[Senate Report 104-258]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
Calendar No. 388
104th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 104-258
_______________________________________________________________________
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
April 30, 1996.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Specter, from the Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 1718]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the
original bill (S. 1718), which authorizes appropriations for
fiscal year 1997 for the intelligence activities and programs
of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and which accomplishes
other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that
the bill do pass.
purpose of the bill
This bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for
(a) the intelligence activities and programs of the
United States Government; (b) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System; and (c) the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September
30, 1997, for the intelligence activities of the United
States and for the Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence;
(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence,
with Office of Management and Budget approval, to
exceed the personnel ceilings by up to two percent;
(4) Extend for two additional years the President's
authority to delay the imposition of sanctions when
necessary to protect
an intelligence source or method or an ongoing criminal
investigation;
(5) Direct the DCI to develop regulations prohibiting
an Intelligence Community employee from working for a
foreign government for five years after retirement;
(6) Clarify FBI's authority to access local and long
distance telephone billing records and expand the
application of the civil remedy provisions that apply
to violations of the access provision;
(7) Criminalize theft of economic proprietary
information on behalf of, or with the intent to
benefit, a foreign government or its agent;
(8) Provide for renewal and reform of the
Intelligence Community; and
(9) Establish a Commission to review the organization
of the U.S. Government to combat proliferation and
recommend improvements.
the classified supplement to the committee report
The classified nature of United States intelligence
activities prevents the Committee from disclosing the details
of its budgetary recommendations in this Report.
The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to this
Report, which contains (a) the classified annex to this Report
and (b) the classified schedule of authorizations which is
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal
status as a public law. The classified annex to this report
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's actions
as set forth in the classified schedule of authorizations. The
classified annex has the same status as any Senate Report, and
the Committee fully expects the Intelligence Community to
comply with the limitations, guidelines, directions, and
recommendations contained therein.
This classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is also made available to
affected departments and agencies within the Intelligence
Community.
scope of committee program and budget review
The Committee conducted a detailed review of the
Administration's three major intelligence budget requests for
fiscal year 1997: the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense; and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) of the Military Services. The Committee's review
included a series of briefings and hearings with senior
intelligence officials, numerous staff briefings, review of
budget justification materials and numerous written responses
provided by the Intelligence Community to specific questions
posed by the Committee.
In addition to its annual review of the Administration's
budget request, the Committee performs continuing oversight of
various intelligence activities and programs, to include the
conduct of audits and reviews by the Committee's audit staff.
These inquiries frequently lead to actions initiated by the
Committee with respect to the budget of the activity or program
concerned.
As a result of a new Memorandum of Agreement between the
leadership of the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services
Committees, the Committee is including its recommendations on
both JMIP and TIARA in its public report and classified annex.
The SSCI has agreed that JMIP and TIARA issues will continue to
be authorized in the defense authorization bill. SASC has
agreed to involve SSCI staff in staff-level defense
authorization conference meetings and to provide the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the SSCI the opportunity to consult with
the SASC Chairman and Ranking Member before a JMIP or TIARA
issue is finally closed out in conference in a manner with
which they disagree. The Committee looks forward to continuing
its productive relationship with the SASC on all issues of
mutual concern.
committee program and budget recommendations
Most of the Committee's specific recommendations related to
the Administration's budget request for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities are classified. This includes
the amount of the total fiscal year 1997 budget request, as
well as any comprehensive treatment of program elements.
However the Committee is committed, consistent with security
considerations, to making its view regarding its concerns and
priorities for intelligence public to the extent possible.
Further recommendations, as well as classified details on these
unclassified recommendations, are provided in the classified
annex accompanying this bill.
national foreign intelligence program
Personnel and funding resources for national intelligence
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Committee has been at
the forefront of actions to reduce and reorient intelligence
funds and personnel to reflect new post-Cold War missions and
priories.
In fiscal year 1991, the Committee initiated the policy
which became a congressional mandate to reduce the number of
national intelligence personnel by 17.5 percent by fiscal year
1999. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence later agreed to extend downsizing by 2 percent per
year for three years for a new objective of 22.5 percent by
2002. All of the intelligence agencies are making progress in
meeting this objective. The Intelligence Community is
increasingly turning its attention to ``right-sizing'' its
workforce, to ensure that it can attract, train, and retain
personnel with the appropriate skills mix for the future.
The Committee has also played a leading role in reducing
and redirecting funding for national intelligence. Since 1990,
the Committee has cut each successive Administration request,
so that Intelligence Community spending has declined by 19
percent in real terms compared to the beginning of the decade.
This year, the Committee is recommending a modest increase--
just over 1 percent--to the Administration's budget request for
national intelligence.
Areas of continuing committee emphasis
Last year, the Committee focused on enhancing intelligence
capabilities in the high-priority areas of proliferation,
terrorism, counter narcotics, and counterintelligence. The
Intelligence Community sustained in fiscal year 1997 most of
the fiscal year 1996 Congressional initiatives in these areas.
The Committee applauds the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and the Intelligence Community for recognizing the need
to reorder priorities within the NFIP in this way. The
Committee also makes additional recommendations for increased
resources in fiscal year 1997 for these programs and
activities.
Another major theme of the Committee's review of the fiscal
year 1996 budget request was an apparent imbalance between
funding of new collection capabilities and funding required to
fully process, disseminate, and exploit collected information.
The Committee is gratified to note that this theme was major
focus of the Intelligence Community fiscal year 1997 program
build and that the DCI sustained in fiscal year 1997 many of
the fiscal year 1996 Congressional initiatives to enhance
processing, dissemination, and exploitation capabilities.
Further work is required in this area, but the DCI has made a
significant commitment in this area that is acknowledged by the
Committee.
Continuing review of NRO financial management
Section 310 of S. 922 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996 contained provisions addressing the
financial management of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO). It restricted the amount of forward funding permitted to
the NRO at the beginning of fiscal year 1997 and directed a
joint review of the NRO's financial management practices by the
Inspectors General of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Department of Defense. It also directed the President to report
to Congress with a proposal to subject the budget of the
Intelligence Community to greater oversight by the Executive
branch.
The Committee continues to review in detail the NRO's
financial condition and its management practices, including
convening two separate on-the-record briefings on this topic.
Further, the Committee approved the reprogramming of $820
million additional excess forward funding from the NRO to
support Bosnia deployment. The Committee has also reviewed the
President's report and approves the measures detailed therein
to enhance Executive Branch oversight of the NRO. Finally, the
Committee awaits the final report of the Inspectors General
related to the NRO's organization, forward funding, and
financial management practices. While much has been achieved,
additional steps are required to restore the confidence of the
Committee in NRO financial management practices.
Arms control monitoring
The Committee has become increasingly disturbed over the
apparent disarray in the Intelligence Community over funding
for arms control monitoring capabilities. Some critical arms
control monitoring capabilities are funded for one year only,
raising the question of whether these systems will be available
to support monitoring requirements for existing arms control
treaties. Shortfalls exist in other critical areas as well,
including exploitation and analysis of arms control
intelligence. In light of this situation, the Committee
requests that the DCI--in coordination with the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--provide a comprehensive
plan for upgrading U.S. arms control collection, processing,
and analysis capabilities by fiscal year 1999 in order to fully
meet the requirement to provide effective monitoring of
treaties signed by the United States or near completion. This
plan should be submitted to the intelligence oversight
committees no later than March 1, 1997.
Quality of life issues
The Intelligence Community is putting renewed emphasis on a
wide variety of quality of life issues for intelligence
personnel. The DCI has recently focused attention on the need
for comprehensive personnel reform for both the CIA and the
defense components of U.S. intelligence. Although the
Administration had not finalized its reform proposals by the
time the Committee marked up the fiscal year 1997 Intelligence
Authorization Act, the Committee is committee to pursuing
legislation and funding for such reforms, as required.
Further, the Committee addressed current shortfalls in
another quality of life area--intelligence facilities. The
Committee annually reviews the facilities plans and
requirements of indivdiual intelligence agencies and
components--including requirements for new facilities or
modifications to existing facilities--funded in the DCI's
annual budget submission. Indeed, Section 602 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 established
very stringent requirements for congressional notification and
approval of Intelligence Community construction and improvement
projects. This year, the Committee is recommending several
changes to the Fiscal Year 1997 NFIP budget request, based on
information received in congressional budget justification
books, hearings, and answers to Committee questions-for-the-
record. Specifically, the Committee has recommended that new
facilities be constructed to house the Army's National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC) and the Defense Intelligence
Agency's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). In both
cases, intelligence personnel are subjected to inadequate
working conditions, with considerable potential structural,
health, fire, and safety hazards. The Committee believes that
new facilities are required and has included recommendations to
this effect in its markup.
joint military intelligence program
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle ACTD
A request for proposal has been released, for a single
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) to replace the former
Hunter and Maneuver program, and contract award is expected
within one month. The restructuring of the program and the
creation of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
has resulted in an excess of unexpended funds in fiscal year
1995 and fiscal year 1996. The Committee is also concerned that
the DARO will not be able to exclude the final year 1997 budget
request for the TUAV of $64.0 million as planned. Therefore,
the Committee recommends that the fiscal year 1997 budget
request for TUAV be reduced by $12.8 million and encourages the
Department to reprogram any remaining prior year funds within
the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP).
The Committee wants to reiterate its strong support for the
TUAV program. At the same time, the Committee is concerned
about the high degree of concurrency in the TUAV program. The
Committee understands the difficulties in transitioning an ACTD
into procurement but still believes that the ``fly before you
buy'' strategy of an ACTD is the correct one.
Global Hawk sensor upgrades
The DARP fiscal year 1997 budget request for the Global
Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle program is $81.2 million. Within
this budget amount, the Administration proposes to initiate a
new payload capacity for Global Hawk. The Global Hawk has not
yet achieved first flight and has not yet successfully
demonstrated its primary sensor capability. Moreover, the
Committee is not aware of any decision to move Global Hawk from
an ACTD into production. Therefore, the Committee believes that
it is premature to initiate any additional payload development
and recommends a reduction to the Administration's fiscal year
1997 budget request of $9.8 million for the Global Hawk sensor
upgrade.
RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft No. 16
The RC-135 RIVET JOINT airborne reconnaissance fleet
provides worldwide tactical intelligence support to theater
users. Its primary mission is to detect, collect, analyze, and
disseminate tactically significant information in support of
theater warfighting needs. The intelligence information
gathered by this platform support a broad spectrum of theater
and national intelligence requirements.
