[Senate Report 113-120]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
Calendar No. 244
113th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 113-120
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
_______
November 13, 2013.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mrs. Feinstein, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 1681]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 1681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2014 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
On June 27, 2013, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the
National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2014 is
$52.2 billion. Other than for limited unclassified
appropriations, primarily the Intelligence Community Management
Account, the classified nature of United States intelligence
activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the
Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations.
Accordingly, the Committee has prepared a classified annex to
this report that contains a classified Schedule of
Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014 that is being reported by the Committee.
Title I--Budget and Personnel Authorizations
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2014.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2014 are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility
to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the
Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103(a) provides that the
DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal
Year 2014 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an
amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit
applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do
so only if necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions.
Section 103(b) requires the DNI to establish guidelines
that would ensure a uniform and accurate method of counting
certain personnel under a system of personnel levels. The DNI
has issued such a policy. Subsection (b) confirms in statute
the obligation of the DNI to establish these guidelines.
Section 103(c) provides that the DNI must report the
decision to allow an IC element to exceed the personnel ceiling
in advance to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA
for Fiscal Year 2014.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $568,736,000
for Fiscal Year 2014 for the activities of the ICMA. Subsection
(b) authorizes 855 positions for elements within the ICMA for
Fiscal Year 2014 and provides that such personnel may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) or detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
positions for the classified Community Management Account as
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and
permits the funding for advanced research and development to
remain available through September 30, 2015.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2014 for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund.
Section 202. CIARDS and FERS special retirement credit for service on
detail to another agency
Section 202 amends the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act to clarify that ``qualifying service'' for
purposes of obtaining certain enhanced retirement benefits
available to CIA employees who carry out duties abroad that are
hazardous to life or health or involve specialized skills
includes service while on detail to another government agency.
CIA recently informed the Committee that a number of Agency
employees on detail to other intelligence agencies who
otherwise qualify for enhanced retirement benefits, and had
been advised by prior CIA leadership that they were entitled to
those additional benefits, would be denied the enhanced
benefits because the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
does not extend such benefits to CIA employees on detail to
another intelligence agency. Section 202 corrects this inequity
by clarifying that ``qualifying service'' includes service on
detail to another agency.
Title III--General Intelligence Community Matters
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MATTERS
Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 303. OPEN FOIA protections
Section 303 amends Section 103H of the National Security
Act, the organic statute for the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, to provide that the identity of an
individual who makes a complaint or provides information may be
withheld in response to a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Under FOIA, information may be withheld
in response to a FOIA request pursuant to a statute that
requires that matters be withheld from the public in such a
manner as to leave no discretion, or establishes criteria for
withholding information or referring to particular types of
matters to be withheld and specifically cites to FOIA. The OPEN
FOIA Act of 2009 (PL 111-83, sec. 564, October 28, 2009)
requires that a statute providing an exemption from disclosure
under FOIA, if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN
FOIA Act of 2009, must specifically cite Section 552(b)(3) of
Title 5, United States Code. The organic statute for the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (PL 111-259,
sec. 405) was enacted at a later date, October 7, 2010.
Accordingly, while Title 5 Inspectors General may exercise this
authority without a reference to Section 552(b)(3), the OPEN
FOIA Act requires that the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community's statute have a specific reference to
Section 552(b)(3), as amended by the OPEN FOIA Act, to be
operative. Section 303 provides the necessary reference.
Section 304. Functional managers
Section 304(a) codifies in statute the existing
requirement, under Section 1.3 of Executive order 12333, to
designate functional managers for signals intelligence
(SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and geospatial
intelligence (GEOINT), and other intelligence disciplines. At
present, the functional managers for SIGINT, HUMINT, and GEOINT
are the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the
Director of the CIA, and the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), respectively. In
addition, Section 304(a) gives responsibility for designating
functional managers to the President. Under Executive order
12333, the functional managers are designated by the DNI.
Section 304(b) codifies the existing responsibilities of
the functional managers to act as the principal adviser to the
DNI for their respective intelligence function. Section 304(b)
also specifies that the functional managers shall act in the
same capacity for the Secretary of Defense.
Section 304(c) establishes a new requirement for each
functional manager to report to Congress annually on the state
of their function, scheduled to occur no later than two weeks
after the President's budget submission. The reporting
requirement calls on each functional manager to identify those
programs, projects, and activities that comprise the
intelligence discipline for which they are responsible
(regardless of the funding source) and to report on resource
issues and other matters relevant to the state of the function.
Section 305. Auditability
Section 305 requires the ODNI, CIA, Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), NGA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and
NSA to undergo full financial audits conducted by internal or
external independent accounting or auditing organizations
beginning with each agency's Fiscal Year 2014 financial
statements. In addition, each of the aforementioned agencies is
required to obtain an unqualified opinion not later than the
audit of their Fiscal Year 2016 financial statements. The chief
financial executive of each of the aforementioned agencies is
required to provide to the congressional intelligence
committees an annual report of each audit conducted.
Section 306. Software licensing
Section 305 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 required the chief information officers of
each element of the IC to conduct an inventory of software
licenses held by such element, including both utilized and
unutilized licenses. Section 305 also required that the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (CIO) report
those inventories to the congressional intelligence committees
within 180 days of enactment of the Fiscal Year 2013 Act. The
Committee received that report on August 22, 2013.
Section 306(a) builds upon Section 305 of the Fiscal Year
2013 Act by requiring that every two years the chief
information officers of each element of the IC: (1) conduct an
inventory of software licenses held by such element, including
both utilized and unutilized licenses held by the element, and
(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by such
element to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and
associated cost savings in software procurement and usage.
Section 306(a) also specifies that the initial inventories and
assessments shall be based on the inventories that were
required under Section 305 of the Fiscal Year 2013 Act.
