[Senate Report 104-4]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]


        104th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - Senate 
Report 104-4

                             SPECIAL REPORT

                          COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

                                 of the
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                  January 4, 1993, to December 1, 1994

 January 18 (legislative day, January 10), 1995.--Ordered to be printed

   ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, 
 J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice 
                                     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
                                     RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
                                     MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
                                     JOHN KYL, Arizona
                                     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
                                     KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
                                     CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN GLENN, Ohio                     WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
  ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, 
            Ex Officio
 Charles Battaglia, Staff Director
 Christopher C. Straub, Minority 
          Staff Director
  Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


                                      United States Senate,
                                  Washington, DC, January 17, 1995.
    Dear Mr. President: As Chairman of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, I hereby submit to the Senate the Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of its activities 
during the 103rd Congress from January 4, 1993 to December 1, 
1994 under the Chairmanship of Senator Dennis DeConcini and the 
Vice Chairmanship of Senator John Warner. The Committee is 
charged by the Senate with the responsibility of carrying out 
oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States. 
Much of the work of the Committee is of necessity conducted in 
secrecy yet the Committee believes that intelligence activities 
should be as accountable as possible to the public. The public 
report to the Senate is intended to contribute to that 

                                           Arlen Specter, Chairman.

                            C O N T E N T S



  I. Introduction.....................................................1
 II. Legislation......................................................3
    S. 647 CIA Voluntary Separation Incentive Act................     3
    S. 1301 FY 1994 Intelligence Authorization Act...............     3
    S. 1885 Framework for Classification and Declassification....     3
    Counterintelligence Legislation..............................     4
    Legislation Creating a Presidential Commission on                 5
    Other Provisions of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY     6
III. Arms Control.....................................................6
    Start II.....................................................     6
    Open Skies Treaty............................................     7
    Chemical Weapons Convention..................................     9
    Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in Korea, Russia, Ukraine, and     15
 IV. Counterintelligence.............................................15
  V. Counterterrorism................................................17
    World Trade Center Bombing and the CIA Employee Shooting.....    17
 VI. Oversight Activities............................................17
    The National Security Threat.................................    17
    Commercial Availability of Imagery...........................    17
    Economic Intelligence........................................    18
    Clipper Chip/Digital Telephony...............................    18
    SSCI Audits and Investigations...............................    20
    Release of JFK Documents.....................................    21
    North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)..................    21
    Covert Action................................................    22
    Russian/Eastern European Organized Crime.....................    22
    Environmental Task Force Hearing.............................    22
    NSA Support to Law Enforcement/Sigint Policy.................    23
    Airborne Reconnaissance......................................    23
    Publication of Booklet on Congressional Oversight............    24
VII. Foreign Intelligence............................................25
    Haiti........................................................    25
    Bosnia.......................................................    25
    Somalia......................................................    25
    Cuba.........................................................    25
    U.N. Intelligence Sharing....................................    26
    North Korea..................................................    26
    DCI R. James Woolsey.........................................    26
 IX. Security........................................................27
    Declassification of Intelligence Documents...................    27
    Review of White House Security Procedures....................    27
    CIA's Office of Training and Education Training Course.......    28
    Security Automation Efforts..................................    28
Appendix.........................................................    31
    Summary of Committee Activities..............................    31
        Number of Meetings.......................................    31
        Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee........    31
        Bills Referred to the Committee..........................    31
    Publications.................................................    31
104th Congress                                                   Report

 1st Session                                                      104-4



 January 18 (legislative day, January 10), 1995.--Ordered to be printed


 Mr. Specter, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 

                              R E P O R T

                            I. Introduction

    Prompted by the most devastating espionage case in our 
nation's history, the Aldrich Ames case, the Committee 
pioneered the most significant counterintelligence legislation 
ever passed in the Congress. The legislation addressed a number 
of problems identified in the Ames case, including the CIA's 
failure to notify the FBI of a counterintelligence problem in a 
timely manner. The legislation required agency heads to 
immediately advise the FBI whenever it becomes apparent that 
classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in 
an unauthorized manner to a foreign government or agent of a 
foreign government. The legislation also required the President 
to issue, within 180 days, an Executive Order setting standards 
for access to classified information; and made physical 
searches conducted for intelligence purposes subject to the 
same court-order procedures (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978) that have been used for electronic surveillance.
    The establishment of a bipartisan presidential commission 
to examine the roles and capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community was a Senate initiative put forth by Vice Chairman 
John Warner. The 17-member commission includes eight members 
appointed by the Congressional leadership and nine private-
sector individuals appointed by the President. The Commission 
is charged with reviewing the missions, budgets, organization, 
and capabilities of U.S. intelligence agencies; and with 
providing a report of its findings and recommendations to the 
Congress and the President by March 1, 1996.
    In 1988, the Committee established its own Audit and 
Investigations staff to conduct audits of special interest 
areas for the Committee. One of the audit team's most 
noteworthy projects during the 103rd Congress was it review of 
the new National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters project. 
The staff reviewed the construction project's cost, overall 
requirements and management. The key conclusions of the staff's 
review were that the full and comprehensive project costs were 
not provided to the Committee by the NRO; the budget for this 
project was not appropriately presented in the annual NRO 
budget submissions to our Committee; and the new NRO 
Headquarters facility significantly exceeded the NRO's space 
requirements, which caused the project costs to be higher than 
necessary. A Director of Central Intelligence and Department of 
Defense joint review of the project, ordered as a result of the 
Committee's findings, confirmed the Committee's assessment.
    The Committee also played a central role in the March 10, 
1994, decision by the Clinton Administration to permit the 
commercial sale of medium resolution imagery and imaging 
equipment. The Committee has long been concerned about the 
intelligence industrial base and the growth of foreign 
competition in the commercial remote sensing field. After 
holding two hearings to examine how the entry of U.S. medium 
resolution imaging technology into the commercial market would 
affect U.S. national security interests and the U.S. 
intelligence industrial base, the Committee strongly urged the 
President to support the commercial sale of such imagery.
    Over the past several years, Committee Members and staff 
have visited with officials from a large number of foreign 
governments to discuss the Congressional oversight process of 
the U.S. Intelligence Community. In response to the growing 
number of requests received from foreign governments for 
information regarding the U.S. system of oversight, and at the 
direction of Senator DeConcini, the Committee produced a 
booklet entitled ``Legislative Oversight of Intelligence 
Activities: The U.S. Experience.'' The booklet contains a 
narrative which traces the evolution and accomplishments of the 
congressional intelligence committees, and explains how the 
committees are organized and function.
    The Committee was instrumental in making more intelligence-
related information available to the public. The Committee 
accomplished this by holding an unprecedented number of 
hearings and briefings that were open to the public. In 
addition, the Committee took the lead in a number of efforts to 
declassify previously classified material by the Executive 
Branch. In total, the Committee has worked with the Executive 
Branch to declassify and make available to the public over 
36,400 pages of material.
    Under the leadership of its Chairman Dennis DeConcini and 
Vice Chairman John Warner, the Committee placed an emphasis on 
reducing the size of the Committee staff and its operating 
budget. In answering the call of the American people for less 
government, the Committee reduced its budget by 10 percent and 
downsized its staff by 25 percent. Despite these reductions, 
the Committee vigorously carried out its oversight 
responsibility, while tackling unforeseen issues as they arose.
    In conclusion, this report demonstrates the wide range of 
issues the Committee dealt with during the 103rd Congress. The 
Committee continued to carry out its responsibilities in the 
same bipartisan manner that has characterized its work since 
its inception, and, for the most part, received excellent 
cooperation from the Intelligence Community. Rarely did the 
Committee receive information that it had requested in less 
than a timely and complete manner. Overall, the close working 
relationship between the Committee and the Intelligence 
Community, so essential to the conduct of legislative 
oversight, has continued. While the future will hold new 
challenges for both institutions, the experience during the 
103rd Congress provides a good foundation for the years to 

