Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, May 11, 2017 - 10:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Director
Michael
Pompeo
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
CIA
Director
Admiral Michael
Rogers
Director of the National Security Agency
NSA
Acting Director
Andrew
McCabe
Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI
Director
Lieutenant General Vincent
Stewart
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA
Director
Robert
Cardillo
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGA
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 115-205]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-205
OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
25-888 WASHINGTON : 2018
____________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800
Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
MAY 11, 2017
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia 3
WITNESS
Dan Coats, Director of National Intelligence; Accompanied by:
Mike Pompeo, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Lt.
Gen. Vincent Stewart, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency; Andrew McCabe, Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National
Security Agency; and Robert Cardillo, Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency................................. 6
Opening statement............................................ 12
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
1983 CIA Report, ``Soviet Strategy To Derail U.S. INF
Deployment,'' declassified in 1999 submitted by Senator Cotton. 68
Responses of Andrew McCabe to Questions for the Record........... 96
OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch,
Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Feinstein,
Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, and Harris.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'd like to call the hearing to order. I'd
like to welcome our witnesses today: Director of National
Intelligence Dan Coats--Dan, it's good to see our former
colleague here--Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Mike Pompeo--good to see you, Mike--Director of Defense
Intelligence General Vince Stewart; Director of National
Security Agency, Admiral Mike Rogers; Director of Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, Robert Cardillo; and Acting Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Andrew McCabe. I thank all
of you for being here this morning, especially to you, Director
McCabe, for filling in on such short notice.
Since 1995, this committee has met in an open forum to hear
about and discuss the security threats facing the United States
of America. I understand that many people tuned in today are
hopeful we'll focus solely on the Russian investigation of
their involvement in our elections. Let me disappoint everybody
up front: While the committee certainly views Russian
intervention in our elections as a significant threat, the
purpose of today's hearing is to review and highlight to the
extent possible the range of threats that we face as a Nation.
The national security threat picture has evolved
significantly since 1995. What used to be a collection of
mostly physical and state-based national security concerns has
been replaced by something altogether different. Today our
traditional focus on countries like North Korea, Russia, and
Iran is complicated by new challenges like strategic threats
posed by non-state actors in the cyber arena and the danger of
transnational terrorists who can use the internet to inspire
violence and fear in the homeland, all without leaving their
safe havens in the Middle East.
What has not changed, however, is the tireless dedication
and patriotism of the women and men who make up the United
States intelligence community, the very people represented by
our witnesses this morning.
One of the many reasons I find so much value in this
hearing is that it provides the American public with some
insight into the threats facing our country. But it also lets
people know what's being done in their behalf to reduce those
threats. I encourage all the witnesses today to not only
address the threats to our Nation, but to talk about what their
organizations are doing to help secure this country, to the
degree they can in an unclassified setting.
Director Coats, your written statement for the record
represents the collective insight of the entire intelligence
community. It is a lengthy and detailed account of what this
country is facing. It is also evidence of why the substantial
resources and investments this committee authorizes are in fact
necessary.
From the human tragedy of the refugee crisis in the Middle
East to the risk that territorial ambitions will set off a
regional conflict in the South China Sea, it's a complicated
and challenging world. Director Pompeo, the Korean Peninsula is
a point of particular concern to me and to many on this
committee. I'd like your insights into what is behind North
Korea's unprecedented level of nuclear and missile testing and
how close they are to holding the U.S. mainland at risk of a
nuclear attack. I'd also value your sense of how Tuesday's
election of a new President in South Korea is going to impact
things for us on that peninsula.
General Stewart, I'm sure you're aware of the reinvigorated
policy discussions on Afghanistan. While we all respect that
you can't offer your own recommendations on what that policy
should be, I would very much value your assessments of the
situation in Afghanistan today, including the state of
governance in Kabul, the sustainability and proficiency of the
Afghan National Security Forces, and whether Taliban
reconciliation is a realistic objective. If the U.S. is ramping
up in Afghanistan, we need to know the IC's views on what we're
getting into.
I also hope you'll share your assessments of the
battlefield in Iraq and in Syria with us this morning. Your
insights into conditions on the ground, including ongoing
operations to dislodge ISIS from Mosul, and sustainability of
the Mosul Dam would be of great value to the members of this
committee and to the public.
Admiral Rogers, I've made a couple references to cyber
already and that's for good reason. Of the many difficult
challenges we're going to discuss this morning, nothing worries
me more than the threat of a well-planned, well-executed
widescale attack on the computer networks and systems that make
America work. From banking and health care to military and
critical infrastructure, the functionality of our modern
society is dependent on computers. When the first line of the
DNI's statement reads, and I quote, ``Nearly all information,
communications networks, and systems will be at risk for
years,'' unquote, that alarms me. Admiral Rogers, I look
forward to hearing from you on this line of assessments.
Director Cardillo, as head of the NGA you sit at the nexus
of innovation and data collection and analysis. Given the
complexity of the intelligence questions the IC is being
confronted with and the global nature of our national security
threats that this country faces, expectations of the NGA are
high. We know the IC can't be everywhere at once, but that's
still kind of what we look to the NGA to do. I'd appreciate
your sense of what NGA analytic strengths are today and what
the role of commercial imagery is in NGA's future.
Director McCabe, welcome to the table and into the fray. To
the extent possible, I hope you'll discuss the Bureau's
assessments of the terrorist threat within our borders. Your
agents are often our last line of defense here at home and I
will say continue to do outstanding work.
We're fortunate to have six people with the experience and
the dedication that we have today. I'll close there, but I'd
like to highlight for my colleagues: the committee will be
holding a classified hearing on worldwide threats this
afternoon at 1:30. I will do everything I can to make sure that
the questions that you ask in this open session are appropriate
to the venue that we're in. I would ask you to think about that
long and hard, and if there's a question to move to a staffer
to ask them whether this is the appropriate area; and if you as
our witnesses feel that there's something that you can't
sufficiently answer in an open setting, that you will pause
long enough to get my attention and I will try to make sure
that we move to the appropriate setting.
With that, I turn to the Vice Chairman for any comments he
might make.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for your leadership on this Committee. I also want to join
in welcome the witnesses. It's good to see you all.
But it is impossible to ignore that one of the leaders of
the intelligence community is not here with us today. The
President's firing of FBI Director Comey Tuesday night was a
shocking development. The timing of Director Comey's dismissal
to me and to many members on this committee on both sides of
the aisle is especially troubling. He was leading an active
counterintelligence investigation into any links between the
Trump campaign and the Russian government or its
representatives and whether there was any coordination between
the campaign and Russia's efforts to interfere in our election.
For many people, including myself, it's hard to avoid the
conclusion that the President's decision to remove Director
Comey was related to this investigation. And that is truly
unacceptable.
We were scheduled to hear directly from Director Comey
today in open session. We and the American people were supposed
to hear straight from the individual responsible for the FBI
investigation. We anticipated asking Director Comey a series of
questions about his actions and the actions of the FBI in terms
of looking into which Trump associates, if any, and some of
their actions during the campaign as it relates to the
Russians. However, President's Trump's actions this week cost
us an opportunity to get at the truth, at least for today.
You may wonder a little bit how seriously I know the White
House continues to dismiss this investigation. I point out
simply for the record the front page of the ``New York Times,''
which shows a picture of clearly an Administration that doesn't
take this investigation too seriously.
It is important to restate the critical importance of
protecting the independence and integrity of Federal law
enforcement. This is central to maintaining the confidence of
the American people in the principle that all Americans, no
matter how powerful, are accountable before the law. The
President's actions have the potential to undermine that
confidence, and that should be deeply concerning no matter
which political party you belong to.
This week's remarkable developments make our Committee's
investigation into Russia's influence on the 2016 U.S.
presidential election even more important. And while it is
clear to me now more than ever that an independent special
counsel must be appointed, make no mistake, our Committee will
get to the bottom of what happened during the 2016 presidential
election. Again, I want to compliment the Chairman on his work
in this effort.
We will not be deterred from getting to the truth. These
actions will do nothing to undermine our resolve to follow the
evidence wherever it leads. We hope to speak to Mr. Comey. We
will speak to anyone and everyone who has something to offer in
this investigation.
Mr. McCabe, while I didn't necessarily expect to see you
here today, we don't know how long you'll be Acting FBI
Director. But while I will adhere to what the Chairman has
indicated in terms of the line of questioning, I will want to
make sure my first question for you, even in this public
setting, will be for you to assure the Committee that if you
come under any political influence from the White House or
others to squash this investigation or impede it in any way,
that you'll let the Committee know.
This investigation has had its ups and downs and again
some, including myself, sometimes have been frustrated with the
pace. We will no doubt face other challenges in the future. But
ups and downs and bumps sometimes is how bipartisanship works.
It's a constant struggle, but one worth making, and I'm proud
of the way Members of this Committee from both sides of the
aisle have conducted themselves in one of the most challenging
political environments we've ever seen.
At the same time, Chairman Burr and I have put this
investigation on what we believe to be a solid bipartisan
footing, with the shared goal of getting the truth. In spite of
the events of the last 24 hours, I intend to maintain our
Committee's focus on the investigation. Indeed, the recent
actions only increase the burden of responsibility on all of us
to ensure that we live up to this challenge and to uncover the
truth, wherever that leads.
There is, obviously, consensus agreement among the U.S.
intelligence community that Russia massively intervened with
active measures in the 2016 presidential elections. Nor do I
imagine that any member of this Committee was surprised to see
the exact same Russian playbook just being run during the
French elections that just took place last weekend. And no one
should forget back in mid-2015--Director Coats, we had some of
the folks in from the German services recently--that there was
a hacking into the German Bundestag. It's fair to say the
Germans should anticipate seeing more cyber attacks directed
against their elected officials with their upcoming national
elections in September.
In short, Russia's direct interference in democratic
processes around the globe is a direct assault that we must
work on together and it's clearly one of the top worldwide
threats.
That being said, gentlemen, I want to start again by
thanking you for your service to the Nation. I want to
particularly note that Director Coats is testifying before this
Committee in the first time since his confirmation. Dan, I know
that you and Marsha were ready for retirement and I thank you
both for being willing to serve your country one more time.
I also want to recognize the men and women who you
represent here today. These thousands of dedicated intelligence
professionals toil in the shadows, put their lives on the line,
and make sacrifices most of us will never know in order to keep
our country safe. I also want to make sure they know that I
appreciate their efforts and am proud to represent them, not
only as the Vice Chair of the Intelligence Committee, but as a
Senator from Virginia, where so many of those intelligence
professionals live.
This Committee's annual Worldwide Threat hearing is an
important opportunity to review the threats and challenges we
face as a Nation. Obviously, these threats continue to
multiply. As the world becomes more complex and challenging,
good intelligence gives our policymakers and national leaders a
heads-up on the challenges they need to address.
The intelligence community in many ways is our Nation's
early warning system. However, a fire alarm only works if you
pay attention to it. You cannot ignore it simply because you do
not like what it's telling you. Similarly, we need to make sure
that all our policymakers pay attention to the warnings
provided by you, the independent, nonpartisan intelligence
professionals.
Since the Second World War, America has relied, as we all
know, on a global system of alliances, institutions, and norms
to ensure our stability and prosperity. Today many challenges
threaten that system, that system that has been built up over
the last 70 years. As the Chairman mentioned, countries like
China and Russia are challenging many of the global
institutions. They are in many cases seeking to undercut and
delegitimize them. We must work together to stand vigilant
against that threat.
Similarly, rogue states such as North Korea have sought to
undercut the global nonproliferation regime. Obviously, North
Korea is one of the most pressing issues our country faces.
And, Admiral Rogers, as the Chairman mentioned, we all share
enormous concern about both the up side and down side of new
technologies and the asymmetrical threats that are posed by
cyber and other technology actors. I would add as well--
Director Cardillo, I think we've discussed this as well--our
dominance in terms of overhead in many ways is at threat as
well from emerging nations.
Terrorist groups and extremists are also able to access a
lot of these new technologies. And while ISIS in particular
continues to suffer losses in Syria, Iraq, and Libya,
unfortunately it continues to spread its hateful ideology
through social media and encrypted communications.
Gentlemen, I have only lightly touched on a few of the
challenges we face. I look forward to the discussion we're
about to have. But again, I thank you for being here and look
forward to this hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman.
