn't say likely—

Chairman SPECTER. On a scale of 1 to 10, where does it fit?

General HUGHES. The obvious answer for me is a 5, but—

(General laughter.)

Chairman SPECTER. We praised you earlier, General Hughes. We may have to withdraw the opening statement.

General HUGHES. Yes. I'm trying to be candid, sir.

My view really is that conditions can change and have changed indeed over a period of time, and it could be that as we get closer to the December deadline, the nations of Europe and particularly NATO may decide that they can provide some kind of a stabilizing force, despite the fact that U.S. ground forces may not be there.

Chairman SPECTER. If they did, it would certainly be a change in United Nation policy to—or NATO policy to do it without the United States, wouldn't it?

General HUGHES. It would, but things indeed have changed, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you think that the attitude of the United States might change after a certain date in November?

General HUGHES. It's possible.

Chairman SPECTER. Possible.

General HUGHES. Yes, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. I won't ask you for a 1 to 10 scale.

One question for you, Mr. Gannon, before I yield to Senator Kerrey.

You say in your statement, page three, he, Karadzic, must go to The Hague. The next statement is regarding to General Ratko Mladic. Is it your view that force should be used if that—IFOR force should be used if that is the only way to take Karadzic and Mladic into custody to take them to The Hague for the War Crimes Tribunal?

Mr. GANNON. Sir, I think if Karadzic stays, he continues to be a symbol that mobilizes extreme national sentiment, which is counterproductive to everything that Dayton wants to achieve. So his removal is, I think, essential.

How it is done, I don't have a view.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, can it be done without force?

Mr. GANNON. It would be difficult, but it could be if—

Chairman SPECTER. It could be. Is he likely to surrender voluntarily?

Mr. GANNON. No, he's not likely to surrender voluntarily. But if he were—

Chairman SPECTER. Well, what in between is there between surrendering and force?

Mr. GANNON. Well, if we are talking about arrest as between using military force versus surrendering—

Chairman SPECTER. Should the War Crimes Tribunal send out their marshals to take him into custody, because they don't have any marshals.

Mr. GANNON. No, they do not. And it will be difficult to arrest him.

Chairman SPECTER. You don't want to give us a recommendation?

Mr. GANNON. I wouldn't give a policy recommendation. I would say it would be difficult to arrest him, and the intelligence judgment is that if he stays, the political environment is much less conducive to fair elections.

Chairman SPECTER. OK. If he stays, the political environment is much less conducive. Somewhat qualified statement. But you say in your statement he must go to The Hague. I do read that right?

Mr. GANNON. You do. And if you are to remove his appeal to the extreme national groups of the—

Chairman SPECTER. OK, I can understand your not willing—your disinclination to state a public position about military force.

So let's move to Mladic. How would you characterize that? You wanted to separate the two.

Mr. GANNON. As long as Mladic is in control of the military in the Republic of Srpska, he is, first of all, an indicted war criminal, and second, he is a symbol of the extreme nationalism that—

Chairman SPECTER. It appears it would be harder to take General Mladic into custody. He's customarily surrounded by a lot of military force. I see General Hughes nodding in the affirmative.

Mr. GANNON. Extremely difficult; extremely difficult, yes.

Senator Kerrey.

I have to excuse myself now to go to Veterans, and I'll return as soon as I can.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Hughes, I'd actually like to get you and Mr. Fingar in a bit of a discussion. I note Mr. Fingar's testimony, you have half a dozen analysts at INR, is that correct?

Mr. FINGAR. Right.

Vice Chairman KERREY. You say 7 days a week, doing analysis on Bosnia. Your principal customer is the Secretary of State.

Mr. FINGAR. That's correct.

Vice Chairman KERREY. And is Ambassador Frowick[?], who is the lead U.S. person responsible for monitoring elections, is that a correct description of his job? Is he working for the Secretary of State? Is his line of command go to the Secretary of State? Or does he go to OSCS?

Mr. FINGAR. OSCE.

Vice Chairman KERREY. OSCE?

Mr. FINGAR. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman KERREY. So he is United States but he is working for OSCE.

Mr. FINGAR. Correct, sir.

Vice Chairman KERREY. And it is OSCE that has—he has no chain of contact, then, with the Secretary of State?

Mr. FINGAR. There is contact with Mr. Frowick, but he is in the position of working for the OSCE to supervise the elections.

Vice Chairman KERREY. OK. And tell me what relationship Mr. Sklar has then with the Secretary of State. I understand he is the President's Special Representative for Reconstruction. What's his—do you support his efforts?

Mr. FINGAR. We support him indirectly. We supply information and analysis to Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and they prepare materials for Mr. Sklar.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Do you, as you look at IFOR, I mean, IFOR is a structure that is a creature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, yes? Do you see it as a NATO operation, NATO military operation?

Mr. FINGAR. Primarily, yes, sir.

Vice Chairman KERREY. And the—do you see a civilian counterpart to that at NATO? I mean, how is the civilian effort organized? You have a list of things on the civilian side that need to be implemented. How is that—how is the civilian side organized?

Mr. FINGAR. There is no direct analog to the IFOR military force in the NATO command structure that is in place. Rather, there are the efforts under Mr. Sklar for reconstruction and development aid under the OSCE—

Vice Chairman KERREY. And he reports directly to the President?

Mr. FINGAR. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman KERREY. All right.

And does he command resources at all other than the IFOR—other than people understand that IFOR backs him up?

Mr. FINGAR. He does not have a pot of money that he can use for reconstruction.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Does he have people under his—I mean, is there any organizational structure on the civilian side that you think is comparable to what we have in the military?

Mr. FINGAR. No, Senator.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Do you view that as a problem?

Mr. FINGAR. Do I view it as a problem?

Vice Chairman KERREY. I mean, if you look at the—if you look at Mr. Gannon's chart here, you've got solid blue on everything that is directly attributable to military. There's a cease-fire over there as a consequence of IFOR, direct consequence of IFOR, and direct consequence of intel support to military and that operation.

Second line, clear and mark minefields, Mr. Gannon, indicates in part that's a problem of, what did you say, the weather and part luke warm attitude of the parties. Withdraw heavy weapons, you've got blue there. Military cooperation with War Crimes Tribunal, significantly less military. You can see it sort of on down the chart there.

It seems to me that where we've having trouble is on the civilian side, and it seems to me reasonable to ask the question, you know, have we organized on the civilian side similar to the way we have organized on the military side. I mean, look at General Hughes' testimony and his part that he actually didn't get to, indicates that in the last paragraph that the military intelligence community has adopted an approach that differs significantly from our doctrine which was designed for high intensity mobile battlefield support and conventional war fighting.

Peace implementation missions, such as the one in Bosnia, in my judgment is likely to be the sort of mission we go on in the future, with the big civilian component in it, and a big international participation in it such as the one in Bosnia requires a different allocation and use of resources. IFOR has brought together a unique coalition of NATO and non-NATO forces which demand a common view of the situation, something that I think is missing on the civilian side as well, that's ushered in significant changes in how the military intelligence community supports the force, especially true in the area of releasability and dissemination of intelligence, and then he goes through—you go through a series of new tools they are using. UAV's, application of sensors and sources to the unusual circumstances, the use of advanced automation and telepresence to ensure connectivity from the operational to the strategic field are indicative of just some of the many changes in military intel support.

I mean, there's a tremendous organization and use of technology there on the military side to carry it out. I am asking, Mr. Fingar, if you see a deficiency on the civilian side, given what we are doing in the military and the capability in the military side.

Mr. FINGAR. Sir, let me begin by noting both the difference in timing and nature of the military task which was a precondition for moving on the civilian implementation. The military task of separation of forces and now maintaining the cessation of hostilities that has been accomplished very, very successfully.

That was a precondition for the much messier processes of institution building, returning people to their home.

Vice Chairman KERREY. You know, I must say, institution building, what's the first and most important institution they need?

Mr. FINGAR. A functioning government.

Vice Chairman KERREY. A functioning government? What is that, all in favor say aye? What is functioning government?

Mr. FINGAR. The election——

Vice Chairman KERREY. What's the function of government they need the most?

Mr. FINGAR. They need a legitimate——

Vice Chairman KERREY. They need a police force, Mr. Fingar. They need a police force—I don't mean to be critical. My tone seems a little bit harsh. I believe the answer to my question should be emphatically yes, if not hell, yes. You have six analysts in your shop. We have a special representative to the President, Mr. Sklar, that's over three. Mr. Frolick doesn't work for the Department of State, he works for OSCE. There is no comparable organization at NATO that is trying to identify the priority issues inside of Bosnia and making sure they get done. And Exhibit A, I would put, is the lack of a fully developed civilian police force. I mean, that's why people were afraid to participate in the election in Mostar that didn't hold the view of either what Croatia wanted or what Serbia wanted. I mean, it seems to me.

Mr. FINGAR. Certainly the police force—civilian police force, the IPTF effort to train local police forces is terribly important. The organization of the civilian side, as you know, Senator, is highly complex, with Carl Bildt is the high representative for civilian implementation, Mr. Froewick with the OSCE for elections, Dick Sklar is supported by, among others, USAID, that the structures are quite different and quite a bit more complex than they are for the military, and timing on them is very different.

I would note on the references to the six analysts; we have six analysts but they are supported by the Balkan Task Force. That group has fed information through us and directly into the civilian side. It is not simply resting on the six in INR.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if any of you could comment on how IFOR is viewed by the different parties—the Bosnian parties. What is the perception?

General HUGHES. I'll start. The perception is spotty. With regards to whether it is positive or negative, in some areas there has been a good relationship established by IFOR presence, and it seems quite positive. In other areas, and this is probably particularly with the Serbs and with areas with which there are real territorial conflicts and other sources of concern, the IFOR is viewed by the local people, the local population, as being something of an adversary.

So far, those circumstances haven't grown into any kind of overt violence, although there have been some incidents and threats against IFOR in recent days, particularly with regard to Radovan Karadzic and whether or not any action would be taken against him.

So I would say that although there are positive——

Senator DEWINE. So that acerbates the situation?

General HUGHES. Yes. There are positive aspects of our relationship with all of the people that we are involved with in Bosnia and in the region. But in the main, I would say that there is still an uncertain relationship and occasionally a confrontational relationship with them.

Senator DEWINE. Anybody else?

Mr. GANNON. I would agree with that assessment, and just reinforce the point that it is the Bosnian Serbs that have the greatest difficulty with that.

Senator DEWINE. After IFOR, I wonder if you could comment, recognizing that we are in a public hearing, post-IFOR, what are the intelligence needs and what are the intelligence plans?

General HUGHES. Once again, sir, the end of my testimony does cover this in part and basically I say that we have begun to plan for the post-IFOR period. The exact needs for intelligence depend to some degree on the residual force or the remaining presence from NATO and other countries that are involved in Bosnia. But generally speaking, we are now anticipating some kind of continuing presence in Bosnia, which will require U.S. military intelligence, and indeed, U.S. intelligence assistance. And it is our intent to plan for that and to try to facilitate it.