                            II. Legislation

            a. s. 647 cia voluntary separation incentive act

    In March, 1993, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
requested legislation to assist in the drawdown of civilian 
personnel at the CIA. On March 30, 1993, the Committee held a 
closed hearing to receive testimony from the DCI and members of 
his staff on the need for such legislation.
    On May 5, 1993, the Committee reported S. 647, the CIA 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Act, introduced by Senators 
DeConcini and Warner, to allow the Central Intelligence Agency 
to offer limited financial incentives to certain categories of 
CIA employees, as determined by the DCI, to encourage such 
employees to resign or retire. (See Senate Report 103-43.)
    The purpose of the legislation was to assist the Director 
of Central Intelligence in downsizing the CIA civilian work 
force while minimizing the need for involuntary separations to 
meet reduction goals. The legislation was modeled after similar 
legislation enacted for the civilian and military personnel of 
the Department of Defense.
    A virtually identical companion bill (H.R. 1723) passed the 
House of Representatives on May 24, 1993, and was agreed to by 
voice vote in the Senate on May 26, 1993. The bill was signed 
into law by the President on June 8, 1993 (see Public Law 103-

           b. s. 1301 fy 1994 intelligence authorization act

    The Committee reported S. 1301, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, authorizing 
appropriations for U.S. intelligence activities for fiscal year 
1994, on July 28, 1993.
    In addition to the annual authorization of appropriations, 
the bill made certain adjustments in the CIA Retirement and 
Disability System, required an unclassified annual report on 
the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, provided 
funding authorization for the National Security Education 
Program for the next three fiscal years, and provided a limited 
exemption for the National Reconnaissance Office to withhold 
from public disclosure information concerning its employees.
    The bill passed the Senate on November 10, 1993, and the 
conference report on the House counterpart bill (H.R. 2330) was 
agreed to on November 20, 1993. The bill was signed into law on 
December 3, 1993. (Public Law 103-178)

      c. s. 1885 framework for classification and declassification

    On March 2, 1994, Chairman DeConcini introduced S. 1885, 
the Security Classification Act of 1994, providing a uniform 
framework for the classification and declassification of 
information in the interests of national security.
    Among other things, the bill provided--
          explicit criteria to govern the classification of 
          procedures for the identification and marking of 
        classified documents;
          procedures to authorize persons to classify 
        information in the interests of national security;
          time limits for the classification of information;
          procedures to govern the establishment of special 
        access programs;
          procedures to govern the declassification of 
        classified information pursuant to a request from a 
        member of the public or with the expiration of time;
          special procedures to govern the declassification of 
        information pertaining to topics of significant 
        historical interest; and
          sanctions for persons who may violate the procedures 
        established by the bill or by the regulations issued 
        pursuant to the bill.
    While the Committee sought comments concerning the bill 
from the public and from witnesses who appeared before the 
Committee, the bill was not reported due to the concurrent 
efforts of the Executive branch to develop a new Executive 
Order on classification to replace Executive Order 12356, 
issued in 1983. Because the Administration had itself been 
unable to resolve internally the issues posed by the bill 
during its consideration of the new Executive order, the 
Committee deferred consideration of S. 1885 until a later date.

                   d. counterintelligence legislation

    In the wake of the arrest of CIA employee Aldrich H. Ames 
and his wife for espionage on February 21, 1994, six bills 
(designed to improve the counterintelligence and security 
posture of the U.S. Government) were introduced in the Senate 
and referred to the Committee: S. 1866 by Senator Metzenbaum; 
S. 1869 by Senators Boren and Cohen; S. 1890 by Senator Heflin; 
S. 1948 by Senators DeConcini and Warner; S. 2056 by Senators 
DeConcini and Warner on request of the Administration; and S. 
2063 by Senator Gorton.
    All of these bills were the subject of a public hearing on 
May 3, 1994, where the Committee heard testimony from former 
SSCI Chairman Boren and Vice Chairman Cohen; Deputy Attorney 
General Jamie Gorelick; DCI R. James Woolsey; FBI Director 
Louis J. Freeh; Robert Kohler, Vice President, TRW Aeronautics 
and Space Surveillance Group; Kate Martin, Director for 
National Security Studies, American Civil Liberties Union; and 
David Whipple, Executive Director, Association for Former 
Intelligence Officers.
    On May 24, 1994, the Committee marked up S. 2056, the bill 
requested by the Administration. S. 2056 was reported to the 
Senate on June 30, 1994. (See Senate Report 103-296.)
    When the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 
1995 (S. 2082) came to the Senate floor on August 12, 1994, 
Senators DeConcini and Warner offered (a slightly modified 
version of the text of S. 2056) as an amendment to the bill. 
The amendment passed by voice vote.
    In conference on the FY 1995 authorization bill, the 
provisions dealing with counterintelligence and security were 
agreed to with certain amendments. Key provisions included:
          a requirement that the President issue regulations 
        establishing uniform minimum standards for access to 
        classified information;
          a requirement that all persons who obtain security 
        clearances be asked to sign a written waiver, as a 
        condition of their security clearance, permitting an 
        authorized investigative agency to obtain access to 
        their financial and travel records consistent with the 
        criteria and approvals set forth in the statute;
          a requirement that the President may require 
        financial reporting of federal employees who occupy 
        positions giving them access to extremely sensitive 
        classified information;
          new authority for authorized investigative agencies, 
        as defined by the bill, to obtain access to financial 
        and travel records of cleared federal employees, 
        subject to the conditions and approvals specified in 
        the bill;
          a requirement that departments and agency heads 
        advise the FBI immediately of cases where classified 
        information has been compromised to a foreign 
        government, and continue to advise the FBI of actions 
        taken with regard to such compromises;
          an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
        Act of 1978 bringing physical searches done for 
        intelligence purposes under the same type of court 
        order procedures as have been used for electronic 
        surveillances since 1978;
          new jurisdictional authority for U.S. courts to try 
        espionage cases where the conduct in question took 
        place outside the United States;
          a new misdemeanor offense for removing classified 
        documents to an unauthorized location with the intent 
        to retain them at such location;
          new authority for the Attorney General to pay rewards 
        in espionage cases; and
          an expansion of the Government's existing authority 
        to subject the property of a defendant in an espionage 
        case to forfeiture when it can be demonstrated the 
        defendant has deliberately moved the proceeds of his 
        espionage activities beyond the reach of U.S. courts.
    These counterintelligence provisions became law when the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 was signed 
by the President on October 14, 1994.

   E. legislation creating a presidential commission on intelligence

    On June 30, 1994, Senators Warner, Graham, DeConcini, 
Metzenbaum, Chafee, and Cohen introduced S. 2258, a bill to 
create a commission on the roles and capabilities of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community.
    When the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 
1995 came to the Senate floor on August 12, 1994, Senator 
Warner offered a slightly modified version of the text of S. 
2258 as an amendment to the intelligence authorization bill (S. 
2082). It passed the Senate on a roll-call vote of 99-0.
    In conference on the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization 
Bill, the Senate provision was agreed to with minor 
modifications. In general, the conference bill provided for a 
17-member commission to be appointed, with the President 
designating 9 members and the remaining 8 being designated by 
the congressional leaders (two each by the Majority and 
Minority Leaders of the Senate and two each by the Speaker and 
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives).
    The legislation provided a broad and comprehensive array of 
topics for review by the commission, to include the missions 
and functions of intelligence agencies, organizational 
arrangements, legal authorities, budgets, etc. The commission 
was also asked to compare the U.S. system with those of 
comparable foreign governments.
    The report of the Commission is to be submitted by March 1, 
    This provision became law on October 14, 1994, when the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 was signed 
into law by the President.

 f. other provisions of the intelligence authorization act for fy 1995

    In addition to the provisions discussed above, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 also 
contained a number of other significant provisions:
          The 1986 statutory limitation on intelligence 
        cooperation with the Government of South Africa was 
          The DCI was directed to provide a report regarding 
        the desirability and feasibility of instituting an ``up 
        or out'' policy similar to that in effect in the 
        Foreign Service;
          The Secretary of Defense was authorized to provide 
        personnel management for employees of the Central 
        Imagery Office under the same authorities pertaining to 
        Defense Intelligence Agency employees;
          The President was directed to promulgate an Executive 
        order on security classification, and money was 
        earmarked for document declassification pursuant to the 
        new order;
          A funding ceiling was placed on expenditures 
        associated with a new office building complex of the 
        National Reconnaissance Office (see the discussion of 
        this building under ``Oversight Activities''); and
          New reporting requirements were imposed on 
        intelligence agencies to advise the congressional 
        oversight committees when new construction projects or 
        improvements to existing facilities exceed the 
        thresholds established in the bill.

                           III. Arms Control

                              a. start ii

    On January 3, 1993, Presidents George Bush of the United 
States and Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation signed the 
Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, better known as START II. The Committee, which 
has closely followed U.S. arms control monitoring capabilities 
since the SALT II negotiations of the 1970s, commenced an 
inquiry into the implications of START II not only for U.S. 
monitoring of Russian compliance with that treaty, but also for 
monitoring of Russian and Ukrainian compliance with the 
original START treaty, which had yet to enter into force. After 
examining the documentation and holding both informal and on-
the-record briefings for staff, the Committee held a closed 
hearing on START II on May 12, 1993. During that hearing the 
Committee heard testimony from the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Joint 
Staff, and Department of Defense elements responsible for 
handling security and implementation matters. The Committee 
also received written answers to 19 questions for the record 
that it submitted after that hearing.
    START II cannot enter into force until START I does so, and 
the Russian Federation conditioned its ratification of START I 
upon Ukraine's adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
as a non-nuclear weapons state. Ukraine did not announce such 
adherence until recently, and START I will not enter into force 
until after the 103rd Congress adjourns. In addition, Russian 
ratification of START II is not assured. There has been 
substantial public debate in Russia over the wisdom of the 
treaty from the standpoint of Russian military strategy. In 
light of these multiple uncertainties, the Committee, like 
other committees of the Senate, decided not to move beyond the 
hearing stage in its consideration of the treaty during the 
103rd Congress. The Committee expects to revisit this treaty 
and to prepare classified and public reports to the Senate on 
START II during the 104th Congress.