Since the Gulf War, the operational tempo for the Rivet
Joint fleet has been extremely high. This high operational
tempo has caused the regional CINC's to make expansion of the
Rivet Joint fleet by two aircraft a top priority. The Committee
is aware that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence have jointly signed an Enhanced Defense
Review Board (EDRB) decision memorandum instructing that two
additional Rivet Joint aircraft be built. Rivet Joint No. 15 is
included in the fiscal year 1997 budget request and Rivet Joint
No. 16 is programmed for FY 1998. Because of the high priority
assigned to additional Rivet Joint aircraft by the CINC's and
the efficiencies that can be realized by acceleration of the
program, the Committee recommends an additional $52.3 million
to build Rivet Joint No. 16 in fiscal year 1997. By
accelerating this procurement into fiscal year 1997, the
Committee believes that the Air Force will realize 15 percent
cost savings over fiscal year 1998 procurement due to
efficiencies from material quantity purchases and mechanical
fabrication.
Rivet Joint technology transfer
The Committee understands that there is an Air Force
requirement for long-range detection and tracking of missile
launches and rapid transmission of precise launch site
information in order to destroy the launch vehicles as well as
provide impact point data to friendly forces. The Committee is
interested in the possibility of transferring operationally
proven Cobra Ball sensor technology to the RC-135 Rivet Joint
fleet to satisfy this requirement. Therefore, the Committee
requests that the Air Force prepare a report and provide it to
the congressional defense and intelligence committees by August
1, 1996, on the proposed technology transfer. The report should
include an assessment of Service requirements for the Cobra
Ball sensor on the Rivet Joint, Rivet Joint program impacts
(cost, schedule, technical risk), and any infrastructure
(processing, dissemination, exploitation) implications of such
a modification to the Rivet Joint program.
U-2 upgrades
The Committee is concerned with the apparent decision by
the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office not to continue
upgrading current airborne reconnaissance platforms. The
Committee understands that the Department of Defense will
shortly be proposing a reprogramming that will add funds for U-
2 sensor upgrades; a move the Committee supports. The Committee
also provides an additional authorization of $25.0 million in
fiscal year 1997 for two separate sensor upgrade programs for
the U-2 fleet, details of which are contained in the classified
annex accompanying this report.
Common data link
The Common Data Link (CDL) program is an effort within the
DARP to define and implement an interoperable command, control
and communications capability for intelligence and
reconnaissance assets, to include manned and unmanned systems.
The Congress authorized and appropriated $48.0 million for CDL
in fiscal year 1996. The fiscal year 1997 budget request for
CDL is $29.5 million. Poor program execution in fiscal year
1996 allows the Committee to recommend a reduction to the
fiscal year 1997 budget request of $6.5 million.
National training simulator
The request for the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP) includes $10.0 million to begin development of a new
national training simulator. Because the outyear funding for
this initiative has not been programmed, and the Committee has
not received any information to justify this effort, including
total program cost and schedule, the Committee recommends that
the request to initiate development of a new national simulator
be denied at this time, and further recommends deletion of
$10.0 million from the DSRP fiscal year 1997 budget request.
tactical intelligence and related activities
Theater Rapid Response Intelligence package
The Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP) is
a manportable system for use by the Army to collect and
disseminate actionable information from deployed locations.
TRRIP have been funded under the Foreign Counterintelligence
Program (FCIP) for theater and echelon above corps units. No
funds have been requested to provide TRRIP to tactical forces.
The Committee recommends an addition of $6.5 million to
purchase approximately 300 sets for tactical units, equipping
Corps and Division level counterintelligence and human
intelligence teams.
Navy JSTARS
The Committee believes that there are sound reasons for the
Navy to acquire the ability to receive, process, display, and
disseminate data on moving targets from the Joint Stars system.
The Navy is requesting the Congress to authorize and
appropriate funds for a new class of ``arsenal'' ship, which
would be equipped with hundreds of surface-to-surface missiles,
such as Tomahawk and the Army TACMS, to attack targets ashore.
For this ship to contribute to halting an invading force, it
must be able to attack mobile targets and not just fixed
installations. As both the Tomahawk and TACMS program offices
attest, the sensor of primary importance to attacking distant
moving targets is the moving target indicator (MTI) radar on
Joint Stars.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that $10.0 million be
provided in fiscal year 1997 in research and development to
integrate Joint Stars into key Navy systems. Of this amount,
approximately $5.0 million is required to integrate the
standard Link 16 data link used on Joint Stars into the Navy's
Tactical Command System. Another $5.0 million would be used to
incorporate appropriate Joint Stars MTI data processing and
display software, including Joint Stars Link 16 message sets,
into standard Navy computer systems and fighter aircraft.
P-3 intelligence support
The budget request includes $17.6 million to augment
forward deployed aircraft with non-developmental, commercial-
off-the-shelf, roll-on/roll-off SIGINT sensors. The Committee
is concerned that the Navy has not developed an operational
concept for this added capability and that these aircraft will
not be interoperable with other SIGINT platforms. The Committee
therefore recommends denial of the authorization request.
RC-135 re-engining
Last year the Committee recommended an initiative to begin
re-engining of the RC-135 specialty aircraft. While the Defense
Department is currently executing the fiscal year 1996 program,
no additional RC-135 re-engining funds were included in the
President's fiscal year 1997 budget request. Therefore, the
Committee recommends an additional $100.0 million in fiscal
year 1997 to re-engine four additional RC-135 aircraft.
Pacer Coin
Pacer Coin is a day/night, all-weather reconnaissance and
surveillance system which provides critical intelligence
support to theater and other commanders. The Committee
recommends an increase of $1.4 million to make air drop
modifications to the Pacer aircraft, giving it a dual-use role.
The Pacer Coin mission is currently being transitioned to
the Air National Guard, and the 152nd Air Wing in Reno, Nevada.
The Nevada Air National Guard is also transitioning to an air
drop mission, and is receiving additional C-130 aircraft
dedicated to this mission. By making the Pacer Coin aircraft
dual-use, the utilization and mission capability of these
aircraft will be significantly broadened. This modification
will enable the Pacer Coin aircraft to maintain a primary
mission of air drop/transport, while also preserving the unique
imagery capabilities of the Pacer Coin for use by theater and
other commanders when needed.
Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar
The OTAH-B radar was originally built in the late 1980's to
provide long-range, wide-area, all altitude surveillance and
tactical early warning of aircraft approaching North America to
provide NORAD and the national command authority (NCA) with
maximum warning/decision time. This system has been in warm
storage since 1994 with limited operations in FY 1994. The
system is not as capable technically as other U.S. radar
systems, therefore, the Committee recommends termination of
this program, and a reduction to the request of $5.7 million.
renewal and reform of u.s. intelligence
Title VII of the bill marks the culmination of many years
of efforts by this Committee and the Congress to renew U.S.
intelligence.\1\ Prompted by changes that had taken place in
Eastern Europe, the Committee began in December 1990 a
comprehensive review of the missions, functions, and
organizational arrangements for the Intelligence Community.
During the course of that review, the staff conducted nearly
130 interviews with current and former government officials and
the Committee held two hearings on the specific subject of
intelligence reorganization. In addition, intelligence
capabilities and reorganization were discussed extensively at
the confirmation hearings of Robert Gates to be Director of
Central Intelligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In 1987, 1988 and 1989, hearings and legislation recognized the
need to integrate the various intelligence entities into a more
coherent, effective and efficient structure by creating a Director of
National Intelligence with greater authority over the Intelligence
Community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While this review was underway, two significant
developments highlighted the need to reassess the Intelligence
Community. The first of these was the U.S. involvement in the
Persian Gulf war. During and after the conflict, the Committee
received considerable testimony both in hearings and briefings
with respect to the quality and timeliness of intelligence
support. This testimony indicated serious problems in existing
organizational structures, particularly with regard to the
exploitation and dissemination of imagery and regarding
consolidation of intelligence support under U.S. field
commanders. The other major development during this time period
was the collapse of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union
and the ascendancy of pro-democracy reform elements, signaling
the end of the Cold War.
In February, 1992, then-Committee Chairman David Boren
introduced a comprehensive proposal for Intelligence Community
reform and reorganization. The Committee held five public
hearings and one closed hearing on this legislation, with a
total of 14 witnesses. While most of this ambitious effort was
not enacted, these efforts did result in the adoption, for the
first time in law, of a comprehensive statement of the
responsibilities and authorities of the agencies and officials
of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Efforts to reform the Intelligence Community gained
momentum again in 1994 in the wake of the Ames espionage case
and the revelation that the NRO had built an expensive new
building without adequately informing this Committee. At the
same time, there was a growing sense in Congress that the
Intelligence Community needed clearer direction regarding its
post-Cold war mission.
To address these concerns, Congress--at the initiative of
this Committee--included in the 1995 Intelligence Authorization
bill a provision to establish a commission to ``produce a
credible, independent, and objective review of the Intelligence
Community.'' The President signed the bill creating the
``Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community'' on October 14, 1994.
the brown commission
The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community was charged with reviewing ``the
efficacy and appropriateness'' of U.S. intelligence activities
in the ``post-cold war global environment.'' The Commission's
statutory charter set forth 19 specific issues to be addressed
by the Commission in its final report, which was to be
submitted to the President and the congressional intelligence
committees no later than March 1, 1996, a date selected to
ensure that the Commission's recommendations could be
considered during the legislative session of the 104th
Congress.
The 17-member Commission consisted of nine members selected
by the President and eight selected by the leaders of the House
and Senate.
The Commissioners selected by the President included former
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and former Senator Warren
Rudman, who were appointed as Chairman and Vice Chairman
respectively; Zoe Baird, General Counsel of Aetna Life &
Casualty Company; Ann Caracristi, a former Deputy Director the
National Security Agency; Anthony Harrington, a lawyer in
Washington, D.C.; General Lew Allen, a former Chief of Staff of
the Air Force and former Director of the National Security
Agency; Stephen Friedman, former chairman of Goldman Sachs &
Co.; Robert Hermann, a former Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office; and Paul Walfowitz, a former Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Commissioners appointed by
Congress included Representative Norman Dicks (D-WA); former
Representative Tony Coelho; Senator James Exon (D-NE); former
Senator Wyche Fowler; Representative Porter Goss (R-FL);
General Robert Pursley, a former Commander of U.S. Forces in
Japan; Senator John Warner (R-VA); and David Dewhurst, a
Houston businessman. The Commission assembled a staff of a
number of former intelligence professionals headed by L. Britt
Snider, former Chief Counsel of this Committee.
The Commission held its first meeting on February 3, 1995,
and met for one or two days each month from March 1995 through
February 1996. The Commission heard formal testimony from 84
witnesses and its staff interviewed over 200 present and former
government officials as well as knowledgeable persons from the
media, academia, and industry. Commissioners also visited a
number of countries with whom the U.S. has cooperative
relationships in the intelligence area.
On May 21, 1995, Commission Chairman Les Aspin died
unexpectedly after a stroke. He was replaced as Chairman by
former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.
The Brown Commission submitted a 200-page report to the
President and the congressional committees on March 1, 1996.