I will mention also that we have, as part of our planning, an attempt to discuss this requirement with our NATO allies, and we will begin to do that in September.

Senator DEWINE. You all described a situation with the refugees which sounds, at least to me, to be rather grim. What is the long term prognosis for any further return to home areas?

Mr. GANNON. I would say the long term prognosis depends—

Senator DEWINE. I mean, is what we see now what we are going to get, basically?

Mr. GANNON. It depends very much, I think, on the success of the implementation of the civilian side of the Dayton Accords, where security can be provided and incentives provided for people to come back to their homes. And that is certainly going to take time.

Mr. FINGAR. I would agree with that. That it very much is going to be contingent on the success of the effort to train a police force that can maintain stability, that can deal with corruption, on government institutions that have credibility, on reconstruction that creates jobs. People are very, very skeptical at this point, and with good reason.

Senator DEWINE. The Dayton Accords, of course, call for economic cooperation and eventual economic union. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what is going on in any kind of informal economy? What's going on? Are there signs of increased activity, economic activity among the parties?

General HUGHES. I'll just mention that in the past few days the first—as far as I know, the first substantial contact has begun between the Muslim government and the larger former Yugoslavia. This is not a direct contact between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims, but instead between Serbia and Muslims, and I would say that that is a hopeful sign. If the Milosevic government and the Muslims can reach some accommodation with regard to political,

economic and other forms of relationship, I'd say that was very positive and hopeful for the future.

But with regard to the Bosnian Serbs, I don't think much has been accomplished yet.

Mr. GANNON. I concur with that, sir.

Mr. FINGAR. There are increasing numbers of commercial transactions and visits across the inter-entity boundary lines, still very small scale, but likely to increase as the economy gets back on its feet. Then, just to pick up on what General Hughes said, Ganic is going to Belgrade. Part of the purpose for his trip is trade.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator DeWine.

Before moving to the next panel, let me just ask the panel, generally, two questions, to see if you can give us any intelligence insights which would be motivating or perhaps even determinative factors for the policymakers.

When we talk about the United Nations staying beyond December, and the United States staying beyond December, there are two factors there. One is what is going to happen over there if there is not a force present. I developed this to some extent with General Hughes. That is an intelligence assessment, what's going to happen, how bad it's going to be or how good it's going to be.

The second question is whether there will be a force there if the United States does not participate. That also is an intelligence assessment. So let me ask you across the board, starting with you, Mr. Fingar, if there is not a force there, how likely, on a scale of 1 to 10, is there going to be stability in the objectives of the Dayton Accord carried out, if there is not a force there?

Mr. FINGAR. Clearly, what happens—

Chairman SPECTER. Could you give me a 1 to 10, because we have got to move on to the next panel? With 10 being the highest likelihood of stability.

Mr. FINGAR. I would put it probably at six for stability, short term.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Gannon, what do you think?

Mr. GANNON. I believe that if there is no force present, there will be a rapid move toward partition and the prospects of the Dayton Accords are poor.

Chairman SPECTER. Sounds like an eight or nine?

Mr. GANNON. That's—yes.

Chairman SPECTER. General Hughes?

General HUGHES. Nine to ten. Very negative if there is no force, because the conditions for civil order have not yet been fully established.

Chairman SPECTER. So you put it at a nine?

General HUGHES. (Nods in the affirmative.)

Chairman SPECTER. What is the likelihood now of a force being present if the United States is not a participant? How would you evaluate that, Mr. Gannon? On a scale of 1 to 10.

Mr. GANNON. My judgment—on a scale of 1 to 10? Will there be some follow-on force if the United—

Chairman SPECTER. The question is what is the likelihood of an adequate force to maintain stability if the United States is not a participant?

Mr. GANNON. I would put it at about a five.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Fingar?

Mr. FINGAR. Same.

Chairman SPECTER. General Hughes, I know you won't select a 5. What do you think?

General HUGHES. I'd say that probably a little lower than 5. But I would hesitate to say that it is not impossible, at all. I think it is possible that a force can remain there without dedicated U.S. ground force presence.

By the way, I believe we have agreed in policy statements to support some continuing force structure in Bosnia. The question precisely is whether or not we will have U.S. ground forces remaining there. We fully intend to try to provide various kinds of support to any residual force.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, OK, let's restate the question.

What's the likelihood of having a force there if the United States does not supply ground forces? General Hughes, give us a number on that.

General HUGHES. Four to five.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Gannon.

Mr. GANNON. Four.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Fingar.

Mr. FINGAR. Five.

Chairman SPECTER. Any further questions, Senator Kerrey?

Vice Chairman KERREY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to continue, sort of open the door here to doing a—getting some examination done on the comparative capacity of the military and the civilian in the way they are organized. I say this because I am very interested in this, because my presumption is that the United States is going to engage to try to assist in providing stability in the future, it is apt to be a multinational effort and it is apt to have a big civilian component. I think the risk of failure in Bosnia is on the civilian side. I really do think it is a question of saying, OK, who's in charge and how are we going to organize the effort. I am not sure that question has been asked or answered.

I mean who—Mr. Fingar, if there is failure on the civilian side, who, in your judgment, should we hold responsible for it? Who is responsible—who should get the credit if there is great success, and who should get the blame if there is failure?

Mr. FINGAR. Senator, I think the primary responsibility rests with the people of Bosnia.

Vice Chairman KERREY. On the military side, no? Let me ask on the military—

Mr. FINGAR. On the civilian side. The Dayton Accords have given the people of Bosnia the opportunity to regroup, rebuild, to try and bridge some of the deep chasms of suspicion and hate that have developed. They have the opportunity. Outsiders can help them—can help create the conditions. Fundamentally, it is their country and their challenge.

Vice Chairman KERREY. So nobody. I should hold—there is nobody on the civilian side that I should hold responsible at all? It's basically up to the Bosnian people and the Secretary of State is not to be held responsible for any involvement, Carl Bildt's not respon-

sible, there is nobody, you're saying, responsible, other than the Bosnian people themselves.

Mr. FINGAR. I think if you wish to discuss the way in which we embarked upon this policy and why we have organized as we have, that is a matter to take up with the policymakers. But fundamentally, analytically, I think this does rest with the people of Bosnia.

Vice Chairman KERREY. I observe that that's a real problem. I mean, I observe that on the military side—I'll ask General Hughes. If they have a military failure, who's responsible?

General HUGHES. The military, clearly. Military commanders and military leadership.

Vice Chairman KERREY. I have no difficulty identifying who's responsible for the military failure. I'll have no difficulty determining who I should give credit for—to, for success. But on the civilian side, we don't have that kind of—we don't have that kind of chain of command. Maybe—you're saying—do you think we need it, Mr. Fingar? You're saying—you're basically presuming, I hear, that perhaps it is not needed. Perhaps sort of a loose structure. You know, it's up to the Bosnian people. You know, it's your deal, figure out how you're going to get it done is OK.

Mr. FINGAR. I think it needs to be a structure that is incredibly adaptive to a continuously changing situation on the ground—

Vice Chairman KERREY. The military structure is incredibly adaptive and able to change to circumstances on the ground. But I am asking the question, should we designate somebody to be in charge who has the responsibility. Right now I have a special representative of the President in charge of reconstruction. Ambassador Froelick, who is a part of the OSCE effort to monitor the election, and Carl Bildt, who works for the United Nations. Is that basically what I've got? Over at the Department of State, six or seven analysts who are providing, along with the Balkan Task Force, assistance to the Secretary of State. Is that how you see it?

Mr. FINGAR. That and the very large contingent in the Bureau of European Affairs.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Bureau of what?

Mr. FINGAR. The Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs is directly supporting the embassy, is supporting—

Vice Chairman KERREY. Do you—when I read the testimony of General Hughes, and I presume—when I read the testimony of General Hughes, I hear a significant adaptation and application of technology to a mission. I mean, use of unmanned aerial vehicles, application of many other sensors, use of advanced automation and telepresence to ensure connectivity from the operational—I mean, there's a significant deployment of intel and technology to the task at hand. But on the civilian side I don't hear that. Am I—is it there? There's shyness to talk about it or is it not there?

Mr. FINGAR. The intel component that is both reporting and analyzing what is happening—information acquired through diplomatic reporting, the media, the NGO's, the sources of information on where the potential problems are, with whom one ought to intervene, at what stage, whether it should be intervention by the United States, by another nation, by an international agency—the collection of information through intelligence channels, diplomatic

channels, exists, it's in place. Could it be better? Unquestionably. But that is the type of information rather than—

Vice Chairman KERREY. You remember Hurricane Hugo in the United States? Do you remember the criticism that James Lee Witt got not moving fast enough to organize the effort? I mean, people knew he was in charge. And he responded and FEMA has adapted, and in subsequent disasters, they handled things differently. But there is a method to the organization. They don't go down there and say, hey, people of South Carolina, it's up to you. Figure it out. You know, you hear what I'm saying. I mean, I believe there is a weakness on that civilian side that calls into question whether or not we're going to be successful and provokes the question on a scale of 1 to 10, do you think I am going to have to keep the U.S. military there forever, basically.

I mean—and I think it also may call into question in the future our capacity to do these sorts of ventures, presuming that—as I see—as I see the political landscape, by the way, the forces are Tudjman and Milosevic.

I mean, I don't—there is a lot of ethnic rivalry and a lot of ethnic tension, but the two big dogs over there are Tudjman and Milosevic. You know, I don't really have a federation army over there. I've got a Croatian army and a Muslim army. I've got Milosevic with significant penetration of the Bosnian Serb operation, and significant efforts to organize politically to take control if the military is not able to get the job done.

So it seems to me that the goal of this whole effort is a unitary Bosnia. That's the goal. It does seem to me that—that there is a significant weakness on the civilian side that is going to contribute to the possibility this whole mission is a failure.

Mr. FINGAR. Senator, you made that point very clearly, and I will certainly communicate it back.

The one response I guess I would have is there is a difficulty in coming to grips with direct analogies between planning for a military operation, planning for recovery from a natural disaster, and rebuilding a country after an ethnic war.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Let me challenge this ethnic war idea. This deal was started by Milosevic, with Tudjman coming in and saying I'd like some of this ground as well. I mean, I understand there's great ethnic tensions and great ethnic hatreds here. But I mean, I really see Croatia wanting a big piece of territory, and Serbia wanting a big piece of territory, not really caring whether Bosnia ends up alive or dead. Is that a fair description of the scene?

Mr. FINGAR. I think that's a fair description of how we got to where we are. But I don't think I am prepared analytically to say that they will rush in without the presence of the United States or another international military force in order to dismember Bosnia to form either greater Croatia or greater Serbia.

Vice Chairman KERREY. We'll end the panel here with my statement. They may not rush in, but they are certainly making an effort already to keep their presence there. I mean, Milosevic is not sitting back and saying, hey, let the Bosnians figure this out. Tudjman is not doing it either. They are not taking the attitude

that apparently the U.S. Department of State has taken that it is up to the Bosnians to figure out how to do it.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Let me just ask one last question, about Iranian influence. What risks, if any, are posed by Iran's influence today, General Hughes, concerning Bosnia.