Section 306(b) provides that, not later than 180 days after
enactment, and every two years thereafter, the CIO shall
compile an inventory of all existing software licenses of the
IC and assess actions that could be carried out by the IC to
achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and associated
cost savings in software procurement and usage.
Section 306(c) requires that the CIO submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a copy of each inventory
compiled under Section 306(b).
Section 307. Public Interest Declassification Board
Section 307 extends the current authorization for the
Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) from December 31,
2014 until December 31, 2018. The PIDB was created in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 to promote
public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary
record of significant United States national security decisions
and activities.
Section 308. Reports of fraud, waste, and abuse
Section 308 amends Section 8H of the Inspector General Act
of 1978, as amended, to expressly permit IC employees and
contractors who intend to report a complaint or information
with respect to an urgent concern to Congress to first report
those complaints or urgent concerns to their respective agency
Inspector General as well as the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
SUBTITLE B--TARGETED LETHAL FORCE OVERSIGHT
Section 311. Targeted lethal force oversight reform
Section 311 requires that the head of an element of the IC
notify the DNI upon a determination that a particular, known
United States person is knowingly engaged in acts of
international terrorism against the United States, such that
the United States Government is considering the legality or the
use of targeted lethal force against that United States person.
Not later than 15 days after the date the DNI receives such a
notification from the head of an element, the DNI is required
to complete an independent alternative analysis of the
determination made by the head of the notifying element. In
addition, the DNI is required to report, as soon as
practicable, to the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community and the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 311 also requires that the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community conduct an annual review of IC
compliance with all appropriate policies and procedures related
to consideration of the use of targeted lethal force against
particular, known United States persons and to report the
findings to the DNI and the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 311 does not prohibit a department or agency of the
United States Government from using targeted lethal force
against a United States person pending notification of the DNI
or completion of the independent alternative analysis. This
section is intended to require independent alternative analysis
of the analytic judgments made by IC elements in support of a
determination to use targeted lethal force against a United
States person. It is not intended to require independent
alternative analysis of the determination to use such force or
the legality of such use by a department or agency of the
United States Government.
Section 312. Unclassified annual report on the use of targeted lethal
force outside the United States
Section 312 requires that the President prepare and make
public an annual report that sets forth the total number of
combatants and noncombatant civilians killed or injured during
the preceding year by the use of targeted lethal force outside
the United States by remotely piloted aircraft. The reporting
requirement under this section does not apply to any use of
targeted lethal force in Afghanistan prior to the end of combat
operations by the United States or to any use of targeted
lethal force pursuant to a declaration of war or authorization
for the use of military force, where such declaration or
authorization is issued after the date of enactment of this
section. This section requires the President to make public
aggregate annual figures for combatants and noncombatant
civilians killed or injured by the use of targeted lethal
force, regardless of whether such deaths or injuries are
intended or unintended. It does not require the President to
report specific information concerning individual uses of force
or the entity responsible for such uses.
SUBTITLE C--REPORTING
Section 321. Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel concerning
intelligence activities
Section 321(a) requires that the Attorney General provide
the congressional intelligence committees a listing of every
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department
of Justice that has been provided to an element of the IC,
whether classified or unclassified.
Section 321(b) provides an exception to the listing
requirement in Section 321(a) when the President determines
that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding
under Section 503(c)(2) of the National Security Act. In such
cases, the President may limit access to information concerning
such a finding that is subject to disclosure under Subsection
(a) to those members of Congress who have been granted access
to the relevant finding.
Section 321(c) provides a second exception to the
disclosure requirements in Section 321(a) where the President
determines that information subject to disclosure under
Subsection (a) is subject to Executive privilege. In such
cases, the Attorney General must notify the congressional
intelligence committees, in writing, of the legal justification
for the assertion of the privilege prior to the date by which
the opinion or listing is required to be disclosed.
The Committee regularly conducts oversight of intelligence
activities that are the subject of one or more OLC legal
opinions. These opinions often represent the best and most
comprehensive expression of the legal basis for the
intelligence activities that the Committee oversees. The
Committee regards access to these legal opinions as necessary
to the performance of its oversight functions and often
requests access to such opinions, or the legal analysis
contained in such opinions, when the Committee is made aware of
their existence.
While the Committee generally is kept apprised of the legal
basis for U.S. intelligence activities, as required by Sections
502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, neither the
Department nor the IC routinely advises the Committee of the
existence of OLC opinions that are relevant to the Committee's
oversight functions. This presents an impediment to the
Committee's oversight function, as the Committee cannot request
access to legal analysis when it is not made aware that such
analysis exists. Section 321 would ensure that the Committee is
aware of the existence of relevant OLC opinions so that it can
obtain access to the legal analysis set forth in these opinions
through a process of accommodation with the Executive branch.
The Committee recognizes that, in certain limited cases,
the fact that an OLC opinion exists may be entitled to
Executive privilege or may reveal information concerning
certain compartmented covert action programs. Therefore,
Subsections 321(b) and (c) provide exceptions for such cases.
Section 322. Submittal to Congress by heads of elements of intelligence
community of plans for orderly shutdown in event of absence of
appropriations
Section 322 requires the head of each element of the IC,
upon submission of a plan pertaining to agency operations in
the absence of appropriations to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, to submit a copy of such plan to the
congressional committees of jurisdiction in a manner consistent
with security handling requirements. During the most recent
government shutdown, such plans pertaining to elements of the
IC were neither publicly available because of classification
constraints, nor readily provided to the Committee.
Section 323. Reports on chemical weapons in Syria
Section 323 directs the DNI to submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, within 30 days, a report on the
Syrian chemical weapons program containing specific elements as
described in Subsection 323(b). In addition, Section 323
requires the DNI to provide the appropriate congressional
committees with progress reports every 90 days that include any
material updates on the Syrian chemical weapons program.
