116<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS 1<sup>st</sup> Session

**SENATE** 

REPORT 116-XX

# REPORT

OF THE

# SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION

VOLUME 4: REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT




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### I. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence acknowledges the impressive accomplishment in drafting and coordinating of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), which was completed as a "Memorandum for the President" on December 30, 2016,

and a declassified version dated January 6, 2017, and made available to the public on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) website. The Committee's review focused on the highly compartmented "Memorandum to the President."

### II. (U) FINDINGS

- (U) The Committee found the ICA presents a coherent and well-constructed intelligence
  basis for the case of unprecedented Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential
  election. On the analytic lines of the ICA, the Committee concludes that all
  analytic
  lines are supported with all-source intelligence, although with varying substantiation.
  The Committee did not discover any significant analytic tradecraft issues in the
  preparation or final presentation of the ICA.
  - (U) The ICA reflects proper analytic tradecraft despite being tasked and completed within a compressed timeframe. The compact timeframe was a contributing factor for not conducting formal analysis of competing hypotheses.
  - (U) The differing confidence levels on one analytic judgment are justified and properly represented. Those in disagreement all stated that they had the opportunity to express differing points of view. The decision regarding the presentation of differing confidence levels was the responsibility of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John Brennan and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) Admiral Michael Rogers, both of whom independently expressed to the Committee that they reached the final wording openly and with sufficient exchanges of views.
  - **(U)** Multiple intelligence disciplines are used and identified throughout the ICA. Where the Committee noted concerns about the use of specific sources, in no case did the Committee conclude any analytic line was compromised as a result.
  - **(U)** In all the interviews of those who drafted and prepared the ICA, the Committee heard consistently that analysts were under no politically motivated pressure to reach specific conclusions. All analysts expressed that they were free to debate, object to content, and assess confidence levels, as is normal and proper for the analytic process.



- 2. (U) The Committee found that the agencies responsible for the ICA—CIA, NSA, and FBI, under the aegis of ODNI—met the primary tasking as directed by President Obama, which was to assemble a product that reflected the intelligence available to the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election.
- (U) The Committee found that the ICA provides a proper representation of the intelligence collected by CIA, NSA, and FBI on Russian interference in 2016, and this body of evidence supports the substance and judgments of the ICA.


Regarding FBI, the ICA states, in its "Scope and Sourcing" introduction, that "[w]e also do not include information from ongoing investigations." The Committee found that the information provided by Christopher Steele to FBI was not used in the body of the ICA or to support any of its analytic judgments. However, a summary of this material was included in Annex A as a compromise to FBI's insistence that the information was responsive to the presidential tasking.

- **4. (U)** The Committee found the ICA makes a clear argument that the manner and aggressiveness of the Russian interference was historically unprecedented. However, the ICA and its sources do not provide a substantial representation of Russian interference in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, as the Committee understands was part of the President's original tasking.
- 5. (Use 12) The Committee found that the ICA did not provide a set of policy recommendations on how to respond to future Russian active measures, which was part of the tasking the President conveyed to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper. The ICA did include, in the compartmented version, an unclassified section independently produced by DHS, FBI, and the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "DHS/FBI/NIST Recommendations: Options to Protect and Defend US Election Infrastructure and US Political Parties."
  - **(U)** The absence of policy recommendations was deliberate, due to the well-established norm that the IC provides insight and warning to policy makers, but does not itself make policy.

- **6. (U)** The Committee found the ICA would benefit from a more comprehensive presentation of how Russian propaganda—as generated by Russia's multiple state-owned platforms—was used to complement the full Russian influence campaign.
  - (U) Open source collection is a long-standing discipline for CIA and other elements of the IC, and open source reporting is used throughout the ICA to support specific analytic assertions. However, open source reporting on RT and Sputnik's coverage of WikiLeaks releases of Democratic National Committee (DNC) information would have strengthened the ICA's examination of Russia's use of propaganda. On this point, the Committee finds that Annex of the ICA—"Open Source Center Analysis: Russia: Kremlin's TV Seeks to Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US," published December 12, 2012—should have been updated to provide a summary of Kremlin propaganda in 2016, thereby making a more relevant contribution to the ICA. An update to this assessment was not produced by the Open Source Enterprise until after the publication of the ICA.
- 7. **(U)**The role of social media has been a significant focus by the Committee and is discussed in a separate volume of this report.

# III. (U) BACKGROUND


**(U)** The Obama Administration released two versions of the ICA, a classified version on January 5 and a declassified version on January 6, 2017, both titled *Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections*.<sup>1</sup>



3 (U) The "Gang of Eight" is an informal term used to refer to House and Senate leadership and the leadership of the House and Senate intelligence committees.

The Committee held two hearings on January 10, 2017—one open hearing in the morning and one closed hearing in the afternoon—to take testimony on the ICA from Director Clapper, FBI Director James Comey, Director Brennan, and Admiral Rogers.<sup>4</sup>

- **(U)** On January 23, Committee Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner of the Committee convened a business meeting to discuss plans for the Committee's oversight on the issue of Russian activities during the 2016 presidential election cycle.<sup>5</sup>
- **(U)** At the business meeting, the Committee unanimously agreed to initiate a formal inquiry into the subject of Russian involvement in the 2016 elections. The Committee agreed to Terms of Reference delineating the lines of inquiry.




**(U)** The Committee conducted its examination of the ICA through document reviews of source documents and related materials and through interviews with IC officials involved in the direction, preparation, writing, editing, and review of the ICA.




