[Senate Report 106-279]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
Calendar No. 528
106th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 106-279
======================================================================
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
May 4, 2000.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2507]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the
original bill (S. 2507), to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2001 for intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System,
and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and
recommends that the bill do pass.
Purpose of the Bill
This bill will:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for (a)
U.S. intelligence activities and programs; (b) the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System; and (c)
the Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September 30,
2001, for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government and
for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence, with
Office of Management and Budget approval, to exceed the
personnel ceilings by up to two percent;
(4) Prohibit the knowing and willful unauthorized
disclosure of classified information to a person not authorized
to receive it;
(5) Establish a POW/MIA analytic capability within the
Intelligence Community;
(6) Preclude the application of any U.S. law implementing
treaties and other international agreements to otherwise lawful
and authorized U.S. Government intelligence activities unless
U.S. law expressly states that it will apply to such
activities;
(7) Require the Director of Central Intelligence to certify
to Congress that each element of the Department of State that
handles, retains, or stores material classified at the
Sensitive Compartmented Information level is in full compliance
with applicable Executive Orders and Director of Central
Intelligence Directives;
(8) Permit Executive branch agencies to contribute
appropriated funds for fiscal year 2000 to support the
Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat;
(9) Expand the reporting requirements of the CIA Inspector
General to include notification concerning certain designated
senior officials;
(10) Extend the CIA's Central Services Program and expand
the authorities for the Central Services Working Capital Fund;
(11) Permit long-term detailing of CIA employees to the
National Reconnaissance Office on a reimbursable basis;
(12) Permit appropriated funds transferred by the CIA to
other government agencies for the purpose of the acquisition of
land to remain available for a period of three years;
(13) Permit the Director of Central Intelligence to
designate categories of employees in addition to those
designated in law that would be eligible to receive partial
reimbursement for the cost of purchasing professional liability
insurance;
(14) Extend for two additional years the Secretary of
Defense's authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection activities;
(15) Support the Intelligence Community's effort to monitor
nuclear weapons tests on a worldwide basis by authorizing the
Department of Defense to convey nuclear test monitoring
equipment to a foreign government through a bilateral agreement
which provides the U.S. the right to install, inspect, and
maintain such equipment and to have continued access to data
collected;
(16) Expand the hiring authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence to facilitate the recruitment of eminent experts
in science and engineering for research and development
projects administered by the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA), National Security Agency (NSA), National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA); and
(17) Clarify the standing of United States citizens to
challenge the blocking of assets under the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act.
Classified Supplement to the Committee Report
The classified nature of United States intelligence
activities prevents the Committee from disclosing the details
of its budgetary recommendations in this Report.
The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to this
Report, which contains (a) the classified annex to this Report
and (b) the classified Schedule of Authorizations which is
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal
status as public law. The classified annex to this report
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's action as
set forth in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
classified annex has the same status as any Senate Report, and
the Committee fully expects the Intelligence Community to
comply with the limitations, guidelines, directions, and
recommendations contained therein.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. The President shall
provide for appropriate distribution within the Executive
branch.
Scope of Committee Review
The Committee conducted a detailed review of the fiscal
year 2001 budget requests for the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) of the Director of Central Intelligence; the
Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense; and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) of the military services. The Committee's
review entailed a series of briefings and hearings with senior
intelligence officials, numerous staff briefings, review of
budget justification materials, and numerous written responses
provided by the Intelligence Community to specific questions
posed by the Committee. The Committee also monitored compliance
with numerous reporting requirements contained in statute. Each
report was scrutinized by the Committee and appropriate action
was taken when necessary.
In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the Committee is
including its recommendations on both JMIP and TIARA in its
public report and classified annex. The Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) has agreed that JMIP and TIARA issues
will continue to be authorized in the defense authorization
bill. The SASC has also agreed to involve the SSCI staff in
staff-level defense authorization conference meetings and to
provide the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI the
opportunity to consult with the SASC Chairman and Ranking
member before a JMIP or TIARA issue is finally closed out in
conference in a manner with which they disagree. The Committee
looks forward to continuing its productive relationship with
the SASC on all issues of mutual concern.
In addition to its annual review of the Administration's
budget request, the Committee performs continuing oversight of
various intelligence activities and programs. The Committee's
audit staff conducts in-depth audits and reviews of specific
programs and activities identified by the Committee as needing
thorough and focused scrutiny. The Audit Staff also supports
the Committee's continuing oversight of a number of
administrative and operational issues. During the last year the
Committee's Audit Staff reviewed the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) and a covert action program; completed
portions of the Committee staff's review of counterintelligence
at the Department of Energy's National Laboratories and the
mishandling of classified information by former Director of
Central Intelligence John Deutch; and monitored the products
and activities of the Community's statutory and administrative
Inspectors General. These kinds of inquiries frequently lead to
Committee action with respect to the authorities, applicable
laws, and budget of the activity or program concerned.
Committee Recommendations
The majority of the Committee's specific recommendations
relating to the Administration's budget request for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities are
classified, and are contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations and the classified annex. The Committee is
committed, however, to making its concerns over, and priorities
for, intelligence programs and activities public to the
greatest extent possible consistent with the nation's security.
The Committee, therefore, has included in this report
information that is unclassified.
Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
In 1997, the Committee established a Technical Advisory
Group (TAG) to inform and advise Members of the threats and
opportunities presented by the extraordinary technological
advances of recent years. The TAG members have extensive
expertise in computer hardware, software, telecommunications,
aviation, satellites, imagery, physics, chemical engineering,
and other technical fields, as well as, in many cases,
extensive Intelligence Community experience. They are drawn
from both government and industry, and volunteer their time and
effort to help the Committee understand how the Intelligence
Community is being affected by, and can take advantage of,
current and developing technologies.
The Committee wishes to thank the TAG members for the many
hours they devoted to examining Intelligence Community
capabilities. The Committee will continue to study the findings
of this distinguished group, to draw upon their world-class
expertise, and to work with the Director of Central
Intelligence to implement the Committee's recommendations that
are based in whole or in part on the findings of the TAG.
Signals Intelligence
In 1997, at the Committee's behest, the TAG undertook a
study of the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA has
responsibility for collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT)
from electronic signals worldwide, and therefore requires an
in-depth understanding of the global telecommunications
revolution to complete its mission. The TAG extensively
reviewed current and planned operations as well as research and
development programs at the NSA. Their findings and
recommendations regarding the NSA's ability to address a
changing technological environment have been incorporated into
prior and current Committee initiatives.
This year, the Committee asked the TAG to update its SIGINT
review in light of reforms both proposed and underway at the
NSA. The Committee has again utilized the TAG's analysis and
recommendations for guidance in drafting the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.
Human Intelligence
In 1998, the Committee asked the TAG to review the status
of the Intelligence Community's human intelligence (HUMINT)
capabilities. The TAG concluded that human intelligence
collection will play an increasingly important role in
defending U.S. national security interests and recommended that
the Intelligence Community develop a comprehensive plan that
recognizes the rapidly changing and technically sophisticated
world that now confronts the HUMINT collector.
This year, the Committee also asked the TAG to assess the
progress that the Intelligence Community has made in
undertaking the substantial changes to HUMINT recommended in
1998. The results of this review have been incorporated, where
applicable, within this year's authorization.
MASINT and IMINT Intelligence
In 1999, the TAG reviewed the Intelligence Community's
capabilities to collect measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The Committee
referred often to the TAG's review of MASINT and IMINT as it
drafted the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000. Some of the TAG's conclusions have influenced provisions
within this year's bill as well.
Committee Priority Issues
Rebuilding the National Security Agency
The Committee is increasingly troubled by the National
Security Agency's (NSA) growing inability to meet technological
challenges and to provide America's leaders with vital signals
intelligence (SIGINT). Successful execution of the NSA's
mission is essential to protecting U.S. national security. The
Committee is committed to providing the resources and support
necessary to restore and improve the NSA's capabilities.
Collecting and deciphering the communications of America's
adversaries has been instrumental in protecting our national
security during the last half of the 20th Century. SIGINT has
played a decisive role in every military confrontation in which
the United States has been involved, from World War II through
the Kosovo conflict. SIGINT also has consistently provided our
nation's policy makers with additional knowledge and
understanding of international developments and threats to the
nation's security. This essential intelligence information has
enlightened our foreign policy, thwarted terrorist attacks,
disrupted narcotics trafficking, and averted unnecessary
military conflict. American presidents and senior policy makers
rely upon this vital source of information to make critical
decisions on behalf of the national interest.
As the central repository of the government's SIGINT
expertise, the NSA is a critical national asset. The NSA
historically has led the way in development and use of cutting
edge technology that has kept the United States a step ahead of
those whose interests are hostile to our own. Unfortunately, in
recent years, the Administration has failed to invest in the
infrastructure and organizational changes required to keep pace
with revolutionary developments in the global
telecommunications system.
As detailed above, in 1998, and again this year, the TAG
reviewed the NSA's operations. The TAG's conclusions are
disturbing. While the current information revolution presents
both opportunities for and threats to its mission, the NSA's
ability to adapt to this changing environment is in serious
doubt. The TAG's two reports identified serious deficiencies
resulting from the sustained budget decline of the past decade.
As resources have been reduced, the NSA systematically has
sacrificed infrastructure modernization in order to meet day-
to-day intelligence requirements. Consequently, the
organization begins the 21st Century lacking the technological
infrastructure and human resources needed even to maintain the
status quo, much less meet emerging challenges.
This year's TAG review, however, sounded a note of
optimism, noting that the NSA Director in November 1999
initiated an aggressive and ambitious modernization effort. In
November 1999, the Director began a series of changes designed
to transform the NSA and sustain it as a national asset.
Spurred by the NSA computer outage in January 2000, this
transformation includes sweeping organizational and business
strategies that promise to transform the way the NSA conducts
its missions. The Committee is encouraged by these actions, and
expects that the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense will support the Director of the NSA in
making the difficult decisions necessary for the NSA to restore
its predominance. To return the NSA to organizational and
technological excellence, NSA managers, as well as Intelligence
Community leaders and the Congressional oversight committees,
must be prepared to accept a level of risk as some resources
are shifted from short-term collection to long-term
infrastructure modernization. Failure to do so will
irreversibly undermine the NSA and its ability to perform in a
transformed global information technology arena.