General HUGHES. We continue to be concerned about the relationship between Iran and the Bosnian Muslims. I think that our concern has diminished slightly, although there are still areas that we are concerned about, like training and assistance of various kinds, and continued Iranian diplomatic presence in the Bosnian Muslim capital.

I think that—

Chairman SPECTER. Was that contributed to by the sale of Iranian arms to Bosnia?

General HUGHES. I would say that yes, any kind of contact, particularly on military capabilities, is of concern to us.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. We very much appreciate your being here. Regrettably the 11 o'clock vote curtails the expanded scope. We thank you for being here.

We turn now to our second distinguished panel: Senior Fellow Susan Woodward, Brookings Institution; Dr. John Hoffman, Chairman of the Board, World Vision; and Vice President of the International Rescue Committee, Roy Williams.

We begin with Dr. Woodward, who brings a very distinguished record to the panel. A bachelor's from Minnesota; masters and Ph.D. from Princeton. Experience on the faculties of Williams, Yale, Georgetown, and currently an adjunct professor for the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

Welcome, Dr. Woodward, and we should have time for 5-minute opening statements and one 5-minute round, if we stick to the time limits, so the floor is yours.

Dr. WOODWARD. I'll try.

STATEMENT BY SUSAN L. WOODWARD, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Senator Specter, Senator Kerrey, and members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to appear before you to share my assessment of the current developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the implementation of the Dayton Accord. I have just returned from Bosnia, 2 days ago, and am convinced that we are at a critical turning point in the Dayton process. The enormous success of the military aspects (Annex 1A) could now be consolidated and continued by the September elections and the civilian tasks of peace building, or the entire process could unravel, the military successes reverse, and war result. The difference between those two outcomes depends largely on what happens here in Washington. In explaining what I mean, I should make clear that I speak as an individual, a scholar expert on the former Yugoslavia and on efforts at international intervention to stop the war in Bosnia, and do not represent the views of the Brookings Institution or any group of people.

Of the three parts of the Dayton Accord, the military aspects—the cease-fire and separation of forces—is a resounding success. The cease-fire has now held 10 months. IFOR has separated forces, destroyed or cantoned heavy weapons, overseen demobilization, and removed police checkpoints. Confidence and security building measures among the armies are working very well.

The second part, the political process to create functioning governments that will assume responsibility for security and enable IFOR to exit, is also on track. Elections will be held on time in September. Opposition coalitions have been formed, party and coalition lists constructed, local election commissions begun their work,

preregistration nearly completed, and the electoral campaign begun. Despite the attempt by the SDA to delay elections by setting the prior condition of Karadžić's arrest, all other parties and international actors now welcome the momentum and start of the long process to remove warlords from power.

The third part, the peace-building process of economic reconstruction, refugee repatriation, arms control, and reconciliation, has barely begun. Confrontations over the return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes have brought the process to a standstill. The UNHCR has abandoned, for the time being, any attempt to return displaced persons to homes outside areas where they are in the majority.

The OSCE and Office of the High Representative have only sent staff to towns outside Sarajevo this past month. Almost no monies have been disbursed for economic reconstruction, and none in the Republic of Srpska. Productive activities have not resumed. Nearly 90 percent of the population remains without gainful employment—nursing a coffee in cafes all day long.

Public buildings are not being repaired. Water is still available only part of the day in most localities, and electricity in many areas awaits the end of political deadlock between parties across the IEHL. Similar disputes prevent telephone communication—so essential to reconnecting families and friends—across the IEHL and between Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Freedom of movement remains largely only for international organizations.

Everything awaits elections: no privatization, no foreign investment, no real disbursement of economic assistance can occur without legitimate authorities capable of signing and guaranteeing contracts and enforcement.

ADJUSTMENTS NEEDED

(1) War or Security

The fact is, the war continues, only with political rather than military means. The ruling parties are still orchestrating the movement, expulsion, and resettlement of people in order to consolidate control over territory. The ethnic division of the country into three is strikingly apparent. And congressional requirements to train and equip a Bosnian army before the cease-fire has been consolidated and before there is some reversal in the division of Bosnia into three states is seen by all international actors and most parties as a direct incitement to war.

There is total consensus in Bosnia on one thing: if IFOR leaves at the end of the year, war will start again. IFOR is more active than ever in keeping the cease-fire—removing new police checkpoints, interrupting cycles of violence over attempts to return home, preventing escalation in the tit-for-tat arrests of accused war criminals between Croats and Muslims. The transfer of responsibility for security to civilian police is, in the interim, a task of the IPTF (International Police Task Force), but it has no weapons or executive authority. In the meantime, with bombs being set at IPTF stations, criminal gangs a major civilian threat, and electoral violence likely, United Nation and U.S. officials have worked out a good arrangement by which the IPTF can call on IFOR to provide backup coercive threat. But the IPTF is woefully under resourced: no radios, often no telephones, no fuel, insufficient cars, a reduction by half of translators in the month of June alone—because the United Nations does not have the money. The United States and its allies do not seem to recognize that IFOR can only begin to reduce its presence if they support and supply the IPTF.

(2) The Political Process

The Mostar elections at the end of June, which were meant to forecast the September elections, turned in a nearly exclusive vote for the two ruling nationalist parties, legitimating the division of the city in two. The Croats refuse to accept the electoral results, pursuing a technicality in the vote count among refugees in Bonn, Germany, because they lost the mayoralty and assembly majority to a skillful Muslim electoral strategy. And nationalist Serbs in the Republic of Srpska celebrate the Mostar results as proof to the outside world that the nations of Bosnia do not wish to live together and will choose separation in September.

The key to exit for American forces and IFOR is the establishment of common institutions for the country and a normal, functioning government and rule of law. The transfer of power from those who lose will be difficult. The elections will create a new map—a political map. The Dayton constitution creates a political system riven with countervailing vetoes and possibilities for delay. The fall will be a difficult time for all as the international actors help to facilitate the formation of common institutions with minimal violence.

(3) *The Need for a Strategy and Coordination*

Most importantly, there is as yet no plan or strategy for achieving peace. This is blatantly obvious in the total lack of coordination among the many organizations and actors implementing the accord. This lack of coordination and strategy enables the three ruling parties to manipulate the international presence to their own advantage, while international actions are having the effect of dividing the country more even while they aim to reintegrate it.

The President has done much in the past months to get the economic process moving faster, but congressional requirements not to aid the Republic of Srpska are playing right into the hands of nationalist Serbs who want separation and preventing Serb moderates from cooperating with allies in the federation. Washington's nearly exclusive focus on indicted Serb war criminals and on "train and equip" is undermining coordination further by creating serious rifts among international actors and within each organization, and it is contributing further to the country's partition. Yet without coordination and a strategy, I cannot see how the international intervention will end.

The strongest impression I bring from my visit to Bosnia the past two weeks is how much there remains to be done, how much we are still at the beginning of this process. Individuals still talk of the hardships they suffered, and most are only this summer beginning to relax and to enjoy some rest. Nonetheless, there is a noticeable though tentative hopefulness, a slow improvement in physical conditions, a willingness to admit a longing to see close relatives and friends on the other side of military confrontation lines, and a hive of activity among politicians preparing for September elections. Opposition parties in both Bosniac and Serb areas already think in terms of the elections in 1998 when they hope to make real inroads into the current control by nationalist parties over media, movement, and monies. People volunteer freely that they are tired of war and simply want a job and normal life. This alone marks the Dayton Accord a success.

However, a consensus is growing among Bosnians and among international actors on the ground: while the United States is still lauded as the great savior—the people who brought peace to Bosnia—it is increasingly seen as the major threat in its unwillingness to commit beyond 12 months and to recognize what it takes to bring peace. If the commitment to some lighter, follow-on force to IFOR is made now so that people can go to the polls knowing that they will be safe while this transitional government is elected and formed, then radicals who wish to disrupt the process and engender fear will be substantially weakened, but if the United States waits to reassure them and then pulls out at the end of December, having insured a whole new source of weapons as well, there will be war; our massive investment will be lost; and we will be blamed.

STATEMENT OF DR. SUSAN WOODWARD, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Dr. WOODWARD. Senator Specter, Senator Kerrey, and Members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to be here today.

I have just returned from Bosnia 2 days ago and am convinced that we are at a critical turning point in the Dayton process. The enormous success of the military aspects could now be consolidated and continued by the September elections and the civilian tasks of peace building, or the entire process could unravel, the military successes reverse, and war result.

In my view, the difference between those two outcomes depends largely on what happens here in Washington.

Let me skip the part of my testimony that goes over what has already been repeated, though I have some details on the civilian side you may want to pay attention to on what is not happening, but I have agreed with almost everything that has been said by the previous panel.

Chairman SPECTER. Especially their evaluations at five?

Dr. WOODWARD. Oh, no, I would say that the—

Chairman SPECTER. You wouldn't agree with that.

Dr. WOODWARD. On that question there is no question—

Chairman SPECTER. Right in the middle and not helpful at all.

Dr. WOODWARD. Yeah.

No, there is no question, if there is no force after December, war will resume absolutely—a 10 on that. If the U.S. doesn't go, that force will be ineffective because it will be seen as an equivalent of UNPROFOR and all parties will take advantage of it. U.S. participation is necessary. Which is separate from saying whether forces will go after December, some follow on force, without the United States.

Chairman SPECTER. Let me come back to that in the Q & A and not interrupt too much of your time to argue with you.

Dr. WOODWARD. OK, sorry.

So let me just turn to my assessment.

First of all, in terms of the three tasks of Dayton—the military, the political process, and the economic reconstruction—let me begin with the first task, the military.

The fact is, the war continues only with political rather than military means. The ruling parties are still orchestrating the movement, expulsion, and resettlement of people in order to consolidate control over territory. The ethnic division of the country into three is strikingly apparent. Congressional requirements to train and equip a Bosnian army before the cease-fire has been consolidated, and before there is some reversal in the division of Bosnia into three states, is seen by all international actors and most parties as a direct incitement to war.

There is total consensus in Bosnia on one thing. If IFOR leaves at the end of the year, war will start again. IFOR is more active than ever in keeping the cease-fire—removing new police check points, interrupting cycles of violence over attempts to return home on all sides, preventing escalation in the tit-for-tat arrests of accused war criminals between Croats and Muslims.

The transfer of responsibility for security to civilian police is, in the interim, an assigned task of the International Police Task Force, but it has no weapons or executive authority. In the meantime, with bombs being set at IPTF stations, criminal gangs a major civilian threat, and electoral violence likely, U.N. and U.S. officials have worked out a very good arrangement by which IPTF can call on IFOR to provide backup coercive threat. But the IPTF is woefully under-resourced. No radios, often no telephones, no fuel, insufficient cars, a reduction by half of their translators in the month of June alone for budgetary reasons because the United Nations does not have the money. The United States and its allies do not seem to recognize that IFOR can only begin to reduce its presence and hand that task to the civilian police in Bosnia if they support and supply the IPTF.

