

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Ms. Susan Gordon upon her nomination to be
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence**

Responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 1: Please explain your understanding of the responsibility of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) in the following capacities:

- a. To assist the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in carrying out the DNI's duties and responsibilities; and
- b. To act in the DNI's place in the DNI's absence.

The PDDNI is statutorily required to assist the DNI in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the DNI, and to act for, and to exercise his/her powers in the event of an absence or disability. In practice, the PDDNI also executes the day-to-day management of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as it engages in its Intelligence Community (IC) oversight and support functions. These include reinforcing the DNI's priorities and executing his vision for the ODNI and the IC as a whole.

QUESTION 2: Is your understanding that you and the DNI will divide responsibilities and that you will have a specific portfolio as PDDNI? If so, please describe this portfolio as you understand it. If not, please describe what you believe your primary responsibilities and activities will be, and on what areas you will concentrate.

In addition to responsibilities of the PDDNI outlined in statute, regulation, and policy, I understand from DNI Coats that if I am confirmed, I will help him lead a broad overview of the roles and missions that have been assigned to the ODNI since its creation in 2004 to ensure they are well aligned to mission, and that they are best conducted by the ODNI. I also will engage the IC elements to ensure we have the policies, processes, and structures in place that best support the innovation and calculated risk taking that is necessary to keep our edge across the various IC disciplines.

Given my background in technical and collection activities, I expect to use my expertise to appropriately help advance these activities. With the myriad threats facing the nation that have their basis in cyber activities, technical exploitation, and big data sets – to name just a few – I will also bring my years of experience to bear on these challenging issues so the Community can successfully move forward.

QUESTION 3: What do you expect to be your specific management responsibilities within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? Is it your understanding that anyone will report to you directly, if you are confirmed?

If confirmed, I anticipate placing a strong focus on managing and leading the ODNI workforce as a whole. In my experience, I have found that the ODNI workforce is dedicated to the defense of the nation, and to best supporting the most effective integration of the IC. If confirmed at PDDNI, my focus will be to ensure they have the tools, resources, policies, and structures in place that will support them as they strive for excellence and that the focus of their efforts is appropriately placed. Under the current organizational structure, the Assistant Directors for National Intelligence, as well as the various component heads, report to the PDDNI.

QUESTION 4: What will your role and responsibilities be in relation to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Information Integration (DDNI/II) and the officials who report to him?

If confirmed, I would oversee the ODNI staff and their interactions with the other 16 IC elements. The DDNI/II is responsible for the integration of intelligence across the IC while the PDDNI is responsible for creating the environment that allows this to happen and for ensuring the adequate and appropriate resources, policies, infrastructure, and process to maximize intelligence integration.

QUESTION 5: Please explain your understanding of the role of the DNI in overseeing elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) that reside within various departments of the federal government and for elements that are not housed within other departments.

As Director Coats stated in his confirmation, the DNI serves as the "head coach" of the intelligence community, coordinating the efforts across the various IC elements. I think this approach makes good sense. Having served in multiple agencies in the IC, I understand that the strength of the IC is with the line organizations, and if confirmed as PDDNI, my responsibility would be to enable their mission success while driving a more integrated community. The ODNI can be a force multiplier in providing the most integrated intelligence that results from strong and innovative IC elements.

If confirmed, I will ensure the perspectives and expertise of the IC elements are consistently considered and integrated, especially at the moment of decision-making.

QUESTION 6: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)? What is your understanding of these issues?

It is my strong belief that the true strength of the IC is with the many talented and varied elements who execute the mission with professionalism and an eye toward excellence every

day. The CIA is a foundational member of the IC, and has been granted special authorities and capabilities by the Congress and the President in support of its unique responsibilities. Although the Director of the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence, in practice it is more of a partnership, and one that continues to strengthen every day. As ODNI does with other IC elements, I expect it would partner with the Agency to enable its mission success. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that ODNI's oversight of the CIA is appropriately exercised as required by statute, and allows for the Agency's continued success.

QUESTION 7: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing intelligence elements of the Department of Defense (DoD)? What is your understanding of these issues?

The ODNI provides the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance on IC priorities to inform the DoD's budgetary decisions as they relate to the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), to ensure unity of effort and an integrated approach to meeting IC needs. As it relates to acquisitions, the DNI serves as the milestone decision authority if NIP equities are involved, ensuring IC and DoD intelligence systems are complementary.

On a more personal level, as the Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency I was part of the leadership of a combat support agency and consequently recognize the criticality of providing timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to the warfighter. I have seen first-hand how processes such as data availability, information security and classification can impact access and usability for the warfighters, and recognize that a balance is both necessary and achievable. I also believe the intelligence obtained by tactical DoD elements makes strategic intelligence more accurate and richer in overall detail. The ODNI works in partnership with the DoD as they collectively oversee the NRO, NGA, NSA, DIA and the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to enable their mission success and ensure that the intelligence necessary for mission success is accessible to the warfighter.