                          b. open skies treaty

    The Open Skies Treaty was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on 
March 24, 1992, and was submitted to the Senate on August 12, 
1992, for its advice and consent to ratification. The 
Committee, which had been following the Open Skies talks 
closely since their inception in 1989, held a series of three 
briefings for staff in late 1992. On March 4, 1993, the 
Committee held a closed hearing on the Treaty during which it 
took testimony from Ambassador John H. Hawes, chief U.S. 
negotiator; Mr. Craig Chellis, Acting Chief of the DCI's Arms 
Control Intelligence Staff; Mr. Leo Hazlewood, Director of the 
National Photographic Interpretation Center; Major General 
Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director, DoD On-Site Inspection 
Agency; Mr. Ray W. Pollari, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense/Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures; 
and Brigadier General Teddy E. Rinebarger, USAF, Assistant 
Deputy Director for International Negotiations, Strategic Plans 
and Policy, the Joint Staff.
    The Committee sought and obtained from the intelligence 
community an interagency assessment of the likely information 
gains and losses resulting from the Treaty. The Committee also 
obtained an interagency assessment of the Treaty's 
counterintelligence and security countermeasures implications. 
Finally, the Committee submitted and received answers to a 
series of questions for the record. Based on these materials, 
the Committee prepared both classified and public reports to 
the Senate. The public report, ``Intelligence and Security 
Implications of the Treaty on Open Skies,'' was published as S. 
Rpt. 103-44 (May 19, 1993).
    The Open Skies Treaty is not an arms control treaty in the 
traditional sense. It does not require the destruction or limit 
the capabilities of any weapons or other military equipment. It 
does not require, therefore, the same sort of monitoring 
through National Technical Means to determine other countries' 
compliance that one finds, for example, in the START Treaty.
    The observation flights envisioned in the Open Skies Treaty 
were very similar, however, to cooperative measures for 
verification that have grown out of arms control treaties. 
Thus, the flights would be implemented by many of the same U.S. 
Government agencies that implement arms control verification; 
the information collected by these flights would have to be 
analyzed by the U.S. intelligence community; and the issues of 
counterintelligence and security protection for U.S. personnel 
and for sensitive or proprietary information were similar to 
those faced in various on-site inspections for arms control 
    These issues of implementation costs and benefits and of 
security concerns and costs were the focus of the Committee's 
report, which is organized around the following questions:
          Does the Treaty contain ambiguities or present 
        monitoring difficulties that are likely to lead to 
        compliance questions?
          What information gains will the United States obtain 
        from this Treaty?
          What sensitive or proprietary information might the 
        United States lose as a result of other countries' 
        observation of U.S. territory or overseas bases?
          How effectively will U.S. security precautions limit 
        the potential loss of such sensitive or proprietary 
          What costs will be incurred in order to implement the 
        Treaty, analyze the information that is obtained, and 
        protect U.S. security?
    The Committee's report included the following 
recommendations, which were also transmitted to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee:

          Recommendation #1: After the first 1-2 years, the 
        United States should not use its full active 
        observation flight quota unless there is a clear 
        likelihood of obtaining significant information through 
        those flights. Unless an environmental sensing package 
        is adopted under Open Skies, only two aircraft should 
        be used for Open Skies flights after the transitional 
          Recommendation #2: The United States should make 
        every effort to use a U.S. observation aircraft and 
        sensors in its Open Skies observation flights.
          Recommendation #3: The Senate should add a condition 
        to the resolution of ratification to the effect that 
        the United States shall not agree to Open Skies 
        Consultative Commission approval of any new Open Skies 
        sensor or of one with improved resolution until at 
        least thirty days after notifying interested Committees 
        of the Senate of its intention to do so; such 
        notification shall include an analysis of the legal and 
        security implications of the proposed change or 
          Recommendation #4: The Executive branch should 
        institute an outreach program to inform industry about 
        the likely impact of the Open Skies Treaty and to offer 
        appropriate assistance in safeguarding proprietary 
        information that may be put at risk. Such assistance 
        need not incur major costs to the government and could, 
        if necessary, be user-funded.
          Recommendation #5: Congress should consider 
        legislation to create a new b(3) exemption to the 
        Freedom of Information Act that would permit the 
        Government to withhold information collected pursuant 
        to the treaty from public disclosure.

    The condition proposed in Recommendation #3 was included in 
the resolution of ratification passed by the Senate on August 
6, 1993, as was a declaration based upon Recommendation #1. The 
legislation suggested in Recommendation #5 was enacted as 
Section 533 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236).

                     c. chemical weapons convention

    On September 3, 1992, after some twenty-five years of 
negotiations, members of the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva concluded the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction--more commonly known as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC. This convention was 
endorsed by the United Nations on November 30, 1992, and was 
opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. On November 
23, 1993, President Clinton endorsed the Convention (which had 
been signed during the Bush Administration) and formally 
submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
    In preparation for Senate consideration of the CWC, 
Committee staff held two on-the-record staff briefings (and 
several less formal sessions) and reviewed numerous documents, 
including a National Intelligence Estimate on U.S. monitoring 
capabilities, written statements from several Executive branch 
agencies, and the Executive branch responses to over 130 
questions for the record. Committee staff also visited U.S. 
Government and industry facilities and attended conferences to 
gain a more detailed knowledge of how information bearing upon 
other countries' compliance with the CWC can be obtained, 
especially through on-site inspections.
    On May 17, 1994, the Committee held a closed hearing on the 
CWC, focused on issues relating to monitoring and verification 
of compliance, the implications of any successful evasion of 
CWC provisions by States Parties, CWC implementation, and the 
Convention's counterintelligence and security implications. 
Testimony was taken at this hearing from the Honorable John D. 
Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency; Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar, U.S. Representative to 
the Conference on Disarmament; Major General David McIlvoy, 
Deputy J-5 (Director for Strategic Plans and Policy) for 
International Negotiations, the Joint Staff; Mr. John Lauder, 
Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for 
Arms Control; Major General John Landry, USA, National 
Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces; Dr. Theodore 
M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic 
Energy) (Chemical/Biological Matters); and the Honorable 
William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export 
Administration. A written statement was submitted by Brigadier 
General Gregory G. Govan, USA, Director of the Department of 
Defense On-Site Inspection Agency.
    On September 30, 1994, the Committee issued both classified 
and public reports to the Senate on ``U.S. Capability to 
Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.'' The 
public report, which the Committee also submitted to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, was published as S. Rpt. 103-
    The Committee's public report includes numerous findings 
and fourteen recommendations, several of which would require 
language in the resolution of ratification by which the Senate 
would give its advice and consent to ratification of the 
Convention. The report's recommendations and major conclusions 
regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention were summarized as 

                      Implications of the CWC Text

    The Committee pursued several issues of treaty 
interpretation in its hearing and in questions for the record, 
and the answers provided by the Executive branch were generally 
reassuring. The lack of a definition of ``law enforcement 
purposes'' could lead, however, to compliance disputes.
    If the CWC is ratified, a new Executive order will be 
needed to minimize the risk of American use of riot control 
agents in ways that would raise compliance questions.
    It is likely that some States Parties to the CWC will 
assert that the Convention requires substantial changes in the 
functioning of the Australia Group. The Committee trusts that 
the United States and other Australia Group members will 
prepare to counter such arguments both publicly and in 
international fora.
    Recommendation #1.--The Senate should make its consent to 
ratification of the CWC conditioned upon a binding obligation 
upon the President that the United States be present at all 
Amendment Conferences and cast its vote, either positive or 
negative, on all proposed amendments made at such conferences, 
thus ensuring the opportunity for the Senate to consider any 
amendment approved by the Amendment Conference.

                      Monitoring and Verification

    A single, all-encompassing judgment cannot be made 
regarding the verifiability of the CWC or U.S. capability to 
monitor compliance with the Convention. In some areas our 
confidence will be significantly higher than others. Like the 
Executive branch, however, the Committee largely accepts the 
Intelligence Community's pessimistic assessment of U.S. 
capability to detect and identify a sophisticated and 
determined violation of the Convention, especially on a small 
scale. The Committee also notes the Intelligence Community's 
assessment that the CWC would give the U.S. Government access 
to useful information, relevant to potential CW threats to the 
United States, that would not otherwise be obtainable.
    It is likely that some countries that ratify the CWC will 
seek to retain an offensive chemical weapons capability. While 
it is unlikely that they would do so by diverting declared CW 
stocks, the covert stockpiling of undeclared agent or munitions 
could well occur. Monitoring such illicit behavior will be the 
single most challenging task for the CWC verification regime 
and U.S. monitoring.
    OPCW investigators, if not blocked from gaining needed 
access to sites and affected persons, should be able to 
determine whether chemical weapons have been used in a 
particular case.
    Recommendation #2.--The Executive branch should work to 
foster OPCW procedures that would permit on-site inspectors to 
identify and record the presence of non-scheduled chemicals, 
while taking extraordinary steps, if necessary, to protect any 
confidential information thereby acquired.
    If the international inspectorate is determined, well 
trained, and well equipped, and if U.S. or other States Parties 
provide accurate and timely leads to the OPCW, there may well 
be some occasions in which on-site inspection will produce 
evidence of CWC violations. It will be vital, however, that the 
OPCW not lose sight of that objective.
    In addition, U.S. and international monitoring will, at 
times, be sufficient to raise well-founded questions. In order 
to maintain the effectiveness of the Convention and to deter 
potential violators, the United States and the OPCW must pursue 
such questions vigorously, even to the point of seeking 
international sanctions if a State Party does not adhere to the 
principle set forth in paragraph 11 of Article IX of the CWC, 
that ``the inspected State Party shall have the right and the 
obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its 
compliance with this Convention.'' U.S. verification policy and 
investment in monitoring technologies should start from the 
principle that monitoring can contribute to effective 
international action even if it cannot conclusively demonstrate 
a country's violation of the Convention.
    Recommendation #3.--The Executive branch should adhere to 
an arms control verification policy that does not require 
agencies to prove a country's non-compliance before issues are 
raised (either bilaterally or in such international fora as the 
OPCW or the United Nations) and appropriate unilateral actions 
are taken.
    The deterrent effect of the CWC is extremely difficult to 
predict. A strong U.S. commitment to the enforcement of the CWC 
will be essential to the effectiveness of the Convention. It 
may in fact be possible to achieve a measure of both 
enforcement and deterrence, but only if the United States is 
prepared to make compliance with the CWC a major element of its 
foreign policy stance toward each State Party to the 