Section 324. Reports to the Intelligence Community on penetrations of
networks and information systems of certain contractors
Section 324 directs the DNI to establish procedures that
require cleared intelligence contractors to notify the
government of any successful unauthorized penetration of the
contractor's network or information systems and to provide the
government with access to such systems in order to perform
forensic analysis in the event of such a penetration.
Section 325. Repeal or modification of certain reporting requirements
Congress frequently requests information from the IC in the
form of reports, the contents of which are specifically defined
by statute. The reports prepared pursuant to these statutory
requirements provide Congress with an invaluable source of
information about specific matters of concern.
The Committee recognizes, however, that congressional
reporting requirements, and particularly recurring reporting
requirements, can place a significant burden on the resources
of the IC. The Committee reconsiders these reporting
requirements on a periodic basis to ensure that the reports
that have been requested are the best mechanism for the
Congress to receive the information it seeks. In some cases,
annual reports can be replaced with briefings or notifications
that provide the Congress with more timely information and
offer the IC a direct line of communication to respond to
congressional concerns.
In response to a request from the DNI, the Committee
examined a set of recurring reporting requirements nominated by
the IC, including those which arise from legislation reported
or managed by committees other than the congressional
intelligence committees. Section 325 eliminates three reports
that were burdensome to the IC when the information in the
reports could be obtained through other means or was no longer
considered relevant to current concerns. Section 325 also
modifies four reports to replace requirements for annual
reports with notification requirements, sunsets a report one
year earlier, and changes the periodicity of a report from a
quarterly basis to a semiannual basis.
Title IV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community
SUBTITLE A--NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Section 401. Appointment of the Director of the National Security
Agency
Section 401 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959
to provide that the Director of the NSA shall be appointed by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Under present law and practice, the President appoints the
Director of the NSA. The appointment has been indirectly
subject to confirmation through Senate confirmation of the
military officers who have been promoted into the position.
Section 401 will make explicit that the filling of this key
position in the Intelligence Community should be subject to
Senate confirmation.
The Committee has had a long-standing interest in ensuring
Senate confirmation of the Director of the NSA, and this
requirement has previously been supported by the Senate. The
Committee renews the requirement for Senate confirmation of the
Director of NSA in this Act in light of NSA's critical role in
the national intelligence mission, particularly with respect to
activities that may raise privacy concerns.
Through advice and consent, the Senate can enable the
Congress to fulfill more completely its responsibility for
providing oversight of the intelligence activities of the
United States Government and ensure that the NSA's
responsibilities and foreign intelligence activities receive
appropriate attention.
Section 401 does not alter the role of the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate in reviewing and approving the
promotion or assignment of military officers. The Committee
intends to approve a separate Senate Resolution that would
dictate the roles of the Committee and the Armed Services
Committee in considering the nomination of a new Director of
the NSA, with the order of the committees' actions to be
determined by whether the nominee is a military officer.
Finally, the section makes clear that the requirement for
Senate confirmation applies prospectively. Therefore, the
Director of the NSA on the date of enactment will not be
affected by this section, which will apply initially to the
appointment and confirmation of his successor.
Section 402. Appointment of the Inspector General of the National
Security Agency
Section 402 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App.) to provide that the Inspector General of the NSA
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Under present law and practice, the
Director of the NSA appoints the NSA Inspector General.
The Inspector General of the NSA performs a critical role
in ensuring that the NSA carries out its national intelligence
mission in full compliance with the law and applicable policies
and regulations. By requiring Presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation of the NSA Inspector General, this
provision will ensure the NSA Inspector General operates
independently of the Director of the Agency in overseeing the
activities of the NSA, particularly with respect to activities
that may raise privacy concerns.
SUBTITLE B--NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Section 411. Appointment of the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office
Section 411 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) to provide that the Director of the NRO
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
The Director of the NRO is responsible for a number of
highly technical programs that involve the obligation and
expenditure of significant sums of appropriated funds. By
requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of
the NRO Director, Congress will be better able to fulfill its
responsibility for providing oversight of these important
programs.
Section 412. Appointment of the Inspector General of the National
Reconnaissance Office
Section 412 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App.) to provide that the Inspector General of the NRO
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Under present law and practice, the
Director of the NRO appoints the NRO Inspector General.
The Inspector General of the NRO performs a critical role
in overseeing complex, high-dollar value programs conducted by
the NRO. In the past, the NRO Inspector General has been
successful in identifying significant instances of fraud,
waste, and abuse within the NRO. By requiring Presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation of the NRO Inspector
General, this provision will ensure the NRO Inspector General
continues to operate with appropriate independence from the NRO
Director in overseeing the activities of the NRO.
Title V--Security Clearance Reform
Section 501. Appropriate committees of Congress defined
Section 501 defines the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' for this title.
Section 502. Technology improvements to security clearance processing
Section 502 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), to conduct an analysis of the
relative costs and benefits of potential improvements to the
process for investigating persons who are proposed for access
to classified information and adjudicating whether such persons
satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such
information.
Section 503. Enhanced reciprocity of security clearances
Section 503 amends Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(d)) to
include a provision that prohibits an agency from rejecting
another agency's determination that an individual is eligible
for access to classified information on the basis that such
eligibility determination is out-of-scope, unless the rejecting
agency certifies that it does not employ any personnel who have
background investigations that also are out-of-scope.
Section 503 also amends Section 3001 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(d))
to establish a presumption that personnel who have been
determined to be eligible for access to classified information
also are suitable for employment.
The Committee understands that some agencies have denied
security clearance reciprocity for some IC personnel where an
eligibility determination is out-of-scope, even when the agency
employs personnel whose eligibility determinations also are out
of scope. In addition, the Committee understands that some
agencies have delayed employment of personnel who have been
determined to be eligible for access to classified information
while the agency adjudicates their suitability for employment.