Let me then turn to the second aspect of the political process—and I mentioned something about the consequences and lessons of the Mostar elections, but let me simply emphasize that the key to exit for American forces and IFOR is the establishment of common institutions between the two entities for the entire country, and a normal, functioning government and rule of law.

The transfer of power after September elections from those who lose will be difficult. The Dayton Constitution creates a political system riven with countervailing vetoes and possibilities for delay. The fall will be a very difficult time for all as the international ac-

tors help to facilitate the formation of these common institutions with minimal violence. I do not predict a government formed by the end of December when we plan to leave.

Third, in terms of economic reconstruction and peace building. Most importantly, there is as yet no plan or strategy for achieving peace. This is blatantly obvious in the total lack of coordination among the many organizations and actors implementing the Accord. This lack of coordination and of strategy enables the three ruling parties to manipulate the international presence to their own advantage, while international actions are having the effect of dividing a country more, even while they aim to reintegrate it.

The President has done much in the past months to get the economic process moving faster. The congressional requirements not to aid the Republic of Srpska are playing right into the hands of nationalist Serbs who want separation and are preventing the Serb moderates—for example, in Banja Luka—from cooperating with allies in the Federation. Washington's nearly exclusive focus on indicted Serb war criminals and on train and equip is undermining coordination further, by creating very serious rifts among international actors and within each international organization there. It is contributing further to the country's partition.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Woodward, could you summarize in conclusion, please.

Dr. WOODWARD. Without the coordination and a strategy, I can't see how the international intervention will end.

Let me just say two things. The strongest impression I come back with is how much remains to be done, how much we are still at the beginning of this process. Though I think the mood suggests a great success for Dayton.

The second conclusion is that there is a consensus growing now that while the United States is still lauded as the great savior, the people who are seen to have brought peace to Bosnia, it is increasingly seen as a major threat in its unwillingness to commit beyond 12 months and to recognize what it takes to bring peace. It seems to me that if we do not say now, that we will stay, in some lighter follow-on force, and as we continue to invest an entirely new source of weapons, but say we're going to pull out at the end of December, there will be war, our massive investment will be lost, and we will be blamed.

Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Woodward.

We turn now to Dr. John Huffman, who has extensive international experience with travel in 80 countries, in addition to being pastor of St. Andrews Presbyterian Church in Newport Beach; serves as the chairman of the board of World Vision, United States, which has relief and development organizations operating 4900 air projects in 101 countries.

The floor is your's, Dr. Huffman.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HUFFMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, WORLD VISION
RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity for World Vision to testify before this joint hearing on the reconstruction of Bosnia and the prospects for peace. Let me introduce myself, I am John Huffman, Chairman of the World Vision U.S. Board of Directors and Pastor of St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church in Newport Beach, CA.

World Vision is an international, faith-based, private voluntary organization (PVO) with operations in 101 countries serving 49 million people.

I recently returned from Bosnia, where I observed the situation, had meetings with leaders and common people on all sides, and observed our World Vision work as well as that of other organizations.

Let me briefly describe our work in Bosnia and make some comments on the progress of the reconstruction of the country and the prospects for peace over the longer term.

Our work is geographically focused in four urban areas—Zenica, Mostar, Tuzla and Sarajevo—and sectorally focused on five basic interventions:

- (1) *Humanitarian relief assistance to those unable to care for themselves,*
- (2) Reconstruction or weatherization of 2,000 homes, 45 schools and 7 hospitals and health clinics,
- (3) Small enterprise business development,
- (4) Psycho-social counseling for people who have been the victims of atrocities, and
- (5) Reconciliation programs to facilitate the reconstruction of civil society.

We serve 200,000 people with a budget of \$14 million.

World Vision U.S. endorsed the Dayton Accords in December 1995 as the best chance for bringing peace to Bosnia, though we recognized then some of the weaknesses of the agreement. We warned last fall that the success or failure of the Accords would be contingent on rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, not on the actual provisions of the Accords themselves.

While we are cautiously optimistic about the long term prospects for the country, there are some warning signs which need to be monitored. Just as it is true that weapons do not cause wars—people do—the stabilization and rehabilitation of a country after a war is not accomplished solely by the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure. It is accomplished by the rebuilding of people's lives, and the institutions of civil society—religious institutions, the judiciary, the education system and private charitable and fraternal organizations—so the citizens of Bosnia can reestablish some routine, some normalcy in their lives.

This will not happen until three conditions are met:

- (1) First, the 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons must be repatriated and resettled to permanent communities. In particular, the return of the educated elites still stranded in camps to permanent communities is essential for public services to be restored, for entrepreneurs to start new businesses to create jobs, and for leaders to re-establish the political system. For this to happen, the long-term societal support structures that will draw people back must be shored-up, and in some cases, be rebuilt. There are great needs in agriculture, health care, education and infrastructure restoration. There also needs to be a focus on the long, hard task of reconciliation.

If you don't restore the leadership of a society, the peace process will not work. No donor country, including the U.S., has made repatriation and resettlement a central objective of its efforts. The U.S. and others should now. As a result of this failure, there has been only a trickle of population movements back home. This is a dangerous warning sign.

We in World Vision believe, with the United Nations High Commission for Relief (UNHCR), that repatriation and resettlement efforts should be focused on the front-line areas most damaged by the war. This is one reason why we chose to concentrate our work geographically in four of these war-ravaged, front-line areas.

- (2) Second, refugees and internally displaced persons must have homes to which they can return. People will not return to their communities without some assurance that they will have shelter and food to feed their families as they reconstruct their lives and their communities. We are troubled by reports that Congress opposes the use of American funding for housing reconstruction. Without it, there will be no peace and no return to normal life. People will not return home with winter approaching in 4 months if they have no shelter—their children will freeze in the Bosnian winter. The very refugees and displaced people essential to making a society viable remain in squalid camps, or in abandoned factories, garages and public buildings which were never designed to care for families. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has funded a modest housing reconstruction program through PVOs, but that will come to an end in a few months. There is no successor to it. If large scale programs are put in place, I believe they will stimulate a major population movement of refugees and displaced people back to their home communities.

- (3) Third, they must have some means of supporting themselves. The economy must produce enough jobs that people can feed their families. Donor governments and the World Bank have focused considerable attention on larger business development with loans of \$300,000 and above, which is certainly necessary. But it is not enough. Studies show that smaller businesses produce more jobs than larger busi-

nesses. The PVOs have focused on small business development, providing loans of \$3,000 to \$20,000, with demonstrable success. More resources need to be focused on small business development or the economy will not get moving. Without jobs there will be no lasting peace.

While we believe that PVOs are playing a critical role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Bosnia, we can not do it alone. Our private resources now are stretched to the limit. The presence of PVOs on the ground does act as a restraint on human rights abuses, and creates a more secure environment which encourages people to take the risk of returning home. We have shown we can act and move quickly; time is critically important. The window of opportunity for peace gets smaller and smaller and despondency takes over among the Bosnian people whose hopes rose so high after the Dayton Accords were signed. World Vision, like dozens of other PVOs, has used its publications and fund raising appeals to explain to our 1.3 million donors in the U.S. why we went to Bosnia and what we are doing there. This has served a powerful but quiet educational function critical to the support of U.S. efforts. This has brought millions of private dollars of contributions to fund PVO reconstruction efforts along with what PVOs have been granted by USAID, United Nations agencies and the World Bank.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HUFFMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, WORLD VISION RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.

Dr. HUFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman.

Having recently returned from Bosnia, serving as a voluntary chair of World Vision, let me make some brief description of our work and then some thoughts, in a condensed form, from that manuscript you have in front of you.

Our work is focused in four urban areas—Zenica, Mostar, Tuzla, Sarajevo—and sectorally focused on five basic interventions: No. 1, humanitarian relief assistance to those unable to care for themselves; No. 2, reconstruction or weatherization of homes, schools and hospitals, and health clinics; No. 3, small enterprise business development; No. 4, psycho-social counseling for people who have been victims of atrocities; and No. 5, reconciliation programs to facilitate the reconstruction of civil society.

We are serving 200,000 people at the present moment with a budget of \$14 million.

We endorse the Dayton Accords as the best chance for bringing peace to Bosnia, although we recognize some of the weaknesses of the agreement. We warned last fall that the success or failure of the Accords would be contingent on rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, not on the actual provisions of the Accords themselves.

While we are cautiously optimistic about the long term prospects for the country, there are some warning signs which need to be monitored. Let me say, there will be no permanent peace, in my estimation, unless three conditions are met.

First, the two million refugees and internally displaced persons must be repatriated and resettled to permanent communities, not necessarily their previous homes, but to permanent communities. In particular, the return of the educated elites still stranded in camps to permanent communities is essential for public services to be restored.

Second, refugees and internally displaced persons must have homes to which they can return. People will not return to their communities without some assurance that they will have shelter, food to feed their families, as they reconstruct their lives and communities. We are troubled by reports that Congress opposes the use of American funding for housing reconstruction. Without it, there

will be no peace, no return to normal life, and winterization of housing there is very important.

And third, they must have some means of supporting themselves. The economy must produce enough jobs that people can feed their families. Donor governments and the World Bank have focused considerable attention on larger business development—and the recent Parsons contract is significant—but we are convinced that these loans of \$300,000 and above, though they are necessary, that's not enough. Private voluntary organizations have focused on small business development, providing loans in the \$3,000 to \$20,000 category, and we believe employment is very critical, of former soldiers, and much of that can be done through micro-business development.

Let me conclude by saying while we believe that the PVO's are playing a critical role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Bosnia, we cannot do it alone. Our private resources are now stretched to the limit. The presence of the private voluntary organizations on the ground does act as a restraint on human rights abuses and creates a more secure environment which encourages people to take the risk of returning home. We have shown we can act and move quickly. Time is critically important, and we would urge that we emphasize at the micro level as well as at the macro level involvement.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Huffman.

We now turn to the vice president for Overseas Policy and Planning of the International Rescue Committee. Mr. Roy Williams, whose activities on the international scene go back to 1974 when he worked with the American Council for Nationality Services, and then was later country representative for the Intergovernmental Commission for European Migration, and later served in Bangkok, Thailand, for the International Commission for European Migration, and was Chief of Operations in Geneva, Switzerland, for the ICM, and has been vice president for Overseas Programs of the International Rescue Committee since 1985.

We welcome you here, Mr. Williams, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT BY H. ROY WILLIAMS, VICE PRESIDENT FOR OVERSEAS POLICY,
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

BACKGROUND

The International Rescue Committee has been active in the Former Yugoslavia since January of 1992. Our presence there was based on assessments conducted during 1991. These assessments convinced us that it would be essential to be on the ground early on, before the war spread. The potential for disruption based on ethnic and social issues was already apparent. An early conclusion was that the distribution of humanitarian assistance would, therefore, be extremely complex. Cooperation across boundaries, be they ethnic or political, would be unlikely.