               Improving U.S. Monitoring and Verification

    Recommendation #4.--The Committee endorses the call by the 
interagency committee under the Deputy Secretary of Defense for 
increased funding of CW sensor technology and urges the 
Executive branch to redirect FY 1995 funds for this purpose as 
well. The Committee also recommends that Congress rescind its 
restriction on DOE efforts to develop CW (and BW) sensors based 
upon technologies it is developing in the nuclear field.
    Funds invested in CW sensor technology may well be wasted, 
however, unless the Executive branch institutes effective 
oversight of the multitude of agency programs in this field. 
The recent formation of a Nonproliferation and Arms Control 
Technology Working Group may provide an appropriate forum in 
which to deconflict and narrow the focus of agency programs and 
to fund the most promising avenues to ensure expeditious 
completion. The Executive branch should ensure that the body 
that makes such decisions is fully briefed on all relevant 
intelligence and defense programs. Even highly sensitive 
programs should not be immune from high-level interagency 
consideration to determine whether they warrant increased or 
lessened support.

                       Cooperation With the OPCW

    The lack of U.S. access to raw data from on-site 
inspections will impede the Intelligence Community's monitoring 
of CWC compliance.
    Progress is being made in The Hague on enabling the OPCW to 
take advantage of the information resources of States Parties; 
the Executive branch should give this matter high priority.
    Recommendation #5.--Rather than waiting until the CWC 
enters into force, the Executive branch should begin preparing 
now to meet the likely need for U.S. support to OPCW 
inspections, including information that would be needed for 
challenge inspections of declared and undeclared sites pursuant 
to Part X of the CWC Verification Annex.
    The Committee cannot assure the Senate that the Preparatory 
Commission's other recommendations will improve CWC 
verification significantly, but it is encouraged by the 
reported general direction of those talks.

                   The Question of Russian Compliance

    The Committee views with great concern Russia's failure to 
comply fully with the data declaration provisions of the 
Wyoming MOU and its implementing procedures. In the absence of 
full compliance with the Wyoming MOU, neither the Committee nor 
the Senate can overlook the distinct possibility that Russia 
intends to violate the CWC.
    The failure to implement all the on-site inspections 
originally agreed to in the Wyoming MOU is another cause for 
serious concern. The inspections under Phase II of the MOU are 
no longer likely to make a significant contribution to 
compliance monitoring or verification. Rather, as pared down in 
1993 and in the final implementing procedures, they will 
continue the confidence-building process and help the two sides 
prepare for later inspections under the BDA and/or the CWC. 
Given Russia's refusal to permit a full suite of technical 
inspection equipment, even after most inspections and all 
challenge inspections of non-declared sites were eliminated, 
the Senate must assume that Russia may have something to hide.
    Recommendation #6.--The President should make full Russian 
implementation of the Wyoming MOU and the BDA an issue of high 
priority in U.S.-Russian relations and raise the matter 
personally at the highest levels. The Committee recommends that 
the Senate add a condition to the resolution of ratification of 
the CWC requiring the President, 10 days after the CWC enters 
into force or 10 days after the Russian Federation deposits 
instruments of ratification of the CWC, whichever is later, 
          (a) to certify to the Senate that Russia has complied 
        fully with the data declaration requirements of the 
        Wyoming MOU; or
          (b) to submit to the Senate a report on apparent 
        discrepancies in Russia's Wyoming MOU data and the 
        results of any bilateral discussions regarding those 
    The Committee further recommends that the Senate add a 
declaration to the resolution of ratification of the CWC 
expressing the sense of the Senate that if Russian data 
discrepancies remain unresolved 180 days after the United 
States receives information on Russia's initial CWC data 
declarations from the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the United 
States should request the Executive Council of the OPCW to 
assist in clarifying those discrepancies pursuant to Article IX 
of the Convention.
    Given the passage of one-and-a-half years since Russia and 
the United States reached ad referendum agreement on BDA 
implementation, and given the fact that the BDA mandates 
extensive on-site inspection by U.S. personnel, the Committee 
believes there is a real risk that the BDA will never enter 
into force, notwithstanding Russia's economic incentive to 
accept bilateral verification. In the absence of agreement on 
BDA implementation, the Committee advises the Senate that 
verification of Russian compliance would likely be based upon a 
smaller number of inspections than originally anticipated, that 
the inspections of Russian sites would be conducted by the OPCW 
inspectorate rather than by U.S. personnel, and that there 
would be no guaranteed U.S. access to the detailed inspection 
data. On the other hand, the OPCW is unlikely to exempt Russia 
from the requirements set forth in the CWC's provisions.
    Recommendation #7.--The Senate should add a condition to 
the resolution of ratification of the CWC, barring the deposit 
of instruments of ratification until the President certifies to 
Congress either: (a) That U.S.-Russian agreement on BDA 
implementation has been or will shortly be achieved, and that 
the agreed verification procedures will meet or exceed those 
mandated by the CWC; or (b) that the OPCW will be prepared, 
when the CWC enters into force, to effectively monitor U.S. and 
Russian facilities, as well as those of the other States 
Parties. Relevant committees may also wish to consider whether 
it would be effective to attach conditions to one or more 
elements of U.S. economic assistance to Russia.
    Recommendation #8.--The Executive branch and the committees 
of Congress with responsibility for U.S. contributions to the 
OPCW budget should pay close attention to the OPCW's changing 
needs, so that additional funds can be made available in a 
timely fashion if current planning assumptions prove too 
    Recommendation #9.--The Executive branch should ensure that 
the effectiveness of the CWC, both in Russia and around the 
world, is the primary objective of U.S.-Russian CW policy.

           Protecting Classified and Proprietary Information

    Although some loss of sensitive information will likely 
occur as a result of CWC data declarations and on-site 
inspections, the Executive branch is taking all reasonable 
steps to protect classified information that may be at risk. 
The Committee welcomes the recent increase in efforts to help 
U.S. industry, but believes that still more can be done to 
protect confidential business information held by private 
    Some loss of classified or proprietary information in 
challenge inspections is likely, at least through perimeter 
monitoring. It will be especially important, therefore, for the 
OPCW to have effective regulations and procedures guarding 
against disclosure of such information by OPCW personnel.
    Recommendation #10.--The United States should exercise its 
right to reject a proposed inspector or inspection assistant 
when the facts indicate that this person is likely to seek 
information to which the inspection team is not entitled or to 
mishandle information that the team obtains.
    Recommendation #11.--Congress should amend the CWC 
implementing legislation (S. 2221) to give the DoD On-Site 
Inspection Agency (OSIA) authority to escort inspectors on non-
DoD sites, when asked to do so by the owners or managers of 
those sites, on a non-reimbursable basis to the extent that 
funds are available.
    Recommendation #12.--The Department of Commerce, with 
assistance from the Department of Defense, should develop a 
database similar to the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness 
Program (DTIRP) database, to which interested firms could 
voluntarily contribute information on security needs at their 
facilities in the event of a CWC inspection.
    Given industry's important role in data declarations, the 
first of which must be submitted by the United States only 30 
days after the CWC enters into force, the risk that industry 
unpreparedness will lead to inaccurate U.S. declarations is a 
cause for concern.
    Recommendation #13.--The Commerce Department should 
undertake a substantially-increased outreach program to inform 
companies that do not yet understand their data declaration 
obligations, in particular. Because U.S. ratification of the 
CWC may well precede enactment of implementation legislation, 
the Commerce Department should begin this effort now, rather 
than waiting for formal designation as the lead agency for this 
    Recommendation #14.--The Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations should pay particular attention to whether section 
302 of S. 2221 provides for sufficient disclosure of 
information to Congress and, if necessary, to the public.