QUESTION 8: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing intelligence elements of other departments of the United States Government? What is your understanding of these issues?

Over the past five years, I have observed the IC elements become increasingly integrated in a way that facilitates mission effectiveness and allows operational efficiency. The integration of information from critically important agencies, such as the FBI and DHS, has significantly improved the quality and breadth of the IC's strategic intelligence. At the same time, other

non-Title 50 agencies are making significant strides in both improving their access to IC products, as well as providing unique insights to IC problem sets and threat indicators.

In practice, the ODNI's oversight of intelligence elements in other U.S. government departments requires a coordinated approach to ensure priorities are aligned. Having come from NGA, I understand first-hand what it is like to serve Cabinet-level principals, and if confirmed, I will take that perspective with me into the position as PDDNI to ensure that the joint oversight construct enables mission.

QUESTION 9: Do you believe additional legislation is needed to clarify or strengthen the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the IC?

At this time, I do not believe that additional legislation is needed to strengthen the authorities of the DNI. However, as we look towards the future, we may need to reexamine the legal and policy structures the Intelligence Community operate under to ensure the Intelligence Community remains agile as we respond both together and as individual elements to new and emerging threats in a timeframe demanded by the pace of change. As a career intelligence officer, I have seen firsthand the success the ODNI has had working with and supporting the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will work to build upon these successes and help position the Intelligence Community for the future.

Keeping the Congressional Intelligence Committees Fully and Currently Informed

QUESTION 10: Please explain your understanding of the DNI's obligations under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947.

Title V of the National Security Act sets forth requirements to keep Congress informed of Intelligence Community activities. Specifically, Section 502 requires the DNI and the heads of all departments and agencies involved in intelligence activities to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, including significant anticipated intelligence activities and any significant intelligence failures.

Section 503 requires that the congressional intelligence committees be kept currently and fully informed of all covert action programs. In extraordinary circumstances, notification of a covert actions may be limited, consistent with the need to protect national security.

QUESTION 11: Does the PDDNI have any responsibilities to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in

intelligence activities in general, and covert action in particular, comply with the reporting requirements in Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947?

The PDDNI, like all ODNI employees, assists the DNI in carrying out his statutory authorities under the National Security Act, which includes ensuring compliance by the Intelligence Community elements with the Constitution and laws of the United States. If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in the critical responsibility of ensuring that all IC elements are in full compliance with the law, including Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act.

QUESTION 12: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe notification should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees?

Under the law, congressional notifications must be made with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence sources and methods and other exceptionally sensitive matters. This is not a limit on whether the intelligence committees must be kept informed about intelligence activities; rather, it simply provides flexibility on how and when to bring extremely sensitive matters to the full committees' attention.

Section 503 permits the President to temporarily limit access to a Covert Action finding or notification to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the U.S. I believe limited notifications should be rare and should be done only in exceptional circumstances.

National Security Threats

QUESTION 13: What do you view as the principal threats to national security with which the IC must concern itself in the coming years? Please explain the basis for your views.

In the next several years, threats will likely continue to come from a variety of sources, including nation state actors, cyber, terrorism, and humanitarian crises.

Nation State Actors

Key nation states continue to pursue agendas that pose substantial risks to U.S. interests. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran all remain a concern, as does the situation in the Middle East. Each creates unique challenges and must continue to be examined closely by the IC to inform decisions facing the administration.

China will continue to pursue an active foreign policy—especially in the Asia Pacific region—highlighted by a firm stance on competing territorial claims in the East China Sea and South

China Sea, relations with Taiwan, and its pursuit of economic engagement across East Asia.

In 2017, Russia is likely to be more assertive in global affairs, more unpredictable in its approach to the United States, and more authoritarian in its approach to domestic politics. Emboldened by Moscow's ability to affect battlefield dynamics in Syria and by the emergence of populist and more pro-Russian governments in Europe, President Vladimir Putin is likely to take proactive actions that advance Russia's great power status.

North Korea's weapons program, public threats, and defiance of the international community, confrontational military posturing, cyber activities, and potential for internal instability pose a complex and increasingly grave national security threat to the U.S. and its interests.

Iran remains an enduring threat to US national interests because of its support to anti-US terrorist groups and militants, the Asad regime, Huthi rebels in Yemen, and its development of advanced military capabilities. Iran's leaders are focused on thwarting US and Israeli influence and countering what they perceive as a Saudi-led effort to fuel Sunni extremism and terrorism against Iran and Shia communities throughout the region.

The Syrian regime, backed by Russia and Iran, will maintain its momentum on the battlefield, but the regime and the opposition are not likely to agree on a political settlement in 2017. Damascus has committed to participate in peace talks but is unlikely to offer more than cosmetic concessions to the opposition.

Cyber

In the cyber realm, our adversaries are becoming more adept at using cyberspace to threaten our interests and advance their own. Despite improving cyber defenses, nearly all information, communication networks, and systems will be at risk for years.

