JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2022
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, this explanation reflects the status of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence for the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022.
The explanation shall have the same effect with respect to the
implementation of this act as if it were a joint explanatory statement
of a conference committee.
I ask unanimous consent that the Joint Explanatory Statement for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 be printed into the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Joint Explanatory Statement--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022
The following is the Joint Explanatory Statement (the
``Explanatory Statement'') to the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (``the Act''), which has been
included as Division X of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2022. The Explanatory Statement reflects the result of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (``SSCI'') and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (``HPSCI'')
(together, the ``Committees''). The Explanatory Statement
shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation
of the Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a
conference committee.
The Explanatory Statement comprises three parts: an
overview of the application of the annex to accompany this
statement; a statement on anomalous health incidents; and
unclassified congressional direction.
Part I: Application of the Classified Annex and Schedule of
Authorizations
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details
concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and
policy direction. Therefore, in addition to the Schedule of
Authorizations, a classified annex to the Act--referred to
here and within the annex itself as the ``Agreement''--has
been prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of
the Committees' actions.
The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes that
accompanied H.R. 5412 and S. 2610; and reconciles differences
between the Committees, with respect to the National
Intelligence Program (NIP). The Agreement also makes
recommendations for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP)
and the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP). The
Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community (IC) to
obligate and expend funds not altered or modified by the
classified Schedule of Authorizations as requested in the
President's budget, subject to modification under applicable
reprogramming procedures.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of
law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to clarify the
authorization levels found in the bill and the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
The Committees view direction and recommendations, whether
contained in the Explanatory Statement or in the Agreement,
as requiring compliance by the Executive Branch.
Part II: Statement Regarding Anomalous Health Incident
From the time the Committees received the first ``Havana
Syndrome'' reports, the Committees have focused intently on
the anomalous health incidents (``AHIs'') that have afflicted
United States Government personnel, including many in the
Intelligence Community (IC) and other United States
Government personnel. Provisions of the Act reflect that
continuing, bicameral and bipartisan effort.
The Biden Administration also has pursued its own
initiatives. As directed by Congress, it earlier this year
appointed a senior official, within the National Security
Council, to oversee the government's response to AHIs.
Additionally, in recent months, a widely-discussed assessment
concluded that a majority of reported AHIs can be explained
by medical conditions or environmental or technical factors,
and that it is unlikely that a foreign actor--including
Russia--is engaged in a sustained, global campaign involving
hundreds of incidents without detection. But the assessment
left other cases unexplained, including a small subset that
the IC continues to scrutinize most closely.
Around the same time, an IC panel of experts determined
that certain AHIs cannot be explained by environmental or
medical conditions, but could be due to external stimuli.
While acknowledging important information gaps, the panel
further determined that pulsed electromagnetic energy--and,
in some cases, ultrasound--plausibly might explain AHIs' core
characteristics; and that psychosocial factors alone could
not account for those characteristics, though they might
cause some other incidents or contribute to long-term
symptoms.
These findings advance the United States' understanding of
AHIs. But these findings are also heavily qualified,
tentative, and based on a developing and incomplete body of
evidence and scientific and medical knowledge. Most
important, as the Committees wish to stress, these recent
developments do not justify shifting the Executive Branch's
AHI-related activities into a lower gear, or discrediting the
reports of AHI victims.
The core work on AHIs--to include examination of a
potential role by one or more foreign actors--must continue
apace. As with prior inquiries into complex and murky
intelligence problems, unraveling the AHI mystery fully may
take time. It might be years before the United States reaches
definitive conclusions about exactly who, or what, is behind
AHIs.
The Administration has acknowledged that a great deal
remains to be done. Indeed, much more evidence will have to
be gathered. Plausible theories regarding responsibility for
AHIs will have to be weighed against a record that will grow
and change over time, and potentially may have to be
revisited if circumstances warrant. And no plausible theory
should be ruled out or downplayed prematurely.
Success will depend on many factors. Among other things, it
will be important to have a well-resourced cadre of ``cross-
cleared'' individuals, at all relevant IC elements and other
Executive Branch organizations, who can readily review and
analyze all relevant intelligence and information, and
without hindrances. The Committees long have emphasized this,
with respect to AHi and many other priority intelligence
matters. However, the Executive Branch has yet to take all
necessary steps, to do away with excessive compartmentation
and unnecessary bureaucracy; and to ensure that, for AHi and
for other vital missions, the right people consistently and
easily can access necessary information. That will have to
change.
Treatment also must remain a matter of highest priority.
All AHi victims must be encouraged to file prompt reports of
their experiences, and without fear of being disbelieved or
dismissed. They and their families must receive the highest
quality medical and
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other care and must receive that care immediately. Thus far,
some bureaucratic roadblocks to the provision of care have
been removed--but there is no excuse for any to remain. They
must be dismantled. And new ones must not be erected.