The report, entitled ``Preparing for the 21st Century: An
Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence,'' concluded that:
[T]he United States needs to maintain a strong
intelligence capability. U.S. intelligence has made,
and continues to make, vital contributions to the
nation's security, informing its diplomacy and
bolstering its defenses. While the focus provided by
the superpower struggle of the Cold War has
disappeared, there remain sound and important roles and
missions for American intelligence.
At the same time, the Brown Commission concluded that the
effectiveness and efficiency of the Intelligence Community need
to be improved in a number of ways. The Commission's report
contains numerous specific recommendations for improving the
performance of the Intelligence Community.
Dr. Brown and Senator Rudman presented the Brown
Commission's conclusions in formal testimony before the
Committee on March 6. As a courtesy, Chairman Specter and Vice
Chairman Kerrey introduced the Commission's legislative package
as S.1593 on the same day.
scope of the committee's recent reform review
While the Brown Commission was conducting its review, this
Committee continued its own efforts to examine the appropriate
role of the Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War would
and how to optimize the structure of the Community to
accomplish that mission. The Community held six hearings and
three Member-level briefings to consider aspects of the Renewal
and Reform efforts. Twenty-six witnesses provided the Committee
with views from a variety of perspectives. The Committee heard
from a broad array of intelligence consumers, including
representatives from the Departments of Justice, State, Energy,
Defense, and Treasury. Witnesses also included former Directors
of Central Intelligence, as well as the current DCI, former
leaders of this Committee, academics, and representatives from
organizations that had done their own review of needed reforms
in the Intelligence Community. In addition, the Committee staff
conducted numerous interviews and carefully reviewed the
results of extensive work done by the Brown Commission.
the committee's reform proposals
In the Committee's view, the Brown Commission did an
excellent job identifying the key issues relating to the reform
of the Intelligence Community. The Committee agrees with many
of the Commission's recommendations, particularly regarding
institutional mechanisms for getting policymakers more involved
in identifying and prioritizing their information needs and for
addressing transnational threats, ways to improve intelligence
analysis, and the need to enhance accountability and
oversight--to include declassifying the aggregate amount
appropriated for the intelligence budget and abolishing term
limits for membership on the intelligence oversight committees.
The Committee believes, however, that the Brown Commission did
not go far enough in providing the Director of Central
Intelligence with both the necessary authority and the
necessary support structure to ensure improved efficiency,
effectiveness, and accountability in the U.S. Intelligence
Community.
DCI authority
The changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet
Union have dramatic implications for U.S. intelligence efforts.
The demands for rapid responses to diverse threats in a rapidly
changing would necessitate a streamlines Intelligence Community
and a DCI with clear lines of authority. This is lacking in the
intelligence bureaucracy that emerged during the bipolar world
of the Cold War.
As the Brown Commission noted, ``The Intelligence Community
* * * has evolved over nearly 50 years and now amounts to a
confederation of separate agencies and activities with
distinctly different histories, missions, and lines of
command.'' Recognizing the pitfalls of decentralized
intelligence--less attention devoted to non-Defense
requirements, waste and duplication, the absence of objective
evaluation of performance and ability to correct shortcomings,
and loss of synergy--the Commission supported centralized
management of the Intelligence Community by the DCI. The
Commission concluded, however, that the DCI has all the
authority needed to accomplish this objective of centralized
management, if only he spent less time on CIA matters and had
the budget presented to him in a clearer fashion.
The Committee believes that the current disincentives for
intelligence to operate as a community, reduce unnecessary
waste and duplication, and become more effective and efficient
in meeting the Nation's needs can only be overcome by enhancing
the DCI's statutory authority over the budget and
administration of all non-tactical intelligence activities and
programs. A key issue for Congressional oversight of the
Intelligence Community is accountability. It has become
increasingly clear that a single manager, the DCI, must be
accountable for the success or failure of the Intelligence
Community. Therefore, the DCI must be given the authorities he
needs to carry out this responsibility.
Control of intelligence budget
``The annual budgets for U.S. intelligence organizations
constitute one of the principal vehicles for managing
intelligence activities,'' noted the Brown Commission in its
Report. ``How effectively and efficiently the Intelligence
Community operates is to a large degree a function of how these
budgets are put together and how they are approved and
implemented.'' The Committee agrees with this assessment and
concludes that the DCI must have ultimate control over the
execution of the principal national elements of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget if he or she is to
effectively manage the Intelligence Community.
Need for ``Goldwater-Nichols'' jointness in the intelligence community
Similarly, there is a need to bring the ``Goldwater-
Nichols'' concept of ``jointness'' to the Intelligence
Community. The Brown Commission recommended that the DCI
establish common Intelligence Community standards in the areas
of skills proficiencies, personnel evaluation systems, trial
period performance criteria, personnel allowances and benefits,
and personnel and physical security. If further recommended
that the DCI establish cooperative arrangements within the
Intelligence Community in the areas of job recruiting,
background investigations, training programs, and facilities.
The Commission acknowledges that similar recommendations have
been made by numerous studies over the years and supported by
Intelligence Community leaders, yet little or no progress has
been made in implementing them. The Committee is convinced that
the same fate awaits these latest recommendations unless the
DCI is given not only the mandate but the authority to effect
implementation.
DCI management support
Once the DCI is given the authority needed to implement
resource and administrative decisions throughout the Community,
it is critical that he or she have a support structure to meet
that enhanced Community role. The Brown Commission considered
organizational arrangements for the Intelligence Community and
concluded that the existing Deputy Director for Central
Intelligence should be replaced by two deputies: one for the
Community and one for the CIA.
The Committee believes that the Brown Commission's proposal
will not adequately support the DCI in overcoming bureaucratic
tendencies, honed over 50 years, that have frustrated previous
efforts to bring greater coherency and coordination to
Intelligence Community efforts. In our view, the institutional
structure to assist the DCI in managing the Community should be
established along functional, rather than organizational,
lines. Accordingly, the Committee recommends the establishment
of three Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence: an
Assistant Director for Analysis and Production, an Assistant
Director for Collection, and an Assistant Director for
Administrative Support.
The Assistant Director for Analysis and Production (ADCI/
A&P) would be responsible for overseeing intelligence analysis
and production throughout the Intelligence Community:
establishing priorities and standards of analysis and
production; monitoring allocation of analytical resources and
identifying unnecessary duplication; tasking the Assistant
Director for Collection with collection requirements; and
providing analytical and production support to the President,
National Security Council, and National Economic Council.
Departments such as State, Defense, and Treasury would retain
their residual analytic capability and provide competing
analytic views.
The Assistant Director for Collection would be responsible
for ensuring that national intelligence collection meets
requirements in an efficient and effective manner by tasking
the collection disciplines--signals intelligence, imagery
intelligence, human intelligence, and measurements and
signatures intelligence; managing and evaluating the
acquisition of collection systems and their operations; and
developing a single, integrated plan, program and budget for
national intelligence collection.
The Committee believes that consolidating the collection
disciplines is a useful way to enhance efficiency and
effectiveness, but the benefits are limited unless these
``stovepipes'' are embedded in a structure that ensures cross-
INT coordination at the top, when requirements are levied and
procurement decisions are made, and at the other end when
collected information is disseminated and analyzed. Having a
single manager for collection and one for analysis and
production--and ensuring strong links between the two--seems
the most compelling structure for ensuring these cross-
fertilization.
In addition, we would encourage the continued cooperation
between analysts and collectors across the board--not just in
HUMINT, Analysts should be encouraged to spend time on rotation
in the various collection agencies to lend substantive
expertise against increasingly technical targets and to return
to their home offices with a greater understanding of the
collection disciplines.
Finally, the Committee would establish a Assistant Director
for Administration who would have responsibility for personnel
management, including education and training; information
management systems; telecommunications systems; finance and
accounting; security; and procurement of supplies and support
services across the Community.
Legislative recommendations
The Committee's legislative proposals are set forth in
Title VII of this bill. Title VII would, among other things,
create Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Transnational
Threats within the National Security Council; establish the
three Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence described
above; give the DCI additional authorities over the
intelligence budget, including budget execution authority over
most of the NFIP; give the DCI the right to concur in the
appointments of the heads of NSA, NRO, and NIMA and to be
consulted on the appointments of the heads of DIA, the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence & Research, the Energy
Department's Office of Nonproliferation & National Security,
and the FBI's National Security Division.
Title VII would also establish an Office of Congressional
Affairs for the Intelligence Community, a statutory General
Counsel for the CIA, and an Intelligence Community Senior
Executive Service that would subsume the separate senior
executive services for the individual intelligence agencies.
The Directorate of Operations
Many of the most visible problems with the Intelligence
Community involve the Directorate of Operations at CIA (the
``DO''). Indeed, much of the Committee's oversight resources
over the past year have been devoted to examining issues such
as CIA's activities in Guatemala and Honduras, the so-called
``French Flap'' involving allegations that CIA attempted to
recruit French government officials to provide economic
intelligence, and the DO's dissemination of reports from assets
known or suspected to be under the control of the KGB.
The insights gained from the Committee's oversight of DO
activities and policies have been shared with the Director of
Central Intelligence and reflected in a number of changes he
has initiated in personnel and in policies. In addition, many
of the Committee's proposals are designed to address problems
identified through the Committee's oversight of the DO. For
example, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the
Committee on Transnational Threats will provide the
Intelligence Community, and particularly the DO, with clearer
guidance on high-profile policy issues such as whether
intelligence agencies should collect economic or environmental
intelligence; whether they should target friendly governments
for intelligence collection; whether they should use certain
forms of cover; and whether they should enter into
relationships with individuals or other governments whose
conduct may not live up to U.S. standards. Similarly, the
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection will
ensure that high-risk HUMINT collection is only employed where
use of technical collection is not a feasible alternative for
obtaining the needed information.
Another key issue is ensuring that the vast majority of
outstanding young men and women who work in the DO are given
the quality of management and career opportunities that will
make their public service personally rewarding, despite the
lack of publicity surrounding their many successes and the
abundance of criticism that greets each and every lapse. The
Committee's proposal for a Senior Executive Service for the
Intelligence Community is a first step in that direction. We
understand the Administration is preparing a comprehensive
personnel reform package and look forward to examining the
legislation when it is finalized. In addition, the Committee
agrees with the Commission's recommendations regarding
strengthening management of the Directorate of Operations in
the CIA, including creating specialized management tracks and
improving training.
Other recommendations
The Committee also endorses a number of additional non-
legislative recommendations made in the Brown Commission
report. For example, the Committee agrees with the Commission's
recommendations regarding promoting closer links between
intelligence producers and consumers, including providing daily
briefings to, and assigning intelligence aides to the staffs
of, senior policymakers. While analysts must be wary of
politicization, it is also clear that intelligence community
efforts will go for naught unless intelligence producers are
close enough to consumers to identify their needs on a daily
basis. The Committee urges CIA to consider implementing the
Brown Commission's suggestions for improving the quality of
analysis, including providing more travel and educational
opportunities for analysts and providing for more non-
managerial senior analyst positions.