Other aspects of the situation also became clear. The coping resources of the area were considerable by comparison with conflictive circumstances elsewhere in the world. The skill level of the population was very high and the industrial base fairly diverse and widespread. There was regular commerce with the remainder of Europe. This commerce was carried out in the usual commercial manner and buttressed by large-scale labor exchange. We also recognized that the proximity to Western Europe would greatly facilitate procurement of needed supplies.

The significance of this was evident. A relief strategy could be built upon a wider base of options than were usually present. In fact, this offsetting conclusion dictated much of our actions during the following 4 years. This observation is no less relevant today.

One of the strongest aspects of our program activity, which exceeded some \$70,000,000 during this period, was the development of local production techniques as an alternative to the direct provision of all aspects of the societies needs. We located and restarted over 40 small factories in a variety of regions. They produced a range of needed goods including stoves, blankets, clothing, sanitation supplies and vitamin-enriched foods.

The value of this was two-fold. Goods were produced which were of immediate assistance to local communities. Additional goods were moved by the trucking fleet we set up to smaller communities without alternative means of support.

A typical arrangement would involve the provision of raw materials obtained either locally or from Europe. Sometimes startup funds would be provided. There would be agreement on the amount and quality of goods. A percentage of these goods would have to be donated to refugees or displaced persons and the balance could be sold at a fair market price. Money was placed in circulation and a group of wage earners reestablished. A needy population was supported and, we believe, fewer internally displaced and refugees were created. This approach opened the way to an extensive range of contacts with civil and governmental actors. These contacts have been maintained.

Funding support for these projects came from a variety of sources including privately raised dollars. The main input, however, was through AID and BPRM.

Other approaches involved the movement and distribution of seed sufficient to produce over 400,000 tons of food. Again, community involvement was critical to the success of this operation as monitoring of distribution was of paramount importance. We subsequently revised the pattern of distribution to reflect a growing knowledge of the needs of the beneficiaries.

Originally, we concentrated on dealing with the larger producers. We found that this approach, while successful, was not the most effective way to reach smaller farmers and households. A change was made. Instead of moving seed in 50-pound bags and utilizing central warehouses, we developed family packets of seeds producing vegetables selected for nutritional value. This change obviously complicated the distribution, since many more trips were made and to a much wider geographic area. On the other hand, those individuals within communities who are often lost track of benefited.

Water and gas were major concerns during the encirclement of Sarajevo. IRC was active in repair of gas pipelines and their extension to areas housing a vulnerable population. The centralized boiler system was another focal point for activity and some 23 units supplying heat to thousands in Sarajevo was the next target. Much of the work force came from the city itself. Another example of the capability of the community being tapped into by NGOs.

Mobile water systems were installed in Sarajevo through a combination of United Nations funding and U.S. government transport assistance. It is worth noting that throughout the war AID took a proactive approach to the problems and seemed fully appreciative of the flexibility of the NGOs.

Our work with the Office of Transition Initiatives of AID provided yet another opportunity to build on our extensive experience with a variety of local communities. The objective of this work was to start the process of rehabilitation within the Federation created in the Washington agreement of March 1994. Projects were to be carried out in the spirit of the Federation, meaning within the framework of ethnic reconciliation.

Communities were engaged to work on projects ranging from school reconstruction to rehabilitation of sports fields. Medical logistics centers and road repair were among a host of others. The critical elements were community involvement and inter-ethnic participation. Results have been mixed. The lessons learned will not go unnoticed in future planning.

A "Primer" was worked out. (See Attachment I.) Organizations entering into the rehabilitation process were requested to guide themselves by its recommendations. It is a candid document and makes no simplistic assumptions as to how easy the road ahead is.

THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

A close look at the past 4-plus years of NGO involvement in the former Yugoslavia suggest at least three things. One, the role of the NGOs in maintaining the populace has been considerable. True, the United Nations was given the overall responsibility but then as now the UN requires so-called implementing partners to be effective. Dozens of NGOs have established networks of actors both national and international. The common element in this has been a focus on attempting to be of assistance. NGOs have understood what is happening on the ground out of dire ne-

cessity. Security was often a concern. The limited availability of resources and the need for local cooperation went hand in hand.

Two, the support provided through the U.S. Government was the difference in enabling the NGO community to move quickly and creatively. True we provided considerable resources from our own coffers but the sheer magnitude of the problem made AID funding critical.

Three, the former Yugoslavia remains a highly fragmented area. It was, of course, imperative that local authority be buttressed during the war. Communication was often restricted and crossing of ethnic boundaries was frequently impossible. It was, more often than not, this local authority that the NGO community interacted with. This is not to say that there wasn't extensive involvement with the governments in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica; there was all during the war and it continues to this day. That fragmentation is still a factor and should be recognized in planning.

The Dayton peace has not changed the face of the region overnight. Much of what will happen over the next several months and years will turn upon local decision making and utilization of local resources. Rebuilding will occur on several levels. Clearly, the massive infrastructure projects will be imperative. But so too will be the smaller second level projects. These are analogous to the work carried out by NGOs during the war. It is our view that the contacts made and relationships established will be critical to accomplishing the work of reconstruction.

The rapidly emerging mental health concerns of this population have been recognized. The NGO community has marshaled funds and attention to begin dealing with a far-reaching problem. The trust gained during the war has facilitated these efforts.

Small business activity is crucial to the reestablishment of a sense of normalcy. Again, it is the NGO community that is well positioned to facilitate the expansion of this sector.

We, therefore, should be looking at the problem of reconstruction as a multifaceted one. The bilateral mechanisms and those of large industrial action represent one aspect of the problem. Lying in the wings is a proven and respected resource—the NGO community.

Thank you for your attention.

IRC—THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

IRC, the first American relief organization on the ground in the former Yugoslavia has operated more programs than any other non-government organization there. Over 26 dedicated internationals, mostly Americans work with more than 150 national staff to bring relief to those most in need.

1996 Objectives.—IRC has been carrying out programs to meet the emergency needs of the victims of the conflict since 1992. In 1996, IRC is focusing on assisting vulnerable groups, while developing and implementing programs emphasizing sustainability and self-reliance.

Locations.—IRC serves nearly the entire region of Federated Bosnia. From field offices in Tuzla, Zenica and Sarajevo, staff monitor and assist all Bosnian municipalities. IRC also operates in Croatia and Serbia with offices in Zagreb, Split and Belgrade.

MAJOR PROGRAMS TO DATE

Programs Designed to Strengthen Bosnian/Croat Federation.—IRC is developing projects to strengthen the fragile social and political bonds between Muslims and Croats.

Agriculture.—Since IRC's first distribution of seeds in the spring of 1993, the organization has delivered close to 25,000 metric tons of vegetable and wheat seed, yielding about 400,000 metric tons of food. Cultivation of fruit orchards and mushroom farms are being supported as well as fisheries.

Local Production.—Recognizing that many communities could produce emergency items such as clothing, footwear, and stoves if given a minimum of assistance, IRC has revitalized over 40 factories, reducing transport time and cost, and putting people back to work.

Non-Food Distribution.—For the fourth year in a row, IRC is providing stoves, solid fuels, clothing, footwear, sheeting, blankets and other necessities to elderly, mentally and physically disabled people; female managed households; and unaccompanied children; and those recently displaced.

Shelter and Infrastructure.—IRC has carried out more than 750 shelter renovation and other facility rehabilitation projects, including collective centers, schools, hospitals and private homes. IRC completed a \$10.5 million project to improve

Sarajevo's natural gas system and a \$5.5 million program to repair the city's gas-fired heating boilers and installed 3,750 gas connections. More than 600 tons of supplies were transported over the treacherous Mt. Igman road to complete these projects.

Transport and Logistics.—IRC operated the largest trucking fleet among non-government organizations working in the former Yugoslavia. From warehouses and logistic facilities in Metkovic, Zagreb, Split and Belgrade IRC has delivered hundreds of thousands of tons of aid since 1992.

Mental Health.—Many in the population are in a state of despair and acute anxiety. IRC is helping victims of the conflict to cope and addressing mental health needs in Bosnia and Croatia. Programs particularly focus on women and children.

Physical Rehabilitation.—Many of those injured in the Bosnian conflict have suffered permanent physical impairment through amputation, nerve injury, or paralysis. There's also been an increase in stroke victims and children with epilepsy as a result of the shelling. To enhance the delivery of physical rehabilitation, IRC provides training, education, and some basic education and supplies to treatment facilities in Zenica and Tuzla.

Children's Medical Project.—IRC is treating war-injured and critically ill children in Zagreb.

APPENDIX I

FEDERATION-BUILDING AND ETHNIC RECONCILIATION: A PRIMER

[The following closely resembles the presentation provided by MC-OTI to NGOs at the "Federation Workshop" seminars held in Split and Zenica. It represents the current status of MC-OTI's conceptual understandings of the Federation and Federation-building, including all strategies and practices utilized to date. It is by no means a final record, representing a definitive finished plan or course of action. These ideas are in a constant state of development and are offered as a baseline from which further discussion and emendation can occur. The following should be read with the understanding that this was prepared for NGOs who are bracing themselves to play a larger part in reconciliation and political development here in Bosnia—something new to almost all of them.]

Increasingly, NGOs remaining in or new to Bosnia are constrained to apply themselves toward supporting both the developing Federation and promoting ethnic reconciliation. This is especially true of organizations receiving funding from the American government, although more donors from other countries are beginning to link their resources to such criteria as well. With the core of several regional political accords, including the Dayton Agreement, centering on a viable Federation entity and provisions for the return of DPs and the reestablishment of multiethnic communities, NGO activity will increasingly be called to play a supportive role in the realization of these goals.

Specifically, organizations are being asked to actively attempt to influence the outcome of the political experiment called the Bosnian Federation, created in the Washington Agreement of March 1994. Governmental entities, the UN, NGOs, and international business interests will all have to formulate creative, imaginative, and determined approaches to advance the Federation vision. Local will is apparently insufficient. Regional leaders have called upon the international community to catalyze the formation of true multi-ethnic governing institutions and to help surmount the inertia and deadlock brought on by 4 years of war.

Whether the Federation is the long term solution to Bosnia's current ills is a legitimate question, as is whether or not the Federation is a good idea. The fact is, however, few if any options are at hand other than this embryonic political blueprint for post-war Bosnia. If the Federation should fail, a return to war or a tense enclaving of ethnic territories is likely, along with the economic hardship associated with the period preceding the signing of the Washington

What follows is a series of suggestions and guidelines for those engaging in reconciliation and Federation support programming to consider as they go about their work.

Why should NGOs consider formalizing their Federation-building efforts?

Before even attempting to characterize "Federation-building," it is appropriate to ask why any structure should be imposed on the concept at all? Why shouldn't each organization simply do what it feels is best? Why bother attempting to coordinate this activity when so many attempts to collaborate on much simpler tasks have failed?

First, organizations who enter the field with the intention of doing Federation building or ethnic reconciliation work are regularly encountering authorities who engage in judicious use of "Federation speak". This is "multi-multi-speak"; "multi-ethnic", "multi-cultural", etc. Having an evaluative framework to deconstruct the talk and to judge our own efforts is critical. If we know what we are looking to do we can more easily bring municipal representatives and others into the process of developing and participating in projects. It also allows us to ascertain how we are measuring up to the standards we set out for ourselves and whether the promises described through "Federation speak" will endure as proposals are further developed.