    The resolution of ratification was not reported out of the 
Foreign Relations Committee during the 103rd Congress, so there 
has been no final disposition regarding either the Intelligence 
Committee's recommendations or the larger issue of Senate 
advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons 

 d. nuclear weapons proliferation in korea, russia, ukraine, and china

    In the 103rd Congress, the Committee continued its on-going 
review of the Intelligence Community's assessment of the threat 
to U.S. national security interests and its effectiveness in 
monitoring the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons and their delivery systems. The Committee 
has worked to enhance the resources devoted to this important 
issue in an increasingly constrained budget environment.

                        IV. Counterintelligence

    In addition to the legislative provisions pertaining to 
counterintelligence which were enacted in the 2nd session of 
the 103rd Congress (see section II, above), the Committee 
devoted a substantial part of its oversight efforts to 
analyzing the Ames espionage case, which came to light on 
February 21, 1994, with the arrest of CIA employee Aldrich H. 
Ames and his wife, Rosario.
    The Committee was first briefed on the case the day of 
arrests and immediately requested the CIA Inspector General to 
undertake an inquiry to determine what Ames had done and how he 
had been able to carry on such activities for a period of nine 
years without detection. In the meantime, the Committee 
continued to receive periodic updates on the progress of the 
criminal investigation and undertook an extensive inquiry into 
the cooperation between the CIA and FBI where 
counterintelligence matters were concerned.
    When both defendants pled guilty to charges stemming from 
their espionage activities on April 28, 1994, the Committee was 
no longer constrained in its inquiry by concerns of hampering 
the criminal investigation and began to look more intently into 
what Ames had done. Closed hearings were held on May 6, June 
16, and June 28. On July 18, the staff held an all-day session 
with representatives of the CIA and FBI to review the case from 
start to finish. These proceedings were supplemented by an 
interview of Ames, conducted by Senator DeConcini, on August 5, 
    On September 24, 1994, the Committee received the first 
draft of the CIA Inspector General's report on the Ames case, 
and on September 28th held a closed hearing where the CIA 
Inspector General presented his report. The following day, the 
Director of Central Intelligence testified with respect to the 
disciplinary actions he had taken in response to the Inspector 
General's report.
    On the basis of these proceedings and the report of the CIA 
Inspector General, the Committee, by unanimous vote, issued its 
own analysis of the Ames case on November 1, 1994. (See Senate 
Report 103-90.) In addition to criticizing the leniency of the 
disciplinary actions taken by the DCI, the Committee found 
``numerous and egregious'' shortcomings in the way the Ames 
case had been handled and proposed 23 separate recommendations 
for change. Among the key findings, the Committee found:
          The counterintelligence function at the CIA was weak 
        and inherently flawed, and, despite numerous reports 
        pointing out these flaws, CIA had failed to correct 
          The CIA had failed to document and address the 
        serious suitability problems demonstrated by Ames, 
        e.g., alcohol abuse, extramarital relationships with 
        foreign nationals, security violations, failure to 
        comply with agency administrative regulations;
          The CIA had failed to adequately coordinate the 
        operational activities of Ames by allowing him to meet 
        alone with Soviet Embassy officials at a time when he 
        had access to extraordinarily sensitive information 
        pertaining to Soviet nationals working clandestinely 
        with the CIA;
          The CIA had failed to aggressively investigate the 
        cases compromised by Ames with adequate resources until 
        mid-1991, six years after the compromises occurred;
          The CIA had failed to adequately limit Ames's 
        assignments and access to classified information after 
        suspicions concerning him had been raised; and
          The CIA had failed to advise the oversight committees 
        of the losses caused by Ames despite a statutory 
        requirement to advise of ``significant intelligence 
          The FBI had failed to devote sufficient resources to 
        the molehunt and delayed for too long in opening a 
        formal investigation of Ames.
    The Committee directed the CIA Inspector General to conduct 
a followup inquiry to determine the extent to which the 
problems noted in the Ames case have been remedied (or still 
exist), and provide a report to the Committee by September 1, 
1995. The Committee promised continuing oversight of this area.

                          V. Counterterrorism

      A. world trade center bombing and the cia employee shooting

    The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City on 
February 26, 1993 awakened Americans to the fact that 
international terrorists are capable of acting within the 
borders of the United States. Six Americans were killed in that 
bombing. In September 1993, the case went to trial and four 
suspects were convicted in March 1994. To date, the FBI has not 
found evidence that a foreign government was responsible for 
the bombing.
    The capability of terrorists to strike within the United 
States was accentuated by the killing of 2 CIA employees as 
they prepared to enter the CIA compound in Langley, Virginia on 
January 25, 1993. The prime suspect for these killings, Amir 
Kansi, fled the country and is the object of a major manhunt.
    During the 103rd Congress, the Committee held four hearings 
to examine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to 
monitor and deter the activities of international and domestic 
terrorist organizations. The Committee has consistently 
supported increased efforts by the Intelligence Community to 
identify support to terrorist organizations and to counter such 

                        VI. Oversight Activities

                    a. the national security threat

    On January 25, 1994 the Committee held an open hearing on 
the current and projected national security threats to the U.S. 
Testifying before the Committee were Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) R. James Woolsey, and Lt. General James R. 
Clapper, Jr., USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA). The witnesses discussed the threats to the U.S. and its 
interests from the former Soviet Union, China, and countries in 
other regions of particular concern (including the Middle East, 
North Korea, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia) and from transnational 
concerns (including the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems, terrorism, and illegal 
drugs). The Committee's hearing transcript, ``Current and 
Projected National Security Threats to the United States and 
its Interests Abroad,'' [S. Hrg. 103-630] which included 
numerous unclassified responses to Committee questions-for-the-
record (QFRs), was printed and is available to the public.

                 b. commercial availability of imagery

    The Committee played a central role in the Administration's 
March 10, 1994, decision to permit the commercial sale of 
medium resolution imagery and imaging equipment.
    Long concerned about the intelligence industrial base and 
the growth of foreign competition in the commercial remote 
sensing field, the Committee held a closed hearing on June 10, 
1993, to learn from government and private sector experts how 
the entry of U.S. medium resolution imaging technology into the 
commercial remote sensing market would affect U.S. national 
security interests and the U.S. intelligence industrial base. 
The Committee held a second open hearing on this topic on 
November 17, 1993, for the purposes of acquainting the public 
with the issue and learning the Administration's progress in 
producing a government-wide policy on commercial remote 
sensing. On December 9, 1993, Chairman DeConcini, Vice Chairman 
Warner, and Senator Robert Kerrey wrote to President Clinton to 
note that ``there are substantial commercial opportunities for 
United States businesses to sell satellite imagery systems and 
products without in any way placing U.S. intelligence 
capabilities and methods at risk'' and urging the 
Administration to more aggressively support such sales. On 
March 10, 1994, the Department of Commerce announced that the 
Administration would henceforth permit the foreign sale of 
remote sensing technology, within the context of a licensing 
regime that would protect U.S. national security interests.

                        c. economic intelligence

    During the spring and summer of 1993, the Committee 
undertook an extensive review of economic intelligence to 
ascertain the nature and extent of the Intelligence Community's 
efforts in this area. After a series of staff visits and 
briefings, the Committee held two closed hearings on this 
subject to hear testimony from representatives of the CIA, the 
NSA, the FBI, and the Departments of State and Commerce. These 
closed hearings were followed on August 5, 1993, with an open 
hearing to receive testimony from private sector 
representatives, to include John F. Hayden, Corporate Vice 
President, the Boeing Company; Thomas Faught, Jr., Faught 
Management Group, Boyden Associates; and Mark M. Lowenthal, 
Senior Fellow, Congressional Research Service.
    On the basis of this review, the Committee concluded that 
while the area of economic intelligence continued to lack 
overall direction and guidance at the national level, the 
ongoing activities of intelligence agencies appeared to be 
consistent with U.S. laws, policy, and objectives, and appeared 
to be producing beneficial results, both from the standpoint of 
U.S. policymakers and U.S. commercial interests.
    This assessment was confirmed during a closed hearing held 
by the Committee in July 1994, where representatives of the 
Departments of State and Commerce testified with respect to 
several cases where intelligence reporting in the economic area 
had led to tangible benefits for U.S. commercial interests. 
While the Committee noted the continued lack of overall policy 
direction in this area, it was satisfied with the progress 
being made in the absence of such direction.
    No further action was taken on this subject during the 
103rd Congress.

