

**NOMINATION OF DAVID C. GOMPERT
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

—————
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009
—————

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate>

—————
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

56-432 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2010

—————
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, *Chairman*
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, *Vice Chairman*

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia	ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RON WYDEN, Oregon	OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
EVAN BAYH, Indiana	SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland	RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin	TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida	JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island	

HARRY REID, Nevada, *Ex Officio*
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, *Ex Officio*
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, *Ex Officio*
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, *Ex Officio*

DAVID GRANNIS, *Staff Director*
LOUIS B. TUCKER, *Minority Staff Director*
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, *Chief Clerk*

CONTENTS

OCTOBER 13, 2009

OPENING STATEMENTS

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California	1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri	3

WITNESS

Gompert, David C., Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence-Designate	5
Prepared statement	6

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees	24
Prehearing Questions and Responses	47
Answers to Questions for the Record	101
Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated August 19, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report	122

**NOMINATION OF DAVID C. GOMPERT
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Feingold, Whitehouse, and Bond.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,
CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA**

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Gompert, I'd like to welcome you here today to the Committee's hearing on your nomination to be the next Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. That would be the second under the command of DNI Blair.

I want you to know I appreciated our meeting last week and believe that you have a strong appreciation for the importance of intelligence, a very firm grasp on the challenges we face around the world and a willingness to work within the intelligence community to make necessary improvements.

The Principal Deputy DNI has two main responsibilities—one, to assist the Director of National Intelligence and, two, to act on behalf of the DNI in his absence or due to a vacancy in the position.

The role of the Principal Deputy is essential to the success of the intelligence community and to its continued transformation. If confirmed, Mr. Gompert will be the third Principal Deputy DNI since Congress created the position in 2004.

Now, both Vice Chairman Bond and I know that there are a number of challenges that the intelligence community faces, and there are also rays of light. The recent intelligence operation to identify and arrest Najibullah Zazi, we believe, shows great improvement in collection abilities and the ability for agencies to work together.

So before getting to a list of issues in need of improvement, I'd like to take a moment to register my appreciation for the fine work that is going on already.

We talked about some areas last week where I think you'll need to focus. One of them is ensuring that the intelligence community

produces accurate and timely National Intelligence Estimates to help policymakers tackle the toughest national security issues we face and to help make sure that intelligence does not lead us wrongly into war ever again.

And I think I mentioned to you that one of my main interests in being Chairman of this Committee was to see that never again is there an NIE like the Iraq NIE was. And I believe we're on our way to changing that—to improving analysis, to improving red-teaming, to really prevent it from ever happening again—and requiring and building the systems to allow the intelligence community to share information so that the stovepipes which were once up and are now down remain down at virtually all levels of the 15-member intelligence community.

Improving our language capabilities across the IC so that we can interpret and analyze all of the information coming in. I strongly believe that the language deficit is one of the greatest hindrances our intelligence community has;

Reducing our reliance on contractors in the IC. And I believe that those things that have inherently governmental functions should be done, in fact, by government employees;

Improving how the IC acquires technical collection systems to prevent the huge cost and schedule overruns that had become the norm, not the exception.

So let me say a few words about this nominee. Mr. Gompert has almost 40 years of experience as a national security professional and information technology company executive. Most recently, he was a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation and previously served as the President of RAND Europe. In 2003 he was a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He has been on the faculty of the National Defense University, the United States Naval Academy, and he served on the National Security Council and State Department staffs. So he has experience as a national security analyst in senior White House and State Department positions, where he worked at the intersection of intelligence and policy.

Mr. Gompert also worked as an executive in the private sector from 1983 to 1990, where he held Vice Presidential positions at Unisys and at AT&T. These experiences give him a good management expertise and a unique perspective on how to address the challenges lying ahead for the intelligence community.

One point I want to draw attention to is Mr. Gompert's written answers to our Committee's pre-hearing questions, where he expressed his views that the current size of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is more or less right. Mr. Gompert wrote in his answer that the ODNI has less than 2 percent of the overall intelligence community employees and less than 1 percent of employees in the IC dedicated to tasks other than those that are part of operational centers like the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Intelligence Council. In fact, two-thirds of ODNI employees are assigned to those operational centers and mission support activities.

This Committee has fought hard for resources to give the ODNI the tools it needs to be effective, and we will continue to do so, especially as we prepare for conference negotiations with our House

colleagues on the 2010 Intelligence Authorization Bill, which has passed the Senate now and, we hope, can pass the House very soon.

With that, I would ask unanimous consent that any opening statements that Members may have or that the witness may have be included in the record in full. And, hearing no objection, so ordered.

Mr. Vice President, I'd like to turn it over to you and then ask Mr. Gompert to introduce his family, to welcome them, and let him make a statement if he'd care to.

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, thank you very much. I was actually Vice President of the Alfalfa Club last year, but I'm now Vice Chairman of this Committee and the President of the Alfalfa Club. But never mind—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. But what does that get you, now, Mr. Vice Chairman?

Vice Chairman BOND [continuing]. It gets me an opportunity to pay a bunch of writers to write a very expensive and, we hope, focused roast of everybody in sight. It's a machine-gun opportunity. [Laughter.]

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I won't be in sight.

Vice Chairman BOND. We might be able to find a spot for you.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

Vice Chairman BOND. I agree with all that you said about Mr. Gompert. His background is outstanding. We're delighted that he has agreed to take this position.

I also join with you in issuing congratulations and I will second that statement that the intelligence community worked together on the recently-announced investigations and the successful dealing with some of the challenges here in the homeland. And that required great cooperation. There still are some more areas we need to work on.

Madam Chair, I was disappointed to hear that this Committee was not going to be able to get an opportunity to consider in a classified session some of the provisions in the bill that Judiciary just passed out on the PATRIOT Act, because we have some questions about it and we've heard those from members of the intelligence community.

And I would like at least to have our members have an opportunity to discuss some of them before they reach the floor. As one who thinks that the Intelligence Committee is too often bypassed, certainly this Act has great ramifications for the work that the intelligence community does. And I want to make sure we get it right and we don't put unnecessary burdens on the intelligence community in collecting the information that they need.

But, with that, I join the Chair in welcoming Mr. Gompert, and we look forward to seeing him often. We always have lots of questions and we welcome your comments and we thank you for taking on these weighty responsibilities.

The responsibilities of the DNI and his Principal Deputy, unfortunately, are not matched by a set of clear and complete legal au-

thorities. You've got the responsibility, but not always the authority.

I've repeatedly expressed my concern with this disparity, which is the reason I did not vote for the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. For several years now I've been asking your predecessors and past DNIs to tell this Committee which authorities need to be enhanced or clarified.

While the Committee has heard general complaints, that's not enough. We cannot change the law unless we understand from your standpoint exactly what the problems are. I hope you will break the tradition of suffering in silence and that you and Director Blair will speak loudly if you believe legislation that we could work on here can help you do your job better.

Now, Mr. Gompert, I was heartened by the emphasis that you placed on personal accountability in your written statement and responses to the Committee's questions, when you stated, "Accountability must include meeting financial commitments and, if confirmed, I would insist on that."

In this vein, you further noted that, "A budget is a compact whereby a unit can count on an agreed amount of resources and the corporation can count on agreed results, and that overruns are not just accounting entries but have real consequences which, in the national security domain, can be profound."

I couldn't agree more. I'd hope that if you're confirmed you'll put these words into action and make it your business to instill in the IC greater business discipline and personal accountability, both of which have been sorely lacking in the intelligence community. We have many wonderful people out there who are doing great jobs. But they have to be accountable to the people of America through this Committee and other committees. And we want to assure that accountability.

As I'm sure you've learned in your preparation for this hearing, over the last decade, the IC has spent nearly \$10 billion on advanced imagery satellites that have never produced a single picture. And that's unacceptable.

It's also unacceptable that at the same time millions of taxpayers face increasing economic hardship the IC still cannot produce auditable financial statements detailing how they are spending these tax dollars. Even worse is the fact that the IC does not expect to be able to produce these statements until at least 2015. I doubt that the American family, average American family could survive that long without taking a hard look at their own budget.

Now, I don't mean to suggest that the IC is without significant accomplishment. The Committee regularly hears about the successes and the hard work and dedication of IC employees that make those successes possible.

Part of our oversight responsibility and a significant part of your responsibilities, if confirmed, will be to ensure that the IC has what it needs to be successful all the time. You'll have your work cut out for you. The Committee's oversight has revealed some stark contrasts within the IC which would be fascinating, but for the fact that our national security is on the line.

For example, as I said earlier, the IC is full of talented, brave and dedicated personnel. But it has no discernible culture of personal accountability.

The IC recently demonstrated in the Zazi investigation and other counterterrorism successes, as the Chair has indicated and I have endorsed, that they have made real progress in information sharing and interagency cooperation. Yet there are still too many FBI intelligence personnel without easy access to top-secret databases and desktop Internet connections.

The IC is capable of technological marvels which have produced a wide array of actionable intelligence for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, most of the IC's major acquisition programs are hugely over cost and behind schedule and, as I noted, some have flat-out failed.

As you mentioned in your written responses to this Committee, when it comes to strategic intelligence, the IC failed to warn policymakers of virtually every seismic geopolitical change in the last few decades, including the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of communism, the emergence of the Internet, the rise of jihadism, and last fall's global economic collapse.

If you're confirmed, the task of working with the DNI to address these shortcomings will fall on your shoulders. I believe you and I'm confident you're up to the task, and I hope and look forward to you working closely with this Committee as you wade into these issues.

I congratulate you on your nomination and look forward to learning more about how you intend to help lead the IC to produce consistently superior results that our nation deserves and demands.

With that, I thank you, Madam Chair. And I apologize. I'm going to listen standing up, because I have a bad back and I've been traveling all weekend, and I am a lot more comfortable standing up as I listen to Mr. Gompert.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Sorry to hear that.

Vice Chairman BOND. So please don't feel that I'm walking out on you. I'm just standing up for a little pleasure. Thanks.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Mr. Gompert, if you'd like to introduce your family, and any comments you would make we'd be happy to receive.

**STATEMENT OF DAVID C. GOMPERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE**

Mr. GOMPERT. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond. I'm honored to come before you as the President's nominee for position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

I am, as you suggested, very pleased that my family could be here: my son-in-law, Kwan, my daughter Ellie, and my wife Cynthia, who has been with me for decades of public service, and has helped me immeasurably in the service to the American people.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Welcome to your family.

We're delighted to have them here. Thank you.

Mr. GOMPERT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

If confirmed, it will be a privilege to continue that service to the American people, to assist Director Blair and to work with this Committee.

The President has stressed the need for first-rate intelligence to keep the nation safe, to inform U.S. policies and to support U.S. troops operating in harm's way. In turn, Admiral Blair has set very demanding standards for the intelligence community and is working tirelessly to transform that community. If confirmed, I'll do my best to meet those very high expectations of the President, of the Director, and of this Committee.

My career consists of three decades in national security, a decade in private industry as a senior executive, a record, both in and out of government, of institutional reform and a commitment to objectivity, and, as the Vice Chairman noted, to accountability.

I hope you will find that I have the qualifications to fulfill the responsibilities of the Principal Deputy, the most important of which are to ensure that intelligence affecting the nation's safety and matters of war, peace and policy is of the highest quality, reliable, timely, useful, and totally objective, and also to integrate and improve the intelligence community for the future.

If confirmed, I would have no higher duty than to do my part to help keep the nation secure from attack. I would also support our national decisionmakers and our military commanders with intelligence of the highest quality. And finally, work to make the intelligence community stronger, by which I mean more agile, more integrated, more collaborative and more resourceful.

In approaching these duties, I consider Congressional oversight to be a clear obligation, and much more. That oversight is crucial for earning public trust in U.S. intelligence and for making the intelligence community more effective. If confirmed, you can count on me not only to provide timely and full information, but also actively to seek your counsel and to do whatever I can do to help you fulfill your responsibilities in oversight.

So again, Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing at such a busy time for the Senate, and I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gompert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID C. GOMPERT, NOMINEE FOR THE POSITION OF
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am honored to come before you as President Obama's nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI). If I am confirmed, it will be a privilege to serve the Nation in this capacity, to repay the President's confidence in me, to assist Director Blair, and to work with this Committee. I thank Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond for holding today's hearing at a time when Senators have so much on their plates.

The President has stressed the importance of high-quality and unbiased intelligence in protecting America, informing U.S. policies and leadership abroad, and supporting U.S. forces serving in harm's way. In turn, Director Blair has set demanding standards for the performance of the Intelligence Community (IC), and is working systematically to transform it, as this Committee has encouraged him to do. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to meet these high expectations and standards.

My career can be summed up as three decades of work in national security, senior executive positions in and out of government, a record of institutional reform, experience in exploiting technology for strategic advantage, and a fierce commitment to objectivity. I hope you will find in me both the professional qualifications and personal qualities to fulfill the responsibilities of the PDDNI.

Those responsibilities flow from the DNI's, which this Committee has helped conceive and guide. The DNI exists for two fundamental purposes: to ensure that intelligence bearing on the protection of the Nation and on matters of war, peace, and policy is reliable, objective, and timely; and to integrate and improve U.S. intel-

ligence capabilities for the future. These purposes require the DNI to organize collaboration and to remove barriers to sharing information throughout the IC and with those who depend on the IC: policy-makers, forces in the field, and those we look to for Homeland defense. In addition, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that intelligence resources, both technical and human, are allocated according to national priorities. To meet pressing and diverse needs in a turbulent world, optimizing IC-wide collection and analytic capabilities is crucial and requires strong DNI leadership. Also, by forming, proposing, and managing an integrated National Intelligence Program, the DNI can assure that investments in improved capabilities are well aligned, that they work together, and that tax dollars are wisely spent to reflect national priorities. This ambitious agenda frames the responsibilities of the PDDNI, whether in assisting or acting for the DNI.

The PDDNI's responsibilities are also shaped by the security challenges facing the United States. The foremost challenge is unblinking vigilance against threats of attack on the Homeland. At present, the most acute such threat comes from terrorist groups with strategic aims, strategic reach, and abiding hatred of the United States, the most dangerous of which is al Qa'ida. Beyond warning and preventing attack, we must understand, find, outsmart, strike, cripple, and defeat these terrorists. That they would eagerly use against us any weapon they get their hands on makes this priority all the more compelling. Recent U.S. success against al Qa'ida is a dividend on a more integrated national intelligence effort. Whether on the Afghan-Pakistan border or anywhere else on Earth, the goal of intelligence must be to leave them no place to hide.

The second challenge is to prevent and counter the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially by reckless regimes and violent extremists. The recent disclosure of Iran's enrichment facility at Qum underscores that integrated intelligence is a prerequisite of effective counter-proliferation. Iran and North Korea are critical priorities in their own right and because they could spawn further proliferation. The wider challenge is to be able to discover the diversion of fissile material, illicit weapons production, and trafficking in WMD materials and know-how.

The third challenge is to comprehend the implications of a changing world—shifting power, emerging threats, economic interdependencies, and new opportunities. China could become a global partner, a rival or both. India has growing capacity and clout, and is strategically located. Cyberspace, health, climate, energy, fragile states, world trade, and financial markets all pose security challenges, thus intelligence challenges. At the same time, more and more countries are willing and able to partner with the United States in tackling these problems. As Director Blair has stressed, good intelligence should illuminate opportunities as well as dangers for U.S. policy and security.

Against this background, I would if confirmed have no greater duty than to help keep the United States safe from attack. Even with decisive actions and successful policies abroad, it could take many years to defeat the likes of al Qa'ida. Meanwhile, weapons of mass destruction and delivery means could spread. These conditions place a premium on unimpeded sharing of information, prompt threat assessment, active collaboration, and the setting of clear priorities at every level across the IC. My goal would be to enhance cooperation among all arms of the IC.

I would also commit myself, if confirmed, to give our national security decision-makers intelligence on which they can rely. The PDDNI is expected to play a supporting role in the NSC inter-agency process while maintaining strictly the objectivity of intelligence analysis. If confirmed, I would adopt the discipline of explaining what the IC knows in its entirety; what it does not know; what it thinks; what is likely to happen; and what may be unlikely to happen but is very consequential and thus crucial to watch. For these purposes, I would rely on the best intelligence professionals and technologies in the world, making use of secret means while making sense of a growing abundance of open information. I would be as ready to have my thinking challenged as to challenge the thinking of others in the IC.

If confirmed, I would also work to make the IC stronger than it is now—more integrated, more agile, and better understood and supported by the public. Stronger also means being more resourceful: exploiting information technology to expand sharing in both intelligence and business functions; creating economies and efficiencies by collaborating; and developing people who can excel in and strengthen such a community. That we are beginning to see a positive return on the effort to transform U.S. intelligence should make us even more determined to press ahead with that transformation, for we have a long way to go.

Managing the IC is a challenge. The DNI and PDDNI must accept heavy responsibilities while at the same time empowering the agencies of the IC to facilitate agile operations, encourage initiative, and respond to changing threats and opportunities. The IC's decentralized structure need not be a problem—in fact, it is a

strength. Having fifteen of its elements reside within six different departments makes U.S. intelligence more responsive to those who depend on it. Increasingly, these departments are benefiting from the DNI's integrative efforts, and the arrangement of shared authority between the DNI and those department heads is working better and better. Moreover, by organizing cross-agency teaming, such as national intelligence centers and mission management, it is possible to gain the benefits of both integration and decentralization.

The imperative of integrated intelligence requires creating shared networks, setting common standards for handling sensitive data, and overcoming cultural barriers. In time, sharing across all intelligence agencies should be institutionalized, resources optimized, operations harmonized, and the Nation made safer with less need for DNI insistence and intervention. Meanwhile, it is up to the DNI and PDDNI to create conditions so that responsibility remains clear, the power of decentralization is fostered, the hardest challenges are tackled by cross-agency teaming, and collaboration becomes the norm.

To me, the Intelligence Community's oversight by and cooperation with Congress are not only obligatory but also crucial for maintaining public trust and for the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence. Trust between the American people and their Intelligence Community is critical because of the secrecy that must surround its work, the potency of its tools, natural concerns about privacy and civil liberties, and the consequences of intelligence failure. Key to building public trust is the IC's accountability, both to the President as the executive and to the Congress as the people's representatives.

Moreover, a close working relationship with Congress will make the IC better at meeting the dangers the Nation faces. Strengthening this relationship is a major responsibility of the PDDNI. It requires not only furnishing timely, full, and reliable information on significant matters to Congress but also inviting your counsel and your concerns. This DNI has made clear to the entire IC, and to me, the importance he places on communications and cooperation with Congress. He and I both believe that the IC benefits from your oversight. If confirmed, I will make myself fully available to you and will actively seek your views.

This is both a critical and a formative time for U.S. intelligence. Success requires that the leaders of the IC work to build the confidence of the American people. Director Blair has said that he wants to increase public understanding of, trust in and admiration for the Intelligence Community and its talented and dedicated people—the way our military has earned such respect. If confirmed, I will join him in that effort. The way we work with and answer to this Committee can be instrumental to that purpose.

Again, Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and thanks to all Members for considering my nomination. I welcome your questions.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gompert.

I have just, first of all, some very precise but rudimentary questions that we ask every witness. Yes or no will suffice.

Do you agree to appear before the Committee, here or in other venues, when invited?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, I do, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to appear before the Committee and designated staff when requested?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, I do, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents and any other material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, I do.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that your respective offices provide such material to the Committee when requested?

Mr. GOMPERT. I will do so, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You're batting 100 percent so far. Thank you.

Mr. Gompert, could you describe how you and Director Blair will be sharing and dividing responsibilities, if you are confirmed? And let me give you just a couple of specifics.

I understand you may assist Director Blair by briefing policymakers, so that he'll be able to focus on the so-called "big picture" issues. Is that correct?

Secondly, who will be briefing the President each morning?

And thirdly, who will be coming to Congress to testify on oversight hearings?

Mr. GOMPERT. Madam Chairman, from the day he asked if I could take this position, if nominated, Director Blair and I have been discussing what an appropriate and helpful division of labor would be.

What we've worked out, and what he's decided upon, is a little bit different than you often see with regard to the number one and number two person in a large government organization. Often the number one person is engaged primarily in external work—in the case of intelligence, in participating in the interagency policy process—and the number two is much more of an internal manager.

Director Blair has decided on a somewhat different division of labor in our case, given my broad background in national security, including policymaking and bringing intelligence to bear on the policy process. He feels that I could be of greatest use to him, to the community, and to the nation by being heavily involved in the interagency process—bringing our intelligence products to bear on policymaking. That would give him that much more time to concentrate on the daunting task of transforming and integrating the intelligence community.

Now, having said that, Madam Chairman, I do want to stress that both of us have responsibilities that cut across the entire intelligence community, both internal and external. I have management duties; I will be chairing various committees; I will certainly be mindful of the needs to continue to develop our personnel. So I will have many internal responsibilities.

But to answer your question directly, I think I'll be mostly working the "outside beat," if I can put it that way.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The "outside beat," or the inside beat? What you're saying is, how intelligence affects policies.

Mr. GOMPERT. That's correct.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So does this mean you'd do the President's PDB?

Mr. GOMPERT. On the President's PDB, the Director is the chief adviser to the President on—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So he will do that.

Mr. GOMPERT [continuing]. On matters of intelligence, and he would certainly continue to do that. Of course, in his absence, I would be present for that briefing.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And he would continue, then, to regularly brief the Intelligence Committees?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, he would.

But there is one area in which he has stressed to me that we would not have a division of labor, and that is with regard to the Congress and to this Committee. We would both regard that as im-

portant responsibilities. So you will see a great deal of both of us—certainly no less of him, and a good deal of me.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Give me an example of what you would do where intelligence meets the road of policy.

Mr. GOMPERT. I would first see to it that all of the intelligence capabilities that we can bring to bear—collection capabilities, as well as analytic capabilities throughout the intelligence community—are brought to bear on whatever policy question is presented.

I would guarantee, of course, that the intelligence effort not wander across the line between the provision of objective intelligence and policy advocacy. That's an extremely important line.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, let me be clear. For example, what to do in Afghanistan. Would it be your responsibility, then, to assemble all of the relevant intelligence for the President to consider in making his decision with respect to General McChrystal's recommendations?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes. On a matter of such tremendous national importance, certainly both the DNI and the Principal Deputy would be deeply involved in collecting and synthesizing the intelligence for the President for such a decision. And, in fact, Director Blair has been extremely busy doing precisely that over recent weeks as the President has faced this decision.

But this is not something that the Director would delegate to me. On a matter of that importance, we would both be heavily involved.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. On the subject of contractors, I think our Committee has been very outspoken on the need to reduce the IC's reliance on contractors. We have doubled the cut in the authorization bill from five to 10 percent. I'm encouraged by your written questions that contractors should be used less, and my specific question is exactly how do you prepare to proceed, because the number of contractors used by these agencies is astronomic.

Mr. GOMPERT. Well, Madam Chairman, the Committee is quite right to raise this question because there has been substantial growth, really since the end of the 1990s. We dipped down in terms of our head count in the first decade after the Cold War and then, finding all of the intelligence demands we face, we found that the quickest way to meet those demands was not by growing our professional staff but by going out and contracting work. And the pendulum is swinging back in the other direction, as well it should.

One specific thing that I will do that I think will move the pendulum in the right direction is every time someone approaches me and says that we have to use a contractor because we lack certain governmental capabilities to perform a task, the question I will ask is should we have those capabilities. Should we have provided those capabilities? And what steps do we have to take, including coming to Congress, to ensure that we build those capabilities for the future so we're never in a situation where we must use contractors for lack of government capabilities?

While that's true in general, it is all the more true when we talk about inherently governmental functions and other critical and sensitive functions that the government and only the government should perform.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

The Chair mentioned Afghanistan, so I thought I'd ask you if you believe you have enough intelligence, based on your experience and what you may have learned about Afghanistan. Do you have a view on whether the United States would see the Taliban, if they were to regain a substantial foothold in Afghanistan, providing safe haven for armed groups including al-Qa'ida, as they did during their short reign from the late 1990s until 2001?

Mr. GOMPERT. Mr. Vice Chairman, I do have some experience with Afghanistan. I've been there—

Vice Chairman BOND. I know you have.

Mr. GOMPERT [continuing]. A number of times, I think the first time was in 1974. I have not, however, been involved in the preparation of any intelligence materials, let alone in the process that Director Blair has been involved in with the NSC on Afghanistan. So I would have no basis for commenting on—

Vice Chairman BOND. That's why I asked. That's the kind of question that probably the next time you come before the Committee you will be asked about.

Mr. GOMPERT [continuing]. Absolutely.

Vice Chairman BOND. That's just a heads up. Those are the kinds of things, if you're representing the DNI, we want to know.

I mentioned the lack of explicit legislative authority and, in the answers to questions about working with the IC, you conclude that the arrangement currently under way "appears to be working well and steadily improving." Do you have any concern that things seem to be working well now because of the good personal relationships which could quickly change? We think there's great personal compatibility in working coordination. If those personalities were not there, would the DNI be able to function as effectively as we hope he functions now?

Mr. GOMPERT. Vice Chairman, I think that's an extremely important question because we are blessed by having personalities in the intelligence community and the departments that have elements of the intelligence community who know how to make things work. I've known both Director Blair and Secretary Gates for decades and these two leaders have certainly helped to produce a much improved relationship between the military side and the civilian side.

The key is not to depend upon personalities and personal harmony, because you're not always going to have it. When you do have it, as we do now, it is important to institutionalize this relationship. So what I've looked at carefully with regard to the relationship between the Defense Department and its intelligence elements and the rest of the intelligence community is, are we institutionalizing this good relationship. And I think the answer is yes, we are with regard to the allocation of resources, the setting of priorities and so on.

Vice Chairman BOND. I would ask, if you see that additional authorities are needed, I would ask you to share those views with the Committee, even if there may be others in the Administration who do not agree with them. Would you be so kind as to share those views with us?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, I would, sir. As I've said, my in-going position is that we have the authorities we need, and if that proves to be

inadequate, I would not hesitate with the Director to come back to you and take you up on your offer.

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, let me get right to the heart of the matter. The DNI has no budget authority over the Military Intelligence Program or MIP, but significant portions of the National Intelligence Program, NIP, budget directly support military operations to Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, and the DOD exercises considerable influence over NIP budget and acquisition decisions. Do you think the DNI should have greater authority to influence the MIP, at least as much influence as the Secretary of Defense exercises in the NIP?

Mr. GOMPERT. One of the important officials in the intelligence community in this regard is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, currently retired General Clapper. And that official occupies a very important position on the question you raise because he in a way is the portal of the DNI and the PDDNI into the Defense Department and into the Military Intelligence Program. So we count on the Under Secretary to ensure that the views of national intelligence, as articulated by the Director and the Principal Deputy, are in fact communicated as the Military Intelligence Program is formulated within the defense budget.

You're right to say that there is no control exercised by the DNI over the Military Intelligence Program. But I believe that we do have the opportunity to have considerable influence on it. So I will watch that very closely, and if I judge that, because of a lack of authority in that regard, working through the Under Secretary for Intelligence, that there's something else we should do to bring about greater harmony than we currently have, then again, with the Director, I would not hesitate to come back and talk to you about it, Senator.

Vice Chairman BOND. I would just suggest that you follow the admonition of a leader a few years ago who said trust but verify.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair and thank you, Mr. Gompert, for your willingness to serve in this position for which you are clearly qualified, and I really did appreciate the meeting we had last week and just want to quickly revisit a few of the issues we discussed, starting with Congressional notification, including statutory notification obligations.

