

Questions for the Record
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Nomination Hearing
July 22, 2020

Questions for the Record for Mr. Christopher C. Miller

[From Vice Chairman Warner]

1. Have you reviewed the DNI's Senior Advisory Group's report on NCTC that was completed in 2019? What were your conclusions regarding its six findings and recommendations?

Response: I have not read the full report. However, I received an initial brief on the study's findings. I agree with most of them, however, I need more information to better understand the data behind some of the study's findings.

As I stated in my response to Question 11 of the pre-hearing questionnaire, I believe the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) is one of the most innovative and capable organizations in the U.S. Government. I had the distinct privilege of working directly with the DSOP during my tenure on the National Security Council Staff (NSC) in 2018 and 2019, specifically in crafting the President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and I saw first-hand the value-add of the relatively small office. They embody the "secret sauce" of NCTC by serving as an analytical, non-partisan, unbiased forum for solving the most intractable problems in the national security realm.

However, some of the key information from the study, as briefed to me, is inconsistent with my experience. For example, I believe NCTC's statutory authorities in implementing Presidential guidance are appropriately leveraged. While serving as the Senior Director for Counterterrorism and Trans-national Threats on the NSC from March 2018 to January 2020, I relied exclusively on the NCTC to lead the development of the President's October 2018 "National Strategy for Counterterrorism" and accompanying "Strategic Implementation Plan" as well as a multitude of interagency forums and planning efforts on regional and functional challenges. I also relied on NCTC to provide the intelligence assessment for every one of the approximately 150 NSC-led "Counterterrorism Security Group" (CSG) meetings I chaired (the Assistant Secretary-level interagency forum). Finally, the NCTC serves an essential role in managing the three times daily CT threat indicators and warnings meetings with every CT element of the USG being present. My assessment is that the NCTC's role as the "honest broker" is more important than ever to support the NSC and interagency decision makers.

If confirmed, I would look forward to reviewing the full report in order to form a more considered opinion on the findings and recommendations.

2. Do you find merit in the critique that Russ Travers offered regarding NCTC in the Politico article dated July 10, 2020, and the NPR story that aired on July 21, 2020?

Response: As I stated in the hearing, I know former NCTC Acting Director Russ Travers, and I consider him both a mentor and friend. I agree with Russ' general theme that we cannot return to a pre-2001 approach to counterterrorism. I understand Russ' concerns center on resourcing, specifically budget, IT systems, and manpower. Taken on their own, these types of concerns are likely shared among program managers across the federal government. But in the context of our nation's CT program, the stakes are too high to ignore. Following nearly 20 years of intense focus on and tremendous success against Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist threats, national security priorities are inevitably beginning to shift. However, we cannot lapse and return to a pre-2001 approach to counterterrorism.

The U.S. Government has spent tens of billions on CT since September 11, 2001. Each year since then, CT programs across the federal space have seen annual increases in both funding and manpower, and NCTC is no exception. At the macro level, I have not yet seen major shifts in budgeting away from CT. I believe we are at the beginning stages of that discussion, and I understand NCTC is taking steps to further ensure its readiness to meet these challenges as the Administration assesses renewed importance of allocating resources to address great power competition, a position which I believe is shared with the congressional intelligence committees. If confirmed, I intend to take a closer look at NCTC's mission requirements, and work with the ODNI Chief Financial Executive and the IC Chief Financial Officer to ensure resources requested are sufficient to meet NCTC's "no fail" mission needs.

Next, although NCTC has matured greatly and largely fulfilled its role as a recognized leader in our nation's CT efforts, we in the CT community continue to face new and difficult challenges. In today's information age, complex data management and technical challenges make information analysis and sharing increasingly difficult. NCTC's watchlisting, screening, and all-source analytic efforts rely on modern, cutting-edge tools and clear, consistent data management policies to keep pace with the evolving terrorist threats of today. While IT modernization can be easy to postpone in favor of other priorities, it is increasingly crucial to NCTC's ability to fulfill its mission requirements. If confirmed, I would work to get a better sense of NCTC's IT infrastructure, work with the dedicated professional staff to understand and prioritize mission critical updates, and advocate for those priority IT updates through the budget and programming process.