Finally, the Committee strongly supports the Commission's
recommendation that the DCI develop a database of Community-
wide intelligence programs and activities to assist him in
making resource allocation decisions and tracking spending. In
the Committee's view, the development of such a database,
together with the establishment of a permanent staff of program
and budget analysts, is a key element to strengthening the
DCI's control of the Community.
Conclusion
The drumbeat for change in the Intelligence Community,
initiated in earnest with the fall of the Soviet empire,
amplified in recent months and years by a distressingly rapid
succession of public scandals, and informed by thoughtful
studies such as those undertaken by the Brown Commission, the
Council on Foreign Relations, Georgetown University's Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy, and others, has brought us to a
propitious moment. Just as years of efforts aimed at
reorganizing the Department of Defense finally came to fruition
with passage of the ``Goldwater-Nichols'' legislation in 1986,
years of efforts by this Committee and others to reform the
Intelligence Community may finally succeed in significantly
enhancing this nation's ability to meet the security challenges
of the next century, renewing the Intelligence Community's
sense of mission, and beginning the process of renewing the
support of the American people of this essential capability.
the national imagery and mapping agency
The Committee was disappointed that the Administration had
not completed drafting the legislation necessary to create the
proposed National Imagery and Mapping Agency before the
Committee marked-up this bill. Nevertheless, the Committee has
included provisions establishing NIMA, providing for its
leadership, and defining its mission. A key concern of this
Committee is ensuring that NIMA serves all intelligence
consumers, national and tactical, military and non-military.
During the Cold War, the overriding threat was perceived to
be the Soviet military. In the Post-Cold War world, many of the
greatest threats to our security often do not lend themselves
to military answer--terrorism, proliferation, political
instability in the emerging democracies and the stress on those
fragile institutions exacerbated by organized crime, to name a
few examples. Cooperative bilateral and multilateral
relationships in law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomacy
present more options for addressing potential crises and
endeavoring to avoid the need to commit U.S. troops. In
addition, economic security is an increasingly important aspect
of our national security, with the U.S. Trade Representative
and the Secretary of Commerce, for example, playing important
roles. Each of these potential avenues for U.S. action needs
intelligence support to optimize their prospects for success.
Imagery has been critical for national policymaking going
back at least to the Cuban Missile Crisis. More recently, it
has played a significant role in UN Representative Madeleine
Albright's efforts to convince the international community to
support continued sanctions on Iraq, in the negotiation of the
Dayton Peace Accords, and in the efforts to bring Bosnian war
criminals to justice, to cite just a few examples. It is
essential that imagery collection, like signals and human
collection, be organized and managed in a manner that ensures
it will continue meeting these national needs.
intelligence community inspectors general
The Intelligence Community agencies are becoming
increasingly interconnected and, as a result, Intelligence
Community Inspectors General (IG) must work closely with each
other on a growing number of interrelated issues. This has
clearly resulted in more cooperation and coordination between
the IGs. However, there is no central point of coordination or
accountability for Intelligence Community IG issues,
particularly as they relate to investigations whose subject
matter crosses multiple agencies. For example, the Guatemala
investigation spanned several agencies (CIA, DOD, Justice,
State), with Inspectors General from each of the agencies
providing a separate investigation and report. There was no
central IG representing the overall intelligence interests,
addressing overarching intelligence themes or weaknesses, or
providing a consolidated report on the Guatemala matter.
Other Intelligence Community Inspector General issues that
have occasionally caused this Committee concern in the past
include:
Lack of effective coordination between the
Intelligence Community Inspectors General, particularly
between the Administrative and Statutory IGs.
Lack of consistent IG coverage of high risk or high
dollar intelligence programs in certain agencies.
Lack of effective management support and attention to
the Inspectors General and their products and
recommendations.
Inconsistent training and professional standards for
IG employees.
In addition, concerns have been expressed for intelligence
officials outside the IG community regarding the
professionalism, experience and training of the IG staffs.
The Committee has considered a variety of options for
addressing these concerns, including establishment of an
Intelligence Community Inspector General. Prior to initiating
these or other actions however, we direct that each of the
Inspectors General, both statutory and non-statutory, from each
organization concerned with intelligence matters, including
CIA, CIO, DIA, DoD, Energy, the Military Services, NRO, NSA,
State, Treasury and Justice provide by January 15, 1997 a
report to the Committees describing the reviews involving joint
intelligence issues they have participated in since January 1,
1994; what their role was in each review effort; how they are
currently staffed and organized to address Intelligence
Community issues (including the number of personnel who have
worked on the intelligence projects); and the percentage of
their total projects since January 1, 1994 which concern
intelligence matters; the percentage of their total
intelligence projects since January 1, 1994 that are joint
issues with other agencies; the formal and informal methods by
which they communicate with the other Inspectors General which
deal with Intelligence Community issues and the effectiveness
of those methods of communication. In addition, we ask that
each of the IGs make any recommendations they deem appropriate
for improving coordination and communication between the IGs,
as well as individual IG assessments of the feasibility and
desirability of creating an IG for the Intelligence Community
to coordinate all joint intelligence efforts. The individual IG
reports to the Committees should also describe how intelligence
related IG topics are selected, the training and other
professional standards they ascribe to, and how they ensure the
implementation of those standards.
combating proliferation
In the view the Committee, the U.S. government at present
is not well organized to meet the threat to U.S. national
security posed by the worldwide proliferation of chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons or devices, and their delivery
systems. More than 80 departments, agencies and other
organizations, including the Departments of Defense, State,
Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services and Justice, as
well as the National Security Council and the intelligence
community, have responsibilities for combating proliferation.
Yet no one individual or organization is responsible for
coordinating the political, military, diplomatic, economic and
intelligence resources that are required to prevent or roll
back proliferation.
Moreover, the Committee believes that there is unnecessary
duplication of effort and other inefficiencies among the
departments and agencies that have responsibilities in this
area, and that streamlining is required.
Organizational inefficiencies and a lack of central focus
and direction have made U.S. efforts to combat proliferation an
hoc, reactive and less effective than they could be. Given the
extraordinary challenge to U.S. national security posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (and the means to
deliver them), and the current lack of focus within the Federal
Government, the Committee believes that a thorough assessment
and review of the institutional architecture of the Federal
Government is required.
The Committee's authorization bill includes legislation to
create a commission to perform such an assessment, and to
report to Congress on specific administrative, legislative and
other changes it believes are required to improve U.S.
performance. It also addresses the threat posed by the spread
of so called dual use and other militarily useful technology by
requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to report
regularly to the Congress on this issue.
economic espionage
The Committee was also concerned about the growing problem
of economic espionage in our country. Foreign countries,
recognizing the value of American proprietary economic
information, have shifted intelligence resources and are now
targeting business and other economic information that will
help them compete in the world market. This shift in
intelligence targeting poses a new threat to the U.S. national
security.
As the Intelligence Community appropriately provides
greater emphasis and resources to counterintelligence, it must
pay particular attention to this emerging economic threat. The
Committee has addressed this threat several times since the end
of the Cold War revealed an increased emphasis upon economic
spying. Four years of hearings have exposed this problem as one
our greatest counterintelligence threats.
What the Committee is intending to combat is the theft of
American proprietary economic information by foreign countries.
When one considers the resources that can be brought to bear by
the world's former superpowers, American companies, large and
small, simply cannot defend themselves. FBI Director Louis
Freeh, noting that the United States may lose almost $100
billion a year to economic espionage, testified before the SSCI
and the Senate Judiciary Committee that ``the United States has
become, in effect, the basic research lab for the world.''
Current federal law is inadequate to deal with this
problem. Not a single federal law directly addresses the theft
of propriety economic information. As current federal laws
provide no systematic approach to the problem, the
Administration, the FBI Director, and scores of others have
informed the Committee that the United States needs a new,
effective, and straightforward law to deal with this problem.
Title V provides such a law.
section-by-section analysis and explanation
Title I--Intelligence activities
Section 101 lists the departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government for whose intelligence
and intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes
appropriations for fiscal year 1997.
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings covered
under this title for fiscal year 1997 are contained in a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of
Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this section.
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 1997 to exceed the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable
under section 102. The Director may exercise this authority
only when necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions or to the maintenance of a stable
personnel force, and any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the two intelligence committees of the Congress.
Section 104 provides details concerning the amount and
composition of the Intelligence Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$95,526,000 for fiscal year 1997 for the staffing and
administration of the various components under the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence. It
also authorizes funds identified for the Advanced Research and
Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force to
remain available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 265 full-time personnel for the
components under the Community Management Staff for fiscal year
1997 and provides that such personnel may be permanent
employees of the Staff or detailed from various elements of the
United States Government.
Subsection (c) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimburseable basis except for temporary situations.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$184,200,000 for year 1997 for the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III--General provisions
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorizes by the
conferee report for salary, pay, retirement and other benefits
for federal employees may be increased by such additional or
supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such
compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the conference report shall not be deemed to
constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
Section 303 extends for an additional two years the
authority granted by section 303 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for the President to
stay the imposition of an economic, cultural, diplomatic, or
other sanction or related action when the President determines
and reports to Congress that to proceed without delay would
seriously risk the compromise of an intelligence source or
method or an ongoing criminal investigation.
The FY 1996 Act terminates the President's authority one
year after enactment, on January 6, 1997. This sunset provision
was added last year during conference with the House to give
Congress an opportunity to see how the delay authority would be
implemented. Because the bill ultimately was not signed into
law until January, there is not yet a sufficient record on
implementation. Thus, the Committee is extending the
application of this provision for an additional two years.
Section 304 requires the DCI to issue regulations, within
three months of enactment of this legislation, requiring each
current or new employee of the Central Intelligence Agency to
agree in writing not to represent, or advise the government of,
or any political party of, a foreign country, for a period of
five years after the termination of the employee's employment
with the Central Intelligence Agency.
The section is motivated by reports the Committee has
received that some former CIA employees have, following
retirement from the CIA employment, agreed to serve as advisers
to the intelligence services of foreign countries or as
representatives of such services in their dealings with other
countries. The Committee believes that opportunities for
conflicts of interest, or at least the appearance of a
conflict, will arise if CIA employees, who frequently must deal
with foreign governments during the course of their CIA
employment, are permitted to work for foreign governments
immediately following termination of their employment by CIA.
Moreover, if a former CIA employee who acts as a representative
of a foreign government uses contacts with third governments
developed as result of his or her Agency employment, it may
result in confusion regarding whether the former CIA's
employee's activities are sanctioned by the U.S. Government.
To avoid such possible conflicts, the Committee believes
that there should be a five-year ``cooling off' period
following a CIA employee's departure from the Agency during
which the former employee is prohibited from working for a
foreign government.
The Committee directs the DCI to implement a regulation
requiring all CIA employees to sign a post-employment
agreement, similar to the non-disclosure and pre-publication
review agreements currently required of all CIA employees, that
the employee will not work for a foreign government within five
years of leaving the CIA, The DCI would be permitted to take
disciplinary action, including termination of retirement
benefits, against any employee found to have violated his or
here agreement.