After our meeting, did you have a chance to look at the National Security Act, and, if so, do you agree that the provision authorizing the so-called Gang of Eight notifications appears only in the section of the law related to covert action?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, Senator, I did go back and study the language and also spend some time with the General Counsel discussing this. And you're absolutely right that that particular method of consultation is covered under Section 503 and not under 502. In discussing this with counsel, the view there is that the fact that it is not covered explicitly under 502 neither mandates the use of that particular method nor precludes the use of that particular method, and that, therefore, from the point of view of our General Counsel, the fact that there has been a practice of applying the

method specified by 503 also to activities other than covert activities suggests that it is a reasonable interpretation. But, Senator, I acknowledge that it does appear in one section and not in the other section.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that. And you know my view that I don't think it's a reasonable approach to statutory interpretation to say that somehow you can import that language into another amendment that isn't there and that that isn't a prohibition. But you've been fair in responding.

Let me take this tack. Would you agree with Director Blair that this would only give the DNI a degree of latitude with regard to how and when, not whether, the full Committee should be notified? And would you agree that months and years of keeping the Committee in the dark, as was the case with the warrantless wiretapping program, certainly exceeds whatever such authorities might exist?

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, Senator, I certainly agree with Director Blair that this is not a matter of whether there's an obligation to provide full and current notification, but how it's provided.

As to the question of oversight and notification and the sharing of information in general, I feel quite strongly that this is a matter of obligation, but not only a matter of obligation, that the intelligence community has to constantly work to earn public confidence and public trust. It's in the nature of our work that we have to work very hard to that end.

And I think that being open with you and full and timely in that openness is really an important aspect of winning and keeping that public trust, and also in permitting you to perform your oversight duties, which in turn, I believe, helps us be more effective.

So to me, it's not only a question of are we absolutely obligated, but should we—above and beyond our obligations, is it in the interest of the country to do so?

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that, and we'll get back to the issue about notification over time.

You said that in setting—on a different issue—in setting intelligence community priorities, “the immediate should not overwhelm the future.” And, as you know, I've long shared these concerns. I also know that you have particular responsibilities for meeting the intelligence needs of policymakers, who, as we all know, are inevitably focused on current crises often rather than long-term or long-range strategic threats.

So how is the Deputy DNI an interlocutor with these policymakers? Will you try to overcome this persistent problem?

Mr. GOMPERT. The problem, as I see it, is that there's a very strong current demand from the policy community and from our military commanders for intelligence collection and analysis on immediate problems. This does not mean that our commanders and our decisionmakers are shortsighted, but this is really what they most need.

Therefore, it is really up to the leadership of the intelligence community—and by this, I mean not only the Director and the Principal Deputy Director, but all the leaders throughout the intelligence community who command both collection and analysis resources—to realize that we have a duty to perform strategic anal-

ysis, to look at the issues that could become major national security problems in the future, even if they aren't today, to perform strategic warning, and also to look at things that would be of great consequence even if they may not seem very probable.

So the first point is that we have to accept that it is our responsibility to do that even if it is not in response to immediate demand. Second, we have to allocate resources accordingly. And again, resources will tend to flow toward where the demand is the greatest and the loudest. And we are going to have to fence off the analytical capacity and use our intelligence-gathering capabilities to address these long-term questions, some of which are at least as complex if not more complex than some of the immediate problems we face.

I think that, when you look back over decades, we've missed some very important developments, watershed developments, that may not have seemed likely before they happened, but if we had only listened to that one dissenting voice, if we had paid attention more to what might change all of our assumptions, we might have been better prepared.

So it is a struggle. I have discovered, though, in my preparations for this confirmation, in talking to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and our NIOs, that there is a keen awareness of this. There has recently been stood up a unit specifically for long-term analysis. There is a growing commitment to working a variety of issues where the intelligence community may not be active in gathering information because it's all out there in the public domain, but in assessing that information and getting it to policy-makers in a form that they can use to take preventive action.

So I sense that the intelligence community, for all of the immediate pressures we face, is mindful of your admonition in this regard, and they'll certainly hear it from me as well.

Senator FEINGOLD. I really appreciate that answer.

And I thank the Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Whitehouse.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Gompert. Thank you for your willingness to take on this task. And I must say I particularly appreciate your administrative and management background. As you probably know, there are very significant acquisitions programs which, in the covert world, do not benefit from daylight, public oversight, press scrutiny and other things. And I think your attention to some of these classified programs and the manner in which they are pursued will be very helpful.

Every agency risks becoming the captive of its contractors. And in the dark areas of our national security program, that concern is, I think, particularly acute. And your experience in that area will be helpful.

One of the problems that you will encounter—with me, anyway—is the question of declassification. As you are aware, there is such a thing as a declassifier in the United States government, somebody who can utter essentially any secret, and instead of having divulged it or revealed it, they have declassified it. And all of those people are presently in the executive branch of government.

And, regrettably, in recent years that fact has been used to rhetorical advantage, even at considerable cost in misleading the American public about what the actual facts are.

As somebody who has spent a good deal of his life in a courtroom, I will tell you I feel intense personal frustration when I know facts that would rebut a case that an Administration is making, and they've declassified their side of the argument and kept mine classified, and I have to keep my peace even though the public is being misled.

I think there's something that we now need to do about that. I think that horse is out of the barn. There's no Administration that will ever unlearn what the previous Administration learned in terms of that capability. And I just want to let you know that I think that's an issue that we need to work on.

I'm not quite sure what the solution is. But to the extent that, among the rival branches of government, the executive branch has that power unilaterally, the desire and the reward of using it, I think, will continue to prove irresistible. And in my view, it has led to very, very substantial misapprehensions of what circumstances are by the American people, because they've frankly been fooled. And we haven't had the chance to explain things more clearly because of that declassification muzzle that we've been under. So I look forward to working with you on that.

The third topic that I think is of key interest where you have considerable background and interest is in maintaining our cybersecurity. You mentioned in your testimony China in particular as a threat that is constantly, I think you said, exerting its power in cyberspace. And I would like to hear your thoughts on where we stand, both in terms of policy, preparedness, and resources to deal with the cyber challenge, bearing in mind that this is a public forum.

Mr. GOMPERT. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate the strong views that you shared with me with regard to acquisition policy and results and also with regard to the need for objectivity—strict objectivity—with regard to declassification. I will heed both of those comments and be happy to come back and discuss with you whether you think there's more that I can do on those points.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. As long as you're aware of them as a matter of concern, and I'm sure you are on the first one, I wanted to highlight for you the second one because, as I said, as somebody who's used to the give-and-take of argument in courtrooms, in politics and a variety of other forums, the idea of being muzzled when you know things that should be in the debate is deeply frustrating, particularly when it leads to the public being misled.

But back to cyber.

Mr. GOMPERT. Right. Well, Senator, I don't think I can assure you that this country or, for that matter, this government has achieved a satisfactory ability to defend all of its networks. We've seen such a remarkably rapid growth of information networking of all forms, especially the Internet, to the point where we are heavily dependent and, by virtue of that dependence, also vulnerable.

So I think we have to face that. You know, we're vulnerable to the exploitation of, interference with, and disruption of information

on which we rely vitally as a country and on which each individual relies vitally.

So we need to start with that understanding, and I think there is a broad understanding now within the executive branch and with the Congress and, increasingly, within the industry itself to that effect.

I think it's important to establish responsibilities, which is not easy because the starting point is that every organization that manages, designs, or operates a network has the responsibility for the integrity and security of that network. Cyber security is not something that you can appoint somebody to take care of and then the rest of us can forget about because all of us who use networks and, certainly, all who control networks have that responsibility.

For the government, the responsibility falls heavily to the Department of Homeland Security for the non-national security networks and non-national security information. And I'm told that the Department of Homeland Security is ramping up significantly its capabilities to improve network defense for such government networks and to work with other network providers where critical infrastructure is concerned. Whether they have enough capability at this particular stage, I can't say, but I can say that they are growing that capability rapidly.

On the national security side, of course, we have considerably more capability, both in the defense establishment and in the intelligence community. Our responsibility, along with our defense colleagues, is the security of our national defense and intelligence networks, and I believe—in fact, I know there's excellent cooperation between DoD and the intelligence community on the security of the networks on which we rely for national security functions. It doesn't mean that we should not be concerned about those networks, but we've got excellent capabilities in this regard.

The intelligence community does have important responsibilities. One, of course, is to ensure the cyber security of the intelligence community's own networks. But the other responsibility is in threat assessment. We're responsible for assessing the threat not only to the intelligence community's networks but to our national security networks, other government networks, and, indeed, those throughout the country where we have important information about the growth of one or another kind of threat.

The intelligence community has the responsibility to share that information, again, as you suggested, consistent with concerns about classification. So we take very seriously—and I would, if confirmed, take very seriously—that larger responsibility in cyber security.

I think that the Administration will be appointing a coordinator. I've heard that this position will be filled. I think that's a good step. I think that's important not only for bringing about greater harmony and some standards across government networks but also speaking to the country at large about the importance of cyber security and the responsibilities that all users bear.

I hope that's responsive to your question. I'd be happy to go further.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It was substantial in length, if not in responsiveness. In any event—no, I didn't mean that as a knock. I just meant it as a friendly comment.

I want to go back to why the DNI was authorized in the first place. And I think both Senator Bond and I were on the Committee at that time. There was real concern about the sharing, about the need to transform the intelligence agencies from a CIA/KGB mentality into this new asymmetric world to be able to engage in cultures where we had not previously engaged.

We found that the intelligence community was intensely territorial and competitive. And, therefore, the creation of one overarching authority that could, in fact, move the deck chairs on the Titanic, so to speak, but could better coordinate, better direct, better see that intelligence needs were fulfilled was important. It was not meant to interfere with the operations of any department, particularly the CIA.

The question I want to ask is, if you look at the DNI's budget today, it's getting very big. And I'm concerned that the original intent is subsumed into a much broader agenda. And I really don't want to see that happen.

How would you work to prevent it from happening?

Mr. GOMPERT. Well, Madam Chairman, just a couple comments, if I may, first of all.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Sure.

Mr. GOMPERT. I think significant progress has been made toward exactly the vision of the DNI and of the intelligence community that you had and that the Senate had in its role in conceiving and launching the DNI.

I do not believe—in fact, I'm absolutely sure from all of my discussions with Director Blair and his chief lieutenants—that there is any interest in going beyond that vision, none whatsoever.

He has those overarching authorities and oversight responsibilities, as you suggested, and he also has the responsibility to make the community more collaborative, as you suggested.

But as to micromanaging the activities of various agencies—16, for that matter—there is no interest in doing that and, really, no significant capability to do that. When you think about the size of the ODNI staff, I would point out, as you yourself suggested, Madam Chairman, that two-thirds of the folks on the ODNI staff are performing line intelligence activities that are best organized at the IC level and, therefore, report to the Director, like the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterintelligence Center, and the National Counterproliferation Center.

The actual staff of the Director is 500 to 600 people which, given the size and the decentralized nature and the diversity of the intelligence community and the need to transform it, does not strike me as an excessive staff at all and certainly not an indication that any of us would want to overstep the important line that you suggested between oversight and integration on the one hand and the management of operations on the other.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. One of my concerns is the inability to get human intelligence that is of the culture, of the languages. And we note that progress is extraordinarily slow in that regard. Do you

have any positive suggestions that might encourage greater progress?

Mr. GOMPERT. I would certainly start by looking at the language deficit that you mentioned. Part of learning a language is learning the context of that language and learning the culture. It doesn't do you any good just to learn the grammar and vocabulary if you don't really understand that culture.

So I consider language training and education to be of critical importance. We have to recognize that we may not have all we need, but as part of that effort we should also be improving the cultural awareness and sensitivity and ability to operate throughout the intelligence community.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I mean practical suggestions.

Mr. GOMPERT. I would like to discuss that, if I could, with our chief of human capital and find out what I could do that would be most helpful to the Director and to our human capital people and then come back to you with something more concrete, if I could, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, we will schedule that. I will not forget that. So I'd very much appreciate it if you would do that, because I think we have pushed on this for at least six years now and it's excruciatingly slow. And to have major platforms in Islamic countries where so few of the people speak the language I think is really not effective. So we will be very interested in your observations and your recommendations.

Mr. Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Just a couple of questions I wanted to follow up on in answer to the Chair's first question. You talked about the division of responsibility with the DNI—briefing Presidents and attending meetings, which too many of us are plagued with meetings. We find that that is one of the most infectious diseases up here for which there's been no vaccine developed.

But we have heard complaints from the working-level DNI staff and seen examples where the pressing daily requirements on the DNI to brief the President and the Congress and attending meetings with interagency senior leadership has not allowed enough attention to be paid to day-to-day staff management, resulting in inertia, stalemates on important policy and oversight issues—things that need to be settled by someone with authority.

Now, will the DNI be focusing on that or will you be focusing on it? Apparently we hear there's a problem. Which one of you is going to solve it?

Mr. GOMPERT. It sounds to me, Mr. Vice Chairman, that it's a problem that both of us will have to work on, because we both need to manage the external demands on the community and the DNI staff. And certainly we both have those management responsibilities.

But I know that the sort of concerns that you have expressed would be of great concern to the DNI. I'll report those to him and one or both of us would return to you with some evaluation of that and comment on what we can do to lessen the daily load and pay more attention to the long-term stability of the staff and its work.

Vice Chairman BOND. Nothing personal, but based on a little experience I've had in management, I want the belly-button solution. I want to know who's taking primary responsibility for it, because if we continue to hear it, I want to know one person whose belly button I should point to to ask that question.

Would you let us know how you and the DNI choose to handle it and who's going to be focusing on that?

Mr. GOMPERT. Well, since I'm here, Vice Chairman, I can volunteer this belly button. And if the Director says, "No, I will take it," then we will let you know that he is taking it.

Vice Chairman BOND. You've got the belly button until we hear of a hand-off.

Mr. GOMPERT. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman BOND. I want to ask you one other question that's a particular interest of mine, and that is information on energy. Energy security is, I think, a vital concern these days, because, as we all know, tremendous amounts of the fuel that we currently use is controlled by people who are not friendly to the United States in varying degrees—some of them being near zero on the friendliness scale.

And we need to have better information, because energy can be used as a tool for major foreign policy initiatives; it can be used as a direct weapon—cutoff of energy supplies can be almost as effective as a cyber attack or a military attack. And the previous DNI claimed that the NIO for economics was the quarterback, yet when we informed this officer of the DNI's view, she was surprised that that was her responsibility.

Do you think energy security is an area that could benefit from formal mission management; and do you see any analogy between the role of a combat commander and that of an IC mission manager?

How important do you think that is? What degree of emphasis do you think that particular area should consume?

Mr. GOMPERT. Vice Chairman, I think it warrants a great deal of attention—more than it has had in the past.

Now, there are two aspects of this on which the intelligence community should especially concentrate. One has to do with the technical aspects of it. My understanding is that the intelligence unit—the analytic unit—within the Department of Energy is doing more on the question of energy security from the point of view of the economic and technical aspects.

The other aspect, as you alluded to it, is that energy insecurity may result from political instability or manipulation on the part of states—either weak states or unfriendly states. So that aspect also must be addressed by the intelligence community, starting with our analysts in the CIA and our National Intelligence Council.

I did raise this in my discussions in preparation for this hearing with the National Intelligence Council. And the strong impression I had is that they are devoting more attention to this and will continue to do so because of the great concerns that you and others have registered about it.

Vice Chairman BOND. I think that's something we'll have continuing discussions about with you. And I thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. Senator Whitehouse.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. My final question, Mr. Gompert.

We've had, on the Intelligence Committee, considerable—we've experienced, I guess, considerable dismay at the news reports of classified information, very often attributed to present or former executive branch officials. And some of the leaks have been of information that at least when presented to us has been presented in a very high security context with staff, you know, required to leave the room and things like that. Then the next thing you know, a newspaper has it.

The intelligence community has profited, I believe, very considerably from the teamwork and coordination of different services and different elements of the intelligence community and I'd like your thoughts on two things.

One, how significant at this point do you consider the problem of leakage out of our covert agencies to be; and two, if you consider it to be a problem that merits serious attention, would the strategies of interagency coordination and so forth that have proven so valuable in intelligence gathering be applicable in this area, so that prosecutors who might have to look at these cases, FBI agents who might have to investigate these cases, counterintelligence folks in the covert community who might have to screen them to protect the integrity of the agency secrets, H.R. people who have to deal with what folks' rights are who may be under a cloud of suspicion could all be brought together and in a more coordinated way try to take a better look at this?

There seems to be a lot of people standing around in the outfield with the balls falling between them right now.

Mr. GOMPERT. Well, over 30 years of service in national security I've developed a very low tolerance for leaks of classified information.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well, you're in for a treat then.

Mr. GOMPERT. I'm not sure, Senator, that I see it getting worse. I'm not sure that I would say that it is worse in one part of the executive branch than it is in another.

Leaks are harmful and they seem to be inherent, but should not be tolerated. So I feel very strongly about that. Whether the particular method that you have suggested would pay off in practical terms I would like to give some thought to. What you're suggesting is—

Senator WHITEHOUSE. If you don't mind, take that as a question for the record and get back to me, because it's much a proposal as it is a question. But it does strike me that this is one of those things where everybody talks about it and everybody has strong opinion about it, but nobody ever does anything about it.

And when you see places where there should be coordination—for instance, between the intelligence community and the Department of Justice when it comes to prosecution—that handoff should be a pretty seamless one; and yet there's a chasm between the two agencies about what each reports about the other's performance across that linkage, which causes me to think that some of those techniques and strategies of coordination might be useful in this area.

Mr. GOMPERT [continuing]. I will certainly get back to you after discussing the idea and give you my opinion about it, including whether and how we might be able to move it forward.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I appreciate that.

Thank you, sir. And again, thank you for your willingness to serve in this capacity. And my congratulations and respect to your family for the long hours and late nights and stresses and strains that they will share with you, without compensation, as members of your family.

Mr. GOMPERT. Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse.

Mr. Gompert, the Committee will be sending you additional questions for the record. I'd like to ask all members through their staffs here today to have any questions submitted by noon on Friday so that we can send them to the nominee.

I agree with those who have pointed out that you are clearly qualified—dramatically so. I do not foresee any problems, but who knows. In any event, we'd like to thank you; we'd like to thank your family. And thank you also for the service you are about to render. We very much appreciate it and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

Supplemental Material

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

UNITED STATES SENATE



**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. NAME: David C. Gompert
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 10/6/45 Hackensack, New Jersey
3. MARITAL STATUS: Married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Cynthia Ann Gompert
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: Cynthia Ann Tuttle
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

NAME

[REDACTED]

AGE

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
U.S. Naval Academy	1963-1967	BS	June 1967
Princeton University	1971-1973	MPA	June 1973

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT.)

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
U.S. Navy	Main Propulsion Officer	Newport, RI	1967-1969
U.S. Navy	Flag Lieutenant	Mayport, FLA	1969-1971
National Security Council	Asst. to Senior Director	White House	1973
State Department	Special Asst. to Secretary	Washington, DC	1973-1975
Council on Foreign Relations	Senior Fellow	New York, NY	1975-1977
State Department	Deputy Director, Pol-Mil Affairs	Washington DC	1977-1981
State Department	Deputy Asst Secretary, European Affairs	Washington DC	1981-1982
State Department	Deputy to Under Sec, Political Affairs	Washington DC	1982-1983

AT&T Corporation	Vice President	Washington DC	1983-1989
Unisys Corporation	Group President	Philadelphia PA	1989-1990
National Security Council	Special Asst to President	White House	1990-1993
RAND Corporation	Vice President	Santa Monica CA	1993-2000
National Defense University	Research Professor	Washington DC	1997-1998
RAND Europe	President	Netherlands	2000-2003
Rand Corporation	Senior Fellow	Washington DC	2003-2009
Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq	Senior Advisor	Baghdad	2003-2004
National Defense University	Research Professor	Washington DC	2004-2005
Director of National Intelligence	Employee (term-limited)	Washington DC	Aug. 2009-present

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8):

Member of Executive Panel of Chief of Naval Operations, 1995-2009
 Led two special panels for Defense Department, 1996 and 2001
 Member of Board of Advisors, Defense Department Regional Centers, 1996-1998

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

Nuclear strategy, arms control, and non-proliferation
 NATO and other alliance relationships and policies
 Base negotiations and operations
 Arms transfers and export controls
 State-Defense cooperation
 Defense strategy, programs, and budget
 Advanced technology for national security
 Intelligence analysis and priority-setting
 Integration of intelligence into decision-making
 Force planning
 Interagency process reform
 Europe, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia
 Relations with China and Russia
 Relations with major European allies and Japan
 Counterinsurgency
 Counterterrorism
 Maritime security
 Space security
 Cyber security
 Exploiting Information Technology in military and intelligence systems
 Ethnic conflict, sectarian conflict, genocide
 Failed and fragile states
 Security sector reform and other aspects of nation-building
 Economic and political development

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT):

National Defense Medal, 1967

Superior Honor Award, State Department, 1983
 Distinguished Service Award, National Defense University, 1997

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS):

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICE HELD</u>	<u>DATES</u>
Council on Foreign Relations	Member	1975-present
International Institute for Strategic Studies	Member	1975-2000
Foreign Policy Association	Fellow	1997-2000
Atlantic-Bruecke	Member	2000-2009
Hopkins House (charity for children)	Trustee	2005-2009

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT OR TRANSCRIPT. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH SUCH PUBLICATION, TEXT, OR TRANSCRIPT):

See attached lists

PART B - QUALIFICATIONS**14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE IN THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED):**

A. Breadth of Experience: My career has had three parts: (1) Senior official in national security establishment, including two assignments on the National Security Council Staff and four assignments at the State Department; (2) Senior corporate executive in the information technology industry; and (3) Executive and researcher at the RAND Corporation. In addition, I have taught at the National Defense University and the U.S. Naval Academy. In the course of this career, I have dealt with and contributed to national security in the following areas (and others):

- Nuclear strategy, arms control, and non-proliferation
- NATO and other alliance relationships and policies
- Base negotiations and operations
- Arms transfers and export controls
- State-Defense cooperation
- Defense strategy, programs, and budget
- Advanced technology for national security
- Force planning
- Interagency process reform
- Europe, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia
- Relations with China and Russia
- Relations with major European allies and Japan
- Counterinsurgency
- Counterterrorism
- Maritime security
- Exploiting information technology in military and intelligence systems
- Ethnic conflict, sectarian conflict, genocide
- Failed and fragile states
- Security sector reform and other aspects of nation-building
- Economic and political development

My understanding of these areas – and virtually all aspects of national security – is reflected in (a) my policy contributions, (b) my writings, and (c) my public speaking and teaching.

B. Knowledge and Application of Intelligence: My specific experience with intelligence includes:

- Twenty years as a consumer of all types of intelligence
- Setting national priorities (especially when on the National Security Council staff)
- Strategic review of operations
- Intelligence institution-building (in Iraq and elsewhere)
- Research on interpretation of intelligence on extremism and other matters
- Intelligence methods and products as they relate to nuclear issues and verification
- Managing the incorporation of intelligence into interagency policy-making
- Prescribing improvements in coordination of intelligence and military operations
- Space security
- Cyber security
- Information requirements for effective counterinsurgency

C. Senior Management: In addition to military and government experience, I have held the following senior executive positions in private industry:

- Director of Market Planning, AT&T International
- Vice President, Civil Services, AT&T Federal Systems (\$900 million in annual revenue)
- Vice President, Corporate Development and Planning, Unisys

- President, Systems Management Group, Unisys (1700 employees)
- Vice President and Director of National Defense Research Institute (NDRI - FFRDC), RAND
- President, RAND Europe

D. *Objectivity*: The hallmark of the RAND Corporation and of those divisions of RAND which I managed is independence and objectivity. RAND's sponsors expect, and RAND's charter demands, that all analysis be objective, regardless of purpose and source of funding. Thus, throughout my career in research, all my work and that of others for which I have been responsible have conformed to the highest standard of objectivity. In addition, in all of the senior positions I have held in the national security arms of government, I have always provided, insisted on, and been known for complete objectivity in analysis and decision-making.

PART C - POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. **POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS):** None
16. **CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE):** None
17. **FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS:** I have worked extensively with allied governments in policy-making and research, all on behalf of or with the full support and involvement of the U.S. Government. I have also helped reform the national security establishments of a number of countries (Europe, Africa, Middle East) at the behest of the U.S. Government. As President of RAND Europe, I supervised work on public policy issues, including but not limited to security, for many allied European countries, with the knowledge of the U.S. Government. As an executive in private industry, I carried out numerous negotiations with foreign governments and companies, all within the constraints of U.S. policy, regulations, and laws (e.g., export controls).

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.)

- A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

- B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

As noted, I supervised or performed RAND research for allied governments at the request of or with the full knowledge of the U.S. Government. I was never compensated for such work except for my regular RAND salary.

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

None

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

None

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

I will sever all such relationships.

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

I have made no such arrangements. I am scheduled to receive a modest defined-benefit pension (\$15,000 per year) from Lucent as of October, 2010.

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

No

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

My wife retired in early 2009 from active management of a small antique and folk art shop (called Eight Hands Round). She still maintains some inventory, a miniscule revenue stream, and a Virginia business license. This is unrelated to the position to which I have been nominated.

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

I am a trustee of Hopkins House – a charitable agency to help at-risk children. I intend to sever this relationship if confirmed.

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

None

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

<u>DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY</u>	<u>VALUE</u>	<u>METHOD OF VALUATION</u>
Home – VA	1,200,000	Assessed Market Value
Home – Maine	350,000	Assessed Market Value

For additional investments, see Schedule A of my OGE Disclosure form: incorporated by reference.

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

<u>NATURE OF OBLIGATION</u>	<u>NAME OF OBLIGEE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
-----------------------------	------------------------	---------------

None

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
SALARIES						
FEES						
ROYALTIES						
DIVIDENDS						
INTEREST						
GIFTS				[REDACTED]		
RENTS						
OTHER						
Wife's business						
Capital gains						
Tax refund						
Pension						
IRA distribution						
TOTAL						

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

U.S. Federal and Commonwealth of Virginia

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

Several inquiries from IRS, all of which were promptly resolved:

- (1) For 2005, we did not list gross proceeds from a bond sale for which the sales price was the same as the cost basis. Upon IRS review, no added capital gains were recognized and therefore no added tax was charged.
(2) For 2005 and 2006, the IRS disallowed claim of IRA deductions for my wife because we exceeded income eligibility. This was the result of our misunderstanding that eligibility for IRA deduction is based on combined income. (Otherwise, my wife qualified for IRA deduction.) We had to pay \$2500.
(3) For 2007, we paid \$2811 in additional tax on net proceeds from sale of mutual funds inadvertently omitted in initial filing.

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

Not applicable.

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of Government Ethics and the DNT's designated agency ethics official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have entered into with the DNT's designated agency ethics official and that has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware of any other potential conflicts of interest.

37. IF APPLICABLE, ATTACH THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORMS YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

SF 278 attached

PART E - ETHICAL MATTERS

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A

COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION,
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

(My wife was once involved in a minor civil litigation regarding her shop. There has been no judgment against her.)

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes; as a standard procedure in connection with special access clearances at RAND.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

The leadership of the intelligence community answers to both the President and the Congress – the President as chief executive and the Congress as the body representative of the American people. This dual accountability is fundamental and especially critical in the domain of intelligence. The collection of intelligence information and conduct of intelligence activities abroad, as well as the relationship of foreign to domestic intelligence, are highly sensitive, both in regard to national security and in regard to protecting the rights of American citizens. The American people hold the Executive Branch and the Congress *together* responsible for safeguarding their security and their rights, and they should consider it impermissible for the Executive Branch and the Congress to fail to work closely, openly and trustfully in meeting that singular responsibility. The attacks of 9/11/2001 have made effective Executive-Congressional cooperation in intelligence not merely an expectation but an imperative. While the intelligence community and its leadership operate within the interagency process of the Executive Branch, their link to Congress is no less important. This puts a premium on a system of Congressional oversight that is governed not only by legal requirements but also by the energetic efforts of the intelligence community's leadership to engage the intelligence committees. In the expectation that the intelligence committees will provide helpful and thoughtful oversight, the leaders of the intelligence community should have a strong commitment to keep them well, currently, and fully informed. This attitude should guide not only formal proceedings but also informal ones, which should be frequent and trustful.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

The Principal Deputy DNI is responsible for assisting the DNI in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the DNI. The PDDNI must be able to act for, and exercise the powers of, the DNI during the absence or disability of the DNI. When necessary, the PDDNI will serve as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, the National Security and Homeland Security Councils. The PDDNI will assist the DNI in leading, managing, and transforming the Intelligence Community (IC) to meet the threats of today and tomorrow, to include providing timely, objective and independent intelligence to support the needs of the President, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and anyone else the DNI determines is appropriate. The PDDNI may assist the DNI in any of the DNI's duties, specifically to include managing the National Intelligence Program budget for current operations and future investments, building an integrated, collaborative IC, and ensuring maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the IC, consistent with national security requirements. The PDDNI performs all of his duties under law in a manner that respects civil liberties and privacy of all Americans.