Finally, NCTC's ability to succeed in its mission goals correlates directly to its ability to continue recruiting and retaining the best and the brightest. My sense is that the detailee staffing model has actually contributed greatly to NCTC's success. But, having heard Russ' concerns and the concerns of this Committee, it is worth taking a look at the appropriate balance between cadre and detailee positions. If confirmed, I will take the first 30 days, as I always have when taking a new position, to delve into

the details and listen to the work force and other experts to allow for a more knowledgeable and meaningful critique.

3. Should NCTC have a senior military officer in its leadership to ensure it remains adequately connected to the Department of Defense?

Response: I think there is merit in having a senior military officer at NCTC to provide insight and expertise about global U.S. military presence, efforts, and capabilities. I understand DNI Ratcliffe recently announced the establishment of a Director's Advisor for Military Affairs (DAMA) at the ODNI, and that the office will be led by the three-star billet formerly assigned as the head of the ODNI's National Security Partnerships Directorate. If confirmed, I would seek to establish a close working relationship with the DAMA to ensure the NCTC is able to leverage DoD expertise and resources in our shared counterterrorism mission. I would also work with DoD to determine how best to leverage any additional expertise specifically for NCTC.

4. If you were to look back on your tenure a year from now as Director NCTC, how do you define whether your tenure has been a success?

Response: As I stated in response Question Eight of the pre-hearing questionnaire, the NCTC's most important metric is assessed every single day, and it is binary: success is preventing strategic surprise by terrorist groups and not allowing terrorist attacks to affect our way of life. If confirmed, this would be my primary metric for success.

Recognizing also that we fight a thoughtful and adaptive enemy that is constantly seeking ways to gain advantage, NCTC can also be assessed on its ability to posture the U.S. Government to respond effectively to attacks with the full weight and power of the United States. If confirmed, in my role as the CT mission manager, I would work with the NCTC leadership team and our partners across the IC to set benchmarks and periodically assess progress against our ability to identify and close high priority CT intelligence gaps and enhance satisfaction across NCTC's five customer segments with overall CT intelligence.

These metrics combined with internal performance assessments of NCTC's support to key customer needs in counterterrorism intelligence, terrorism identities intelligence, and situational awareness services and readership and feedback analytics from NCTC products online through its "Current" portal, also provide a useful metrics for the Center. If confirmed, I would consider myself successful if were able to build on our progress on all of these fronts.

5. How do we keep our intelligence edge against terrorist organizations with a more limited forward presence in places like Syria and Afghanistan?

Response: Potential reductions in forward presence in places like Syria and Afghanistan underscore the importance of the allied foreign partnerships the United States continually works to expand and strengthen. In addition, U.S. efforts to adopt a more agile and expansive approach against the terrorist threat - as called for by our national counterterrorism strategy - by integrating intelligence with other instruments of national power such as diplomacy, law enforcement, strategic communications, and counterterrorism finance are vital. Robust partnerships with host nation services and allied foreign governments have enabled us to share burdens and draw from their specialized knowledge, relationships, and capabilities to degrade terrorist infrastructure in Syria and Afghanistan. Maintaining these alliances will sustain counterterrorism pressure and would enable us to provide a rapid contingency response in the event of a terrorism-related crisis. Our national CT strategy recognizes that the United States faces more geographically-diverse and adaptive terrorist groups, underscoring the continued need to stay ahead of the enemy through technological innovation and investments in our workforce to increase their skills and capabilities. NCTC's role in monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of our strategic counterterrorism efforts, chartered in legislation and executive order, also positions us as an "honest broker" to help inform interagency decisions to prioritize U.S. government actions and priorities against terrorists who possess the intent and capability to attack the Homeland and our overseas interests.

6. What is the state of al-Qaida and ISIS? Do you see any danger of a resurgence as the US has drawn down in Syria and as we are drawing down in Afghanistan?

Response: Al Qaeda and ISIS are in trouble. Their combat capabilities are severely diminished, their ability to project power is limited, and their doctrine and approaches have proven inept. However, both groups retain the intent and desire to attack U.S. interests and kill Americans to gain adherents and resources. Both groups still have the ability to generate plotting and external operations capabilities in secrecy, although I don't believe they are currently able to conduct a strategically-significant attack. If pressure is maintained through our integrated campaign, I'm hopeful that we are on the verge of transitioning to a partner-led, U.S.-enabled approach with the goal of rendering them a local actor no longer capable of attacking the United States.