Section 305 of the bill requires the President to submit to
Congress, within 90 days of enactment of this legislation, a
report on the implementation of Executive branch proposals to
improve oversight of the intelligence community budget. On
April 9, 1996, the President submitted a report to Congress
describing proposed Executive branch actions to improve budget
oversight. The Committee believes the actions, if fully
implemented, will be a major step in strengthening oversight of
the intelligence budget by the Executive branch. However, the
Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community, and
specifically the National Reconnaissance Office, may not be
able to comply with the actions detailed in the report.
Accordingly, the Committee is requesting the President to
prepare a status report on the implementation of his proposals.
Specifically, the report is to include:
The extent to which NFIP programs are now held to
requirements comparable to other Department of Defense
components in the implementation and execution of the
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Federal
Financial Management Act of 1994.
The extent to which NFIP programs now submit to the
Office of Management and Budget budget justification
materials and execution reports similar to those
submitted by non-intelligence components of the
Department of Defense.
The extent to which the National Reconnaissance
Office submits to the Office of Management and Budget,
the Community Management Staff, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense detailed information related to
major new acquisitions.
The extent to which the National Reconnaissance
Office has submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget, the Community Management Staff, and the Office
of Secretary of Defense monthly budget execution
reports similar to the budget execution reports
submitted by non-intelligence Department of Defense
programs.
Title IV--Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 401 amends Sections 2703 and 2709 of Title 18,
United States Code. This amendment is a clarification of the
meaning of the phrase ``telephone toll billing records'' as
used in 2703 and 2709. Congress intends to make clear, with
this amendment, that the phrase applies to both local and long
distance telephone toll billing records.
Section 2703 of Title 18, United States Code, among other
things, authorizes law enforcement to obtain various records
from providers of electronic communication during the course of
an official investigation, pursuant to an administrative
subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, or trial subpoena. The records
that can be obtained pursuant to these subpoenas include among
other things, ``the name, address, telephone toll billing
records, telephone number * * *'' Section 2709 of Title 18,
United States Code, authorizes the Director of the FBI to
obtain similar records from providers of wire and electronic
communications during the course of an authorized foreign
counterintelligence investigation, to include ``the name,
address, length of service, and toll billing records.''
The precise interpretation of ``telephone toll billing
records'' was recently called into question by Southwestern
Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. Specifically, Southwestern Bell
questioned whether the term referred to local as well, as long
distance records. The issue arose in March of 1995, when
Southwestern Bell received two grand jury subpoenas issued
pursuant to Section 2703 for airtime telephone toll records.
Southwestern Bell filed a motion to partially quash both
subpoenas arguing that the words ``telephone toll billing
records,'' as used in Section 2703, meant only information
related to long distance cellular airtime records.
The issue presented to the District Court was whether
Congress intended by its use of the term ``telephone boll
billing record'' to authorize a grand jury to obtain by
subpoena only long distance billing records. In a May 19, 1995
ruling, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri (Bartlett, D.J.) denied Southwestern
Bell's motion to quash the grand jury subpoenas, finding that
the ``plain meaning of the words `telephone toll billing
records' is billing records that contain information which was
used or could be used to charge for telephone calls or
services.'' Based on this finding, the District Court concluded
that the term ``toll billing records,'' as used in Sec. 2703,
applies to ``all records of calls from or attributed to a
particular number.''
Despite this ruling favorable to the government, nothing in
the plain wording of the statute or its legislative history is
conclusive on this point. The best that the District Court
could find is that there was nothing in the plain meaning of
the term or in the legislative history which would contradict
the ruling. This clearly leaves the interpretation open to
other challenges by well-meaning providers concerned about
their equities.
It should also be noted that substantial punitive
provisions have been added to the civil remedies available to
providers, subscribers, or customers aggrieved by any violation
of Chapter 121 of Title 18, United States Code. Currently,
unauthorized access to stored communications, whether for
purposes of commercial advantage, malicious destruction or
damage, or private financial gain, subjects the perpetrator to
not only criminal penalties but civil fines as well. These
fines, however, do not include punitive damages, irrespective
of the state of mind of the perpetrator. This provision makes
clear that if the violation is willful or intentional, such
punitive damages as the court may allow can be awarded by a
jury. Also, in the case of any successful action to enforce
liability under this section, the costs of the action, together
with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court, will
be available to an aggrieved plaintiff.
Finally, this provision provides for disciplinary actions
if a court determines that any agency or department of the
United States has violated Chapter 121 and the court finds that
the circumstances surrounding the violation raise questions of
whether or not an officer or employee of the agency or
department acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the
violation. This provision directs the agency or department to
promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not
disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or
employee who was responsible for the violation.
Title V--Economic Espionage Act of 1996
Section 501 contains the short title of this title of the
bill.
Section 502 adds new sections 571-578 to Title 18, U.S.
Code that criminalizes theft of economic proprietary
information undertaken on the behalf of, or with the intent to
benefit, a foreign government or its agent.
Section 571 sets forth definitions of certain key terms
used in the new chapter and builds upon definitions already set
out in Chapter 1 of Title 18.
Section 572(a) defines the offense of ``economic
espionage'' and punishes the theft or wrongful appropriation,
duplication, alteration, destruction, or conversion of
proprietary economic information on behalf of a foreign
government. Attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies to commit
such offenses are also made punishable, as are wrongful
receipts, possessions, or purchases of stolen vital proprietary
economic information. To make out an offense, the prosecution
must show in each instance either that the perpetrator intended
to benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent or
had actual knowledge or reason to believe that they are acting
on behalf of a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.
The intangible nature of vital proprietary economic
information requires the section to be written broadly enough
to cover both traditional instances of theft, where the object
of the crime is removed from the rightful owner's control and
possession, as well as non-traditional methods of
misappropriation involving electronic duplication or alteration
in which the original property never leaves the dominion or
control of the rightful owner. The maximum punishments
specified recognize the gravity of the offenses involved and
their concomitant effect on the Nation's economy and security.
Section 572(b) specifies a separate maximum punishment for
an organization found guilty under this section. The higher
maximum fine reflects the significant potential financial
benefit to the offending organization from the theft and is
designed to ensure that the fine is viewed as something more
than a cost of doing business.
Section 572(c) makes clear that it is not a violation of
law in contravention of Section 571 to disclose proprietary
economic information in the case of appropriate disclosures to
Congress or disclosures that are deemed essential to reporting
a violation of United States law.
Section 573 is designed to permit recapture of both the
proceeds and implements of the offenses specified in the
chapter. These provisions may prove especially effective as the
proceeds of economic espionage may be staggering. The section
incorporates through reference existing law to provide for
procedures to be used in the detention, seizure, forfeiture,
and ultimate disposition of properly forfeited proceeds under
the section. It provides for an in personam action against the
offender, rather than one against the property itself, and
preserves the rights of innocent third parties.
Section 574 authorizes the President to prohibit,
consistent with international obligations, for a period of up
to 5 years, the importation into, or exportation from, the
United States, whether by carriage of tangible items or by
transmission, of any merchandise produced, made, assembled, or
manufactured by a person convicted of any offense described in
subsection 571, or in the case of an organization convicted of
any offense described in subsection 571, its successor entity
or entities. Any sanctions so imposed are enforceable through a
civil action that may be brought by the Secretary of the
Treasury and which could result in the imposition of a civil
penalty of not less than $100,000. Imposition of such a penalty
must be in accordance with applicable Custom laws.
Section 575 is to rebut the general presumption against the
extraterritorial effect of U.S. criminal laws, this section
makes it clear that Section 571 is meant to apply to certain
conduct occurring beyond U.S. borders. To ensure some nexus
between the assertion of such jurisdiction and the offense,
extraterritoriality is provided for only if the offender is a
U.S. person or an act in furtherance of the offense is
committed in the United States. ``United States'' is defined in
Chapter 1 of Title 18. In pursuing such cases, it is expected
that the Department of Justice will focus its investigative and
prosecutorial resources on those in which there has been a
substantial harm to U.S. interests.
Section 576 makes clear that non-Federal remedies, whether
civil or criminal, for dealing with the theft or
misappropriation of economic proprietary information are not
preempted by the Act. Several states have criminalized the
theft of intellectual property but enforcement may be
frustrated by the ease with which such property is transferred
across state or national boundaries.
Section 577 requires a court to preserve the
confidentiality of alleged proprietary economic information
during legal proceedings, consistent with the requirements of
the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws. This
preserves the information's confidential nature and, hence, its
value. Without such a provision, owners may be reluctant to
cooperate in prosecutions for fear of exposing their
proprietary information to public view--thereby destroying its
value.
Section 578 makes clear that this chapter does not prohibit
or impair any lawful activity conducted by a law enforcement or
regulatory agency of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision of a State, or an intelligence agency of the United
States.
Title VI--Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of
1996
Section 601 contains the short title of this title of the
bill.
Section 611 authorizes the establishment of a commission,
to be known as the Commission to Assess the Organization of the
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (the Commission). This section directs that
the Commission would be composed of eight members, with four
appointed by the President; one appointed by the Majority
Leader of the Senate; one appointed by the Minority Leader of
the Senate; one appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; and one appointed by the Minority Leader of
the House of Representatives. Section 611 also outlines the
period of appointment of members of the Commission; vacancies;
meetings; and the selection of a Chairman and Vice Chairman.
Section 612 describes the duties of the Commission. In
general, the Commission would be responsible for carrying out a
thorough study of the organization of the Federal Government,
with respect to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). This section describes specific
requirements: to assess the current structure and organization
of the Federal departments and agencies, including elements of
the intelligence community, that have responsibilities for
combating proliferation of WMD; and to assess the effectiveness
of the cooperation between elements of the U.S. intelligence
community and the intelligence services of foreign governments
relating to WMD proliferation. Section 612(b) would require
that the Commission make specific recommendations to improve
the performance of the Federal Government with respect to
combating WMD proliferation. Section 612(c) would require the
Commission to submit to Congress a report containing detailed
findings and recommendations no later than 18 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 613 describes the powers of the Commission,
including the power to hold hearings, take testimony and
receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable.
This would include any information, both classified and
unclassified, from any government department, agency or other
organization the Commission considers necessary to carry out
its duties. Finally, this section discuss the use of the United
States mails, and the use of gifts or donations of services or
property.
Section 614 sets forth the compensation for members of the
Commission. Members who are not officers or employees of the
Federal Government would be compensated at a rate equal to the
daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay described for
level IV of the Executive Schedule. Members who are officers or
employees of the Federal Government would receive no additional
compensation for their work as members of the Commission. This
section describes the travel allowances and per diem in lieu of
subsistence that would be allowed to Commission members. This
section contains provisions for the hiring and compensation of
Commission staff personnel, including the detail of Federal
Government employees.