For members' purposes, we have a vote scheduled on the
floor at 11:00 o'clock. It's the intent of the Chair and Vice
Chair that we will rotate the gavel so that the hearing
continues through. Members will be recognized by seniority for
five minutes. When we conclude the open session, hopefully with
enough gap for our witnesses to have some lunch, we will
reconvene at 1:30. The afternoon vote to my knowledge is not
set yet, but we will work around that, so plan to be back at
the SCIF by 1:30 for that hearing to start.
With that, Director Coats, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;
ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR OF THE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MIKE POMPEO, DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ANDREW MCCABE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ADMIRAL MICHAEL ROGERS,
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND ROBERT CARDILLO,
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director Coats. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner,
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I'm here with my colleagues from
across the IC community and I'm sure I speak for my colleague
Mike Pompeo, the new Director of the CIA, that the two of us,
new to the job, have inherited an intelligence community with
leadership and professionals, with expertise, that is
exceptional. It is a great privilege to hold these positions
and know that we have the support from across 17 agencies
relative to gathering intelligence, analyzing and synthesizing
that intelligence, and several of those leaders are sitting
here today and we're most appreciative of their contributions
to their country and to this issue.
The complexity of the threat environment is ever expanding
and has challenged the IC to stay ahead of the adversary, and
it has not been an easy task. Given the tasks we face around
the world, the IC continues its work to collect, to analyze,
and integrate these and other issues.
We appreciate very much the support from your committee to
address these threats in a way that will give the President,
the Congress, and other policymakers the best and most
integrated intelligence we can assemble.
In the interest of time and on behalf of my colleagues at
the table, I'll discuss just some of the many challenging
threats that we currently face. The intelligence community's
written statement for the record that was submitted earlier
discusses these and many other threats in greater detail.
Let me start with North Korea. North Korea is an
increasingly grave national security threat to the United
States because of its growing missile and nuclear capabilities
combined with the aggressive approach of its leader, Kim Jong
Un. Kim is attempting to prove he has the capability to strike
the U.S. mainland with a nuclear weapon. He has taken initial
steps toward fielding a mobile intercontinental ballistic
missile, but it has not yet been flight tested.
North Korea updated its constitution in 2012 to declare
itself a nuclear power and its officials consistently state
nuclear weapons are the basis for regime survival, suggesting
Kim does not intend--not intend--to negotiate them away.
Although intelligence collection on North Korea poses
difficulties given North Korea's Isolation, the IC will
continue to dedicate resources to this key challenge. It
requires some of our most talented professionals to warn our
leaders of the pending North Korean actions and of the long-
term implications of their strategic weapons programs.
In Syria, we assess that the regime will maintain its
momentum on the battlefield provided, as is likely, that it
maintains support from Iran and Russia. The continuation of the
Syrian conflict will worsen already disastrous conditions for
Syrians in regional states. Furthermore, on April 4th the
Syrian regime used the nerve agent sarin against the opposition
in Khan Sheikhoun in what is probably the largest chemical
attack by the regime since August 2013. The Syrian regime
probably used chemical weapons in response to battlefield
losses along the Hama battle front in late March that
threatened key infrastructure.
We assess that Syria is probably both willing and able to
use CW, chemical warfare, in future attacks, but we do not know
if they plan to do so. We are still acquiring and continuing to
analyze all intelligence related to the question of whether
Russian officials had foreknowledge of the Syrian CW attack on
4 April, and as we learn this information we will certainly
share it with this committee.
Cyber threats continue to represent a critical national
security issue for the United States for two key reasons.
First, our adversaries are becoming bolder, more capable, and
more adept at using cyber space to threaten our interests and
shape real-world outcomes. And the number of adversaries grows
as nation-states, terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and
others continue to develop cyber capabilities.
Secondly, the potential impact of these cyber threats is
amplified by the ongoing integration of technology into our
critical infrastructure and into our daily lives.
Our relationships and businesses already rely on social
media and communication technologies and on critical
infrastructure. It is becoming increasingly reliant on the
internet. As such, this raises the potential for physical,
economic, and psychological consequences when a cyber attack or
exploitation event occurs.
The worldwide threat of terrorism is geographically diverse
and multifaceted, and it poses a continuing challenge for the
United States, for our allies and partners who seek to counter
it. ISIS is experiencing territorial losses in Iraq and Syria,
with persistent counterterrorism operations degrading its
strength. However, ISIS will continue to be an active terrorist
threat to the United States due to its proven ability to direct
and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the
world.
Outside Iraq and Syria, ISIS is seeking to foster
interconnectedness among its global branches and networks,
align their efforts to its strategy, and withstand counter-ISIS
efforts. We assess that ISIS maintains the intent and
capability to direct, enable, assist, and inspire transnational
attacks.
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to pose a significant
terrorist threat overseas as they remain primarily focused on
local and regional conflicts. Homegrown violent extremists
remain the most frequent and unpredictable terrorist threat to
the United States homeland. This threat will persist, with many
attacks happening with little or no warning.
In Turkey, tensions in Turkey might escalate rapidly and
unpredictably in 2017 as the government's consolidation of
power, crackdowns on dissent, and restrictions on free media
continue.
Let me now take just a quick run through some key areas of
the Middle East. In Iraq, Baghdad's primary focus through 2017
will be recapturing and stabilizing Mosul and other territory
controlled by ISIS. ISIS in Iraq is preparing to regroup,
however, and continue an insurgency and terrorist campaign even
as it loses territory. We assess that Iraq will still face
serious challenges to its stability, political viability, and
territorial integrity even as the threat from ISIS is reduced.
Reconstruction will cost billions of dollars and ethnosectarian
and political reconciliation will be an enduring challenge.
In Iran, Teheran's public statements suggest that it wants
to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action because it
views the deal as a means to remove sanctions while preserving
some nuclear capabilities. Iran's implementation of the deal
has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months
to about a year.
Teheran's malignant activities, however, continue. For
example, Iran provides arms, financing, and training and
manages as many as 10,000 Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shia
fighters in Syria to support the Assad regime. Iran has sent
hundreds of its own forces, to include members of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and the IRGC Quds Force, to Syria as
advisers.
In Yemen, fighting--we assess fighting will almost
certainly persist in 2017 between Houthi-aligned forces trained
by Iran and the Yemeni government, backed by a Saudi-led
coalition. Neither side has been able to achieve decisive
results through military force to this point. Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, an ISIS branch in Yemen, have exploited the
conflict and the collapse of government authority to gain new
recruits and allies and expand their influence.
In South Asia, the intelligence community assesses that the
political and security situation in Afghanistan will almost
certainly deteriorate through 2018, even with a modest increase
in military assistance by the United States and its partners.
This deterioration is undermined by its dire economic
situation. Afghanistan will struggle to curb its dependence on
external support until it contains the insurgency or reaches a
peace agreement with the Taliban.
Meanwhile, we assess that the Taliban is likely to continue
to make gains, especially in rural areas. Afghan Security
Forces' performance will probably worsen due to a combination
of Taliban operations, combat casualties, desertions, poor
logistics support, and weak leadership.
Pakistan is concerned about international isolation and
sees its position through the prism of India's rising
international status, including India's expanded foreign
outreach and deepening ties to the United States. Pakistan will
likely turn to China to offset its isolation, empowering a
relationship that will help Beijing to project influence into
the Indian Ocean.
In addition, Islamabad has failed to curb militants and
terrorists and Pakistan. These groups will present a sustained
threat to the United States' interests in the region and
continue to plan and conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan.
Pakistan is also expanding its nuclear arsenal and pursuing
tactical nuclear weapons, potentially lowering the threshold
for their use.
Let me now turn to Russia. We assess that Russia is likely
to be more aggressive in foreign and global affairs, more
unpredictable in its approach to the United States, and more
authoritarian in its approach to domestic policies and
politics. We assess that Russia will continue to look to
leverage its military support to the Assad regime to drive a
political settlement process in Syria on their terms. Moscow is
also likely to use Russia's military intervention in Syria in
conjunction with efforts to capitalize on fears of a growing
ISIS and extremist threat to expand its role in the Middle
East.
We assess that Moscow's strategic objectives in Ukraine--
maintaining long-term influence over Kiev and frustrating
Ukraine's attempts to integrate into Western institutions--will
remain unchanged in 2017. Russia's military intervention in
eastern Ukraine contains more than two years--continues, excuse
me--more than two years after the Minsk 2 Agreement. Russia
continues to exert military and diplomatic pressure to coerce
Ukraine into implementing Moscow's interpretation of the
political provisions of the Minsk agreement, among them
constitutional amendments that would effectively give Moscow a
veto over Kiev's strategic decisions.
In China, China will continue, we assess, to pursue an
active foreign policy, especially within the Asia Pacific
region, highlighted by a firm stance on competing territorial
claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea, relations
with Taiwan, and its pursuit of economic engagement across East
Asia. China views a strong military as a critical element in
advancing its interests. It will also pursue efforts aimed at
fulfilling its ambitious ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative to
expand their strategic influence and economic role across Asia
through infrastructure projects.
Just a quick look at sub-Saharan Africa, home to more than
a billion people and expected to double in size by mid-century.
African governments face the threat of coups, popular
uprisings, widespread violence, and terrorist attacks,
including from Al-Qaeda and its ISIS affiliates.
In the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela's unpopular autocratic
government will turn to increasingly repressive means to
contain political opponents and street unrest. Oil has long
been the regime's cash cow, but mismanagement has led to
declining output and revenue. We assess the Venezuelan
government will struggle to contain inflation, make debt
payments, and pay for imports of scarce basic goods and
medicines.
Mexico's government will focus on domestic priorities to
prepare for the 2018 presidential election while seeking to
limit fallout from strained relations with the United States.
Public demand for government action against crime and
corruption will add to political pressure.
As Cuba heads into the final year of preparations for a
historic transition to a next generation leader in early 2018,
the government's focus will be on preserving control while
managing recession. Cuba, which continues to use repressive
measures to stifle human rights and constrain democracy
activists, blames its slowing economy on lower global commodity
prices, the U.S. embargo, and the economic crisis in Venezuela,
a key benefactor.
Let me just make a statement on the threat from illegal
drugs. The threat to the United States from foreign-produced
drugs, especially heroin, synthetic opioids, meth, and cocaine,
has grown significantly in the past few years. This is
contributing to previously unseen levels of U.S. drug-related
mortality, which now exceeds all other U.S. causes of injurious
death.
Finally, I'd like to make a few points here that are
important to the IC going forward. As you are all very aware,
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is due to expire at the
end of the year. I cannot stress enough the importance of this
authority in how the IC does its work to keep Americans safe,
and I know that is shared by everyone at this table.
Section 702 is an extremely effective tool to protect our
Nation from terrorists and other threats. As I described in my
confirmation hearing, 702 is instrumental to so much of the
IC's critical work in protecting the American people from
threats from abroad.
The intelligence community is committed to working with all
of you, in both classified and unclassified sessions, to ensure
that you understand not only how we use our authorities, but
also how we protect privacy and civil liberties in the process.
Additionally, many of you have asked me as part of my
confirmation process about the status of the IC, its
effectiveness and efficiency, and how it can be improved. As
part of the Administration's goal of an effective and efficient
government, the ODNI has already begun a review of the entire
intelligence community, to include the Office of the DNI, and
to answer the very questions about how we can make our process
even more streamlined, more efficient, and more effective.
My office is proud to lead this review and I look forward
to the confirmation of my principal deputy in order to shepherd
this process to completion, and I have total confidence in her
that she has the capacity and capability to effectively lead
this effort.
The recently passed intelligence authorization bill also
includes the requirement for a review of the IC focused on
structures and authorities ten years beyond the intelligence
reforms of the mid-2000s. Between these two reviews, I am
confident that I will be able to report back to the committee
with constructive recommendations on the best ways forward for
the whole of the IC.
In the short time I've been on this job, I have learned
that the IC is full of dedicated, talented, creative, and
patriotic men and women who are committed to keeping America
safe. We must retain this posture while looking for ways to
improve.
In conclusion, the intelligence community will continue its
tireless work against these and all threats, but we will never
be omniscient. Although we have extensive insight into many
threats and places around the world, we have gaps in others.
Therefore, we very much appreciate the support provided by this
committee and will continue to work with you to ensure that the
intelligence community has the capabilities it needs to meet
its many mission needs.
With that, we are ready to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Coats follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Director Coats, thank you for that very
thorough and comprehensive testimony on behalf of the
intelligence community. Dan, quite frankly, you make us proud,
seeing one of our own now head the entire intelligence
community, and I want to thank you and Marsha personally for
your willingness to do that.