While the caliphate has, for practical purposes, been defeated, ISIS remains intact as a centrally-led organization that will continue to threaten U.S. and Western interests globally. Over the past year, the group suffered a series of setbacks, most notably the death of its former leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, ISIS's structure and cohesion probably has allowed it and its thousands of fighters to sustain a level of influence in some areas despite ongoing CT pressure. We also must recognize the challenge we will face long-term from the thousands of foreign fighters imprisoned in Syria by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – this “foreign fighter issue” is orders of magnitude greater than that resulting from the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s.

For its part, al Qaeda continues to function as a global network committed to attacking U.S. and Western interests with varying degrees of capability and access. International cooperation to strengthen security and disrupt, degrade, and dismantle the group have helped constrain the group's ability to plan and execute plots. Over the past year, al Qaeda also suffered a series of major setbacks, including the removal of three affiliate emirs. However, the group's affiliates and allies remain an enduring threat to the United States. For example, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility for the shooting in Pensacola, Florida in December 2019, and in April, the FBI confirmed AQAP's ties to the attacker.

I believe ISIS and al Qaeda will use any long-term lapses in pressure to strengthen their networks, rebuild their ranks, and restart external operations plotting. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS remains committed to its long-term goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate. If pressure from pro-regime forces or other opposition groups escalate in northwest Syria, al Qaeda elements could move to other spaces in Africa and Asia they perceive as safer operation environments. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is probably incapable of conducting independent complex attacks because U.S. CT pressure since 2001 has depleted its ranks and facilitation infrastructure. However, the remaining membership and leaders continue to encourage attacks and have transnational goals beyond Afghanistan. The group's elements in Afghanistan may seek to exploit potential lapses in pressure there to advance their goals and encourage attacks in country.

- When the United States withdrew most of its military forces from Syria, did this create an opening for ISIS and other terrorist groups to bounce back?

Response: No. We have maintained effective CT pressure, unilaterally and with partners, that has not allowed ISIS to mass in any meaningful way. The "Defeat-ISIS" campaign that includes over 80 members is designed for U.S. forces to withdraw during this phase and for other coalition members to assume lead for recovery and rebuilding. Although ISIS has maintained a steady pace of operations in Syria over the past year, which have been concentrated in Kurdish-held areas as well as some larger-scale attacks against Syrian regime forces in the eastern desert, their efforts have been of an insurgent nature. The group's networks in eastern Syria face continued pressure from the SDF, who work with the International Coalition to conduct raids to clear local ISIS cells and arrest their members. The group has lost a number of key senior leaders in the last year, particularly in Syria, which may prevent it from rapidly advancing its operational momentum there.

- What happened to the thousands of ISIS detainees held by Kurdish forces in northern Syria? Given U.S. forces' withdrawal, are we able to track their whereabouts or even if they are still in custody, especially given the Turkish focus on fighting the Kurdish forces in northern Syria (YPG), not ISIS?

Response: I have seen estimates indicating Syrian Kurdish Security Forces are detaining thousands of ISIS fighters, some of whom are ISIS foreign fighters from more than 50 countries, as well as Syria and Iraq. To date, the United States has assisted the SDF in negotiating the repatriation of a small number of these fighters. There are also reports that a smaller number of ISIS members escaped from prisons affected by Turkish military activity during the Turkish incursion in October 2019. Although we lack details on their current statuses and whereabouts, the vast majority of the imprisoned ISIS fighters being held have been biometrically enrolled in international databases.

- Turkish and Russian forces have filled the gap in the region after the US withdrawal: are they as focused on CT and fighting ISIS or is this a lower priority for these countries?

Response: As a general rule, the strategic priorities of other foreign governments, especially Turkey and Russia, do not necessarily align with U.S. CT objectives. My sense is that they likely give greater priority to preserving the regime in Syria, or countering perceived Kurdish separatism, for example. That said, there are likely some situations where it may be in Russia's and Turkey's best interests to support the Syrian regime's CT operations. For example, it may be that Russia may support Syrian CT efforts where they are aimed at reducing the group's facilitation activities and insurgent operations against pro-regime military targets. This is probably likely less of a priority for Turkey. ISIS operates in areas of Syria controlled by Turkish forces and Turkish-supported opposition, where the group benefits from Turkey's focus on cementing its influence against the regime in the northwest and countering the Kurds in the northeast.

7. In April 2019, the administration designated Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) – the first time any such government entity has been so designated.

- Is it NCTC's responsibility to now track and provide analysis on the IRGC, and should it be provided with the resources to do so? From where would these resources be taken? Against which other priorities / terrorist groups should NCTC reduce resources if extra resources are not appropriated by Congress?