The Committee believes that both of these practices
inappropriately impede the movement of cleared personnel
between agencies, often at significant cost to the government.
Section 504. Report on reciprocity of security clearances
Section 504 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress
each year, through 2017, that provides information on the
reciprocal treatment of security clearances, including (1) the
periods of time required by authorized adjudicative agencies
for accepting background investigations and determinations
completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized
adjudicative agency, (2) the total number of cases in which a
background investigation or determination completed by an
authorized investigative entity or authorized adjudicative
agency is accepted by another agency, and (3) the total number
of cases in which a background investigation or determination
completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized
adjudicative agency is not accepted by another agency.
Section 505. Improving the periodic reinvestigation process
Section 505 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of OPM to transmit to
Congress each year, through 2017, a strategic plan for
improving the process for periodic reinvestigations.
Title VI--Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections
Section 601. Protection of Intelligence Community whistleblowers
Section 601 would create a new Section 2303A of Title 5 of
the United States Code, modeled on protections for Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employees in Section 2303 of
Title 5. This new section would prohibit taking a personnel
action against an IC employee as a reprisal for making a
protected whistleblower disclosure to the DNI (or his
designee), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
the head of the employing agency (or his designee), the
appropriate Inspector General of the employing agency, a
congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a
congressional intelligence committee. The President would be
directed to provide for enforcement of this section. The
section also clarifies that this bill in no way affects the FBI
provisions under Section 2303 of Title 5.
Section 602. Review of security clearance or access determinations
Section 602 would prohibit making security clearance and
access determinations because of a protected whistleblower
disclosure.
The section would direct the DNI to create procedures to
allow appeals of adverse security clearance and access
determinations alleged to be in retaliation for a protected
disclosure. This section would create certain due process
protections, including the right to an independent and
impartial fact-finder; for notice and the opportunity to be
heard, including the opportunity to present relevant evidence,
including witness testimony; to be represented by counsel; to
receive a decision based on the record developed; and to
receive a decision within 180 days, unless the employee and the
agency agree to an extension, or the impartial fact-finder
determines in writing that a greater time period is needed in
the interest of fairness or national security.
If whistleblower retaliation is found, the agency would be
required to take corrective action, which could include back
pay, costs, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000.
Relief may not be granted if the agency demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same
personnel action absent the disclosure, giving the utmost
deference to the agency's assessment of the particular threat
to United States national security interests.
Classified information may be used in the process,
including through ex parte submissions if the agency determines
that national security interests so warrant. The employee would
have no right to compel the production of classified
information except as necessary to establish that the employee
made a protected disclosure. The DNI would be directed to
create procedures to allow individuals to retain government
employment, to the extent practicable, during this appeal
process. However, an appeal of an agency's suspension of a
security clearance or access determination for the purposes of
conducting an investigation would not be allowed if a
suspension lasts longer than one year.
An employee would be permitted to appeal the agency's
decision within 60 days of receiving it. The appellate board's
review would be de novo, based on the complete agency record
and any portions of the record that were submitted ex parte
shall remain ex parte during the appeal. If the board
determines that further fact-finding is necessary, it would
remand the matter to the agency for additional proceedings. If
the board finds that an adverse security clearance or access
determination violated this section, it would order corrective
action. The board would then separately determine whether
reinstituting the security clearance or access determination is
clearly consistent with national security, with any doubt
resolved in favor of national security. The board may
recommend, but may not order, reinstatement of the security
clearance or access determination. Additionally, the board may
recommend, but not order, reinstatement or the rehiring of a
former employee. The board may order that the former employee
be treated as though the employee were transferring from the
most recent position held when seeking other federal
employment. The agency would be required to take the actions
ordered within 90 days, unless the DNI, Secretary of Defense,
or Secretary of Energy determines that doing so would endanger
national security. Congressional notification of board orders
would be required, but neither judicial review nor a private
cause of action would be permitted.
Section 603. Revisions of other laws
Section 603 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to establish
procedures for resolving instances in which a complaint or
information would create a conflict of interest. In addition,
Section 603 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978, the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and the National
Security Act of 1947 to authorize an individual who has
submitted a complaint or information to an Inspector General
under those acts to notify any member of Congress or
congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has
made such submission.
Section 604. Regulations; reporting requirements; nonapplicability to
certain terminations
Section 604 would require the DNI to issue regulations to
carry out the IC protections created by Section 601 and to
report to Congress on the implementation of these regulations
within two years. This section also would require the DNI to
establish the appellate board referenced in Section 602.
Section 604 also provides that the legislation affords no
protections for certain terminations of employment: (1) those
under 10 U.S.C. 1609; and (2) those personally and summarily
carried out by the DNI, the Director of the CIA, or an agency
head under 5 U.S.C. 7532, if the Director or agency head
determines the termination to be in the interest of the United
States, determines that the procedures prescribed in other
provisions of law that authorize the termination of the
employee's employment cannot be invoked in a manner consistent
with national security, and notifies Congress within five days
of the termination.
Title VII--Other Matters
Section 701. Repeal of the termination of notification requirements
regarding the authorized disclosure of national intelligence
Section 701 eliminates the sunset for Section 504 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. Section
504 of that Act requires government officials responsible for
making certain authorized disclosures of national intelligence
or intelligence related to national security to notify the
congressional intelligence committees concurrent with such
disclosures.
Section 702. Gifts, devises, and bequests
Section 702 amends Section 12 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 in order to provide the Director of the CIA
with express authority to engage in fundraising in an official
capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations that
provide support to surviving family members of deceased Agency
employees or that otherwise provide support for the welfare,
education, or recreation of Agency employees, former Agency
employees, or their family members. Section 702 limits such
fundraising to active participation in the promotion,
production, or presentation of an event designed to raise funds
and requires that such fundraising adhere to ethical
constraints established by the Office of Government Ethics.