                   d. clipper chip/digital telephony

    During the 103rd Congress, the Committee explored two 
initiatives proposed by the Clinton Administration to deal with 
problems posed by advancing technologies which threatened to 
hamper or thwart the ability of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, acting pursuant to existing law and 
policy, to intercept electronic communications for foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. While the concern 
which motivated both initiatives was principally that the 
government's ability to conduct wiretaps for law enforcement 
purposes be preserved, both initiatives also affected foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence equities.
    The first of these initiatives, and the one which received 
the most attention from the Committee, was the so-called 
``clipper chip'' proposal. This proposal was prompted by the 
growing concern that the encryption of telecommunications was 
becoming increasingly sophisticated and would in time become 
increasingly widespread, and that law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, acting pursuant to applicable law and 
policy, would be unable to decrypt such communications. The 
Administration plan envisioned the Government henceforth 
purchasing only secure telephones that used a special computer 
chip, called a ``clipper chip,'' to encrypt conversations over 
such telephones. While the clipper chip telephone would provide 
excellent security, the Government would retain a special 
``key'' that would allow it to decrypt conversations encrypted 
with the clipper chip. This key would be in two parts, each 
part to be held by a designated ``key escrow agent,'' who would 
provide access to authorized law enforcement agencies when 
presented with a court order or warrant. These ``key escrow 
agents'' were to be designated by the Attorney General.
    While the proposal did not require U.S. manufacturers of 
encryption software to use the ``clipper chip'' in the 
manufacture of such software for sale to the public, the 
Administration assumed that, since the Government was by far 
the largest user of secure telephones, manufacturers would, as 
a matter of economic practicality, conform to the Government 
    The Administration's proposal envisioned that U.S. 
companies would be able to secure export licenses to use 
``clipper chip'' devices outside the United States to secure 
their communications abroad, and left open the possibility of 
sale of clipper chip telephones to foreign governments.
    After a series of staff-level meetings with Administration 
officials and representatives of the private sector, the 
Committee held a closed hearing on the clipper chip proposal on 
June 17, 1993, receiving testimony from representatives of the 
government agencies principally involved in developing the 
proposal. This was followed by a series of written questions to 
the agencies involved to explore various issues raised at the 
hearing. The Committee took no legislative or budgetary action 
with respect to the ``clipper chip'' proposal. Congress, 
however, enacted new legislation in November, 1993, which 
called for a comprehensive review of national cryptography 
policy by the National Research Council, the principal 
operating element of the National Academy of Science (see 
Public Law 103-160). The Administration announced that it would 
defer further implementation of the ``clipper chip'' initiative 
pending the outcome of this review.
    The second initiative reviewed by the Committee was the 
Administration's proposed legislation to address the problem 
posed by ``digital telephony.'' The problem arises as telephone 
companies switch to digital communications to transmit voice 
patterns more efficiently over telephone lines. If lines 
carrying such digital signals are wiretapped, the conversations 
transmitted by such signals are unintelligible unless the 
digital signals carrying the conversations are processed 
through software that makes the conversations intelligible. The 
Administration's proposed legislation would require the 
providers of telephone services to make such software 
conversion possible so that targeted conversations could be 
isolated and made intelligible to authorized federal agencies, 
acting pursuant to lawful authority.
    The legislation drafted by the Administration was 
considered by the Committees on Judiciary of the House and the 
Senate. While this Committee held no hearings on the 
legislation and took no official position with regard to the 
proposal, Chairman DeConcini, acting in his personal capacity, 
did provide testimony to the Judiciary Committees in support of 
the need for legislation, albeit with certain reservations 
concerning the Administration's proposal. In October, 1994, the 
Judiciary Committees agreed to a modified version of the 
legislation proposed by the Administration, which was 
ultimately enacted into law. (See Public Law 103-414)


    The audit staff was created in 1988 by the Committee to 
provide ``a credible independent arm for Committee review of 
covert action programs and other specific Intelligence 
Community functions and issues.'' The Audit and Investigations 
staff has brought a new dimension to the oversight capability 
of the Committee by the depth and quality of the program 
reviews it has provided. During the 103rd Congress the staff 
conducted seven individual program reviews and assisted on a 
number of other critical Committee activities.
    One of the most noteworthy projects undertaken by the Audit 
and Investigations staff was the review of the new NRO 
Headquarters project. The staff reviewed the construction 
project's cost and schedule estimates, and overall requirements 
and management. The key conclusions of the staff's review were 
that the full and comprehensive project costs were not provided 
to the Committee by the NRO; the budget for this project was 
not appropriately presented in the annual NRO budget 
submissions to our Committee; and the new NRO Headquarters 
facility significantly exceeded the NRO's space requirements, 
which caused the project costs to be higher than necessary.
    As a result of the Members' concerns about the new NRO 
Headquarters facility, the President advised the DCI and 
Secretary of Defense to make public the existence of the new 
NRO Headquarters facility. This was done on August 8, 1994. On 
August 10, 1994 the Committee held a public hearing to express 
their concerns to NRO and Intelligence Community officials. At 
that hearing, witnesses acknowledged NRO failures. For example, 
DCI Woolsey stated, ``If this [construction project] were begun 
today, * * * there's no question it would be done 
differently.'' The NRO project director added, ``We have been 
negligent, clearly negligent, for not showing the budget 
breakout for this project.''
    The DCI and Secretary of Defense also committed to further 
review of the NRO headquarters project to consider if there 
were failures in the process, and identify potential cost 
savings, if any. That review upheld the Committee's concerns. 
The DCI/Secretary of Defense Review Team concluded, among other 
things, that the NRO failed to follow appropriate budget 
guidelines for communicating the costs of the new headquarters 
project to the Congress and that there had been an insufficient 
review of the project's space requirements, which resulted in 
an oversized facility which could house as many as 1,000 
additional people.
    As a result of the Audit and Investigations Team efforts, 
the Committee took several actions which are designed to 
strengthen oversight of intelligence facilities. For example, 
Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1995 placed certain limitations upon the funding 
authorized for the NRO, including:
          suspending $50 million in funding until further 
        examination of the project was done,
          allowing no further construction of NRO facilities 
        unless Department of Defense policies and procedures 
        for new construction are adhered to, and
          placing a cap on the new NRO headquarters 
        construction costs.
    Section 602 of the conference report established procedures 
for congressional notification and approval of certain 
intelligence community construction and improvement projects.

                      f. release of jfk documents

    Public Law 102-526, the ``President John F. Kennedy 
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992,'' mandated the 
expeditious disclosure of records relevant to the assassination 
of President John F. Kennedy.
    In the spring of 1993, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence identified 175 archived boxes of material as 
having possible relevance to the assassination. A page by page 
review by Committee staff was completed by August 1993 and 
resulted in the identification of over 34,000 pages of relevant 
    Coincident with the document identification and cataloging 
process, agencies with equities in these documents were invited 
by the Committee to conduct a security review of the 34,000 
pages. Ninety-nine percent of the documents were declassified. 
The Committee transmitted all declassified and redacted 
documents directly to the National Archives. Classified 
documents are being held by the Committee pending disposition 
by the President's Board of Review.
    The process of identification, cataloguing, security review 
and transmittal to the Archives for public release was 
completed in August of 1994.

             g. north american free trade agreement (nafta)

    Committee members held a November 4, 1993, open hearing to 
explore NAFTA's potential impact on U.S.-Mexico relations, 
hemispheric ties, the pace of Mexican economic reform and 
narcotics trafficking. The CIA's National Intelligence Officer 
for Economics testified that NAFTA's implementation would 
likely facilitate greater openness and competitiveness in 
Mexico's political system, stimulate greater economic change 
and growth in Mexico and enhance efforts by the United States 
to promote export-oriented growth policies and internal reform 
programs throughout the Hemisphere. Representatives of the U.S. 
private sector and academe presented testimony emphasizing the 
far-reaching economic implications of NAFTA.

                            h. covert action

    Covert action funding represents a small and shrinking 
fraction of the intelligence budget. However, mindful of the 
need to ensure that covert activities serve an agreed foreign 
policy objective and are conducted in accordance with American 
law and values, the Committee devoted a substantial amount of 
oversight to this topic. In addition to regular periodic 
reviews, the Committee convened special sessions to consider 
new activities initiated by the President. The Committee also 
acted in the FY 1995 budget process to ensure that the Central 
Intelligence Agency's covert action capability remained 
sufficient to respond to short-notice requirements.

              i. russian/eastern european organized crime

    A serious problem since the end of the Cold Car has been 
the apparent growth of Russian organized crime. Within Russia, 
crime has become the most serious public issue, with some 
treating the growth of organized crime as a real threat to the 
future of democratic and free market reforms in Russia. The 
international reach of Russian organized crime has raised 
concerns in Europe because of the reported involvement of 
Russian organized crime elements in everything from stolen car 
rings to drug smuggling and nuclear proliferation. Russian 
organized crime activity has also reached America, involving 
major criminal activities in New York and Los Angeles and other 
areas as well.
    The Committee and its staff have engaged in a series of 
oversight activities intended to focus high level attention on 
the Russian/Eastern European organized crime problem and ensure 
that our intelligence response to this problem is timely, 
adequately supported, and fully coordinated with our law 
enforcement efforts. The Committee notes with regret that the 
issuance of a formal executive branch policy delineating the 
foreign intelligence/law enforcement interface in this area is 
now more than a year overdue, despite vigorous attempts by the 
Committee to urge the policymaking process to completion. The 
subject, and the intelligence/law enforcement interface policy, 
will remain special subjects of Committee interest in the 104th 

                  j. environmental task force hearing

    The Committee has been working with the Intelligence 
Community on efforts to use intelligence assets and data to 
assist environmental scientists and federal agencies with an 
environmental mission. Since its inception, the Environmental 
Program has taken numerous steps to determine the role 
classified systems and data can play in environmental science.
    In 1993, the Committee initiated a study of the potential 
use of classified systems in support of the environmental 
missions of appropriate federal agencies, including the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and the Departments of Interior 
(including USGS), Transportation, Commerce (including NOAA), 
Agriculture, Defense, and Energy.
    The study was completed in May 1994, and affirmed the 
significant potential benefits of this effort in providing 
unique environmental information to federal agencies. The 
Committee directed the Environmental Program to shift its focus 
to this effort, and has emphasized the importance of closer 
coordination between the Intelligence Community and federal 
agencies with environmental data needs.
    On August 4, 1994, the Committee held a hearing to provide 
Committee members with detailed information relating to the 
efforts of the Environmental Program. CIA's Deputy Director for 
Science and Technology testified.
    During 1994, the Committee did express specific concerns 
regarding the focus and budget of the Environmental Program, 
and took steps to resolve these concerns.