Response: As I stated in response to Question 28 in the pre-hearing questionnaire, designation as a terrorist organization may require NCTC to allocate analytic resources to identify and watchlist terrorists and those who provide material support, analyze changing and emerging threats from the organization, and provide IC coordinated assessments-prioritizing threats to the Homeland using all-source intelligence analysis and our unique access to terrorism data.

I am aware that following the FTO designation of the IRGC, NCTC performed analysis of Iran's terrorism-related activities as it had previously with respect to IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), while continuing to appropriately defer to IC partners for broader coverage of Iranian activities. My understanding is NCTC has so far been able to address this emerging requirement within the limits of its authorized and appropriated resource levels. If confirmed, I would take a closer look at how NCTC allocates resources against the full spectrum of CT intelligence requirements, and if necessary, work through the budgeting and programming process to advocate for additional resources.

- Is there any difference in how NCTC should approach analysis of non-state terrorist groups like al-Qaida or ISIS and the IRGC, which is part of a government?

Response: In my view, this is an area where the IC must set clear lanes in the road to avoid unnecessary analytic duplication. NCTC must continue to closely coordinate with IC elements covering state actors to ensure a logical and mutually understood delineation of responsibility that takes into account the capacity in which a designated group is acting. For example, if a designated state actor were to act as a sponsor, facilitator, or ally to other terrorist groups and proxies, those activities would be of direct concern to NCTC's mission and responsibilities.

8. In May, the President said that United States would designate "Antifa" as a terrorist organization, even though none of those charged with serious federal crimes stemming from recent protests have been linked to Antifa. FBI Director Wray told the Judiciary Committee last month that the FBI "considers Antifa more of an ideology than an organization." Given that Antifa is not an actual organized group, how would such a terrorism designation work? Has this designation been made? Is there a plan to do so?

Response: It is my understanding that NCTC provides analytic support as appropriate to the Department of State and the policy community to inform determinations on whether or not an entity is designated, but I would respectfully defer to the agencies with that designation authority to describe the process by which such a designation may occur.

From Senator Bennet:

1. We are approaching 20 years since the attacks on 9/11. How have terrorist threats have evolved since the conception of NCTC? Based on your experience, does NCTC need to evolve to meet those threats and keep Americans safe?

Response: As I stated in my response to Question Seven of the pre-hearing questionnaire, I believe the terrorism threat we face has evolved significantly since NCTC's establishment. Today, the reduced capacity of many prominent terrorist groups and resurgence of threats from prominent state actors is causing many in national security circles to reexamine national security priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure that NCTC serves as an honest broker in responsibly coordinating the CT enterprise's shift to support a national security strategy that focuses on meeting the challenges of state competitors while maintaining the ability to protect the American homeland and people from terrorist threats.

The war against Islamist fundamentalist terrorist groups, which NCTC was structured to lead since its creation, is indeed a generational struggle – but it is not a multi-generational one. I believe we are nearing the end of that generation. My goal is to finish that fight and help NCTC translate the remarkable tradecraft, process improvements, and coordination procedures into a model the U.S. government can use to effectively counter other transnational security threats. For the United States to be truly successful in eliminating terrorist threats to the American way of life, NCTC must evolve to fit the size and scale of its new and enduring CT mission.

However, if the threat of terrorism to the United States and our interests at home and abroad remains elevated, NCTC must further solidify its position as the leader and integrator of the national CT effort, with sustained focus on achievements in recruiting and retaining personnel, developing partnerships, and the “big data” arena that could be applied across other mission areas. NCTC must also continue to play a central coordinating role in ensuring that the efforts of the CT enterprise support and are informed by broader national security and foreign policy aims.

If confirmed, I intend to assess our progress against the threat landscape and foster a robust and substantive discussion about how to apply lessons learned to the new threats we face today.

2. How do you view other transnational challenges, such as international white supremacist extremists or violent extremist organizations? What type of coordination with domestic law enforcement may be required on these threats?

Response: I believe transnational security challenges pose a growing CT threat to the United States and our interests. By statute, NCTC serves as the primary organization for analyzing all CT information, except CT information that is exclusively domestic. My understanding is that NCTC identifies and monitors international and transnational trends across a range of violent extremist actors, including those motivated by racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (RMVE), and works closely with relevant counterparts to address these threats.