AFFIRMATION

I, DAVID C. GOMPERT, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE.

AUG 26, 2009
(Date)

David Compert
(Name)

John Wigle
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commonwealth of Virginia
My Commission Expires 6/30/2010

John Wigle
(Notary)

324663



TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:


In connection with my nomination to be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.



Signature

Date: AUG 26, 2009

John Wigle
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commonwealth of Virginia
My Commission Expires 6/30/2010



#324663



Books, Articles, and Public Statements of David C. Gompert

Dangers Ahead: A Framework for Analyzing Iraq's Security as U.S. Forces Leave, with Terrence Kelly and Jessica Watkins, RAND, 2009

Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies, with Walter L. Perry, et al., RAND 2009.

Hope under Fire: Improving Security for Civil Counterinsurgency, with Terrence Kelly, Michelle Parker, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Kim Colloton, RAND, 2009

Underkill: Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations, with Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, David Frelinger, John Gordon IV, and Raymond Smith. RAND, 2009

Oversight of the Liberian National Police, with Rob Davis and Brooke Stearns Lawson. RAND, 2009

"Decisions of the CPA," with L. Paul Bremer and James Dobbins. *Survival*, Volume 50, Issue 4, August 2008.

Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis, with Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, and Duncan Long. RAND, 2008

Developing Resource-Informed Strategic Assessments and Recommendations, with Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, and Duncan Long. RAND, 2008

War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, with John Gordon. RAND, 2008

"Deterring China through Escalation," with Duncan Long, in *Coping with the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and the U.S. Military*. National Defense University, 2007

Bying Back: Regaining Information Superiority against 21st-Century Insurgents, with Martin Libick, David Frelinger, and Raymond Smith. RAND, 2007

Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector, with Olga Oliker, Brooke Stearns, Keith Crane, and K. Jack Riley. RAND, 2007

Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), RAND Occasional Paper, Counterinsurgency Study Paper No. 1, 2007

Chinese Response to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense, with James Mulvenon et al. RAND 2006

Bringing Defense into the Information Economy, with Paul Bracken, Defense and Technology Paper, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2006

Lee's Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett's Charge, with Richard L. Kugler, Defense Horizons, Number 54, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2006

Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, with Frances Burwell et al, Policy Paper of the Atlantic Council of the United States, February 2006

"For a Capability to Protect: Mass Killing, the African Union and NATO," *Survival* Vol. 48 No. 1, Spring 2006

Creating a NATO Special Operations Force, with Raymond C. Smith, Defense Horizons No. 52, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2006

Extending the User's Reach: Responsive Networking for Integrated Military Operations., with Alf Andreassen and Charles Barry, Defense and Technology Paper No. 24, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2006

Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense, with James Mulvenon et al, National Defense Research Institute, RAND, 2006

"Custer in Cyberspace," with Richard Kugler, *Joint Forces Quarterly* Issue 41. 2nd Quarter 2006

GWAT? New Democracy Foundation, 2005

"Of Tyrants and Terrorists: America's Ambition and Europe's Response," Essay, Atlantik Bruecke Jahresbericht, Berlin, 2005

Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing, with Courtney Richardson, Richard Kugler, and Clifford Bernath, Defense and Technology, Paper 15, CTNSP, NDU, 2005

A New Military Framework for NATO, with Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, Center for Technology and National Security Policy Occasional Paper, 2005

Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Advantage in Networked Warfare, with Irving Lachow and Justin Perkins, National Defense University Press, 2005

China on the Move: A Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese Strategies and Their Consequences for Transatlantic Relations, with Francois Godement, Evan S. Medeiros, and James C. Mulvenon, RAND Conference Proceedings, 2005

"La Transformation de l'Appareil Militaire Americain," in *Les Etats-Unis aujourd'hui: Choc et Changement*, edited by Guillaume Parmentier, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2004

A New Persian Gulf Security System, with Andrew Rathmell and Theodore Karasik, RAND Issue Paper, 2003

"What Does America Want of Europe?" in *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq*, edited by Gustav Lindstrom, Transatlantic Book 2003, European Institute for Security Studies, 2003

Shoulder to Shoulder: The Road to US-European Military Cooperability, with Uwe Nerlich, Center for Euro-Atlantic Military Analysis, RAND, 2002

"The Day After: An Assessment". in *Survival* (IISS Quarterly), Volume 43, Number 4, Winter, 2001

"Die EU auf der Weltbühne", in *Internationale Politik*, No. 1, January 2002

A Framework for Strategy Development, with John McGinn et al, RAND, 2002

"The European Union on the World Stage", in *Internationale Politik* (Transatlantic Edition), Volume 3, 2002

Future German Military Requirements, with John Gordon and Stuart Johnson, RAND AB(L)-598, May, 2002

"Treat Europe as a Full Partner and It Will Be," in *RAND Review*, Vol 26, No. 2, 2002

Ballistic Missile Defense: A German-American Analysis, with Klaus Arnholt, RAND Issue Paper, in cooperation with Stiftung fur Wissenschaft und Politik, January, 2001

"Legitimacy and World Politics," in *The Real and the Ideal*, edited by Anthony Lake and David A. Ochmanek, Rowman and Littlefield, 2001

"U.S. Alliance Relations in the Global Era", in *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the Presidents-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security Policy*, edited by Frank Carlucci, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Robert Hunter, RAND, 2001

"Weapons of Mass Destruction", in *American Military Strategy*, edited by Philip Zelikow, Aspen Institute, W.W. Norton and Company, 2001

"US-EU Economic Relations: Equality Or A More Balanced Partnership?" *Atlantisch Perspectief*, No. 7/8, volume 24, 2000

"Alternative Concepts for National Missile Defense," in *Occasional Papers* 18, edited by Burkhard Schmitt, WEU Institute for Security Studies, September 2000

"Sharpen the Fear," in *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2000.

Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of Systems: An Adaptive Strategy, with Jeffrey A. Isaacson, RAND Issue Paper, 1999

"Right Makes Might," in *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, edited by Zalmay Khalilzad and John White, RAND, 1999

Transforming US Forces: Lessons from the Wider Revolution, with Irving Lachow, RAND Issue Paper, 1999

Mind the Gap: How to Conduct a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs, with Richard Kugler and Martin Libicki, National Defense University, 1999

"Needed: A New Atlantic Compact," in *NATO at 50*, Agenda Publishing, London, 1999

"Common Interests, Common Responsibilities: How an Atlantic Partnership Could Stabilize the Middle East," with Jerrold Green and F. Stephen Larrabee, *RAND Review*, 1999

"The Future Purpose of NATO," in William Perry and Aston Carter, Stanford University, 1999

Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age, McNair Paper 59, National Defense University, 1998

Transforming the Force: Suggestions for DoD Strategy, with Paul Davis, et al, RAND Issue Paper, 1998

"The Information Revolution and U.S. National Security," in *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1998

Strategic Assessment, General Editor, National Defense University, Washington, 1998

"Rethinking Nuclear Weapons," *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University, 1998

"Adaptiveness in National Defense," with Paul Davis and Richard Kugler, in Khalilzad and Ochmanek, eds., *Strategic Appraisal*, RAND, 1997

"NATO Enlargement: Putting the Costs into Perspective," *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University, 1997

"U.S. Policy and Yugoslavia's Wars," in Richard Ullman, ed., *Yugoslavia's Wars*, Council on Foreign Relations, 1997

"Building a New Atlantic Partnership," *RAND Research Review*, Vol. XX No. 2, 1997

Rebuilding the Team: How to Get the Allies to Do More in Defense of Common Interests, with Richard Kugler, RAND Issue Paper, 1997

"Changing Roles for the United States and Europe," in *NATO 1997: Year of Change*, National Defense University, 1997

America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era, ed. with S. Larrabee, Cambridge Press, 1996

Global Security: Partnership, The Foreign Policy Project, Overseas Development Council and Stimson Center, 1996

Adaptiveness in National Defense: the Basis of a New Framework, with Paul Davis and Richard Kugler, RAND Issue Paper, 1996

"No First Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," with Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, *Survival*, Vol. 37 No. 3, 1995

"Free Rider Redux," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74 No. 1, 1995

"How to Defeat Serbia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73 No. 4, 1994

"American Diplomacy and the Haig Mission: An Insider's Perspective," in *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law*, A. Coll and A. Arend, eds., University of Virginia, 1985

Nuclear Weapons and World Politics, ed., Council on Foreign Relations, 1977

Nuclear Non-proliferation, ed., Council on Foreign Relations, 1977

Conventional Arms Transfers, ed., Council on Foreign Relations, 1977

"Constraints on the Use of Force," Proceedings from IISS Annual Conference, 1976

Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1972

Op-ed pieces:

Washington Post, 7/17/2008: "China's Responsibility to Protect."

San Francisco Chronicle, 12/2/2007: "Take Advantage of Improved Security in Iraq to Withdraw"

United Press International, 01/26/2007: "No Need to Expand U.S. Army"

Christian Science Monitor, 5/2/2006: "Stability in Iraq Won't Come without Disbanding Militias."

Washington Post, 12/11/2005: "We Advance Our Cause."

Welt am Sonntag, 11/27/2002; Trans-Atlantic relations.

Tekening, 2002: "Molten Steun von Europa ververven voor Raketdefensie."

Die Ziet, 3/9/2000: "Alles fata Morgana?"

Testimony:

Public briefing for interested Members and staff from the House of Representatives and the Senate, 2/11/08, on counterinsurgency

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 07/22/2004, on Iraq

UK Parliamentary Committee on Defense, 1/28/2003, on military transformation

Public remarks:

RAND "Continuum of Force" Conference, 4/22/2009: New Concepts

RAND "Shaping Tomorrow Today" Conference, 3/18/2009: Building Global Human Capital

Clausewitz Association Conference, Berlin, 3/25/2009: Transatlantic Security

RAND "Politics Aside" Symposium, 11/15/2008: Foreign Policy under the New Administration

U.S.-European Conference on Security and Defense, 4/21/2008: Future Agenda

Business Leaders Luncheon, 9/27/2005: Iraq.

Atlantic-Brucke, Bremen, 6/2005: Middle East Security

USIP Interview, 8/2004: Iraq

Ronald Reagan Oral History, University of Virginia, 5/15/2003: Falkland Crisis

EU Commission, 10/10/2002: Information Security

George Marshall Center Commencement Address, 8/2/2002: Terrorism and Democracy

CSSP, Geneva, 6/23/2002: Asymmetric Warfare

NATO Permanent Representative Conference, Keynote Address, 6/2002: Future of NATO

Charlemagne Forum, 5/8/2002: Europe's New Role in World Affairs

EU Conference, 5/2002: Unilateralism and Multilateralism

GCSP, Geneva, 1/2002: Revolution in Military Affairs

Joint Operations Symposium, Norfolk, 11/7/2001: Improving National Security by Unlocking U.S. Advantages

Swedish Parliamentarians Talk, 12/6/2001: New Terrorism

Globalization Conference, Paris, 11/27/2001: Globalization and Security, Post 9/11

Madrid Conference, 10/23/2001: US Quadrennial Defense Review

IISS, 10/2001: Implications of 9/11, U.S. Perspective

DoD Public Briefing, 5/2001: U.S. Conventional Forces, 2001-2015

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 5/25/2000: Transatlantic Security

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

September 29, 2009

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Bond:

Enclosed please find the completed responses to the Prehearing Questions in support of Mr. David C. Gompert's nomination to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on (703) 275-2473.

Sincerely,



Kathleen Turner
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure

Responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 1:

A. Explain your understanding of the responsibility of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI):

- To assist the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in carrying out the DNI's duties and responsibilities; and
- To act in the DNI's place in the DNI's absence.

If you believe that the PDDNI has any additional responsibilities, please describe them.

ANSWER: The PDDNI's responsibilities flow from those of the DNI. Whether assisting, acting for, or serving alongside the DNI, the PDDNI has core responsibilities bearing on U.S. national security:

- Helping to keep the United States safe by bringing to bear the full capabilities of U.S. intelligence to warn of and prevent attack.
- Providing national security policy-makers with objective, high-quality intelligence information and analysis.
- Ensuring that U.S. operating forces and commanders have the benefit of all intelligence that might improve their effectiveness.

In turn, these core responsibilities require the PDDNI, working for and with the DNI, to integrate and improve U.S. intelligence in several fundamental ways:

- Setting priorities across the intelligence community so that both the allocation of existing collection and analytic capabilities and investments to improve those capabilities are optimized.
- Enabling the effective sharing of intelligence information at all levels across the community and with clients.
- Organizing cross-agency collaboration, such as through national intelligence centers, mission managers, and other forms of teaming.

I would, if confirmed, also be responsible, with the DNI and other IC leaders, for improving the understanding of, respect for, and trust in the intelligence community and its people on the part of the American people. Our national security depends on, and intelligence professionals have earned, public confidence, cooperation, and support.

B. Is it your understanding that you and the DNI will divide responsibilities and that you will have a specific portfolio as PDDNI? If so, please describe this portfolio as you understand it. If not, please describe what you believe your primary responsibilities and activities will be, and on what areas you will concentrate.

ANSWER: As just noted, the PDDNI, like the DNI, has responsibilities to meet today's intelligence needs as well as to integrate and improve U.S. intelligence. In 2005, the "WMD Commission" noted that "the DNI's responsibilities are both critically important and exceedingly difficult" and warned that "the obligation to provide current intelligence support to the President and senior policy makers will reduce or eliminate the

attention the DNI can devote to the painstaking, long-term work of integrating and managing the community." With this dual challenge in mind, Director Blair and I have agreed that my background and knowledge are especially suited to meeting the needs of policy-makers with information and analysis drawn from across the IC. This would enable the DNI to concentrate that much more of his energies on integrating and improving U.S. intelligence for the future.

Of course, the DNI is the chief intelligence advisor to the President and would in any case remain a key and full participant in the interagency process at the "principals" level. Likewise, if confirmed, I would be expected to fulfill all the responsibilities of the PDDNI, as just outlined.

C. To what extent should the PDDNI be a manager within the ODNI? Is it your understanding that anyone will report to you directly if you are confirmed?

ANSWER: I would, if confirmed, have management duties within ODNI. This has both formal and equally important informal aspects. Formally, I will be responsible for preparing performance reviews of the heads of the ODNI National Intelligence Centers and Mission Managers. This fits with the emphasis on supporting policy-makers, as just described, in that these organizations all relate directly to ensuring IC consumers are provided with objective, integrated, high-quality current intelligence. For his part, the DNI would be responsible for reviewing the performance of those ODNI officials responsible for helping to integrate and manage the IC, as well as heads of the intelligence agencies.

Notwithstanding these formal reporting and reviewing relationships, Director Blair and I agree that the leaders of all these organizations will continue to have direct access to and support of the DNI. Conversely, all parts of ODNI, not just those formally reviewed by the PDDNI, could count on me, if confirmed, to take a strong interest in their work, guide and support them as needed, and be completely accessible. Indeed, the PDDNI's role in IC management at the deputies' level and involvement in issues and initiatives as they arise will require my regular reliance on and contact with all parts of ODNI.

These understandings, along with the close working relationship I would expect to have with the Director, should make this arrangement succeed. My conversations with the DNI and senior ODNI managers in the course of preparing for confirmation convince me that it will.

QUESTION 2:

A. Explain your understanding of the role of the DNI in overseeing elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) that reside within various departments of the federal government, and for elements that are not housed within other departments.

ANSWER: The DNI's role is to see to it that the whole of the IC is greater than the sum of its many components. This does not require the DNI to second-guess day-to-day operations or management of the agencies, so long as they are consistent with law and applicable policies. Nor do I envision the DNI attempting to manage how elements of the IC are serving their parent departments. At the same time, the DNI

should encourage and assist these agencies to utilize the entire IC to serve their departments, such as through their involvement in IC-wide priorities-setting, information sharing, and collaboration. Likewise, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that all IC elements, including those within departments, function in ways that make U.S. intelligence as a whole more effective.

In addition to this general oversight role, the DNI has specific authorities by law to guide elements of the intelligence community, including those that reside in other government departments, for the overall effectiveness of national intelligence. In particular, the DNI provides budget guidance to these elements and ultimately approves and presents a consolidated National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget to the Congress; he approves transfers and reprogrammings of appropriated NIP funds; and he has the authority to effect transfers personnel among intelligence agencies for certain purposes.

The component of the IC that is not part of another department is, of course, the CIA. By law, the Director of the CIA reports to the DNI. The DNI has statutory authority to: direct the CIA to perform such functions and duties related to intelligence activities affecting the national security as may be required; direct the CIA in its coordination of foreign intelligence relationships; direct the allocation of NIP appropriations to the CIA; and ensure that the CIA complies with the law. Also, by statute and under Executive Order 12333, the DNI has a consultative or concurring role with respect to the appointment and removal of heads of intelligence elements in other departments. The DNI is responsible for recommending an individual to the President for nomination as CIA Director, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

B. What issues have you become aware of through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the role of the DNI in overseeing intelligence elements of the Department of Defense? What is your understanding of these issues?

ANSWER: I appreciate the vital importance of an effective relationship between the Office of the DNI and DoD. Moreover, I know from studying the legislative history of IRTPA that there were concerns that the chain of command between our armed forces and their DoD leadership could be complicated by the DNI's relationship with the various defense intelligence organizations that are part of the IC. From my observation over the years since IRTPA was enacted, reinforced by my preparation for confirmation, I believe that the awareness and effectiveness of our armed forces has in fact been improved by greater IC integration. From my own observation, I believe that DNI and DoD efforts to tighten the relationship between DoD and non-DoD IC elements is already increasing the timeliness and completeness of the intelligence available to our commanders and armed forces. This is increasingly evident from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where information sharing and collaboration between DoD and non-DoD intelligence arms has expanded since the establishment of the DNI. Conversely, I am not aware of any cases in which our commanders and forces have been disadvantaged by IC integration.

In addition to intelligence sharing, the DoD-ODNI relationship is working well with regard to:

- Allocating collection and analytic capabilities to serve both military and national needs

- Allocating funds for investment to develop and acquire improved capabilities to serve both military and national requirements
- Jointly managing development and acquisition programs that address both national and military intelligence needs, and that may involve both NIP and MIP funds.
- Addressing collaboratively the growing need for securing military and intelligence networks.

Although this is a positive and promising picture, it is so critical to national security and to current military operations that it should remain a top and constant priority for the DNI, the Principal Deputy, and leaders throughout the IC. I would, if confirmed, dedicate myself to doing all I can to ensure that the support of the DNI and the entire IC enables our military to be served better and better by national intelligence. Because the intelligence needs of DoD and our forces overlap with but differ from the intelligence needs of our nation's policy-makers, issues and trade-offs will inevitably arise about how best to exploit and improve total U.S. intelligence capabilities. I would, if confirmed, join the DNI and DoD leaders in addressing them squarely and resolving them cooperatively.

In sum, the relationship of the ODNI and DoD's intelligence arms, and between DNI and DoD generally, is vital, has progressed well, is bearing fruit, and will remain a top priority.

- C. What issues have you become aware of through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the role of the DNI in overseeing intelligence elements of other departments of the United States government? What is your understanding of these issues?**

ANSWER: The DNI's challenge in overseeing the intelligence elements in other departments and agencies is to coordinate and integrate their efforts. Aside from the FBI and CIA, the elements outside of the Department of Defense are analytical elements that serve their parent departments. The DNI is responsible for ensuring that each of these elements has access to all the intelligence that can support its department's mission. Likewise, it is the DNI's responsibility to ensure that skills and information resident in any element that can help other departments or address larger national intelligence questions are identified and optimized as part of an integrated team. While I am not aware of any issues regarding the intelligence functions or relationships between the ODNI and non-DoD federal departments, my impression is that they are making steady progress in meeting the heightened requirements facing the nation since 9/11, particularly those concerning terrorist threats. Moreover, they are making increasingly important contributions to U.S. intelligence as a whole. Being part of an increasingly integrated IC should help these intelligence elements as well as the departments they serve.

QUESTION 3:**A. Do you believe additional legislation is needed to clarify or strengthen the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the IC?**

ANSWER: While I have studied the responsibilities and authorities of the DNI as set forth in law and Executive Order, I lack the first-hand experience to make a considered judgment on the need for additional legislation.

I find the DNI's responsibilities, and by extension mine, if confirmed, as PDDNI, to be very clear. Simply stated, they are to lead the IC, to serve as chief intelligence advisor to the President and NSC, to improve both warning and support for policy-making, to give U.S. forces access to the best, fullest, fastest national intelligence, to effect IC-wide sharing and collaboration, to set priorities, and to build and manage an integrated National Intelligence Program.

The matter of authorities is more complex. The ODNI is unusual in that it has responsibilities over sixteen other IC elements, fifteen of which reside in six different departments and answer to the heads of those Departments as well as to the DNI. Consequently, DNI authorities are in many respects shared or otherwise limited by these dual reporting relationships. Overall, this arrangement appears to be working well and steadily improving. My judgment at this point is that the DNI is able to fulfill his responsibilities even with shared or limited authority where these six departments are concerned. Moreover, the departments themselves are all benefiting, and see themselves as benefiting, from the IC integration, sharing, and collaboration that the DNI already provides and is expanding. Finally, the roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships of IC agencies within their respective departments is a strength of U.S. intelligence insofar as it improves responsiveness to departmental policy and operational demands.

In sum, the current arrangement with other departments, while complex and decentralized, has significant advantages and is not an inherent impediment to strengthening and integrating the IC under the DNI. Based on what I know now, I am confident that the understandings and practices governing shared authorities with cabinet departments will keep improving.

If confirmed as PDDNI, my views on this will be seasoned by experience. If I conclude that U.S. intelligence and national security could be strengthened by further clarification of DNI authorities, I would not hesitate to raise it with the DNI. In any case, it is important and helpful to have an open and continuing discussion with the intelligence oversight committees regarding the evolution and sufficiency of DNI authorities, and I look forward to joining that discussion if confirmed.

B. What do you understand to be the authorities of the PDDNI? Does the PDDNI possess any authorities independent of the DNI, or are the PDDNI's authorities derived entirely from the DNI?

ANSWER: Under the law, the PDDNI's function is to assist the DNI in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the DNI. In addition, the PDDNI becomes the acting DNI in the DNI's absence. The law does not include any separate authorities for the PDDNI. The law does permit the DNI to delegate certain authorities to the PDDNI, including the authority to protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, the PDDNI may be called upon to make major acquisition decisions. As

an executive branch officer, the PDDNI could also be directed by the President or the DNI to carry out any other lawful executive branch functions.²

Although the PDDNI's authorities are not specifically enumerated in statute, if confirmed, I anticipate that I will assist the DNI in executing his authorities, to include overseeing IC elements, resolving issues between IC elements over the tasking of national collection assets, providing common services, ensuring maximum information sharing and collaboration, and ensuring objective and high-quality analysis of intelligence to support national security needs.

C. If confirmed, will you have any role in completing the policies, guidelines, and procedures necessary to fully implement the revised Executive Order 12333? In answering this question, please identify and discuss the most important issues that you believe need to be addressed with respect to the implementation of Executive Order 12333.

ANSWER: Executive Order 12333, as amended, is one of the fundamental documents governing the activities of the IC. In my view, its most important provisions are those that go to the heart of the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence: setting objectives, priorities, and guidance for collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination; issuing guidance with respect to how intelligence is provided to, or accessed by the IC; and issuing guidance concerning the deconfliction, coordination, and integration of intelligence activities. I also regard guidance concerning the functional managers and mission managers as extremely important to the IC's effectiveness and integration. If confirmed, I will focus on these areas, under the guidance of the DNI, to ensure that we have adequate implementing guidance in place.

QUESTION 4

A. Explain your understanding of the obligations of the DNI under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947.

ANSWER: Section 502 of the National Security Act requires the DNI, as well as the heads of all departments and agencies with intelligence components, to keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all U.S. intelligence activities (except covert actions that are covered in section 503). Clearly, this includes significant anticipated intelligence activities and significant intelligence failures. Section 503 imposes similar obligations with respect to covert action. Under this section, the DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the U.S. Government involved in a covert action are charged with keeping the committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions that may be undertaken by elements of the U.S. Government.

Both sections 502 and 503 require the DNI to furnish the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning an intelligence activity or covert action that the committees request in order to carry out their responsibilities.

Section 502 provides that congressional notification must be made to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. Section 503 includes similar language. In extraordinary circumstances, I

believe it could be appropriate to brief only the Chairman and Vice Chairman/Ranking Member of the intelligence committees on particularly sensitive matters.

Director Blair has emphasized throughout our conversations his commitment to and insistence on timely and complete congressional notification. Like him, I believe that congressional notification must be timely to be effective. If confirmed as PDDNI, I will conduct myself in complete accord with his strong views, which I share.

B. Does the PDDNI have any responsibility to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities in general, and covert action in particular, comply with the reporting requirements of those sections?

ANSWER: The PDDNI has the responsibility to assist the Director in carrying out his statutory authority under the National Security Act to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States, including those that require all components of the IC to keep the Congress fully and currently informed of intelligence activities and covert actions. Soon after assuming his position, Director Blair issued a memorandum to the heads of all IC components reminding them of their obligation in this regard and directing that they review their internal procedures to ensure full and timely compliance. If confirmed, I will assist the Director in ensuring that all IC elements comply with the reporting requirements in sections 502 and 503.

C. What lessons do you believe should be learned from the experiences of the last several years concerning the implementation of Sections 502 and 503, including the decisions not to brief the entire membership of the congressional intelligence committees on significant intelligence programs at their inception such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) detention, interrogation and rendition program and the National Security Agency (NSA) electronic communications surveillance program (often referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" or "TSP")? With the benefit of hindsight, do you believe these decisions were wise?

ANSWER: As I understand it, the previous Administration initially limited notification to Congress of the CIA's rendition, detention, and interrogation programs, as well as the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP"), to the so-called "Gang of 8". As noted in one of my previous answers, Sections 502 and 503 provide that congressional notification must be made to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. This does not limit the obligation to keep the intelligence committees informed but rather provides the Administration a degree of latitude in determining how and when to bring extremely sensitive matters to the committees' attention. I agree with Director Blair that limited notification should be undertaken only in the most exceptional circumstances, as reflected in the standards set in Sections 502 and 503.

Because of the limited notification of the programs referred to in the question, those programs did not receive oversight of the full membership of the congressional intelligence committees. Such oversight helps ensure that intelligence activities are conducted effectively and efficiently, have solid legal and constitutional foundations, and protect the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens. I believe that timely and complete congressional notification to the full intelligence committees should be

provided and that the "Gang of 8" limitations should be used only when consistent with standards set forth in the statute.

D. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe notification should be limited to Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees?

ANSWER: See response to questions 4 (A) and (C).

National Security Threats

Question 5:

A. What are the principal threats to national security with which the IC must concern itself in the coming years?

ANSWER: Based on my experience in assessing national security threats and my preparation for confirmation, I believe the IC should concern itself with the following priorities.