Second, without a clear understanding of what we mean by Federation-building, we will confuse municipalities as we all besiege them for projects—and we will confuse and frustrate one another. Municipalities will have a difficult time developing consistent proposals for the NGO community. We will also create an environment where clever authorities may play NGOs off of one another, allowing them to "shop" for an NGO with the easiest terms. This will favor politically intransigent and separatist authorities in their bids to retain power.

Third, if we engage in parallel development or work that benefits only one ethnic group while calling such efforts "Federation-building," we solidify the base of support of separatist ethnic leaders who may argue that they can both attract international money to the locale while remaining true to a separatist ethnic dogma.

Fourth, without consistent approaches among the NGO community we are losing our ability to have financial influence in Croat areas that are generally wealthier than neighboring Bosniac communities. Whereas Bosniac communities are still in greater need of assistance and are often more willing to subscribe to the terms of the donor, Croat areas can be more discriminating concerning who they choose to work with. Without coordination and consistency we lose our ability to negotiate.

Fifth, with increasing numbers of organizations and more resources being brought to bear on Federation development and ethnic reconciliation, only coordinated and consistent effort will catalyze political progress. For example, strategies that envision occasional withholding of funds, using Federation institutions instead of separate ethnic authorities, and linking aid to concrete political progress will only work if most, if not all organizations coordinate and adopt a basic set of working assumptions.

What is "Federation-Building"?

"Federation-building" work may mean direct support for the establishment of Federation institutions and the demographics to allow those institutions to govern. It may be as direct as helping Federation institutions set up office space, assisting in the creation of Federation ministries, supporting the training of judges, police, progressive leaders, etc. It may mean directly supporting reconciliation and the establishment of multiethnic communities by creating utility interdependence, joint use facilities and services, housing for DPs of all ethnicities in a single location, and promoting freedom of movement through repair of rail lines, roads, etc. This has been referred to in the past as the "bricks and mortar" of Federation-building work.

But there is also crucial work to be done promoting the "spirit" of the Federation. The Federation, as a political creation, rests squarely on liberal western democratic principles—principles which had very little time to develop before the war. Work that promotes multi-party democracy, independent media, citizen's associations, revitalization of cultural opportunities, and enhancing educational facilities and avenues for individual expression are all examples of efforts to stabilize the democratic underpinnings of the Federation.

A wide range of activity can therefore be considered "Federation-building" yet several characteristics appear to be central to Federation support, whether we do "bricks and mortar" work or engage in fostering the "spirit" of the Federation. The following matrix attempts to preserve this flexibility while holding the efforts we call "Federation-building" to certain standards. (These may also be used as objectives by which to measure the success or failure of our work at the completion of projects. See "Measuring Success" below.)

An ideal project would include all the following components. It should be noted that the greater number of the following characteristics a project takes on, the greater the complications in developing and implementing that project. However, the greater number of the following characteristics a project has, the greater its overall impact toward the end of Federation building. IRC-OTI holds itself to engaging in projects which have a minimum of two of the following recommended characteristics for Federation-building projects:

Using Federation Institutions.—Involvement of Federation institutions (municipal, cantonal, or federal) in identifying, developing, approving, and implementing

projects. (In any project where municipal or other governmental approval is necessary for project implementation, work only through established Federation bodies.)

Resolving Cross-Community/Divided Community Tensions.—Fostering interdependence, freedom of movement, and bridging a divided community (*i.e.*, Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, Vitez-Stari Vitez, East Mostar-West Mostar) or developing linkages between divided communities (*i.e.*, Zepce-Zavidovici, Maglaj-Novi Seher).

Multi-ethnic Participation.—Involving Bosniacs, Croats, and/or “Others” from involved communities in the course of project.

Cultivating Democracy.—Encouragement of democratic processes in the development and implementation of the project. This may, for example, include support of independent media, alternative party participation in Federation development, and citizens associations promoting dialogue about multi-ethnicity and participation in a transitioning state.

The following outline provides a more elaborate treatment of each of these four characteristics including common features of federation building projects which contain such attributes. A review of the pros and cons of using such characteristics as elements of a federation building project is included.

Federation Building Characteristics Practically Considered

1. Involvement of newly formed Federation institutions

- a. Identify projects in conjunction with newly formed Federation institutions
 - i. encourage Federation bodies to present project concepts for funding
 - ii. have Federation bodies investigate project possibilities with local officials
- b. Implement projects by coordinating through Federation institutions
 - i. run implementing funds through Federation bodies
 - ii. use Federation bodies to coordinate labor or other local inputs
- c. Use Federation institutions to coordinate or influence local communities
 - i. gather necessary documentation
 - ii. have Federation officials secure necessary approvals from higher Federal authorities

PROS: encourages the legitimacy of the newly formed institutions; helps Federation institutions become involved in operational issues (*i.e.*, runs resources through Federation structures); if they lack the capacity to implement projects at least provides an opportunity to become involved in local issues.

CONS: Federation institutions may not yet enjoy much political influence at the local, cantonal or Federal level; Institutions may lack the necessary local knowledge to identify or implement projects, or possess the capacity to implement or monitor a project; infant Federal institutions may have their development weakened by local officials who continue to enjoy a great degree of autonomy; Does not always apply to project development (*i.e.*, in supporting citizen's associations, independent media, or other avenues of expression out of favor with current political authorities, it may even be advisable to circumvent government authorization and involvement).

2. Resolving cross community/divided community tensions

- a. Identify projects which bridge the ethnic divide between two sides of a divided community, or develop linkages between ethnically distinct communities
 - i. interdependent infrastructure
 - iii. joint public services
- b. Involve both sides of a divided community, or two neighboring, but ethnically distinct communities, in the implementation process
 - i. insist on joint meetings and joint approval for project
 - ii. ethnically mixed local labor when possible
 - iii. encourage local contributions of in-kind donations as an expression of political will
- c. Ensure results benefit both sides of a divided community, or two neighboring, but ethnically distinct communities
 - i. insure freedom of movement issues resolved
 - ii. insure sufficient local will to use facility or service
 - iii. equal access to the facility or service
 - iv. insist on joint management and maintenance of facility or service
- d. Promote reintegration and interdependence between, or within such communities
 - i. improves freedom of movement
 - ii. development of trust
 - iii. deconstructs political divisions

iv. reintegrates management systems

PROS: focuses resources on communities directly affected by conflict; promotes interdependence; reestablishes trust; avoids concentrating resources in one community; addresses social and political isolation; encourages joint decisionmaking; often, but not always involves multi-ethnic participation in implementation and/or use; avoids "parallel development"—building evenly on each side but not creating interdependence, common use, or common linkage.

CONS: may be the most difficult kind of project to implement; implementation or management difficulties might exacerbate tensions between communities; might encourage premature interaction; procurement of materials, hiring of local skilled labor and site location may be unavoidably unequal; one-for-one participation may not satisfy both communities if perception of inequality exists.

3. Multi-ethnic participation

- a. Identify projects which bring ethnic groups together
 - i. across communities lines
 - ii. between divided communities
 - iii. and within communities with primarily one ethnic group
- b. Involve multi-ethnic labor force or multi-ethnic teams in the implementation process
 - i. insure ethnic balance in teams
 - ii. joint decision making (*i.e.*, ethnicity of team leaders, etc.)
 - iii. insure equitable application of implementation funds
 - (1) procurement of materials in both communities
 - (2) equal wages for labor hired from both ethnic groups
- c. Ensure results benefit inter-ethnic relations and promote cooperation
 - i. equal access to finished product
 - ii. freedom of movement
 - iii. joint management of facility or service
- d. Promote the cultivation of trust between ethnic groups
 - i. community activities
 - ii. project improves community relations with minority ethnic group
 - iii. improves interaction between ethnic groups within or between communities

PROS: improves inter-ethnic interaction; promotes integration of ethnic minorities; provides resources to ethnically mixed groups; empowers ethnic minorities; forces political recognition of minorities; can often be linked to cross community/divided community projects.

CONS: insisting on mixed work crew may not be technically feasible if skills rest primarily in one community; extremely difficult to establish what constitutes a reasonable ethnic mix; insistence on ethnic mix may exacerbate ethnic identification; re-enforces ethnic consciousness and potentially, isolation.

4. Cultivating democracy

- a. Identify projects from outside the conventional lines of authority
 - i. media or artist with no avenue of expression
 - ii. alternative or non-political groups
 - iii. groups who's organization or operations are democratic
- b. Involve those who might not identify with the existing political process
 - i. groups or individuals which do not feel represented by national/ethnic parties
 - ii. those wanting to provide a service which is not viewed as significant by the existing political authorities
 - iii. involve those promoting alternative to ethnic identity
- c. Ensure product benefits a broad constituency and promotes democratic political or social processes
 - i. encourages a democratic evolution of the Federation
 - ii. politicizes and empowers individuals apathetic with past and present political systems
 - iii. activates marginalized or disenfranchised members of society
 - iv. promotes consideration of alternatives to emerging two party nationalist political identity

PROS: provides counter point to emerging two party nationalist political system; provides resources for alternatives to ethnic identity; reintroduces democratic processes into the Federation's development; potentially encourages greater political involvement in the political process; instills hope in the transitioning state.

CONS: may directly challenge the authority of the two dominant national political parties; may jeopardize the neutrality and apolitical mandate of humanitarian orga-

nizations; may actually act to weaken the emerging Federation system which is currently dominated and driven by two nationalist political parties.

Specific Examples of Federation-Building Projects

Projects which harbor combinations of the above attributes may include; building offices for Federation institutions; resettlement of DPs into multi-ethnic neighborhoods and communities; supporting local enterprise initiatives that will employ or benefit individuals of all backgrounds; creating an academic journal written by and for intellectuals of all ethnic backgrounds; supporting independent media—news-papers, television, radio; creating functional linkages in rail, electric, water, sanitation, heating, and communications systems, etc.; supporting citizen's councils, university libraries, professional guilds; supporting traveling multi-ethnic entertainment groups offering a tolerance theme in their work; support for ambulanta and hospitals staffed by and serving all ethnicities; support for joint children's choir's, teen sports groups, dance instruction, recreation facilities, etc.; establishing e-mail networks, mobile teaching services, etc. A great many kinds of projects can fall under the label "Federation-building". In general, it is a rebuilding of the civil and social infrastructure of society. By adopting a framework for our efforts, we can more easily identify, coordinate, explain, and measure what it is we choose to do to support the transitioning state.

Development and Implementation Strategies for Federation Building Work: Suggestions

Several strategies are useful in identifying, developing, and finally implementing proposals and projects. Not all of these will be appropriate in all projects, but where relevant, use of the following approaches can amplify the Federation-building impact of a chosen activity. It is not only a project's outcome that should be weighed for its Federation-building value. Opportunities for reconciliation and political development exist at every stage of project development and implementation.