Domestically, NCTC can provide appropriate support to the FBI and DHS consistent with legal authorities and its Attorney General-approved guidelines for protecting the

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of U.S. persons. As the hub for U.S. Government CT information, NCTC is uniquely positioned to identify links to international terrorism previously unknown to FBI or DHS by leveraging its extensive data holdings to identify transnational connectivity between domestic terrorism actors that FBI or DHS have identified and terrorist actors overseas. NCTC provides intelligence information based on those relevant requirements to FBI and DHS in support of their counterterrorism investigatory and operational responsibilities. Also, NCTC, jointly with FBI and DHS, produces unclassified and "For Official Use Only" counterterrorism intelligence and information for state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement entities for dissemination through FBI and DHS distribution channels.

3. Based on your experience, do we need to invest in analysis of how methods of radicalization may be passed between extremist organizations?

Response: Yes. This, in my view, is precisely the type of strategic analysis and thinking that the NCTC is designed and chartered to undertake within the Directorate of Strategic and Operational Planning. Understanding radicalization is critical to mitigating the overarching terrorist threat over the long term. The CT community has spent years seeking further understanding of the extremist mindset and radicalization processes of Sunni violent extremists who join, support, or are inspired by groups like al Qaeda, ISIS and others. I understand NCTC is currently working to compare radicalization processes across violent extremist ideologies. I believe this kind of research can help us gain better insight into what drives individuals' decisions to radicalize and hopefully inform strategies for intervention. If confirmed, I would work to apply lessons learned into NCTC's analytic tradecraft and share the results of our analysis with CT partners better positioned to identify and mitigate pre-radicalization activity.

4. Based on your experience, how important are allies in confronting terrorist threats?

Response: As I stated in response to Question 39 of the pre-hearing policy questionnaire, my experience fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq and supporting partners worldwide validated for me Churchill's aphorism, "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them." Foreign partner relationships are crucial to our shared success against terrorism. Working with global partners and allies, I believe the CT community has made tremendous progress in our ability to detect and disrupt multi-actor, sophisticated terrorist attacks. NCTC must work closely with foreign CT partners to improve information sharing and to assist in capacity building.

In my experience, throughout the CT community, our international counterterrorism partnerships are vital to achieving our counterterrorism goals. To this end, we should remain committed to helping partners develop the capacity and willpower to pursue our shared objectives.

In particular, our efforts can help professionalize the military, intelligence, law enforcement, and judicial systems of key partners so they are able to effectively counter terrorists. We expect significant contributions from our foreign partners so that they appropriately share the burden of the CT effort. To get ahead of the terrorism problem, we must continue to empower stakeholders to build prevention architectures to thwart the appeal of terrorism. In concert with our partners, we will apply sustained pressure to disrupt, degrade, and prevent the reconstitution of terrorist networks. If confirmed, this will be one of my major emphasis areas.

From Senator Wyden:

1. Do you believe NCTC has any role to play, coordinating with or supporting the Departments of Homeland Security or Justice, in connection with protests against racism and police abuses? If yes, please elaborate.

Response: By statute, NCTC serves as the primary U.S. Government organization for analyzing and integrating all counterterrorism information, except counterterrorism information that is exclusively domestic. Generally, NCTC can provide appropriate support to the FBI and DHS in the conduct of their domestic counterterrorism missions, consistent with its legal authorities and Attorney General-approved guidelines for protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of U.S. persons, as I noted in further detail in response to Senator Bennet's Question Two. I do not believe any intelligence authorities can or should be used to surveil Americans engaged solely in constitutionally-protected activities.

2. Which IC entities have been the most supportive of the NCTC in terms of providing detailees and assignees, and which have been the least supportive?

Response: So far, I have not been intimately involved in manning discussions with NCTC's mission partners, and I do not have insight at an agency-by-agency level of detailee staffing commitments. If confirmed, I commit to working collaboratively with my counterparts at the committing agencies on this issue.

3. Do you believe that agreements from IC entities to provide detailees and assignees to NCTC should be enforced? If so, how and by whom?

Response: In general, I believe agencies should strive to honor commitments made to each other as it relates to detailee staffing agreements. It is my understanding that there are ongoing discussions between NCTC and its partner organizations on how to ensure NCTC's mission critical detailee billets are staffed. As the Committee is aware, NCTC's partner organizations also face resource challenges and emerging priority requirements. I am committed to working with them to take their own resource concerns into account while ensuring that NCTC fulfills its statutory mandate.