<sup>4 (</sup>U) SSCI Open and Closed Hearings on Russian Active Measures Against the U.S. Political System, January 10, 2017.


<sup>5 (</sup>U) Throughout 2017 the Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on the subject of Russian active measures, and Committee staff organized briefings on this topic as part of regular oversight activities.




(U) On July 22, 2 DNC. <sup>7</sup>	2016, WikiLeaks	s began to diss	eminate materi	al exfiltrated fi	rom the
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Ibid. Ibid. SBI opened its formal invalued CROSSFIRE HU			coordination with		ommittee n








- 26 (U) Ibid., p. 35.
- 27 (U) Ibid., pp. 17-19.
- 28 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21. 29 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
- 30 (U) Ibid., pp. 21-23.
- 31 (U) Ibid., p. 18.




<sup>32 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 36-38, 43.


<sup>33 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 26-27.


<sup>34 (</sup>U) *Ibid.*, p. 26. 35 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 52.




<sup>36 (</sup>U) *Ibid.*, pp. 80-84. 38 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 35. 39 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.


















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### V. (U) ICA REVIEW: TASKING TO PUBLICATION

### A. (U) Tasking and Drafting

In a meeting of the NSC on December 6, 2016, President Obama instructed Director Clapper to have the Intelligence Community prepare a comprehensive report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.<sup>53</sup> Director Clapper told the Committee: "I don't think we would have mounted the effort we did, probably, to be honest, in the absence of presidential direction, because that kind of cleared the way on sharing all the accesses."<sup>54</sup>

The President directed that the report include everything the IC knew about Russian interference in the 2016 elections. In addition, the tasking included providing the IC's understanding of the historical context of Russian interference in U.S. political processes, focusing on the 2008 and 2012 elections. The presidential tasking also requested recommendations on how to prevent interference in the future and how to strengthen electoral systems. Finally, the instruction was to have a version available to brief Congress, and also a declassified version releasable to the public. The President requested this product be completed


<sup>52</sup> 

<sup>53 (</sup>U) Chronology and dates for the drafting of the ICA draw from many interviews conducted by the Committee.
54 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence, July 17,

<sup>2017,</sup> p. 53.


<sup>55 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 8.

by the end of his Administration, January 20, 2017. There was no document memorializing this presidential direction.





<sup>56 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 10.

<sup>57 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp. 22-23, 32.



58 (U) Interview with Bill Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, FBI, April 13, 2017; Interview with [Section Chief, Counterintelligence Analysis Section, CD-1, FBI] April 21, 2017. The Section Chief of Analysis was Jonathan Moffa.





<sup>65 (</sup>U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 86.

<sup>66 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 38-39.


<sup>67 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18, 2017, p. 50.

<sup>68 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 66-73.


<sup>69 (</sup>U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., May 9, 2017, pp. 72-73.

<sup>70 (</sup>U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., May 9, 2017, p. 65.

<sup>71 (</sup>U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., pp. 74.



established relationship with FBI. This material eventually became Annex A of the ICA, but its placement in the ICA was not resolved until December 29.




77 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security Agency, and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19, 2018, p. 58.

<sup>78 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 62-65.

<sup>79 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>80 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 60.




<sup>81 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 53. ("One guy speaks for NSA.")

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<sup>82 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>83 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence, July 17, 2017, p. 54. In November 2016, the transition team invited Admiral Rogers to New York to interview for the DNI position. Admiral Rogers told the Committee that he met with the President-elect ("did a job interview, went back to my job . . . [w]hich had zero impact on anything I have ever done)." Admiral Rogers also told the Committee that he consulted with his lawyer and spoke with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before going to the interview. See SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security Agency, and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19, 2018, p. 104.


<sup>85</sup> 86 87 **(U)** SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security Agency,




88 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 61. 89 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18, 2017, pp. 52-53.

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92 (U) Ibid.






103 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security Agency, and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19, 2018, p. 66.

104 (U) Ibid., p. 67.

105 (U) Ibid., p. 68.





## C. (U) Discussion of the "Steele Reporting" in the ICA

The CIA team working on the ICA first learned on December 20, 2016, of information the FBI held and wanted to include in the ICA. Despite the fact that the ICA explicitly excluded ongoing investigations, FBI sought to introduce a summary of the material from former officer Christopher Steele.<sup>111</sup>

The Committee reviewed the debate over whether and where to include the Steele materials with all participants to the drafting of the ICA. In the first meeting of the Committee with Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division (AD/CD) of the FBI, he articulated the FBI's concerns. First was the directive from the President to include all the information the IC had on Russian involvement in the 2016 presidential election, and this included material that FBI held. Even though the Assistant Director suggested that "the FBI didn't want to stand behind it," it qualified for this directive. Second, the question immediately became how to handle this information in the drafting of the ICA. This was ultimately resolved by including the information as Annex A, a two-page summary attached only to the most classified version of the ICA (i.e., the "Memorandum to the President" version). FBI officials told the Committee that they "would have had a major problem if Annex A had not been included," and that FBI believed they "had to put everything in."