Terrorism

The worldwide threat from terrorism will remain geographically diverse and multifaceted—a continuing challenge for the United States, our allies, and partners who seek to counter it. Sunni violent extremists will continue to embroil conflict zones in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

US-based homegrown violent extremists will remain the most frequent and unpredictable Sunni violent extremist threat to the US homeland.

A joint UN-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons investigation concluded that ISIS used the chemical warfare agent sulfur mustard in an attack in 2015, and reports that it has used chemicals in additional attacks in Iraq and Syria suggest that such CW use continued. We also are concerned about the possibility that terrorists might develop biological warfare capabilities. Since no terrorist group will be able to conduct a nuclear

attack without first acquiring nuclear material, and no group will be able to produce its own nuclear material, the IC should remain vigilant in monitoring foreign nuclear programs for the potential loss or theft of nuclear materials or weapons.

Instability from Humanitarian Crises

Finally, severe humanitarian crises will be fueled by conflict, adverse environmental conditions, and natural disasters. These crises can, in turn, degrade political and economic stability, strain international assistance efforts, and produce significant internal and external migration. We are closely monitoring ongoing humanitarian crises in Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, central Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

QUESTION 14: In your opinion, and based on your experience in the IC, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats?

In general, I believe the IC is making good progress in addressing the dynamic and geographically diffuse threats facing our nation. Over the past five years, I have experienced a more integrated IC, and continue to be encouraged by the progress the IC as a whole continues to make.

For example, in my experiences with the “hard target campaigns” the ODNI and DoD use to focus on specific problems, I see coordinated interagency efforts across resources, plans, policies, and other areas to address complex, emerging threats.

The breadth of threats to the U.S., its allies, and its interests continues to expand; the challenge the IC faces is responding to these threats given the challenge of global coverage in a period of stagnant or declining resources. Nonetheless, our responsibility is to ensure that as a collective, we leverage those resources in the most effective manner.

Management Challenges Facing the Intelligence Community

QUESTION 15: Apart from national security threats discussed in your prior responses, and based on your experience in the IC, what do you consider to be the highest priority management challenges facing the ODNI and the broader IC?

Intelligence is about delivering advantage to the policymaker in support of U.S. national security objectives. The ODNI and the broader IC need to consider threats and problems sets just over the horizon. To do this, we need to encourage and foster innovation.

Throughout my career, I have never accepted as an answer “that is the way we have always done it.” Rather, I regularly take a fresh look at how we do business to assess whether there

are better ways to approach problems through new technology, new partnerships, or streamlined processes.

This willingness to consider changed conditions that might drive different approaches also helps us evaluate whether we are spending our limited resources in the right areas to ensure we are delivering the best intelligence to policymakers. We must continue to do so, while maintaining our current missions, which is not an easy balance to achieve.

Resources in a Challenging Budget Environment

QUESTION 16: Given the Nation's current financial situation, what are your views on the intelligence budget in the short-, medium-, and long-term?

Over the past few years, building the intelligence budget has been a challenging endeavor.

Under a persistent cloud of budget uncertainty, the IC has preserved its core mission, protected our workforce and key capabilities, while taking incremental reductions across the enterprise and making hard choices to eliminate or reduce intelligence capabilities in order to have room to advance the mission.

The recent FY 2018 budget submission represents the first step in a multi-year effort to re-set and strengthen intelligence capabilities and improve readiness. I believe the IC has charted a course that will perpetuate this objective into the future. But make no mistake, without relief from Budget Control Act-mandated levels, long term planning will remain incredibly difficult and we will run the risk that our rate of change will be insufficient to keep up with the growth in mission need or adversarial capability.

QUESTION 17: From your experience as Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and in your multiple positions at CIA, please describe your understanding of the requirements and appropriate practice in obtaining Congressional concurrence for reprogrammings and releases from reserves.

I recognize that the IC can obligate or expend appropriated funds for an intelligence activity only if Congress specifically authorizes those funds for the activity.

The IC Chief Financial Officer is delegated day-to-day responsibility for the review and submission of all reprogramming and transfer actions as specified within the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, in concert with language provided within annual appropriations or intelligence authorization acts.

The IC CFO also issues Reprogramming and Transfer guidelines to all IC Program offices and

has developed a training program for the Program CFO Staff that addresses reprogramming and transfer legal requirements, policies and submission procedures.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

There has been considerable debate in Congress concerning the appropriate size and function of the ODNI. Congress has considered various proposals to address these issues. In answering the questions that follow, please address the ODNI's staff functions and the specific ODNI components.

QUESTION 18: What is your view of the ODNI's size and function?

ODNI has a diverse set of functions and responsibilities. These have evolved since the ODNI's creation over a decade ago, and will likely continue to do so. In my initial review of the Office, I noted that the majority of the workforce is assigned to major mission centers: NCTC, NCPC, NCSC, CTIIC and the Intelligence Integration component (including the National Intelligence Council and the President's Daily Briefing staff). While the organization appears to be efficiently and effectively run, if confirmed, the DNI and I will thoroughly and carefully review each component and continue to seek ways to enhance mission effectiveness and improve efficiency.