            k. nsa support to law enforcement/sigint policy

    The Committee, while in agreement with the National 
Security Agency's need to protect intelligence sources and 
methods and the constitutional imperative prohibiting practices 
that infringe upon individual rights, is nonetheless of the 
view that the National Security Agency can and should do more 
than it has done in the past in foreign intelligence collection 
to support U.S. law enforcement. The Committee believes that 
the threat to domestic tranquility posed by international 
organized crime of all kinds, but especially international 
illegal drug trafficking, is so great that NSA's past 
conservative approach to this problem does not meet the 
American people's expectation that their government will fully 
exert its resources and capabilities in their defense. 
Accordingly, in section 810, ``Counternarcotics Targets 
Funding,'' of Public Law 103-359, the Committee increased 
funding directed against the narcotics target by $5 million and 
directed that ``* * * a detailed operations plan with special 
emphasis on the United States/Mexico border and including the 
participation of the National Security Agency, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
and the United States Customs Service * * * '' be completed and 
provided to the Committee by November 15, 1994. The Committee 
is gratified by NSA's initial response to the Committee's 
directions and views and expects that the Agency, in close 
coordination with the Department of Justice, will make the 
maximum effort permitted under the law, with full respect for 
the constitutional protections afforded all U.S. persons. This 
is another area where the executive branch's formal policy on 
the foreign intelligence/law enforcement interface, which is 
more than a year overdue, can make a positive difference.

                       l. airborne reconnaissance

    The Committee undertook three significant actions affecting 
airborne reconnaissance programs and activities in the 103rd 
Congress: (1) The placing of additional safeguard conditions on 
the tactical UAV program to ensure that the warfighter gets a 
tactical UAV that works; (2) the reversal of the proposed 
transfer of the U-2 airborne reconnaissance program to the 
Tactical Intelligence and Related activities (TIARA) 
aggregation; and (3) the consolidation of governmental efforts 
into a new organization responsible for the development and 
acquisition of all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
    The Committee strongly supported the HUNTER UAV system 
which is designed for short-range reconnaissance in direct 
support of tactical commanders. However, the Committee noted 
early on that the HUNTER UAV system had experienced several 
fundamental problems during its development and early 
procurement efforts. The Committee feared that past concerns 
were not resolved, and that as of April 1994, the HUNTER 
program included an insufficient and unrealistic testing 
schedule, extremely poor logistics support, engine design 
problems, and questionable program management. Five UAV 
crashes/mishaps between June and October of 1994 attested to 
the significance of the HUNTER problems. While DOD restructured 
the HUNTER program in the middle of the Congressional budget 
cycle, the SSCI was instrumental in an amendment that 
established additional safeguards.
    In 1994, the Administration proposed transferring the U-2 
program to TIARA on the basis of consolidating management of 
certain functional areas such as airborne reconnaissance, 
rather than according to the current statutory framework 
governing intelligence programs and activities, specifically, 
the distinction between national and ``solely'' tactical 
intelligence. At the insistence of the SSCI, funding and 
oversight responsibility for the U-2 airborne reconnaissance 
capability was retained in the DCI's National Foreign 
Intelligence Program. The Committee included in its public 
report accompanying the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act 
language requiring prior Congressional notification of any 
further proposed transfers of programs out of the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program.
    In response to Congressional concerns, the Secretary of 
Defense established the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
(DARO) in November of 1993. Its Director was given 
responsibility for managing the development and acquisition of 
all joint Service and Defense-wide manned and unmanned airborne 
reconnaissance capabilities including vehicles, sensors, data 
links and data relays. In support of DARO's stated goal ``to 
bring management attention, order, and efficiency to tactical 
airborne reconnaissance development and acquisition,'' the 
Committee negated the President's request to allow a 
duplicative UAV developmental effort by a non-DoD agency. The 
Committee noted that such a bifurcation of responsibilities 
would clearly have duplicated DARO's charter and capability to 
develop and acquire UAVs. The Committee did not understand the 
Administration's need for, or the practicality of, authorizing 
two U.S. Government activities to develop separate UAV 

          m. publication of booklet on congressional oversight

    Principally in response to the growing number of requests 
received from foreign governments for information regarding the 
U.S. system of oversight, the Committee approved the 
publication of a new booklet in the fall of 1994 entitled 
``Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. 
Experience.'' (Senate Report 103-88)
    The booklet contains a narrative which traces the evolution 
and accomplishments of the congressional intelligence 
committees, and explains how the committees are organized and 
function. The appendix to the booklet contains the pertinent 
statutes, congressional rules, and executive branch policy 
documents regarding the congressional oversight process, as 
well as several recent commentaries on the subject.

                       VII. Foreign Intelligence

                                a. haiti

    The Committee held six closed hearings and briefings 
exclusively on Haiti and discussed the evolving Haitian 
situation during several additional closed hearings in a 13-
month period beginning September 1993. Members focused on the 
controversy surrounding the CIA's psychological profile of 
President Jean- Bertrand Aristide, the impact of the embargo, 
the political situation in Haiti and military plans surrounding 
the September 19, 1994 U.S. intervention in that country.

                               b. bosnia

    The conflict in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina was an 
area of intensive focus for the Committee throughout the 103rd 
Congress. The Committee held numerous closed briefings and 
hearings on the situation in Bosnia and the adequacy of 
intelligence support to U.S. Government efforts in Bosnia. 
These briefings and hearings provided the Committee with 
intelligence assessments of the military situation in Bosnia; 
the likely impact of potential U.S. military actions; the 
potential for achieving a negotiated settlement; and the 
effectiveness of sanctions enforcement efforts. In addition, 
the Committee examined the intelligence community's role in the 
international community's efforts to investigate war crimes in 

                               c. somalia

    During the 103rd Congress, the Committee held a number of 
closed briefings on the U.S. involvement in the United Nations 
military effort in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Committee also 
addressed this issue in open session during the January 25, 
1994 open hearing on ``Current and Project National Security 
Threats.'' In their testimony and responses for the record, 
both DCI Woolsey and DIA Director General Clapper expressed 
their pessimistic views of the United Nations' ability to reach 
a peaceful, long-term settlement of the clan warfare in Somalia 
after the March 31, 1994, withdraw of U.S. forces.

                                d. cuba

    The Committee held an open hearing on July 29, 1993, to 
assess U.S. policy toward Cuba and the prospects for political 
and economic change in that country. The National Intelligence 
Officer for Latin America testified that without profound 
economic reforms the Castro government will be increasingly at 
risk if it cannot bring significant relief to the population. 
Other witnesses told the Committee that a peaceful transition 
to democracy in Cuba is a vital U.S. interest. Witnesses from 
the private sector differed in their assessments of U.S. 
policy, with some arguing that the U.S. embargo against Cuba 
has failed in promoting a democratic transition and others 
suggesting that with economic pressure on Castro increasing, 
now is not the time to relieve that pressure by lifting the 
U.S. embargo.

                      e. u.n. intelligence sharing

    With the expansion of the United Nations role in 
multilateral peacekeeping and inspection regimes, the Committee 
heard testimony from U.S. officials on U.S. policy and 
practices in providing intelligence support to the United 
Nations for these efforts.
    The Committee expressed several concerns in this area, 
particularly concerning the security implications for 
intelligence sources and methods where intelligence information 
is provided to the U.N. The Committee will continue to examine 
this issue in the 104th Congress.

                             f. north korea

    In view of the crisis generated by the North Korean's 
military activities and nuclear weapons program, North Korea 
was the focus of considerable Committee time and energy during 
the past two years. The Committee conducted six hearings 
dedicated to intelligence analysis and capabilities on North 
Korea's vast military build-up, its unstable political regime, 
its fragile economy, its development of a nuclear weapons 
program, and its development and proliferation of missiles.
    Two specific issues of particular focus for the Committee 
were the death of President Kim II Sung in July 1994, which 
raised many questions about the succession of his son Kim 
Chong-il and his command and control of the country. And the 
October 21, 1994, nuclear agreement between the United States 
and North Korea. In December 1994, the Committee held a hearing 
on this nuclear agreement to address the capability of the 
United States intelligence community to monitor North Korea's 

                          VIII. Confirmations

                        a. dci r. james woolsey

    On February 2, 1993, the Committee held a public hearing on 
the nomination of R. James Woolsey to be Director of Central 
Intelligence. A partner in the Washington law firm of Shea & 
Garnder, Mr. Woolsey had previously served as Ambassador and 
U.S. Representative to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed 
Forces (CFE) and as a Delegate to the START talks from 1983-
1986. He had also served as Under Secretary of the Navy during 
the Carter Administration.
    Mr. Woolsey testified on his own behalf at the confirmation 
hearing. There were no other witnesses.
    On February 3, 1993, the Committee reported Mr. Woolsey's 
nomination to the Senate by a vote of 15-0. The nomination was 
confirmed by the Senate by voice vote later that same day.