The Assistant Director for Don December 22, and recalled the FBI's interest in "weaving their dossier in the actual text of the report." Assistant Director for stated there was no "visibility, at the time of the writing of the report, into the sub-sourcing dynamic for that dossier . . . because of the sub-sourcing, I felt [it] was not appropriate for inclusion in the report and would detract from the report." The Assistant Director for told the Committee that when she asked the FBI Assistant Director for CD for more information on the sources for the dossier, the Assistant Director for CD told her that the FBI's primary source "had not provided information regarding

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<sup>111 (</sup>U) Analyst 2, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Analysts Panel, July 18, 2017, p. 151.

<sup>112 (</sup>U) Interview with Bill Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, FBI, April 13, 2017.

<sup>113 (</sup>U) Interview with [Section Chief, Counterintelligence Analysis Section, CD-1, FBI] April 21, 2017.

addressed it, it would have either created the impression among people who didn't go through the sourcing that we had relied on it, which we didn't, or that we were unaware of it." <sup>124</sup>

Deputy Director for Analysis stated, "We would have never included that report in a CIA-only assessment because the source was so indirect. And we made sure we indicated we didn't use it in our analysis, and if it had been a CIA-only product we wouldn't have included it at all." <sup>125</sup>

Director Clapper later reiterated to the SSCI in a closed hearing in May 2018:

I don't think you'll find in any of the footnotes in the ICA any reference to the dossier. We thought it important to include a summary description of it, but it was not included as an organic part of the ICA. Maybe a difference without a distinction, but to us that was a very important point. For our part, particularly the CIA and ODNI, since we could not validate the second and third-order assets, that's why we did not use it as part of the assessment. We felt—and the whole reason particularly for Jim Comey's part—that we had a duty to warn the President-elect that it was out there, and that was the whole point. But it was not included as an organic part of the assessment. 126

Director Brennan reiterated the CIA's reservations about the FBI's Steele material, noting that the DDA "was very concerned about polluting the ICA with this material," and that "there was stiff opposition, especially from CIA, to include that material either in essence or in substance in that report," which "was not used in any way as far as the judgments in the ICA were concerned." Director Brennan stated:

Jim Comey and the FBI felt strongly that, here is a very sensitive document that is being produced by CIA, NSA, and FBI about Russian attempts to interfere in the election and Russian attempts to denigrate one candidate and promote prospects of the other. The FBI has acquired this information that comes from a former foreign intelligence officer from a pretty respectable service, that includes information of potential kompromat related to Donald Trump. So Jim Comey, with some elegance said: How can we have this report and deliver it to the outgoing President and the incoming President and for he, Jim Comey, to be completely silent on this dossier that a lot of people have seen and that the FBI

<sup>124 (</sup>U) Analyst, ibid., p. 152.

<sup>125 (</sup>U) Deputy Director for Analysis, ibid.

<sup>126 (</sup>U) Closed SSCI Hearing with Former Intelligence Directors, May 16, 2018, pp. 33-34.

<sup>127 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, June 23, 2017, pp. 60-65.

was following up on and doesn't know whether or not Mr. Trump is aware or not?<sup>128</sup>

When Brennan appeared before the SSCI in a closed hearing in 2018, he stated:

Initially FBI wanted it incorporated into the assessment itself. We all pushed back on that. They wanted it to be included as the last portion of the assessment if it wasn't even going to be used as a finding. We pushed back against that. But Jim Comey made a very strong case, which we didn't object to, that it needed to accompany the assessment because it was related to the issue, and we didn't know where the FBI's investigation was as far as some of those things. 129

Director Brennan volunteered to the Committee that around the time he received a call from who said that:

[H]e wanted to make sure that I understood and that others in the senior officialdom of the U.S. government understood that that officer, Steele, had been a former officer, but had no current relationship with and, and that dossier was not put together in any way with support. So he wanted to make sure there was a separation there. 130

Director Comey addressed the question of the dossier and its placement when asked by SSCI Chairman Burr whether he "insisted that the dossier be part of the ICA in any way, shape, or form?" Director Comey replied:

I insisted that we bring it to the party, and I was agnostic as to whether it was footnoted in the document itself, put as an annex. I have some recollection of talking to John Brennan maybe at some point saying: I don't really care, but I think it is relevant and so ought to be part of the consideration. <sup>131</sup>

NSA played no role in the debate over the Steele reporting and the ICA. NSA analysts told the Committee they had "no role in drafting, nor role in its inclusion, no role in reviewing the source material, became aware of it as it was appended." NSA analysts first

see Closed SSCI Hearing with Former

Intelligence Directors, May 16, 2018, p. 44.

<sup>128 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 60-61.

<sup>129</sup> Closed SSCI Hearing with Former Intelligence Directors, May 16, 2018, pp. 34-35.

<sup>130</sup> SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency,

June 23, 2017, p. 65. When Brennan appeared before the SSCI in 2018, he added that

<sup>131 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed SSCI Hearing with James Comey, Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 8, 2017, p. 49.