To address these problems, the TAG recommended new business
practices coupled with additional resources to finance this
recovery. Inadequate National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) spending leaves little flexibility to meet the
increasingly complex intelligence challenges faced by the NSA,
but the crisis demands immediate attention and warrants
shifting resources in order to stave off a steady and
inevitable degradation of the NSA's unique and invaluable
capabilities. The budget recommendations in the classified
annex accompanying this bill constitute a down payment on this
requirement.
The Committee supports the NSA Director's transformation
objectives, and recommends investments in areas that are
consistent with his plan. The Committee is particularly
encouraged by the willingness of the Director to reach beyond
his current workforce to hire industry professionals. The
Director has hired a Chief Financial Manager from industry, an
essential prerequisite if the NSA is to develop a comprehensive
business plan for this effort. As the Director moves forward on
his plan to reshape the Agency, the Committee will look for
specific goals to support establishment of business-based
objectives.
Despite the need for additional resources, the Committee
does not believe that money alone will solve the NSA's
problems. Organizational change also is essential. The Director
of the NSA has authority over approximately thirty percent of
the total SIGINT budget within the NFIP. Other agencies and
organizations within the NFIP and the Department of Defense
expend funds for cryptologic activities outside the authorities
of the Director of the NSA. If the Director of the NSA is to
have functional responsibility for rebuilding the nation's
cryptologic program, the Director must have greater authority
in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of the
entire SIGINT budget. To build a comprehensive, efficient U.S.
Cryptologic System, the NSA Director must have the requisite
authorities to manage his program. The Committee will work with
the Director to improve his ability to provide centralized
direction across the SIGINT infrastructure as he implements his
modernization strategy.
Rebuilding the NSA is the Committee's top priority. Failure
to do so risks our nation's security. The Committee, therefore,
will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure America's
continuing superiority in the signals intelligence field.
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Funding Shortfall
The Committee has long been concerned that intelligence
collection continues to outstrip analysis, and is troubled that
funding for the latter remains woefully inadequate. This
funding shortfall challenges the Intelligence Community's
ability to manage the tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED) of intelligence collected by satellites,
airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other platforms and
sensors. The issue of TPED is at the heart of how the
Intelligence Community collects raw intelligence data, and then
in a timely manner, turns it into a product that is
understandable and usable to a wide variety of consumers, from
the President of the United States to the military commander in
the field.
In June 1999, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) issued a congressionally-mandated report describing the
challenges and projected shortfalls in the areas of TPED of
intelligence to be collected by the Future Imagery Architecture
(FIA) satellite program and other intelligence collection
systems. The funding shortfall figures in the NIMA report were
updated in the summer of 1999.
The NIMA report addressed only Phase I of three phases
identified by the Intelligence Community's TPED assessment
process. The three phases of TPED modernization are defined and
staged in the following manner:
Phase One--Infrastructure Foundation: covering
fiscal years 2001-2005, this portion of the TPED modernization
plan will (a) provide full support to the Enhanced Imagery
System (EIS); (b) provide a foundation for the FIA; (c) provide
infrastructure ``hooks'' for commercial imagery; and (d)
provide a minimal level of modernization supporting airborne
systems.
Phase Two--Imagery and Geospatial Information
Transition: covering fiscal years 2002-2007, this portion of
the TPED modernization plan will (a) provide full support for
the FIA; (b) provide full support for commercial imagery; (c)
provide intermediate modernization supporting airborne systems;
(d) expand the ability to handle motion imagery; and (e)
provide infrastructure ``hooks'' for TPED modernization
supporting all intelligence collection (``multi-INT''),
including signals intelligence, human intelligence, and
measurement and signature intelligence.
Phase Three--Common Operational Picture: covering
fiscal years 2004-2009, this portion of the TPED modernization
plan will (a) provide full support for multi-INT TPED; (b)
provide support of all sensor platforms; (c) integrate moving
target indicator (MTI) data; and (d) provide full support for
airborne systems.
The updated NIMA modernization plan for Phase One contains
26 recommendations for TPED modernization with associated cost
estimates to implement each. The multi-billion dollar
modernization plan sets forth an overall cost ranging from
implementing only the Imagery and Geospatial Community's
highest priority TPED improvements to full funding of all 26
recommendations over the next five years.
Complete Phase Two and Phase Three cost estimates have not
yet been developed and are expected to be formulated in the
context of the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2004 budget
cycles, respectively. Preliminary indications are that each
phase will carry a significant price tag over and above the
funding range currently estimated for Phase One.
The funding contained in the proposed fiscal year 2001
budget for Phase One TPED modernization is about 10% of the
total funding amount pledged by the Administration for the
effort over the next five years. A proportionate, one-fifth,
installment of the total amount pledged would have required a
funding commitment in fiscal year 2001 nearly double the amount
actually proposed.
The inadequacy of the fiscal year 2001 TPED funding request
is more stark when compared to the needs set forth in the
NIMA's updated TPED modernization plan. The fiscal year 2001
request for NIMA TPED is significantly below what is required
in the upcoming year to support only the top priorities in the
modernization plan. This shortfall balloons when compared to
the funds needed to proceed with all the recommended fiscal
year 2001 TPED improvements. When expressed in percentage form,
the proposed funding in fiscal year 2001 for NIMA TPED is 25%
of what is required for the top priorities alone, and 15% of
what is required for the full complement of modernization
projects.
The recently completed Defense Science Board Task Force
report on NIMA also found the TPED modernization funding plan
to be insufficient and recommended an investment of $3 billion
over the next five years in order for the U.S. to maintain
information superiority in the future.
The Committee concludes that Phase One of the TPED
modernization plan is woefully underfunded in the proposed
fiscal year 2001 budget and over the Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP), i.e., fiscal years 2001-2005. The Committee is troubled
by the Administration's unwillingness to recognize the
significant disparity between its proposed funding plan and the
TPED modernization funding plan, which is based on a rigorous
technical evaluation that has yet to be challenged as being
either flawed or inflated. The proposed funding for the TPED
modernization effort to date has come from anticipated savings
from lower than expected inflation over the next five years and
not from other programs within the Intelligence Community and
defense budgets, thus avoiding the tough programmatic trade-
offs and choices required to fully fund needed modernization.
The Committee is concerned that the dramatic underfunding
of Phase One TPED modernization in fiscal year 2001 is setting
up a budgetary crunch wherein a disproportionate amount of
funds will be required in subsequent years of the FYDP.
Assuming the budgetary top line for national security is not
increased over this period of time to cover the emerging TPED
modernization bill, these out-year balloon payments will create
a Hobson's choice for the Intelligence Community: either make
abrupt and deep cuts in other needed programs or curtail the
TPED modernization program to an extent that raises serious
doubt as to why tens of billions of dollars are being spent on
intelligence collection platforms when the customers of the
intelligence will not be able to use much of the raw data that
is collected. The Committee cannot and will not accept either
alternative.
When the yet unknown costs for the Phase Two TPED
modernization effort covering fiscal years 2002-2007 and the
Phase Three TPED modernization effort covering fiscal years
2004-2009 are added to the equation, this chasm widens as does
the challenge to find the needed funding to bridge it.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a number of funding
changes within the NIMA budget, both in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program, to bolster Phase One TPED modernization efforts in
fiscal year 2001. These funding changes are described in the
classified annex to this Report.
Mishandling of Classified Information by Former DCI Deutch
The Committee was deeply concerned to learn of serious
breaches of security by former Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) John M. Deutch. As the DCI, Mr. Deutch was entrusted with
protecting our nation's most sensitive secrets pursuant to the
National Security Act of 1947, which charges the DCI to protect
the sources and methods by which the Intelligence Community
conducts its mission. It is this Committee's view, based upon
the Committee's inquiry to date, that Mr. Deutch failed in this
responsibility. Mr. Deutch, whose conduct should have served as
the highest example, instead displayed a shocking and reckless
disregard for the most basic security practices required of
thousands of government employees throughout the CIA and other
agencies of the Intelligence Community. In open testimony
before the Committee, current DCI George Tenet stated, ``there
was enormously sensitive material on [Mr. Deutch's] computer,
at the highest levels of classification.''
The Committee believes further, based upon the Committee's
inquiry to date, that, in their response to Mr. Deutch's
actions, Director Tenet, Executive Director Nora Slatkin,
General Counsel Michael O'Neil, and other senior CIA officials
failed to notify the Committee in a timely manner regarding the
Deutch matter, as they are required by law to do.
The Committee has determined that there are several gaps,
or potential gaps, in existing law that require legislative
action. The Committee has decided to proceed with one statutory
change at this time (Section 401, described below), despite the
fact that the Committee has not completed its inquiry, because
there is broad agreement on the nature of, and the solution to,
this particular problem. The Committee also wishes to ensure
that this amendment can be enacted into law expeditiously as
part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001. The Committee is reviewing additional proposals for
statutory changes, and may make recommendations when the
Committee completes an unclassified report setting forth the
Committee's findings and conclusions.
Inspector General reporting requirements relating to senior CIA
officials
Section 401 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 closes gaps in the Congressional reporting
requirements to the intelligence committees revealed by the
Deutch matter. Current law requires the Inspector General to
notify the committees ``immediately'' if the Director or Acting
Director, but not the former Director, is the subject of an
Inspector General inquiry. The committees were not notified of
the security breach by Mr. Deutch until more than 18 months
after it was discovered, and even then the full scope of the
problem was not adequately disclosed. This amendment broadens
the notification requirement to include former DCIs, all Senate
confirmed officials (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management, Assistant Directors for Central Intelligence, and
General Counsel), the Executive Director and the Deputy
Directors for Operations, Intelligence, Administration, and
Science and Technology. In addition to expanding the number of
senior officials covered by the notification requirement, the
amendment also requires the IG to notify the intelligence
oversight committees whenever one of the designated officials
is the subject of a criminal referral to the Department of
Justice.
State Department Security and Counterintelligence
Limitation on Retention or Storage of Certain Classified Materials by
the Department of State
In the last two years, the Committee has taken a series of
steps designed to identify, and require the State Department to
address, serious deficiencies in policies, procedures, and
attitudes relating to the protection of classified information.
Despite these efforts, and a nascent, if belated, recognition
by the State Department of the magnitude and severity of the
problem, serious breakdowns in security and counterintelligence
practices continue to occur.
Most recently, on April 17, 2000, The Washington Post
published an article entitled ``State Dept. Computer with
Secrets Vanishes.'' According to this article and subsequent
press reporting, a laptop computer containing highly sensitive
classified intelligence materials, including Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) relating to weapons
proliferation, has disappeared from the State Department Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR), and is presumed stolen. The
FBI is investigating the matter. The Committee has been briefed
by the Department of State, the CIA and the FBI.