                              IX. Security

             A. Declassification of Intelligence Documents

    During the 103rd Congress, the Committee took the lead in a 
number of efforts to declassify previously classified material 
by the Executive Branch. In total, the Committee has 
coordinated with the Executive Branch over 36,400 pages of 
material that has been declassified and made available to the 
public. The following is a compilation of the declassification 
efforts pursued by the Committee:

                 Subject                    Page count       Status     
Intelligence Information Reports re: POW/           20  Pending.        
 MIA's (SSCI# 93-0308).                                                 
Salvadoran Human Rights (SSCI# 94-0712)..         1762  Complete.       
SSCI Transcript, Testimony of Elliott              116  Complete.       
 Abrams on December 8, 1986 (SSCI# 92-                                  
SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the North               50  Denied in full. 
 American Free Trade Agreement on                                       
 September 22, 1993 (SSCI# 93-4125).                                    
Senate Iran/Contra Committee Transcript              2  Complete.       
 Excerpt re: Discussions with Iranian                                   
 Representatives regarding U.S. Hostages                                
 (SSCI# 94-0964).                                                       
CIA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding                  4  Complete.       
 regarding Activities of Present or                                     
 Former CIA Officers or Employees That                                  
 Are of Counterintelligence Concern                                     
 (SSCI# 94-1684).                                                       
SSCI Transcript, Hearing of ``ISA'' on              40  Pending.        
 September 25, 1987 (SSCI# 94-2156).                                    
SSCI Transcript, Hearing on Honduran                43  Complete.       
 Interrogation Manual, June 16, 1988                                    
 (SSCI# 94-2162).                                                       
Honduras and the Honduran Death Squads              43  Pending.        
 (SSCI# 94-2128).                                                       
CIA Memorandum regarding Aldrich Ames,               2  Complete.       
 December 5, 1990 (SSCI# 94-2831.                                       
SSCI Transcript re: Interview with                 108  Complete.       
 Aldrich Ames, August 5, 1994 (SSCI# 94-                                
 2922 Sanitized Version).                                               
NRO Material regarding the SSCI's hearing           46  Complete.       
 on August 10, 1994.                                                    
JFK documents released...................       34,392  Complete.       

    The total number of pages of previously classified JFK 
related documents totaled 34,392 (3089 total documents) all of 
which were released to the National Archives and Records 
Administration for public dissemination.

              B. Review of White House Security Procedures

    In May 1994, the Committee received a request from the 
Executive Officer of the President to review the White House 
procedures for the issuance of White House passes and other 
security-related functions that provide access to sensitive 
classified information in the Executive Office of the 
President, and make any recommendations to enhance those 
    Committee staff met with White House officials in May 1994 
to review the existing procedures and to inform the Chairman of 
the findings. After many hours of discussions with executives 
within the Executive Office of the President the review was 
completed and the Chairman forwarded his recommendations to the 
    The following four recommendations were made to the 

          1. The White House Office of Administration should be 
        assigned a Secret Service Agent or other appropriate 
        government official in a full-time position to function 
        as the Director of Security. Such a person should be 
        non-partisan, and responsible for overseeing all 
        security-related functions within the Office of 
        Administration. The person filling this position should 
        be a security professional to provide the White House 
        with broad security-related specialties, to include but 
        not limited to: knowledge of investigative and 
        adjudicative procedures; classified document handling 
        procedures; communication security procedures; and a 
        law enforcement background. This person would be 
        directly involved in the decisionmaking process for 
        final adjudication of White House access passes and Top 
        Secret security clearances.
          2. A single office within the White House should 
        coordinate all background investigations. Currently the 
        Executive Office of the President has two separate 
        offices that initiate, track, control, and process 
        background investigations. One office processes 
        political appointees and another processes career 
        employees. In addition to these arrangements, the White 
        House Counsel's Office processes the background 
        investigations of Presidential Appointees who require 
        Senate confirmation. This practice gives the appearance 
        of an enormous amount of redundancy and lack of 
        centralized control. These offices should be combined 
        and headed by a senior security official (preferably 
        the Director of Security identified in item #1) in the 
        White House.
          3. All security clearance/background investigation 
        paperwork should be completed and turned in on or 
        before the first day of employment with the White House 
        rather than the current procedure of 30 days. This 
        would alleviate any delay in initiating a security 
        background investigation and thus reduce the amount of 
        time, now approximately 120 days, that it takes to 
        process a new employee for a sensitive White House 
        access pass.
          4. Currently, new employees are required to undergo 
        an FBI full-field background investigation for 
        employment at the White House, regardless of whether or 
        not they have been the subject of a recent full-field 
        investigation from another government agency. New 
        employees who have undergone an FBI background 
        investigation within 5 years should not have to undergo 
        another full-field background investigation. The same 
        background investigation that is currently accepted 
        throughout the government should satisfy White House 
        requirements as well.

       C. CIA's Office of Training and Education Training Course

    On November 30, 1993, Committee staff worked with 
representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency's Office 
of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Office of Training and 
Education to shoot a training video of a mock Congressional 
briefing in the Committee's hearing room. The video has been 
incorporated as a key element of the OCA-administered course 
``Briefing Congress.'' The video was shot ``on location'' to 
provide viewers with an atmosphere of authenticity to assist in 
educating Agency and Community employees with some of the 
essential aspects of an effective oversight process.


    The Committee expanded its use of technology during the 
103rd Congress to facilitate the day-to-day mechanics of its 
oversight responsibilities, pioneering a security clearance 
management database. The system centralizes and tracks 
Committee staff access to numerous special access programs, 
provides timely alerts for updates of background 
investigations, and generates the required material for passing 
of clearances from Committee records to relevant agencies. 
Complimentary software enables staff to efficiently create, 
maintain, and update the personal information required for 
background investigations. Together these systems further 
bolster the integrity of the Committee's handling of 
information classified at all levels.
                            A P P E N D I X


                   I. Summary of Committee Activities

                         A. number of meetings

    During the 103rd Congress, the Committee held a total of 
103 on-the-record meetings and hearings. There were seventy 
(70) oversight hearings and seven (7) business meetings. Twelve 
(12) hearings were held on the budget including the Conference 
sessions with the House. Hearings on specific legislation 
totaled nine (9) and nomination hearings totaled one (1).
    Additionally, the Committee staff held four (4) on-the-
record briefings with over two hundred (200) off-the-record 

          B. bills and resolutions originated by the committee

    S. Res. 43--An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Select Committee on Intelligence. Referred to the 
Committee on Rules and Administration.
    S. 647--Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation 
Incentive Act.
    S. 1301--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994. 
Enacted under bill number H.R. 2330. Public Law 103-178.
    S. 2082--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1995. 
Enacted under H.R. 4299. Public Law 103-359.

                   C. bills referred to the committee

    S. 1578--Intelligence Authorization Process Adjustment Act.
    S. 1869--Counterintelligence Improvements Act of 1994.
    S. 1885--Security Classification Act of 1994.
    S. 1886--Personnel Security Act of 1994.
    S. 1890--A bill to require certain disclosures of financial 
information to expose espionage activities by foreign agents in 
the United States
    S. 1948--Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act 
of 1994.
    S. 2056--Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act 
of 1994.
    S. 2258--A bill to create a commission on the roles and 
capabilities of the United States intelligence community and 
for the other purposes.

                            d. publications

    Senate Report 103-20--Special Report--Committee Activities 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 3, 
1989-October 28, 1990.
    Senate Report 103-23--Special Report--Committee Activities 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 3, 
1991-October 8, 1992.
    Senate Print 103-29--Legislative Calendar for the 102nd 
    Senate Report 103-43--Report to accompany S. 647, the 
Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Incentive Act.
    Senate Report 103-44--Intelligence and Security 
Implications of the Treaty on Open Skies.
    Senate Report 103-155--Intelligence Authorization for 
Fiscal Year 1994.
    Senate Hearing 103-296--Nomination of R. James Woolsey to 
be Director of Central Intelligence.
    Senate Report 103-256--Intelligence Authorization for 
Fiscal Year 1995.
    Senate Report 103-296--Report to accompany S. 2056, the 
Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994.
    Senate Hearing 103-565--Hearing before the SSCI on the 
Prospects for Democracy in Cuba.
    Senate Hearing 103-630--Current and Projected National 
Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad.
    Senate Hearing 103-650--Hearing on Economic Intelligence.
    Senate Report 103-390--U.S. Capability to Monitor 
Compliance With the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Senate Print 103-88--Legislative Oversight of Intelligence 
Activities: The U.S. Experience.
    Senate Report 103-90--SSCI Report on the Aldrich Ames 
Espionage Case.