Section 615 provides that the Commission will terminate 60
days after the date on which the Commission submits its report
under section 612.
Section 616 states that for the purposes of this Act, the
term intelligence community would have the meaning given such
term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)).
Section 617 authorizes to be appropriated for the
Commission in fiscal year 1997 such sums as may be necessary
for the Commission to carry out its duties. This section
directs that the amounts appropriated pursuant to this
authorization of appropriations would remain available until
the termination of the Commission.
Section 621 directs that not later than 6 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter,
the Director of Central intelligence would submit to Congress a
report on the acquisition of dual-use and other technology
useful for the development and production of WMD during the
preceding 6 months. This section directs that the report would
include a discussion of the trends in the acquisition of such
technology by such countries. This section notes that the
report would be submitted in an unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
Title VII--Intelligence Activities Renewal and Reform Act of 1996
Section 701
Section 701 contains the short title of this title of the
bill.
Section 702
Section 702 amends Section 101 of the National Security Act
of 1947 by adding a new subsection (h) which creates a
Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) of the National
Security Council. The CFI would consist of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, who would serve as Chairman of the CFI.
The purpose of the CFI, the creation of which was
recommended by the Brown Commission, would be to provide a
better institutional mechanism to provide policy-level guidance
for the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities. The CFI would
identify the intelligence required to address U.S. national
security interests, establish priorities to address these
requirements, and evaluate the performance of the intelligence
community in satisfying intelligence requirements. The NSC has
on occasion issued statements of intelligence requirements, but
the Committee believes that the process for setting
requirements and priorities should be institutionalized and
should be performed on a regular basis.
The CFI would also establish policy guidelines for
intelligence activities, such as whether intelligence agencies
should collect economic or environmental intelligence; whether
they should target friendly governments for intelligence
collection; whether they should use certain forms of cover; and
whether they should enter into relationships with individuals
or other governments whose conduct may not live up to U.S.
standards. Intelligence agencies have historically been left to
make these difficult decisions themselves; in the Committee's
view, these decisions should be made at the policy level.
The Committee anticipates that the CFI would meet several
times each year and, as recommended by the Brown Commission,
would be assisted by a subordinate ``Consumers Committee''
composed of senior representatives of principal intelligence
producers and consumers. The Consumers Committee would meet
more frequently and provide continuous, ongoing guidance with
respect to intelligence requirements and priorities as well as
feedback on the performance of the Intelligence Community.
The CFI would be required to prepare an annual report for
the NSC and the DCI on its activities.
The President recently announced his intent to create a CFI
by executive order, as recommended by the Brown Commission. The
Committee applauds the President's decision to create the CFI
but believes that the entity should be created by statute
rather than by executive order to ensure continuity from
Administration to Administration.
Section 703
Section 703 would amend Section 109 of the National
Security Act of 1947 to require the President to submit to
Congress, no later than January 31 of each year, an annual
report on U.S. intelligence requirements and priorities and the
performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Section 109
currently requires the DCI to submit an annual report
describing the activities of the intelligence Community during
the previous year, including significant successes and
failures.
Rather than require the Executive branch to prepare two
separate but related intelligence reports, the Committee
believes that an intelligence report submitted by the President
could cover much of the same material previously submitted by
the DCI but would focus more on requirements and priorities.
Although the Committee has chosen not to request a copy of the
annual report submitted by the CFI to the President, as
required by Section 701 of this bill, the Committee expects
that the President's annual report would be based largely on
the findings and conclusions of the CFI.
The bill states that the report should be submitted in
unclassified form but may have a classified annex. It is the
Committee's intention that the unclassified version should
describe the President's intelligence requirements, as well as
intelligence successes and failures, in as much detail as
possible, consistent with the protection of sources and
methods. The classified version should specify requirements and
priorities in sufficient detail to assist the Congress in
making resource allocation decisions.
In addition, Section 108 of the National Security Act will
continue to require the President to submit to Congress an
annual ``national security strategy report'' which identifies
U.S. national interests and sets forth a national security
strategy. The Committee expects that the President's annual
report on intelligence, which would be required to be submitted
at the same time as the national security strategy report,
would describe the intelligence required to address the
national security interests identified by the President in this
report.
Section 704
Section 704 amends Section 101 of the National Security Act
of 1947 by adding a new subsection (i) which would establish a
Committee on Transnational Threats of the National Security
Council. The Committee would consist of the DCI, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
who would serve as the Committee's chairperson.
The creation of such a Committee was recommended by the
Brown Commission, which found that the Federal government is
not well organized to combat certain ``transnational''
activities, such as international terrorism, drug trafficking,
weapons proliferation, and organized crime, that threaten the
national security of the United States. (The Brown Commission
referred to transnational activities as ``global crime'' to
emphasize their links to global criminal elements. The
Committee prefers to continue to refer to such activities as
``transnational threats'' to emphasize, as discussed below,
that law enforcement is only one of several possible Federal
government responses to the problem.)
A number of federal departments and agencies play important
roles in combating transnational threats, but their activities
are not well coordinated. Moreover, in the absence of higher
level direction, law enforcement agencies have usually been
left to take the lead. This has often resulted in conflicts
with other agencies, including the Intelligence Community. In
the Committee's view, a high-level group in needed to decide,
as a policy matter, when to give priority to law enforcement,
to intelligence, or to foreign policy or other considerations
in responding to transnational threats. The Committee believes
that a committee of the National Security Council would be best
suited to fulfill this role. As with the Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee believes the Committee on
Transnational Threats should be established by legislation.
The Committee on Transnational Threats would identify
transnational threats; develop strategies to respond to them in
a coordinated way; assist in resolving operational differences
among federal departments and agencies; develop policies and
procedures to ensure the effective sharing of information among
federal departments and agencies, including between the law
enforcement and foreign policy communities; and develop
guidelines for coordination of federal law enforcement and
intelligence activities overseas.
The Department of Justice has objected to giving the
Committee on Transnational Threats authority to ``direct'' law
enforcement activities on the ground that law enforcement
activities should not be directed on the basis of
considerations unrelated to the enforcement of law. In the
Committee's view, one of the key reasons to create a high-level
Committee on Transnational Threats is to ensure that
considerations other than law enforcement are taken into
account in the Federal Government's response to terrorism and
other transnational threats. The Attorney General and law
enforcement officials would still be responsible for directing
law enforcement operations on a day-to-day basis, but the
broader policy decisions regarding whether to give priority to
law enforcement, or to intelligence, or to foreign policy
interests, should be made at a higher level.
Section 705
Section 705 amends Section 102 of the National Security Act
of 1947 to add a new subsection (d) that establishes an Office
of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Office would
include the DCI, the DDCI; the newly established positions of
Assistant DCI for Collection, Assistant DCI for Analysis and
Production, Assistant DCI for Administration, the National
Intelligence Council, and such other offices as the DCI may
designate.
Section 102(d)(3) directs the DCI to employ and utilize a
professional staff to assist him in carrying out his Community-
wide responsibilities. This staff would be part of the Office
of the DCI. The staff could, in the DCI's discretion, operate
as a unit, or be divided among the three new Assistant DCIs.
The Committee anticipates that this staff would replace the
functions of the current Community Management Staff and, while
it should include some detailees from the Intelligence
Community, it should consist primarily of a core professional
staff. And increase of new personnel levels is neither
warranted nor authorized with the exception of the three
assistant DCIS.
Section 705 also transfers the current section 102(a)(1),
which establishes the Central Intelligence Agency, to a new
section 102A of the National Security Act. Section 102A would
reference Section 103(d), which sets forth the responsibilities
of the Director of Central Intelligence as head of the CIA.
Section 706
Section 706 would amend Section 103(b) of the National
Security Act of 1947 to specifically authorize the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) to enter into contracts with experts
outside the intelligence Community to assist in the preparation
of national intelligence estimates. Although the NIC has in
recent years hired more individuals from outside the
Intelligence Community to serve as National Intelligence
Officers, it still has not, in the Committee's view, tapped
sufficiently into the large reservoir of expertise on foreign
policy issues that exists in the academic and business
communities. The new authority would make clear that the NIC
could contract for the services of such experts on a temporary
basis. Section 103(b)(1)(B) currently directs the DCI, when
prescribing security requirements for personnel appointed to
the NIC from the private sector, to avoid unduly intrusive
requirements. The Committee urges the DCI to consider ways to
reduce the security requirements, such as eliminating or
reducing the scope of the polygraph requirement, for contract
employees of the NIC who may have limited access to sensitive
intelligence information and who may be discouraged by
intrusive security measures.
In addition, Section 706 adds a new sentence to Section
103(b)(1)(A) to provide that the NIC be located in a place
readily accessible to policymaking officials and persons who
are not otherwise associated with the Intelligence Community.
The Committee believes that locating the NIC outside the
Central Intelligence Agency would help it to attract more
outside experts, who might otherwise be leery of a more direct
affiliation with CIA.
The foregoing changes were recommended by the Brown
Commission. The Committee notes that the Brown Commission also
recommended that the NIC be more fundamentally recast into a
``National assessments Center'' that would produce unclassified
assessments based largely on open sources as well as classified
estimates. The Committee is not persuaded that the preparation
of unclassified assessments is a proper function for the
Intelligence Community and is not prepared to endorse such a
change at this time.
Section 707
Section 707 of the bill would give the DCI increased
authorities to manage the Intelligence Community. Despite his
title of Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI, in the
Committee's view, lacks sufficient authority to direct the
activities of the various parts of the Intelligence Community
in the most efficient and effective way.
Section 707(a)(1) would amend Section 103 of the National
Security Act of 1947 to give the DCI the authority--in addition
to his current authority to develop the annual budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program--to concur in the
development of the annual budget for the Joint Military
Intelligence Program and to be consulted by the Secretary of
Defense in the development of the budget for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities.
Section 707(a)(3) gives the DCI authority to manage all of
the national collection activities of the Intelligence
Community. This would allow the DCI to ensure that collection
resources are used in the most efficient and effective manner
to meet intelligence requirements, rather than continuing to
leave collection and acquisition decisions solely to individual
program managers.
Section 707(b)(1) would provide that no funds could be
reprogrammed within JMIP programs without DCI approval. The DCI
currently has the authority to disapprove a reprogramming only
with respect to NFIP elements. While the Committee believes
that the DCI should have authority to approve JMIP
reprogrammings as an extension of his authority to concur in
the JMIP budget, the Committee recognizes that JMIP programs
are administered by the Secretary of Defense. The Committee
expects that the DCI will work cooperatively with the Secretary
of Defense in exercising the DCI's authorities under this
section.
Section 707(b)(2) would give the DCI authority to reprogram
funds and transfer personnel among NFIP elements after
consultation--in lieu of coordination, as required under
existing law--with the head of the agency or department
affected by the transfer. The Committee believes that the
current requirement for coordination has prevented the DCI from
exercising his authorities effectively.