QUESTION 19: Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources to carry out its statutory responsibilities effectively?

If confirmed, one of my first responsibilities will be to answer this very question as part of a broader review of the ODNI's roles, missions, and resources.

QUESTION 20: In your view, what are the competing values and interests at issue in determining to what degree there should be a permanent cadre of personnel at the ODNI, or at any of its components, and to what degree the ODNI should utilize detailees from the IC elements?

The mix of cadre and detailees is a function of the need for continuity and expertise over time (cadre), and the desire to avoid of an entrenched cadre bureaucracy (detailees). Additionally, by providing opportunities for joint duty from other IC elements, we allow these officers to understand the mission and value of the ODNI. ODNI also provides opportunities for cadre to go on detail assignments in order to grow and broaden professionally. This provides the best community expertise for key IC jobs that rest solely in ODNI (National Intelligence Officers, National Intelligence Managers, IARPA Program Managers, other subject matter experts).

QUESTION 21: Do you believe that the ODNI is adding sufficient value to justify its large staff and budget? If not, what do you intend to do to reverse that perception?

The DNI and ODNI have a diverse set of responsibilities under law and Executive Order with the majority of the ODNI workforce is assigned to the major mission centers, including the NCTC, NCSC, and NCPC, whose responsibilities are also legislatively mandated. Many of the functions performed by the ODNI are required by statute. While the ODNI appears to be an effective and efficiently run organization, I recognize the ODNI must earn the trust and support of the IC elements every day and must deliver unique value to the nation's security. If confirmed, I will do what I have done for my career and make sure that every investment of America's resources delivers mission outcome.

QUESTION 22: Describe your understanding of the role played by National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) under ODNI's current structure and organization.

NIMs serve as the principal advisor to the DNI and PDDNI on all aspects of intelligence related to their region or function and ensure IC integration and synchronization. They develop community-wide strategies that focus areas and priorities, identifies gaps, and develops initiatives to address these gaps. A key aspect of the NIM role is to ensure there are appropriate resources to address these many needs.

If confirmed, I look forward to learning how we can best balance the IC's limited resources against such needs, and leverage cross-community and cross-discipline solutions.

WikiLeaks and Information Sharing

QUESTION 23: Has information sharing expanded too broadly beyond those with a "need to know"?

No. The IC is always trying to find the right balance between information sharing initiatives and the need to safeguard classified information, and those who betray their oaths of secrecy are the most insidious of adversaries. However, we cannot and should not step backward in terms of information sharing. Instead, we should adopt the "trust, but verify" perspective.

In 2011, the Executive Branch formally established the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), co-chaired by the DNI and the Attorney General, to assist this effort. The NITTF promulgated the "National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs," providing an implementation framework for the departments and agencies to guard against this threat. Since that time, the Executive Branch has made significant progress in implementing this national policy, promoting the deterrence,

detection, and mitigation of compromises to classified information to ensure that we appropriately balance need to know and need to share.

QUESTION 24: What recommendations do you have to ensure that the IC does not curtail information sharing too much as a response to WikiLeaks?

Information sharing must be done in balance with effective safeguarding efforts.

In application, our insider threat programs must take a holistic approach to identifying anomalous activity, contextualizing these events, and coordinating appropriate organizational responses. The end goal is not to catch malicious insiders after the compromise, but rather to proactively engage the workforce in a manner that preempts the compromise of classified information.

However, it is also worth discussing the issue of over classification. Classifying information requires resources to manage, track, store, and archive. The more information we classify, the more resources we consume in the management of this information. We need all IC employees, from the most junior to the most senior, to make deliberate classification decisions.

QUESTION 25: What views and recommendations do you have on implementing audit systems to identify IC employees who misuse their access to information?

IC employees who misuse their access to intelligence information not only violate law and/or policy, they violate the public's trust and degrade the public's confidence in the integrity of the IC as a whole.

Further, with today's technological capability for rapidly moving massive volumes of data from information systems, it is imperative that we have safeguards in place to detect such nefarious activity as close to near real time as possible.

I support the auditing and monitoring user activity programs in place across the IC. These are a critical piece of effective insider threat programs because of the confidence we gain in knowing what is happening to information we share.

Cybersecurity

QUESTION 26: If confirmed, what will your cybersecurity-related responsibilities entail?

Given my history and experience with cyber, from both an operational and management perspective, I expect to play an active role in overseeing cyber related issues including IC policy development, operational considerations, and safeguarding IC systems. I will also be responsible for ODNI's management of threat and asset response for the integrated defense of the IC information environment.

If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in his cyber security responsibilities, and to ensure the ODNI and the entire IC has the resources needed to support intelligence integration related to cyber security.

QUESTION 27: In 2015, President Obama directed the DNI to establish the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) to provide all-source analysis connecting foreign cybersecurity threats to the United States and our national interests, as well as to assist other federal departments and agencies in identifying, investigating, and mitigating these cybersecurity threats.