Director Coats. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. And to also pass to you, we are anxious for
your deputy to be considered by the committee. Would you please
send us a nomination?
Director Coats. We are doing our very best to do that.
Nobody's more anxious than me.
Chairman Burr. I'm sure that's the case.
I'm going to recognize myself for five minutes.
Director McCabe, did you ever hear Director Comey tell the
President that he was not the subject of an investigation?
Excuse me. Did you ever hear Director Comey tell the President
he was not the subject of an investigation?
Director McCabe. Sir----
Chairman Burr. Could you turn on your microphone, please.
Director McCabe. Rookie mistake. I'm sorry.
Sir, I can't comment on any conversations the Director may
have had with the President.
Chairman Burr. Okay.
General Stewart, you heard Director Coats state on
everybody's behalf that there is an expected deterioration of
conditions in Afghanistan. Can you give us DIA's assessment of
the situation today in Afghanistan and what would change that
deterioration?
General Stewart. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I pay close
attention to the operations in Afghanistan. I make two trips
there each year, one before the fighting season and one
following the fighting season. That way I get on the ground my
own personal assessment of how things are going.
I was there about six weeks ago. The ANDSF, two years into
taking control of the security environment, has had mixed
results in this past year. Those mixed results can characterize
the security environment as a stalemate and, left unchecked,
that stalemate will deteriorate in favor of the belligerents.
So we have to do something very different than what we've been
doing in the past.
Let me back out just a little bit and talk about the fact
that the Taliban failed to meet any of their strategic
objectives that they outlined during the last fighting season.
They controlled no district centers. They were able to execute
high-visibility attacks, which causes a psychological effect,
that has a debilitating effect. They maintained some influence
in the rural areas, but they controlled none of the large
district centers.
Having said that, the Afghan National Defense Security
Forces did not meet their force generation objectives. They had
some success in training the force. They were able to manage a
crisis better than they have in the past. They were able to
deploy forces, but failed in my opinion to employ the ISR and
the fire support to make them as effective on the battlefield
as possible.
Unless we change something where we introduce either U.S.
forces or NATO forces, that changes the balance of forces on
the ground, changes the fighting outputs on the ground, or add
additional training and advising capability at lower levels
than we do now, the situation will continue to deteriorate and
we'll lose all the gains that we've invested in over the last
several years.
So they've got to get more trainers below the corps level,
I believe--not sure how far down--or they'd have to get more
personnel on the ground, generate greater forces, greater fire
support, greater use of ISR, or this will in fact deteriorate
further.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, General.
Admiral Rogers, every aspect of our daily lives continues
to become part of a traceable, trackable, interacting
environment now known as the Internet of Things. In addition,
artificial intelligence, or AI, has increasingly enabled
technology to become autonomous. What is the IC's current
assessment of the ever-changing capabilities of the Internet of
Things and what it presents?
Admiral Rogers. It represents both opportunity, but from an
information assurance or computer network defense perspective
it represents great concern, where the ability to harness
literally millions of devices that were built to very simple,
day to day activities, suddenly can be tied together and
focused and oriented to achieve a specific outcome. We've seen
this with denial of service attempts against a couple
significant companies on the East Coast of the United States in
the course of the last year.
This is going to be a trend in the future. It's part of the
discussions we're having. I'm in the midst of having some
discussions in the private sector. This is going to be a
problem that's common to both of us. How can we work together
to try to, number one, understand this technology and, number
two, ask ourselves how do we ensure that it's not turned
around, if you will, against us.
Chairman Burr. Thank you for that.
Admiral Rogers, I'll probably put this to you as well.
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act authorizes the
government to target only non-U.S. persons reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States for the purposes of
acquiring foreign intelligence information. Section 702 cannot
be used to target any person located inside the United States,
and the law prohibits the government from reverse targeting,
that is targeting a non-U.S. person outside the United States
specifically for the purpose of collecting the communications
of a person inside the United States. The IC uses FISA 702
collection authority to detect, identify, and disrupt terrorist
and other national security threats.
How would you characterize 702 authority and its importance
to the current intelligence collection platform overall?
Admiral Rogers. If we were to lose 702's authorities, we
would be significantly degraded in our ability to provide
timely warning and insight as to what terrorist actors, nation-
states, and criminal elements are doing that is of concern to
our Nation, as well as our friends and allies. This 702 has
provided us insight that is focused both on counterterrorism
quite as well as counter-proliferation, understanding what
nation-states are doing. It's given us tremendous insights in
the computer network defense arena. I would highlight much--not
all--much of what was in the intelligence community's
assessment, for example, on the Russian efforts against the
U.S. election process in 2016 was informed by knowledge we
gained through 702 authority.
Chairman Burr. Thank you for that.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've got a couple questions that hopefully will only
require yes or no answers. First, for the whole panel, the
assembled leadership of the intelligence community: do you
believe that the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment
accurately characterized the extent of Russian activities in
the 2016 election in its conclusion that Russian intelligence
agencies were responsible for the hacking and leaking of
information and using this information in order to influence
our elections? A simple yes or no would suffice.
Director Cardillo. I do, yes, sir.
General Stewart. Yes, Senator.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, I do.
Director Coats. Yes, I do.
Director McCabe. Yes.
Director Pompeo. Yes.
Vice Chairman Warner. I guess the presumption, the next
presumption--I won't even ask this question--is, consequently
that community assessment was unanimous and is not a piece of
fake news or evidence of some other individual or nation-state
other than Russia. So I appreciate that again for the record.
I warned you, Mr. McCabe, I was going to have to get you on
the record as well on this. Mr. McCabe, for as long as you are
Acting FBI Director do you commit to informing this Committee
of any effort to interfere with the FBI's ongoing investigation
into links between Russia and the Trump campaign?
Director McCabe. I absolutely do.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you so much for that. I think,
in light of what's happened in the last 48 hours, it's
critically important that we have that assurance. And I hope
you'll relay, at least for me, to the extraordinary people who
work at the FBI that this Committee supports them, supports
their efforts, supports the professionalism, and supports their
independence.
Director McCabe. I will, sir. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Warner. In light of the fact that we just saw
French elections where it felt like deja vu all over again in
terms of the release of a series of emails against Mr. Macron
days before the election, and the fact that this committee
continues to investigate the type of tactics that Russia has
used, where do we stand as a country in terms of preparation to
make sure this doesn't happen again in 2018 and 2020?
Where have we moved in terms of collaboration with State
voter files, in terms of working more with the tech community,
particularly the platform entities, in terms of how we can
better assure real news versus fake news? And is there some
general sense--Director Coats, I know you've only been in the
job for a short period of time--of how we're going to have a
strategic effort? Because while it was Russia in 2016, other
nation-states could launch similar-type assaults.
Director Coats. Well, we will continue to use all the
assets that we have in terms of collection and analysis
relative to what the influence has been and potentially could
be in future. The Russians have spread this across the globe.
Interestingly enough, I met with the Prime Minister of
Montenegro, the latest nation to join NATO, the number 29
nation. What was the main topic? Russian interference in their
political system.
So it sweeps across Europe and to other places. It's clear,
though, the Russians have upped their game using social media
and other opportunities in ways we haven't seen before. So it's
a great threat to our democratic process, and our job here is
to provide the best intelligence we can to the policymakers as
they develop a strategy in terms of how to best reflect a
response to this.
Vice Chairman Warner. One of the things I'm concerned about
is, we've all expressed this concern, but since this doesn't
fall neatly into any particular agency's jurisdiction, who's
taking the point on interacting with the platform companies, a
la the Google, Facebook, and Twitters? Who's taking the point
in terms of interacting with DHS, I imagine, in terms of State
boards of election? How are we trying to ensure that our
systems are more secure?
If we could get a brief answer on that because I have one
last question for Admiral Rogers.
Director Coats. Well, I think obviously our office tasks
and takes the point, but there's contribution from agencies
across the IC. I might ask Director Pompeo to address that, and
others might want to address that also. But each of us, each of
the agencies, to the extent that they can and have the
capacity, whether it's NSA through SIGINT, whether it's CIA
through HUMINT or other sources, will provide information to us
that we want to use as a basis to provide to our policymakers.
Relative to a grand strategy, I am not aware right now of
any--I think we're still assessing the impact. We have not put
a grand strategy together, which would not be our purview. We
would provide the basis of intelligence that would then be the
foundation for what that strategy would be.
Vice Chairman Warner. My hope would be that we need to be
proactive in this. We don't want to be sitting here kind of
looking back at it after a 2018 election cycle.
Last question very briefly. Admiral Rogers, do you have any
doubt that the Russians were behind the intervention in the
French elections?
Director Rogers. Let me phrase it this way. We are aware of
some Russian activity directed against the Russian--excuse me--
directed against the French election process. As I previously
said before Congress earlier this week, we in fact reached out
to our French counterparts to say: We have become aware of this
activity; we want to make you aware; what are you seeing?
I'm not in a position to have looked at the breadth of the
French infrastructure, so I'm not really in a position to make
a whole simple declaratory statement.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCabe, can you--without going to the specifics of any
individual investigation, I think the American people want to
know, has the dismissal of Mr. Comey in any way impeded,
interrupted, stopped, or negatively impacted any of the work,
any investigation, or any ongoing projects at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation?
Director McCabe. As you know, Senator, the work of the men
and women of the FBI continues despite any changes in
circumstance, any decisions. So there has been no effort to
impede our investigation to date. Quite simply put, sir, you
cannot stop the men and women of the FBI from doing the right
thing, protecting the American people and upholding the
Constitution.
Senator Rubio. This is for all the Members of the
Committee. As has been widely reported--and people know this--
Kaspersky Lab software is used by, not hundreds of thousands,
millions of Americans. To each of our witnesses, I would just
ask: would any of you be comfortable with Kaspersky Lab's
software on your computers?
Director Coats. A resounding no for me.
Director Rogers. No.
Director Pompeo. No, Senator.
Director McCabe. No, sir.
Director Stewart. No, Senator.
Director Cardillo. No, sir.
Senator Rubio. Director Pompeo, on Venezuela, which was
mentioned in Director Coats' statement, as all of you are
probably well aware, armed civilian groups or colectivos, these
militias in the street, have been armed by the regime for
purposes of defending, for lack of a better term, the regime
from protesters. We all are aware of the Maduro regime's cozy
relationship with Hezbollah, with the FARC, which is a
designated terrorist organization, and links to
narcotrafficking.
Among the weapons in the stockpile of the military in
Venezuela are Igla-S, these basically Russian variants of our
Stinger missiles. Director Pompeo, if you could comment on the
risk that I believe exists that as these groups become more
desperate, potentially even operate at some point outside the
control of the Maduro regime, running around in the streets,
also in search of money and food and anything else that they
want to get their hands on, the threat of any advanced weaponry
such as what I just mentioned being sold or transferred to the
FARC, a terrorist organization, sold to drug cartels in Mexico
potentially, or even sold to terrorist organizations on the
black market? Is that a real threat? Is that something we
should be cognizant of?
Director Pompeo. Senator, it is a real threat. As we have
all seen, the situation in Venezuela continues to deteriorate.
Maduro gets more desperate by the hour. The risk of these
colectivos acting in a way that is not under his control
increases as time goes on as well.
In a classified setting, I'm happy to share with you a
little bit more about the details of what we know. We have not
seen any of those major arms transfers take place. We don't
have any evidence that those have taken place to date. But
those stockpiles exist, not only in the Maduro regime, but
other places as well. There are plenty of weapons running
around in Venezuela and this risk is incredibly real and
serious and ultimately a threat to South America and Central
America, in addition to just in Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. Staying in the Western Hemisphere for a
moment--and this potentially is also to the Director, Director
McCabe, and to you, Director Pompeo. I continue to be concerned
about the potential and I believe is the reality of a concerted
effort on the part of the Cuban government to recruit and
unwittingly enlist Americans, business executives and others,
even local and state political leaders, in an effort to have
them influence U.S. policymaking on Cuba, and particularly the
lifting of the embargo.
Would this be a tactic consistent with what we have seen in
the past from other nation-states, including the regime in
Cuba?
Director Pompeo. I'll let Mr. McCabe comment as well, but
yes, of course. Frankly, this is consistent with--the attempt
to interfere in the United States is not limited to Russia. The
Cubans have deep ties. It is in their deepest tradition to take
American visitors and do their best to influence them in a way
that's adverse to U.S. interests.
Director McCabe. Yes, sir, fully agree. We share your
concerns about that issue.