Section 707(b)(3) of the bill would give the DCI authority
to allocate and expend all funds appropriated for national
intelligence programs, projects, and activities that are
managed by the directors of the National Security Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery Office, and
the Central Intelligence Agency. Under current law, the DCI has
budget execution authority only over funds appropriated for the
CIA. Despite his responsibility for directing all NFIP
elements, the DCI has lacked the ``power of the purse'' to
ensure that his decisions stick. Giving the DCI budget
execution authority over the principal national elements of the
NFIP would significantly enhance the DCI's authority to manage
the Community.
Section 707(c) would give the DCI authority to rotate
personnel among the national elements of the Intelligence
Community and to consolidate personnel, administrative, and
security programs to reduce overall costs, subject only to
consultation (in lieu of the existing requirement for
coordination) with affected department and agency heads.
Section 708
Section 708 would amend Section 105 of the National
Security Act of 1947 to give the DCI shared responsibility,
with the Secretary of Defense, for the performance of certain
NFIP functions, including the operation of effective
organizations for the conduct of signals intelligence, imagery
intelligence, and the procurement and operation of overhead
reconnaissance systems.
Section 105 was added to the National Security Act in 1992
in order to set forth the responsibilities of the Secretary of
Defense for elements of the NFIP. As currently written, Section
105 provides that the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities
are to be undertaken consistent with the responsibilities and
authorities given to the DCI under Sections 103 and 104 of the
National Security Act.
While recognizing that the National Security Agency, the
Central Imagery Office, and the National Reconnaissance Office
are line elements of the Department of Defense, the Committee
believes that giving the Secretary of Defense sole
responsibility for the operation of these organizations does
not sufficiently recognize the responsibility of the DCI for
the direction of the national intelligence functions of these
organizations. Moreover, once the DCI has budget execution and
reprogramming authority with respect to these national
elements, it is difficult to continue to hold the Secretary of
Defense solely responsible for ensuring they effectively
fulfill their mission. Accordingly, Section 708 of the bill
would provide that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI are
jointly responsible for the performance of these functions. The
Secretary of Defense would remain primarily responsible
(consistent with the DCI's responsibilities and authorities
under Sections 103 and 104) for the operation of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and military service intelligence units.
Section 709
Section 709(a) of the bill would add a new subsection (e)
to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 to
establish the position of Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Collection. This position would be appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
The bill provides that if neither the DCI nor the DDCI is a
commissioned officer in the Armed Forces, the ADCI for
Collection shall be a commissioned officer in recognition of
the fact that, except for the CIA, the major intelligence
collection agencies are located within the Department of
Defense.
The ADCI for Collection would be one of three new Assistant
Directors of Central Intelligence who would assist the DCI in
carrying out his Community-wide management responsibilities.
The ADCI for Collection, in particular, would assist the DCI in
carrying out his new responsibility, as added by Section 707 of
this bill, to manage all Intelligence Community collection
activities. In performing this function the ADCI for Collection
would manage all national intelligence collection activities,
including identifying targets where a particular intelligence
discipline offers a comparative advantage and allocation
resources accordingly. The ADCI for Collection would also
provide guidance for, and would be required to concur in, the
procurement and operation of national collection systems and
assist the DCI in formulating plans and budgets for national
collection activities.
Section 709(b) of the bill would provide for the
consolidation of certain clandestine human-source collection
activities currently conducted by the Defense HUMINT Service
within the Department of Defense into the Directorate of
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. This
consolidation was recommended by the Brown Commission. The
Commission found that, while military personnel are important
to the successful collection of information from human sources
about military topics, it is inefficient for the Department of
Defense to maintain a large, separate infrastructure of
military collectors who serve only a few years before returning
to their regular career tracks.
Section 709(b) would require the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense to enter into an agreement, no later than June 30,
1997, providing for the transfer of the clandestine collection
elements of the Defense HUMINT Service to the CIA, which should
be accomplished no later than June 30, 1998. CIA would be
responsible for all clandestine intelligence collection from
human sources, except those clandestine HUMINT activities
undertaken by DoD elements in advance of, or as part of, a
specific military operation. In collecting HUMINT on foreign
military targets, CIA should, as needed, use military personnel
on detail from DoD or the military services.
Section 710
Section 710 would add a new subsection (f) to Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 to establish the position
of Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and
Production. This position would be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.
The ADCI for Analysis and Production would assist the DCI
in overseeing analysis and production of intelligence by all
elements of the Intelligence Community, establish priorities
for analysis, and monitor the allocation of resources in order
to eliminate unnecessary duplication in analysis and
production.
Intelligence analysis and production of analytical products
is broadly dispersed across the Intelligence Community. CIA,
DIA, NSA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence &
Research, and the intelligence units of the military services
are all significant producers of intelligence analysis.
Although some competitive analysis is necessary and some
products are needed to serve purely departmental needs, the DCI
currently lacks an effective mechanism to review intelligence
analysis and production community-wide in order to ensure the
most effective allocation of resources and to eliminate
unnecessary duplication. Intelligence producers have worked
together voluntarily to reduce overlaps, but the Committee
believes that a better institutional structure in needed. The
new ADCI for Analysis and Production would perform this
function.
Section 711
Section 711 would add a new subsection (g) to Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 to establish the position
of Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Administration. This position would be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.
Numerous studies, including the Brown Commission, have
urged greater consolidation of personnel and administrative
functions and use of common standards across the Intelligence
Community. The largest agencies, nevertheless, continue to
maintain separate administrative, personnel, security, and
training systems. The Brown Commission concluded ``While the
Commission is willing to accept that some latitude is needed
for individual agencies to satisfy their unique requirements,
we see no reason for all of these programs and activities to be
administered separately, or, at least without greater
uniformity.'' The Committee agrees with this conclusion.
The role of the proposed ADCI for Administration would be
to assist the DCI in bringing about this uniformity. The ADCI
for Administration would coordinate the various personnel
management systems, information systems, telecommunications
systems, finance and accounting services, and security programs
for the Intelligence Community. The Committee expects that the
ADCI for Administration would also assist the DCI in exercising
his authorities under Section 104(f) of the National Security
Act to consolidate personnel, administrative, and security
programs of Intelligence Community elements.
Section 712
Section 712 amends Section 5315 of Title 5, United States
Code, to place the positions of Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Collection, Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Administration, at Level IV of the
Executive Schedule.
Section 713
This provision would establish the position of General
Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency to be appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. This provision is
identical to Section 402 of this Committee's bill to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 1995. The provision was dropped
from the Senate bill after opposition of the Administration.
The Committee understands that the Administration no longer
opposes the establishment of a statutory General Counsel for
the CIA and, accordingly, has included the provision again in
this year's bill.
The Committee believes that the confirmation process
enhances accountability and strengthens the oversights process.
It is also important to note that currently, all elements of
the Intelligence Community--except the CIA--are part of
departments that have statutory general counsels who are Senate
confirmed. Requiring that the CIA's General Counsel be
confirmed has been recommended several times over the years,
including proposals by the Church Committee and the Iran-Contra
Committee. The Senate's version of both the FY 1994 and FY 1995
Intelligence Authorization Bill also contained a provision
requiring Senate confirmation of the CIA General Counsel.
Subsection 20(a) provides that the General Counsel be
appointed by the President from civilian life and be confirmed
by the Senate. The statutory CIA General Counsel would be
subject to the authority and supervision of the DCI by virtue
of the DCI's authority as head of the CIA under Sections
102A(a) and 103(d) of the National Security Act.
Subsection 20(b) establishes the General Counsel of the CIA
as the chief legal officer of the CIA. As chief legal officer,
the General Counsel will be responsible for ensuring that legal
advice and assistance are provided as appropriate throughout
the CIA, and all personnel providing legal services within the
CIA will be bound by the legal opinions issued by the General
Counsel in the course of the General Counsel's duties.
Subsection 20(c) provides that the DCI shall prescribe the
functions of the statutory CIA General Counsel. Thus, the
Director may assign the General Counsel functions beyond those
inherent in the General Counsel as the CIA's chief legal
officer. In particular, the DCI may assign to the statutory CIA
General Counsel the function of providing legal advise to the
DCI in the performance of the DCI's statutory functions that
transcend the CIA.
Section 714
Section 714 would add a new subsection (h) to Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 to establish an Office of
Congressional Affairs of the Intelligence Community. The Office
would coordinate the congressional affairs activities of the
various elements of the Intelligence Community. It is not the
Committee's intention that the Office direct the activities of
other legislative affairs offices within the Intelligence
Community; rather, the office would serve as a focal point for
coordinating and responding to congressional requests that
involve more than one department of agency.
Section 102(h)(2)(B) would permit the DCI to designate the
Director of the office within the Central Intelligence Agency
currently known as the Office of Congressional Affairs to serve
also as the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs for
the Intelligence Community. Section 102(h)(4) would provide
that nothing in the provision is intended to preclude the
individual offices of congressional affairs within elements of
the Intelligence Community from responding directly to requests
from the congressional committees.
Section 715
Section 715 would add a new Section 105A to the National
Security Act of 1947 that would specifically authorize
intelligence agencies to collect information outside the United
States about non-U.S. persons at the request of a law
enforcement agency. This change was recommended by the Brown
Commission.
CIA and NSA currently interpret their legal authorities as
permitting them to engage in intelligence collection only for a
``foreign intelligence'' purpose. (NSA believes that the
``primary'' purpose of the collection must be to obtain foreign
intelligence.) The Brown Commission concluded that the
Intelligence Community may be taking to restrictive a view
regrading whether intelligence assets can be tasked by law
enforcement agencies to collect information overseas about non-
U.S. persons. The law enforcement proviso of the National
Security Act was intended to prohibit the CIA from infringing
on the domestic jurisdiction of the FBI and from becoming a
national secret police that might be directed against U.S.
citizens. These concerns are not present when the Intelligence
Community collects against foreign persons outside the U.S.
At the same time, the need to combat terrorism, drug
trafficking and other transnational threats effectively
requires that the capabilities of the Intelligence Community be
harnessed to support law enforcement agencies as efficiently as
possible.
Section 715 would clarify that CIA is not violating the law
enforcement proviso if it collects intelligence overseas about
non-U.S. persons at the request of a law enforcement agency and
would also ensure that CIA, NSA, and other collection agencies
apply the same standard when responding to law enforcement
requests.
Section 716
Section 716 would rewrite Section 106 of the National
Security Act of 1947. Section 106(a) of the National Security
Act, which was added in 1992, currently provides only that the
DCI be consulted by the Secretary of Defense with respect to
the appointments of the directors of the National Security
Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Section 106(b) currently
provides that the Director of the Central Imagery Office (CIO)
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense ``upon the
recommendation'' of the DCI.