The loss of this information, which endangers intelligence
sources and methods directed at one of our most critical
intelligence targets, is a matter of urgent concern. The
Committee expects that the FBI will thoroughly pursue all
aspects of this loss, including a full counterintelligence
investigation.
In addition to security and counterintelligence issues with
regard to the loss of the classified laptop, the Committee also
was distressed at the failure of the State Department, and the
CIA, to notify the Congressional intelligence committees about
this incident--even after the story appeared in the press. The
State Department had known of the loss for almost three months.
The CIA became aware of the loss of the computer in mid-
February.
Section 502 of the National Security Act [50 U.S.C. 413a]
requires that the heads of all departments of the United States
Government involved in intelligence activities keep the
intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities,'' including ``significant intelligence
failures.'' Clearly, the loss and possible compromise of highly
sensitive compartmented intelligence information should be
considered a significant intelligence failure and should have
been reported in a timely manner to this Committee and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Beyond the clear legal requirement for notification, we
note that the State Department is well aware of this
Committee's sustained interest in security and
counterintelligence problems at INR and the Department at
large, and therefore should have informed us of this event even
in the absence of a statutory requirement.
The January 2000 laptop incident follows the discovery of a
Russian listening device in a seventh floor State Department
conference room. On December 8, 1999, the FBI detained a
Russian intelligence officer, Stanislav Gusev, as he was
recording transmissions from a bug implanted in a piece of
chair rail, in a conference room within the Department of State
headquarters building. Gusev was declared persona non grata and
required to leave the United States.
Gusev's expulsion capped a six-month investigation that
began when the FBI spotted the Russian intelligence officer
loitering near the State Department. Following surveillance and
observation of Gusev, technical countermeasures discovered the
remotely-activated device in the conference room.
The FBI and State Department continue to investigate who
was responsible for planting the bug, and what sensitive
materials discussed in the conference room may have been
compromised. Recreating the extent to which Russian
intelligence or other personnel may have had access to the room
in question has been complicated by the fact that from 1992
until August 1999, there were no escort requirements for
Russian (or other foreign) visitors to the State Department.
The Gusev incident followed a February 1998 incident, in
which an unidentified man wearing a tweed jacket entered the
Secretary of State's seventh floor office suite and removed
classified documents, including SCI documents. He has never
been identified, the documents have never been recovered, and
poor procedures for handling classified information resulted in
the Department's inability to reconstruct which documents were
taken.
Following the ``tweed jacket'' affair, the SSCI, in the
Annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1999, directed the State Department Inspector General (IG) to
review and report on State Department policy and procedures for
handling classified information within the State Department
Headquarters facility.
The resulting IG report, entitled Protecting Classified
Documents at State Department Headquarters, found that ``[t]he
Department [of State] is substantially not in compliance with
the DCIDs [Director of Central Intelligence Directives] that
govern the handling of SCI.'' (emphasis in original) According
to the Report:
``Very highly classified documents relating to
intelligence reporting are not safeguarded in accordance with
government regulations. Most offices have never been inspected
and accredited for handling such documents.
A significant number of foreign nationals are
permitted unescorted access to the Department. Uncleared
maintenance, repair, and char force personnel are not always
escorted in areas where classified information is handled,
processed, stored, and discussed.
Administrative actions taken to discipline
employees are ineffective to ensure that poor security
practices are corrected.
Unit security officers are not well informed about
security requirements and do not have the authority to enforce
security requirements.''
In response to the IG Report, in the Annex to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the
Congressional intelligence committees fenced funds for the
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research pending
receipt of (1) a State Department report on specific plans for
enhancing the security of classified information within the
State Department and fully implementing, as appropriate, the
recommendations found within the Inspector General's report,
and (2) a report from the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) evaluating the State Department's compliance with all
DCIDs related to the protection of Sensitive Compartmented
Information. These reports were provided to the Congressional
committees in February of this year. The State Department, in
its response, identified a number of actions or proposed
actions it intended to take in response to the IG Report.
The DCI report noted that an independent review by the CIA
and the Community Management Staff confirmed that the State
Department was not in compliance with applicable DCID
requirements, and concluded that certain additional steps were
required to ``improve security practices in Department offices
where SCI is handled and discussed as well as to strengthen SCI
document control and accountability.'' The Department agreed
with the findings of the DCI report as to the steps required to
address these deficiencies.
In addition, in the wake of the Gusev incident, Secretary
Albright ordered a ``top-to-bottom'' review of the Department's
security practices and procedures led by Assistant Secretary
for Diplomatic Security David Carpenter. The review is expected
to be completed in the near future. The Committee looks forward
to receiving the presentation of a comprehensive plan that will
ensure that security and counterintelligence receive adequate
resources and consistent senior management attention.
Despite the February 2000 report confirming that the State
Department failed to comply with applicable DCID requirements,
the DCI decided to permit the CIA and other Intelligence
Community components to continue to provide SCI materials to
INR and other authorized recipients at the Department of State.
The Committee believes, however, that the time has come for the
State Department to be held accountable for its failure to
comply with directives governing the protection of SCI
information.
The Committee therefore has adopted a provision, Section
306 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
that would require the DCI to certify to the Congressional
intelligence and foreign affairs committees whether each
element of the State Department that handles, retains or stores
classified information that is classified as SCI complies with
all applicable DCI directives (DCIDs) and all applicable
Executive Orders relating to the handling, retention, or
storage of such classified information. Moreover, the DCI may
not certify, as in compliance, any element that is operating
under a DCI waiver of compliance with respect to any such
directive or Executive Order. The DCI must promptly notify the
Congressional intelligence and foreign affairs committees if
the DCI determines that any element is not in full compliance.
Unless the DCI has certified each covered element of the
Department of State to be in full compliance, the following
restrictions take effect as of January 1, 2001: (1) no funds
authorized to be appropriated under the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 may be obligated or
expended by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State, until each covered element has been
determined to be in full compliance, and (2) no covered element
that has not been certified to be in full compliance may retain
or store SCI material, until the DCI has certified that it is
in full compliance.
The provision further stipulates that the President may
waive the application of the restriction on the retention or
storage of classified information if the President determines
that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the
United States. The President must provide to the Congressional
intelligence and foreign affairs committees a report with
respect to any such waiver, describing the element affected,
the reasons for the waiver, and the actions taken by the
President to protect covered classified material to be handled,
retained, or stored by the element in question.
Department of State Inspector General Review
The Committee anticipates that the Department will come
into compliance with applicable DCIDs in the near future. There
will be a need for continued monitoring and oversight to ensure
ongoing compliance, however. Therefore, the Committee directs
the Department of State Office of Inspector General to conduct
reviews of State Department policies and procedures for
protecting classified information at Main State Headquarters
annually for the next five years, beginning with a report to be
submitted by December 31, 2001. As in the September 1999
report, the Committee expects the State IG to determine, among
other matters, compliance with Director of Central Intelligence
Directives (DCIDs) regarding the storage and handling of
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material.
Transfer of SCI Authority at the Department of State
In 1998, the Committee directed a State Department Office
of Inspector General review of the protection of classified
information at the Department of State, and last year the
Committee directed a review by the Director of Central
Intelligence Department compliance with directives regarding
protection of classified material. Among the State IG
recommendations included in its review was the transfer of
responsibility for protection of Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The DCI review
did not address this recommendation. The Committee believes
such a transfer unnecessarily complicates efforts to address
this issue, and may hinder the possibility for success in this
vitally important task.
The transfer of responsibility for protection of SCI
material from INR to DS improperly transfers authority from an
Intelligence Community element to a bureau over which the
Director of Central Intelligence has no oversight authority.
Despite INR's record, it is a member of the Intelligence
Community, and the DCI has statutory authority to approve its
budget. This oversight and budgetary authority will be critical
to ensure effective implementation of measures to protect
intelligence information. The DCI does not approve the budget
request for DS, has no influence over DS personnel, and will
not have the organizational authority to review directly DS
compliance with directives concerning the handling of
classified information. This will severely limit the ability of
the DCI to carry out his responsibility under the National
Security Act of 1947 to ensure the protection of intelligence
sources and methods.
Further, the proposed transfer will complicate and hinder
oversight of protection of SCI material at the State Department
by the Legislative branch. This Committee and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) are the
congressional bodies with the legal responsibility,
institutional knowledge, and expertise necessary to exert
legislative oversight over the protection of SCI material. The
SSCI and HPSCI are charged with overseeing the Intelligence
Community, which produces the SCI material that requires
stringent controls and accounting. Neither the SSCI nor the
HPSCI currently have direct jurisdiction or oversight over the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
For the reasons stated above, the Committee believes the
proposed transfer of the responsibility for protection of SCI
material from INR to DS imprudently takes this function away
from those with the authority to ensure successful
implementation. Therefore, the Committee will closely review
any Department of State plan to transfer the responsibility for
protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information from the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research to the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security. The Committee supports the efforts by the Secretary
of State to improve the security procedures and practices
throughout the State Department. However, the Committee
believes the responsibility for protecting SCI material within
the Intelligence Community elements that use and produce such
information must continue to reside with those elements
themselves.
Counterintelligence--CI 21
The Committee has become increasingly concerned about the
ability of existing U.S. counterintelligence structures,
programs, and policies to address both emerging threats and
traditional adversaries using cutting edge technologies and
tradecraft in the 21st Century. The Committee has made its
views known to the nation's senior intelligence and
counterintelligence officials, and found many of them share
these concerns.
On March 8, 2000, the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the FBI, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
unveiled a proposal entitled ``Counterintelligence for the 21st
Century'' during a closed hearing before the SSCI. The plan,
generally referred to as ``CI 21,'' resulted from a review
launched in June 1999 to assess existing counterintelligence
structures and capabilities to address emerging as well as
traditional counterintelligence threats.
CI 21 restates and expands upon other recent assessments of
the emerging counterintelligence environment. The report notes
that the threat has expanded beyond the traditional paradigm of
``adversary states stealing classified data''--which includes
traditional espionage by Russia, the PRC, North Korea, Cuba,
Iran, and Iraq--to include new efforts by these traditional
adversaries, as well as threats from certain allies and
friendly states, to collect economic information and critical
but unclassified technologies.
Terrorist groups, organized crime, and drug cartels are
additional, non-state actors that pose an increasing
counterintelligence threat. New roles and missions for U.S.
military forces, such as peacekeeping and new kinds of
coalition operations, create new force protection and
counterintelligence challenges. Academic exchanges and joint
ventures also are venues for the loss--witting or unwitting--of
sensitive or even classified information.