- Finding and crippling al-Qa'ida
- Preventing and countering the proliferation of WMD, especially:
 - Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs
 - Diversion and trafficking of fissile materials
 - Biological weapons
- Supporting U.S. forces in the field and securing the future of Afghanistan and Iraq
- Understanding the implications of change, especially:
 - Growing Chinese power
 - Global economic and financial stability
 - Cybersecurity
 - Energy security, environmental security, and health security

While most of these challenges are likely to be with us for years to come, I would observe that security conditions are unstable and that specific dangers and U.S. priorities can change. So the IC should continuously rethink its views of the principal threats.

B. What is the nature of each such threat and what are the questions that the IC should address in its collection activities and assessments?

ANSWER: Al-Qa'ida remains a serious threat to the Homeland despite recent successes in degrading its command structure. Although other terrorist groups, e.g., Hizballah, can pose a threat, none currently combine intent and capability to the same degree as al-Qa'ida. The challenge facing the IC is to understand, locate, track, isolate, disrupt and damage al-Qa'ida leadership, networks, and franchises. In this regard, the IC can help Pakistan improve its efforts against al-Qa'ida and extremist groups that support it.

Key questions for the IC include: the aims of the terrorists; the extent they pose a threat to the Homeland, its people, American interests at home and abroad, and American allies; their vulnerabilities; their capabilities; the states or other entities providing support (financial, political, logistical, and other support); recruitment into these groups; and potential disruption of the recruitment process; potential partnerships to achieve American goals.

Iran's continuing efforts to develop capabilities suitable for producing nuclear weapons could damage U.S. interests, threaten U.S. friends, and trigger wider proliferation in a critical region. With North Korea, I worry not only about nuclear weaponry in the hands of a potentially reckless regime, but also its covert sale of nuclear technology and missile weaponry. Biological weapons, which can be easier to acquire and use than nuclear, could present a growing threat.

Key questions for the IC include: the objectives and intentions of the Iranian and North Korean leadership; changes in these regimes and their objectives and intentions; opportunities options are to alter their intentions; current and developing capabilities and potential for disruption; regime sharing or selling their nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons technology; availability of weapons-producing knowledge, materials, and technology, both overtly and covertly; production of weapons-grade materials and weapons themselves.

The Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan is proving resilient. Besides supporting the commanders and armed forces in the field, the IC must assist and inform policymaker efforts to enhance security, improve governance and extend development so that Afghanistan does not revert back into a safe haven from which terrorists can attack Americans or American interests. Intertwined with the fate of Afghanistan is Pakistan, which has increased the tempo of its fight against militants. But Islamabad faces enormous social, political, and economic challenges dealing with the underlying reasons for the growing extremism.

Key questions for the IC include: the capabilities in the National Intelligence Program to support the policy makers and the war fighter and how can they be best utilized; the capabilities and intentions of the Taliban.

The situation in Iraq has improved in the last two years and is substantially better than when I served there in 2003-2004. Continued extremist violence is virtually certain. This danger suggests a need to watch closely how the main groups react to extremist provocations, and how the departure of U.S. forces will affect the behavior of all parties.

Key questions for the IC include: the potential of AQI to cause more widespread and sustained violence; the posture of the main groups (Shi'a, Sunni, Kurd) that make up Iraq's political order; reactions of key neighboring states (Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) to developments in Iraq.

China continues to grow rapidly and exert its power in a variety of arenas, from economics and military to cyberspace and diplomacy. The IC will be called upon to gather, analyze, and synthesize intelligence on all aspects of China's growth, capabilities, goals, strategy, and likely conduct.

Key questions for the IC include: China's interests and goals, and how are they evolving as China develops and integrated; the role of military capabilities and the use or threat of force in Chinese strategy; the issues on which China can and might play a constructive and cooperative role; China's internal development and its affect on its external policies; the growth of Chinese power and reach affecting U.S. interests and stability in East Asia.

The global economic downturn has the potential to contribute to political and social instability in many countries especially where unemployment remains high, resources are inadequate, and investment is lagging. Weak governance and failing states sow the seeds of instability, providing safe havens to terrorists and organized crime groups and resources are sourced.

Key questions for the IC include: the threats that economic instability poses to U.S. national security; the extent these threats emerge or escalate abroad; the conditions that exacerbate economic threats to national security and how these conditions and the threats themselves be detected and mitigated.

Most aspects of American life—commercial, financial, military, transportation, utilities, law enforcement, public safety, education, health, and social — are increasingly dependent on information networks and systems. This reality, combined with the spread of cyber know-how and the “open” (increasingly Internet-based) character of most information services, suggests that information security and cyber security will be a growing problem and potentially severe problem.

Key questions for the IC include: the disruption, intrusion, or destruction threat to IC IT systems, to U.S. Government IT systems, to American commercial IT systems, to critical infrastructure; Detection of threats and intrusions; other countries use of IT.

Energy security, environmental security, and health security present diffuse but important and related issues for policymakers. How environmental resources are acquired and exploited to create energy for powering states impacts climate change which in turn affects future energy resources and the quality of the environment and the health of the people in it. Energy security is quickly becoming a leading driver for the actions of foreign nations and the H1N1virus presents both a threat to American health security and an opportunity to establish cooperation on future health issues. All three issues present opportunities for international cooperation but can also stress state relations and lead to conflict. Energy, health, and environmental security present a difficult challenge for the intelligence community because of the wide variety of sources to collect from, including open source, academic, and scientific in addition to clandestine and indirect sources. Because of the potential for these types of security issues to impact how nations interact, even if and when they go to war, the IC must play a useful, focused role for policymakers in providing information on these issues.

Key questions for the IC include: the influence of energy security, health security, and environmental security on foreign nations interactions with the U.S. and each other; the affect of energy, health, and environmental issues on the goals and interests of other nations.

C. In your opinion, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats?

ANSWER: Without having done the kind of comprehensive examination I intend to do if I am confirmed, I can only give you an initial impression of the IC's performance in addressing these dangers. While the dangers are multifarious, it is necessary to apply whatever capabilities it takes to theaters where U.S. forces operate and are at risk, notably Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the demands of warning of Homeland attacks and disrupting those who might launch such attacks must also be met. On these highest immediate priorities, I think the IC has done well in strengthening and focussing its collection and analytical capabilities.

At the same time, the immediate should not overwhelm the future. Any of the longer-term threats I mention could also become strategic and dangerous. Decision makers need help now in defusing and preparing for those threats and should not have to wait until immediate threats ease.

In general, the IC is making progress in adapting to a world of complex, diverse, and shifting dangers and demands. The IC is getting better at setting and adjusting priorities, allocating collection assets, exploiting all available information, and analyzing untraditional threats. A long term challenge is to develop a corps of analysts who are both deeply knowledgeable about known problems and versatile enough to spot and comprehend emerging ones.

D. If not otherwise addressed, discuss your view of the appropriate IC roles and responsibilities with respect to the issues of climate change and energy security, and how well the IC has performed in these areas.

ANSWER: Both climate change and energy dependence could cause national security problems in the future. The greatest concerns about energy security are with the disruption of supply resulting from attacks on production sources or supply routes, political upheaval in key supplying countries, and political manipulation. The IC has clear responsibilities to analyze and warn of such dangers. Security problems from climate change could include disasters, resource conflicts, and turmoil in fragile and/or critical regions. While these dangers may be well into the future, the IC has a duty to analyze and apprise policy-makers of them today so that we can prevent and prepare for them.

Climate change and energy have an obvious but complex interrelationship. Increasingly, the IC's role will be to understand such interrelationships, as well as to analyze these issues from many different perspectives – political, economic, and demographic, and from the perspective of several scientific disciplines. My experience is that the IC has been working to build expertise in many of those areas. For example, the National Intelligence Council issued National Intelligence Assessments on both climate change and energy security over the past year. In addition, the NIC has established a special Long-Range Analysis Unit, which is responsible for focusing IC attention on longer range challenges to US interests.

Outreach to and involvement of the expert community are increasingly important ways for the IC to gain specialized knowledge and information, while also contributing to national understanding. This is especially crucial on climate change, energy security, and other long-term global issues.

E. Please discuss your view of the appropriate IC roles and responsibilities with regard to the vulnerability of both US government and privately-owned satellites.

ANSWER: The IC has the responsibility to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning threats to space systems that support U.S. national security and military operations. This entails assessing foreign counterspace capabilities and intent, actual and potential, as well as providing indications and warning of any threatening activity to help space operators mitigate intentional threats as well as natural and accidental dangers. It encompasses threats not only to satellites but also to other space subsystems and links, whether such threats are physical or electronic. Such intelligence can be used by space system designers, developers, and operators to identify and reduce satellite and other space system vulnerabilities.

The IC is also responsible for assessing threats to U.S. space systems that are not primarily for national security. As appropriate, information may also be shared with U.S. commercial and friendly foreign space authorities.

Finally, in cooperation with the U.S. military, the IC is responsible for ensuring the survivability, endurance, and performance of U.S. space systems with national security missions.

Management Challenges Facing the Intelligence Community

QUESTION 6:

A. Apart from national security threats discussed in answer to Question 5, what do you consider to be the highest priority management challenges facing the IC at this time?

ANSWER: While the IC as a whole and the DNI face a multitude of management challenges, my highest management priorities as PDDNI, if confirmed, flow from the core responsibilities and the expectations of the DNI as described in the answer to Question 1.

Coupling intelligence with policy-making is critical. Much of my career has been spent doing that. It is essential that the IC's organizations and people support the interagency policy process while maintaining their objectivity, which is fundamental to good intelligence. I sense that important lessons have been learned about the importance and challenge of keeping this balance between support to policymakers and independence from policymaking, and I am confident that it will be done. As one of the IC's leaders, if confirmed, I would draw on my experience, maintain my commitment, and work hard to ensure that the IC supports U.S. policy-makers with reliable information and unvarnished analysis.

Ensuring ever greater collaboration across the intelligence community is another high-priority management challenge. As reforms are made to integrate intelligence -- to improve sharing, remove barriers, set standards, and institutionalize cross-agency work -- such collaboration will become the norm. Meanwhile, by forming cross-agency teams to tackle critical current and looming problems, the DNI and PDDNI can help ensure that collection and analytic resources are aligned, that all information is exploited, that

best practices are developed and used, that people with Community awareness are developed, and that a culture of sharing is promoted.

One of the most important benefits of having a DNI is the ability to set priorities across the Intelligence Community and see to it that existing capabilities and investments in better capabilities are guided by those priorities. From what I have learned of it, the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) is a good way to push continually for optimal use of existing capabilities. Also, the National Intelligence Program (NIP) both requires and allows investment funding to address priorities Community-wide. In addition to enhancing and utilizing the NIPF and NIP, I would if confirmed be able to help convey and translate the needs of policy-makers and military commanders to set the priorities of the intelligence community.

Recently, the DNI issued the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) to guide the community for the next four years; this Strategy sets out the following guiding principles: responsive and incisive understanding of global threats and opportunities, coupled with an agility that brings to bear the Community's capabilities. Using the new NIS as a springboard for practical efforts and programmatic priorities is a management challenge for the DNI and PDDNI.

In my conversations with Director Blair and others in preparation for confirmation, I have also been encouraged to support the CIO in transforming the IC's business operations – people, processes and technology, such as for budgeting, financial tracking, and managing human resources. My background in this area convinces me that the IC as a whole could be more integrated and efficient if currently disparate "back-office" environments are rationalized and improved. Because the IC is not the only large and decentralized enterprise that has faced this problem, it can learn from how others have tackled it, while also heeding the requirements of the users of these systems, which can motivate and guide transformation.

Finally, the DNI has undertaken a major effort to establish, communicate, and apply IC-wide standards of quality and objectivity in analysis and intelligence products. I bring to the IC considerable experience in the principles and practice of assuring quality through standards, analytic transparency, proper documentation, balance, and critical review. While I am inspired by the IC's level of commitment, sophistication, and recent progress on this front, it is a major challenge, which I intend to help tackle if confirmed.

B. Is it your understanding that you will have specific management responsibilities if confirmed?

ANSWER: In addition to those management responsibilities shared with the DNI and noted in the division of labor, addressed in the response to Question 1, responsibilities unique to the PDDNI include:

- Chair of the IC Deputy Executive Committee (DEXCOM)
- Vice Chair of the IC Executive Committee (EXCOM)
- Chair of the IC Intelligence Requirements Board (IRB)
- Chair of the Intelligence Resource Alignment Framework (IRAF) process

If confirmed, I expect that there will be additional management responsibilities added to the PDDNI portfolio after the DNI and I have an opportunity to work together.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence**QUESTION 7:**

There has been considerable debate in the Congress concerning the appropriate size and function of the ODNI. The Congress has considered proposals to cap the size of the ODNI. In answering this question, please address the staff functions of the ODNI and the specific components of the ODNI, where appropriate, such as the National Counterterrorism Center.

A. What is your view of the ODNI's size and function?

ANSWER: In preparing for confirmation, I have considered the size of the ODNI. I have looked at key DNI responsibilities and the ODNI functions needed to fulfill them, to include: improving and ensuring information sharing (in both intelligence and business systems); setting and managing IC-wide priorities; organizing and managing cross-agency collaboration; making major acquisition decisions; assuring quality standards are set, understood, and met; assembling and manage a huge budget; performing independent program analysis; providing policies and oversight; supervising or overseeing national intelligence centers; and providing services to the other parts of the IC. I also weighed the fact that the IC is a large, diverse, and decentralized enterprise, much of it embedded in other departments, which implies significant management challenges. Finally, I have considered the IC-wide functions performed prior to the creation of the DNI and the additional responsibilities and functions added by the creation of the DNI. Based on this preliminary assessment, as well as my experience in various fields and organizations, my judgment is that the ODNI is sized about right.

That said, as a former business executive with a sharp eye for savings, I always look for efficiencies and economies, and I would do the same as PDDNI, if confirmed. Moreover, upon assuming the job and learning more, I could find that my preliminary judgment is off in one direction or the other. Finally, while I think the ODNI is about the right size, I have not examined whether each of its parts is as well.

B. Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources to carry out its statutory responsibilities effectively?

ANSWER: Yes, for the reasons noted above.

C. In your view, what are the competing values and interests at issue in determining to what degree there should be a permanent cadre of personnel at the ODNI, or at any of its components, and to what degree the ODNI should utilize detailees from the IC elements?

ANSWER: After two decades of government civil service and my exposure to the ODNI in preparing for confirmation, I believe that both the sense of community and the effectiveness of that community are served when the agencies detail exceptional people to the ODNI and its mission and support activities. Detailees offer expertise and knowledge of their parent organizations and missions. They provide important perspectives and insight into how activities are currently conducted and how they could be improved. Working together, ODNI permanent staff and detailees learn and bond. Moreover, being detailed to ODNI expands the person's familiarity not only with ODNI but also with many or all components of the IC as a whole. For example, I

believe having detailees at the NCTC and NCPC has been of great benefit to improving the quality of government-wide analysis and cooperation in counterterrorism and counterproliferation, respectively. The civilian joint-duty opportunities provided by the ODNI also allow for high-level exposure, leadership development, and exposure to policy-making. The presence of detailees from across the community also provides credibility to the ODNI and facilitates the process of institutionalizing the Community construct. While there is a balance that we need to be struck between permanent cadre and detailees, the IC as a whole benefits from the presence of detailees at the ODNI.

D. In November 2008, the ODNI Inspector General released a report on intelligence community management challenges. Have you had an opportunity to review that report? If you have, what is your reaction to this report's conclusions and recommendations? Do you disagree with any of them? Which recommendations do you believe should be high priorities for the ODNI or for the PDDNI in particular?

ANSWER: I have reviewed the ODNI IG's report on Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges, as well as the DNI's response to it. Without being familiar with the internal workings of ODNI before the current Director, I have no first-hand basis on which to comment on the report's validity. Still, I found it useful in highlighting management challenges, and I have no reason to disagree with any of the recommendations. In the ten months since the report, ODNI has made major progress implementing its recommendations: of the 16 recommendations made in the report, ODNI has fully implemented 8 and has taken significant steps to implement 5 more. If confirmed, I will do my part to implement outstanding IG recommendations that remain valid, as well as to encourage further IG study.

For the PDDNI in particular, the recommendations in the IG report on strengthening governance and communications should be especially high priorities because they go to one of the main purposes for which the ODNI was created: to integrate U.S. intelligence. This includes ensuring that critical Intelligence Community Directives are issued in a timely manner and their implementation tracked.

The significant advances made – and still being made – since last year's IG report are the result not only of the general progress of the DNI and ODNI but also their openness to IG views and recommendations. This suggests to me a willingness to listen, to learn, and to confront the remaining obstacles to fulfilling the vision of a stronger IC and a commitment to surmount them.

E. Some officials in the intelligence agencies do not believe that the ODNI is adding sufficient value to justify its large staff and budget. What do you intend to do to reverse that perception?

ANSWER: As the question implies, it is not enough for me to believe that the value of ODNI justifies its size if people elsewhere in the IC think that it does not.

I foresee a number of ways to show the value ODNI adds:

- The NIPF can be invaluable not only to the DNI and PDDNI in ensuring that the use of intelligence capabilities responds to priorities but also to individual IC agencies and professionals in managing their resources, adjusting to the availability of other agencies' capabilities, and understanding how their work relates to national needs.

- Likewise, the NIP helps all parts of the IC make good use of funding for their activities and investment, which works to the advantage of the IC as a whole and of the nation. The NIP also provides a framework through which intelligence agencies and professionals can create and exploit synergies for greater effectiveness at lower cost.
- The NCTC adds value by providing a focal point for sharing information and assessing terrorist strength, conduct, strategies, and threats. This makes every agency better informed and more capable, whether in collecting on or analyzing violent extremist groups. Likewise, the NCPC and NCIX contribute to agency effectiveness for counter-proliferation and counterintelligence, respectively.
- Other forms of cross-agency collaboration organized and supported by ODNI, e.g., mission management, afford agencies opportunities to improve their contribution to national intelligence and national security. As people throughout the IC participate in such collaboration, they become aware of the benefits: focusing on problem-solving, knocking down barriers, gaining better access to information, and serving intelligence users in direct and meaningful ways.
- The ODNI also includes the IC's CIO, which plays a central role in integrating, managing, and securing the information architecture of the IC as a whole, and is charged with improving intelligence sharing, transforming systems and securing IC networks.
- IARPA pursues exploratory research in S&T that offers promise to improve the capabilities of IC agencies.

It is also of significant value that several elements of the ODNI, e.g., IARPA, CIO, and the national centers, provide funding from the ODNI's Community Management Account to IC agencies for the purpose of improving integration, investment, and effectiveness.

Finally, I would point out that the ODNI has less than 2% of all IC personnel. Because approximately 2/3 of ODNI personnel are in the national centers and mission support activities, the remaining ODNI staff who provide IC management and integration, is less than 1% of IC personnel. From my experience, this is not excessive for managing such a large, complex, diverse, and dispersed organization as the IC.

QUESTION 8:

- A. Describe your understanding of the role played by mission managers in the IC since the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).**

ANSWER: Mission managers play an increasingly important role. The IC is and will remain a decentralized structure, most of which is concerned with the production (collection and analysis) of intelligence. Yet much of the demand upon it requires an integrated and rapid response. Where the need is substantial and persistent, e.g., in the cases of counterterrorism and counterproliferation, it may

justify maintaining a national intelligence center. Otherwise, high-priority demands for integrated intelligence can be met by organizing horizontal collaboration, one form of which is mission management. Provided they are given the focus, authority, support, resources, and latitude they need, mission managers provide a way to align and integrate collection and analytic capabilities with the needs of policy makers and commanders. In so doing, they also provide opportunities for persons throughout the IC to work together across agency lines to tackle common, important, and hard problems. Of course, mission management is not needed or appropriate for every IC challenge. Criteria for the use of this approach should include importance for U.S. national security interests, difficulty, multi-agency requirements, and strong external demand, e.g., from the NSC or U.S. commanders.

B. If confirmed, what questions would you ask of the existing mission managers and members of the IC to assess the performance of the mission manager system?

ANSWER: Director Blair and I have talked about what I could do, if confirmed as PDDNI, to help the existing mission managers succeed and to broaden the concept of cross-agency teaming, formal and informal. Drawing on my experience in institutional reform in general and horizontal collaboration in particular, I hope I can advance this important aspect of achieving the benefits of IC integration while retaining the benefits of IC decentralization.

Based on my experience with analogous collaborative efforts and what I have learned about IC mission management, I would expect a mission manager to be able to answer the following questions:

- Precisely what is the intelligence problem you are expected to address?
- How will you ensure that the fruits of your work will be responsive to your clients?
- What do you want me to do to secure buy-in from agency leaders?
- What collection and analytic resources do you need to fulfill your responsibility (e.g., people, information access, and other capabilities)?
- What obstacles do you see, and what do you recommend be done to overcome them?
- How will you engender motivation, focus, and cohesion in your team?
- How will you measure progress?

C. Do you believe that the National Intelligence Officers are well positioned to assume some mission manager responsibilities?

ANSWER: Apart from the formal mission managers that exist, NIOs are in sense mission managers insofar as they coalesce and align analytic resources across agencies to address intelligence requirements in their domains. But they could also be mission managers in the more formal sense. Given their responsibilities and experiences as NIOs, they should be well prepared, and well networked, for such assignments. Whether and when to assign an NIO as mission manager would depend on the problem to be addressed, the level of importance, the resources needed to solve the problem, and the relationship of the task to the NIO's regular duties. If mission

management is mainly to meet a cross-agency analytic need, and can be done without consuming all the time of the NIO, the NIO could be the natural candidate. On the other hand, if there is a need for a dedicated mission manager, if a major collection challenge is involved, and if the NIO is facing significant other demands, it may be better to select someone else. In that case, the NIO should be coupled tightly with the effort. In sum, mission management does not lend itself to a "cookie-cutter" approach, and the DNI and PDDNI, along with other IC leaders, must make sound judgments based on conditions.

D. What do you believe is the appropriate role of the ODNI, if any, in solving the difficulties FBI has with clearing materials requested by this Committee through the Department of Justice (DoJ)?

ANSWER: It is difficult to formulate an appropriate response without fully understanding the context, circumstances, and results of previous committee requests for information from the FBI. If confirmed, I will look into any difficulties that the committee has encountered in receiving intelligence-related materials in a timely manner and work to resolve them. I take seriously my commitment and the responsibility of the intelligence community and its members to keep the Committee fully and currently informed of intelligence activities and to be responsive to the Committee's congressional oversight responsibilities.

QUESTION 9:

The SSCI recently approved legislation to create a statutory, Senate-confirmed Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Do you support establishing in law an independent, fully empowered Inspector General for the Intelligence Community?

ANSWER: I support the creation of a Presidentially-appointed, Senate confirmed Inspector General (IG) for the Intelligence Community. However, as the DNI has testified, it is important to ensure that the roles and responsibilities for this position be clarified, and that potential conflicts and duplicative efforts with existing departmental and agency IGs be avoided.

QUESTION 10:

A. Describe the role of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC).

ANSWER: Established by the IRTPA, the JICC is chaired by the DNI, and comprises Cabinet Secretaries of the Departments containing intelligence elements (Defense, State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Energy, Justice). The JICC assists the DNI in developing and implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort, by (a) advising on requirements, budgets, management, and performance, and (b) ensuring the execution of DNI programs, policies, and directives. It is, in sum, the highest-level IC forum available to the DNI to gain departmental input, commitment, and help to improve and integrate U.S. intelligence.

B. In your understanding has this mechanism been useful? Are there ways in which it should be improved?

ANSWER: Yes, the JICC has been useful. I am told that the first two DNIs used the JICC to receive senior level advice on key cross-Community issues, especially with respect to the budget. Director Negroponte used the JICC to consider the draft of the first National Intelligence Strategy (NIS). Director McConnell used the JICC to inform and build consensus and support for his key initiatives, e.g., revision of EO 12333, updating of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and development of a comprehensive cybersecurity initiative. I understand that Director Blair is planning a JICC session to discuss IC efforts in support of critical national priorities, review the NIP, and to discuss the new National Intelligence Strategy.

Without having any direct involvement with the JICC, I have no definite views on how it could be improved. From my experience, top-level bodies like this should complement and guide the rest of the management system, rather than substitute for that system. There are several mechanisms to address IC-wide issues, hear from departments, and discuss priorities. Moreover, the processes that have been put in place – for forming strategy, developing plans, assessing tradeoffs, forming an integrated budget, and allocating capabilities and other resources – do not require the routine collective involvement of Cabinet Secretaries. This suggests that the JICC can have a critical role in helping the DNI to set general direction for the IC, to discuss important initiatives, and if need be to settle issues not settled elsewhere. My general view is that the utility of such high-level bodies lies not in how frequently they meet but in how well they guide and energize cooperation at every level and how well they tackle what only they can.

C. If confirmed, will you have any role regarding the JICC?

ANSWER: The membership and roles of the JICC laid out in the IRTPA do not specify a role for the PDDNI. That said, I would be prepared to assist or fill in for the DNI in carrying out those duties and responsibilities, per the statutory role of the PDDNI. In addition, the PDDNI could help the DNI and the JICC by identifying and preparing issues that would benefit from cabinet-level attention.

QUESTION 11:

A. Do you believe the mission of the National Counterintelligence Executive needs to be changed? If so, how? If not, why not?

ANSWER: It is important that the DNI and other IC leaders have a place to turn for a comprehensive understanding of foreign intelligence activities against the United States, how they are being conducted, and the damage they have caused. The counterintelligence components of the departments and agencies have pieces of this puzzle, but someone needs to put the puzzle together. It is also important to go beyond the “what” and the “how” to develop an understanding of our adversaries’ intentions in conducting these activities—i.e., “why”—and what they have learned, or believe they have learned, about us. This understanding would inform our own intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

The revolution in information technology raises the stakes, by increasing both the capabilities of foreign intelligence activities and our own ability to counter and exploit those activities. This suggests that the demands on U.S. counterintelligence will continue to grow and require an effective integrating mechanism for all components involved.

These needs are consistent with my understanding of the mission and functions of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) and staff. The NCIX serves as the head of U.S. national counterintelligence. NCIX responsibilities include the production of an annual National Counterintelligence Strategy and a National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, the coordination of strategic analyses, the coordination of budgets and resource allocation plans for departmental counterintelligence activities. From my current vantage point, I am not able to judge if a change in the mission of the NCIX is necessary.

Cyber Security

QUESTION 12:

The Obama Administration is moving forward with a major initiative to improve government cyber security, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.

A. Are you familiar with the recent White House review of this initiative?

ANSWER: Yes. One of the "Near-Term Actions" of the White House's 60-Day *Cyberspace Policy Review* is to produce an updated national cyber strategy that builds on the accomplishments of the CNCI and brings the full range of Government perspectives and capabilities to bear on the complex set of cyber security threats the Nation may face. The White House review acknowledged the progress achieved to date on the CNCI, but noted that much remains to be done.

B. What changes do you believe need to be made to the initiative, based on this review?

ANSWER: By design, the initiative was to move rapidly and then be improved through experience, learning, and implementation. The initial six-month effort yielded several important insights about what remains to be done, e.g.:

- The need to intensify work with traditional U.S. allies and partners and with international bodies that are deliberating standards which will affect U.S. cyber security now and in the future.
- The need for innovative ways to foster close and effective partnerships with the private sector, expanding the dialogue on security solutions, policy, and competitiveness.
- The need for more expansive cyber education, taking the issue beyond the credentialing of the government cyber-security workforce to encompass the private sector. This should include helping the U.S. public at large understand basic cyber-security practices in order to avoid becoming a victim or an unwilling part of a cyber attack.

C. What are the major privacy or civil liberties issues concerning the CNCI that you believe need to be addressed?

ANSWER: Intrusion detection programs that look for digital signatures associated with malicious software are becoming ubiquitous in our private and business systems. As they do, we need to be sensitive to the public's insistence on and right to privacy, including in their communications with government. Those involved in government security efforts must also be conscious of the responsibility to protect entrusted personal information. More generally, we must accept the need for transparency and oversight as we begin to implement the CNCI.