As revised by Section 716 of the bill, Section 106(a) of
the National Security Act would require the Secretary of
Defense to obtain the concurrence of the DCI before appointing
the directors of the NSA and NRO. (Section 802 of the bill
separately requires the DCI to concur in the recommendation of
the Secretary of Defense to the President to appoint the
Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).)
New section 106(b) would require that the DCI be consulted with
respect to the appointments by the relevant department or
agency head of the heads of DIA, the State Department Bureau of
Intelligence & Research (IN&R), the National Security Division
of the FBI (NSD), and Office of Non-Proliferation and National
Security (ON&NS). New section 106(c) would require the DCI to
provide input to the annual evaluations of the directors of
NSA, NRO, and NIMA by the Secretary of Defense.
The Brown Commission recommended, and the Committee agrees,
that the DCI should have a stronger voice in the appointments
of the directors of the NSA and the NRO as well as some voice
in the appointments of the heads of DIA, IN&R, ON&NS/DoE, and
NSD/FBI.
The Committee believes more involvement by the DCI in the
appointment of the heads of NSA and NRO is desirable in light
of the roles each of these individual plays in the collection
of national intelligence. Similarly, while the heads of DIA,
IN&R, and ON&NS manage activities that primarily support
departmental requirements, their organizations play substantial
roles in Intelligence Community activities.
The Committee notes that the Department of Justice and the
Director of the FBI strongly object to requiring the Attorney
General to consult with the DCI on the appointment of the head
of the FBI National Security Division. In the Committee's view,
consultation with the DCI is appropriate given that the
National Security Division Director, while also responsible for
domestic law enforcement functions, controls a significant part
of the NFIP.
Section 717
Section 717 would add a new Section 110 to the National
Security Act of 1947 that would direct the Director of Central
Intelligence to promulgate regulations to establish an
Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service. This provision
was recommended by the Brown Commission and serves the
Committee's objective of establishing more uniform personnel
policies. In addition, the new service borrows from the recent
Defense reform legislation by requiring that career
intelligence personnel serve in at least one assignment outside
their home agency before being eligible for promotion into the
Senior Executive Service.
The new Senior Executive Service would include personnel
from the CIA, NSA, DIA, CIO, and NRO as well as certain
civilian employees of the Department of Defense. Individuals
who are currently a member of the Senior Executive Service of
any of these agencies would automatically become members of the
Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service.
The regulations issued by the DCI under this section would
establish SES pay rates, performance appraisal standards,
promotion guidelines, and standards for appointment to and
removal from the SES.
The DCI would be permitted to detail or assign any member
of the Intelligence Community SES to serve in a position
outside the individual's parent organization, including
elsewhere in the Intelligence Community, another government
agency, or outside the Federal government.
The DCI would be required to consult with the Secretary of
Defense when issuing the regulations under this section.
Section 718
Section 718 would require the President, as part of his
annual budget submission to Congress, to provide in
unclassified form the total amount appropriated by Congress for
all intelligence and intelligence-related activities during the
current fiscal year and the total amount requested in the
budget for the next fiscal year.
The Committee believes that public disclosure of the
aggregate annual intelligence budget (including the budgets for
the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA) would allow the American people to
know the amount that is being spent on intelligence as a
proportion of all federal spending. The Committee believes that
disclosure of the aggregate amount would not raise significant
national security concerns. The Committee notes that a number
of other major democratic governments, including the British,
Australians and South Koreans, have in the last few years
disclosed their aggregate intelligence budgets without adverse
effect.
The Committee also notes that the bipartisan Brown
Commission, which was tasked specifically by its statutory
charter to consider the question, unanimously recommended
disclosure of the total amount appropriated for intelligence
activities for the current fiscal year and the total amount
requested for the next fiscal year.
Section 719
Section 719(a) would delete the first sentence of Section
2(b) of Senate Resolution 400, which currently prohibits
members of the Senate Intelligence Committee from serving
continuously for more than eight years. This shall take effect
with the commencement of the 105th Congress in January of 1997
and will in no way affect the Senate Majority and Minority
Leader's appointment prerogative as it relates to the
Committee. Section 2(b) was part of the original S. Res. 400,
which established the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1976.
The SSCI is the only Senate committee with membership term
limits, and it was the Committee's unanimous view that the
SSCI's original charter relating to the length of tenure of its
Members has proven unnecessary and even counterproductive to
the Committee's oversight responsibilities. The Committee
believes that limiting tenure on the SSCI limits Member
experience and expertise, thereby detrimentally affecting the
quality of oversight. The Committee notes that Senators with
the most extensive service on committees have proved capable of
the most far-reaching reforms--for instance in the Senate Armed
Services Committee's work on the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. As stated in the Brown Commission
report, `` * * * because of the fixed tenure rule, Members
often have to rotate off the [House and Senate intelligence
oversight] committees at the very time they have begun to
master the complex subject matter. Indeed, knowing their tenure
is limited, some put their time in on other committees. As a
consequence, in the view of many Commission witnesses, an
unfortunate loss of expertise and continuity occurs, weakening
the effectiveness of the committees.''
The primary rationale for membership term limits on the
Committee was the fear that Members would somehow be co-opted
by the Intelligence Community. Yet at no point has the
Committee faced a serious danger of co-optation. Indeed, SSCI
Members are no more likely to be co-opted by the Intelligence
Community than the Members of other authorizing Committees are
likely to be co-opted by the Departments and agencies they
oversee. In 1994, for example, the Committee issued a highly
critical report of the CIA's handling of the Aldrich Ames
espionage case--a report that was endorsed by all Committee
Members representing a wide range of views about the
Intelligence Community.
Requiring rotation of Members was also seen as a means to
ensure that the SSCI could benefit from a flow of fresh ideas
and alternative viewpoints of new Members. Since the SSCI was
created 20 years ago, sixty-one Senators have served on the
Committee and the average Member term of service on the
Committee has been just over 5 years--and approximately 60
percent of Committee Members have served on the Committee less
than 8 years (the current Committee term limit). This
historical record underscores the fact that it is a virtual
certainty that vacancies will continue to occur regularly on
the SSCI, thus allowing for new faces and fresh ideas to enter.
At the same time, however, Members who have a long-term
interest in the area of intelligence can continue to serve and
develop much-needed expertise.
Both the Brown Commission and the Council on Foreign
Relations task force on the future of U.S. intelligence
recommended ending Member term limits on the SSCI as a means of
increasing Member expertise in intelligence oversight. In
addition, former Directors of Central Intelligence Robert Gates
and R. James Woolsey have advocated the termination of
Committee term limits, as have SSCI hearing witnesses Harold
Brown and former Committee Members Warren Rudman and Howard
Baker.
While the Committee believes that the tenure of Members
appointed to the Committee should not be constrained by term
limits, the Committee does believe that it would be prudent to
place limitations on the length of time that Members are
allowed to serve in a Committee leadership capacity. The
Committee notes that the Senate Republican Conference has
recently established 6-year term limits for service as Chairman
or Ranking Minority Member for any standing committee,
effective in January 1997. Accordingly, the Committee imposed a
6-year term limit for both the SSCI Chairman and Vice Chairman.
Section 720
Section 720 of the bill would require the DCI to submit a
report to Congress on the threats to the national information
infrastructure from information warfare and other non-
traditional attacks by foreign nations, groups, and entities.
Government, including military, and private sector information
and communications systems have become almost entirely reliant
on commercial switching networks that are vulnerable to
disruption. To date, identification of threats to these
networks from foreign entities has not been a high priority for
the Intelligence Community. The Committee believes it is
important for the Intelligence Community to undertake a review
of the plans and capabilities of foreign countries and groups
to engage in, and of the capabilities of the Intelligence
Community to provide indications and warning of, such attacks.
Title VIII--National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Section 801 defines the terms ``imagery'', ``imagery
intelligence'', and ``geospatial information''.
Section 802 establishes the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency.
The mission of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency will
be to provide timely, relevant, and accurate imagery, imagery-
related products, imagery intelligence and geospatial
information to all of its customers within the U.S. Government
in support of the national security objectives of the United
States, with appropriate emphasis on support to the warfighter.
The ability of all members of the Intelligence Community to
obtain both imagery intelligence support regarding matters of
common concern and support necessary for individual agency
requirements will be maintained and expanded as appropriate.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency is being created to
accelerate the fusion of geospatial information and imagery
intelligence to benefit a growing and diverse customer base,
which will include non-Department of Defense customers and
customers supporting military operations. One of the Agency's
key responsibilities will be to solicit and advocate the needs
of those customers, and to act as focal point for their
support. Creating a single agency, focused on the exploitation
and dissemination of geospatial information and imagery
intelligence to meet the needs of an expanding customer base,
will increase the leverage on technology, research, and the
expanding commercial imagery base to better serve both imagery
and mapping customers. It will, acting on behalf of the
Director of Central Intelligence, strengthen the management of
imagery as an end-to-end process. It will also enhance the
consistency of training, career development and career
standards.
Under this section, the President would appoint the
Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The
Secretary of Defense would, with the Concurrence of the
Director of Central Intelligence, recommend an individual to
the President for such appointment. This section would also
provide for a Deputy Director of NIMA. The Director and Deputy
Director could be selected from civilian life or from among the
commissioned officers, except that, as with the DCI and DDCI,
at no time could both the Director and Deputy Director be
commissioned officers. The Committee urges the DCI and
Secretary of Defense to ensure the appropriate balance between
Defense and non-Defense needs by choosing either the Director
or the Deputy Director from the non-Defense Intelligence
Community.
Section 121 would provide a clear, affirmative
authorization for the Central Intelligence Agency to provide
administrative and contracting services to the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA), to insure accomplishment of the
national mission of the NIMA or the performance of intelligence
community activities of common concern, notwithstanding
provisions of law that would otherwise limit such an
authorization. This section would permit the Central
Intelligence Agency to detail CIA employees to NIMA for
indefinite periods of time.
It also would permit the Central Intelligence Agency to
provide security police services for NIMA facilities,
notwithstanding any limitations on jurisdiction of such
personnel contained in section 15 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 403o). This authority is
required to provide continuity of physical security support for
CIA facilities being transferred to the NIMA.
Section 803 makes this title effective on October 1, 1996
or the date of enactment of appropriations for the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency for fiscal year 1997 whichever is
later.
committee action
On April 24, 1996, the Select Committee on Intelligence
approved the bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.
estimate of costs
In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee attempted to
estimate the costs which would be incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this bill in fiscal year 1997 and in each of the
five years thereafter if these amounts are appropriated. For
fiscal year 1997, the estimated costs incurred in carrying out
the provisions of this bill are set forth in the classified
annex to this bill. Estimates of the costs incurred in carrying
out this bill in the five fiscal years thereafter are not
available from the Executive branch, and therefore, the
Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3)
of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to include
such estimates in this report.
evaluation of regulatory impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds no regulatory
impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of this
legislation.
changes in existing law
In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to
dispense with the requirements of section 12 of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the
business of the Senate.