4. In your responses to pre-hearing questions, you wrote that “NCTC also provides support to FBI and DHS on purely domestic terrorism issues when assistance is requested.” In terms of resource allocation, how should NCTC prioritize its responses to these requests? Specifically, what do you see as the primary “domestic terrorism” threats against which NCTC resources should be applied?

Response: NCTC leverages its unique access to foreign and domestic terrorism information to identify the nature of and origin of emerging threats as they occur. My understanding is that NCTC provides domestic counterterrorism assistance to FBI and DHS consistent with NCTC’s authorities, commensurate with the threat to the homeland, and in line with the President’s overall national intelligence and counterterrorism priorities. As the lead agencies responsible for domestic counterterrorism, my understanding is that FBI and DHS set the priorities and that FBI considers racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (RMVE) a national threat priority.

From Senator King:

1. Over the last several years, the IC has been moving away from the kind of counterterrorism posture we were on since 9/11. This is a measure of the success of the CT community, including NCTC. This means that resources are flowing away from the CT mission as we move to focus more on great power competition with Russia and China.
 - What will you prioritize in an era of shrinking resources, while ensuring that we still do all we can to detect and prevent terrorist plots?

Response: If confirmed, I will maintain a laser-like focus on those individuals, groups, and organizations that have displayed the intent to conduct strategically-significant attacks against U.S. citizens and infrastructure. As noted previously, we remain a target of a plethora of creative and adaptive antagonists that mean us harm and, despite our best efforts, their attacks will sometimes be successful. But the American people have proven remarkably resilient and understand the nature of the threat. Put colloquially, the enemy has “thrown the kitchen sink” at us, and we have withstood their attacks and responded with a fury that they did not imagine we were capable of that has eliminated their sanctuaries and disaggregated their fighting formations. However, they remain virulent and we must maintain specific, unrelenting focus on their efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.

As I stated in response to Question Seven of the pre-hearing questionnaire, NCTC must continue to prioritize its people, its partnerships, information sharing, and data management. If confirmed, I will seek to build on the successes of my predecessors in each of these foundational areas to evolve and improve the Center’s capacity to accomplish mission objectives.

NCTC's ability to succeed in its mission goals correlates directly to its ability to continue recruiting and retaining the best and the brightest. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on recruiting qualified individuals, from within both the IC and the private sector. I will also ensure the NCTC management team seeks new ways to help our existing workforce grow, develop, and continue contributing to our nation's CT efforts.

Next, I've been impressed with NCTC's robust partnerships with foreign partners as well as state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners. If we are to sustain gains made over the past 16 years reducing the threat of terrorism to the United States and our interests, we must not lose sight of the importance of CT partner relationships, both at home and abroad. NCTC alone cannot eradicate terrorist threats, and if confirmed, I would seek to build on the success of my predecessors by seeking additional ways to deepen relationships and collaborate with key CT partners and stakeholders.

Although NCTC has matured greatly and largely embraced its position as a recognized leader in our nation's CT efforts, we in the CT community continue to face new and difficult challenges. In today's information age, complex data management and technical challenges make information analysis and sharing increasingly difficult. The collection, use, and management of new types and greater quantities of data remains a challenge across the federal government - and NCTC is no exception. NCTC's watchlisting, screening, and all-source analytic efforts rely on modern, cutting-edge tools and clear, consistent data management policies to keep pace with the evolving terrorist threats of today. If confirmed, I would work to ensure NCTC retains a cadre of highly-skilled, technology-focused professionals like data scientists, who can help bring valuable knowledge about the challenges of rapidly evolving technology and its impact on our ability to analyze and manage CT data.

More broadly, it is important to note that the terrorism threat we face has evolved significantly since NCTC's establishment. Today, the reduced capacity of many prominent terrorist groups and resurgence of threats from prominent state actors is causing many in national security circles to reexamine national security priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure that NCTC serves as an honest broker in responsibly coordinating the CT enterprise's shift to support a national security strategy that focuses on meeting the challenges of state competitors while maintaining the ability to protect the American homeland and people from terrorist threats.

- What is the state of AQ and ISIS... do you see any danger of an unexpected resurgence as the US has drawn down in Syria and as we are drawing down in Afghanistan?

Response: Please see my responses above to Vice Chairman Warner's Question Six.

- How do we keep our intelligence edge with a more limited forward presence?

Response: Please see my response above to Vice Chairman Warner's Question Five.