- A. Are you familiar with the CTIIC?
- B. How well do you believe the CTIIC initiative is being executed?
- C. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTIIC's role vis-à-vis the IC?

I am familiar with the CTIIC. While I was at CIA, I led a study for the Director of CIA that advocated for a community cyber analytic center, so I was very glad when CTIIC was established to provide the integrated analysis in support of situational awareness, cyber event response, and opportunity analysis that the cyber community and policymakers need.

I and others have been impressed by how CTIIC has established its role in a short amount of time (18 months) without going beyond its intended coordination mission. The Center has addressed our long-standing gap of rapidly providing collective situational awareness of the most significant cyber threats we face. They've done this through timely products that translate technical information for a broader audience, highlight the threats that give most cause for concern, and--perhaps most important for those without a technical background—they convey the information in a plain-English way that informs decision-making.

I think it is probably too early recommend changes to CTIIC at this time, although I'm open to the possibility as I review all ODNI entities, if confirmed.

QUESTION 28: What should the ODNI's role be, within the broader IC, to protect United States critical infrastructure and commercial computer networks from foreign cybersecurity threats, as well as from supply chain-related cybersecurity threats?

The IC is responsible for collecting, analyzing, producing and disseminating intelligence on foreign cyber threats and supply chain-related cybersecurity threats. The DNI, through various ODNI offices, leads the IC in generating and integrating information on foreign cyber threats. When threat intelligence supports the needs of critical infrastructure and other private sector entities, this information is made available to federal partners such as DHS, FBI, and USG sector specific agencies for sharing with the private sector.

QUESTION 29: What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with the United States' critical infrastructure managers to enable them to protect their networks from cyber attacks?

The ODNI and the wider IC supports DHS, FBI, and USG sector specific agencies to implement mechanisms for sharing both classified and unclassified cyber threat information with regulators, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure owner/operators, consistent with the need to protect sources and methods, and existing law and regulation.

Our responsibility as an IC is to produce intelligence with ever more fidelity to understand the nature of the threat and to find appropriate ways to make our data and assessments appropriately available.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 30: How do you assess the state of research and development (R&D) activities within the IC?

Because of our R&D investments at both Community and IC element levels, the IC has been able to maintain its technological and intelligence dominance over our adversaries by developing an outstanding set of technical capabilities. However, our adversaries are expending more money and working hard each day to overcome our intelligence advantage. We must pursue bold action in order to sustain our lead into the future and the IC can make more progress in this regard.

I am, however, encouraged by our increasing outreach to the private sector. IARPA, perhaps one of the more visible examples of the IC's R&D effort, has funded research at over 500 organizations, mostly universities and small businesses, to address key IC S&T challenges. Within ODNI, the Assistant Director for Acquisition, Technology, and Facilities formed a partnership with industry that has provided insight into novel and innovative R&D

opportunities. The IC's expanding use of prize challenges and other creative acquisition tools are drawing in non-traditional researchers to help solve our hardest technical challenges. Finally, there are some really ground-breaking activities going on at individual IC elements, like the work NGA is doing in process automation and developing artificial intelligence to help manage geospatial-intelligence collection and processing.

QUESTION 31: What changes, if any, need to be made in the IC regarding R&D?

For the IC to continue to deliver revolutionary capabilities, we need to ensure: (a) that our R&D organizations are properly resourced, (b) that our technology transition and R&D acquisition processes are agile and responsive, and (c) that our R&D strategies of the IC elements are truly forward looking.

We also need to support robust investments in R&D, particularly in classified basic research - both to develop a pipeline of cleared researchers, and to lay the foundation of new science that leads to future intelligence breakthroughs. Finally, we need to be open to disruptive ideas, and create business processes that allow us to be agile and responsive to new challenges and opportunities.

IC Missions and Capabilities

QUESTION 32: Please explain your views of the current quality of the IC's intelligence analysis.

What I saw first-hand at NGA was the quality, scope, and relevant of IC analysis consistently improving. IC elements have also improved in their efforts to incorporate effective visual information, a newly introduced tradecraft standard.

However, the massive and increasing amounts of data pose unique challenges for the IC, and we need to position ourselves to stay ahead of the swell. We must leverage leading edge data analytics, advanced data technologies, and processing speeds because we cannot grow the analytic workforce to meet the exponential growth of data in this digital age. And then we must go further.

QUESTION 33: If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve the IC's intelligence analysis?

The IC must continue to enhance integration of the analytic enterprise and enhance its relationships with other parts of the IC, academia, and the private sector. In particular, the IC must continue its commitment to shared experiences, such as joint duty and joint training,

which will enable trust, build stronger collaborative work practices, and help break down stovepipes. The IC must continue to maintain high standards for the quality and objectivity of analysis.

In my view, the analytic community must become capable “data swimmers”, able to navigate large swaths of data efficiently and effectively, with tools and technology. Our systems must assist them by making the data available and accessible, and the existing infrastructure must support the sharing of that data.