All projects should either be identified or designed in conjunction with municipal authorities, local organizations, or appropriate individuals from the community. In each case, all authorities or individuals to be involved in the realization of the project, regardless of the community in which they live, should be required to be present in common meetings. Safety of individuals should be arranged prior to such engagements. This increases inter-ethnic contact and demands consideration of freedom of movement issues from the very beginning of proposal development while decreasing opportunities for miscommunication that often arise as NGO representatives shuttle from one authority to the other. Even if the project never survives the preparation phase, at least some impact will have occurred from simple insistence on regular joint meetings.

Proposals which create opportunities for long-term interaction between ethnicities should be preferred over the support of one-time or short-term events. Short-term interaction opportunities should be avoided to prevent "negative image reinforcement" that sometimes occurs in brief encounters with the stereotyped "enemy". Provisions should be designed into projects, where appropriate, to ensure interaction and continuity beyond the life-span of the project.

Contributions should be requested from the communities/authorities/individuals benefiting from the project. These may take the form of materials, labor or dissension and an opportunity for those involved to develop a sense of investment in the outcome of the project.

Where governmental assent or involvement is necessary, only Federation institutions should be approached and addressed as the relevant legitimate governing bodies. They may be used, where appropriate, to arrange joint access, management, and fundamental guarantees of freedom of movement and mine clearing, for example.

Materials and services used in the course of the project should be obtained through balanced purchasing. Economies in both Bosniac- and Croat-controlled areas are supported through such practice. While it may be more expensive to procure some materials from Bosniac sources, this should be considered a legitimate cost of doing Federation support work and creating equal economic benefit. Buying from local sources should also be considered. The current economic disparity between Croat and Bosniac areas is one of the biggest impediments to Federation progress.

Materials and payments for services should be delivered according to a schedule that allows the NGO to address problematic developments, stop payment or provision of supplies, and apply pressure for correction.

Generous reporting requirements should be built into each project contract. This will not only help educate the implementing NGO but also assist in monitoring the Federation-building effort and measuring its overall effect.

Where applicable, projects promoting parallel development in divided communities should not be supported. Only projects that propose to develop interdependent linkages and greater interaction opportunities between areas of control in such environments will be considered.

Where appropriate and required, the resettlement of displaced persons should only be supported after security guaranties by involved municipalities and civilian and military authorities are received and evaluated.

General Orientations: Implications of Making Federation-Building a Priority

Whether an organization identifies Federation-building and/or ethnic reconciliation as the primary features of a particular project—or the mandate of its entire operation—several implications follow. Federation-building often means not doing business as usual as compared to the standard operating procedures of the last 4 years of Bosnian relief efforts.

Identifying, developing, and implementing effective Federation-building projects takes time, determination and patience. Donors and implementers alike must recognize the delicate nature of much of this work and the careful preparation that must be put into each endeavor to ensure the greatest likelihood of success. It may take months to prepare the appropriate groundwork for certain kinds of projects.

Organizations must be willing to be assertive in the face of non-compliance and project goals are obstructed. The approach should not be to spend money, for the single reason of using the amount of expended monies as a measure of effort. Quite simply, it often has little to do with a project's Federation-building impact. Often, withholding funds motivates reconciliation and political progress more than rapid expenditures of large sums of money. Sometimes a relatively small amount, targeted at the right project, can inspire much more reconciliation and progress than immense expenditures on grandiose projects. Again, much depends on firmly identifying the priority of the project/organization.

The total number of beneficiaries served by a project is also not an adequate measure of a project's worth. Sometimes a highly symbolic project, such as repairing the completely devastated adjacent homes of a prominent Croat and Bosniac who wish to return to a tense and polarized community, may have immense psychological impact. The ratio of costs to beneficiaries may be unappealing but the ultimate impact of the project may be attractive.

Even "inefficiency" may need to be tolerated on occasion. For example, if a housing or road repair project could be completed quicker—and with better quality—by securing the services of a contractor, it would seem to make sense to secure such services. However, if the only contractors available are from ethnically homogenous areas then little ethnic interaction will occur during project implementation. If arrangements are made to secure qualified ethnically mixed supervisors to oversee a work force that is able, mixed, but put together from both the project community(ies) and elsewhere, ethnic interaction is facilitated throughout the project's course. It may take longer, occasionally cost more, and produce products of lesser quality but "inefficiency" can turn into "project strategy" with reconciliation as the priority of programming. Again, it is not only a project's outcome that should be weighed for its Federation-building value. Opportunities for reconciliation exist at every stage of project development and implementation.

Organizations may want to restrict their activities to those municipalities where concrete political progress toward implementation of the Federation has been made. When coordinated with political initiatives, donors, and other implementers, this linkage to Federation formation can encourage Federation-building activity in more politically stagnant communities. Exceptions to this general rule may include scenarios where the introduction of projects in separatist communities would act as catalyst toward implementation of the Federation in that locality.

Measuring Federation-Building

Federation building and ethnic reconciliation are elusive qualities to measure. *First*, progress may be gauged by assessing the growth of Federation institutions themselves. This would be in keeping with a stricter understanding of the meaning of "Federation-building" but would not be helpful in measuring the outcome of projects that do not directly engender the creation of institutions. *Second*, the total number of beneficiaries assisted by a proposal under consideration may be the measure of choice. This is not unlike methods already utilized by organizations using funds without the strings of "Federation-building" attached. But, as mentioned above, serving the greatest number of

Third, some quantification of the degree of ethnic interaction could be attempted, creating a "cooperation index" by which to evaluate improvement. Identifying the variables to assign numerical values to would, in this case, be challenging and po-

tentially controversial. *Fourth*, also mentioned above, progress could be measured using the simple exhaustion of granted monies as a criteria. Organizations may cite the total amount of funds spent toward "Federation-building" as a measure of accomplishment, without ever identifying their understanding of the concept or maximizing Federation-building opportunities throughout the duration of the project.

Below is a draft of a working paper suggesting some interim evaluative strategies for Federation-building work that attempts to overcome the limitations of the measures mentioned above. It is by no means complete and will need far more development to be a truly useful tool. It utilizes the characteristics recommended for Federation-building projects and makes objectives of them. Each is followed by questions whose answers may provide both qualitative and quantitative measures of a project's ultimate impact. Again, this is a early draft in an ongoing effort to devise a more comprehensive measurement scheme for such projects.

Strategies for Assessing the Impact of "Federation-Building" Projects: Draft

1. Objective: Expedite the formation and growth of Federation institutions.
 - In what ways has a Federation body participated in a given project?
 - Has the project significantly altered perceptions of the Federation body in the communities it serves?
 - Were projects and support used to encourage development of Federation institutions in an otherwise intransigent environment?
 - Are there any observable differences in the Federation structure or in Federation authority over a region as a direct result of IRC reconciliation projects?
2. Objective: Diminish cross community/divided community separatism.
 - Are freedom of movement restrictions eased in the project community?
 - Were interdependent linkages established between separate or in divided communities?
 - Were projects identified, developed, implemented, and/or managed cooperatively by each community?
 - What contributions were made by each community to the project?
 - Have projects encouraged larger linkages between the communities in question and the surrounding region, national governing bodies, or the international community?
 - Have long-term joint use agreements resulted from projects in the area?
3. Objective: Involve Croats, Bosniacs, and where appropriate, "Others" in each project.
 - What role did Croats, Bosniacs, and "Others" play in the realization of projects?
 - How were program funds distributed in communities? What percentages of resources benefited which communities?

STATEMENT OF ROY WILLIAMS, VICE PRESIDENT FOR OVERSEAS PROGRAMS, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, sir.

I think, given what has already been said, that I am going to just narrow my observations to the perspective of one organization working on the ground since January 1992, and where we see the situation in the former Yugoslavia as coming out today.

Basically the things that have been most impressive to us have been the striking fragmentation of that society, and that fragmentation goes down to every level. This is important, I think, because of the complexities of stitching it back together again. I can remember being in places where one house was destroyed and the house next door to it was left standing. The implication was quite obvious as to what was happening within what was then a very small community.

The other thing that I think that after spending a lot of time over there became perfectly apparent was the very opportunistic use of the West on the part of the combatants, and by combatants, I am referring to all sides.

We, the West, tend to categorize things, and that made it very easy for those involved in politicizing what was happening on the ground, to have messages one way or the other, which were very useful. In short, created our own Frankensteins very easily by taking a very simplistic view of what was happening during this war.

I think some of the observations and some of the questions that have already been raised focus on this. We talk about a split between the military responsibilities and the civilian responsibilities, which is certainly there. If you look back at what UNPROFOR was doing for a long time in a failed way in the former Yugoslavia, they attempted to incorporate some of the civilian responsibilities simply because there, was no one else around to do some of the things that the civilian communities needed done.

This has imposed a tremendous burden on IFOR, because that expectation still is there within the communities. I think they look at IFOR and saying, to a certain degree, in a disappointed way, why did you not do what UNPROFOR did in a very local sense.

Going back to my first statement, this, too, reflects the fragmentation within the society. This world, to put it simply, has come to expect a great deal from the West, has come to rely very heavily upon what the West has done, all in the absence of a political framework, which is very much in the process of being developed now. They don't see that there is a wide range of choices.

The last time I was there I made it a point of talking to all of our people, national staff, who had worked for us over the last 4 years, those of them that were still around, and I think the striking consensus was that if IFOR were to leave, the war would resume immediately.

They are going about building their homes. They have no choice. That's the natural thing to do. But they are doing it without a great deal of confidence in their future.

Reference was made to the Mostar election as having been carried off successfully. That's true. There were something like 3,000 troops and ITPF people there. It's not easy to avoid violence under those circumstances. I remember Mostar before the fighting, and even then this fragmentation was implicit in what was happening in that city, well before the fighting began. It should not have come as a surprise to anyone.

Nonetheless, here we are in 1996, looking at what the Dayton Accords have accomplished, working within the Federation Accords and trying to stitch it all together.

I think my concluding remarks must essentially be that to rebuild, we have to really do it probably in the most primitive way possible: from the ground up, and make no assumptions as to the distinctions between the military role and the civilian role. I don't know that making such a situation is going to enable us to go very much further than we have already gone.

Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Williams.

I'll begin with Mr. Williams. You talk about their fragmentation of society, talk about rebuilding from the ground up, looking for a political framework. Just how do we go about that and how much time will it take and how much will it require by resources from NATO, United Nations, or the United States.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, again, I will have to acknowledge that some of my remarks have been inspired, as it were by something of what I have heard here, plus some of the thinking that we have all been doing over time. But how do we go about it? One is an assumption that I understand being made, that there is a central government which actually, was—whose writ runs across all of Bosnia. That is simply not the case. There are cities that have established, out of necessity, during the war, their own structures. They've maintained their own communities. They've protected their own people. And a lot of that—

Chairman SPECTER. How do we get that central government? Is it realistic for the United States to stay there long enough for—for IFOR to stay there long enough to do that job? How long is it going to take? How long will there be patience of the American people to support that?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I can't presume to answer that question. My only sense of it is that in order to create a central government you have to first recognize what is not there. In other words, start the conversation not with the central government exclusively, but with the regional governments, with the central government as the focal point finally. That is the only answer I can give to that, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. Can you do it with the regional governments without a central government?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, sir, you can. It was done all during the war with considerable success.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Woodward, you're pretty emphatic that if IFOR leaves, there is going to be a very bad situation there, destruction of society. What—what kind of a timeframe are you looking at to keep IFOR there and to keep U.S. military forces there?