<sup>132 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18, 2017, p. 86.

heard of the information on December 29 and had no insights into Steele's source network, and the Steele material had no effect on NSA's views of the Key Judgments of the ICA. 133

Admiral Rogers recalled that he heard of this from his team of analysts on December 29 while reviewing a draft of the ICA to which this material had been appended. Admiral Rogers's initial reaction was that the Steele information ought not be in the body of the ICA, but "let's put it in the appendix." <sup>134</sup>

Director Clapper said he "first heard" of the Steele material in a conversation with Director Brennan "around the 15<sup>th</sup> of December." The NIOs were witting of some of the conversations regarding the Steele material, but "had almost no say in this," and recalled a "unanimous sense that this was not germane to the judgments and findings in the paper" and "did not add value." The NIO for Russia and Eurasia said that they were "comfortable placing it in the annex" because "that remained true to the task." <sup>137</sup>

On December 27, a SVTC was held between the four deputies of CIA, NSA, FBI, and ODNI, in order to reach an agreement on where to place the Steele materials in the ICA, with the FBI insisting it remain in the body of the ICA. No agreement was reached and, according to the CIA senior officer assigned to the ICA, Director Brennan left it to the analysts to make the call on where to put it. On December 28, Director Comey was still insisting the document be in the body. On December 29, Deputy Director Cohen and Deputy Director McCabe agreed to place the material in an annex.<sup>138</sup>

Director Brennan recalled to the Committee: "So as long as it was separated from the ICA's substance and judgments and as long as it was not going to be part of the formal briefing we gave on the ICA, we felt, ok, Jim [Comey], you want to do it, okay. We're not going to object." <sup>139</sup>

### D. (U) Finalizing the ICA

With the placement of the Steele material resolved, the ICA was formalized as a Memorandum to the President, dated December 30, 2016, and handed to the NIOs at the NIC.

138 Interview with

April

13, 2017.

139 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, June 23, 2017, p. 62.


<sup>133 (</sup>U) Ibid.

<sup>134 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security Agency, and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19, 2018, pp. 69, 71.

<sup>135 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed Hearing: Former Intel Directors Panel on Russian Interference, May 16, 2018, p. 107.

<sup>136 (</sup>U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp. 90, 92.

<sup>137 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 93.



- **(U)** While noting details of disagreement in content and confidence levels as reviewed above, the Committee heard no significant criticisms or objections to the ICA process, or the resulting paper, from all the analysts, managers, and agency heads interviewed. Every witness interviewed believed the collaboration was transparent and professionally candid, including disagreements over confidence levels. Every witness interviewed by the Committee stated that he or she saw no attempts or pressure to politicize the findings.
- **(U)** The Committee asked about the lack of recommendations, how the process compared with other ICA productions, how additional time would have benefited this ICA

<sup>140</sup> 

<sup>141</sup> 


<sup>142</sup> **(U)** NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp. 121-122.

<sup>143 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 124.

exercise, and how and whether the counterintelligence question was handled during the ICA process.

The President's original tasking included a request for recommendations about protecting electoral infrastructure and responding to foreign interference in the future. All witnesses interviewed by the Committee stated the position that the IC does not make policy recommendations. The NIO for Russia and Eurasia stated, "that's an area we don't touch," while noting that the final "Memorandum to the President" included, as a separate document (but not an annex), an unclassified, eleven-page paper produced by DHS, FBI, and the Department of Commerce's National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), titled "Recommendations: Options to Protect and Defend US Election Infrastructure and US Political Parties." NIO for Russia and Eurasia stated there was no input to this document from anyone writing the ICA. 144

The NIO for Russia and Eurasia was mindful of the President's full direction and stated that she reached out to both the National Security Council (NSC) and the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the period after the first complete draft was presented on December 19 and presented a deadline to submit policy recommendations by December 27. The NIO received no responses.<sup>145</sup>



The other key difference in this process, according to the NIO for Russia and Eurasia, was dealing with discussion of U.S. persons. The NIO noted, "[d]ay to day, we do not deal with U.S persons in any way." The participants in the process even debated whether to

<sup>144 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>145 (</sup>U) Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>146 (</sup>U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., pp. 61-64.

name the two leading candidates. Regarding the option of leaving the candidates unidentified, NIO for Russia and Eurasia concluded this made "no sense . . . but that felt uncomfortable, I think, for a lot of us."  $^{147}$ 

NIO for Cyber Issues stated:  [More time would have helped] to collate FBI information in terms of the changes because their reporting and the reporting from private industry and states takes a long time You can see in the paper the line where we say because we . And if we had , we could have something more complete. 149  NIO for Russia and Eurasia also believed more time would have allowed for:
[More time would have helped] to collate FBI information in terms of the changes because their reporting and the reporting from private industry and states takes a long time You can see in the paper the line where we say because we And if we had we something more complete. And if we had we something more complete. NIO for Russia and Eurasia also believed more time would have allowed for:
changes from private industry and states takes a long time You can see in the paper the line where we say because we something more complete. 149  NIO for Russia and Eurasia also believed more time would have allowed for:
150
151

<sup>147 (</sup>U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., p. 102.

<sup>148 (</sup>U) Ibid., pp. 103-104.

<sup>149 (</sup>U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., p. 103.

<sup>150 (</sup>U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid.

The Committee asked the NIOs who worked on the ICA how they handled the question of whether activities were being coordinated between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. The NIO for Russia and Eurasia responded that "it did not come up. . . . We didn't have any evidence for that. There was not information that pointed us in that direction." The NIO for Cyber Issues stated "[w]e rely on our FBI colleagues to bring it up. But it was not discussed." As noted elsewhere, neither the Fusion Cell members nor the ICA authors were read into the FBI's investigation.