Finally, the IC must invest in future technologies that not only improve our ability to issue timely reports across a vast breadth of issues, but that also take the next step and see beyond the swell and over the horizon, and to better predict future events. The IC needs to be able to both access and assess more data so that our analysis increasingly skews towards anticipating vice reporting.

QUESTION 34: Please explain your views of the current quality of the IC’s intelligence collection.

The IC’s collection performance against a wide variety targets that threaten U.S. interests is robust, and will improve even more with the delivery of new collection systems and platforms over the next several years. However, in the IC, demand continues to outpace supply so effective collection management requires balancing sometimes conflicting requirements and maximizing the varied capabilities of our collection systems to achieve the best possible result for decision-makers.

QUESTION 35: What are your recommendations for improving the quality of the IC’s intelligence collection?

Our adversaries are constantly improving their capabilities to deny us information and we must seek innovative ways to defeat their efforts. To maintain our competitive advantage, the IC must continue to invest and re-invest in its most important collection assets. No one approach will work for the issues we face today.

If confirmed, I will lead the development of innovative collection capabilities, strengthen our abilities to process and assess data, and strengthen the skills of our people who collect information and manage our collection strategies.

And we need to look where industry can help. The explosive growth of the commercial marketplace as it relates to computing power, processing speed, and data collection is driving the government away from government-specific solutions, and it should. We must embrace what is increasingly openly available and address how it can best be accessed and used. The

growth in commercially-available imagery and communications systems are just two such examples, but I am certain there are countless others.

By investing in new technical capabilities, strengthening current critical assets, building the necessary supporting architecture, and leveraging a healthy commercial market, we will position ourselves to tackle current and future challenges.

QUESTION 36: If confirmed, what role would you have with regard to intelligence collection, and what steps would you take to improve the IC's intelligence collection?

If confirmed, I will use my position to better integrate the disparate collection functions, and drive innovation to close intelligence gaps. I will encourage initiatives aimed at improving effectiveness and efficiency, such as cross-agency collection orchestration, and to improve the data available to analysts. I would also advocate for continued partnerships across the government and with the private sector, capitalizing on their unique expertise and R&D investments to seek cost-effective solutions to the IC's most vexing problems.

QUESTION 37: Please explain your views of the IC's use of contractors.

Based on my experience at both CIA and NGA, contractors play an important role in the work we do. In fact, throughout the IC's history, it's worth mentioning that there have been few significant accomplishments without the support of industry or private sector partners.

Contract personnel are part of an integrated team of professionals who bring remarkable, often rare expertise. They support U.S. government personnel in performing mission and mission support activities. They are an excellent source of highly qualified experts, and often provide a level of technical depth not found in government. Additionally, contracting staff can help surge support to tackle and emerging needs as we engage in the slower (but necessary) process of workforce transformation.

QUESTION 38: In your view, has the IC achieved a proper balance of government and contractor personnel? Please explain the basis for your response.

I believe the crucial operating principle here is how well the government directs and oversees contractors. To do this effectively, it requires a government staff able to ensure contractors meet their contractual obligations in an ethical manner. We must have remarkable skill and capability in our government cadre; everything starts with this.

The lifting of the civilian personnel position caps in the FY17 Intelligence Authorization Act will allow for a consistent approach to strategic workforce planning and budget alignment

across the IC. If confirmed, I would support Director Coats' commitment to find the right balance of contractors and to uphold his long interest to find the best value for the taxpayer's dollars.

QUESTION 39: In your view, are there some functions that contractors should not conduct, or for which the IC's use of contractors should be discouraged or require additional approvals, including by the DNI? Please describe the basis for your response.

Yes, contractors should not perform inherently governmental functions, such as making decisions on how we use or allocate resources, conduct monetary transactions or prioritize work. Further, contractors should not be the driver for more or new work. I have believed and acted on this foundational principle throughout my career.

QUESTION 40: If confirmed, would you recommend changes to the security clearance process regarding IC contractors and/or Federal employees?

If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for the ongoing modernization efforts of the security clearance process with regard to the entire federal workforce – to include contractors, government civilians, and military personnel.

I would specifically want to focus on improving the oversight and management of the workforce security clearance process – both contractor and Federal employee – emphasizing standardization and consistency in application to address any gaps that impact an individual's eligibility for access to classified information. I also want to ensure the IC establishes processes that effectively and prudently enable the movement of these cleared national security professionals between the private/public communities, something increasingly commonplace in today's IC careerists.

QUESTION 41: Please explain what your responsibilities would be, if confirmed, in making decisions or recommendations concerning IC officials' accountability with respect to matters of serious misconduct.

The PDDNI assists the DNI in carrying out his statutory responsibility to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by elements of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I would work with the DNI to ensure that IC elements promptly, objectively, and completely investigate any allegation that an IC official engaged in serious misconduct. These investigations might be conducted by the IC element, the applicable Inspector General, or the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community.

Although IC elements, and in turn their overarching Department or Agency, are principally responsible for addressing allegations of misconduct, I expect that IC element heads will take appropriate disciplinary actions when warranted. If I believe an IC element has failed to take appropriate action in response to allegation or evidence of misconduct, it would be my duty, if I am confirmed, to raise the issue with the DNI and, if appropriate, recommend an accountability review.