Above all, there can be no slowing down, in the
investigation into AHIs and in the treatment of AHI victims
and their families. To do so would risk signaling--to those
individuals, to the broader IC workforce, and to the wider
world--that, though it prioritized the issue most highly for
a discrete time, the United States is ``moving on'' from
AHIs.
That cannot be allowed to happen. And the Committees will
continue to conduct vigorous oversight, to prevent it from
happening.
Part III: Unclassified Congressional Direction
This Joint Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference,
and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction
contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (S. Rept. 117-37) and in the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H. Rept.
117-156).
The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:
Assessment of Intelligence Community Counternarcotics
Capabilities
The Committees direct the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with such other Federal
Government entities as the Director determines appropriate,
to submit an assessment to the congressional intelligence
committees within 120 days of enactment of this Act, on the
status of the Intelligence Community's (1) counternarcotics
capabilities and resourcing with regard to intelligence
collection and analysis; (2) operational support to foreign
liaison partners; and (3) operational capacity to support the
counteractions mission of the Federal Government. The
assessment shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
Assessment of Intelligence Community's Intelligence-Sharing
Relationships with Latin American Partners in
Counternarcotics.
The Committees direct the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with such other Federal
Government entities as the Director determines appropriate,
to submit an assessment to the congressional intelligence
committees within 120 days of enactment of this Act, on the
intelligence-sharing relationships of the Intelligence
Community with foreign partners in Latin America on
counternarcotics matters. The assessment shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Report on Intelligence Community Support to Visas Mantis
Program
The Committees direct the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with such other Federal
Government entities as the Director determines appropriate,
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees within 120 days of enactment of this Act, on
intelligence matters relating to the Visas Mantis program,
including efforts by (1) the Intelligence Community to
provide and plan for effective intelligence support to such
program; and (2) hostile intelligence services to exploit
such program or any other program by which visas for
admission to the United States are issued. The report shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex, as necessary.
Assessment and Report on Interagency Communication Relating
to Efforts to Address Anomalous Health Incidents
The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence
to (1) conduct an assessment of how the various elements of
the Intelligence Community are coordinating or collaborating
with each other and with elements of the Federal Government
that are not part of the Intelligence Community in their
efforts to address anomalous health incidents, and (2) submit
a report to the congressional intelligence committees within
180 days of enactment of this Act on the findings of the
Director with respect to the assessment. The report submitted
pursuant to subsection shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
Reporting on Occurrence of Anomalous Health Incidents
The Committees direct that, whenever the head of an element
of the Intelligence Community becomes aware of a report of an
anomalous health incident occurring among the employees or
contractors of the element, no later than 90 days after each
incident, the head of the element shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a brief report on the
reported incident. The Committees further direct that this
reporting requirement shall cease upon joint notice from the
congressional intelligence committees to the Director of
National Intelligence.
Report on Cooperation by Intelligence Agencies of Key
Democratic Countries Regarding Technological Competition
with China
The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act, on the
status of current cooperation among the intelligence agencies
of key democratic countries and key partners and allies of
the United States in order to track and analyze the
following:
1. Technology capabilities and gaps among allied and
partner countries of the United States;
2. Current capabilities of China in critical technologies
and components;
3. The efforts of China to buy startups, conduct joint
ventures, and invest in specific technologies globally;
4. The technology development of China in key technology
sectors;
5. The efforts of China relating to standard-setting
forums; and
6. Supply chain vulnerabilities for key technology sectors;
The Committees further direct that the report shall include
a plan to address any deficiencies identified in the report
with respect to the cooperation described in such subsection
and suggested areas for increased cooperation.
STEM Technology Fellowship
The Committees direct the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and
any other relevant Intelligence Community elements, to
conduct and present to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 180 days after enactment of this Act, a
feasibility study examining the benefits of creating a
Science, Technology, Engineering, Math (STEM) fellowship for
the Intelligence Community, and whether such a fellowship
would help alleviate the Intelligence Community's workforce
shortages and retention challenges in STEM fields. The study
shall include:
1. A comprehensive assessment of the IC's current and
future workforce needs in high demand STEM fields, such as
data science, cybersecurity, computer network exploitation,
software development, and artificial intelligence/machine
learning, including:
a. An assessment of whether the Intelligence Community's
current positions and career categories are sufficient to
track and retain high demand STEM employees, and
b. An assessment of workforce needs by grade, category, and
position descriptions.
2. An overview of Intelligence Community programs aimed at
developing and recruiting new and mid-career hires in STEM
fields;
3. Proposed timelines for converting fellows and interns to
permanent employees;
4. Mechanisms by which the Intelligence Community could use
such a fellowship or internship to address shortfalls in
diversity among the workforce; and
5. An assessment of the authorities and resources required
to establish an Intelligence Community-wide STEM technology
fellowship.
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