Senator Rubio. My final question is, with all this focus on
Russia and what's happened in the past, is it the opinion of
all of you or those of you--certainly all have insight on
this--that even as we focus on 2016 and the efforts leading up
to that election, efforts to influence policymaking here in the
United States vis-a-vis the Russian interests are ongoing, that
the Russians continue to use active measures even at this
moment, even on this day, to try, through the use of multiple
different ways, to influence the political debate and decisions
made in American politics, particularly as they pertain to
Russia's interests around the world? In essence, these active
measures are an ongoing threat, not simply something that
happened in the past.
Director McCabe. Yes, sir, that's right.
Director Pompeo. Senator, it's right. In some sense,
though, we ought to put it in context. This has been going on
for a long time. There's nothing new. Only the cost has been
lessened, the cost of doing it.
Director Coats. I would just add that the use of cyber and
social media significantly increased the impact and the
capabilities. Obviously, this has been done for years and
years, even decades. But the ability to have--to use the
interconnectedness and all that provides, that it didn't
provide before--they've literally upped their game to the point
where it's having a significant impact.
Director Rogers. From my perspective, I would just
highlight, cyber is enabling them to access information in
massive quantities that weren't quite attainable to the same
level previously. That's just another tool in their attempt to
acquire information, misuse of that information, manipulation,
outright lies, inaccuracies at times, but in other times
actually dumping raw data, which we also saw during this last
presidential election cycle for us.
Chairman Burr. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
There's obviously more than one threat to our country. I
would argue that the greatest danger to the United States is
North Korea. I'm one of those who has been very worried and
trying to follow this as close as possible.
In the statement for the record, you state, and I quote:
``North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs will
continue to pose a serious threat to U.S. interests in to the
security environment in East Asia in 2017.'' You go on to
state: ``Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range
nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat
to the United States.''
These assessments, combined with North Korea's behavior,
recent ballistic missile launches, and proximity to U.S. forces
and allies in Asia, are deeply concerning. For the purpose of
this open hearing, could each of you express the threat posed
by North Korea in this public setting and then address, most
importantly, some of the specific actions we're taking as a
Nation? Some of it you may want to do in the closed hearing
later.
Director Coats. I think we could get into greater detail in
the closed hearing. But it's clear that we have assessed this
as a very significant, potentially existential, threat to the
United States that has to be addressed. You're aware there has
been considerable discussion among the policymakers, with our
providing intelligence with the Administration, relative to
steps moving forward. General Mattis has taken a major role in
this, as well as our Secretary of State and others.
The interaction with the Chinese of late we think can play
a significant role in terms of how we deal with this. We have
dedicated a very significant amount of our intelligence
resources to the issue of North Korea. I think we'd look
forward to going deeper into all of that in the classified
session.
Senator Feinstein. Well, let me ask this. Is it possible in
this hearing to estimate when they will have an
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of taking a nuclear
warhead?
Director Coats. I think it would be best if we save that,
those kind of details, for the closed session.
Senator Feinstein. Can you say in this session how
effective China has been in stopping some of the testing?
Director Pompeo. Senator Feinstein, let me try and answer
that as best I can. I actually just returned from Korea. I was
there last week. I had a chance to be with our great soldier,
General Brooks, and his team, as well as the great soldiers of
the Republic of Korea Army who are on the front lines there.
They're doing amazing work in a difficult condition.
With respect to the Chinese, they have made efforts in a
way that they have not made before in an effort to close down
the trade that they have and putting pressure, diplomatic
pressure as well, on the North Koreans. The intelligence would
suggest that we're going to need more to shake free this
terribly challenging problem, and that they could do more and
they have the capacity to do more as well.
Senator Feinstein. Could you be specific? Have they
entirely stopped coal? To what degree have they reduced it? How
about oil and other commodities?
Director Pompeo. I'd prefer to defer the details of that to
the classified setting, but there have been restrictions on
coal that have been significant.
Senator Feinstein. Is there any other comment?
Director Stewart. If I could, Senator. North Korea has
declared its intent. It said it publicly. It produces
propaganda images that show their intent to develop
intercontinental missiles, nuclear-armed. What we have not seen
them do is do a complete end to end test of an ICBM with a
nuclear device.
In the closed session we can talk about how close they
might be to doing that. But they're certainly on parallel
paths: a nuclear device, processing enough fissile material for
nuclear warheads, and developing a wide range of missile
technology--short, intermediate, long-range missile technology.
So they're going to put those two together at some point, but
we have not seen them do that, test it end to end, missile
launch, intercontinental range, miniaturization, and survival
of a reentry vehicle. But they're on that path and they're
committed to doing that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Director Cardillo. I'd just add, Senator, on top of General
Stewart's comments that they are in a race. He's pushing very
hard on the accelerator here. This whole panel is well aware of
that and we are doing everything in our power--and we can give
you the details in closed--to make sure that we give you and
our customers the advantage to win that race.
Senator Feinstein. If I might just say, Mr. Cardillo,
you've given us very good information, very solid information.
It is much appreciated. I think it is time for the American
people to begin to understand that, as the Director said, we do
in fact have an existential threat in the Pacific Ocean and we
need to come to grips with it.
Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Coats, let me join everybody else in welcoming you
back to the Committee, this time on the other side of the
hearing table, but pleased along with others as you take this
responsibility.
It's my understanding--I want to talk just a little bit
about two executive orders on vetting that the President has
been challenged on in court. My understanding is you're, as the
DNI, involved in that vetting, in that process; is that right?
The screening process, is that something that reports up
through you?
Director Coats. You're talking about the classification
process?
Senator Blunt. Well, I'm talking about the extreme vetting,
where the President's issued--the first executive order was
January the 27th, where the President's order said that we'd
suspend refugee admissions from certain countries for 90 days
pending a review. There's also 120 days mentioned in that
order.
Since we're beyond 90 days and approaching 120 days, my
real question is, are we, in spite of what's happening outside
of the organization, are we continuing to pursue that time line
and are we about to get to the 120 days of having that review
period behind us?
Director Coats. I would like to take that question and get
back to you with the specifics relative to the days away, what
has been done to this particular date, and are we on target.
Obviously, this is going forward. I don't have the details in
front of me right now, but I'd be happy to get that information
for you.
Senator Blunt. Good. I'd be interested in that. And I'd be
very concerned, frankly, if we're now over 100, close to 120,
days into that time frame, to find out that the 120 days didn't
get the job done because we were waiting to figure out how the
order could be properly enforced. So I'd be very interested in
that.
On the cyber front, Director Cardillo, I know, among other
things, your organization has conducted what you've called
hackathons, or at least have been called hackathons. What has
that done in terms of bringing other people into the discussion
of how we protect ourselves better from these cyber attacks?
Director Cardillo. Thank you, Senator. We're quite proud at
NGA of our history of support to the community and to you, but
through predominantly historically closed systems, government-
owned systems, etcetera. As the committee has already discussed
and the panel has responded, clearly the high-tech reality of
our world, the interconnectedness of the internet, etcetera.
What we're trying to do is take that historic success of our
expertise and our experience and then engage with that
community in a way that we can better leverage our data in a
way to inform and warn you.
I'm trying to tap into the agility and the innovation of
that community. We use these hackathons to put out challenge
questions in which we can engage with industry and academia in
a way that will enable us to do our job better.
Senator Blunt. Let me ask one more question of you. We had
a witness before this committee on March 30th in an open
hearing, Clint Watts, who observed that--he said, quote: ``The
intelligence community is very biased against open source
information.'' That ends his quote.
I may come to you on that, too, Director Pompeo. But in
terms of Geospatial, what are you doing there with open source
information?
Director Cardillo. We're engaging. As Admiral Rogers
mentioned, though, there's an up side to this connectedness and
the fact that the commercial market and the commercial imagery
market is getting into a business that was prior a government-
only entity has great advantage. We seek to build on that and
take advantage of those developments.
We also need to go in eyes wide open and realize that there
is a risk. So I don't have a bias. I have an awareness and
appreciation for this open development and innovation. My
commitment is to smartly engage with it, to make sure that we
use the best of it, while we're aware that there is a risk as
we do so.
Senator Blunt. Director Pompeo, do you think that was a
fair criticism, that the intelligence community is biased
against using open source information?
Director Pompeo. Senator Blunt, I think historically that
may well have been true. I don't think that's the case today.
We have an enormous open source enterprise that does its best
to stay up with and be world class in information management
and get information that is not stolen secrets, but open source
information, to the right place at the right time to help
inform the intelligence that we provide to you and to our other
customers.
So today I would say that statement is inaccurate.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Director.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask--let me highlight one issue and ask a question,
Director Coats, about another issue. And I'd invite comment
from anyone who has something they want to offer. I've been
increasingly concerned about foreign governments hiring
lobbyists here in Washington and, unbeknownst to members of
Congress, actually lobbying Congress to enact policies which
may be contrary to the best interests of the American people.
Of course, the Foreign Agent Registration Act provides some
level of transparency for that. But I just highlight that issue
and we can come back to it at a later time because I want to
ask you about another topic as well.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
or CFIUS, provides a very important role in determining whether
there are technology transfers from the United States to
foreign governments. I'm happy to see, Director Coats, your
comments on page 4 of your written statement specifically
regarding China's increasing effort to use investment as a way
to improve its technological capabilities.
China we've seen continues to use an aggressive campaign to
vacuum up advanced U.S. technology however and whenever it can,
whether stealing it through cyber or buying it on the open
market. Do you feel like the current CFIUS process adequately
protects against this threat vector, and are all elements of
the U.S. Government cognizant of these vulnerabilities?
Director Coats. I can't speak to how many agencies of the
U.S. Government are as cognizant as perhaps they should be, but
I certainly think that, given China's aggressive approach
relative to information-gathering and all the things that you
mentioned, it merits a review of CFIUS in terms of whether or
not it needs to have some changes or innovations to address the
aggressive, aggressive Chinese actions, not just against our
companies but across the world.
They clearly have a strategy through their investments.
They started a major investment bank. You name a part of the
world, the Chinese probably are there, looking to put
investments in. We've seen the situation in Djibouti where
they're also adding military capability to their investment in
a strategic area on the Horn of Africa there, that you wouldn't
necessarily expect this. But they're active in Africa, northern
Africa. They're active across the world.
Their ``One Belt, One Road'' process opens their trade and
what other interests they have to the Indian Ocean in a
different way to address nations that they've had difficulty
connecting with.
So it's clearly an issue that we ought to take a look at.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Director Pompeo. Senator Cornyn, if I might just add one
comment, two quick comments, one on CFIUS. It mostly deals with
change of control transactions, purchases. There are many other
ways one could invest in an entity here in the United States
and exert significant control over that entity. I think that
ought to be looked at.
Then second and apart from CFIUS, there are many vectors.
You mentioned several. Other places are educational
institutions, where there are many folks coming here, some who
are coming here in good faith to learn, but others who are
being sent here with less noble undertakings and missions.
Director Rogers. The only additional comment I was going to
make is, it is clear as we watch China and other nations they
are gaining greater insights as to our CFIUS processes, the
criteria that we use that tend to shape our decision process.
So I think that's also an issue of concern that we're aware of
here.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. I look forward to visiting with
you in the closed session later on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it's fair to say I disagreed with Director Comey
as much as anyone in this room. But the timing of this firing
is wrong to anyone with a semblance of ethics. Director Comey
should be here this morning testifying to the American people
about where the investigation he has been running stands.
At our public hearing in January when he refused to discuss
his investigation into connections between Russia and Trump
associates, I stated my fear that if the information didn't
come out before Inauguration Day it might never come out. With
all the recent talk in recent weeks about whether there is
evidence of collusion, I fear some colleagues have forgotten
that Donald Trump urged the Russians to hack his opponents.
He also said repeatedly that he loved WikiLeaks. So the
question is not whether Donald Trump actively encouraged the
Russians and WikiLeaks to attack our democracy. He did. That is
an established fact. The only question is whether he or someone
associated with him coordinated with the Russians.
Now, Mr. McCabe, the President's letter to Director Comey
asserted that on three separate occasions the Director informed
him that he was not under investigation. Would it have been
wrong for the Director to inform him he was not under
investigation? Yes or no?
Director McCabe. Sir, I'm not going to comment on any
conversations that the Director may have had----
Senator Wyden. I didn't ask that. Would it have been wrong
for the Director to inform him he was not under investigation?
That's not about conversations. That's a yes or no answer.