QUESTION 42: Please explain your responsibilities, if confirmed, to ensure that performance and rewards systems across the IC agencies are fair and equitable.

Rewarding employees for high performance and exceptional professionalism is a core function for leadership. Research suggests that the right rewards and recognition are important motivators and reinforce behaviors that lead to higher performance. More simply, you value what you reward. Doing this in a fair and equitable manner is of the utmost importance.

The IC is always looking for ways to influence performance and to drive the behaviors that will make us successful. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief Human Capital Officer to ensure we are approaching the rewards process in an effective, fair, and equitable manner across the enterprise and supportive of our values and missions.

Financial Management and Infrastructure

QUESTION 43: If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in reviewing business system investments in the IC?

Each IC element has business systems in place to ensure the smooth functioning of routine administrative functions; some of these systems have been in place for decades and may no longer be responsive to current mission or operating conditions. I would expect that the IC's movement to a common Information Technology Enterprise would enhance the IC's ability to integrate some of these systems to find economies of scale, and I would look to encourage that wherever possible.

QUESTION 44: What responsibilities have you had at the NGA for producing financial statements?

As the Deputy Director at NGA, I had primary responsibility for senior engagement with our independent auditors to ensure organizational responsiveness, understand progress and remove impediments to the goal of a clean audit. Additionally, through my Enterprise

Oversight Counsel (effectively and accountability board), I reviewed regularly the goals and plans to achieve objectives, overcome deficiencies, and drive progress.

During my tenure, we made significant, steady progress toward auditability and a clean audit. Moreover, I believe I put into place a culture and process that will make a clean audit a reality in the foreseeable future.

Acquisitions

QUESTION 45: What is your assessment of the IC's current acquisitions capability?

Intelligence Community Major System Acquisitions (MSAs) are generally achieving affordable and timely capability deliveries. This year's assessment of IC MSA progress reveals the IC's continued ability to meet or exceed IC-wide cost, schedule and performance threshold goals.

Since the creation of the ODNI, the IC has shown improvements in reducing development timelines, and so I believe the ODNI acquisition policies have had a positive impact on acquisitions.

However, these successes do not mean that there is no room for further improvements – in fact, the potential to facilitate technology insertion and acquisition streamlining across the IC Agencies and within ODNI processes, provides potential efficiency improvements in the delivery of enhanced mission.

If confirmed, I would propose to the DNI a review of our current acquisition policies and practices to determine if we can introduce even more agility and innovation into our acquisition programs without introducing unacceptable mission, budget or schedule risk.

QUESTION 46: Do you believe the space industrial base specifically, and the intelligence industrial base more generally, are capable of producing the number of complex systems the IC and the DoD demand of them on time and within budget?

I believe the space and intelligence industrial base is sufficiently capable of producing the systems required of the IC. We have witnessed this through our recent success in major systems acquisitions. All of our current major space acquisitions are executing within cost and on schedule. Additionally, as we go forward with future acquisitions, we are able to compete among multiple prime vendors and are not bound to sole-source contracts.

Competition and the industrial base must be key considerations as we develop acquisition strategies and conduct milestone review for our major programs. As just one example, recent growth of the commercial space industry has improved the industrial base as some

companies are no longer reliant on the U.S. government as the sole or major source of revenue.

Department of Defense

QUESTION 47: Please explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of national and tactical consumers, specifically between establishing a unified intelligence effort that includes DoD intelligence elements with the continuing requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military commanders.

The need to balance national and tactical consumer requirements is crucial when national requirements related to long-term issues can quickly become a near-term crisis. The IC should not focus on just one or the other but ensure there is strategic planning that can be flexible enough to warn and respond to emerging threats, crises, and opportunities. Joint intelligence efforts between the IC and DoD are valuable in achieving such a balance.

The key is to always focus on needs and then to consider satisfaction of those needs across the whole spectrum of available capabilities (from IC to DoD, commercial to clandestine, overhead to ground), and not just within each individual system. It requires a “system of systems” approach.

QUESTION 48: What concerns do you have, if any, as to the IC’s ability to support war zones while still retaining its full capabilities to conduct missions outside of war zones?

Over time, the IC has largely been able to adjust and balance its analytic and collection resources to cover war zone operations and other important intelligence requirements. The IC has accomplished this through better optimization of collection and analytic activities. We’ve sought efficiencies across agencies and worked with foreign and domestic partners to mitigate global coverage risks and ensure our responsiveness to policymakers’ priorities. The IC routinely takes steps to adjust collection and analytic postures to address emerging threats and monitor potential crises. And one of the goals of IT modernization is to allow the reach necessary to provide useful intelligence to even the most disadvantaged user.

However, even in war zones, IC resources do not provide ubiquitous coverage, which results in accounting for some level of risk across all regional areas and cross cutting issues. In some cases, the IC’s enhanced focus in war zones also brings resources into a region that might incidentally enhance our capabilities in adjoining countries/regions.