Both traditional and non-traditional threats are exploiting
modern technology, particularly modern computer technology and
the Internet, to develop information warfare (IW) and
intelligence collection capabilities and tradecraft that alter
traditional notions of time, distance and access.
Complicating the task of U.S. counterintelligence agencies
is the sheer volume of classified and sensitive information
that requires protection, and the resulting need for top level
policy guidance and prioritization in determining which
information and technologies must be protected.
CI 21 found current U.S. counterintelligence capabilities
intended to confront this expanding and changing threat to be
``piecemeal and parochial.'' Key problems include:
inadequate coordination between policy and
counterintelligence, including failure to identify
``must protect'' information;
inadequate coordination, cooperation, and
information-sharing between counterintelligence
agencies;
lack of strategic counterintelligence threat
analysis;
lack of agility, and a focus that is
reactive instead of proactive--at both the national and
operational levels;
failure to adequately exploit new
technologies;
lack of a national counterintelligence plan
to integrate information, analysis, and a new proactive
focus;
an inadequately prepared workforce and
insufficient, diffused resources;
a lack of a national advocate for resources,
policies, and proactive initiatives; and
inadquate coordination with the private
sector.
To address these shortfalls, the CI 21 report recommends
adoption of a new counterintelligence philosophy--described as
more policy-driven, prioritized, and flexible, with a
strategic, national-level focus--and a restructured national
counterintelligence system. The proposed new national
counterintelligence system would include:
A National Counterintelligence Executive;
A National Counterintelligence Board of
Directors; and
A National Counterintelligence Steering
Committee.
The Committee commends both the senior leadership and the
senior counterintelligence officials of the CIA, FBI, and the
Defense Department for their work in developing the CI 21
proposal. This ambitious plan proposes significant changes in
the way the United States Government approaches, and organizes
itself to meet, the threat of foreign espionage and
intelligence gathering. Implementation would require additional
resources, as well as changes to existing Presidential
directives and statutory authorities. Perhaps most difficult,
it would challenge traditional ways of doing business.
The Committee notes that the CI 21 plan has not yet
received final interagency approval. Given the seriousness and
evolving nature of the threat, and the demonstrated
shortcomings of current counterintelligence structures, the
Committee strongly urges the agencies involved to reach
agreement on this matter.
Counterintelligence--Department of Energy
Following its extensive 1999 review of Department of Energy
(DOE) security and counterintelligence problems, the Committee
continues its oversight over the Department's
Counterintelligence and Intelligence programs. The Committee is
monitoring closely the Department's implementation of
Presidential Decision Directive-61 (PDD), the DOE
Counterintelligence Implementation Plan and the National
Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2000 to ensure that
the Department follows through on these and other long-overdue
reforms. Although the Committee understands that the
Department's problems are deeply-rooted and will not be solved
overnight, the Committee is disappointed that in the
Department's initial counterintelligence inspections of the
major weapons laboratories, only one lab--Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory--received a ``Satisfactory'' rating. Sandia
National Laboratories received an ``Unsatisfactory'' grade,
while Los Alamos National Laboratory was judged ``Marginal.''
The Committee is also concerned that, to date, neither the
DOE Director of Counterintelligence, the DCI, nor the FBI
Director has been able to certify to the Congress, pursuant to
Section 3146(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, that the foreign visitors program at any one
of the national laboratories: complies with applicable DOE
orders, regulations, and policies, and PDD and similar
requirements, relating to the safeguarding and security of
sensitive information; fulfills counterintelligence
responsibilities arising under such requirements or Directives;
has adequate protections against the inadvertent release of
Restricted Data or other sensitive information; and does not
pose an undue risk to the national security of the United
States.
The results of the DOE counterintelligence inspections,
which will make it difficult indeed to make the certifications
set forth under Section 3146, underline the extent and
resilience of the problems identified at the Department of
Energy. They also reinforce the need for continued vigorous
executive leadership at the Department, together with
aggressive Congressional oversight, to ensure that the current
momentum for reform is maintained.
Management of MASINT
The Committee has repeatedly noted the significant
contribution that measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT) can make in accomplishing critical missions within the
Intelligence Community, particularly in countering
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the
Congress has specifically designated a significant amount of
additional funds provided over the last three years to bolster
MASINT capability. At the same time, the Congress and various
independent entities, including the Department of Defense (DOD)
Inspector General, have criticized the Intelligence Community
for failing to come to grips with resources, management, and
organizational MASINT deficiencies. Therefore, the Committee
was not surprised to learn that during its first real combat
test in Kosovo, MASINT performed poorly. The January 31, 2000,
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-action Report stated that
MASINT's ``flaws in supporting tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination limited their overall utility
and needed to be corrected to make these capabilities an
integral part of intelligence support to operations.''
The Committee believes that the continued lack of adequate
management within the Intelligence Community for the MASINT
program has been demonstrated by the failure to sustain
Congressional priorities, especially in the General Defense
Intelligence Program (GDIP). The Committee is concerned with
the funding shortfalls in individual programs that have not
been addressed as part of a comprehensive plan.
At the same time, the Committee also recognizes that the
capitalization of these sensors appears to be beyond the
capability of the GDIP as it is currently constituted and
resourced by the Administration. The Committee also questions
whether the Cold War orientation of many of these sensors, and
level of funding required to maintain them, is reflective of
the current realities regarding transfer and proliferation.
Rather than a piecemeal approach to recapitalization, it seems
prudent to the Committee to direct a review of the technical
collection ``system of systems,'' with particular emphasis on
articulating the requirements base, programmatic status,
operations and maintenance costs, and the Administration's
approach to recapitalizing or reconfiguring the current
systems. The review should be conducted by the DCI, in
conjunction with the GDIP Program Manager and the Director of
the Central MASINT Organization, and result in a report to be
delivered to the Committee no later than October 1, 2000. As
far back as 1993, this Committee has expressed its displeasure
with the management of MASINT. The Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994, noted that ``[t]he Senate has been
critical of the performance of the Central MASINT Office (CMO)
to date and concerned that the Director, DIA, did not have the
interest or authority to manage a major but uncoordinated and
underdeveloped discipline.'' Little, other than the
organization's name, has changed and intelligence support to
our operational forces is now suffering.
Last year, the Committee concurred with the findings and
recommendations of its Technical Advisory Group (TAG). In their
report, the TAG recommended the creation of a new high-level
organization, led by a world-class expert and staff detailed
from operational elements to facilitate deployment of
technologies on an urgent basis. The Senate and House Conferees
noted the importance and potential offered by MASINT
technologies--if they are rigorously developed and rapidly
deployed. The Conferees specifically noted that, (1) successful
exploitation of MASINT technologies could significantly enhance
U.S. national security; (2) MASINT technologies could
potentially eclipse in value the more traditional intelligence
disciplines; (3) MASINT technologies offer potential solutions
to denial and deception capabilities and other countermeasures;
and (4) the IC currently lacks a sufficiently robust MASINT
organizational structure, particularly for development and
integration of close-in (less than 10 km) MASINT technologies.
In addition, the House of Representatives dealt with the
management issue of MASINT legacy systems, and as a result, the
Conferees to the fiscal year 2000 authorization bill directed a
report, now in the hands of Congress, that addresses concerns
such as the identification of collection systems, the need to
review requirements, and the need to overcome operational
shortfalls between national level collection and analysis and
warfighter support.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management to conduct a
utility and feasibility study to find a way to improve MASINT
management and organization including the possible
establishment of a centralized tasking, processing,
exploitation and dissemination (TPED) facility. Of the facility
options, one which should be explored is a facility located
within the extended metropolitan region (less than 100 miles
from nation's capital). As envisioned, such a facility would
serve as a significant integration capability for specified
MASINT integration cells (i.e. SURF EAGLE MASINT Integration
Cell/Navy Oceanographic Command, SAR/MASINT Integration Cell/
National Air Intelligence Center, the Integrated Missile-
related MASINT Cell/Missile and Space Intelligence Center
located in Huntsville, Alabama (see the GDIP section of the
Classified Annex for details). The conceptual outline of the
aforementioned study shall include management, organization and
the integration facility and shall be briefed to the
Intelligence Committees prior to the conference on the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. An interim
report with cost data shall be provided to the Intelligence,
Appropriations, and Armed Services Committees not later than
December 15, 2000. The final study shall be transmitted not
later than April 1, 2001.
Counterterrorism
The Committee continues to be extremely concerned by the
threat posed by international terrorism to our nation's
security, and to the lives of Americans here and around the
world. The Committee is further concerned that, in addition to
traditional weapons such as hijacking and car bombs,
terrorists' attacks are ever more likely to include chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
The threat of terrorist use of such weapons exacerbates an
already critical threat. This threat took on crisis proportions
during the recent millennium celebrations. Counterterrorism
experts throughout the U.S. Government worked around the clock
and resources were reportedly stretched thin. This is of
particular concern given the assessment that the threat was
deferred rather than defeated.
The Committee notes that all too often the United States
Intelligence Community receives no thanks for its efforts. Its
operations, by necessity conducted in secret, are unknown to
the people whose lives are saved. The United States
intelligence and law enforcement communities stand between
America and terrorist plans to attack U.S. interests. The
Committee has expressed its appreciation and again thanks the
Intelligence Community on behalf of the American people.
The Committee will work to ensure that the Intelligence
Community's efforts to fight international terrorism are well
funded. In support of this goal, and because the Committee is
concerned about repeated leaks of classified intelligence and
the impact of these leaks on the counterterrorist effort, the
Committee directs that the DCI provide a report describing any
and all known leaks since January 1, 1998, that may have made
the counterterrorist effort more difficult. The report should
include an assessment of the potential damage to sources and
methods arising from these leaks. This report should be
provided to the Committee no later than December 1, 2000.
Counterproliferation and Arms Control
Proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons
The Committee believes that the bi-annual reports provided
by the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to Section 721
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 are
valuable to the Senate and contribute to the public's knowledge
of proliferation activities of concern. The Committee also
acknowledges the many classified reports and briefings on
proliferation provided to the Committee and Committee Staff.
The Committee believes, however, that a number of issues
warrant comprehensive assessments and in some cases,
publication of unclassified separate reports.
1. Russian and Chinese proliferation to Iran
The Committee directs the DCI to provide the Committee with
a comprehensive report detailing available information
concerning Russian and Chinese cooperation with Iranian
military programs and their transfer of sensitive technologies
to Iran. This report should be provided no later than October
1, 2000, and if possible should be provided in classified and
unclassified versions. The classified report should include
information gained from bilateral discussions with the
Russians. The unclassified version should include, to the
maximum extent possible, declassification of information
provided to the government of Russia under the classification
``Secret, Release Only to Russia.''