Section 703. Budgetary effects
Section 603 provides that the budgetary effects of this
Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-
You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the
latest statement titled, ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO
Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the
Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted
prior to the vote on passage.
Committee Comments
Analytic integrity
Since at least 2008, the IC has provided draft assessments
for comment to policymakers and warfighters who have direct and
potentially conflicting interests in the subjects being
assessed. For example, commanders are asked to comment on IC
assessments of aspects of their military missions and
Ambassadors are asked to comment on IC analyses of trends in
security or national politics within their country of
assignment. In both examples, policymakers and warfighters have
insights and access to unique information that should be
reported and included as intelligence that informs the analytic
debate. In each example, however, analysts are required to make
assessments about issues that could reflect directly on the
offices and operations of those asked to comment. This creates
professional tension between the IC and policy communities and
could put undue pressure on analysts to conform to the analysis
provided by the more senior warfighter or policymaker.
Sound intelligence analysis requires that analysts who are
dealing with issues of concern network in the United States and
internationally to develop trusted relationships with partners
external to the IC. These trusted relationships could include,
as appropriate, experts in academia; think tanks; industry;
nongovernmental organizations; the scientific world (e.g., U.S.
Government laboratories, national academies, national research
councils, and Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers); state, local, tribal and territorial governments; and
other non-IC U.S. Government agencies. These communities allow
the IC to expand its knowledge base, share burdens, challenge
assumptions and cultural biases, and encourage innovative
thinking.
Such trusted relationships should be a key component of the
normal integration, evaluation, and analysis of intelligence
information that results in the production of finished
intelligence judgments and assessments. Elements of the IC
should use outside experts to closely review analytical
assumptions, logic and, where appropriate, evidence, both
during analysis and after assessments have been completed.
At the same time, the IC is responsible for ensuring that
all finished intelligence is timely, objective, based on all
available sources of information, independent of political
consideration, and employs the standards of proper analytic
tradecraft. In view of this, no intelligence product of the IC
should be unduly delayed or inappropriately altered to conform
to the timelines or viewpoints of external partners, and care
should be taken to avoid operational or policy-related
conflicts of interest when seeking outside commentary. For
example, IC assessments about the efficacy of a particular
policy or covert action under consideration should not be
altered to conform to the views of the policymakers crafting
the policy. Likewise, assessments of the capabilities of
foreign security services trained by the U.S. military or U.S.-
led coalitions should not be delayed or altered to conform to
the assessments of those responsible for the training.
Threat finance intelligence
Counter threat finance (CTF) leverages the capabilities of
the interagency to help detect, deter, disrupt, and destroy
terrorist organizations and those supporting terrorism by
targeting the foundation of their operations, their financial
resources. CTF is dependent upon the effective collection,
analysis, and integration of Threat Finance Intelligence (TFI).
TFI-enabled CTF is a critical component of the United States
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which was
released on July 25, 2011. A number of agencies within the IC
have played a significant role in interagency CTF efforts
against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and other key actors. IC
agencies continue to develop and expand their ability to
support efforts to disrupt our adversaries using the CTF
discipline. IC support to the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC)
under joint DOD-Department of Treasury leadership and the
Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) under Drug Enforcement Agency
leadership enabled efforts to identify and disrupt funding
sources supporting insurgent and terrorist organizations, aided
in the identification of key insurgency members and enablers,
and supported TFI collection and analysis. It is important for
the IC to ensure that lessons learned from these initiatives
are captured and institutionalized to build upon successes and
mature the IC's capability to apply the CTF discipline to new
problem sets.
The Committee believes that the CTF discipline is an
essential tool in combating transnational criminal networks and
terrorist organizations worldwide, and believes it should be
fully integrated into IC tradecraft, programmatic priorities,
and operational planning. Furthermore, the IC must be able to
integrate with, support, and enable other law enforcement and
government agencies' CTF and TFI activities. Finally, it is
important that the IC execute and organize TFI and CTF efforts
throughout the community in a way that maximizes effectiveness
and prevents duplication.
The Committee directs the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, not later than 180 days
after enactment of this Act, a report outlining each CTF and
TFI activity currently being planned or conducted by an element
of the IC. Each summary should include a detailed description
of the activity, identification of lead and supporting
agencies, a description of each agency's role, the level and
source of funding associated with each activity, a description
of the desired outcomes from each activity, and a description
of how this activity aligns with the goals of existing
interagency strategies to address terrorism, corruption,
crimes, narcotics, and other transnational threats, including
the United States Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime. The report should also include a summary of operational
lessons, best practices, and tools employed in ITFC and ATFC
efforts, and how they can be replicated to advance other IC CTF
missions. It should also include a description of the efforts,
both within the IC and between the IC and other relevant
agencies, to foster communication and ensure integrated support
to interagency partners. Further, the report should identify
any current gaps in the IC's CTF capabilities and authorities.
Suspension and debarment
The Committee is concerned that the IC does not have an IC-
wide mechanism for identifying and tracking exploitative,
unscrupulous, suspended or debarred contractors to ensure the
Community deals only with vendors who are responsible in
fulfilling their legal and contractual obligations. It is
through the sharing of such information that the IC can make
informed decisions, ensure the Community conducts business only
with responsible contractors, prevent suspended and debarred
contractors from initiating or repeating business throughout
the IC, and avoid misuse or loss of potentially billions of
dollars of taxpayer money.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to develop a plan
to meet the requirement, per the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, to determine whether prospective vendors are
debarred, suspended or listed on the federal government's
System for Awards Management (SAM), a Web-based system
maintained by the General Services Administration (GSA).