# VI. (U) ICA REVIEW: KEY JUDGEMENTS

- (U) The Committee finds that the IC met President Obama's primary tasking and that the ICA is a sound intelligence product. While the Committee had to rely on the agencies that the sensitive information and accesses had been accurately reported, as part of its review the Committee examined analytic procedures and interviewed analysts, managers, and senior intelligence officers who wrote and oversaw the production and who were well-versed with the information. These findings are based on these interviews as well as a detailed review of the entire body of finished intelligence reporting used to substantiate the ICA.
- **(U)** In all the interviews of those who drafted and prepared the ICA, the Committee heard consistently that analysts were under no politically motivated pressure to reach specific conclusions. All analysts expressed that they were free to debate, object to content, and assess confidence levels, as is normal and proper for the analytic process.
  - A. (U) On the Key Judgments of the December 2016 ICA
    - 1. (U) Russian Efforts to Influence the 2016 Election
    - (U) The ICA states:

Russian efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant

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
152 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., p. 61.


153 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., p. 116-117.

escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations.


- (U) The ICA revealed the elements of a comprehensive and multifaceted Russian campaign against the United States as it was understood by the U.S. Intelligence Community at the end of 2016. The intelligence presented supports the judgment that the Russian campaign "demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations."
- **(U)** However, the Committee found the ICA's treatment of the historical context of Russian interference in U.S. domestic politics limited.

# 2. (U) Russian Leadership Intentions






- (U) The Committee found that the ICA provided a range of all-source reporting to support these assessments.
- (U) The Committee found that specific intelligence as well as open source assessments support the assessment that President Putin approved and directed aspects of this influence campaign.
- (U) Further, a body of reporting, to include different intelligence disciplines, open source reporting on Russian leadership policy preferences, and Russian media content, showed that Moscow sought to denigrate then-candidate Clinton.
- (U) The Committee found that the ICA presents information from public Russian leadership commentary, Russian state media reports, and specific intelligence reporting to support the assessment that Putin and the Russian Government demonstrated a preference for candidate Trump.
- **(U)** Russia leadership intentions is the only assessment in the ICA that had different confidence levels between the participating agencies—the CIA and FBI assessed with "high confidence" and the NSA assessed with "moderate confidence"—so the Committee gave this section additional attention. The Committee finds that the analytic disagreement was reasonable, transparent, and openly debated among the agencies and analysts, with analysts, managers, and agency heads on both sides of the confidence level reasonably justifying their positions.
  - 3. (U) Multifaceted Russian Influence Operations



(U) The Committee found that the ICA presents a detailed assessment of the elements that comprised the influence campaign,

**(U)** While the ICA cites examples of Russian media in 2016, its analysis of RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik is dated, and the ICA does not provide an updated assessment of this Russian capability in 2016, which the Committee found to be a shortcoming in the ICA, as this is information that was available in open sources.

# 4. (U) The Threat from Future Russian Influence Operations



(U) Since January 2017, the Committee has discovered additional examples of Russia's attempt to sow discord, undermine democratic institutions, and interfere in U.S. elections. The Committee also has reviewed intelligence demonstrating Russia's efforts to interfere in the elections of our allies as well as countries Russia perceives to be in its sphere of influence.

### B. (U) Counterintelligence Investigations


**(U)** The ICA did not attempt to address ongoing investigations, to include whether Russian intelligence services attempted to recruit sources with access to any campaign. All individuals the Committee interviewed stated that the Steele material did not in any way inform the analysis in the ICA—including the key judgments—because it was unverified information and had not been disseminated as serialized intelligence reporting. The material was instead included in Annex A of the compartmented ICA.

# C. (U) The Unfinished Work of Intelligence

**(U)** The Committee notes that, as is the case with all intelligence questions, information continues to be gathered and analyzed. The Committee finds the conclusions of the ICA are sound, and is reassured by the fact that collection and analysis subsequent to the ICA's publication continue to reinforce its assessments.


# D. (U) Intelligence Cited in the ICA

(U) The ICA has footnotes. Source documents for the footnotes include: 154



From FBI—intelligence reports cited fifty-one times, including FBI Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs)

"Letterhead Memorandum" (LHM), which is an FBI manner for formally assembling intelligence reporting on various topics; and records of victim notifications.




VII. (U) ICA Review: Section-by-Section


- Analytic Line : Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence
  U.S. Election
- Analytic Line : Russian Campaign Was

  Multifaceted This section had five sub-headings:
  - O Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Political Organizations
  - o Public Disclosures of Russian-Collected Data
  - o Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State Electoral Infrastructure
  - o Russian Propaganda Efforts
  - Russian Fropaganaa Efforts


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
- Analytic Line : Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the U.S.
- Analytic Line : Election Operation Signals "New Normal" In Russian Influence Efforts
- A. Analytic Line : Putin Ordered Campaign to Influence U.S. Election
- **(U)** The Committee found that reporting from multiple intelligence disciplines was used as evidence to support this analytic line, and that the analytic tradecraft was transparent.







a. (U) Open Source Reporting








c. (U) NSA Reporting






d. (U) FBI Reporting





173 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 40. 174 (U ) FBI, IIR 4 212 0834 17, November 2, 2016


FBI, IIR 4 212 0168 17, October


11, 2016
















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



# 2. (U) On Putin Directing the Active Measures



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
b.







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<sup>213</sup> 

<sup>214</sup> **(U)** NIO for Cyber Issues, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp. 77-78.

<sup>215 (</sup>U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., p. 79.



216 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., p. 81.


217 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., pp. 82-83.


218 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18, 2017, pp. 29-30.