D. What changes to the CNCI and the intelligence community's role within it would you recommend that the Administration consider?

ANSWER: (See "B" above for prospective changes to the CNCI). The President assigned responsibility for monitoring and coordinating implementation of the CNCI to the DNI, although much of the CNCI portfolio falls outside the IC. This "stewardship" approach has worked. But as the CNCI matures and national cybersecurity strategy evolves, it is natural that leadership from outside the IC will be required.

E. What should be the IC's role in helping to protect US critical infrastructure and commercial computer networks?

ANSWER: As with traditional adversaries, the IC has a critical role in all-source threat assessment, detection, and warning against threats to important networks on which the government and country depend. Beyond that, the IC must take the primary role in protecting its own intelligence and administrative networks and data from intrusion, disruption, and exploitation. The IC should also have an important role in protecting the data and networks of the wider U.S. national security establishment, as well as the networks that enable essential government functions. Finally, the IC should assist in providing threat assessment, detection, and warning to other networks, including commercial ones, because the functioning of cyberspace has repercussions, direct and indirect, on all Americans and on our national security and welfare.

Regarding commercial computer networks, the IC should be prepared to provide threat information (discussed in greater detail below) to owners and operators of commercial networks to help foster a shared situational awareness and understanding of current and prospective cyber threats. Through such wider engagement, the IC may also be able to gain knowledge about threats and security measures that would in turn help in defending national security networks.

F. What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with managers of the Nation's critical infrastructure to enable them to protect their networks from possible cyber attack?

ANSWER: Cyber threat information that should, in principle, be shared with critical infrastructure managers, consistent with the protection of sensitive sources and methods, includes:

- notification that a network is being targeted for foreign exploitation
- specific signatures and indicators of cyber attack

general cyber techniques that will inform managers of our critical infrastructure of protection options and allow them to take appropriate precautions against cyber attack and exploitation.

QUESTION 13:

If confirmed, will you have any cyber security responsibilities?

ANSWER: Based on my conversations with Director Blair, I expect to concentrate much of my time and energy, if confirmed, in supporting the national security policy-making process. This would naturally include how cybersecurity affects and is affected by the other challenges the United States faces (e.g., how it might be used by a state or non-state adversary). Cybersecurity is both an issue to be addressed in its own right and part of the larger fabric of national and global security in the 21st Century.

In addition, based on my own background in the information technology industry and my research on various aspects of cybersecurity, I will be prepared to offer ideas and support on cybersecurity within the IC, the ODNI, and more broadly.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 14:

A. How do you assess the state of science and technology (S&T) activities within the IC?

ANSWER: Because I have not been briefed in detail on S&T programs within the IC, my views on this are based on impressions formed in recent years. Although there has been great emphasis on the need to bolster HUMINT – justified, in my judgment – there is no question that the complex global collection and processing requirements the IC faces demand sustained and robust S&T. IC S&T should take advantage of the incomparable U.S. S&T base, but that too requires considerable IC S&T resources, technical prowess, and ingenuity. Moreover, IC S&T can benefit as much as any IC function from cross-agency sharing and collaboration to pool efforts, exchange knowledge, and exploit opportunities for technologies to complement one another. In sum, without knowing the details of promising research or deficiencies, I would say that S&T is crucial for U.S. intelligence – and a distinct U.S. advantage that should be sustained.

I would lend my support to whatever the DNI can do to spark greater and bolder S&T throughout the IC. In this regard, I consider the creation of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) as a major step, since it addresses the Community's need to have a source of high-risk/high-reward research.

B. What, if anything, have you done in the past to improve S&T management at other organizations?

ANSWER: Successful S&T management in U.S. intelligence demands an understanding of how the country's advantages in science and technology can be exploited. This includes knowing how to balance the need to link research to known needs and the need to nurture exploration that can give rise to new discovery and even breakthroughs. From my experiences as an executive, I recall two episodes in

which I have sought to improve the management of S&T research, each with a different lesson. The first was as an executive at AT&T in the 1980s, when I along with others worked to foster an orientation at Bell Labs toward meeting the needs of a rapidly shifting global market for information technology. This involved more "directed work" and by implication less resources and latitude for exploratory research. The second was as an executive at RAND in the 1990s when I advocated research on matters beyond those driven by current needs. These two experiences frame the balance I have described. While I have not studied in detail the IC's investment in S&T, I think these considerations should bear on it.

C. What reforms need to be made with regard to S&T?

ANSWER: While I have a lot to learn about S&T as it relates to U.S. intelligence, I have experience working at the intersection of technology and national security generally. From this, I place heavy emphasis on maintaining and exploiting U.S. advantages in S&T. The most striking recent case in point is the way U.S. forces and intelligence capabilities have incorporated a wide array of information sensing, processing, and networking technologies to achieve critical operational advantages. But it takes large, sustained, and reasonably stable investment and development, both in resources and personnel, before initiatives can be exploited to maintain or expand that advantage.

In my opinion, it is a priority to find an ODNI director for S&T and to commission that person to do a thorough review of S&T in the IC. That, in turn, will permit IC leadership to focus resources on the most promising and important areas. In addition, the new director should put into place a strategy and plan that supports the human capital needs of S&T, in particular IC recruiting, development, and retention of highly skilled technical personnel.

The IC must also ensure adequate funding of S&T and work to improve the speed with which technology is integrated into capabilities and operations.

QUESTION 15:

The SSCI has been clear in its recommendations for increased IC research & development (R&D) funding and in its support for the IC's new R&D organization, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity.

A. What is your philosophy of the role of R&D in the IC?

ANSWER: In line with my attitude about S&T, I believe R&D should play an important role in strengthening the capabilities of U.S. intelligence. Beyond that general view, IC R&D should focus on unique needs and niches that are critical to U.S. intelligence but under-supported or ignored by other government agencies and the commercial sector. Additionally, IC R&D should focus on leveraging the explosive, world-wide growth in information technology and applying innovation to intelligence missions faster and more effectively than do our adversaries. Finally, IC R&D needs to be a source of innovation for the IC as a whole, not only in meeting known requirements but also in seizing potentially game-changing opportunities that can revolutionize how the IC carries out its mission.

B. What are your top priorities with respect to R&D in the IC?

ANSWER: From a management standpoint, I will, if confirmed as PDDNI, work with the DNI and the Director of S&T to ensure that an R&D perspective is well represented in budget decisions; ensure adequate funding and manpower for R&D activities; emphasize cross-agency R&D activities; and examine the effectiveness of current mechanisms for interacting with the most innovative and advanced companies in the private sector.

Concerning technology priorities, I would like to delve deeper into the IC's needs and current R&D investments before providing a definitive answer. From other experience, though, I would inquire about various information technologies, nanotechnology, and analytical tools. I will also be interested to learn about R&D that could improve U.S. intelligence on technologies that hostile states and other actors could acquire and use against us.

IC Missions and Capabilities**QUESTION 16:**

Explain your understanding of strategic analysis and its place within the IC, including what constitutes such analysis and what steps should be taken to ensure adequate strategic coverage of important issues and targets.

A. Have you had the opportunity to review any long-range analysis recently produced by the IC and, if so, what is your view of such analysis?

ANSWER: I have read several long-term analyses recently produced by the IC and have been impressed by the sophistication of what I have seen. From my government background in national security, I know that under fluid and unpredictable conditions such work is as hard as it is essential. I also know from experience how the press of immediate analytic and collection demands can crowd out long-term work. It is a testament to the managers and analysts of the IC that time and resources are being made available for such research despite heavy current demands from both policy-makers and military commanders in the field.

Two decades of non-government work leading and performing research on national security has made me familiar with a variety of methods to conduct long-term analysis that is more than simply projecting trends, e.g.: scenario analysis, exploratory modeling, and adaptive planning. Drawing on these sorts of methods, the IC has come a long way in its long-term analysis. This is important because some security challenges facing the U.S. may manifest themselves not as stark threats but as subtle but no less consequential problems. These may include hostile exploitation of cyberspace, vulnerability to transnational health problems, threats to maritime trade, the enlargement of under-governed areas, demographic imbalances and migrations, and adverse effects of climate change.

One aspect that could use more emphasis is the analysis of alternative futures that may be of low probability but could be of great consequence for U.S. security and interests. Also, it should be noted that the country at-large, including local governments, private sectors, and citizens, can benefit from the unclassified version of long-term analysis by the IC. Such contributions to general awareness of future dangers is not only beneficial

in prevention and preparedness but also in increasing public appreciation of the IC. Conversely, while the IC should not “outsource” work on the future, it can benefit from reviewing independent work while also gaining knowledge from the national research community on how to do long-term analysis.

B. What is your view of the initiative to produce unclassified analysis such as Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World?

ANSWER: I have read Global Trends 2025 twice: when it first came out and again recently. I was struck in my first reading with how far the IC has come in performing disciplined analysis of the future, especially with a global scope. I found the method sound, the caveats clear, and the findings interesting, important, and for the most part convincing. I was struck in my second reading that the analysis considered neither the possibility nor the effects of a global financial crisis and sharp economic contraction, which in fact occurred as the report was being issued. I do not mean this as a criticism of the analysis – after all, few analysts expected the crisis that ensued. Rather, it is a reminder of the difficulty and need for humility when peering into the future. In addition, it underscores the need to identify unlikely but highly consequential developments in any long-term or strategic analysis.

While the IC has improved in long-term analysis, I will if confirmed offer ideas, support, and guidance if useful to encourage this important progress.

C. Please discuss your view of the appropriate mix of analytical resources between current, mid-term and long-term security concerns, particularly given that many of the oft-quoted failures of US intelligence involved broad-based social and government change with significant long-term ramifications, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iranian revolution.

ANSWER: This is one of the hardest and, as the question suggests, consequential dilemmas facing U.S. intelligence – today as much as ever. My views on it are shaped by experience in tasking and consuming intelligence, and as a practitioner and leader of national security research – experience that includes such unexpected developments as the fall of the Shah, the collapse of Soviet communism, the rise of jihadism, the rapid global spread of the Internet, and the relentless economic growth of China. I wish there was an easy formula to resolve this dilemma, but I don’t think there is. Other than providing support for and insisting on long-term work, I doubt that there is an ideal mix of resources. At the same time, I do think there are some good practices to institute and nurture.

First, the corps of U.S. intelligence analysts must not become one exclusively of experts in specific countries, ideologies, weapons, technologies, economic sectors, etc. Also needed are people with broad knowledge who excel analytically – spotting hidden or subtle trends, noticing patterns across regions and links across sectors, offering competing hypotheses to explain events and future possibilities, and understanding how politics, economics, and technology interact. As a case in point, the experts who most closely watched the Soviet Union during the Cold War did not see, and could not have seen, that the information revolution gaining speed in Western commercial markets would decisively tip the East-West balance in ways that the Kremlin could not ignore. While I sense that the IC has learned this lesson, the pressures to rely overwhelmingly on experts are great.

Second, leaders of the IC must lead the battle against accepted ways of thinking about intelligence questions that tend to exclude non-conforming explanations and forecasts. The failure to understand the Shah's tenuous hold on power was the result of a failure to appreciate the depth of dissatisfaction in the population at large with the regime's economic and internal security policies, because such dissatisfaction did not conform with the accepted view that those very same policies assured the regime's survival. The few intelligence analysts who warned of an impending revolution were not heeded until the revolution's onset. I note that the IC has instituted practices of obtaining and showing alternative views, which can be critical in identifying long-term developments that may be at odds with short-term observations.

Third, it is important to recognize that indicators of long-term problems are usually evident in near-term developments, provided analysts are alert for them. This argues against a sharp separation between near- and long-term analysis. That said, we also have to recognize that long-term work often takes a back seat to responding to near-term demands. For this reason, I was pleased to see that the National Intelligence Council created a unit specifically for long-term analysis. If confirmed, I will encourage this work while also urging interaction between analysts with near- and long-term responsibilities.

Fourth, I note that the United States has unrivalled capabilities in research and analysis on long-term national security challenges. The IC should not be totally dependent on think tanks, universities, and other non-governmental institutions to conduct such work, given its importance. But it can rely more heavily on external sources for long-term analysis than it can for short-term analysis, which often requires awareness of current detail that only the IC itself can have. Moreover, several of the most important long-term questions facing U.S. intelligence – e.g., energy, health, and environment – require use of scientific inquiry that need not, and largely cannot, be done by the IC itself. Finally, use of high-quality, peer-reviewed external analysis can help the IC learn of subtle trends, intersections, and alternative explanations.

QUESTION 17:

A. Explain your views concerning the quality of intelligence analysis conducted by the IC.

ANSWER: Analytic quality and objectivity are essential to the IC's mission and to the success of the policy-making and military operations that depend on the IC. In preparing for my confirmation hearing, I made a point of reading a wide selection of recent IC analysis. Having been a consumer of U.S. intelligence in a variety of capacities for over three decades, I believe the current level of quality is excellent. I also believe that sustaining and improving analytic quality takes persistence, clarity about expectations, leadership – including leadership by example – recognition, reward, and a healthy dose of peer pressure. From our discussion, I know that Director Blair is determined to achieve and maintain the highest levels of analytic quality and integrity in U.S. intelligence. Quality assurance is an area to which I bring long experience, relevant methods, and a strong commitment, so I look forward to helping.

B. What is your assessment of steps taken by the ODNI, and the elements of the IC, to improve the quality of intelligence analysis within the IC, including through the creation of an Analytic Integrity and Standards Unit, the use of alternative analysis and "red teaming," and the use of collaboration tools such as Intelipedia?

ANSWER: I am impressed by the steps the IC has taken in recent years to enhance the quality of intelligence analysis and to ensure objectivity. Drawing on direction in the IRTPA, the ODNI established the position of ODNI Analytic Ombudsman and promulgated common IC Analytic Standards for objectivity, independence from political considerations, timeliness, use of all available intelligence, and application of proper analytic tradecraft, including alternative analysis. ODNI's Analytic Integrity and Standards staff has established a vigorous evaluation program to assess how well IC products adhere to these standards, and its feedback helps the IC target its analytic training and professional development, and quality assurance initiatives. IC analytic elements are conducting parallel efforts to promote the standards and evaluate product quality. The ODNI and the IC elements are promoting the use of techniques such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses that help analysts challenge their assumptions and consider alternatives.

I also consider it extremely important to tap into independent views by involving experts outside the government, and I support steps the IC has taken to enhance such outreach. For example, the National Intelligence Council's Long Range Analysis Unit promotes strategic analysis that challenges assumptions by drawing on expertise from inside and outside the IC.

Finally, I strongly endorse harnessing technology to enable more effective sharing of information across and with key IC stakeholders; the Library of National Intelligence, A-Space, and Intelipedia are important accomplishments in this area that I wholeheartedly support.

C. If confirmed, what responsibilities will you have with regard to analysis?

ANSWER: If confirmed, Director Blair and I have agreed that my background and knowledge are especially suited to meeting the needs of policy-makers with information and analysis drawn from across the IC. This would enable the DNI to concentrate that much more of his energies on integrating and improving U.S. intelligence for the future.

QUESTION 18:

A. Explain your views concerning the quality of intelligence collection conducted by the IC and your assessment of the steps that have been taken to date by the ODNI to improve intelligence collection.

ANSWER: The quality of intelligence collection is good and getting better. Significant efforts in this area by the ODNI are bearing fruit. IC country-specific integrated collection plans bring the best of each intelligence discipline to bear on a problem. This integration results in better tipping and queuing, maximizes the effectiveness of individual intelligence techniques, and has produced significant progress on a range of topics. The ODNI and the rest of the IC also are vigorously linking collection and policy-maker priorities.

B. If confirmed, what responsibilities will you have with regard to collection?

ANSWER: The tools are largely in place—the emphasis now must be on using them well. If confirmed, I will work with IC leaders, through the Executive and Deputies Committees, to ensure collection is focused against the highest priorities and that our capabilities are adequately resourced.

QUESTION 19:

A. The ODNI has attempted several processes for conducting strategic planning. The most recent effort, "Strategic Enterprise Management," could face the problems of inadequate information on program life-cycle costs and lack of full cooperation from IC elements.

ANSWER: The DNI recently realigned the ODNI to consolidate and strengthen its capability to analyze programs and resource allocations. He created a new unit—Systems and Resource Analyses (SRA)—to provide independent, in-depth, resource trend and trade-off analysis to inform DNI resource decisions. Strategic priorities will be identified early in the planning process to guide the development of the NIP, and a limited set of major issues will be identified for cost and risk analyses to inform resource allocation decisions in a constrained fiscal environment.

SRA has already initiated analyses of five major issues to be analyzed in forming the FY 2012 NIP. IC elements are key participants in these studies, providing substantive expertise and resource data to ensure analytic integrity, as well as transparency and cooperation.

B. What do you believe are the most effective means for gaining acceptance for this approach from the individual IC elements? To what extent do you plan to be involved?

ANSWER: The DNI will use existing IC senior leadership committees—the Joint Intelligence Community Council, Executive Committee, and Deputies Executive Committee --to advise him, ensure transparency, tackle issues squarely and fairly, and build consensus on all aspects of resource alignment.

I believe the assurance of sound analysis, a transparent process, and an active role for the IC agencies in that process will help the DNI gain the IC's appreciation of, commitment to, and participation in the effort to make well-informed resource decisions. If confirmed, I will also work to that end, through my chairmanship of the Deputies Executive Committee as well as less formally. It is, as the question implies, crucial for the IC as a whole to have confidence in relying on a central, independent, and trusted capability to inform the sort of difficult resource issues that a better integrated and optimized IC will need to face.

QUESTION 20:

The ODNI has created a process known as the Intelligence Collection Architecture (ICA) as a way to guide future IC investment decisions. To date, the process has not led to major investment decisions terminating underperforming programs despite projected budget shortfalls.

A. What is your understanding of the main elements of the ICA?

ANSWER: The ICA was a joint ODNI-DoD activity to assess proposed collection capabilities from an integrated mission-focused perspective, perform trades across collection disciplines and programs, and lead change in our strategic thought processes regarding what intelligence capabilities we need.

The main elements of the ICA were:

- Governance was to be provided by a joint steering group composed of senior officials from the IC and DoD, with formal documentation of roles and responsibilities. Upon receiving and prioritizing the results of these studies, this joint steering group made investment recommendations which were presented to the DEXCOM and EXCOM for decision.
- The purpose of the ICA was to develop a single set of recommendations to rebalance, integrate, and optimize collection capabilities to meet current and future customer and analytic priorities and ensure that those capabilities are aligned with national intelligence strategy goals.
- Processes used by the ICA were to include ODNI management of the study process, study letters to define issues, interagency study teams led by key IC agencies, and interactive vetting of the studies by a standing interagency group that had wide clearance for IC activities. These processes were intended to create capability trades across all intelligence organizations, disciplines, and programs.

These elements allowed the ICA to develop community perspectives on some critical issues. In some cases -- notably GEOINT architecture, some SIGINT priorities, and development of integrated ground and identity intelligence concepts -- ICA studies became the baseline for IC efforts.

B. What is your view of the effectiveness of the ICA process as an investment decision-making tool and are there any changes that you would make?

ANSWER: As I understand it, the ICA process is being reworked. Although it had useful results, the ICA also had its shortcomings. Foremost among these were the lack of a defined offset process and the fact that many of the ICA studies resulted in recommendations for budget increases that were not adequately incorporated into the annual budget process.

In preparing the FY 2011 budget, the DNI placed the ICA on hold and chartered an independent review of the IC planning, programming and budgeting process. That review recommended a new organization and process to conduct independent analysis of program costs, performance and risks. As a result, the DNI formed SRA (described above).

I think it was important to establish SRA and to implement a new process that: conducts independent cost, performance, and trade-off analyses on major issues selected by the DNI; integrates the results of those analyses into the budget cycle in a way that provides for fiscally constrained planning; and coordinates with the DoD budget cycle.

C. What are your views on the best mechanisms for the ODNI in managing investment decisions concerning the IC's major systems acquisitions?

ANSWER: My understanding is that once a major acquisition program begins, the IC acquisition oversight process is the best mechanism to evaluate acquisition progress and performance. That oversight process is managed by the IC Senior Acquisition Executive and presented to Congress annually in the Program Management Plan Report.

For major systems acquisitions that are 51% to 100% funded in the NIP and executed by DoD IC elements, oversight is shared between the DNI and SECDEF, who co-chair the Joint Intelligence Acquisition Board, co-sign acquisition decision documents, and co-lead quarterly program reviews.

For new programs, IC acquisition policy provides guidelines on the mechanisms and best practices to enable sound investment plans and decisions prior to program initiation. IC acquisition policy requires:

- requirements validation by the appropriate ODNI authority
- affordability analysis or full independent cost estimate
- analyses of alternatives
- independent program review
- program management plans

In sum, ODNI has instituted oversight measures that should improve program management, provide progress monitoring, and facilitate effective shared DNI-DoD management of programs that are jointly funded.

Authorities of the DNI: Personnel

QUESTION 21:

A. Explain the DNI's authority to direct the transfer or detail of particular personnel from one element of the IC to another. Do you believe this authority is easy to exercise?

ANSWER: My understanding is that the DNI may transfer up to 100 IC personnel in order either to establish newly authorized intelligence centers or transfer people from one IC element to another of higher priority for no more than two years, provided the transfer supports an emergent need, improves effectiveness, or increases efficiency. In either case, the DNI must obtain the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and notify the relevant Congressional committees. The DNI may also transfer personnel through the annual budget process by moving resources from one IC element to another.

I also understand that this authority needs to be used with care. The greater the numbers of potential transferees, the larger the impact will be on the functions from which people are being shifted. Similarly, the transfer of persons with rare and critical expertise, even in small numbers, must be approached thoughtfully. At the same time, national imperatives may well call for the transfer of significant numbers of personnel and/or personnel with exceptional skills. For this reason, exercising this authority requires strategic analysis and balancing of priorities. Fortunately, the DNI has tools,

such as the NIPF, that can inform decisions to transfer personnel. As this framework is improved, embraced, and exercised by the agencies of the IC, and departments in which most of those agencies reside, transfers can increasingly be done collaboratively. But the DNI's authority will remain essential. In sum, this is an important authority for ensuring that IC resources are optimally employed, but one that must be used judiciously and cooperatively.

B. What policies should govern the role and responsibilities of IC elements and of the DNI with respect to transfers and details?

ANSWER: Because all IC agencies are performing essential work, any decision to transfer personnel from one to another should be taken with care and be based on a rigorous analysis of advantages and risks. As noted, this analysis is aided by such priority-setting tools as the NIPF. These processes can take time, and if critical national intelligence needs dictate, the DNI may need to exercise this authority decisively, if only temporarily. In order to build consensus throughout the IC for this DNI authority, as well as for any specific use of it, it is important to be transparent, analytic, and consistent. For transfers outside of the National Intelligence Center context, the joint procedures called for in statute, which must be agreed to by the DNI and the affected department or agency head, will ensure that the process is fair and cooperative.

C. What approach would you recommend if the head of an IC element or the head of a concerned department or agency objects to the transfer of particular personnel from one element of the IC to another?

ANSWER: The objection to a personnel transfer on the part of the head of a department or agency would be a serious matter requiring the immediate attention of the DNI and/or PDDNI. From my experience in analogous cases, I would try to resolve the issue analytically. For instance, I might suggest a joint review of how the NIPF and other ways of gauging IC client needs elucidate the various priorities at issue. I might initiate a study of the consequences of several options, e.g., full transfer, partial transfer and no transfer. I would be open to proposals to meet the looming need without actual personnel transfer, e.g., through Mission Management or other forms of cross-agency teaming. My belief is that going the extra mile in this fashion – consistent with meeting national security needs – is the best way to create the sense of community, shared problem-solving, and agreed practices that the new IC needs.

QUESTION 22:

To what extent do you plan to be involved in the reprogramming process?

ANSWER: It is the responsibility of the DNI and PDDNI to ensure that there is a sound process in place to review priorities so that reprogramming can be considered based on those priorities, as well as changes to them. The DNI has delegated authority for the reprogramming process to the CFO. Consequently, the DNI or the PDDNI would need to be involved in the process only in cases that cannot be resolved by the CFO.

QUESTION 23:

Explain your view of the principles that should guide the use of contractors, rather than full-time government employees, to fulfill intelligence-related functions

A. Are there some functions that should never be conducted by contractors or for which use of contractors should be discouraged or require additional approvals, including by the DNI?

ANSWER: I appreciate the concerns expressed by Congress about the use of contractors rather than government employees to perform intelligence-related work. I have observed and experienced this issue from several perspectives over two decades, and my own views have evolved. What once seemed to me to be a major opportunity for the government to benefit from the scale and skills of the American economy as a whole, as well as to meet temporary or unusual needs, has in practice raised questions about government dependence, lost competence, and the appropriateness of some functions being performed by contractors. If these questions are valid for the government as a whole, they are especially valid for U.S. intelligence, given its criticality and sensitivity.

After years of down-sizing following the Cold War, followed by a steep growth in demands after 9/11, the IC's use of contractors expanded significantly. Moreover, reliance on contractors for sensitive tasks has generated controversy. So this is an area that requires close attention by the leaders of the IC, including the PDDNI. The strategic principle guiding this effort, in my view, should be to use contractors as a way to tap into the economic and technical strengths of the nation for the purpose of improving government performance and capabilities.

Using contractors may be justified and should be considered under a variety of conditions: when it is determined that they are markedly more cost-effective than federal civilian employees; when they possess unique or scarce expertise; when they are essential to meet sudden and temporary exigencies; when they enable the government to concentrate on what it must or can best do; and when they can help the government to improve its own capabilities.

At the same time, the need to turn to contractors because of a lack of government personnel may indicate a shortcoming in government capacity or competence. Indeed, extended reliance on contractors may mask government deficiencies that should not be ignored. The IC should not become habitually dependent on contractors instead of confronting inadequate government capabilities, especially for important functions that recur or persist.

Although the direction at present should be to reduce reliance on contractors, specific capabilities and choices should be viewed strategically. For example, one domain where, from my experience, reliance on contractors may be indicated is that of services based on information technology, where the public can best be served by the government being a smart buyer and a smart user instead of trying to replicate the scale and talent of this fast-moving industry. It would be counter-productive, in my view, if the reduction in use of contractors in general led to a reduction in the ability of the government, including the IC, to exploit such critical technologies.

Whether in seeking additional government resources where reliance on contractors has gone too far, in reviewing functions that lend themselves to contracting support, or in tracking progress in reducing dependence on contractors, it strikes me that this is a topic that warrants open and continuing dialogue between the IC and the Congressional committees that oversee it.

B. What consideration should be given to the cost of contractors versus government employees?

ANSWER: From my own experience as an executive in the information technology industry, I believe that there can be significant economies in using contractors, even for continuing and important functions. These economies may result from the scale that the private sector can achieve, as well as from the possession of knowledge and skills that do not exist or are not economical to maintain within the government. Saving money by the use of contractors can permit the IC to focus its resources on more essential government capabilities. There may even be cases where the use of contractors is not economically advantageous but the level of service is substantially better. Finally, contractors may play a critical role in introducing new technology to the government and building government capability to use it effectively. However, economic justifications for the use of contractors should not enter into decisions concerning core mission functions mentioned in my answer to the previous question. Nor should cost considerations obviate the need for IC managers to address critical gaps in government capabilities.

Having offered my philosophy regarding the use of contractors, I should add that as PDDNI, if confirmed, I would not hesitate if critical circumstances dictate to use whatever capabilities, public or private, that U.S. intelligence and security demand, with the exception of inherently governmental functions that cannot be lawfully performed by contractors. The challenge for management is to ensure that the use of contractors in such circumstances is not the result of failure to have created and maintained capabilities that the government itself should have.

C. What legislation or administrative policies and practices should be implemented to facilitate the replacement of contractors by full-time employees?

ANSWER: In the course of preparing for my confirmation hearing, I have discussed the IC's use of contractors with those responsible for policy. This has led me to conclude that there is clear awareness of this issue and that policies and practices are being strengthened in line with the views I have stated here. I am not aware of a need for legislation to provide either authority or impetus for improvement. However, knowing the concerns of Congress, I will if confirmed give this my attention and would not hesitate to recommend additional reforms, including legislation.