2. Biological weapons capabilities
The Committee commends the Intelligence Community on its
publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
biological weapons capabilities. However, the Committee
believes that the information in this report should be provided
in an unclassified form to the maximum extent possible. The
Committee therefore directs the DCI to provide the Committee
with an update to the NIE as well as an unclassified version of
the NIE no later than October 1, 2000.
3. Possible Iraqi misuse of Oil for Food Program funds
The Committee is concerned by the lack of monitoring and
verification of Iraqi purchases under the United Nations Oil
For Food Program. While the United States reviews contracts
prior to United Nations approval, no monitoring and
verification program exists to confirm identified end uses and
end users once items enter Iraq. The Committee therefore
directs the DCI to provide the Committee with a report on the
challenge posed by this lack of monitoring and verification,
the number and nature of dual use items provided under Oil For
Food contracts to date, and the contribution these dual use
items could make to Iraq's chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear weapons, and missile programs. The report should be
provided to the Congressional intelligence committees no later
than February 28, 2001.
Foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threat to the
United States
The Senate report 105-24 accompanying the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 directed the
Intelligence Community to produce annual reports on the
ballistic missile threat. The reports, due annually in March,
have been provided in March 1998 and September 1999.
In July 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States, also known as the Rumsfeld
Commission, produced an independent assessment of and
recommendations for improvements to Intelligence Community
assessments. The Intelligence Community adopted these
recommendations and the changes were reflected in the September
1999 report. The Committee applauds the more realistic approach
to the ballistic missile threat and the analytical rigor of the
September 1999 report, which was prepared as a National
Intelligence Estimate, and which drew upon outside expertise as
recommended by the Rumsfeld Commission.
The Committee is disappointed, however, that the
Intelligence Community has missed the deadline for submission
of this year's congressionally-mandated annual report. The
Committee also notes that the requirement for an annual
estimate on the ``non-traditional'' weapons of mass destruction
threat to the United States, as detailed in the Senate report
105-24, has not been met. The Committee urges the Director of
Central Intelligence to ensure that these Congressional
requirements are satisfied. The Administration should also
ensure that adequate funds and other resources are made
available to enable timely provision of rigorous assessments to
Congress and the American public.
Consolidation of Theater and Cruise Missile Analysis and Production
The Committee remains deeply concerned with the growing
threat posed by ballistic and cruise missiles. On February 2,
2000, the Director of Central Intelligence testified before the
Committee that the proliferation situation was ``stark and
worrisome.'' The DCI testified that ``[t]ransfers of enabling
technologies to countries of proliferation concern have not
abated. Many states in the next ten years will find it easier
to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them.''
The Committee notes that the analysis and assessment of
these weapons is spread among organizations within the
Intelligence Community to such an extent that developers of our
theater ballistic and cruise missile defense programs must deal
with many different organizations, each employing different
analytical methodologies and differing assumptions about the
threat. The Committee believes that this situation often
results in problems ranging from inconsistent data, duplication
of effort, and poor use of resources.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the GDIP Program
Manager consolidate all analysis and production of intelligence
on foreign theater ballistic missiles (with ranges less than or
equal to 3500 km, guided or unguided, and regardless of basing)
within elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Furthermore, to allow a consistent approach to the analysis of
all missile threats within a theater of operation, the
Committee also recommends that the GDIP Program Manager
consolidate all intelligence analysis of foreign cruise
missiles, regardless of basing, within elements of the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
North Korea
The Committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence
to provide an all-source, comprehensive report covering the
history and status of all North Korean chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear programs and North Korean missile
programs. This report should include all available information
regarding assistance or cooperation received by North Korea
from other countries. The Report should be provided no later
than December 1, 2000.
Arms control monitoring
The Committee is aware that a number of arms control
negotiations are underway regarding follow-on agreements to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The
Committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence to
provide the Committee with a report on the Intelligence
Community's ability to monitor the follow-on agreements under
discussion and negotiation, and the contribution and challenges
each agreement will make to the U.S. Government's understanding
regarding other nations' programs in each of these areas. Key
areas of uncertainty and resource requirements for monitoring
should be addressed. To the extent possible, this report should
be provided in classified and unclassified forms no later than
December 1, 2000.
Enhanced monitoring of nuclear test explosions worldwide
Section 502 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to convey
to a foreign government nuclear test explosion equipment to be
installed within the sovereign territory of that government.
This authority may be delegated to the Secretary of the Air
Force. Conveyance, or other provision, of the monitoring
equipment would be accomplished through bilateral agreements in
which the nation receiving the equipment agrees to provide the
United States with full and timely access both to the data
collected and to the equipment for purposes of inspection and
maintenance.
The goal of this arrangement is for the United States to
obtain the cooperation of foreign governments in locating
monitoring equipment in important sites throughout the world
and to have the guarantee of full access to the data and
equipment. This equipment would be installed as part of the
United States Atomic Energy Detection System. The Intelligence
Community has relied heavily on data from this system, which is
operated by the United States Air Force, to monitor nuclear
weapons tests on a worldwide basis. The agreements envisioned
by Section 502 are with governments judged by the Intelligence
Community to be capable of providing monitoring coverage in
parts of the world of high U.S. national security concern.
These instruments must be properly maintained to achieve
top performance. Moreover, as technology evolves, they must be
upgraded to meet new U.S. standards. Section 502 authorizes the
use of appropriated funds to maintain and upgrade the equipment
that has been provided or conveyed to foreign governments under
the agreements.
Section 502 would not authorize the provision of nuclear
test explosion monitoring equipment to any international
organization, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Organization
and its International Monitoring System.
Counterdrug
Section 308 waives two existing prohibitions and authorizes
Executive branch agencies to contribute appropriated funds for
the purpose of supporting the Counterdrug Intelligence
Executive Secretariat established by the President's General
Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (the Plan) on February 12, 2000.
The Plan fulfills requirements contained in the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-61) and
the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. These two provisions
required the Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy to submit ``a plan to improve coordination and eliminate
unnecessary duplications among the counterdrug intelligence
centers and counterdrug activities of the Federal Government,''
and to specifically report on efforts to structure the National
Drug Intelligence Center to ``effectively coordinate and
consolidate strategic drug intelligence.'' The Congress had
requested completion of these two tasks by February and April
1998 respectively. While disappointed by the two year delay,
the Committee understands the difficulty in undertaking such a
far-reaching, multi-agency review and appreciates the
thoroughness of this effort and the subsequent Plan.
The Committee has and continues to place high priority on
counterdrug intelligence programs. These programs provide
essential support to the nation's efforts to attack the supply
of illicit drugs and thereby reduce drug abuse and its
devastating societal consequences in the United States.
Intelligence is critical to effective source country programs,
interdiction actions, and law enforcement investigations.
The Committee is encouraged by the steps outlined in the
Plan. Although the initial reorganization and the
implementation of action items is modest, the Plan has the
potential to significantly enhance coordination among the
various law enforcement and intelligence agencies that play a
role in counterdrug efforts. Increased coordination should lead
to better information sharing not only among Federal agencies,
but also with and between state and local law enforcement
entities.
In addition to the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive
Secretariat, the Plan establishes the Counterdrug Intelligence
Coordinating Group as a sub-cabinet level interagency body to
oversee the Secretariat. The Group will be the primary forum
for counterdrug intelligence policy discussions and resolution
of interagency disputes. The Committee directs the co-chairs of
the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group to provide
annual reports concerning outstanding drug intelligence issues
to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the
Committees on Intelligence and Appropriations.
One area of concern is the lack of a permanent staff for
the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat. As
currently structured, the staff will be comprised entirely of
individuals on loan from other agencies. The Committee
understands the valuable role that detailees can play in an
interagency organization such as this, but also considers it
important to maintain some number of senior staff who can
provide continuity and corporate memory. The Plan addresses
this question and calls on the Counterdrug Intelligence
Coordinating Group to annually review and recommend the
appropriate mix of detailees and permanent staff. The Committee
requests that the co-chairs of the Counterdrug Intelligence
Coordinating Group inform the Committee of that recommendation.
Export Control
The Committee remains concerned with exports of sensitive
technologies and the effect of these transfers on the
capability of the Intelligence Community to collect information
regarding critical threats to our nation. In recent years, the
development and widespread usage of advanced computing and
telecommunications systems has brought technologies previously
limited to governments and militaries into the worldwide
marketplace. Most of these technologies are of little or no
national security significance, and pose no threat to the
capabilities of intelligence agencies. Many of these
technologies, however, may be used by adversaries of the United
States to thwart the ability of the Intelligence Community to
collect intelligence critical to our national security.
In light of these concerns, the Committee will continue to
review modifications to export regulations and proposed
statutory changes to existing export laws to ensure such
changes do not adversely affect intelligence and national
security interests.
Intelligence Sharing
The Committee maintains a keen interest in the
intelligence-related implications of NATO enlargement and the
subsequent evolution of European security structures. In a
March 1998 report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Committee staff assessed the intelligence, security, and
counterintelligence implications of admitting Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic into NATO, noting the risks posed by
these nations' past associations with Soviet intelligence
services, their proximity to Russia, and continuing Russian
intelligence efforts in these countries. The report also
highlighted the significant steps taken by the three NATO
entrants to restructure, reform, and redirect the activities of
their intelligence services.
To establish a mechanism for continued monitoring of these
issues, the Committee directed two reports on the procedures
and methods utilized in each of the countries for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, and how these
procedures and methods compared with those in place in other
NATO countries. These reports have made a useful contribution
to the Committee's understanding and continued oversight of
these issues.
The Committee is also concerned about the implications of
the evolution and proliferation of European security structures
for intelligence sharing with, and within, the NATO alliance.
At the recent Helsinki summit, European Union (EU) members took
steps to create a European Security and Defense Identify
(ESDI), but failed at the time to develop a mechanism to work
with NATO on military matters. Moreover, current EU structures
were not designed to manage elements such as the proposed
rapid-reaction corp nor to coordinate closer intelligence
sharing among the EU members.
In addition to structural issues, as a practical matter, EU
members face enormous resource challenges in making ESDI a
reality, with the result that European reliance on NATO--and
thus U.S.--intelligence support will remain a military reality
in Europe for the foreseeable future. Many of these operational
and organizational problems and shortfalls were highlighted
during NATO air operations last year in the Balkans. The
difficulties encountered under the relatively undemanding
combat conditions over Kosovo point to far more serious
difficulties that might arise in a more challenging political
and military environment.