Dr. WOODWARD. I think the first thing is we need to stay through the next elections. The elections of September 1996, will be followed in 2 years time. Let's assume September again. No question in my mind that in those 2 years, we will see whether a central—a common government among the two—between the two entities can in fact function, or whether the country has, in fact, been partitioned. We will then have elections in 1998, which most of the opposition parties now are really—on all sides, including the Serb side, are looking toward, as a chance, really to replace the current warlords.

So we could stay through the end, let's say, of 1998, with a much smaller force, and see what has happened, and if in fact the country has been partitioned and everyone goes their own way, we could do the final drawing of new borders which will have to take place.

Chairman SPECTER. Smaller force? We currently have 60,000. IFOR—

Dr. WOODWARD. Yes, closer to 55,000.

Chairman SPECTER. How much?

Dr. WOODWARD. Closer to 55,000 now, even though it says 60,000, that suits 55. I know the current planning for a follow on force says that about 20,000 might well be sufficient if it is well deployed. So that's quite a substantial—

Chairman SPECTER. Twenty thousand total?

Dr. WOODWARD. Uh-huh.

Chairman SPECTER. And participation of the United States of how much?

Dr. WOODWARD. Yes. One hopes about 5,000 American soldiers.

But let me just add that the Dayton Accord itself sets out on the civilian side a timeline of 5 years on the civilian side, and 6 years, in fact, on the central bank appointments from the International Monetary Fund. So there is a sense in which that will be there—the process will take at least 5 or 6 years. How long of that time we need military is another question.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Huffman, how long do you think it is necessary for IFOR to stay, with U.S. participation?

Dr. HUFFMAN. I would concur with Ms. Woodward. I believe to withdraw at this point would be counterproductive as a state of disequilibrium. I don't believe the force needs to be as large as it is. I speak as a citizen who was opposed to our going in there in the first place, but I argue, having been there and seen the scene, that we should stay longer. I would say this though, I do think our troops should be allowed to mingle with the populace. I have seen in the British, French, and Dutch troop deployment the creation of a healthy environment. I realize our desire to protect our own troops, but I do believe this relationship with the citizenry is very important.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you.

Senator Kerrey.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Woodward, earlier when I was asking Mr. Fingar who had the responsibility on the civilian side, his answer was it was the people of Bosnia. Do you agree with that?

Dr. WOODWARD. No, I do not.

Vice Chairman KERREY. In your testimony you said that there is as yet no plan or strategy for achieving peace, and actually I made the comment that Mr. Bildt works for the United Nations. General Hughes sent me a couple of cards up here correcting me on that. It's even worse. He works for a thing called the—two organizations, as I understand it. Do you know that.

Dr. WOODWARD. He got that from me.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Oh, he did? Well, he works then—he works for the Peace Implementation Council, and he works for the Contact Group. The Peace Implementation Council contains on it the United States, the European Union, Russia, the Organization of the Islamic Council, NATO, and Canada. Is that—

Dr. WOODWARD. Yes. That's the group that met at Florence in the middle of June and met in Brussels several weeks ago, was the Contact Group. The Contact Group is really five countries—the United States, Germany, France, Britain, and Russia. In the meeting in Brussels last week when there was disagreement on the Karadzic maneuvers, Russia only sent an observer.

Vice Chairman KERREY. The Peace Implementation Council, would you say they are the organization that is supposed to be responsible for the development of a plan?

Dr. WOODWARD. Yes, that's what was set up by the Dayton Accord and Ambassador Holbrook's negotiations.

My own view is that this is an American-led negotiation and an American-led NATO force on the ground, not a United Nations op-

eration in any way, and therefore, basically President Clinton ought to be responsible for it. I think in some ways, his delegation of Sklar recently, for example, is a recognition of that.

Vice Chairman KERREY. It's a recognition, but it could, in some ways, make matters worse, because it could leave the impression that we are actually doing something when in fact we're not. I mean, Sklar can get an awful lot of good things done, we could call him up from the Foreign Relations Committee, he could list all the terrific things that are done. But if there is nobody in charge and the Peace Implementation Council doesn't come to Congress to get money—it's all voluntary contributions that they are trying to solicit, and you know, Mr. Fingar is—basically Fingar is actually basically the civilian component of the intel analysis to what we are doing on General Hughes' side on the military. I continue to praise and be impressed by the military's flexibility in planning and the intensity of that planning that began before the take-over of authority.

I mean, when I visited Molesworth, which is a Joint Analysis Center in England, responsible for fusing and taking intel to the Bosnian theater, I mean, it's a very, very impressive organization, and they know Dayton—they have read that document and they know it backwards, forwards, chapter and verse. They know every single timeline and what is going on. But I don't see any civilian counterpart to that. I don't think that the PIC is going to get the job done.

Dr. WOODWARD. Nor in fact, they haven't any real authority. I think what is really interesting—and this is a point that Roy Williams has also said—is the people I found most impressive in terms of coordinating and strategy on the ground at the moment are the ARRC, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps from NATO. They are there until the end of December. Just as Bildt and Sklar, everyone's leaving at the end of December, which is a very serious problem. We don't, at the moment, see any continuity on any side.

But the ARRC people make a very strong argument based—with which I agree—that you cannot separate the military and civilian aspects of it. They have to be integrated and they have to be integrated into a long term horizon for regional stability as well as Bosnian. They can do it. They are able to work with Bildt and Frowick and Sklar and the European Union and Rory O'Sullivan of the World Bank, all of the different operations of the United Nations with the civil affairs and with the police task force, each of these separate hierarchies could be coordinated together with the military in somebody on the ground. The obstacle to that is usually assumed to be, and I think correctly so far, is a decision by the Pentagon to insist on a sharp distinction between military and civilian activities. So we could redevise this in the course of the fall as we plan for a follow-on force, to reintegrate these pieces and do what we know works better for peace building.

Vice Chairman KERREY. I wish, for my benefit, you would give some thought to the question whether or not NATO should have the civilian counterpart to its military operation. Basically it's a NATO organized mission. I quite agree with you, it's the United States that made the decision to go forward. NATO would not have gone forward had it not been for the United States' doing it. So it's

basically a U.S. operation. But we are using the NATO structure to do it, and it's very impressive to have all NATO involved, and it's very impressive to have some of the Partners for Peace involved. The Russian involvement. There's lots of—there are a lot of benefits that come from making this a NATO operation.

But I don't think that—I really don't believe this Peace Implementation Council can be relied upon to get the job done. Particularly if you want to integrate the military and the civilian component. It's almost got to be, do we have to create a civilian counterpart in NATO, somebody that can come and say to the United States, this is your assessment. We can't go in there—when we go in there to do the military side, we don't get voluntary contributions. We don't go to private voluntary organizations and say, say, could you give us \$50 million for this, and could you give us \$10 million here, and try to cobble together this operation. I mean, we make a commitment to protect our forces, and we make a commitment to give them the best, and as a consequence it is successful.

But if the premise is true, and I believe it is, that the military success is heavily dependent upon the civilian success, then it seems—it opens at least the question as to whether or not we shouldn't organize a civilian structure that can develop—that has the responsibility for developing a plan. So here's the plan. You may not like it, you may have disagreements with it. If you do, say so. But this is the plan, I'm in charge—I'm in charge for executing the plan. Yes, we're going to integrate the military and the civilian. We'll have discussions about how to get that done so we don't give up sources and don't give up our own security considerations on the military side.

But it seems to me, unless we have that kind of structure, we're not going to be able to either carry this one out to success, nor do I think we're likely going to be able to carry out similar ones in the future.

Dr. WOODWARD. Well, Senator Kerrey, I completely agree with you. I have heard others talk—for example, David Hamburg at Carnegie Corporation—who were talking about the Bildt operation at the Office of the High Representative being as a kind of testing ground for the development of such a capacity that we could even use for earlier action in other such conflicts that I think would be excellent.

The difficulty is at the moment that because there is no executive authority, I agree, the PIC isn't such, it is too huge, it has no—it is only people to whom you report so that everyone's interests are taken into account at the national level, but until we get some coordination of national interest and, in my view, our government not sending in—and partly out of congressional mandate and partly under political pressure, every time they see something going wrong to go sort of unilaterally at something that then undermines the tasks on the ground, you see increasing fights among the different organizations on the ground that is also undermining, in my sense, the process.

Vice Chairman KERREY. The military comes and says here's our plan, here's what we need to execute the plan. There is nobody in—there's no counterpart on the civilian side—

Dr. WOODWARD. I agree.

Vice Chairman KERREY [continuing]. That comes and says here's the plan, here's the resources we need to execute the plan. As Dr. Huffman said, you weren't alone, an American civilian saying we ought not to go there in the first place. There's a lot riding on this venture. If it's successful—and I think Americans feel good to date. It's not just the Bosnians who are beginning to wonder whether it is going to be successful. Americans are as well. If it is unsuccessful, we may say no to going to places that also need us. I mean, the extraordinary thing about this is what America can get done uniquely, in my judgment. What we are capable of doing when we apply our minds and our hearts to the task.

Dr. WOODWARD. Fully agree.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you all very much. That concludes our hearing.

Thank you.

[Thereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]

Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina





Implementation of the Dayton Accord, 18 July 1996

Arrow indicates:
(from previous week)

▲ Improvement
○ or
▼ Backsliding

● Full
compliance

◐ Progress
toward
compliance
(evidence of
intent to
comply)

◑ Compliance
uncertain
(information
incomplete)

◒ Potential
problem
(evidence of
intent not to
comply or no
known movement
toward
compliance)

○ Noncompliance

(N/A) Not applicable

Key Provisions	Deadline	Croatia	Serbia	Bosnian Government	Bosnian Croats	Bosnian Serbs
Adherence to cease-fire	Ongoing	(N/A)	(N/A)	●	●	●
Clear and mark minefields in zone of separation	19 January 1996	(N/A)	(N/A)	◐	◐	◐
Withdraw heavy weapons to barracks/cantonments and demobilize forces	18 April 1996	(N/A)	(N/A)	◐	◐	◐
Cooperation with UN War Crimes Tribunal	Ongoing	◐	◐	●	◐	◑
Transfer governmental authorities to the Federation	22 January 1996	(N/A)	(N/A)	◐	◐	(N/A)
Hold elections for Federation and Republic presidents and assemblies	14 September 1996	(N/A)	(N/A)	◐	◐	◐
Prevent activities hindering return of displaced persons	Ongoing	(N/A)	(N/A)	◑	◑	◑
Permit freedom of movement of persons, goods, and services	Ongoing	(N/A)	(N/A)	◐	◐	◑

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