Additionally, the DNI shall create an IC-wide Contractor
Responsibility Watch List. This plan will be approved by the
head of each IC element and the DNI, submitted to the
congressional intelligence committees within 120 days of
enactment of this bill, and implemented within a year of the
date of such enactment.
DIA and NRO Financial Management System Study
The Committee has learned that implementation of the NSA's
financial management system has experienced multiple delays and
that the system requirements have been re-baselined since
program inception. These delays have introduced additional risk
for both the NSA and DIA towards achieving unqualified opinions
on the Fiscal Year 2016 financial statements, as required by
this Act. Therefore, the Committee requests that the DIA and
the NRO conduct a joint study to determine the cost and
feasibility of the DIA adopting the NRO's business systems and
processes to the greatest extent possible. Additionally, the
Committee requests that the NSA and the NRO conduct a joint
study to determine the cost and feasibility of the NSA adopting
the NRO's business systems and processes to the greatest extent
possible.
The NGA and the NRO previously conducted a similar study.
This study would serve as a useful basis for both of these new
studies. The Committee requests that the joint study teams
evaluate the cost, schedule, and performance requirements
associated with implementing a system at both the DIA and the
NSA, similar to that already in use at the NRO and the NGA.
The Committee requests that the chief financial executives
of the DIA and the NSA, in association with the NRO, each
complete a report and provide those reports to the
congressional intelligence committees in 60 days.
Insider threats
The recent unauthorized disclosures to the media, and
potentially to foreign adversaries, by Edward Snowden, a core
contractor working at the National Security Agency, highlights
the threat posed by insiders entrusted with access to IC
facilities and networks.
The IC relies on a varied workforce comprised of civilians,
uniformed military and core contractors to perform its work.
These individuals are deployed at many government and
contractor sites around the world. The IC also grants limited
access to foreign partners, officials at the federal, state and
local levels of government, and select representatives from
industry. In this complex environment, the IC employs multi-
layered counterintelligence and security measures to mitigate
the potential threat posed by a trusted insider. It screens
individuals through hiring, security clearance and contracting
processes. The IC induces compliance through nondisclosure and
secrecy agreements. It monitors these people over time through
periodic reinvestigations, and financial and other regular
reporting requirements. The IC monitors and audits behavior on
official networks to detect inappropriate access and
transmission of classified and sensitive information. The
Justice Department punishes violations as a deterrent.
Despite this layered defense, there are still
counterintelligence and security lapses. Mr. Snowden's decision
to provide classified and sensitive information to the media
will have ramifications for our national security for years to
come. Initiatives have been underway for years to deal with
such contingencies, most recently the President's National
Insider Threat Policy, signed in November 2012. However, the
Committee is concerned that this policy has not been fully
implemented across the IC.
The Committee supports substantially enhancing and
expediting efforts to deter the insider threat. The Committee
believes that addressing the insider threat requires an
integrated counterintelligence and security apparatus that
spans the IC and the U.S. Government. Stovepiping
counterintelligence and security capabilities can prevent
derogatory information about personnel from being shared and
allow spies and others seeking to disclose classified national
security information to roam undetected in the Community. The
Committee believes the IC's information technology
modernization effort--the IC Information Technology
Enterprise--must provide the infrastructure to detect insider
threats earlier and more effectively. Robust
counterintelligence data and analytic tools to monitor, analyze
and audit personnel behavior will be critical to this endeavor.
Under current law, the IC is required to have a fully
operable automated insider threat detection system in place by
the end of Fiscal Year 2014. In this bill and associated
classified annex, the Committee has recommended additional
resources to help assure the IC meets this and other
counterintelligence and security goals as soon as possible.
Action on R&D Commission findings
In June 2013, the bipartisan National Commission for the
Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United
States Intelligence Community issued its report to Congress, as
required by Public Law 107-306. The commission identified a
number of concerns, many of which have been surfaced in
previous studies (dating to the 1948 Eberstadt Report) and been
the subject of past reform efforts (including the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). Most notably, the
commission found the continued inability of the IC to
confidently estimate research and development (R&D) investments
across the various agencies and elements (e.g., cyber R&D),
which would enable smarter spending in today's constrained
budget environment. Being able to identify R&D investments is a
baseline requirement to properly stewarding these resources.
The Commission also highlighted the IC's inability to
understand, let alone bring coherence to, the efforts of its
various elements against foreign science and technology (known
as S&TI). S&TI informs not only IC R&D investment decisions,
but also policymakers' decisions about what capabilities to
develop. The IC's R&D and S&TI capabilities are only growing in
importance given the pace and scope of change in technology and
the threat environment.
Therefore, within 180 days of enactment, the DNI, in
conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)), shall provide a Zero Based Review to the
congressional intelligence committees. This Zero Based Review
shall include the following:
The identification of total financial
investments for R&D functions and programs allocated
across the NIP and Military Intelligence Program (MIP),
and their relationship to investments at other U.S.
Government departments and agencies;
An explanation of the requirements process for
S&TI across the IC, including identifying similarities
and differences in procedure and nomenclature across
the various agencies and elements;
A review of current organization, to include
IC leadership and management of R&D and S&TI efforts
across the IC and within each agency, for how the IC
attains synergies and unity of effort, and how it
avoids unnecessary duplication of R&D.
The Committee also believes a strategic plan for R&D and
S&T is essential to meeting the challenges of a globalized,
interconnected world. The rapid diffusion of science and
technology across the globe provides state and non-state actors
with new opportunities to develop asymmetric advantages,
increasing the risk of strategic surprise to the U.S.