To address these and related issues, the Committee directs
the DCI to provide to the Congressional intelligence
committees, no later than January 1, 2001, a report in
classified and unclassified form, to address the following
issues:
An update of the findings contained in the
reports previously provided to the Committee concerning
(a) the status and effectiveness of procedures and
requirements established by Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, to include measures relating to
computer, information, and communications security, and
(b) an assessment of how these procedures and
requirements compare with the procedures and
requirements for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods of other NATO members. The report should
include any examples of unauthorized disclosures of
U.S. or NATO classified information by any NATO member
or official, or any official of a NATO member;
The extent and adequacy of cooperation in
resolving cases of espionage against the United States
or NATO by U.S. citizens;
An analysis of the NATO intelligence
shortfalls and other intelligence-related lessons
learned from the Kosovo campaign; and
An analysis of the potential implications
for U.S. intelligence sharing with NATO, including the
protection of sources and methods, that may arise as a
result of the evolution and proliferation of European
security structures.
Collection of National Intelligence
The Committee is concerned about impediments and
restrictions imposed by policies, other than those directed by
statute or Executive order, of any entity of the U.S.
Government on the collection of national intelligence in
foreign countries. The Committee notes that such policies have
in some cases impeded collection of intelligence by elements of
the Intelligence Community legally authorized to undertake such
collection. These policies can restrict U.S. collection of high
priority intelligence regarding some of the most dangerous
threats to the United States. The Committee is further
concerned that it was not notified of these impediments and
restrictions.
The Committee therefore directs that the DCI report to the
Congressional intelligence committees on all policy impediments
and restrictions--written or understood--that have been
interpreted to prohibit, restrict, or discourage intelligence
collection. The report should be provided to the Committees no
later than 90 days after the enactment of this bill. The
Committee further directs that any such impediment or
restriction on the duly authorized collection of intelligence
should be notified to Congress pursuant to Section 502(1) of
the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
Administrative Inspectors General
Last year the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
reconfirmed its ongoing interest in sustaining the capabilities
and independence of the administrative Inspectors General
within the Intelligence Community. These include the Inspectors
General at the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).
Senate Report 106-48 called for the Directors of the above
agencies to provide a written response setting out their
efforts to ensure that each agency's administrative Inspector
General has a separate budget line item and personnel
authorization, and the authorities required to independently
manage those resources. The responses to this request indicated
that appropriate steps were being taken to meet these
requirements. The Fiscal Year 2001 Congressional Budget
Justification for each of the agencies, except the DIA,
contained a separate line item for the Inspector General. The
Committee also notes that the budget submission for the NIMA
contained a significant budget increase for the Inspector
General, giving that office greater parity with the size and
capabilities of the other Intelligence Community administrative
Inspectors General.
While clear progress has been made, the Committee remains
concerned about the ability of the Intelligence Community's
administrative Inspectors General to hire and retain staffs
that are professionally and technically qualified. At some
agencies, limited hiring authorities, with respect to both
positions and occupations, will not allow the Inspector General
to keep pace with attrition. As they seek to fill vacancies,
the Inspectors General need the flexibility to hire individuals
with demonstrated audit, inspection, and investigation skills,
as well as individuals with expertise in critical areas such as
information technology and financial and contract management.
The Committee also is concerned that the relatively low
government service pay for the senior managers within selected
administrative Inspectors General has the potential to impair
their independence, effectiveness, and credibility.
Based on these concerns, the Committee requests that the
Directors of the NSA, DIA, NRO, and NIMA provide the Committee
with a report outlining the projected hiring requirements of
their agencies' Inspector General over the next five years. The
report should include a projection of the number,
qualifications, and rank of staff, as well as anticipated
difficulties in acquiring or retaining these skills and
positions. This report should be provided to the Committee no
later than July 31, 2000.
Senate Report 106-48 also required annual reports from each
administrative Inspector General detailing the fiscal and
personnel resources requested for the coming fiscal year, plans
for their use, comments on the office's ability to hire and
retain qualified personnel, and any other concerns relating to
the independence and effectiveness of the Inspector General's
Office. The initial reports were helpful to the oversight
process, but the Committee requests that the following
information be added to future reports: a specific breakdown of
staff by function (e.g. audit, inspection, investigation, or
support); budget information for the two previous years, the
current request, and projections for the next two years; and an
overall assessment of the agency's response to the Inspector
General's individual report findings and recommendations during
the previous year. These reports should be provided to the
Congressional intelligence committees by January 31 of each
year.
Rule of Statutory Construction
Section 305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to add
a new provision which articulates a rule of statutory
construction applicable to U.S. laws enacted to implement the
provisions of treaties and other international agreements.
Section 305 provides that future U.S. criminal laws enacted to
implement treaties shall not be construed as making unlawful
what are otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence
activities of the United States Government, unless Congress
includes an express provision to the contrary.
United States intelligence activities currently are subject
to a comprehensive regime of U.S. statutes, regulations and
presidential directives that provide authorizations,
restrictions and oversight. In addition, U.S. agencies involved
in intelligence activities have extensive internal regulations
and procedures governing appropriate levels of approval and
authorization depending on the nature of such activities. These
laws and regulations have developed from decades of interaction
and agreement between the executive and legislative branches of
the U.S. Government. The intelligence oversight committees
themselves were created to meet a perceived need that the
Congress must keep a close watch on the potential abuses that
can occur in the intelligence area.
It is important that the Intelligence Community be able to
look to this clear and precise body of U.S. domestic law,
regulation and procedures as the controlling source of
authority for its activities. There has been a concern that
future legislation implementing international agreements could
be interpreted, absent the enactment of Section 305, as
restricting intelligence activities that are otherwise entirely
consistent with U.S. law and policy. Of course, Congress may
extend any such implementing statutes to cover intelligence
activities if that is its intent, but it must do so expressly
under the new provision. Such an expression of congressional
intent would result in a clear prohibition that would be added
to the existing body of law regulating intelligence activities.
The intelligence officers who work hard to conduct lawful and
authorized activities to protect the national security of the
United States will not be burdened by the uncertainty that laws
never intended to apply to their activities could be so
interpreted.
POW/MIA Analysis
Section 304 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to
establish and maintain an analytic capability within the
Intelligence Community with responsibility for supporting
activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons
since 1990. Currently, no standing analytic capability exists.
This analytical shortfall was highlighted by the case of Navy
Lt. Commander Michael Speicher who was shot down over Iraq on
January 17, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War. Section 943 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1866; 10 U.S.C. 1501 note)
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to provide
intelligence analysis on matters concerning prisoners of war
and missing persons to all departments and agencies of the
Federal Government involved in such matters.
The Committee notes that Commander Speicher's fate remains
unknown. The Navy declared Commander Speicher ``killed in
action'' in May 1991. Federal regulations state that a finding
of presumptive death is made when a survey of all available
sources of information indicates, beyond doubt, that the
presumption of continuance of life has been overcome.
Information available to Congress does not necessarily support
this conclusion.
The Committee has reviewed the support of the Intelligence
Community for the decision of the United States Government to
characterize Commander Speicher's status as ``killed in
action.'' The review was based upon a September 1998 report by
the Direct or Central Intelligence and additional information
on the chronology of the disappearance of Commander Speicher.
The Committee concluded that it is critical that an
intelligence organization be specifically assigned
responsibility for analysis of all-source information on POW/
MIA matters, including information derived from sensitive
intelligence sources and methods, such as the information
collected with respect to Commander Speicher.
The case of Commander Speicher demonstrates that valid
questions about POW/MIAs remain today, and that rigorous and
timely analytic assessments and accountability are essential to
resolving such questions. A POW/MIA analytic capability in the
Intelligence Community is required. The Committee understands
the sporadic nature of the requirement for this analytic
capability and directs the DCI to designate a small number of
analysts with responsibility for current POW/MIA issues and
with the capability to surge their effort should the need
arise.
National Foreign Intelligence Program
Guidelines and limitations governing intelligence collection
information on U.S. persons
The Committee is concerned about recent media accounts
alleging that the National Security Agency (NSA) conducts
activities that may violate the constitutional rights of United
States persons.
The NSA's primary mission is to intercept and analyze the
communications of foreign adversaries, including terrorists and
drug traffickers. The President and other policymakers rely
heavily on the critical information provided by the NSA. The
Committee recognizes the potential intrusion into the private
lives of U.S. citizens inherent in this type of intelligence
collection, and the need to remain vigilant to ensure that the
laws and regulations that protect the privacy of U.S. persons
are strictly adhered to. This Committee was created in part in
response to violations of the constitutional rights of American
citizens by intelligence agencies that at times lost sight of
the critical balance between defending national security and
defending those values upon which our security as a nation
ultimately depends. The Committee has no more critical
responsibility than to ensure that this balance is maintained.
In the 1970's, after congressional inquiries revealed
abuses by the NSA, CIA and FBI, the Congress and the Executive
branch created an extensive structure of laws and oversight
(including the creation of the Congressional oversight
committees). These laws, executive orders and regulations
established stringent guidelines and limitations governing the
collection of information on U.S. persons. Finally, the
intelligence agencies, including the NSA, were prohibited by
presidential executive order from circumventing United States
legal restrictions by asking foreign agents or governments to
collect information on their behalf.
The Committee believes, based on all available information,
that the NSA is in compliance with applicable laws and
regulations. The NSA is required by law to keep the oversight
committees fully and currently informed of all significant
intelligence activities and must report any illegal
intelligence activities. Moreover, the NSA, in coordination
with the CIA and the Justice Department, was required last year
by Congress to conduct a review of the legal standards in place
to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. persons from
intrusive electronic surveillance. The report indicates that
the legal standards controlling the NSA's electronic
surveillance are effective in adhering to the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As
noted above, however, the Committee has no more critical
responsibility than to ensure that the balance between national
security and rights of Americans established in law is
maintained, and will continue to monitor strictly the NSA's
activities.
Experimental Personnel Management Program for Technical Personnel for
Certain Elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 503 establishes an experimental personnel program
providing the Director of Central Intelligence with limited
authority over a five-year period to recruit up to 39 science
and engineering experts for advanced research and development
projects administered by three elements of the Intelligence
Community. Of the 39 positions covered under this personnel
program, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) will be
allocated no more than fifteen positions, the National Security
Agency twelve positions, the National Reconnaissance Office six
positions, and the Defense Intelligence Agency six positions.