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























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
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



**(U)** The Committee found that this section is supported and substantiated by multiple intelligence disciplines. The cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use is consistent with proper analytic standards.




a. On Putin's Role








The term "neighbors" is nomenclature the Russian intelligence services have used to refer to each other going back to the 1930s. 263



263 **(U)** See, e.g., Weinstein and Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood* (1999) (describing Soviet intelligence activities in the U.S. during the Stalin era and drawing on Soviet intelligence services archives accessible in the 1990s). 264 **(U)** SSCI Transcript of the Closed Hearing on Russian Active Measures Against the U.S. Political System, January 10, 2017, pp. 14-15.

265 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp.79-80.



## b. (U) On Russia's Influence Capabilities


"Moscow's campaign aimed at the U.S. election reflected years of investment in its capabilities, which Moscow has honed in the former Soviet states."





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269 (U) Ibid. p. 85.


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








**(U)** The Committee found that this sub-topic is supported and substantiated by multiple intelligence disciplines. The cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use is consistent with proper analytic standards.







# b. (U) GRU Operations










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



**(U)** The Committee found that this sub-topic is supported and substantiated by multiple intelligence disciplines. The cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use is consistent with proper analytic standards.




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
300 (U) Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, classified Appendix One, July 2018.







b. (U) Open Source Reporting












- 4. Sub-topic: Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State Electoral Infrastructure
- **(U)** The Committee found that this sub-topic cites multiple intelligence disciplines. With the limited exception of certain FBI materials, the sources cited support logically defensible conclusions that are consistent with proper analytic standards.


The Committee found that while FBI material is used for most citations, some FBI reports referenced vary in relevance and transparency, and one FBI report is missing.






a. (U) CIA Reporting






b. (U) NSA Reporting





c. (U) FBI Reporting



320 321 322 323


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reporting cited includes an unclassified email with an unprinted zip file attachment, and therefore cannot be judged to support the ICA language. The other footnote to this statement cites a document missing in both copies of supporting materials provided to the Committee. Therefore, the Committee cannot verify if the information cited supports the ICA language.


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


# 5. Sub-topic: Russian Propaganda Efforts

- **(U)** The Committee found that analysts draw inferences from open source reporting in this sub-topic.
- **(U)** The Committee found that CIA, FBI, and NSA reporting is properly used to support this section, and this sub-topic expounds on the propaganda element in the Russian influence campaign in 2016. The use of sources, except where noted, supports logically defensible conclusions that are consistent with proper analytic standards.





# a. (U) Open Source Reporting







**(U)** Throughout this section, open source reporting supports the text in the ICA, with the following notable exceptions.










# c. (U) NSA Reporting














- C. Analytic Line : Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US
- **(U)** The Committee found that this section logically follows Analytic Line and is supported and substantiated by multiple intelligence disciplines. As above, the cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use is consistent with proper analytic standards.
- **(U)** The Committee acknowledges that the purpose of the ICA was not to present a comprehensive historical perspective, and that the authors were working under significant time constraint, yet the direction received from the President asked for context for the 2016 election by looking at foreign interference in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
- **(U)** The Committee notes there is no historical precedent for the use of cyber intrusions followed by release of stolen information (i.e., hacks and leaks) used in combination with other elements of state activity for the purposes of an active measures campaign against the United States. However, the ICA's treatment of the historical context of Russian interference in U.S.



domestic politics is limited, and the over-redacted FBI references in the ICA source book make the assessments in this section difficult to substantiate.








# 1. (U) NSA Reporting



# 2. (U) FBI Reporting



The sentence summarizes a key point in this analytic line, which is that

This citation, to FBI reporting, resulted in significant confusion in the Committee's review of the ICA. The original set of ICA source documents made available to the Committee in March 2017 included a December 27, 2016, FBI Letterhead Memorandum supporting footnote 222. This LHM did not match the document cited in the footnotes of the ICA, which referred to an LHM of the same date with a different heading.<sup>362</sup>

360 FE	BI,	, October 18, 2016
361 Th	e LHM submitted to the ICA source book r	
		all of which are also redacted.
362	FBI, LHM FBI	Review for POTUS Tasking on Russian Influence in
the 2016 Presid	ential Tasking, December 27, 2010 (1011)	outote 222).
		FIDE O
	For background, see this soci frans	
	August 22, 2017, pp. 1	12-17.

The LHM originally submitted to the Committee was an FBI summary of materials FBI had received from Christopher Steele.<sup>363</sup> The LHM specifically cites the various "company reports" that are included in the Steele material, which are a compilation of reports all titled (and numbered as) "company reports." Submission of this memo for footnote 222 appears to have been an FBI error, as the LHM did not support the ICA language cited. When the Committee noted this anomaly to the FBI in repeated conversations, as well as noting repeated statements by FBI and CIA that no Steele material was used in the ICA, the FBI withdrew this document.

It was not until January 28, 2018, that the FBI submitted to the Committee the LHM cited in the ICA footnotes, "FBI Review for POTUS Tasking on Russian Influence in the 2016 Presidential Election."

3. (U) CIA Reporting

As previously discussed, the Steele material was summarized in Annex A of the ICA, "Additional Reporting From an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts." The reports in the Steele material are labeled "company reports," which the FBI cite as such in their LHM under the designation "CROWN."

<sup>364</sup> FBI, LHM FBI Review for POTUS Tasking on Russian Influence in the 2016 Presidential Tasking, December 27, 2016 (ICA footnote 222).