Director McCabe. As you know, Senator, we typically do not
answer that question. I will not comment on whether or not the
Director and the President of the United States had that
conversation.
Senator Wyden. Will you refrain from these kinds of alleged
updates to the President or anyone else in the White House on
the status of the investigation?
Director McCabe. I will.
Senator Wyden. Thank you.
Director Pompeo, one of the few key unanswered questions is
why the President didn't fire Michael Flynn after Acting
Attorney General Yates warned the White House that he could be
blackmailed by the Russians. Director Pompeo, did you know
about the Acting Attorney General's warnings to the White House
or were you aware of the concerns behind the warning?
Director Pompeo. I don't have any comment on that.
Senator Wyden. Well, were you aware of the concerns behind
the warning? I mean, this is a global threat. This is a global
threat question. This is a global threat hearing. Were you
aware?
Director Pompeo. Senator, tell me what global threat it is
you're concerned with, please? I'm not sure I understand the
question.
Senator Wyden. Well, the possibility of blackmail. I mean,
blackmail by an influential military official, that has real
ramifications for the global threat. So this is not about a
policy implication. This is about the National Security Adviser
being vulnerable to blackmail by the Russians. The American
people deserve to know whether in these extraordinary
circumstances the CIA kept them safe.
Director Pompeo. Yes, sir, the CIA has kept America safe,
and the people at the Central Intelligence Agency are committed
to that and will remain committed to that. And we will do that
in the face of----
Senator Wyden. You won't answer the question.
Director Pompeo. We will do that in the face of political
challenges that come from any direction, Senator.
Senator Wyden. But you will not answer the question of
whether or not you were aware of the concerns behind the Yates
warning?
Director Pompeo. Sir, I don't know exactly what you're
referring to with ``the Yates warning.'' I wasn't part of any
of those conversations.
Senator Wyden. The Yates warning was----
Director Pompeo. Senator, I have no----
Senator Wyden [continuing]. That the White House could be
blackmailed.
Director Pompeo. I have no firsthand information with
respect to the warning that was given. She didn't make that
warning to me. I can't answer that question, Senator, as much
as I would like to.
Senator Wyden. Okay.
Director Coats, how concerned are you that a Russian
government oil company run by a Putin crony could end up owning
a significant percentage of U.S. oil refining capacity, and
what are you advising the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States about this?
Director Coats. I don't have specific information relative
to that. I think that's something that potentially we could
provide intelligence on in terms of what the situation might
be.
Senator Wyden. I'd like you to furnish that in writing.
Let me see if I can get one other question in. There have
been mountains of press stories with allegations about
financial connections between Russia and Trump and his
associates. The matters are directly relevant to the FBI. My
question is, when it comes to illicit Russian money and in
particular its potential to be laundered on its way to the
United States, what should the Committee be most concerned
about?
We hear stories about Deutschebank, Bank of Cyprus, shell
companies in Moldova, the British Virgin Islands. I'd like to
get your sense, because I'm over my time, Director McCabe. What
should we be most concerned about with respect to illicit
Russian money and its potential to be laundered on its way to
the United States?
Director McCabe. Certainly, sir. As you know, I am not in a
position to be able to speak about specific investigations and
certainly not in this setting. However, I will confirm for you
that those are issues that concern us greatly. They have
traditionally and they do even more so today. As it becomes
easier to conceal the origin and the track and the destination
and purpose of illicit money flows, as the exchange of
information becomes more clouded in encryption and more obtuse,
it becomes harder and harder to get to the bottom of those
investigations that would shed light on those issues.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner [presiding]. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, the purpose of this hearing, as the Chairman
expressed, is to give the American people some insight into
what we all do which they don't see pretty much at all. So I
think what I want to do is I want to make an observation and
then I want to get your take on it, anybody who wants to
volunteer, and I'm going to start with you, Director Coats, as
a volunteer.
I've been on this Committee all the time I've been here in
the Senate and all through the last Administration, and I have
been greatly impressed by the current Administration's hitting
the ground running during the first 100 days as far as their
engagement on intelligence matters and their engagement with
foreign countries.
The national media here is focused on domestic issues,
which is of great interest to the American people, be it health
care, be it personnel issues in the government, and they
don't--the media isn't as focused on this Administration's
fast, and in my judgment, robust engagement with the
intelligence communities around the world and with other
governments.
My impression is that it's good and it is aggressive. I'd
like your impression of where we're going. Almost all of you
had real engagement in the last Administration. All
administrations are different. Director Coats, do you want to
take that on to start with?
Director Coats. I'd be happy to start with that. I think
most Presidents that come into office come with an agenda in
mind in terms of what issues they'd like to pursue, many of
them issues that affect--domestic issues that affect
infrastructure, education, a number of things, only to find
that this is a dangerous world, that the United States--the
threats that exist out there need to be given attention to.
This President, who I think the perception was not
interested in that--I think Director Pompeo and I can certify
the fact that we have spent far more hours in the Oval Office
than we anticipated. The President is a voracious consumer of
information and asking questions and asking us to provide
intelligence. We are both part of a process run through the
National Security Council, General McMaster, all through the
deputies committees and the principals committees, consuming
hours and hours and hours of time, looking at the threats, how
do we address those threats, what is the intelligence that
tells us, that informs the policymakers in terms of how they
put a strategy in place.
So what I initially thought would be a one or two time a
week, 10 to 15-minute quick brief has turned into an every day,
sometimes exceeding 45 minutes to an hour or more just in
briefing the President. I have brought along several of our
directors to come and show the President what their agencies do
and how important it is, the information they provide, for the
basis of making policy decisions.
I'd like to turn to my CIA colleague here to let him give
you, and others, to give you their impression.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. We're almost out of time.
But I did--Director Pompeo, you kind of sat in the same spot we
all sit in through the last several years. I'd kind of like
your observations along the line of Director Coats.
Director Pompeo. I think Director Coats had it right. He
and I spend time with the President every day briefing him on
the most urgent intelligence matters that are presented to us
in our roles. He asks good hard questions, makes us go make
sure we're doing our work in the right way.
Second, you asked about engagement in the world. This
Administration has reentered the battle space in places that
the previous administration was completely absent. You all
travel some, too.
Senator Risch. Yes.
Director Pompeo. You will hear that when you go travel. I
have now taken two trips to places and they welcome American
leadership. They're not looking for American soldiers. They're
not looking for American boots on the ground. They're looking
for American leadership around the globe. And this President
has reentered that space in a way that I think will serve
America's interests very well.
Senator Risch. I couldn't agree more. We deal with them not
only overseas, but they come here, as you know, regularly.
Director Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Risch. And the fact that the President has pulled
the trigger twice as he has in the first 100 days, and done it
in a fashion that didn't start a world war, and was watched by
both our friends and our enemies, has made a significant and a
huge difference as far as our standing in the world.
My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Director McCabe, you obviously have
several decades of law enforcement experience. Is it your
experience that people who are innocent of wrongdoing typically
need to be reassured that they're not the subject of an
investigation?
Director McCabe. No, sir.
Senator Heinrich. I ask that because I'm still trying to
make heads or tails of the dismissal letter from earlier this
week from the President, where he writes: ``While I greatly
appreciate you informing me on three separate occasions that I
am not under investigation.'' I'm still trying to figure out
why that would even make it into a dismissal letter.
But let me go to something a little more direct. Director,
has anyone in the White House spoken to you directly about the
Russia investigation?
Director McCabe. No, sir.
Senator Heinrich. When did you last meet with the
President, Director McCabe?
Director McCabe. I don't think I'm going to comment on
that.
Senator Heinrich. Was it earlier this week?
Director McCabe. I have met with the President this week,
but I don't really want to go into the details of that.
Senator Heinrich. But Russia did not come up?
Director McCabe. That's correct, it did not.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
We've heard in the news claims that Director Comey had lost
the confidence of rank and file FBI employees. You've been
there for 21 years. In your opinion, is it accurate that the
rank and file no longer supported Director Comey?
Director McCabe. No, sir, that is not accurate. I can tell
you, sir, that I worked very, very closely with Director Comey
from the moment he started at the FBI. I was his Executive
Assistant Director of National Security at that time; then
worked for him running the Washington Field Office; and of
course I've served as Deputy for the last year.
I can tell you that I hold Director Comey in the absolute
highest regard. I have the highest respect for his considerable
abilities and his integrity, and it has been the greatest
privilege and honor of my professional life to work with him.
I can tell you also that Director Comey enjoyed broad
support within the FBI and still does to this day. We are a
large organization. We are 36,500 people across this country,
across this globe. We have a diversity of opinions about many
things. But I can confidently tell you that the majority, the
vast majority, of FBI employees enjoyed a deep and positive
connection to Director Comey.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you for your candor.
Do you feel like you have the adequate resources for the
existing investigations that the Bureau is invested in right
now to follow them wherever they may lead?
Director McCabe. Sir, if you're referring to the Russia
investigation, I do. I believe we have the adequate resources
to do it and I know that we have resourced that investigation
adequately.
If you're referring to the many constantly multiplying
counterintelligence threats that we face across the spectrum,
they get bigger and more challenging every day and resources
become an issue over time. But in terms of that investigation,
sir, I can assure you we are covered.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Director Coats, welcome back. Would you agree that it is a
national security risk to provide classified information to an
individual who has been compromised by a foreign government, as
a broad matter?
Director Coats. As a broad matter, yes.
Senator Heinrich. If the Attorney General came to you and
said one of your employees was compromised, what sort of action
would you take?
Director Coats. I would take the action as prescribed in
our procedures relative to how we report this and how it is
processed. It's a serious issue. I would be consulting with our
legal counsel and consulting with our inspector general and
others as to how best to proceed with this. But obviously we
would take action.
Senator Heinrich. Would one of the options be dismissal,
obviously?
Director Coats. That very potentially could be a dismissal,
yes.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Director.
Vice Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman or Mr. Vice
Chairman.
Mr. McCabe, is the agent who is in charge of this very
important investigation into Russian attempts to influence our
elections last fall still in charge?
Director McCabe. We have many agents involved in the
investigation at many levels. So I'm not sure who you're
referring to here.
Senator Collins. The lead agent overseeing the
investigation.
Director McCabe. Certainly almost all of the agents
involved in the investigation are still in their positions.
Senator Collins. So has there been any curtailment of the
FBI's activities in this important investigation since Director
Comey was fired?
Director McCabe. Ma'am, we don't curtail our activities. As
you know, are people experiencing questions and are reacting to
the developments this week? Absolutely. Does that get in the
way of our ability to pursue this or any other investigation?
No, ma'am. We continue to focus on our mission and get that job
done.
Senator Collins. I want to follow up on a question of
resources that Senator Heinrich asked your opinion on. Press
reports yesterday indicated that Director Comey requested
additional resources from the Justice Department for the
Bureau's ongoing investigation into Russian active measures.
Are you aware of that request? Can you confirm that that
request was in fact made?
Director McCabe. I cannot confirm that request was made. As
you know, ma'am, when we need resources we make those requests
here. So I'm not aware of that request and it's not consistent
with my understanding of how we request additional resources.
That said, we don't typically request resources for an
individual case. As I mentioned, I strongly believe that the
Russia investigation is adequately resourced.
Senator Collins. You've also been asked a question about
target letters. Now, it's my understanding that when an
individual is the target of an investigation, at some point a
letter is sent out notifying the individual that he is a
target. Is that correct?
Director McCabe. No, ma'am, I don't believe that's correct.
Senator Collins. So before there is going to be an
indictment there is not a target letter sent out by the Justice
Department?
Director McCabe. Not that I'm aware of.
Senator Collins. That's contrary to my understanding. But
let me ask you the reverse----
Director McCabe. Again, I'm looking at it from the
perspective of the investigators. So that's not part of our
normal case investigative practice.
Senator Collins. That would be the Justice Department,
though, the Justice Department.
Director McCabe. Yes, ma'am. I see.
Senator Collins. I'm asking you, isn't it standard practice
when someone is the target of an investigation and is perhaps
on the verge of being indicted that the Justice Department
sends that individual what is known as a target letter?
Director McCabe. Ma'am, I'm going to have to defer that
question to the Department of Justice.
Senator Collins. Well, let me ask you the flip side of
that, and perhaps you don't know the answer to this question.
But is it standard practice for the FBI to inform someone that
they are not a target of an investigation?
Director McCabe. It is not.
Senator Collins. So it would be unusual and not standard
practice for there to have been a notification from the FBI
Director to President Trump or anyone else involved in this
investigation, informing him or her that that individual is not
a target, is that correct?