QUESTION 24:

A. Explain your responsibilities if confirmed in making decisions or recommendations concerning the accountability of officials of the IC with respect to matters of serious misconduct.

ANSWER: If an IC official was alleged to have engaged in serious misconduct, my responsibility as PDDNI, if confirmed, would be to see to it that the allegation was investigated thoroughly, objectively, and promptly by the department or element, and

that appropriate disciplinary action was taken. If the official in question worked within an IC element, I would in the first instance refer the matter to the element's head, who has the responsibility to take appropriate action.

When necessary to ensure an objective inquiry, I would in parallel refer the matter to the ODNI IG and ask that the IG of the agency in question be involved. I would also confer with the DNI and, in cases of agencies within a government department, the department's leadership. I would also ensure that the matter is referred to the Justice Department, if advised by counsel that a criminal law may have been violated.

I would expect the DNI to hold the heads of IC elements responsible for ensuring that appropriate disciplinary actions are taken when warranted. In the event the head of an IC element did not take appropriate action, or was alleged to have been involved in the misconduct, the DNI has a role in the removal of that head. As PDDNI, if confirmed, I would not hesitate to raise concerns in such cases, and I would have both the duty and authority to take action in the DNI's absence.

It is also good practice to refer any recurring patterns of misconduct, even if not severe, both to relevant agency heads and to the ODNI IG. The IC Inspectors General Forum, chaired by the ODNI IG, is an excellent venue for examination of chronic problems, based on which the DNI, PDDNI, and agency heads may learn and act.

B. What is your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the accountability system that has been in place at the IC and what actions, if any, should be taken to strengthen both to strengthen accountability and ensure fair process at the IC?

ANSWER: Since the creation of the DNI, the IC has improved its internal oversight structure. The existence and attention of the DNI, PDDNI and ODNI provides the IC with additional levels of assurance. Moreover, IC-wide coordination bodies, e.g., EXCOM and DEXCOM, facilitate sharing of information and concerns across agencies. Such management oversight is supplemented by IGs, Offices of General Counsel, Civil Liberties Protection Officers, and others organizations. For example, the ODNI IG leads IGs across the community in identifying systemic issues, reducing redundancy, sharing best practices, and conducting cross-cutting IC examinations that result in recommendations to agency heads and the DNI. While I have no first-hand basis for assessing how well these structures work in practice, they appear to me to provide an adequate framework for vigilant, thorough, prompt, and fair accountability.

No framework is stronger than the commitment to and acceptance of the principle of accountability on the part of leadership. Leaders are accountable not only for their immediate actions and inactions but also for the results and conduct of the organizations over which they have responsibility and authority. It is up to leaders to put in place and motivate people who are competent, prepared, and committed to the same principle. While I have not identified specific measures that I should take, if confirmed, to strengthen the DNI's system of accountability, I intend to make clear by my statements and actions that accountability starts and ends with leadership.

C. Explain your responsibilities if confirmed on ensuring rewards systems across the IC agencies that are fair and equitable.

ANSWER: My responsibilities, if confirmed, will be to assist the DNI in ensuring that policies and practices across the IC concerning employee performance and rewards are consistent with existing directives. These directives, which apply to employees and to senior officers, provide safeguards and oversight to prevent discrimination and favoritism in personnel actions.

In fulfilling these responsibilities, I would depend on the National Intelligence Civilian Compensation System, which requires that:

- there is a clear and evident link between performance and compensation, including pay, bonuses, and other incentives and rewards;
- recognition is linked to demonstrated ability, individual achievement, and contribution to collective results;
- rights are protected and avenues are provided for reconsideration and redress;
- performance and recognition systems include internal review mechanisms to guard against discrimination, partisan pressures, and other non-merit factors;
- merit-based pay decisions are transparent.

Even if no problems are brought to my attention, I would, if confirmed, review periodically the effectiveness of these policies and directives, and initiate changes as needed to ensure our employees perceive the system and their treatment under it as fair.

D. What is your view regarding the value of permitting highly skilled officers, particularly in niche disciplines, to enter the Senior Intelligence service (SIS) without having to become managers?

ANSWER: My understanding is that the IC uses a dual-track career system for seniors that includes both senior executives and senior professionals. Exceptional officers with rare or essential abilities can enter the IC senior corps and continue their careers without having to become a supervisor or manager. This approach recognizes the importance of and distinction between managerial and technical skill requirements. I understand it is working well in the IC today. For example:

- at DHS, DoE, FBI/DEA, State, and Treasury, senior managers come under the Senior Executive Service and senior technical experts come under the Senior-Level and Scientific/Professional Corps;
- at ODNI, senior officers in the Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS) are classified as either "executive" or "professional;"
- at CIA, senior officers in the Senior Intelligence Service are classified as either "manager" or "expert;"
- at DoD IC elements, senior executives fall under the Defense Intelligence SES, and senior technical experts are covered by the Defense Intelligence Senior-Level Corps.

Authorities of the DNI: Information Access and Analysis

QUESTION 25:

Section 103G of the National Security Act establishes the authorities of the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (IC CIO), including procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the enterprise architectures of all intelligence community components.

A. How do you interpret this statute with respect to the authorities of the IC CIO for programs funded by the Military Intelligence Program (MIP)?

ANSWER: My understanding is that the IC CIO has IC-wide oversight authority for information systems and discharges this authority by:

- participating in the development of DNI planning and programming guidance and recommendations for DoD guidance;
- chairing the IC CIO Council and works with agency CIOs as they develop their programs and budgets;
- assisting the DNI in providing advisory guidance on MIP-funded programs and works closely with counterparts in the DoD to ensure there is coordination on information sharing and IT-related national and defense intelligence activities; and
- working closely with the DoD CIO to harmonize and de-conflict NIP and MIP IT systems and new programs.

The IC CIO is also a member of the Joint Intelligence Acquisition Board, co-chaired by the DNI Senior Acquisition Executive and his DoD counterpart, which makes milestone decisions for IC major system (including IT) acquisitions jointly funded by NIP and MIP.

The IC CIO monitors the performance of the IC enterprise architecture and leads reviews and assessments, and prioritizes IT investments in the IC. These efforts are designed to eliminate redundant systems, improve interoperability, and focus IT resources on intelligence priorities.

The IC CIO, who is the IC's Enterprise Architect, develops a comprehensive mission-focused architecture that furthers information sharing and identifies capability needs across the entire IC. The IC Enterprise Architect also works with the DoD Enterprise Architect to ensure DoD agencies and IC elements develop capabilities in accordance with common standards.

B. What is your view of the authority of the IC CIO to create an integrated national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprise?

ANSWER: The IC CIO's authority is for the IC enterprise architecture and is not divided strictly along NIP/MIP lines. DoD and IC personnel are working cooperatively to address a wide range of enterprise issues, including improvements in the systems used to transmit and share intelligence products, network consolidation efforts, enterprise email and collaboration tools, and shared data centers.

C. If confirmed, will you have any role regarding the integration of national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprises?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will assist the DNI as needed in guiding and supporting the IC CIO.

Authorities of the DNI: Financial Management and Infrastructure

QUESTION 26:

A. What is your view of the legislation passed by the Congress to create a comprehensive Intelligence Community Business Enterprise Architecture (which did not become law due to a presidential veto) controlling financial management and financial reporting within all IC elements?

ANSWER: I support the concept of creating a Business Enterprise Architecture for the IC. The IC has embarked on a significant Business Transformation initiative, with plans to deliver an initial BEA in several months.

B. What is your view of the authority of the DNI to create this architecture and the steps required, if any, to do so?

ANSWER: The IC CIO has the necessary authority required to create an effective Business Enterprise Architecture.

C. What will be your role in moving the Intelligence Community forward in modernizing business systems?

ANSWER: As the PDDNI, if confirmed, I will join the DNI in moving IC business transformation forward, and I will work with the heads of the IC agencies to further this important initiative.

QUESTION 27:

The Committee has sought to ensure that IC elements become able to produce auditable financial statements. The majority of the IC elements still lack the internal controls necessary to receive even a qualified audit opinion. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that existing commitments to improve the IC's financial and accounting practices are carried out in an effective and timely manner, and that IC reporting on the status of these efforts is factual and accurate?

ANSWER: This issue is of first-order importance in that the DNI and others depend on sound financial information to make sound budgetary and program decisions bearing on the effectiveness and cost of U.S. intelligence. This is why it is high-lighted as an area in need of attention in the new NIS.

Specifically, improving the IC's financial and accounting practices will require:

- implementing cost-effective financial management practices and internal controls to further our intelligence mission;
- adopting standard accounting and financial management practices that leverage government and private sector best practices;

- ensuring the IC remains on target to obtain and sustain the same unqualified audit opinion is expected of other government entities;
- streamlining IC operations and employ common business services to deliver financial capabilities that use taxpayer dollars more efficiently and effectively;
- improving financial management transparency by producing financial information that is timely, reliable, and relevant;
- holding IC program manager's accountable for financial management progress and implementation of NIS objectives in their personal performance agreements; and
- improving communications and reporting processes so that Congress is informed quarterly of our challenges, as well as our successes, in meeting financial improvement goals

Congress has encouraged the DNI to strengthen accountability for financial data and reporting throughout the IC. The DoD intelligence agencies, CIA, and ODNI are all focusing resources, time, and personnel to improve and harmonize financial management practices and strengthen internal controls.

Even with this effort, improvement in financial reporting of this magnitude will take time and considerable resources to achieve.

QUESTION 28:

Explain your understanding of Section 102A (i) of the National Security Act of 1947, which directs the ODNI to establish and implement guidelines for the classification of information, and for other purposes.

A. If confirmed, how will you be involved in implementing this section of the law?

ANSWER: The President stated that his administration is committed to operating with an unprecedented level of openness. As such, he directed a review of Executive Order 12958 which addresses the Administration's implementation of the law. I would expect that after the review is completed and guidelines are established the DNI and I, if confirmed, would monitor the IC's implementation of that the President's directive.

B. What other issues would you seek to address, and what would be your objectives and proposed methods, regarding the classification of information? Please include in this answer your views, and any proposals you may have, concerning the over-classification of information.

ANSWER: Simply stated, we need a classification system that adequately protects information that requires protection but at the same time allows information to be shared within the IC, as well as with policy makers and operators at all levels in the wider national security establishment. To the extent that we can eliminate the concern for the protection of sources and methods by writing intelligence reports or analysis in a way that removes any references to sources and methods, we should do so.

An underlying problem is that there are, appropriately, many penalties for those who improperly disclose classified information, but few rewards for those who take the additional effort to write at lower levels of classification. It is much safer to write and

classify at higher levels than to go through a time-consuming declassification process for wider distribution. If confirmed, I will be looking for ways to reform the system at its lowest levels so that incentives are created at the very outset of creating intelligence reports to make them as widely available as possible.

If confirmed, I would expect that the DNI and I would work closely with the Information Security Oversight Office to ensure that standards are created for the establishment of classification management programs within the IC. Then, new IC guidance could be issued by the DNI regarding classification guides, marking tools, training, and classification audits. I believe that these efforts would go far to assist in resolving the serious issue of over-classification.

C. Are you familiar with the review of this issue directed by President Obama? What do you expect to happen as a result of this review?

ANSWER: Please see my answer to Question 29 (A).

D. What approach would you take to the systematic review and declassification of information in a manner consistent with national security, including the annual disclosure of aggregate intelligence appropriations?

ANSWER: I understand that there is an initiative to create a National Declassification Center. Assuming this comes to fruition, the IC should have a prominent role in balancing the advantages and risks of declassification. It would be natural for ODNI to take the lead for the IC on that. The question of what to disclose about intelligence appropriations, and when to disclose it, could be taken up in that process.

Acquisitions

QUESTION 29:

A. What is your assessment of the state of acquisitions in the IC?

ANSWER: I would assess the state of acquisitions in the IC to be uneven but improving. Systems started under IC acquisition policy written by the ODNI have generally done well. Some acquisitions started earlier had significant cost and schedule growth. I have been assured that these have largely been stabilized under the current IC acquisition policy.

Transparency is also improving, and clear baselines are being put in place.

B. Do you believe the space industrial base specifically, and the intelligence industrial base more generally, are capable of producing the number of complex systems the IC and Department of Defense demands of them on time and within budget?

ANSWER: While I have not studied this, my "going-in" judgment is that our industrial base, while fragile and challenged in many ways, is still capable of producing systems of unrivaled performance if given appropriate direction, freedom, oversight, and stable funding.

Successful outcomes are not easy, but the fundamental capability is in place, and with the right combination of government policies and oversight, there is every reason to expect the industrial base will rise to the challenge and overcome the substantial

technical and management obstacles to create the complex systems the IC and DoD need.

QUESTION 30:

The National Reconnaissance Office has historically had difficulty matching its program content to the budget that the President has provided it. We understand that this problem is again arising in the fiscal year 2011 budget build now in progress. What skills or experience do you bring to help the DNI tackle this critical fiscal problem?

ANSWER: I am broadly familiar with the problem stated in the question. My experience as a line executive in private industry gives me a perspective and some tools that could help deal with such problems if I am confirmed. First is the conviction that a budget is a compact whereby a unit can count on an agreed amount of resources and the corporation can count on agreed results. Consequently, if a unit cannot deliver the results expected of it within its budget, there are serious implications for the enterprise as a whole and for other units. While the government cannot be run like a corporation, over-runs are not just accounting entries but have real consequences, which in the national security domain can be profound.

Second, if it becomes apparent that the budget is not sufficient, the matter must be escalated without delay so that measures can be taken, which may include steps to return to budget or analysis leading to decisions to re-allocate resources. A distinction must be made between whether additional funding is the result of additional needs and changed priorities or, instead, inadequate estimating or managing of costs. The current security environment is too unstable to expect requirements to remain constant. But there must be discipline, transparency, and precision if changing requirements indicate a need to adjust resources.

Finally, as noted elsewhere, my experiences in the military, government, and business have produced a strong belief in accountability, for myself and others. Accountability must include meeting financial commitments, and if confirmed I would insist on it.

The Department of Defense

QUESTION 31:

A. Explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of national and military consumers, specifically between establishing a unified intelligence effort that includes Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence elements with the continuing requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military commanders.

ANSWER: I do not see a contradiction between establishing a unified intelligence effort that includes DoD and the requirement of combat support agencies to respond to the needs of military commanders. With the right approach by DNI, good DNI-DoD co-leadership, improved information sharing, and agreed methods for setting and managing all intelligence priorities, a more integrated IC should help those with

immediate responsibilities to meet the intelligence needs of military commanders. In fact, I think that this is what we are increasingly witnessing in the field.

Of course, even with good collaboration, balance between national and military requirements – like balance within both sets of requirements – can raise issues. These usually have to do with the capacity of collection capabilities and the assignment of analysts. Sometimes multi-purpose collection systems for signals and imagery intelligence do not have the capacity to handle all requirements. Sometimes analysts might have to be taken from one subject and to support another. Such issues are far easier to resolve with an integrated IC, a strong DNI, and a close DNI-DoD relationship than otherwise. Moreover, the DNI can also help combat support agencies meet their duties to commanders in the field by being able to draw from and share information and analysis from the entire IC.

The majority of capabilities under the NIP reside in DoD. Because one of the DNI's core responsibilities is to meet the needs of U.S. commanders and forces, these authorities can be, should be, and are used to enhance the effectiveness of the combat support elements of the IC.

Conversely, DoD combat support agencies have demonstrated the ability to contribute to meeting national intelligence requirements, both within and beyond DoD. This contribution is also being increased by IC integration, an active DNI, and a good DNI-DoD relationship.

If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in striking an appropriate balance in using and improving capabilities to meet the entire range of U.S. intelligence requirements. Because of my background in national defense and military affairs, I believe I will, if confirmed, be prepared for this.

B. What is your assessment of how this balance has been handled since the creation of the OONI and what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to achieve a proper balance?

ANSWER: I do not have sufficient knowledge at this point to make a definitive assessment of how this balance has been handled. Overall, intelligence support for both forces and national policy-makers has been improving, and I do not perceive that one mission is being broadly compromised in order to fulfill the other. At the same time, both of these intelligence missions are highly challenging – support for forces because of the complex and unstable character of military operations; support for policy-making because of the complex and unstable character of global security conditions. So striking the right balance will be a constant challenge for the IC leadership.

If confirmed, managing that balance to meet these two challenges will undoubtedly be one of my most important responsibilities, working with the DNI and DoD. As I become more able to address this question in detail, I would be glad to share my assessment with the committee.

C. What is your assessment of the national intelligence effort to satisfy the needs of military commanders for human intelligence collection and what steps would you take to prevent or redress any deficiencies?

ANSWER: In regard to HUMINT, military commanders' requirements and national requirements overlap but are obviously not identical. Additional HUMINT capabilities are needed to meet both sets of requirements. Moreover, military commanders are reluctant to depend solely on military HUMINT, which is not sufficient to assume full responsibility for the wartime HUMINT mission. In these circumstances, it is important that both national and military HUMINT capabilities be able to contribute to meeting both national and military HUMINT needs – under the idea of the whole of U.S. intelligence being greater than the sum of the parts.

DoD's own efforts to increase HUMINT collection capabilities are part of the solution but could take years to mature. Developing and employing collectors with in-depth understanding of the languages and cultures of critical regions is an important but challenging part of that effort. Clear ODNI support for DoD efforts to increase organic collection provides payoff in two respects: enabling theater military commanders, which best understand their requirement, to conduct HUMINT; and freeing national-level agencies to maintain focus on strategic targets. In addition, the DNI's emphasis on IC-wide sharing in general and military-civilian sharing in particular will help address the military's operational needs with both HUMINT and other intelligence collection means.

D. What is your assessment of the military intelligence effort and what role do you see for the DNI in the challenges faced by programs funded by the Military Intelligence Program?

ANSWER: From my direct observation, independent research, and my preparation for the confirmation hearing, I believe U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and around the world, receive the finest intelligence support that has ever been provided to deployed forces, American or otherwise. The support comes primarily from military HUMINT and from surveillance systems such as manned aircraft and UAVs that are largely funded under the MIP. I also believe that DNI efforts to integrate the IC, strengthen linkages with DoD, and improving access to information from national intelligence capabilities are beginning to pay dividends for forces in the field. As I learn more about this, if confirmed as PDDNI, I will be glad to share a more considered assessment with the committee.

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to ensure that there is common effort, understanding, DNI input to the MIP, and synchronization of NIP and MIP resources to maximize effectiveness and minimize costs.

QUESTION 32:

A. What is your understanding of the role that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has played with respect to the elements of the IC that are within DoD?

ANSWER: The USD(I) exercises the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction and control over the defense intelligence and combat support agencies (NSA, NGA, DIA). The USD(I) also exercises the Secretary's statutory requirement to advise the DNI on his requirements for the NIP, and he is the portal for the DNI's participation in

developing the MIP, for which the USD(I) is the Program Manager. Thus, USD(I) helps to ensure coherence among the defense elements of the IC, which contributes substantially to the integration and effectiveness of the IC as-a whole.

While it is important to coordinate IC policies and procedures with the USD(I), the DNI maintains a direct relationship with heads of the DoD intelligence elements and with the Secretary of Defense.

B. Please describe any issues that you believe require the attention of the DNI and the Secretary of Defense with regard to the role of that office.

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will inform myself in detail about the current relationship between the ODNI and DoD. One of the questions deserving continuing attention is the relationship between the NIP and the MIP. These are very different constructs: the USD(I)'s authorities over the MIP are not equivalent to the DNI's authorities over the NIP. I understand that the procedures for reaching agreement on resource allocations to shared responsibilities between the NIP and MIP are just now becoming firmly established.

If confirmed, I look forward to discussing with DoD leadership, including USD(I), the most appropriate mechanisms for strengthening further both sharing and programmatic cooperation between the DoD and the DNI.

C. Do you believe any issues with regard to that office should be addressed through legislation?

ANSWER: I do not know of any. Again, the existence and effectiveness of USD(I) is helpful to the DNI's mission of integrating U.S. intelligence, while also facilitating DNI support for in meeting defense intelligence needs. If I am confirmed and encounter any issues, I will discuss them with the DNI and DoD leaders, and will recommend legislation, if appropriate.

D. What do expect to be the regular method of interaction between you and officials in the Department of Defense over intelligence matters?

ANSWER: If confirmed, the regular method of interaction between me and DoD counterparts will include both formal and informal contact. We will be colleagues in the NSC. They will be consumers of intelligence. Together, we will jointly manage programs and decisions that are within the NIP; and the views of the DNI, PDDNI, and non-DoD IC agencies will be weighed in programs and decisions within DoD's MIP. The USD(I) will be a key counterpart in the management of the defense elements of the NIP and because USD(I) is the DNI's window into the MIP. Finally, senior DoD intelligence officials sit on the DEXCOM, which the PDDNI chairs. It happens that I have worked with key members of DoD leadership, in particular Secretary Gates (under whom I served at the NSC), Deputy Secretary Lynn, and Under Secretaries Carter and Flournoy. And I will of course make a point of establishing a similarly close and open relationship with General Clapper, if I am confirmed. Of course, good personal ties and the cooperation they engender are no substitute for institutional ties. If confirmed, I would propose to my DoD colleagues that we together set the goal of further institutionalizing our cooperation for our successors.

Covert Action**QUESTION 33:**

A. What is your view of the DNI's responsibility to supervise, direct, or control the conduct of covert action by the CIA?

ANSWER: Pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the IRTPA, Executive Order 12333 calls for the DNI to oversee and provide advice to the President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action programs. This includes ensuring that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of all covert actions, that covert action programs are effectively implemented, and that they comply with the law.

B. Do you believe any additional authorities are necessary to ensure that covert action programs are lawful, meet the public policy goals of the United States, or for any other purpose?

ANSWER: Based on my preparation for my confirmation hearing and my preliminary impression, I am not aware of any lack of DNI authority to fulfill his responsibility to ensure that covert action programs are lawful and supportive of policy goals. However, if I am confirmed and discover a need for more authority, I will discuss it with the DNI and, with his concurrence, this committee.

C. Do you support the enactment of statutory requirements for regular audits by the CIA Inspector General of any ongoing covert action program with appropriate reporting to Congress?

At this time, I am not aware of all the internal Executive Branch oversight mechanisms currently in place. I would want to review those mechanisms before making any recommendations about additional ones.

D. If confirmed, what role will you have regarding covert actions?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will assist the DNI to ensure that covert actions are thoroughly considered, appropriately authorized, notified to Congress, and implemented in a manner that complies with U.S. laws, furthers U.S. goals and interests, and makes the best use of U.S. resources and capabilities.

Privacy and Civil Liberties**QUESTION 34:**

A. Describe the efforts of the IC to protect privacy and civil liberties and what, if any, challenges face the IC in these areas.

ANSWER: If the IC is to succeed in its missions, it must earn and retain the trust of the American people. I have a strong sense that the men and women who work in our intelligence agencies are dedicated the rule of law, take seriously their pledge to support and defend the Constitution in every respect, and respect our citizen's rights and freedoms.

It is my impression that the IC is working increasingly hard to protect privacy and civil liberties while also accomplishing its intelligence objectives. At the same time, meeting this dual imperative is complicated by new information technology, the growth and

accessibility of a global information infrastructure, the character and conduct of state and non-state adversaries, and the need for U.S. intelligence services to operate in this domain. The more each of us participates in cyberspace, the harder it gets to protect privacy. Consequently, even with a heightened commitment throughout the IC, it will not get any easier to carry out intelligence support for national security while satisfying the American people that their privacy and civil liberties are absolute protected.

In general – specifics to follow in response to the next question – my sense is that IC leaders accept that privacy and civil liberties are not merely a constraint but a solemn responsibility, and that they support increasingly strong safeguards

B. Explain the roles of the Civil Liberties Protection Officer, the department privacy and civil liberties officers, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, and the Intelligence Oversight Board in ensuring that the IC complies with the Constitution and applicable laws, regulations, and implementing guidelines governing intelligence activities.

ANSWER: The Civil Liberties Protection Officer is a senior ODNI official whose job is to ensure that the policies and procedures of IC elements include adequate protections for privacy and civil liberties. He also oversees compliance by the ODNI with laws and policies relating to privacy and civil liberties, investigates complaints, and provides related advice and oversight.

There are other privacy and civil liberties officers designated by statute at other departments and agencies. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has a Chief Privacy Officer, and a Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer, and the Department of Justice has a Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, all of whom perform their duties on a full-time basis. Moreover, the IRTPA provides that heads of certain other departments and agencies must designate a senior officer to carry out privacy and civil liberties responsibilities – namely, at the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and at the CIA. These officers are to perform advice and oversight duties with respect to privacy and civil liberties matters within their departments and agencies.

The DNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer interacts with these and other officers with privacy and civil liberties responsibilities across the Federal government on a regular basis. This also includes offices of general counsel, offices of inspector general, and other senior representatives from specific IC elements, to the extent they have responsibilities relating to privacy and civil liberties.

The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is the oversight component of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, which is a board of outside senior advisors formed to provide direct advice to the President and senior leadership on intelligence matters. The IOB receives, reviews, and makes recommendations based on reports from IC elements and the ODNI regarding possible violations of law, executive order, or presidential directive. To the extent these involve matters affecting privacy and civil liberties, the IOB would be in the position to identify serious matters meriting direct reporting to the President, recommend corrective action and review efficacy of such action.

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is an independent board within the Executive Branch that provides advice and oversight on policies and actions to protect the Nation from terrorism. It consists of a full-time chair and four part-time members

from outside government. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in ODNI's close work with the Board – once its members are nominated and confirmed - to ensure it receives the information and cooperation it needs to play its important advisory and oversight role.

QUESTION 35:

Section 102A of the National Security Act provides that the DNI shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the CIA and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the IC through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.

A. What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?

ANSWER: The DNI and PDDNI have the responsibility both to protect the nation from foreign threats and to protect the civil liberties of Americans. The Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is the Constitutional issue most frequently raised in connection with intelligence collection. It is also imperative that intelligence activities are conducted with due regard for First Amendment freedoms.

In addition, intelligence collection needs to be carried out in compliance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Privacy Act, and the Attorney General's guidelines required by Executive Order 12333, as well as other statutes, regulations and orders.

B. What methods, and through what officials, should a DNI use to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws, including but not limited to the Office of the General Counsel, the ODNI Inspector General, and the Civil Liberties Protection Officer?

ANSWER: The DNI has made clear his personal commitment to ensuring that all elements of the IC are in compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. To fulfill this commitment, the DNI should rely on all of the offices mentioned in the question. The DNI also should ask elements of the IC and their host departments to conduct their own legal reviews prior to undertaking activities that raise issues of privacy or other legal issues.

It is essential that the ODNI General Counsel, the IG, and the Civil Liberties Protection Officer have a close working relationship with one another, with the DNI and PDDNI, and with their counterparts throughout the IC. The three offices have related but distinct responsibilities and approach those responsibilities from different perspectives. This provides both an opportunity and a need for collaboration among them, giving each one a comprehensive picture of any problem and of possible solutions. In the course of my preparations, I have been in contact with all three officers and expect, if confirmed, to rely heavily on them.

C. What do you understand to be the obligation of the DNI to keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed about matters relating to compliance with the Constitution and laws?

ANSWER: Section 502 of the National Security Act requires the DNI, as well as the heads of all departments and agencies with intelligence components, to keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all U.S. intelligence activities (except covert actions that are covered in section 503). Clearly, this includes significant anticipated intelligence activities and significant intelligence failures, to include compliance with the Constitution and laws.

In addition, both sections 502 and 503 require the DNI to furnish the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning an intelligence activity or covert action that the committees request in order to carry out their responsibilities.

Section 502 provides that congressional notification must be made to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. Section 503 includes similar language.