Government. From advanced manufacturing to advanced biometrics,
we cannot take for granted legacy superiority in technology and
expect the United States to maintain its competitive edge. The
unique nature of science and technology requires a renewed
commitment from senior leaders within the IC, especially at a
time when neither R&D nor S&TI attracts sufficient
prioritization from policymakers in the executive and
legislative branches of government.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in conjunction
with USD(I), to append a Strategic Plan to the Fiscal Year 2015
congressional budget submission. The plan shall include both
the NIP and MIP. The Strategic Plan must include mechanisms to:
Establish robust leadership, unity of effort,
and an emphasis on R&D issues;
Establish an executive agent within the IC for
S&TI;
Better align R&D investments across the IC in
order to avoid unnecessary duplication and to achieve
synergies among R&D efforts across the NIP and MIP;
Develop partnerships with, and leverage talent
from, academia and industry, especially smaller,
innovative firms that may not traditionally collaborate
or contract with the U.S. Government, and an R&D
reserve corps to supplement the IC's expertise as
needed;
Increase policymakers' exposure to global R&D
trends that could affect U.S. national security or
undermine the U.S. Government's R&D efforts;
Leverage the foreign scientific and technical
talent increasingly available to U.S. academic
institutions and businesses.
Analysis of commercial imagery capabilities
In our increasingly constrained budget environment, the
Committee is committed to reducing the costs of acquiring
electro-optical and radar satellite imagery to meet the
requirements of our nation's leaders, military forces and other
mission partners.
Imagery obtained from the commercial satellite industry has
several virtues, including supporting IC and Department of
Defense missions that require sharing unclassified imagery
products with foreign or other government partners, and
assisting first-responders during natural disasters such as
floods or forest fires. In addition, it may be more cost-
effective, depending on specific capabilities on orbit. The
Committee supports commercial imagery and believes industry
proposals to further enhance the capabilities of commercial
data providers are worthy of additional discussion.
Leveraging commercial imagery and radar is in line with
longstanding policy guidance. The U.S. Commercial Remote
Sensing Policy (April 2003) states, ``the United States
Government will rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S.
commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filling
imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence,
foreign policy, homeland security and civil users.'' The
National Space Policy (Presidential Policy Directive 4, June
2010) directs the Executive branch to, ``Purchase and use
commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum
practical extent when such capabilities and services are
available in the marketplace and meet the U.S. Government's
requirements [and] modify commercial space capabilities and
services to meet government requirements when existing
commercial capabilities and services do not fully meet these
requirements and the potential modification represents a more
cost-effective and timely acquisition approach for the
government.'' The DNI's and Secretary of Defense's ``Electro-
Optical Way Ahead'' strategy (approved on April 7, 2009)
combined high-resolution government satellites and enhanced use
of mid-resolution commercial systems and called for increasing
the use of imagery available through U.S. commercial providers.
More generally, Part 10 of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation favors commercial solutions, requiring government
agencies, before any major acquisition, to conduct market
research, ``To determine if commercial items or, to the extent
commercial items suitable to meet the agency's needs are not
available, non-developmental items are available that meet the
agency's requirements, could be modified to meet the agency's
requirements, or could meet the agency's requirements if those
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.''
Pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal
Year 2013, the Committee impaneled an independent GEOINT
Commission, whose mandate was to examine the entire scope of
the nation's GEOINT architecture, including its performance,
ability to meet mission requirements, and affordability. The
commission's findings echo a need to closely examine current
utilization of commercial satellite imagery.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI and the Secretary
of Defense to conduct an analysis to determine: (1) which
national and military intelligence mission requirements can be
satisfied with current or proposed architectures from the
commercial electro-optical and radar imagery satellite
industry; (2) whether long-term service level agreements (i.e.,
10 years or longer) with commercial providers would be more
cost effective in meeting mission requirements than future
government-owned constellations of the same or similar systems;
and (3) whether greater reliance on commercial systems may
provide certain benefits (e.g., greater resiliency, easier
replacement, risk-sharing with the private sector, and greater
ability to share unclassified imagery with others) or encumber
certain risks. This analysis should inform decisions about the
amount and mix of National Technical Means and commercially
available imagery that the IC should invest in in the future
that balances meeting mission requirements and cost. This
analysis should be presented to the Committee no later than 90
days after the enactment of this legislation.
Commercial imagery
The Committee understands that a commercial data provider
has requested licensing approval to collect and sell on the
open market, electro-optical imagery with a ground sample
distance of 0.25-meter. Recognizing the ability of U.S.
commercial imagery providers to contribute more substantially
to the national security mission at a lower cost point, and
consistent with the U.S. policy of enabling U.S. companies to
maintain a leadership position in this industry, the Committee
encourages the GEOINT functional manager and the DNI to
promptly review this licensing request. The Committee is
concerned that foreign commercial imagery providers may soon be
able to provide imagery at or better than the currently allowed
commercial U.S. resolution limit of 0.5 meters. As foreign
firms approach or surpass this level of resolution, current
restrictions on U.S. commercial imagery data providers put the
United States at a competitive disadvantage and may harm an
industrial base that is important to national security.
Cross-intelligence cost and effectiveness report
In a time of tightening budgets for the IC, the Committee
requires accurate and detailed data on the effectiveness of all
of the intelligence disciplines given the anticipated missions
the IC will face, relative to their costs to the taxpayer, in
order to effectively legislate and authorize expenditures for
the NIP.
Therefore, the Committee directs the ODNI to complete a
detailed analysis comparing the effectiveness and costs of the
Geospatial, Human, Measurement and Signatures, Open Source, and
Signals Intelligence disciplines. The study must include
detailed analysis of the costs and effectiveness of
subcomponents and major programs of each intelligence
discipline. The DNI shall provide a written report and oral
brief covering this analysis to the Committee no later than 90
days after the enactment of this legislation.