- E. Analytic Line: Election Operation Signals "New Normal" In Russian Influence Efforts
- **(U)** The Committee found that multiple intelligence disciplines are used to support this analytic line, the analytic tradecraft is transparent, and the sources support the language of the ICA, except where noted.
- **(U)** While the Committee notes that "new normal" is an imprecise term, the Committee found that this section convincingly argues that Russia's use of active measures to target

elections has been widely applied outside the United States over the past decade.

**(U)** The analytic line on "new normal" serves as both prediction and warning, and the Committee notes that IC and open source reporting has revealed much evidence to reinforce the IC's 2016 assessments.


	The	final analyti	ic line of the ICA states	:
presidential electr	ion to future inf n intelligence se ified success	luence efforts in ervices would ha		e. We
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
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














# 3. (U) DIA Reporting



# 4. (U) Open Source Reporting



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
5. (U) Department of State Reporting

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
6. (U) DHS Reporting



VIII.



401



## IX. (U) The ICA Annexes

- (U) The ICA includes an unclassified, twelve-page addendum that provides recommendations jointly prepared by DHS, FBI, and the NIST to protect U.S. election infrastructure and political entities.
- **(U)** The addendum represents a partial response to the original presidential tasking for the ICA, which included a request for recommendations. According to Director Clapper, "[w]hat we ended up doing was focusing on the cyber things that could be done. That's what generated separately on an unclassified basis the best practices paper that DHS and FBI did."
- **(U)** The Committee addresses election security issues in Volume 1 of this report, including some of the recommendations made in this annex.
  - A. Annex A: Additional Reporting from an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts

Annex A represents a summary of information provided to the FBI by

Christopher Steele. The annex cites reports, and FBI. The FBI references cite two LHMs, one of which is a summary of FBI reports. The second LHM, "Additional CROWN Reporting for USIC Tasking," was erroneously provided to the Committee

<sup>402 (</sup>U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence, July 17, 2017, p. 42.


as the supporting material for footnote 222. The final citation is an open source reference to an October 31, 2016, piece in Mother Jones.

Annex A includes qualifiers for the Steele material, but does not mention the private clients who paid for Steele's work. The Committee found no evidence that analysts working on the ICA were aware of the political provenance of the Steele material.

CIA shared drafting responsibility for the first portion of Annex A, which states, "Some of the FBI source's reporting is consistent with the judgments in this assessment," and the first three footnotes of the ICA are reprised.

The annex language notes, however, that one aspect of the Steele material . The assertion that the Kremlin "regretted its decision to intervene"


The Committee asked whether they had any "intelligence that responded, "We had no reporting of that at all." (For more information on this material, see elsewhere in the Committee's report.)





Election Influence Operation,











C. (United Annex : Open Source Center Analysis: Russia—Kremlin's TV Seeks
To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US, Published December 12, 2012

(U) Annex is referred to in the section in the ICA on "Russian Propaganda Efforts."

It is a nine-page unclassified report produced by the Open Source Center (OSC, now Open Source Enterprise, OSE) in 2012. The NIO for Russia and Eurasia characterized this report to the Committee as an "off-the-shelf OSE product from 2012." It was not updated until after the publication of the ICA. 425

(U) Annex introduces the role of Russian social media only near the end, and provides a graphic of "comparative social media footprint" contrasting RT and RT America with Al Jazeera English, BBC World, CNN, and CNN International social media broadcasting. However, it does so without proper contextualization for the platforms highlighted (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook). Further, the product includes statements such as, "[a]ccording to market research company Nielsen, RT had the most rapid growth (40%) among all international news channels in the United States over the past year."

This statement could be interpreted to imply media prominence greater than it actually was, as this was only a measure of YouTube views, which are a distinct subcategory of "all informational news channels." This product makes no mention of the Internet Research Agency or Russia's use of social media trolls, the latter of which the Russian Government had already developed by 2012.

423 (U FBI, Electronic Communication,
, August 22, 2016 FBI, Electronic Communication,
, December 2, 2016
424 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 99.


**(U)** The Committee believes this annex, while providing a historical snapshot of one aspect of Russian propaganda in 2012, does not contribute to understanding Russian interference in the 2016 election. Recognizing that the ICA's authors were working under a compressed time table, the presentation of the multifaceted aspects of the Russian interference campaign—specifically, the use of RT, Sputnik, other Russian media platforms, social media, and trolls, as part of the propaganda element of the influence campaign—would have been much stronger with an updated OSE annex.




<sup>426</sup> **(U)** NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 16.

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- H. (U) Annex : Estimative Language
  - (U) Annex is standard language that is attached to NIC products.








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429 (U) Ibid., pp. 35-37.


430 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed Hearing: Former Intel Directors Panel on Russian Interference, May 16, 2018, pp. 18-19.









<sup>444</sup> **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30. 445 **(U)** *Ibid.*, p. 59. 446 **(U)** *Ibid.*, p. 60.







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# (U) APPENDIX B: CIA ANALYSIS ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES—1981-1991, 2016

#### A. (U) Historical Analysis—1981-1991

As noted in the Committee's report, the Committee believes that the ICA and its supporting sources do not provide a satisfactory representation of Russian interference in the two previous presidential elections, as requested in the original POTUS tasking. Noting the lack of information provided to support the ICA on this issue, the Committee could not determine whether this was due to a lack of collection, or the failure of the three agencies, particularly the FBI, which holds primary responsibility for counterintelligence threats to U.S. domestic targets, to access historical reporting or produce finished analysis. As noted in the Committee's report, FBI support for the historical record presented in the ICA is so redacted as to be largely meaningless to anyone reviewing these reports for the ICA.