Covert Action

QUESTION 49: What is your view of the DNI's responsibility to supervise, direct, or control the conduct of covert action by the CIA?

By law, any decision to employ covert action as a tool of national security strategy will be made by the President of the United States. The President has charged the Director of the CIA with the responsibility for supervising, directing, or controlling the conduct of covert action programs. The DNI is responsible to oversee and provide advice to the President and the NSC with respect to ongoing and proposed covert action programs. The DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government keep the Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of covert action activities.

QUESTION 50: Do you believe that any additional authorities are necessary to ensure that covert action programs are lawful, meet the public policy goals of the United States, or for any other purpose?

I do not believe that additional authorities are needed in this area.

QUESTION 51: What in your view is the appropriate role for the CIA Inspector General in auditing covert action programs?

The CIA IG is already charged with reviewing and auditing covert action programs on a regular basis. I support these regular reviews.

QUESTION 52: If confirmed, what role will you have regarding covert actions?

If confirmed, I will assist the DNI with his responsibilities as discussed, including ensuring that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed as required by law.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

QUESTION 53: Please describe the IC's efforts to protect privacy and civil liberties, and what, if any, challenges face the IC in these areas.

Throughout my career in the Intelligence Community, I have experienced first-hand the IC's commitment to protecting privacy and civil liberties as it carries out its national security mission. We understand that our success in protecting the nation depends on our having the

public's trust. This means that the IC must ensure that its intelligence activities comply with legal safeguards, and that we do all we can to support effective oversight.

For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is a vitally important statute that enables the IC to obtain critical foreign intelligence in a manner that protects civil liberties and privacy. The IC rigorously implements its requirements under the careful oversight of Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Earning the public's trust requires not only that we follow applicable rules and that we support effective oversight, but that we also provide appropriate transparency to the public. During my time at NGA, we took a leadership role in promoting transparency to the extent possible while continuing to protect national security. It is challenging to both enhance intelligence transparency and protect sources and methods, but this is a challenge that we must continue to proactively address.

The rapid pace of technological change in our increasingly data-driven world will also pose challenges for the IC. We must find ways to innovate while also remaining mindful of the privacy and civil liberties implications posed by these changes. I am confident that the IC will continue to succeed in navigating these challenges so that we can both protect the nation's security and civil liberties and privacy of its people.

QUESTION 54: Section 102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that “[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the intelligence community through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.” What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?

It is critical that all Intelligence Community activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Of particular importance is respecting and protecting the Constitutional rights of our citizens. To that end, the Intelligence Community must always act in a manner that respects the rights and freedoms of our citizens, including protecting with vigor the First and Fourth Amendments. The Intelligence Community must act in compliance with the laws of the land, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the National Security Act, the Privacy Act, and Freedom of Information Act.

QUESTION 55: What methods, and through what officials, should the DNI use to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws, including, but not limited to, the

Office of the General Counsel, the ODNI Inspector General, and the Civil Liberties Protection Officers?

I am personally committed to working to ensure all elements of the Intelligence Community comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States. I expect the same of every employee in the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I would expect to work together with, and rely on, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, the Equal Employment Office, and the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community.

Expiring Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provisions

QUESTION 56: What is your view with respect to reauthorizing Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provisions that expire on December 31, 2017, and, specifically, whether any of the provisions should be revised?

Section 702 of FISA has produced and continues to produce significant intelligence that is vital to protect the nation against international terrorism, cyber threats, weapons proliferators, and other threats. At the same time, Section 702 provides strong protections for the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens. Recent public testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary discuss in more detail both the value and importance of this authority. To that end, reauthorization of Section 702 is the Intelligence Community's top legislative priority.

Potential Politicization of Intelligence

QUESTION 57: How do you define the politicizing of intelligence?

Politicization of intelligence is any effort to distort the Intelligence Community's analysis by individuals or groups to support or provide justification for a policy initiative. Politicization of analysis is characterized by assessments that run counter to the information base and contravene IC analytic tradecraft standards. Politicization pressures can originate within a Community element or from external policy-makers or other intelligence consumers.

QUESTION 58: What responsibilities does the PDDNI role entail, relative to ensuring the IC's analysis remains objective and free from political consideration?

If confirmed, one of my most important responsibilities will be to ensure the intelligence the IC provides is timely, objective, and free from politicization. The Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 specifies that the ODNI has a responsibility to safeguard the objectivity of intelligence analysis.

QUESTION 59: In your view, how significant a concern is the risk of politicized intelligence?

Politicized intelligence is always a risk, but it is one that I think the Intelligence Community has developed safeguards to detect and mitigate. I am confident that the IC's commitment to analytic integrity and its emphasis on implementing and improving analytic tradecraft are strong defenses against the threat of politicization.

On a personal note, I can commit that I will continue to provide the IC, the ODNI, the Congress and this Committee my unbiased analysis and honest assessments without regard to outside influence, political or otherwise.