Director McCabe. Again ma'am, I'm not going to comment on
what Director Comey may or may not have done.
Senator Collins. I'm not asking you to comment on the facts
of the case. I'm just trying to figure out what's standard
practice and what's not.
Director McCabe. Yes ma'am. I'm not aware of that being a
standard practice.
Senator Collins. Admiral Rogers, I want to follow up on
Senator Warner's question to you about the attempted
interference in the French election. Some researchers,
including the cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint, claim that
APT28 is the group that was behind the stealing of and the
leaking of the information about the President-elect of France.
The FBI and DHS have publicly tied APT28 to Russian
intelligence services in the joint analysis report last year
after the group's involvement in stealing data that was leaked
in the run-up to the U.S. elections in November.
Is the IC in a position to attribute the stealing and the
leaking that took place prior to the French election to be the
result of activities by this group, which is linked to Russian
cyber activity?
Admiral Rogers. Again, ma'am, right now I don't think I
have a complete picture of all the activity associated with
France. But as I have said publicly both today and previously,
we are aware of specific Russian activity directed against the
French election cycle in the course particularly of the last
few weeks, to the point where we felt it was important enough
we actually reached out to our French counterparts to inform
them and make sure they had awareness of what we were aware of
and also to ask them, is there something we are missing that
you are seeing?
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Mr. McCabe, thank you for being here today
under somewhat difficult circumstances. We appreciate your
candor in your testimony.
On March 20th, Director Comey--then-Director Comey
testified to the House of Representative: ``I have been
authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the
FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is
investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in
the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating
the nature of any links between individuals associated with the
Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was
any coordination between the campaign and Russian efforts. As
with any counter intelligence investigation, this will also
include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.''
Is that statement still accurate?
Director McCabe. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator King. And how many agents are assigned to this
project? How many--or personnel generally within the FBI,
roughly?
Director McCabe. Sir, I can't really answer those sorts of
questions in this forum.
Senator King. Well, yesterday a White House press spokesman
said that this is one of the smallest things on the plate of
the FBI. Is that an accurate statement?
Director McCabe. It is----
Senator King. Is this a small investigation in relation to
all--to all the other work that you're doing?
Director McCabe. Sir, we consider it to be a highly
significant investigation.
Senator King. So you would not characterize it as one of
the smallest things you're engaged in?
Director McCabe. I would not.
Senator King. Thank you.
Let me change the subject briefly. We're--we've been
talking about Russia and--and their involvement in this
election. One of the issues of concern to me, and perhaps I can
direct this to--well, I'll direct it to anybody in the panel.
The allegation of Russian involvement in our electoral systems,
is that an issue that is of concern and what do we know about
that? And is that being followed up on by this investigation?
Mr. McCabe, is that part of your investigation? Now, I'm--
I'm not talking about the presidential election. I'm talking
about State-level election infrastructure.
Director McCabe. Yes, sir. So obviously not discussing any
specific investigation in detail, the issue of Russian
interference in the U.S. democratic process is one that causes
us great concern. And quite frankly, it's something that we've
spent a lot of time working on over the past several months.
And to reflect comments that were made in response to an
earlier question that Director Coats handled, I think part of
that process is to understand the inclinations of our foreign
adversaries to interfere in those areas.
So we've seen this once; we are better positioned to see it
the next time. We're able to improve not only our coordination
with--primarily through the Department of Homeland--through
DHS, their--their expansive network, and to the State and local
election infrastructure, but to interact with those folks to
put them in a better position to defend against whether it's
cyber attacks or any sort of influence-driven interactions.
Senator King. Thank you. I think that's a very important
part of this issue.
Admiral Rogers, yesterday a camera crew from Tass was
allowed into the Oval Office. There was no any American press
allowed. Was there any consultation with you with regard to
that action in terms of the risk of some kind of cyber
penetration or communications in that incident?
Admiral Rogers. No.
Senator King. Were you--you were--your agency wasn't
consulted in any way?
Admiral Rogers. Not that I'm aware of. I wouldn't expect
that to automatically be the case. But no, not that I'm aware
of.
Senator King. Did it raise any concerns when you saw those
pictures that those cameramen and crew were in the Oval Office
without----
Admiral Rogers. I'll be honest. I wasn't aware of where the
images came from.
Senator King. All right, thank you.
Mr. Coats, Director Coats, you lead the intelligence
community. Were you consulted at all with regard to the firing
of Director Comey?
Director Coats. I was not.
Senator King. So you had no--there were no discussions with
you even though the FBI's an important part of the intelligence
community?
Director Coats. There were no discussions.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Let me just run through some quick questions on this.
Director McCabe, thanks for being here as well. Let me hit some
high points of some of the things that I've heard already, just
to be able to confirm. You have the resources you need for the
Russia investigation, is that correct?
Director McCabe. Sir, we believe it's adequately resourced.
Senator Lankford. Okay, so there's not limitations on
resources? You have what you need? The--the actions about Jim
Comey and his release has not curtailed the investigation from
the FBI? It's still moving forward?
Director McCabe. The investigation will move forward,
absolutely.
Senator Lankford. No agents have been removed that are the
ongoing career folks that are doing the investigation?
Director McCabe. No, sir.
Senator Lankford. Is it your impression at this point that
the FBI is unable to complete the investigation in a fair and
expeditious way because of the removal of Jim Comey?
Director McCabe. It is my opinion and belief that the FBI
will continue to pursue this investigation vigorously and
completely.
Senator Lankford. Do you need somebody to take this away
from you and somebody else to do?
Director McCabe. No sir.
Senator Lankford. Okay. Let me ask you a separate question.
As I go through the report tracking through the worldwide
threats that were put out, that Director Coats put out, there's
a section on it on narcotics and the movement of illegal drugs.
And there's a section on it about tens of thousands of illegal
pharmacies that are online at this point distributing
narcotics. And 18 to 20 of those go online a day still.
Can you help me understand a little more about what the FBI
is doing to be able to interdict, to be able to engage? How
many of those are American? How many of those are
international, and what we can do to be able to stop the
movement of narcotics through our mail system?
Director McCabe. Yes, yes, sir. It's a great question and
one that we spend a great deal of time on. As you know, the
traffic of illegal narcotics is something that we, along with
our partners at the DEA and other law and Federal, State, and
local law enforcement partners have focused on for many years.
We've had great success.
But the issue, the threat continues to change, continues to
develop and confront us in new ways. The profusion of illegal
online pharmacies is certainly one of those ways. And quite
frankly, it's something that we are learning more about,
spending more time on every day.
Senator Lankford. Well, I'm glad that it is highlighted in
the report. With tens of thousands of these pharmacies that are
out there in the distribution systems, it's no longer a drug
dealer on the corner anymore. They just deliver it to your
house now and there's a whole different set of issues that we
aggressively need to address on this.
Director Coats, I have a--I have a question for you. We've
talked often about a cyber doctrine and it's one of the issues
that keeps being raised that other nations and nation-states
and actors need to understand what our boundaries are and how
we're going to do this. This seems to be talked to death and
everyone that I raise it with says yes, it needs to occur.
What I need to know is, who has the ball on leading out to
make sure a year from now we're not talking about we need to
get a cyber doctrine? I guess specifically, when we do this
hearing next year who should we hold accountable if we don't
have a cyber doctrine?
Director Coats. Well, that's a very good question. I think
all of us would agree we need a cyber doctrine because clearly
it is one of the top, if not the number one threat today, that
we're dealing with. As you know, the President tasked an effort
under the direction of former Mayor Giuliani with this. That
has not led to a conclusion at this particular point in time. I
don't have the details on that.
I would agree with you, however, that this is a threat that
our policymakers need to--need to address. I'm hoping that when
we are here next year, we will have a solid response to your
question, but at this particular point in time, frankly, given
the proliferation of issues that we're trying to deal with,
it's almost overwhelming getting our hands on all of them.
Senator Lankford. And it is and that's been there are just
so many things that are flying around, this keeps getting left,
and it has been for years, been left. And what we need to try
to figure out is how do we actually find out who's got the ball
and who do we hold to account to be able to help us work
through this or is this something that we need to be able to
work through?
I noticed as I read through your report, which was
excellent by the way, on all the worldwide threats, every
single section of your report, every section of it, had a
section on Iran, every part of it, that there was a threat. In
fact, in one section of it you wrote ``Iran continues to be the
foremost state sponsor of terrorism.''
Whether it was cyber, whether it is active terrorism,
whether it is involvement in every different nefarious action,
it seems to always circle back to Iran at some point in some
way of facilitating this. So this is one of those areas that
we've got to be able to figure out how to be able to deal with.
Just in a broad question on it, and maybe, General Stewart,
you'd be the right one to be able to deal with this, but anyone
could--could answer this. My concern is that when we're dealing
with Syria the focus seems to be on Russia in Syria or ISIS in
Syria and we're losing track of the movement of Iran through
Iraq into Syria. We're losing track of what's happening in
Yemen and other places.
What is your perception of Iran's goal through the Middle
East? Is their goal higher for Yemen or is it higher going into
Syria and into Iraq and to be able to occupy and stay? And is
the perception that the Russians want to remain there or Iran
wants to remain in Syria and be the dominant force there?
General Stewart. Clearly, Iran views themselves as the
regional--the dominant regional power. They will continue to
use militia forces and asymmetric forces to achieve the aims of
controlling large parts of the region. And if they can't
control them physically, they tend to influence them
politically. Syria becomes a very key strategic point for them.
It allows them to leverage the Syrian forces, Lebanese,
Lebanese Hezbollah, and move capability and forces across the
region. They will be in competition, at some point, with
Russia.
Russia views themselves as the regional power, at least the
dominant regional power today. I'm not sure that Russian and
Iran's influence will remain aligned in the long term. In the
near term they're very closely aligned as it relates to
propping up and securing the Syrian regime.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here. I really appreciate it.
And I know that, Mr. McCabe, you seem to be of great interest
of being here. And we're going to look forward to really
hearing from all of you all in the closed hearing this
afternoon, at which I think that we'll able to get into more
detail. So I appreciate that.
I have just one question for Mr. McCabe. It's basically the
morale of the agency, the FBI agency and the morale basically
starting back from July 5th to July 7th, October 28th, November
6th, and Election Day. Did you all ever think you'd be
embroiled in an election such as this and did--what did it do
to the morale?
Director McCabe. Well, I--I don't know that anyone
envisioned exactly the way these things would develop. You
know, as I said earlier, Senator, we are a large organization.
We are--we have a lot of diversity of opinions and--and
viewpoints on things. We are also a fiercely independent group.
Senator Manchin. I'm just saying that basically before July
5th, before the first testimony that basically Director Comey
got involved in, prior to that, did you see a change in the
morale? Just a yes or no, yes a change, more anxious, more
concern?
Director McCabe. I think morale has always been good.
However, we had--there were folks within our agency who were
frustrated with the outcome of the Hillary Clinton case and
some of those folks were very vocal about those concerns.
Senator Manchin. I'm sure we'll have more questions in the
closed hearing, sir. But let me say to the rest of you all, we
talked about Kaspersky, the lab, KL Lab. Do you all--has it
risen to your level, being the head of all of our intelligence
agencies and people that are mostly concerned about the
security of our country, of having a Russian connection in a
lab as far outreaching as KL Labs?
Has it come with your IT people coming to you or have you
gone directly to them making sure that you have no interaction
with KL or any of the contractors you do business with? Just
down the line there. Mr. Cardillo?
Director Cardillo. Well, we count on the expertise of
Admiral Rogers and the FBI to protect our systems and so I
value----
Senator Manchin. But you have IT--you have IT people,
right?
Director Cardillo. Absolutely.
Senator Manchin. Have you talked to the IT people? Has it
come to your concern that there might be a problem?
Director Cardillo. I'm aware of the Kaspersky Lab challenge
and/or threat.
Senator Manchin. Let me tell you, it's more of a
challenge--more than a challenge, sir. And I would hope that--
I'll go down the line, but I hope that all of you--we are very
much concerned about this, very much concerned about security
of our country and their involvement.
Director Cardillo. We share that.
Senator Manchin. General.
General Stewart. We are tracking Kaspersky and their
software. There is, as well as I know, and I've checked this
recently, no Kaspersky software on our networks.
Senator Manchin. Any contractors?
General Stewart. Now, the contractor piece might be a
little bit harder to define, but at this point we see no
connection to Kaspersky in contractors supporting our IT----
Senator Manchin. Admiral Rogers.