Expanded hiring authorities of this type were granted to the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in fiscal year 1999.
The need for such authorities in the Intelligence Community has
been supported by the testimony of the respective program
managers and was reaffirmed by the Committee's May 1999
Technical Advisory Group report on the NIMA, the future of
imagery intelligence, and the emerging challenge of modernizing
the Intelligence Community's tasking, processing, exploitation,
and dissemination system.
Beginning in 2001, the DCI must submit, no later than
October 15 of each year in which employees serve under the
program, an annual report to the intelligence oversight
committees of the Congress. The annual report shall include a
discussion on the DCI's exercise of the special personnel
management authority during the reporting period, the sources
from which individuals appointed were recruited, and the
methodology of identification and selection of recruits.
Functional management of Tactical Imagery and Geospatial Programs
The Committee is concerned that the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) does not exercise comprehensive
functional management authority over U.S. imagery and
geospatial programs. The NIMA's founding legislation, Public
Law 104-201, sets forth authorities provided to the NIMA
Director in relation to other elements of the Intelligence
Community, the Department of Defense, and the military
services. Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.60
established the NIMA within the Defense Department and
prescribed its mission, organization, responsibilities, and
authorities. Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.60
notes two types of management authority those of a functional
manager and those of a program manager. Functional management
is defined as ``[t]he review of and coordination on investment
activities related to imagery, imagery intelligence, and
geospatial information, which includes RDT&E [research,
development, testing, and evaluation] and procurement
activities within the NFIP (National Foreign Intelligence
Program), JMIP (Joint Military Intelligence Program), and TIARA
(Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities) aggregate.''
Although not defined, program management authority is
understood in practice to include the authority to make program
investment decisions as well as all authorities present under
functional management.
The NIMA's authorities regarding national and tactical
level imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial programs
are different for each function. The NIMA Director is both
``program manager'' and ``functional manager'' for the National
Imagery and Mapping Program within the NFIP and the Defense
Imagery and Mapping Program within the JMIP. As such, the NIMA
Director is tasked with providing imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial information for national customers
within the CIA, the State Department, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the service components, and has the
authority to make program investment decisions to support these
missions.
However, the NIMA Director serves only as the ``functional
manager for imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
investment activities which include Research, Development,
Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement initiatives
within the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
aggregate.'' As a result, the NIMA Director has less influence
over the tactical imagery and geospatial programs within the
military services.
The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201)
amended the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b))
to provide the NIMA with substantial functional management
authority. Under the amended section 105(b)(2) of the National
Security Act, the NIMA Director is responsible,
``notwithstanding any other provision of law, for prescribing
technical architecture and standards related to imagery
intelligence and geospatial information and ensuring compliance
with such architecture and standards.'' This provision was
further expanded by Department of Defense Directive 5105.60,
which provides the NIMA with the authority to set standards for
end-to-end architecture related to imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial information; geospatial
information products; career and training programs for imagery
analysts, cartographers, and related fields; and technical
guidance regarding standardization and interoperability for
systems utilizing imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
information.
Officials involved in the formation of the NIMA believed
the combination of authority to set standards, and review
investment and RDT&E decisions, would provide the NIMA with a
significant ability to influence tactical imagery and
geospatial programs even though the agency did not control
their funding. However, current NIMA officials have commented
that the authority merely to review investment and RDT&E
decisions has not given the NIMA a prominent position in the
budget review process. Being a relatively new agency, the NIMA
has had to work to assert its role in the already established
Department of Defense and Intelligence Community
infrastructures.
To address a similar lack of comprehensive management with
regard to tactical signals intelligence programs, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in 1995 granted the National Security
Agency Director approval authority over the tactical investment
and RDT&E decisions of the Defense Cryptologic Programs of the
service components. National Security Agency (NSA) officials
have stated that this approval authority enabled the NSA
Director to be more involved in investment and RDT&E decisions
earlier in the budget process, thereby assuring that his
recommendations and guidance as functional manager of signals
programs were incorporated into tactical systems.
In September 1999, the Committee issued an audit report of
the NIMA's structure, mission, and role within the Intelligence
Community. The first conclusion of the audit report is that the
lack of approval authority over tactical investment and RDT&E
programs limits the ability of the NIMA Director to serve as
the functional manager for imagery and geospatial programs. The
NIMA has had difficulty receiving information about tactical
programs in a timely manner and has had to provide its
recommendations on service components plans late in the budget
review process. The Committee recommended that the Secretary of
Defense grant the NIMA Director the approval authority over
service component imagery and geospatial investment and RDT&E
programs to ensure that NIMA has an established role and can
provide oversight early in the budget process.
The recently completed Defense Science Board Task Force
report on NIMA concurred with the Committee's recommendation:
``RECOMMENDATION 1: Strengthen NIMA's Role as
Functional Manager of U.S. Imagery and Geospatial
Information ``* * * The Deputy Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) need to
reemphasize NIMA's charter as the executive agency for
all geospatial information, much as NSA is the
executive agency for all SIGINT information.''
The Secretary of Defense, in his January 5, 2000, reply to
the Committee's audit report concurred with all of its
conclusions and recommendations and noted that his staff was
working with the NIMA on implementing them, with the exception
of the recommendation to grant the NIMA approval authority over
tactical investment and RDT&E decisions. The reply states: ``We
are currently working with the Services and with NIMA to
evaluate this recommendation, and we hope to reach a decision
within the next few months.'' To date, no such decision has
been reached.
The Committee reiterates its support for strengthening the
role of the NIMA Director as functional manager of U.S. imagery
and geospatial programs and directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide a status report on efforts to implement the
recommendations pertaining to this issue contained in the
Committee and Defense Science Board Task Force reports. The
report shall be submitted to the Committee no later than July
31, 2000.
Hard Copy Production in the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) Era
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has no stated
requirement to generate hard copy products for the Intelligence
Community as part of the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), nor
does the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) plan to
produce these products. The Committee is concerned that the
transition to soft copy image display and archiving systems has
been slower than planned, potentially creating a situation
where current hard copy imagery users will not be able to
receive soft copy images when the FIA becomes operational.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the NIMA, in
coordination with the Director of the NRO, to provide a report
detailing imagery user requirements and a roadmap for the
transition of hard copy imagery users to soft copy before the
FIA begins operation. The report shall be submitted to the
Congressional intelligence committees no later than July 31,
2000.
Critical Intent Model 2 (CIM2)
Given the emergence of new and ambiguous threats, it is
important for the United States, its allies and future
coalition partners to find and develop additional ways to
exploit new information technology to improve radically their
crisis avoidance, situation assessment, and collaboration
capabilities. The explosion of information available combined
with reduced resources available for national security programs
highlighted the need for a fast and efficient capability to
detect and manage crises. The Committee is aware of the
Critical Intent Model (CIM)--a structured argumentation tool--
as a key enabling technology in PROJECT GENOA, which provides
analysts and policy makers with the capability to track ongoing
and evolving situations, collect analysis, and enable users to
discover previously unknown information and critical data
relationships. The CIM structured argumentation tool
facilitates more comprehensive analysis, creates a corporate
memory for use in current analysis, and allows the comparison
and contrasting of details of a particular argument. Moreover,
CIM captures logic patterns for policy option analysis and
serves as a foundation for scenario-based crisis avoidance
systems.
The Committee recommends the transition of the CIM
structured argument prototype software from the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency to the Intelligence
Community, and strongly recommends investment by the
Intelligence Community in the CIM structured argument tool with
available fiscal year 2000 and 2001 funds.
Funding of intelligence activities, section 504
At a time when the Intelligence Community faces many
difficult decisions about spending priorities, the Committee
continues to be concerned that the budget practices of the CIA
and the Intelligence Community as a whole are simply inadequate
to address current requirements. Upper level program managers
lack sufficient insight into the process to make informed and
timely decisions regarding the allocation of funds, and to
assure Congress, and themselves, that funds are being spent as
appropriated and authorized. The Committee is particularly
troubled by recent CIA reprogramming requests that appear not
to meet legal requirements.
Those legal requirements are outlined in Section 504 [50
U.S.C. 414] of the National Security Act of 1947. According to
Section 504, ``[a]ppropriated funds available to an
intelligence agency may be obligated or expended for an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if:
(1) those funds were specifically authorized by the
Congress for use for such activities; or
(2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for
Contingencies * * * or
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by
Congress for a different activity--
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher
priority intelligence or intelligence-related
activity;
(B) the need for funds for such activity is
based on unforseen requirements; and
(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, * *
* has notified the appropriate congressional
commitees of the intent to make such funds
available for such activity * * *'' (emphasis
added).
In the case of the CIA, the Committee is not convinced that
all funds reprogrammed in fiscal year 2000 met the thresholds
of ``higher priority'' and ``unforseen requirements'' as stated
in the National Security Act of 1947. Recent actions, including
taxing directorates for funds to be used in other areas, and
moving funds within expenditure centers without Congressional
notification, have eroded this Committee's confidence that
appropriations are used as intended. The Committee understands
that the CIA's Inspector General is conducting an audit of the
CIA's budget process and reprogramming practices and will
report on the overall budget process and compliance with
Section 504. Such an independent and detailed assessment is
long overdue, and we applaud the Inspector General's efforts in
this regard.
To address the Committee's concern that resources be
obligated and expended as intended by Congress, without unduly
restricting the CIA's flexibility to respond to high-priority
unfunded requirements, the Committee directs the CIA's
Comptroller to provide to the Congressional intelligence
committees quarterly briefings on the CIA's execution of its
budget during the remainder of fiscal year 2000 and in fiscal
year 2001. These briefings should provide the committees with
sufficient information to demonstrate the CIA's compliance with
Section 504.
Joint Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Avionics Family
The proposed fiscal year 2001 budget includes $17.0 million
in Air Force procurement funding for the purchase of one Joint
SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) High Band Subsystem (HBSS)/Low
Band Subsystem (LBSS) unit. The proposed funding is
insufficient to purchase the appropriate spares, aircraft
cabling, antennas, and installation needed to field the first
operational JSAF system on the U-2 aircraft. The current JSAF
procurement plan is to procure one U-2 JSAF unit in fiscal year
2002 and two JSAF units in each of the next five years. This
funding plan fails to take advantage of economics of scale
associated with higher production rates, delays fielding the
JSAF capability in the U-2 fleet, and will not support the
stated goal of maintaining 11 sensors (a combination of RAS-1R
and JSAF) by the end of 2004 when aircraft currently in the
fleet will no longer be flown. The Air Force deploys the U-2
aircraft in detachments of three planes to their forward
operating bases, and the current requirement is to have no
fewer than two of the three aircraft carrying the JSAF.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an addition of $52.0
million in Air Force procurement funding to the JSAF program:
(1) $8.0 million to fully fund the first JSAF unit with
appropriate antennas, spares and installation on the U-2; and
(2) $44.0 million to procure two additional units to take
advantage of economies of scale and to provide sufficient units
for fielding a complete detachment of three U-2 aircraft.