- (U) The authors of the ICA used popular and academic open source reporting for this annex,
- (U) During this review, the Committee requested that CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) search CIA's holdings for analytic products on Russian active measures.

These reports demonstrate a body of information known to the IC about Russian active measures, including definitions, organization, goals, types of activities, and leadership direction. None are referenced in the ICA.


- **(U)** The following products were provided to the Committee by CSI, and are attached to the Committee's report:
  - **(U)** The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus, Research Paper, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Soviet Analysis, April 1986.


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
- **(U)** For the purpose of highlighting what the CIA knew about the history of Russian active measures, this section organized select excerpts from these products under four themes:
  - (U) Definitions and Activities of Russian Active Measures;
  - (U) Leadership Direction and Cost Assessment for Russian Active Measures;
  - . (U) Goals of Russian Active Measures; and,
  - (U) Understanding Russian Active Measures.
    - (U) Nb: All text under each heading is quoted directly from the product.








Leadership Direction and Cost Assessment





**Understanding Active Measures** 









# B. (U) National Intelligence Council Report—2016


Nearly 15 years later, the National Intelligence Council prepared the following paper on Russian active measures:


National Intelligence Council Report,


January 19, 2016.

All products previously cited in this appendix are historical intelligence products on Russian active measures from the period 1981-1991, covering the period from when the U.S. made its last concerted effort to confront Russia's use of active measures through the end of the Cold War. This NIC product was produced at the beginning of 2016, with no specific anticipation of the Russian interference to come that year.


All text below is quoted directly from the 2016 NIC product.














# (U) Appendix C: THE COMMITTEE REVIEW PROCESS

(U) Committee Access







The Committee's review of the ICA involved studying the underlying source documents, interviewing all the relevant directors, managers, and analysts involved in the production of the ICA analysis and conducting a structured review of the analytic lines of the ICA.

(U) The Committee conducted twenty-five interviews and hearings with over forty intelligence officers from the across the IC involved in the ICA process, including the directors of ODNI, CIA, NSA, and FBI. The Committee undertook these interviews for the purpose of evaluating the ICA and the ICA process. Interviews were conducted in SSCI secure spaces and at CIA Headquarters and always included bipartisan representation by the Committee. Almost all interviews were transcribed. The Committee also conducted follow-up discussions and emails on many points for better understanding and clarification, and held other interviews with CIA, FBI, and NSA officers, for better understanding about collection and operating environments on the Russia target.

### (U) Committee Methodology

**(U)** The Committee evaluated the ICA along two lines. First, the Committee determined whether the ICA met the tasking from the President on December 6, 2016. Second, the Committee reviewed the analytic lines within the ICA, asking the following questions:



- (U) Was the analysis supported by the intelligence presented?
- (U) Was the analytic tradecraft sound?
- (U) Does the Committee accept the analytic line?
- **(U)** This report volume represents the detailed examination and conclusions the Committee reached on these questions.

### ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

- (U) Over the course of nearly 20 years at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have refused to assume the accuracy of intelligence assessments and have endeavored to always ask the hard questions. That is what this report does, painstakingly scrutinizing every piece of intelligence that went into the Intelligence Community Assessment and allowing the Committee to independently verify the findings of that assessment. The findings are not a "hoax." They are not in doubt because, as Donald Trump stated, Vladimir Putin "very strongly" denies them. Russian interference in the 2016 election is a fact and Donald Trump's deference to Putin only serves to further Russian disinformation and undermine efforts to defend the United States against ongoing attacks.
- (U) This report also provides additional evidence against Donald Trump's false assertions regarding Ukraine. For example, the Committee conducted an extensive examination of the intelligence demonstrating Russia's intrusions into DNC networks. That review, which confirmed the ICA's findings, is fundamentally incompatible with Trump's conspiracy theories about Ukrainian involvement, for which there is no supporting evidence of any kind.
- One aspect of the ICA calls for more commentary. The ICA cites DHS's assessment that "the types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying." In my Minority Views to Volume I of the Committee's investigation, I discussed confidence levels in and gaps related to DHS's assessment, as acknowledged at the Committee's June 21, 2017, hearing. This report adds additional context, quoting a DHS email that requested that the Department's assessment be "couched with references to intelligence gaps and ongoing forensic investigations," caveats that were not included in the public version of the ICA.
- (U) The limitations associated with this aspect of the ICA provide important lessons regarding intelligence collection and analysis and the topic of election security. All-source intelligence must be integrated with information collected by DHS to produce coordinated IC-wide assessments. Analytic tradecraft related to confidence levels and dissents must be applied. And limits on DHS's ability to track attacks must be addressed. I have previously discussed the need for nation-wide mandated paper ballots, risk-limiting audits and minimum cyber security standards for all election systems. The ongoing failure to require these basic security measures across the country is not just a threat to our democracy, it damages the ability of DHS and the IC to assess whether, or to what extent U.S.

election systems have been compromised. It is the job of the IC to seek to address intelligence gaps, particularly when those gaps hinder assessments related to our most urgent and serious national security priorities. The actions of our adversaries challenge our intelligence capabilities. In this case, in which audits are inadequate, state and local election officials lack the expertise and resources to identify sophisticated cyber-attacks, and DHS lacks comprehensive, nation-wide information, the harm is partly self-inflicted.