Admiral Rogers. I'm personally aware and involved as the
Director of the National Security Agency of Kaspersky Lab
issue, yes, sir.
Director Coats. It wasn't that long ago I was sitting up
there talking, raising issues about Kaspersky and its position
here. And that continues in this new job.
Director Pompeo. It has risen to the Director of the CIA as
well, Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Great.
Director McCabe. We're very concerned about it, sir, and we
are focused on it closely.
Senator Manchin. The only thing I would ask all of you, if
you can give us a report back if you've swept all of your
contractors to make sure they understand the certainty you
have, concern that you have, about this, and making sure that
they can verify to you all that they're not involved whatsoever
with any Kaspersky hardware.
I'm going to switch to a couple different things because of
national security. But you know, the violent gangs that we have
in the United States, and I know--we don't talk about them
much. And when you talk about you have MS-13, the Crips, you've
got Hells Angels, Aryan Brotherhood, it goes on and on and on,
it's quite a few.
What is are we doing and what is it to your level--has it
been brought to your level the concern we have with these gangs
within our country, really every part of our country? Anybody
on the gangland?
Director McCabe. Yes sir. We spend a lot of time talking
about that at the FBI. It's one of our highest priorities.
Senator Manchin. Do you have the resources to go after each
one of these? Because they're interspersed all over the
country.
Director McCabe. We do, sir. We have been focused on the
gang threat for many years. It, much like the online pharmacy
threat, it continues to change and develop. We think it's
likely having an impact on some of the elevated violent crime
rates we see across the country, so we're spending a lot of
time focused on that.
Senator Manchin. One last question real quick--my time is
running out--is on rare earth elements. I'm understanding ever
since the closure of the California, which is the Mountain Pass
mine, which was the last mine that we had that was giving us a
domestic source of rare earth elements, that's been closed and
now we're 100 percent dependent of foreign, on basically
foreign purchases of rare earth elements for what we need every
day to run this country.
We don't do any of it in this country anymore. And most of
it comes from China. Do any of you have a concern about that?
Director Pompeo. Senator Manchin, I'll speak to that. Yes,
we're concerned. We are--we do a lot of work to figure out
where they are and help the intelligence community--help the
policy community shape policy surrounding how we ought to treat
this issue. But it's a very--it's a very real concern, and it
obviously depends on the element. But we use them for important
technologies that keep us all safe, those very rare earth
elements.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say that I--it's been told to
me that the Department of Defense needs about 800 tons of rare
earth elements per year, and I want to make sure that you know,
West Virginia has the opportunity to provide this country with
the rare earth elements it has because of our mining process
and all of that that we have extracted through the mining
process. We are happy to come to aid, sir.
Director Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Before I turn to Senator Cotton, can I say for members, the
Vice Chair and I have to step out for a meeting that we can't
push off. I would ask Senator Harris, Senator Cotton, to
complete their first round of questions. Any member that seeks
additional questions will be recognized by the Chair. I would
ask you to limit those questions, if you can, but the Chair
will ask--will say we're not going over five minutes for the
second round of questions.
It is my hope that we will give sufficient time to these
six gentlemen to have some nutrition before we reconvene at
1:30 in 219. It's my understanding that there will be a vote
circa 2:00, and we will decide exactly how we handle that. But
the closed hearing, we like to make sure that nobody misses
anything, so we--we might slightly adjust what we are doing.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Chairman, just an inquiry, and I
appreciate your thoughtfulness. So in your departure, as we
work through it, it's still acceptable to begin another five-
minute round for those----
Chairman Burr. Up to five minutes.
Senator Wyden. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Inmates are running the asylum.
[Laughter.]
So, I think everyone here in this room and most Americans
have come to appreciate the aggressiveness with which Russia
uses active measures or covert influence operations,
propaganda, call them whatever you will, as your agencies
assess they did in 2016, and hacking into those e-mails and
releasing them, as news reports suggest they did, in the French
election last week.
That's one reason why I sought to revive the Russian Active
Measures Working Group in the FY17 Intelligence Authorization
Act.
These activities, though, go far beyond elections, I think,
as most of our witnesses know. Former Director of the CIA, Bob
Gates in his memoir ``From the Shadows,'' detailed Soviet
covert influence campaigns designed to slow or thwart the U.S.
development of nuclear delivery systems and warheads, missile
defense systems, and deployment of Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces systems to Europe.
Specifically, on page 260 of his memoir, he writes:
``During the period the Soviets mounted a massive covert action
operation aimed at thwarting INF deployments by NATO. We at CIA
devoted tremendous resources to an effort at the time to
uncovering this Soviet covert campaign. Director Casey
summarized this extraordinary effort in a paper he sent to
Bush, Schultz, Weinberger, and Clark on January 18, 1983. We
later published it and circulated it widely within the
government and to the allies, and finally provided an
unclassified version for the public to use.'' End quote.
I'd like to thank the CIA for digging up this unclassified
version of the document and providing it to the Committee,
``Soviet Strategy to Derail U.S. INF Deployment,'' specifically
undermining NATO's solidarity in those deployments. I ask
unanimous consent that it be included as part of the hearing
transcript and, since the inmates are running the asylum,
hearing no objection, we'll include it in the transcript.
[Laughter.]
[The material referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Cotton. Director Pompeo, earlier this year, Dr. Roy
Godson testified that he believed that Russia was using active
measures and covert influence efforts to undermine our nuclear
modernization efforts, our missile defense deployments, and the
INF Treaty in keeping with these past practices.
To the best of your ability in this setting, would you
agree with the assessment that Russia is likely using such
active measures to undermine U.S. nuclear modernization efforts
and missile defenses?
Director Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
As I mentioned earlier, the FY17 Intelligence Authorization
Act included two unclassified provisions that I authored. One
would be re-starting that old Active Measures Working Group. A
second would require additional scrutiny of Russian embassy
officials who travel more than the prescribed distance from
their duty station, whether it's their embassy or a consulate
around the United States.
In late 2016, when that bill was on the verge of passing, I
personally received calls from high-ranking Obama
administration officials asking me to withdraw them from the
bill. I declined. The bill did not pass. It passed last week as
part of the FY17 spending bill.
I did not receive any objection from Trump administration
officials, to include from our intelligence community. Director
Coats, are you aware of any objection that the Trump
administration had to my two provisions?
Director Coats. No, I'm not aware of any objection.
Senator Cotton. Director Pompeo.
Director Pompeo. None.
Senator Cotton. Do you know why the Obama administration
objected to those two provisions in late 2016, I would add,
after the 2016 presidential election?
Director Coats. Well, it would be pure speculation. I
don't--I couldn't read--I wasn't able to read the President's
mind then and I don't think I can read it now.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I'd like to turn my attention to a very important provision
of law I know that you've discussed earlier, Section 702.
Director Rogers, it's my understanding that your agency is
undertaking an effort to try to release some kind of
unclassified estimate of the number of U.S. persons who might
have been incidentally collected using 702 techniques. Is that
correct?
Admiral Rogers. Sir, we're looking to see if we can
quantify something that's of value to people outside the
organization.
Senator Cotton. Would that require you going in and
conducting searches of incidental collection that have been
previously unexamined?
Admiral Rogers. That's part of the challenge, how do I
generate insight that doesn't in the process of generating the
insight violate the actual tenets that----
Senator Cotton. So you're trying to produce an estimate
that is designed to protect privacy rights, but to produce that
estimate you're going to have to violate privacy rights?
Admiral Rogers. That is a potential part of all of this.
Senator Cotton. It seems hard to do.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. That's why it has taken us a
period of time and that's why we're in the midst of a dialogue.
Senator Cotton. Is it going to be possible to produce that
kind of estimate without some degree of inaccuracy or
misleading information or infringing upon the privacy rights of
Americans?
Admiral Rogers. Probably not.
Senator Cotton. If anyone in your agency or, for that
matter, Director McCabe, in yours, believes that there is
misconduct or privacy rights are not being protected, they
could, I believe under current law, come to your inspector
general, come to your general counsel. I assume you have open
door policies?
Admiral Rogers. Whistleblower protections in addition, yes,
sir, and they can come to you.
Senator Cotton. And they can come to this Committee.
Admiral Rogers. They can come to the Committee.
Senator Cotton. So four--at least four different avenues--
I'm probably missing some--if they believe there are any abuses
in the Section 702 program.
Director McCabe. And anyone in their chain of command.
Senator Cotton. I would ask that we proceed with caution
before producing a report that might infringe on Americans'
privacy rights needlessly and that might make it even that much
harder to reauthorize a critical program, something that,
Director McCabe, your predecessor last week just characterized,
if I can paraphrase, as a must-have program, not a nice-to-have
program.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Harris.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
Acting Director McCabe, welcome. I know you've been in this
position for only about 48 hours and I appreciate your candor
with this Committee during the course of this open hearing.
Director McCabe. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Harris. Until this point what was your role in the
FBI's investigation into the Russian hacking of the 2016
election?
Director McCabe. I've been the Deputy Director since
February of 2016. So I've had an oversight role over all of our
FBI operational activity, to include that investigation.
Senator Harris. And now that you're Acting Director, what
will your role be in the investigation?
Director McCabe. Very similar, senior oversight role to
understand what our folks are doing and make sure they have the
resources they need and are getting the direction and the
guidance they need to go forward.
Senator Harris. Do you support the idea of a special
prosecutor taking over the investigation in terms of oversight
of the investigation, in addition to your role?
Director McCabe. Ma'am, that is a question for the
Department of Justice and it wouldn't be proper for me to
comment on that.
Senator Harris. From your understanding, who at the
Department of Justice is in charge of the investigation?
Director McCabe. The Deputy Attorney General, who serves as
Acting Attorney General for that investigation. He is in
charge.
Senator Harris. And have you had conversations with him
about the investigation since you've been in this role?
Director McCabe. I have. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Harris. And when Director Comey was fired, my
understanding is he was not present in his office. He was
actually in California. So my question is: Who was in charge of
securing his files and devices when that--when that information
came down that he had been fired?
Director McCabe. That's our responsibility, ma'am.
Senator Harris. And are you confident that his files and
his devices have been secured in a way that we can maintain
whatever information or evidence he has in connection with the
investigation?
Director McCabe. Yes, ma'am, I am.
Senator Harris. It's been widely reported, and you've
mentioned this, that Director Comey asked Rosenstein for
additional resources. And I understand that you're saying that
you don't believe that you need any additional resources?
Director McCabe. For the Russia investigation, ma'am, I
think we are adequately resourced.
Senator Harris. And will you commit to this committee that
if you do need resources, that you will come to us,
understanding that we would make every effort to get you what
you need?
Director McCabe. I absolutely will.
Senator Harris. Has--I understand that you've said that the
White House--that you have not talked with the White House
about the Russia investigation. Is that correct?
Director McCabe. That's correct.
Senator Harris. Have you talked with Jeff Sessions about
the investigation?
Director McCabe. No, ma'am.
Senator Harris. Have you talked with anyone other than Rod
Rosenstein at the Department of Justice about the
investigation?
Director McCabe. I don't believe I have, not recently;
obviously, not in that--not in this position.
Senator Harris. Not in the last 48 hours?
Director McCabe. No, ma'am.
Senator Harris. Okay. What protections have been put in
place to assure that the good men and women of the FBI
understand that they will not be fired if they aggressively
pursue this investigation?
Director McCabe. Yes, ma'am. So we have very active lines
of communication with the team that's--that's working on this
issue. They have some exemplary and incredibly effective
leaders that they work directly for. And I am confident that
those--that they understand and are confident in their position
moving forward on this investigation, as my investigators and
analysts and professional staff are in everything we do every
day.
Senator Harris. And I agree with you. I have no question
about the commitment that the men and women of the FBI have to
pursue their mission. But will you commit to me that you will
directly communicate in some way--now that these occurrences
have happened and Director Comey has been fired, will you
commit to me that, given this changed circumstance, that you
will find a way to directly communicate with those men and
women to assure them that they will not be fired simply for
aggressively pursuing this investigation?
Director McCabe. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
And how do you believe we need to handle, to the extent
that it exists, any crisis of confidence in the leadership of
the FBI, given the firing of Director Comey?
Director McCabe. I don't believe there is a crisis of
confidence in the leadership of the FBI. I suppose that's
somewhat self-serving, and I apologize for that.
[Laughter.]