Geospatial Production
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is in the
initial stages of an internal reorganization and realignment of
personnel that will shift almost one-tenth of its geospatial
workforce over to imagery analysis to better meet the growing
needs of the imagery customer base. Over the five years,
beginning in fiscal year 2001, a total of 300 geospatial
experts--60 positions a year--will be retrained as imagery
analysts. As a result, geospatial production readiness within
the Intelligence Community will degrade and the NIMA's reliance
on the contractor community for the outsourcing of geospatial
products will increase. The Committee recommends an additional
$5.0 million for geospatial production under the NIMA's Omnibus
Outsourcing Program to shore up this erosion in readiness.
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
GUARDRAIL Common Sensor
The GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) is a corps-level,
airborne signals intelligence collection and location system
capable of providing tactical commanders with near-real time
targeting information. The GRCS combines communications
intelligence and electronic intelligence capabilities onboard
multiple versions of RC-12 fixed-wing aircraft.
The Committee recommends an addition of $2.0 million in
Army procurement funding for the GUARDRAIL modifications effort
to accelerate the integration of the Tactical Intelligence
Broadcast System (TIBS) capability for GRCS System 2. The
additional funding will complete the integration of TIBS in the
last of four GRCS systems.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Common Ground System
The Common Ground System receives, processes, correlates,
and disseminates data simultaneously from the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, unmanned aerial
vehicles, and other tactical, theater and national systems for
targeting, situation development, and battle management.
The Committee recommends a reduction of $2.0 million in
Army RDT&E funding proposed for the Distributed Common Ground
Station--Army prototype. The Committee understands that this
effort duplicates an effort being performed under the Army's
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities program.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
title I--intelligence activities
Section 101. Authorization of Appropriations
Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government for whose intelligence and
intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes
appropriations for fiscal year 2001 and lists authorization of
appropriations for conduct of intelligence and intelligence
activities for certain elements of the United States Government
for fiscal years 2002 through 2005.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 states that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for the
entities listed in section 101 for fiscal year 2001 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this
section.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2001 to exceed the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable
under Section 102. The Director may exercise this authority
only when necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions or to the maintenance of a stable
personnel force, and any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the
Congress.
Section 104. Community Management Account
Section 104 provides details concerning the amount and
composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$232,051,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the staffing and
administration of various components under the CMA. Subsection
(a) also authorizes funds identified for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee to remain available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 618 full-time
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2001 and
provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the Director
of Central Intelligence to transfer the $27,000,000 to the
Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the
authority of the Attorney General, and subject to Section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
title ii--central intelligence agency retirement and disability system
Section 201. Authorization of Appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$216,000,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
title iii--general provisions
Section 301. Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits Authorized
by Law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the
conference report for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the conference report shall not be deemed to
constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
Section 303. Prohibition on Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified
Information
Section 303 creates a basis in law for prosecuting the
knowing and willful unauthorized disclosure of classified
information to a person not authorized to receive that
information. This section closes the gap in existing law for
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Section 304. POW/MIA Analytic Capability in the Intelligence Community
Section 304 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to establish and maintain a POW/MIA analytic capability within
the Intelligence Community with responsibility for intelligence
in support of the activities of the United States relating to
prisoners of war and missing persons.
Section 305. Applicability to Lawful United States Intelligence
Activities of Federal Laws Implementing International Treaties
and Agreements
Section 305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to add
a new provision which articulates a rule of statutory
construction applicable to U.S. laws enacted to implement the
provisions of treaties and other international agreements.
Section 305 provides that future U.S. laws enacted to implement
treaties shall not be construed as making unlawful what are
otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence activities of the
United States, unless Congress includes an express provision to
the contrary.
Section 306. Limitation on Handling, Retention, and Storage of Certain
Classified Materials by the Department of State
Section 306 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to certify to Congress that each element of the Department of
State that handles, retains or stores material classified at
the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level is in full
compliance with all applicable Director of Central Intelligence
directives (DCIDs) or Executive Orders regarding the handling,
retention, or storage of SCI materials. As of January 2001,
funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act for the
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall
be prohibited from obligation or expenditure so long as any
covered element of the Department of State has not been
certified by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as
being in full compliance. Any element of the Department of
State not certified will be prohibited from retaining or
storing material classified at the SCI level until the DCI
certifies its compliance, unless such elements receive a
Presidential waiver.
Section 307. Clarification of Standing of United States Citizens to
Challenge Certain Blocking of Assets
Section 307 amends the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act (title VIII of Public Law 106-120) (hereafter
referred to as the ``Act''). This provision simply states that
whatever process was available to a United States citizen under
the Administrative Procedure Act or any other provision of law,
with respect to the blocking of assets by the United States,
prior to the enactment of the Act, remains available after the
enactment of the Act. It was not the intent of the United
States Congress to abrogate in any way the due process rights
of U.S. citizens upon the enactment into law of the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Section 307 expressly states
in statutory language Congress's original intent.
Section 308. Availability of Certain Funds for Administrative Costs of
Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat
Section 308 waives prohibitions that prevent Executive
branch agencies from contributing appropriated fiscal year 2000
funds to an interagency body for the purpose of supporting the
Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
title iv--central intelligence agency
Section 401. Expansion of Inspector General Actions Requiring a Report
to Congress
Section 401 closes gaps in the reporting requirements to
the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress revealed
by the Committee's inquiry into the mishandling of classified
information by former DCI John Deutch. Current law requires the
Inspector General to notify the intelligence oversight
committees only if the Director or Acting Director is the
subject of an inquiry. This amendment broadens the notification
requirement to include former DCIs, all confirmed officials
(General Counsel, DDCIs and ADCIs), the Executive Director, and
the Deputy Directors for Operations, Intelligence,
Administration, and Science and Technology. In addition to
expanding the number of senior officials covered by the
notification requirement, the amendment also requires
congressional notification whenever a criminal referral to the
Department of Justice is made on one of the designated
officials.
Section 402. Subpoena Authority of the Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 402 provides several technical corrections to the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to address superseding
legislation, conform language and streamline reporting
procedures.
Section 403. Improvement and Extension of Central Services Program
Section 403 extends the Central Services Program until
March 31, 2005, and clarifies that the Central Services Program
Working Capital Fund may retain and use receipts resulting from
reimbursements for utility services and meals provided to
individuals and cash receipts from the rental of property and
equipment to employees and detailees. This change would allow
the Central Services Program Working Capital Fund to retain
miscellaneous receipts that are paid directly to an enterprise
by an individual, thereby properly offsetting costs incurred in
the operation and maintenance of enterprise facilities where
the Government incurs costs associated with those individuals.
In addition, this section expands the current law to allow
retention of rents collected from individuals who are not CIA
employees, and therefore not subject to payroll deduction.
Finally, this section excludes depreciation of CIA owned
structures as a recoverable operating expense.
Section 404. Details of Employees to the National Reconnaissance Office
Section 404 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act to
permit the Director of Central Intelligence to detail CIA
employees on a long-term basis to the National Reconnaissance
Organization (NRO). Current laws, regulations and Comptroller
General opinions which govern the detailing of employees from
one government agency to another have been interpreted by the
CIA General Counsel to limit details to NRO to no more than
five years. This amendment would exempt CIA from these
requirements and would provide the flexibility necessary to
deal with the unique staffing requirements of the NRO.
Section 405. Transfers of Funds to Other Agencies for Acquisition of
Land
Section 405 extends the life of appropriated funds
transferred by the CIA permitting them to remain available for
three years to other government agencies for the purpose of
purchasing land. Any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the
Congress.
Section 406. Eligibility of Additional Employees for Reimbursement for
Professional Liability Insurance
Section 406 allows the Director of Central Intelligence to
designate categories of employees in addition to those noted in
Public Law 104-208, who would be eligible to receive
reimbursement for up to one-half of the cost of purchasing
professional liability insurance. This section permits the
expenditure of appropriated funds to reimburse employees who
are at risk of incurring liability claims due to the nature of
their duties, but are not included within the existing job
categories that are currently eligible for reimbursement. Any
exercise of this authority must be reported to the intelligence
oversight committees of the Congress.
title V--department of defense intelligence activities
Section 501. Two-year Extension of Authority to Engage in Commercial
Activities as Security for Intelligence Collection Activities
Section 501 amends section 431(a) of title 10 to extend
current Department of Defense authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities
until December 31, 2002. This authority expires on December 31,
2000.
Section 502. Nuclear Test Monitoring Equipment
Section 502 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, who may
delegate the authority to the Secretary of the Air Force, to
convey to a foreign government nuclear test explosion
monitoring equipment that is installed within the territory of
that government. This equipment would be conveyed with a
bilateral agreement in which the recipient nation agrees to
provide the United States with timely access to the data
produced, collected, or generated and to provide the U.S.
access to the equipment for purposes of inspecting, testing,
maintaining, repairing, or replacing the equipment.
Section 503. Experimental Personnel Management Program for Technical
Personnel for Certain Elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 503 allows the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), for a period of five years from the date of enactment of
this Act, to carry out an experimental program using special
personnel management authority to facilitate the recruitment of
eminent experts in science or engineering for research and
development projects administered by the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the
National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Under this limited authority, the
DCI may appoint scientists and engineers from outside the civil
service and uniformed services to the NIMA, NSA, NRO and DIA.
Committee Action
On April 27, 2000, the Select Committee on Intelligence
approved the Bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.
The Committee approved by a vote of 12-1 an amendment by
Senator Levin to add Section 307, a clarification of the
standing of United States citizens to challenge certain
blocking of assets by the United States.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying
out the provisions of this Bill, for fiscal year 2001, are set
forth in the classified annex to this Bill. Estimates of the
costs incurred in carrying out this Bill in the five fiscal
years thereafter are not available from the Executive branch,
and therefore the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to
paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, to include such estimates in this report. On May 4,
2000, the Committee transmitted this Bill to the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and requested that it conduct an estimate
of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this
Bill.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) rule XXXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the
provisions of this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law
In the opinion of the Committee it is necessary to dispense
with the requirements of section 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the business
of the Senate.