Director Blair has emphasized his commitment to and insistence on timely and complete congressional notification. Like him, I believe that congressional notification must be timely to be effective. If confirmed as PDDNI, I will conduct myself in complete accord with his strong views, which I share.

D. What do you understand to be the specific obligations of the PDDNI in this area?

ANSWER: The PDDNI has the responsibility to assist the Director in carrying out his statutory authority under the National Security Act to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States, including those that require all components of the IC to keep the Congress fully and currently informed of intelligence activities and covert actions. If confirmed, I will assist the Director in ensuring that all IC elements comply with the reporting requirements in sections 502 and 503.

QUESTION 36:

A. In your view, should the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (often referred to as the "lone wolf," "roving wiretap," and "Section 215" provisions) which expire on December 31, 2009, be extended?

ANSWER: I am aware that the Administration has requested that all three provisions be reauthorized, and the Administration also noted willingness to consider additional privacy protections provided they do not undermine the effectiveness of the authorities. I am not familiar with the application of these provisions, however, and if confirmed, would consult with IC professionals to better understand the details.

B. Should they be made permanent?

ANSWER: I would like to defer judgment until I have the opportunity, if confirmed, to thoroughly examine the pros and cons of these provisions.

C. Should they be extended in their current form, or modified?

ANSWER: Again, I would like to defer judgment until I have the opportunity, if confirmed, to thoroughly examine the pros and cons of these provisions.

D. If you believe they should be modified, what modifications would you recommend?

ANSWER: Please see answers 36 (A), (B), and (C) above.

Miscellaneous

QUESTION 37:

A. What are the advantages to having the position of PDDNI filled by an individual nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, rather than having other individuals fulfill the PDDNI's duties on an acting basis?

ANSWER: It is clearly preferable to have the PDDNI position filled by a leader nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate rather than by an acting PDDNI, especially since the PDDNI acts for and may exercise the powers of the DNI during his absence or disability. However, in the interim, it may be advantageous to national security for the first assistant to the PDDNI to exercise the authorities of acting PDDNI, or to have the President appoint an "acting PDDNI" on an interim basis pending Senate confirmation of a Presidential nominee.

QUESTION 38:

For each of the following, describe specifically how your experiences will enable you to serve effectively as PDDNI:

- Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq
- President of RAND Europe
- RAND Fellow
- Senior Director for Europe and Asia, National Security Council
- Your various positions at the State Department
- Your various positions in the private sector.

ANSWER: Senior Advisor, CPA: Several aspects of this experience stand out with regard to enabling me to serve effectively as PDDNI if confirmed. The first is the direct exposure to the complexities of the Muslim and Arab worlds in the course of six months in Iraq. While one cannot generalize from one country and set of conditions, I found a society and individuals pulled in many directions: modernization, a hunger for democracy, strong religious currents, ambivalence toward the West, and vulnerability to extremist appeals. As a result of my duty in Iraq, I believe I understand better now how such a mix of conditions can give rise to insurgency and terrorism. At the same time, I know that a half year exposure is only the beginning, and also that we need the best expertise our Country can offer on this region and its problems. But just as leaders of U.S. intelligence during the Cold

War had to comprehend the potential for conflict in Europe, leaders of U.S. intelligence today should work to better understand the sources of anger and turmoil in the Muslim and Arab worlds today. The second aspect is what I learned about the challenge of building new institutions of governance, security, and economic progress under such conditions. One lesson is that it takes time, resources, and patience. Another is that the persistence of violence can take a major toll on institution-building. A third is that it is crucial to make clear to local counterparts that they must take responsibility for dealing with their country's problems, even as the United States is making a major effort to support them. Such lessons can be helpful in supporting policy-makers with intelligence analysis and advice.

My service in Iraq also gave me first-hand exposure to the intelligence needs of our military forces in complex counter-insurgency operations. I observed the problems of sharing and collaboration between military and civilian intelligence arms, including classification, technical, and organizational barriers. I was especially struck by the time it took for intelligence information to find its way to a user in need of it, during which time insurgents might have melted away, or struck. This experience convinced me that the United States could do much better in moving intelligence across bureaucratic jurisdictions – indeed, that the United States had to do better if it was to succeed in campaigns like Iraq and Afghanistan. As I noted elsewhere, there has been considerable progress in overcoming these barriers since I served in Iraq five years ago, owing in large part to the reforms launched by IRTPA and implemented by increasingly close IC-DoD collaboration.

President of RAND Europe: Having spent part of my career in developing and implementing U.S. policy toward Europe, I felt I knew the region and its people well. But living and working in Europe greatly expanded my understanding. At RAND Europe, with research centers in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, my vice presidents, board, employees, clients, and competitors were almost all Europeans. In addition to having a better understanding of the region and its people, I was able to witness first hand the debates in Europe about security dangers, about sharing responsibilities and risks with the United States, about NATO, and about Europe's role in the world. This experience bears directly on my effectiveness as PDDNI, if confirmed, because the Europeans, bilaterally and through NATO, remain the largest collection of close and capable allies the United States has. For the IC, this affects analysis in support of policies that seek European cooperation, as well as how to effect fruitful intelligence relationships.

Vice President of RAND and Director of the National Defense Research Institute: This position required me to guide research and analysis on an extremely wide range of national security matters, including emerging threats, violent extremism, homeland security, military capabilities and readiness, proliferation of WMD, critical regions, and intelligence - all relevant to PDDNI responsibilities. In addition, I was responsible for assuring the quality and objectivity of every piece of work done within my organization, and at one point led a RAND-wide quality review at the request of the board of trustees. The discipline and methods used to assure quality and objectivity of RAND work are clearly applicable to the IC, where similar standards are being instituted by the DNI. If confirmed, I believe I can lend significant help to the effort to ensure greater reliability of U.S. intelligence.

Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia, NSC: I served in this capacity at a time of discontinuity, promise, and danger in world affairs, centered on the collapse of the Soviet empire and the USSR itself. Among other things, this experience underscored both the importance and difficulty of managing immediate crises with an eye toward the future, including the long-term implications of current decisions. Because actions taken during times of upheaval often have especially significant long-term consequences, good intelligence provides policy-makers with both tactical and strategic analysis. As an NSC senior director, I was heavily involved in tasking the IC with critical and often shifting demands. I developed a particularly good understanding of and NSC's relationship with the NIC and the analytic and operational activities of the CIA. As the President's Special Assistant, I had responsibility to ensure that he was prepared for policy decisions, international negotiations, and crises as they arose, including the coup that precipitated the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and the Gulf War. I prepared many analytic papers for the President and NSC, and from that have an appreciation of how to convey information and analysis that is concise, balanced, and of high quality. These are, of course, features of good intelligence products. Finally, I had significant interagency coordination responsibilities during those tumultuous times, and I saw first-hand the vital role of the IC and importance of reliable intelligence in informing the interagency process.

State Department: In my several assignments at State, I developed a close relationship with and appreciation of the intelligence community, especially INR and the CIA. I gained a sense of how good intelligence organizations and professionals can best serve their colleagues with policy responsibility. I requested and applied intelligence on such matters as the 1973 Middle East War and ensuing peace negotiations, the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO's deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, Poland's Solidarity uprising, and the Falklands War. In working for Secretaries Kissinger, Vance, Muskie, Haig, and Schulz, I bore significant responsibilities for tasking intelligence and applying it in shaping policy and managing crises.

Private sector experience: In addition to developing general leadership skills, my private sector experience can help me in several respects. First, as noted earlier, I learned and applied critical principles: performance accountability; measurement of results; clarity about the link between goals and resources; and disciplined short- and long-term planning. I also acquired skills at cost-cutting, budgetary and financial discipline, and cross-divisional collaboration. Finally, because I worked as an executive in the information industry, with many large and sophisticated government and corporate customers, I acquired considerable knowledge of how to exploit a wide range of information technologies to solve business problems, gain economies and efficiencies, and achieve strategic advantage. These are all relevant to the IC in general and to the role of PDDNI especially.

Naval officer: My years as an officer in the U.S. Navy instilled in me the values of service, honor, steadiness in the face of challenge, and regard for "shipmates." It is when I first experienced and embraced the importance of accountability. These values are relevant to any senior government position, including the position of PDDNI.

CNO Executive Panel: In fifteen years of active membership on the Executive Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations, I have become closely connected to several of DoD's

intelligence arms, especially the Office of Naval Intelligence and the DIA, which frequently brief the Panel and support its studies.

QUESTION 39:

Do you believe you would be a stronger candidate for this position if you had experience as an analyst, collector, or manager in the IC? If not, why not?

ANSWER: My experience as an analyst and supervisor of analysts bears directly on my candidacy for the position of PDDNI. Most of my career in analysis - in government, at RAND, at the National Defense University and elsewhere -- has concerned national security. I am familiar with, and have often been at the forefront of, methods of evidence-based analysis that include exploratory modeling, computer simulation, robust long-term planning, hypothesis testing, cost-benefit analysis, strategy-to-resource analysis, and systems analysis. Moreover, I have done and led a great deal of analysis of political, economic, and technological factors, as well as how they interact. I have conducted and overseen extensive peer-review and quality-assurance work, which is the key to subjecting analysis to high standards of evidence, logic, balance, transparency, comprehensiveness, and objectivity. There is a growing awareness in the IC of the importance of such disciplines, and if confirmed I intend to be a strong advocate, exacting reviewer, and helpful colleague, given my experience.

In regard to management, I have been an executive in government, in the for-profit world, and in the world of research and analysis. I have held deputy responsibilities in three jobs in government, have been a vice president at two large corporations, and have held the presidency of a business group in one case and a subsidiary in another. I have been accountable for a full range of financial results, have depended on full, accurate and timely financial accounting, and have held fiduciary responsibilities in board positions. This management background bears on my qualifications to manage within ODNI and the IC. For example, it could be useful to bring proven and generally applicable management practices from the corporate world into the IC. Of course, the IC is substantially different from business organizations I have managed. However, the specific management challenges I will face, if confirmed, are not new to me. Regarding ODNI itself, I have managed successfully in organizations of comparable size and complexity, with a number of senior people reporting to me. Regarding the IC as a whole, managing effectively in a diverse and decentralized enterprise requires the ability to set general direction, establish performance expectations, allocate resources, delegate authority over operations, insist on accountability, organize collaboration, and remedy shortcomings. I have experience in all these aspects of management.

I have not served as an intelligence collector, though from in my government and research work on national security I have a thorough understanding of collection, and I have been a consumer of every sort of sources and methods and am familiar with the advantages and limitations of each. I believe this gives me the necessary knowledge to be an effective PDDNI, given the way the Director envisions my role and focus. At the same time, I will if confirmed delve deeply into the collections field. Having been briefed by those responsible for it within ODNI in preparation for my confirmation hearing, I do not believe that this particular lack of practical experience will be a handicap.

In sum, my background and abilities in national security, analysis, and executive management, while not as an IC career professional, should enable me to be effective, if confirmed. Where I may be lacking, I would make every effort to come up to speed.

QUESTION 40:

The Committee has been notified that as of August 21, 2009 you have been serving as a “term-limited” government employee of ODNI pursuing a “task pertaining to an assessment of the mission management construct.”

Please describe what your responsibilities are in this new position and what you have learned about the ODNI so far. What are your own views on the mission management construct?

ANSWER: My responsibility is to study the IC experience with mission management with a view toward further developing this function. By mandate, I have had no supervisory responsibilities in regard to mission management, no direct involvement in any current mission management, and no authority to implement my views.

While incomplete, my assessment has led me to several general views:

- Cross-agency teaming, of which mission management is a prominent form, is critical to making the decentralized, production-oriented U.S. IC more integrated and responsive. This is key for meeting intelligence challenges that are at once difficult, critical, and beyond the capabilities of any single agency. In addition to serving policy-makers and commanders better, it fosters a sense of community, drives the IC towards problem-solving, works to remove barriers, and enables creative solutions to hard problems.
- Such teaming should range from enduring intelligence challenges (for which national centers can be created) to current high priorities (e.g., Af-Pak) to sudden crises that require integrated response across agencies. Organizing, empowering, and clearing obstacles to the success of mission management and teaming in general are among the most important responsibilities of the DNI and PDDNI.
- Wise selection of mission managers and other team leaders is crucial, given the need for leadership qualities, broad knowledge of the policy context, experience across the IC, and skill at serving clients while maintaining strict objectivity. As important is to be precise about the mission and to track performance.
- Mission management may require flexibility and support regarding such matters as co-location, how agency resources are applied, IT, internal organization, common clearances, upward reporting, and tracking costs across agencies.
- For these reasons, the support of the IC’s leadership for the function of mission-management (and cross-agency teaming in general) and for specific undertakings is indispensable. Building this support is mainly up to the DNI and PDDNI.
- Going forward, we need agreed criteria for establishing and maintaining mission management on particular problems. When the criteria are met, we should not hesitate to take this path. While most IC work does not demand formal mission management, many of the collaborative practices and pathways created by mission management can have wider benefit.

In sum, my preliminary assessment is that mission management is vital to IC integration and performance; is going well so far; is promising enough to expand; can and should take various forms; requires clarity on criteria, problem specificity, resource assignment, and measurement of results and costs; and deserves leadership attention and support. If confirmed, I would hope to be able to give this considerable attention, and would welcome every chance to discuss ideas, progress, and issues with this committee.

Questions for the Record for
David C. Gompert
Nominee to be Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI)

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN FEINSTEIN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN BOND:

Current Position at ODNI Studying Mission Management

Since August of this year you have been working on a short-term assignment at the ODNI to evaluate how the “mission manager” concept is working in practice.

- **Have you learned anything that surprised you?**

ANSWER: I did not expect to find as much cross-agency teaming other than formal mission management as I found. Increasingly, Office of Director National Intelligence (ODNI)-led integrated collection strategies are being targeted on important and difficult subjects. Likewise, for certain countries, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has organized more robust cross-agency analytic collaboration than the norm for National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). In the course of my short-term assignment, I have identified opportunities to combine integrated collection efforts with integrated analytic efforts and have discovered considerable receptivity to this within ODNI and the Intelligence Community (IC).

This informal cross-agency teaming is not altogether surprising. In my experience in both public and private sectors, professionals working in separate structures can be highly motivated to collaborate across the boundaries of those structures in the interest of tackling important problems. In the case of the IC, the DNI has made clear in the latest National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) and in recent public remarks that mission management and other forms of cross-agency collaboration are keys to integrating U.S. intelligence and to being more responsive and agile. Such encouragement, coupled with practical ODNI efforts to clear away obstacles to teaming, is resonating well with our intelligence professionals.

I have also learned that practices and procedures vary from one mission manager to the next, e.g., the relationship to the relevant NIO, the skill-set of the mission manager, and criteria for measuring effectiveness. This is not necessarily a problem; indeed, I have concluded that some flexibility is important.

- **Have you identified any improvements that might be made?**

ANSWER: I have identified a number of practical measures that could be taken to facilitate mission management and other forms of horizontal teaming. These include the removal of obstacles to collaboration that are characteristic of vertical structures, e.g., differences in work routines, intelligence accesses, and work location. (Removing such barriers in connection with cross-agency teaming would have the added benefit of fostering collaboration and integration generally.) In addition, I have identified means of providing more consistent yet flexible oversight to provide general guidance, assistance, and quality assurance without imposing excessive control, which can inhibit performance and innovation. Such governance would be linked to existing IC management mechanisms, in particular the Executive Committees and the Deputy Executive Committee, as well as to the NIC.

Given that this assignment was done while awaiting my confirmation hearing as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI), I have not proposed any such improvements to IC agency leaders, whose support and involvement will be important. Therefore, I ask that the Committee regard these only as my ideas, which I would pursue if I am confirmed.

- **Under what circumstances might you recommend creating new mission managers?**

ANSWER: As part of my short-term study, I have identified four basic criteria that should be considered when determining whether and when mission management should be established:

- a. Importance to national security, near- and long-term
- b. Difficulty of performing satisfactory intelligence collection and analysis in the absence of formal cross-agency collaboration

- c. Requirement to mobilize human and technical resources of multiple agencies
- d. Demands of intelligence consumers, e.g., policymakers and military commanders.

These same criteria could be used to determine whether and how long any mission manager position should remain. Among my conclusions is that mission management organized to deal with temporary problems should not become permanent, and that ODNI and IC leadership must be sure that the application of the mission management concept is adapted in response to shifting security conditions and intelligence needs.

- **When you have finished your review of the Mission Management function, will you provide your findings to the Committee?**

ANSWER: I would be glad to do so. If confirmed, I will seek an early opportunity to provide my thoughts to the Committee.

National Intelligence Estimates

Since the National Intelligence Estimate of 2002 overstated Iraq's WMD capabilities, the Intelligence Community, with the support of this committee, has worked to reform the process of writing these NIEs. The Committee is currently evaluating the outcomes of these reforms, including the new focus in the drafting process on sourcing, dissent, confidence levels and assumptions. We also want to make sure NIEs are timely in terms of relevance and that they are completed in a timely fashion once they are in the pipeline.

- **What do you believe is the purpose of the National Intelligence Estimates?**

ANSWER: National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the most authoritative written means by which the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) conveys to the President and other leaders the judgments of the entire IC regarding national security issues. NIEs make assessments about the future, well beyond interpretation of current developments and often about trends that are not yet at the top of policymakers' agendas. They explain and, if appropriate, sharpen conflicting views within the Community on critical issues and lay out the reasons for the differences. The Chairman of the NIC, who is responsible for production of the NIE's ensures that rigor in

vetting sources, attention to changes in key analytic and estimative judgments, and encouragement of alternative and contrarian views are built into the NIE process.

- **How do they differ from other NIC and Intelligence Community products?**

ANSWER: They differ from other products in the degree of attention formally given by the entire IC leadership. All NIEs are reviewed and approved by the DNI-chaired National Intelligence Board. In addition to the DNI and PDDNI, the board is composed of the principals of the 16 intelligence elements. Besides reviewing NIE findings, this body discusses the strengths, weaknesses, and credibility of the sources used in developing critical judgments. NIEs are also measured against the new IC analytic quality standards promulgated by the DNI.

- **If confirmed, how will you work with the NIC to ensure that NIEs are written in a timely manner?**

ANSWER: In preparation for my confirmation hearing, I have had substantial discussions with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the NIC regarding our respective expectations about the relationship of the PDDNI and the work of the NIC. As background, I have worked with the NIC and many NIOs over the years while at the NSC and the State Department, have had close ties with numerous NIC leaders, have acquired a high regard for this institution, and had a hand in commissioning NIEs. Current NIC leaders and I agree that I should, if confirmed, support the preparation of NIEs in several ways, e.g., in lining up agency support when needed, in shaping questions to be answered, in addressing critical analytic issues (where I have the knowledge to do so), in assuring quality, in meeting schedules, and in disseminating results. This does not mean that I would routinely involve myself in coordinating and producing NIEs, which are the responsibility of the NIC leadership and the NIOs. I will work to strengthen the NIC products, not micro-manage the NIC. I should also stress that Director Blair is also active in the NIE process. The DNI and PDDNI are ultimately responsible for the timeliness, quality and integrity of NIEs.

- **How can the DNI leadership ensure that the NIE judgments reflect good analytic tradecraft, particularly the range of view-points within the Intelligence Community and current discussions analysts are having about a given topic?**

ANSWER: As I indicated in response to the pre-hearing questionnaire, I have been impressed by the analytic quality standards and tradecraft best practices recently developed and issued by the ODNI. Based on my experience in quality assurance of research and analysis, I know that such standards result in high quality only if they are widely understood and embraced by the analytic community and accompanied by processes to assure independent critical review. It will take actual experience, if I am confirmed as PDDNI, before I can assess how well the new standards are applied in practice.

The use of sound analytic tradecraft in NIEs, including the incorporation of a range of views, should be based on this general quality assurance system. Indeed, NIEs should set the “gold standard” of quality assurance, given their usual importance and impact. Having read scores of NIEs over the years, and in preparation for my confirmation hearing, my impression is that alternative points of view are commonly but not always given adequate attention. It is crucial that they figure importantly in every NIE. Even if the consensus judgment in the IC supports certain conclusions, policy makers, intelligence executives, and other readers need to know that matters addressed by NIEs are normally complex and surrounded by uncertainty. I have found that this is better understood in the NIC and elsewhere in the IC than it once was, but I am prepared to encourage and if necessary insist on inclusion of improbable, dissenting, or other “outlying” analyses. In keeping with formal DNI quality assurance standards, an NIE must give due attention to ranges of uncertainty and to alternative views.

- **Do you believe that National Intelligence Estimates should be declassified?**

ANSWER: The policy of the DNI is that NIEs should not, as a rule, be declassified and should not be prepared in the expectation that they will be. The basic reason for this policy is that the intent to declassify could affect the way an NIE is written, which could reduce its value to national decision makers. I have not studied the question of when exceptions to this policy

might be made. But I will do so if confirmed and would be glad to discuss this matter with the Committee. In any case, any declassification must protect sources and methods and must not jeopardize U.S. diplomatic activities or military operations.

The Department of Defense

Any troop increase in Afghanistan will necessarily require additional intelligence support. Since 9/11, we have seen DoD requests for forces pull traditionally strategic assets – such as those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) – from foreign intelligence programs to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While no one argues the necessity to provide our soldiers with the best possible intelligence support, it comes at a cost – opportunity cost as well as real manpower and funding costs that impact other efforts.

- **What is the DNI's role in these resource decisions for Afghanistan and Iraq?**

ANSWER: The DNI has a central role in finding the right balance between meeting the needs of forces and of policymakers. The National Intelligence Priorities Framework distinguishes between these priorities and is informed by input from both policymakers and combatant commanders. This provides a discipline, a tool, and a venue for assessing trade-offs and deciding how best to meet competing priorities. The framework is managed by the ODNI.

In my view, the integration of the IC, in such forms as information sharing, cross-agency analytic collaboration, and integrated collection strategies, is crucial to meeting competing demands, including those that the question highlights. With integration, collection assets are more optimally used, results are not compartmented but shared, human and technical resources can be shifted flexibly and strategically, and opportunity costs can be reduced. The more progress the DNI makes in integrating the IC, the better U.S. intelligence will be at balancing and meeting the needs of military commanders and policy makers. I have not been party to the specific resource decisions mentioned in the question, but my general impression is that the IC and its clients are already seeing the benefits of this, though considerable upside potential remains. If confirmed, I will work with the Director, DoD leaders, and other IC elements to realize the benefits of integration in meeting competing demands. I will also assist the Director in

organizing and making required trade offs in ways that consider all the needs and costs at stake.

- **What can be done to ensure that broader strategic collection is not sacrificed to support tactical collection in Afghanistan and Iraq?**

ANSWER: Again, I am not under the impression that strategic collection is being seriously sacrificed to support tactical collection in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, in light of significant current needs for the strategic intelligence, it is crucial to ensure that these are not neglected, as this question suggests.

In regard to collection in particular, a definitive answer to the question would require more details about assets and methods that cannot be discussed in an unclassified document. Broadly stated, some means are primarily of tactical value, some are primarily of strategic value, and some are of dual value. Moreover, opportunities may exist to adjust priorities among strategic needs, some of which might be of lower priority than tactical requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. This means that the most important tactical needs (e.g., those where U.S. forces are operating) can be met without sacrificing the most important strategic needs. Finally, a share of collection for Afghanistan and Iraq has strategic as well as tactical benefit.

While these factors do not mean that there is no need to make tradeoffs, they limit to some extent that field in which tactical and strategic requirements compete. In the final analysis, there is no substitute for disciplined and frank interagency discussion among intelligence and policy officials, supported by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, to resolve such competition in a way that ensures that the most important strategic needs are met regardless of tactical needs.

Financial Auditability and Accountability

The Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 required all IC elements to receive an audit of their financial statements by March 1, 2005. This deadline was extended several times, but today the IC remains unable to acquire the software systems or perfect the processes needed to produce auditable financial statements. The Committee remains concerned that the intelligence agencies continue to

operate without the internal controls necessary to ensure the effective use of their resources.

I was heartened by the emphasis you placed on both the need for auditable financial statements and personal accountability. The previous DNI pledged to make senior managers accountable for achieving real progress in achieving “clean opinions” on the IC’s financial statements. But to date, the Committee has seen no evidence of such accountability.

- **What value do you see in the ability of the intelligence agencies to produce auditable financial statements?**

ANSWER: Broadly stated, the value of auditable financial statements lies in the independent scrutiny they permit of those entrusted to manage public resources. For the IC, financial statements are tangible indicators of whether every agency’s finances are ably managed, its use of resources economical, and its operations efficient. Auditable financial statements, based on accepted and objective standards, permit disinterested review and evaluation of these indicators. Thus, such statements are among the most important instruments to ensure and verify that taxpayer dollars are being spent purposefully, effectively, and accountably.

The DNI, supported by the rest of the IC leadership team, has set as a strategic goal the achievement of “financial management transparency, accountability, and auditability, compliant with applicable laws and OMB guidelines.” This reflects both an appreciation of its importance and recognition that the IC has a considerable distance to go. When intelligence agencies have the ability to produce auditable financial statements, the DNI, the Executive Branch as a whole, Congress, and the American people should be able to have a clear view of how all the resources provided the IC are managed.

- **If you agree it is a worthy goal to produce auditable financial statements, what steps will you take to ensure each agency takes the actions necessary to become auditable as soon as practicable?**

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will assist the DNI and support the CFO in several ways. I would, if confirmed, ensure that every agency does what

is necessary to achieve the goal, for example, by maintaining focus on financial management as a priority for the IC leadership team (e.g., in the Deputies Executive Committee); by insisting on regular progress reports; by advocating financial management and controls that leverage public and private sector best practices; by expecting the CIO to assist the CFO by streamlining information systems to deliver timely, detailed and reliable financial results; and by including progress in achieving the goal in our assessment of leadership performance.

- **Are you personally willing to make good on past promises in this area?**

ANSWER: I am willing to commit to do whatever I can to achieve this strategic objective and to keep the Committee informed of progress.

- **And if so, what approach would you take in incentivizing senior managers for financial results?**

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will expect that programs, budgets and other financial targets are formal commitments, just as they are in any strong enterprise. I will work with the DNI, the CFO, and the program managers to make the fulfillment of these commitments an explicit and significant aspect of performance review, including for the leaders of IC elements. Meeting these financial commitments requires making adequate resources available and I will do my part to live up to this side of the compact.

Acquisitions, Budgets, and Accountability

The Committee has been concerned about the IC's acquisition management practices for some time. Several recent acquisition failures have involved massive cost and schedule overruns. The ODNI recently estimates that for Fiscal Year 2009 over 72 percent of the NIP was executed through the contracting workforce, indicating the acquisition function is critical to successful missions and operations. Despite this importance, the primary finding of a recent Committee staff review of

the Community's acquisition capability found that agency senior managers continually failed to dedicate adequate attention and resources to the function.

In your written responses you described a budget as a contract by which a unit can count on an agreed amount of resources and the corporation can count on agreed results. That is the way the IC should be run, too, but it has been largely lacking.

- **What concrete management and accountability practices are you prepared to take to end the IC's chronic overruns on big, expensive programs?**

ANSWER: Without detailed knowledge of specific programs, my starting point if confirmed would be the IC acquisition policy promulgated by the DNI, which is specifically aimed at controlling and eliminating over-runs. In particular, I would reinforce the following tenets of that policy: do not start acquisitions you cannot afford; fully fund what you expect to acquire; use proven technology or else fully fund efforts to prove new technology; provide transparent execution; and rely on tough, independent reviews and oversight. I would also ensure that acquisition program managers and their senior management understand that they will be measured against their cost, schedule and performance commitments. While I do not believe that centralized top-down management of acquisition is necessary or desirable, I would be prepared to advise the DNI to withdraw delegation of decision authority from IC element heads if necessary to achieve better performance.

Taken together, and applied vigorously and consistently, these practices should address the issues that have beset large IC acquisition efforts. I am satisfied that the new Deputy DNI for Acquisition and Technology is seized with this challenge and capable of orchestrating the effort to meet it. As a result, I expect a significant and sustainable improvement in the IC's ability to deliver major acquisitions on schedule, for the identified cost, and with the expected performance.