You know, it was completely within the President's
authority to take the steps that he did. We all understand
that. We expect that he and the Justice Department will work to
find a suitable replacement and a permanent director, and we
look forward to supporting whoever that person is, whether they
begin as an interim director or a permanently selected
director. This organization in its entirety will be completely
committed to helping that person get off to a great start and
do what they need to do.
Senator Harris. And do you believe that there will be any
pause in the investigation during this interim period, where we
have a number of people who are in acting positions of
authority?
Director McCabe. No, ma'am. That is my job right now, to
ensure that the men and women who work for the FBI stay focused
on the threats, stay focused on the issues that are of so much
importance to this country, continue to protect the American
people, and uphold the Constitution. And I will ensure that
that happens.
Senator Harris. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Director McCabe. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Burr. Thank you.
Senator King. Second round, five minutes each.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to the question I asked you, Director
Pompeo. And I went out and reviewed the response that you gave
to me. And of course, what I'm concerned about is the Sally
Yates warning to the White House that Michael Flynn could be
blackmailed by the Russians.
And you said you didn't have any first-hand indication of
it. Did you have any indication--second-hand, any sense at all
that the national security adviser might be vulnerable to
blackmail by the Russians? That is a yes or no question.
Director Pompeo. It's actually not a yes or no question,
Senator. I can't answer yes or no. I regret that I'm unable to
do so. You have to remember this is a counterintelligence
investigation that was largely being conducted by the FBI and
not by the CIA. We're a foreign intelligence organization.
And I'll add only this. I was not intending to be clever by
using the term ``first-hand.'' I had no second-hand or third-
hand knowledge of that conversation either.
Senator Wyden. So with respect to the CIA, were there any
discussions with General Flynn at all?
Director Pompeo. With respect to what, sir? He was for a
period of time the National Security Adviser.
Senator Wyden. Topics that could have put at risk the
security and the well-being of the American people. I mean, I'm
just finding it very hard to swallow that you all had no
discussions with the National Security Adviser.
Director Pompeo. I spoke with the National Security
Adviser. He was the National Security Advisor. He was present
for the daily brief on many occasions and we talked about all
the topics we spoke to the President about.
Senator Wyden. But nothing relating to matters that could
have compromised the security of the United States?
Director Pompeo. Sir I can't recall every conversation that
I had with General Flynn during that time period.
Senator Wyden. We're going to ask more about it in closed
session this afternoon.
Admiral Rogers, let me ask you about a technical question
that I think is particularly troubling and that is the SS7
question and the technology threat. Last week the Department of
Homeland Security published a lengthy study about the impact on
the U.S. government of mobile phone security flaws. The report
confirmed what I have been warning about for quite some time,
which is the significance of cyber security vulnerabilities
associated with a Signaling System 7.
The report says that the Department believes, and I quote,
``that all U.S. carriers are vulnerable to these exploits,
resulting in risks to national security, the economy, and the
Federal Government's ability to reliably execute national
security functions. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by
criminals, terrorists, and nation-state actors and foreign
intelligence organizations.''
Do you all share the concerns of the Department of Human--
the Homeland Security Department about the severity of these
vulnerabilities and what ought to be done right now to get the
government and the private sector to be working together more
clearly and in a coherent plan to deal with these monumental
risks. These are risks that we are going to face with
terrorists and hackers and threats. And I think the Federal
Communications Commission has been treading water on this and
I'd like to see what you want to do to really take charge of
this and deal with what is an enormous vulnerability to the
security of this country?
Admiral Rogers. Sure. I hear the concern. It's a widely
deployed technology in the mobile segment. I share the concern.
The Department of Homeland Security in their role kind of is
the lead Federal agency associated with cyber and support from
the Federal Government to the private sector, has overall
responsibility here.
We are trying to provide at the National Security Agency
our expertise to help generate insights about the nature of the
vulnerability, the nature of the problem, partnering with DHS,
talking to the private sector. There's a couple specific things
from a technology standpoint that we're looking at in multiple
forms that the government has created partnering with the
private sector.
I'm not smart, I apologize, about all of the specifics of
the DHS effort. I can take that for the record if you'd like.
Senator Wyden. All right. I just want to respond before we
break to Senator Cotton's comments with respect to Section 702.
Mr. Director, glad to see my tax reform partner back in this
role. You know, Mr. Director, that I think it's critical the
American people know how many innocent law-abiding Americans
are being swept up in the program.
The argument that producing an estimate of the number is in
itself a violation of privacy is I think a far-fetched
argument. It has been made for years. I and others who believe
that we can have security and liberty, that they're not
mutually exclusive, have always believed that this argument
that you're going to be invading people's privacy doesn't add
up.
We have to have that number. Are we going to get it? Are we
going to get it in time so we can have a debate that shows that
those of us who understand there are threats coming from
overseas, and we support the effort to deal with those threats
as part of 702, that we are not going to have Americans'
privacy rights indiscriminately swept up.
We need that number. When will we get it?
Director Coats. Senator, as you recall, during my
confirmation hearing we had this discussion. I promised to you
that I would, if confirmed--and I was--go out to NSA, meet with
Admiral Rogers, try to understand, better understand, why it
was so difficult to come to a specific number. I did go out to
NSA. I was hosted by Admiral Rogers. We spent significant time
talking about that.
And I learned of the complexity of reaching that number. I
think the statements that had been made by Senator Cotton are
very relevant statements as to that. Clearly, what I have
learned is that a breach of privacy has to be made--against
American people, have to be made in order to determine whether
or not they breached privacy. So, there is a anomaly there.
There are issues of duplication.
I know that a--we're underway in terms of setting up a time
with this Committee, I believe in June, as early as June, to
address, get into that issue and to address that and talk
through the complexity of why it's so difficult to say. This is
specifically when we can get you the number and what the number
is.
So we are committed to a special meeting with the Committee
to try to go through this, this particular issue. But I cannot
give you a date because--and number, because I understand the
complexity of it now and why it's so difficult for Admiral
Rogers to say this specific number is the number.
Senator Wyden. I'm well over my time. The point really is
privacy advocates and technologists say that it's possible to
get the number. If they say it and the government is not saying
it, something is really out of sync. You've got people who want
to work with you. We must get on with this and to have a real
debate about 702 that ensures that security and liberty are not
mutually exclusive, we have to have that number.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King, I understand you have a question.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator.
If this hearing had been held two weeks ago, we'd be
spending the last two hours talking about North Korea. And I
think we ought to pay some attention to that. Director Pompeo
and Director Cardillo, could you give us an update on the North
Korea situation, the nature of the threat, whether some of the
pressure that we were feeling two and three and four weeks ago
has relieved? Is there anything going on that should either
concern or make us feel better about that situation?
Director Pompeo.
Director Pompeo. Senator, I don't see anything that should
make any us feel any better about this threat. We have a threat
from flashpoints that something could spark and have a
conventional war, right, wholly apart from the issues we talk
about with ICBMs and nuclear, just a well-armed adversary that
our Department of Defense works hard to make sure and mitigate
against. Those risks remain.
The leader continues to develop, test, attempt to verify,
not only in the launches that we see, many of which have
failed, but learned from each one, but continue to develop
software that improves day by day. This threat is very real.
We should not all focus simply on the ICBMs either.
American interests are held at risk today by shorter-range
missiles in theater, enormous American assets.
Senator King. Seoul is held at risk by artillery.
Director Pompeo. Seoul is held at risk. We have enormous
American interests in and around the region in Seoul.
So, no, I wouldn't say that, in spite of the fact that it
has fallen out of the headlines for the moment, that there's
any decreased risk associated with the threat from Kim Jung Un.
Senator King. There was some discussion after--again, about
two weeks ago, of entering into some kind of discussions with
the North Koreans. Has anything--can you report anything on
that front?
Director Pompeo. Sir, there are none that I'm aware of
related to trying to talk Kim Jung Un away from his nuclear
missile program. We have taken actions at the Agency. I've
stood up a Korean Mission Center to draw the best minds, the
most innovative, creative people from across our Agency, and
I'm sure we'll have others join in from across the intelligence
community, to try and focus this effort so that we can get back
on our front foot with respect to foreign intelligence
collection against the North Koreans and the capacity to impact
what Kim Jung Un is actually doing.
Senator King. On that latter point, would you agree that
the path to influence is through China?
Director Pompeo. I think it's among our most productive
paths and one that I know the President's committed to working,
as is Secretary Tillerson.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
Admiral Rogers----
Director Cardillo. Senator King----
Senator King. Yes, please.
Director Cardillo. May I just chime in? I was in front of
you in closed session a couple of weeks ago giving you great
detail about the threat you've just highlighted. What you'll
hear this afternoon is just the continuation of what I was
briefing a couple of weeks ago.
So I would agree with the Director that this is--this
threat has not only been sustained, it's continued to grow.
Senator King. Because it's fallen out of the headlines
doesn't mean it's not----
Director Cardillo. That's correct. It's still our highest
priority.
Senator King. Thank you.
Director Coats. It is the highest priority, one of the
highest, if not the highest, priority of the intelligence
community at this time. A great deal of effort is being spent
relative to how we can even better assess the situation and
provide all the relevant intelligence to our policymakers.
Senator King. Thank you.
Two final questions. Admiral Rogers, the reason I was late
this morning, we had a very informative hearing in Armed
Services on cyber with Jim Clapper and Admiral Stavridis and
General Hayden. The upshot of that hearing was that we still
don't have a doctrine. We still don't have a policy. We still
don't really fully understand--you would concur, I assume, that
cyber's one of the most serious threats we face?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator King. And do we need to have a policy and a
deterrent policy and something further than what we have now,
which is kind of an ad hoc response to events?
Admiral Rogers. Right, it tends to be a case-by-case basis.
Yes, sir, I agree. And we spoke about that when I testified
before the SASC last week, as a matter of fact.
Senator King. And Senator McCain said what's the
impediment? Why can't we get there? Is it the structure of our
government? We've got too many people thinking about this? What
is it going to take to get us to the point of having a doctrine
that will guide us in this incredibly important era?
We are seeing the notion of warfare change before our eyes.
Admiral Rogers. Sir, I don't have any easy answer for you.
My role in life, not speaking now as the Director of NSA, but
as the commander of the United States Cyber Commander, is to be
operational commander. So I don't develop policy. I play a role
on the doctrine side, trying to provide an operational
perspective.
Senator King. Well, I hope from your position, though, you
would be----
Admiral Rogers. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator King [continuing]. Telling the Administration and
everyone you can think of, because----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator King [continuing]. I do not want to go home to
Maine and say, well, we talked a lot about this but we didn't
do anything, and when the electric system went down, you know,
we might've been able to prevent it.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Director Pompeo, a final question. Do you
think that Russian activity in the 2016 election was a one-off?
Director Pompeo. No, sir.
Senator King. This is a continuing threat, is it not?
Director Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator King. And things that they learned in this election
they're going to apply in--in 2018, 2020, and beyond?
Director Pompeo. Yes, sir. And I hope we learn from it as
well and we'll be able to more effectively defeat it.
Senator King. And I believe that's why the work of this
Committee and others is so important, because we've got to
understand what they did, how they did it so that we can deal
with it in the future. Would you agree?
Director Pompeo. Yes, Senator, I would.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
Director Coats. Senator King, if I could just add to that.
I think making this as transparent as possible, not only to our
own public, but throughout democratic nations that are facing
this threat. The more we inform our people of what the Russians
are trying to do and how they're trying to impact our thinking
and our decisions relative to how we want to be governed and
what kind of democratic institutions that we want to preserve,
the better.
So, my hope is the Russians have overstepped here to the
point where people will say we absolutely have to do something
about it and we have to put deterrent efforts in place as well
as potentially offensive efforts.
Senator King. Well, I think your point about open hearings
and education is incredibly important. You and I were in the
Ukraine and Poland just about a year ago and what they told us
over there was that the best defense--they can't shut down
their TV networks, they can't turn off the internet. The best
defense is if the public knows what's happening and they say,
oh, it's just the Russians again. And we have to reach that
level of knowledge in this country. So I completely agree and
hope that as much of our work as possible can be done in open
hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator King.
Gentlemen, thank you so much. Thank you all for your
service. Thank you to all the men and women of all 17 agencies
for the incredible service they provide to the people of the
United States, keeping them safe, doing things that most people
in America will never know nor be able to fully appreciate.
Mr. McCabe, a special thank you for stepping up to the
battlefield promotion and representing your agency quite well
here.
This part of the hearing will be adjourned. And gentlemen,
you have about an hour and six minutes and we'll see at the
other room. Thank you. Meeting's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]