Intelligence Community Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
workforce needs
The IC's long-term success in a highly competitive security
landscape will depend on a workforce that has significant
expertise in the science, technology, engineering and
mathematics (STEM) disciplines. The Committee supports
workforce recruitment efforts to create pipelines of STEM-
trained students from our nation's universities. Such efforts
may include fellowships, summer internships, semester
externships, and sponsored-research. The Committee is aware of
interest in such program at some of the IC's technically
focused elements, including NRO. The IC's Centers for Academic
Excellence, for which the DIA is the executive agent, and the
NSA's Cyber Center for Academic Excellence may offer models and
a set of best practices that can be applied to the STEM student
population. The Committee also is aware of a STEM coop program
that involves an initial group of schools, including the
University of Southern California, University of Nevada at Las
Vegas, Mississippi State University and Auburn University, that
has promise.
Therefore, the Committee encourages the IC's human capital
officers and their mission partners to develop and invest in
programs that are designed to attract a large pool of STEM
students from the full geographic diversity of U.S. academic
institutions. These programs should have cost-effective
operating models and demonstrate clear benefit to the IC. The
Committee also requests briefings on such initiatives.
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)
The Committee continues to strongly support the mission of
the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA),
which focuses on high-risk, high-reward research and
development to help the IC meet a dynamic and rapidly changing
security and threat environment. IARPA's mission should remain
a priority, even during the fiscal environment when research
and development investment can come under pressure. Its mission
and work should be integral to the IC R&D strategic plan
required above.
Therefore, the Committee strongly supports full
preservation of the budget request for IARPA in Fiscal Year
2014 and encourages robust investment by the IC in IARPA in
Fiscal Year 2015.
Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of positions within
the Intelligence Community
In S. 1681, the Committee provides for the direct Senate
confirmation of four positions--the Director of the NSA, the
Inspector General of the NSA, the Director of the NRO, and the
Inspector General of the NRO. The Committee believes that
Senate confirmation of these four positions will improve
oversight and accountability and, ultimately, the effectiveness
of the agencies in question. While the Committee supports
Senate confirmation of these four positions, the Committee also
believes that it is necessary to reduce the overall number of
positions subject to Senate confirmation across the government.
Therefore, the Committee will evaluate whether there are other
positions within the IC that are currently subject to Senate
confirmation that do not continue to require Senate advice and
consent. The Committee also is cognizant of the need to ensure
that critical leadership positions within the IC do not remain
vacant as a result of a lengthy appointment or confirmation
processes.
National Security threat assessments
The Committee has an interest in reviewing intelligence
assessments prepared by the IC as part of the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process and has
reached an agreement with the ODNI and Senate Banking Committee
on this matter.
Under this agreement, upon completion of a review or
investigation that concludes CFIUS action, or the announcement
by the President of a decision, for a covered transaction, the
DNI will alert the congressional intelligence committees to the
availability of any National Security Threat Assessment (NTSA)
completed by the IC. These alerts will occur on a biweekly
basis, will be included in the ``National Intelligence Council
(NIC) Weekly,'' and shall include the title of the NSTA,
foreign company host country, date of publication, and short
summary. Further, the DNI shall provide a briefing on any NSTA
and the NSTA itself upon request by the congressional
intelligence committees.
Committee Action
On November 5, 2013, a quorum being present, the Committee
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report and the classified
annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill the base text for purposes of amendment.
The Committee also authorized the staff to make technical and
conforming changes in the bill, report, and annex, following
the completion of the mark-up.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to a managers'
amendment by Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss to:
(1) strike a provision from the bill concerning Committee
access to reports and assessments produced as part of the CFIUS
process and replace it with language in the report to accompany
the bill; (2) require IC elements to submit plans to Congress
concerning plans for orderly shutdown in the event of a lapse
in appropriations; (3) require reports on the Syrian chemical
weapons program; (4) require Senate confirmation of the
Director of the NSA and the Inspector General of the NSA; (5)
amend the whistleblower title to add protection for
whistleblower disclosures made to Inspectors General within the
IC and to the congressional intelligence committees; and (6) to
make amendments to the classified annex.
By a vote of 8 ayes to 7 noes the Committee agreed to an
amendment by Senator Feinstein to require the President to make
public an annual report on the number of combatants and
noncombatant civilians killed or injured by the use of targeted
lethal force. The votes on the amendment in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--
aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--
aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--
aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--no; Senator Burr--no; Senator
Risch--no; Senator Coats--no; Senator Rubio--no; Senator
Collins--no; Senator Coburn--no.
By a vote of 10 ayes to 5 noes the Committee agreed to an
amendment by Senator King to require independent alternative
analysis of the analytic basis for use of targeted lethal force
against a United States person. The votes on the amendment in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye;
Senator Rockefeller--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator
Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator
Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--no;
Senator Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Coats--no; Senator
Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Coburn--no.
By a vote of 6 ayes to 9 noes the Committee rejected an
amendment offered by Senator Feinstein to substitute with
report language the text of an amendment offered by Senator
Coburn to make the Director and Inspector General of the NRO
subject to Senate confirmation. The votes on the amendment in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye;
Senator Rockefeller--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Mikulski--
aye; Senator Udall--no; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--no; Senator
Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Coats--no; Senator Rubio--
no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Coburn--no.
By a vote of 14 ayes to 0 noes the Committee agreed to the
amendment by Senator Coburn to make the Director and Inspector
General of the NRO subject to Senate confirmation. The votes on
the amendment in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman
Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--did not vote; Senator
Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--aye; Senator
Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Vice
Chairman Chambliss--aye; Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye;
Senator Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye;
Senator Coburn--aye.
Vote to report the committee bill
The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a
vote of 13 ayes and 2 noes. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--
aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--
aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--
aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--aye; Senator Burr--no; Senator
Risch--aye; Senator Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator
Collins--aye; Senator Coburn--no.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On November
7, 2013, the Committee transmitted this bill to the
Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the
costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes in Existing Laws
In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the
business of the Senate.