- **Please provide your thoughts on the use of tenure agreements and succession planning to ensure program managers of major programs develop a sense of ownership and accountability.**

ANSWER: I am impressed by what I have learned about the direction of IC acquisition policy in this regard. To improve continuity, personal

commitment, and accountability, the DNI has taken an initiative that supports appropriate personnel tenure and active work force management for major IC acquisitions. The DNI is considering policy guidance requiring signed tenure agreements between program managers and their respective decision authorities, which would set forth the expectations and commitments of both parties in respect to funding, schedule, and requirements.

In addition, the ODNI is monitoring the tenure of program managers for major systems and adding this information to the next Annual Report to Congress on Major Acquisitions. Also, for major programs in DoD's IC elements, the USD(I) is currently reviewing a proposed statement to ensure compliance with policy requiring tenure agreements.

These measures point in the right direction, which is to base acquisition performance on clear and reciprocal commitments, on accountability of key managers and their leaders, and on revising personnel and performance policies to promote better management and results. If I find that there are other steps that could reinforce these, I would be glad to discuss them with the Committee, if I am confirmed.

QUESTION FROM VICE-CHAIRMAN BOND:

Value of Long-term, Strategic Intelligence Projections

Your written answers were candid about the huge geopolitical events that U.S. intelligence has failed to predict – e.g., *“the fall of the Shah, the collapse of Communism, the rise of jihadism, the rapid global spread of the Internet, and the relentless economic growth of China.”* More recently you note that the IC's recent “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”, *“considered neither the possibility nor the effects of a global financial crisis and sharp economic contraction, which in fact occurred as the report was being issued.”*

- **In light of these low probability, but extremely high impact events that U.S. intelligence consistently fails to project, do you believe that policy-makers should ever expect the IC to anticipate transformative events?**

ANSWER: The problem as I see it is that the needs of policymakers can, understandably, skew intelligence efforts to focus on informing immediate national security matters. From my own experience (e.g., at the end of the Cold War), I know that transformative developments often begin precisely when, or because, current conditions are in turmoil, when policymakers can be preoccupied. Thus, the risk is not so much that policymakers cannot count on the IC to anticipate major change but that the demands of policymakers will tend to pull the IC in the opposite direction. It follows that IC leaders have to take responsibility and initiative to anticipate major discontinuities even in the absence of strong current demands to do so. This may include investigating low-probability but high-consequence developments that are neither part of the “assumption set” of current policy nor obvious from current conditions.

The exchange I have had with the Committee on this problem prompts me to think that it will be important, if confirmed, to explore explicitly with colleagues on the policy side the need for analysis of seemingly unlikely but high-impact developments. The existing National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which is based on policy-intelligence dialogue, would lend itself to establishing priorities for such analysis.

In sum, policymakers should expect the IC to anticipate transformative events; IC leaders must be ready to take the initiative; and improving U.S. intelligence in this regard may require more explicit discussions between the intelligence and policy communities, which would of course include this Committee.

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MIKULSKI:

Mr. Gompert, it is absolutely critical to have a Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (P/DDNI) who is honest, candid, and objective. As you stated in your confirmation hearing, when the Director of National Intelligence is absent or unavailable, you will be the principal intelligence advisor to the

President. This may require you to tell the President something he doesn't want to hear.

We can't have a person in your position who only says "yes" to the President. The DNI and PDDNI must speak with truth and candor to the President because this will help create more informed policies and will help prevent our government from making reckless mistakes. I, like many other Americans, have great respect for your lengthy national security experience – and it is admirable that you are willing to return to government service.

- **Given your lengthy intelligence and national security career, how can we count on you to speak truth to power?**

ANSWER: The ability and determination to speak truth to power is fundamental to the responsibilities I will shoulder if confirmed. Failure to do so would be a disservice to the American people, to the President himself, and to my own duty and values. Having never hesitated to be "honest, candid, and objective," I made a point in my first conversation with Director Blair that I could only accept the nomination to be PDDNI if this is what was expected of me. He said that these values were among the reasons he wanted to recommend me, and that the President expected no less.

In both government and the private sector, I have observed how the reluctance of advisors and analysts to bear bad news can result in bad decisions with bad results. In intelligence, this is intolerable. The key to the discipline your question suggests, in my experience, is to make up one's mind in advance that such considerations as job security, career prospects, and the desire to please superiors must and will have no bearing on one's objectivity. If I am confirmed, I have every expectation that those who look to me for intelligence information and judgment will count on strict objectivity, which is what they will receive.

- **What specific examples can you point to where you told a leader something that he or she didn't want to hear?**

ANSWER: While I do not want to imply that any leader would have preferred me to be other than objective, I can give examples of delivering information or advice that challenged established assumptions and preferences.

In the early 1980s, I warned that U.S. NATO allies would be unable to support the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe without an earnest parallel arms control effort. This was not received well in all quarters (until huge demonstrations in Europe validated my views). As a result of speaking truth to power in this case, I found it necessary to interrupt my government career.

Prior to and during the violent break up of Yugoslavia, I warned that there could be large-scale human suffering – what turned out to be “ethnic cleansing” and mass killing – unless the U.S. organized a NATO initiative. I did not hesitate to apprise others in government that atrocities in Bosnia were likely to become so severe that our reputation and leadership would suffer.

As Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense in the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003-04, I advised more than one senior visitor from Washington that a full-blown Sunni insurgency was in the making, fueled by jihadist messages and support. The accepted wisdom at the time was that Sunni resistance came primarily from former elements of Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus and therefore would die out. I also made clear that the insurgency was growing in size and sophistication faster than Iraqi security forces were, which would lead either to defeat or to a need to increase U.S. forces. These assessments varied sharply with the more upbeat view at that juncture and called into question the continuation of policies based on that view.

In business, on many occasions I insisted on making – or demanding – realistic assessments that implied financial targets would be missed. The sooner decision makers hear what they need to hear, rather than what they would like to hear, the more likely it is that they will be able to adjust and avert or mitigate damage.

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR HATCH:

On-going versus Future Threats

In your prepared responses to the Committee questionnaire, you say that one of our most critical national security priorities should be to “find and cripple” Al-Qa’ida.

- **What do you mean by “cripple”? “Crippling” does not necessarily equal eliminating their lethal intent.**

ANSWER: The leaders and loyal followers of Al-Qa’ida and other jihadist groups embrace distortions of history, religion, and international politics that stoke strong hatred of the West, of regimes throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, and especially of the United States. While it is important to pursue policies that encourage popular antipathy toward and thus isolate the likes of Al-Qa’ida, hardened terrorists and eager recruits are essentially immune to such efforts. Consequently, we cannot count on affecting the intent of hard-core jihadists and instead must eliminate the threat they pose to the U.S. and its interests and friends, whether by preventive action or defense.

My use of the term “cripple” in responding to the Committee’s questionnaire was short-hand for disrupting, hampering, degrading the material condition, damaging the organization, discrediting, and capturing or killing those who lead or kill on behalf of Al-Qa’ida – measures that are required against those whose intent we cannot expect to influence.

While it is not my place as a nominee for a leadership position in the IC to prescribe counterterrorist strategy, this is my analysis of what it takes to counter Al-Qa’ida.

- **And why do you focus only on Al-Qa’ida? Do you not believe that the global violent *takfiri* movement could create other Al-Qa’ida imitators, what terrorist expert Marc Sageman calls “Leaderless Jihad”?**

ANSWER: We cannot exclude that violent salafist extremists, including takfiri, will organize and conduct terrorism with global ambitions and reach. Still, the principal danger to the U.S. and its interests remains Al-Qa’ida, even as its form changes. There have been splinter groups and spontaneous cells with jihadist agendas, though these have so far been limited in scale, structure, and means, and sometimes appear more concerned with local issues than global ones. Often such groups are inspired by, reach out to, or otherwise are touched by Al-Qa’ida’s tentacles. Even as Al-Qa’ida elements in Pakistan’s frontier regions have been damaged by U.S. and allied action, regional affiliates – Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qa’ida in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qa'ida East Africa— have demonstrated an ability and will to attack U.S. interests and friends, if not necessarily the U.S. homeland. While Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other top Al-Qa'ida leaders may not be directing or enabling operations among these far-flung groups, they still appear to provide at least some inspiration. In any case, the strength of Al-Qa'ida's extended network does not depend on a strong Al-Qa'ida center. In sum, while we should remain vigilant for salafist or takfiri movements and threats independent of Al-Qa'ida, we are finding that Al-Qa'ida is showing an ability to survive, adapt, mutate, and motivate.

Having said this, I agree that our intelligence collection and analysis, as well as counterterrorism operations and defense, should not be so preoccupied with Al-Qa'ida's network to the exclusion of other potent transnational movements with extremist agendas and strategic reach. While not jihadist as such, Hezbollah operates in several countries and regions and is virulently anti-U.S. We should certainly not assume that only Al-Qa'ida would be a threat to the U.S.

The On-going Threat of Armed Groups

I believe that, for the foreseeable future, our nation will be facing the threat of armed groups, which is how I refer to violent sub-state actors that include terrorist organizations, insurgencies and criminal organizations. Many of these groups have much in common with the others, and to approach the phenomenon as armed groups should allow us to begin to adapt lessons we are learning in countering some in order to apply against the others. The southern perimeter of the United States will be subject to all kinds of pressure from armed groups operating against us and the governments of Mexico, Central and South America.

- **Where, in your priority of threats, do you place the threat of armed groups?**

ANSWER: Classifying terrorist organizations, insurgencies, criminal organizations, and other violent actors as “armed groups” is useful for conceptualizing a general, growing pattern of non-state dangers, as well as for fashioning effective ways to counter them. This is not inconsistent with maintaining important distinctions, e.g., between terrorists with global ambitions, insurgents with local grievances, and criminal organizations with economic motivations.

Armed groups south of the U.S., highlighted in the question, appear to be driven by economic and local political considerations than by religious or ideological extremism, though there is no guarantee against the latter (and some signs of potential). Nevertheless, these armed groups are not only non-state but transnational and even multinational. Some gangs that specialize in drugs, extortion, and other crimes extend from Central or even South America through Mexico to the U.S. – some with ties to U.S. gangs. At present, the Mexican government is taking strong action, with U.S. support. Consequently, while violence is on the rise, the IC's current assessment is not pessimistic. However, Mexico is a significantly higher priority than it was a few years ago, and I would favor great vigilance in case the armed-group threat worsens. If it does worsen, the threat of armed groups to the south of the U.S. would assume very high priority.

If confirmed, I would assess how well the IC is performing and preparing for the threat of armed groups, apart from Islamist terrorists, and I would be glad to discuss with the Committee both current IC efforts and any additional efforts that might be indicated.

- **And how do you assess their real and potential threats to our national security?**

ANSWER: While I have answered this to some extent in the preceding response, I would say there is a serious and potentially severe threat to U.S. security in several forms:

- a. Drug trafficking
- b. Drug-related violence against Americans along the border, along drug-trade routes, and visiting Latin America
- c. Interference with economic commerce and U.S. investments
- d. Cyber attacks.

In general, it is important to appreciate that such groups can be sophisticated, complex, dynamic, elusive, distributed, resourceful, and uninhibited when it comes to advancing and protecting their interests, which are inimical to ours.

Where in the IC Are Lessons Learned?

In your prepared responses to Committee questions, you state, "IC leaders must lead the battle against accepted ways of thinking."

- **Can you give me any examples of where and when this occurred?**

ANSWER: My sense is that the IC is making real progress in encouraging and presenting unconventional analyses, which I would build upon if confirmed. The CIA's "Red Cells" regularly publish papers that question assumptions and highlight alternative outcomes on most key national security issues, including the Middle East, terrorism, proliferation, the recent economic downturn, and religious extremism. Several recent NIC publications also have challenged accepted thinking. The NIC's Long-Range Analysis Unit examined the implications of high energy prices for U.S. interests a year before prices peaked, and its Global Trends work identified shifts in power from developed to developing states as well as possible resource scarcities that challenged common assumptions. I have also found alternative views well presented in many of the classified studies I read in preparation for confirmation. In sum, the direction is right, and the next PDDNI should join the DNI and other IC leaders in lending their hand and ideas to strengthening the trend.

- **Can you please indicate how you would routinize analytic procedures to include, for example, Alternative Competitive Hypothesis Testing?**

ANSWER: Alternative competitive hypothesis testing is one method of satisfying the IRTPA requirement to conduct alternative analysis. Many IC products already involve structured exercises that challenge underlying assumptions and develop alternative interpretations of events, trends, and underlying forces. Production of several NIC products on Iran and Egypt included, for example, exercises with outside experts that tested competing scenarios for those countries. The DNI-chaired National Intelligence Board, on which the PDDNI sits along with the heads of the 16 intelligence agencies, would seem to be the best vehicle to promote and institutionalize further the practice of the questioning key assumptions and examining alternative scenarios. Most NIEs already feature alternative scenarios and critiques by outside experts and, as such, can serve as models for the rest of the IC to follow.

I was also pleased to learn that the DNI's latest "Standards of Analytic Tradecraft" calls for the incorporation of "Alternative Analysis" where appropriate. This is important because it helps assure that adequate treatment of unconventional views will be part of the IC's new quality-assurance process.

- **Have you read the 2004 Report this Committee published on the intelligence failures related to the Iraq's weapons of mass destruction? If you have read the report, what lessons do you draw from its conclusions? If you have not read the report, would you please do so before you next testify to this Committee?**

ANSWER: I have read the report from cover to cover. The lessons I draw are essentially those spotlighted by the report: poor HUMINT, inadequate skepticism about questionable sources, "group-think," insufficient attention to alternative explanations and dissenting voices, poor quality assurance, failure to piece together an integrated view, haste. I was struck by the finding that IC performance concerning WMD was broadly unsatisfactory whereas IC performance on the question of alleged links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qa'ida was generally satisfactory. This contrast suggests that the inadequacies of the Iraq WMD effort were not indicative of an IC incapable of correct judgments.

Among the measures taken to address the lessons captured in the Committee's 2004 Report, based on the IRTPA and Executive Order 12333, I would note the sharpening of analytic quality standards, the strengthening of quality assurance processes, the upgrading of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, the instituting of greater sharing and collaboration for both collection and analysis, investment in better HUMINT, and clear evaluation of the reliability of sources.

- **Finally, the IC is engaged in this Nation's conflicts in essential ways, and it is learning how to do business in the new 21st century threat environment. But, unlike the military, which cultivates a "lessons learned" culture, the IC has done this in a very paltry way. How do you intend to redress this, and what measurements of success are you will to commit to?**

ANSWER: From what I know, the IC's effort in learning lessons is uneven. Among the mechanisms used by the IC are investigations by

inspectors general, oversight committees, quality assurance officers, historians, and of course, management. The ODNI has created a lessons-learned program and is endeavoring to coordinate this function with the agencies. I understand that some of the products have been recognized as quite good and valuable. Examples of useful lessons-learned in parts of the IC underscore the potential value of institutionalizing this IC-wide.

Based on limited exposure, my impression is that more could be done to regularize and create throughout the IC a culture of lessons learned, of the sort practiced so diligently by the U.S. military. I have seen successful lessons-learned work done for the military by the Joint Forces Command and by Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (e.g., RAND and IDA). I have observed that military organizations and leaders are not merely willing to learn from experience – including failure – but determined to do so in order to improve plans, capabilities, and doctrine. I would like to hold off identifying specific measures that I might take, if confirmed. But I agree that the question is important and would be glad to take up the question with the Committee when I have formed a clearer idea of what should be done.

Implementing COIN in Afghanistan

You wrote an interesting monograph for RAND entitled *Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency*. It focused on the global jihadist threat, in specific, and counterinsurgency, or COIN (“coin”) theory in general.

- **What are the major gaps in analysis that the IC faces in trying to support our military in Afghanistan?**

ANSWER: As a nominee for confirmation, I have not been involved in or privy to sensitive intelligence specific to Afghanistan. My general observation is that our forces have substantially better, faster, and more complete intelligence information and analysis available to them in a more rapid manner than they did only a few years ago. I attribute this in large part to a strengthening of IC-DoD cooperation, which has intensified under Secretary Gates and Director Blair. Nonetheless, I have the impression that our forces would benefit from having a more sophisticated understanding of various tribes and tribal leaders, especially in the “Pashtun belt.” If confirmed, I would be glad to report back to the Committee on any gaps and efforts to fill them.

The IC Role in Understanding Certain Global Threats

In identifying the major national security threats, you have indicated that one of them is “understanding the implications of change.” You specifically identify certain aspects of change, including “environmental security.”

Some still believe that intelligence is essentially about stealing secrets – gaining access to protected foreign information that has an impact on our security. And intelligence analysis is largely about analyzing information our enemies and competitors would deny us.

Regarding “environmental security,” this very serious subject is in the purview of scientists and policy makers, but some believe the IC, which appears not to have a lot of excess capacity, should be focusing on its core missions, which, by definition, it will always meet incompletely.

- **Please explain as specifically as possible your understanding of the IC’s unique contribution to understanding the issue of “environmental security.”**

ANSWER: It is important, in my view, for the IC not to try to do too much in regard to gathering intelligence regarding environmental security, given the abundance of open source information and scientific data. Rather, the IC’s mission with respect to environmental security should be to analyze this open environmental information vis-à-vis U.S. national security and produce intelligence products that provide policymakers and military commanders a clearer picture of environmental security threats and their potential to impact on U.S. persons and interests. IC analysis should concentrate on what the U.S. Government can do to avoid, mitigate, or prepare for dangers to environmental security. Examples of useful intelligence analysis which otherwise might not be available include: economic, political, humanitarian, security implications that affect U.S. interests and responsibilities; consequential behavior of other governments; and useful input to inform negotiations and diplomacy.



United States
Office of Government Ethics
1201 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005-3917

August 19, 2009

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairwoman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairwoman:

In accordance with the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, I enclose a copy of the financial disclosure report filed by David C. Gompert, who has been nominated by President Obama for the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

We have reviewed the report and have also obtained advice from the agency concerning any possible conflict in light of its functions and the nominee's proposed duties. Also enclosed is an ethics agreement outlining the actions that the nominee will undertake to avoid conflicts of interest. Unless a date for compliance is indicated in the ethics agreement, the nominee must fully comply within three months of confirmation with any action specified in the ethics agreement.

Based thereon, we believe that this nominee is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert I. Cusick".

Robert I. Cusick
Director

Enclosures

August 6, 2009

Ms. Corin R. Stone
Deputy General Counsel
and Designated Agency Ethics Official
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2B-200 LX2
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Ms. Stone:

The purpose of this letter is to describe the steps that I will take to avoid any actual or apparent conflict of interest in the event that I am confirmed for the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

As required by 18 U.S.C. § 208(a), I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that has a direct and predictable effect on my financial interests or those of any person whose interests are imputed to me, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2). I understand that the interests of the following persons are imputed to me: any spouse or minor child of mine; any general partner of a partnership in which I am a limited or general partner; any organization in which I serve as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee; and any person or organization with which I am negotiating or have an arrangement concerning prospective employment.

Upon confirmation, I will resign from my position with the RAND Corporation. For a period of one year after my resignation, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which the RAND Corporation is a party or represents a party, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).

Because I am participating in a defined benefit pension plan with Lucent Technologies, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that has a direct and predictable effect on the ability or willingness of Lucent Technologies to provide this contractual benefit, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2).

Upon confirmation, I will resign from my positions with Hopkins House. For a period of one year after my resignation from this position, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which Hopkins House is a party or represents a party, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).

Upon confirmation, I will also resign from my position on the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. This entity is an advisory body to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Because I served as a consultant to the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the Congress through September 2008, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the Congress is a party or represents a party for a period of one year after my service as a consultant ended, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).

Finally, I understand that as a Presidential appointee, I am required to sign the Ethics Pledge (Exec. Order No. 13490) and that I will be bound by the requirements and restrictions therein in addition to the commitments I have made in this and any other ethics agreement.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David C. Gompert", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

David C. Gompert

Executive Branch Personnel PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

Reporting Individual's Name Last Name: Gornert First Name and Middle Initial: David C		New Entrant Nominee, or Candidate: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Termination Date (If Applicable) Date (Month, Day, Year):	
Position for Which Filing Title of Position: Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Department or Agency (If Applicable): ODNI		Calendar Year Covered by Report Incumbent: <input type="checkbox"/>		Fee for Late Filing Any individual who is required to file this report after the 30-day period after the date the report is required to be filed, or, if an extension is granted, more than 30 days after the last day of the reporting period, shall be subject to a \$200 fee.	
Location of Present Office (for forwarding address) Address (Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code): 1200 South Hayes St, Arlington VA 22202 Telephone No. (Include Area Code): 703-413-1100		Title of Position(s) and Entity(ies) Held Member, Chief of Naval Operations Essoffus Panel, 1995 to present Adjunct faculty member, U.S. Naval Academy, 2008		Reporting Periods Incumbents: The reporting period is the preceding calendar year except Part I, which is the reporting period for the calendar year up to the date you file. Part II of Schedule D is not applicable. Termination Filers: The reporting period begins at the end of the period covered by your previous filing and ends at the date of termination. Part II of Schedule D is not applicable.	
Presidential Nominee Subject to Senate Confirmation Name of Congressional Committee Considering Nomination: Do You Intend to Create a Qualified Divestified Trust?		Select Committee on Intelligence: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No		Nominees, New Entrants and Candidates for President and Vice President: Schedule A—The reporting period for income (BLOCK C) is the preceding calendar year and the current calendar year as of any date you choose that is within 31 days of the date of filing. Schedule B—Not applicable. Schedule C, Part I (Liabilities)—The reporting period is the preceding calendar year and the current calendar year up to the date of filing that is within 31 days of the date of filing. Schedule C, Part II (Agreements or Arrangements)—Show any agreements or arrangements as of the date of filing. Schedule D—The reporting period is the preceding two calendar years and the current calendar year up to the date of filing.	
Certification I CERTIFY that the statements I have submitted are true and all assets and liabilities have been disclosed to the best of my knowledge.		Signature of Reporting Individual Date (Month, Day, Year): 08, 06, 2009		Signature of Other Reviewer Date (Month, Day, Year):	
Agency Ethics Official's Opinion On the basis of information contained in this report, I conclude that the filer is in compliance with the law (subject to any comments in the box below).		Signature of Designated Agency Ethics Official/Reviewing Official Date (Month, Day, Year): 8/7/09		Signature Date (Month, Day, Year): 8/19/09	
Office of Government Ethics Use Only		Signature: <i>W. A. Smith</i>		Agency Use Only	
Comments of Reviewing Officials (If additional space is required, use the reverse side of this sheet)		(Check box if filing extension granted & indicate number of days _____) <input type="checkbox"/>		OGE Use Only AUG 10 2009	

SF 278 (Rev. 03/2000)
5 C.F.R. Part 2634
U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Reporting Individual's Name
Compett, David

Page Number
9 of 12

SCHEDULE A continued
(Use only if needed)

Income: type and amount. If "None (or less than \$201)" is checked, no other entry is needed in Block C for that item.

Valuation of Assets at close of reporting period

Assets and Income

BLOCK A	BLOCK B		BLOCK C							Other Income (Specify Type & Actual Amount)	Date (Mo., Day, Yr.) Only if Honoraria									
	Valuation of Assets at close of reporting period		Type	Amount																
	\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	\$1,000,001 - \$25,000,000	Over \$25,000,000	Dividends	Interest	Capital Gains	None (or less than \$201)	\$1,001 - \$2,500	\$2,501 - \$5,000	\$5,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	Over \$100,000	Over \$5,000,000	
1																				
2																				
3																				
4																				
5																				
6																				
7																				
8																				
9																				

* This category applies only if the asset/income is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the asset/income is either that of the filer or jointly held by the filer with the spouse or dependent children, mark the other higher categories of value, as appropriate.

Printed Edition: Cannot be used.

OGE/Adobe Acrobat version 1.0.2 (11/01/2004)

SCHEDULE B

Page Number 10 of 12

Do not complete Schedule B if you are a new entrant, nominee, or Vice Presidential or Presidential Candidate

Reporting Individual's Name
Compt, David C

Part I: Transactions

Report any purchase, sale, or exchange of property used solely as your personal property during the reporting period between you, your spouse, or dependent child. Check the "Certificate of divestiture" block to indicate sales made pursuant to a certificate of divestiture from OGE.

Do not report a transaction involving property used solely as your personal property during the reporting period between you, your spouse, or dependent child. Check the "Certificate of divestiture" block to indicate sales made pursuant to a certificate of divestiture from OGE.

Transaction Type (X)	Date (Mo., Day, Yr.)	Amount of Transaction (\$)	Certificate of Divestiture
Sale	2/1/99	\$15,000	
		\$25,000	
		\$50,000	
		\$75,000	
		\$100,000	
		\$125,000	
		\$150,000	
		\$175,000	
		\$200,000	
		\$225,000	
		\$250,000	
		\$275,000	
		\$300,000	
		\$325,000	
		\$350,000	
		\$375,000	
		\$400,000	
		\$425,000	
		\$450,000	
		\$475,000	
		\$500,000	

*This category applies only if the underlying asset is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the underlying asset is either held by the filer or jointly held by the filer with the spouse or dependent children, use the other higher categories of value, as appropriate.

Part II: Gifts, Reimbursements, and Travel Expenses

For you, your spouse and dependent children, report the source, a brief description, and the value of: (1) gifts (such as tangible items, food, clothing, lodging, food, or entertainment) received from one source totaling more than \$260, and (2) travel-related cash reimbursements received from one source totaling more than \$260. For conflicts analysis, it is helpful to indicate a basis for receipt, such as personal friend, agency approval under 5 U.S.C. § 4111 or other statutory authority, etc. For travel-related gifts and reimbursements, include travel itinerary, dates, and the nature of expenses provided. Exclude anything given to you by the U.S. Government; given to your agency in connection with official travel; or given to you by your spouse or dependent child or totally independent of their relationship with you at the donor's residence. Also, for purposes of aggregating gifts to determine the total value from one source, exclude items worth \$104 or less. See instructions for other exclusions.

Source (Name and Address)	Brief Description	Value
Examples: Nat'l Assn. of Book Collectors, NY, NY Frank Jones, San Francisco, CA	Airline ticket, hotel room & meal incident to national conference 6/15/99 (personal activity unrelated to duty) Leather briefcase (personal friend)	\$500 \$200

None

SF 278 (Rev. 01/2000)
 U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Reporting Individual's Name
 Gompert, David C

SCHEDULE D

Page Number
 12 of 12

Part I: Positions Held Outside U.S. Government

Report any positions held during the applicable reporting period, whether compensated or not. Positions include but are not limited to those of an officer, director, trustee, general partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise or any non-profit organization or educational institution. Exclude positions with religious, social, fraternal, or political entities and those solely of an honorary nature.

None

Examples	Name of Organization (Include full name, street address, city, state, and zip code)	Type of Organization	Position Held	From (Mo./Yr.) To (Mo./Yr.)
1	The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA	Non-profit policy research	Senior Fellow	01/1993 present
2	Hopkins House, Alexandria VA	Charitable School	Trustee	07/2005 present
3	Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, Washington DC	Research Institution	consultant	04/2008 9/2008
4				
5				
6				

Part II: Compensation in Excess of \$5,000 Paid by One Source

Report sources of more than \$5,000 compensation received by you or your business affiliation for services provided directly by you during any one year of the reporting period. This includes the names of clients and customers of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, or any other source (Name and Address)

None

Examples	Source (Name and Address)	Brief Description of Duties
1	Doi Jones & Smith, Hometown, State Metro University (client of Doi Jones & Smith), Moneysroom, State	Legal services Legal services in connection with university construction
2	The RAND Corporation	Senior Fellow
3		
4		
5		
6		

Prior Editions Cannot Be Used.

DDG/Aasky-Arenson Version 1.02 (1/01/2004)