Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, February 25, 2014 - 2:30pm
Location:
Dirksen 562
Nomination of John P. Carlin to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice, and Nomination of Francis X. Taylor to be the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 113-601]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-601
OPEN HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS
OF JOHN P. CARLIN AND FRANCIS X. TAYLOR
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS KING, Maine
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
FEBRUARY 25, 2014
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 2
WITNESSES
General Francis X. Taylor, Nominee, Undersecretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security..... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
John P. Carlin, Nominee, Assistant Attorney General for National
Security, Department of Justice................................ 11
Prepared Statement........................................... 13
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees--Taylor.... 32
Additional Prehearing Questions--Taylor.......................... 64
Letter dated February 21, 2014, from International Association of
Chiefs of Police supporting General Taylor's Nomination........ 87
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees--Carlin.... 88
Additional Prehearing Questions--Carlin.......................... 108
OPEN HEARING TO CONSIDER THE
NOMINATIONS OF JOHN P. CARLIN
AND FRANCIS X. TAYLOR
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room SD-526, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable
Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Wyden, Udall (of Colorado), Heinrich, King, Collins, and
Coburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. We meet today to consider two
intelligence positions, President's nominations for those
positions. One is Mr. John Carlin, a very young-looking nominee
to be assistant attorney general for national security in the
Department of Justice; and the other is the slightly more
mature General Frank Taylor, the nominee to be undersecretary
of homeland security for intelligence and analysis.
We have votes scheduled for 3:30, so my hope is we can be
succinct to the point and be able to conclude this hearing
within that time. But I'd like to begin by saying welcome to
you both, and particularly to your family and friends who are
here with you today.
The two positions for which these nominees have been
nominated were both created as a part of reform efforts in the
past decade after major intelligence failures, including most
specifically the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The
assistant attorney general for national security in the
National Security Division of the Department of Justice that
Mr. Carlin would lead, if confirmed, is intended to bring
together the counterterrorism, intelligence, and
counterintelligence efforts within the Department of Justice.
The National Security Division conducts oversight of FBI
national security investigations and has the lead within DOJ
for reviewing and approving requests to the FISA Court for
surveillance activities. Increasingly important, the assistant
attorney general must also ensure that when terrorists,
proliferators, and spies against America come into our custody,
our response strikes the proper balance between gathering
intelligence from them and being able to prosecute them.
Mr. Carlin is well-suited to the position, having served as
the acting assistant attorney general since his predecessor,
Lisa Monaco, went to the White House last year to become
President Obama's top adviser for counterterrorism and homeland
security.
Mr. Carlin was previously the principal deputy assistant
attorney and chief of staff for the National Security Division
in 2011. He served in leadership positions at the FBI,
including chief of staff to FBI Director Bob Mueller. He served
in a variety of positions in the department between 1999 and
2007.
Our other distinguished nominee, General Frank Taylor, has
a long career in national security, starting with his 31-year
career in the United States Air Force, most of which was spent
in the counterintelligence field. In 2001, he was named the
coordinator for counterterrorism, the senior-most
counterterrorism position in the State Department, and then
assistant secretary of state in charge of diplomatic security.
He spent the past nine years in the private sector, during
most of which time he was the chief security officer for
General Electric. In that position, he has seen the
government's national and homeland security functions from the
outside, giving him an important perspective on the Department
of Homeland Security's support to nonfederal positions,
partners, and stakeholders--specifically, the private sector.
General Taylor will have to put his leadership skills and
experience to good use as undersecretary of DHS for
intelligence and analysis. The office, like the department as a
whole, has a large number of missions to accomplish, with a
long history and precedent to rely on.
I'm going to cut my remarks short and put the remainder in
the record and recognize the distinguished vice chairman for
his remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Well, thanks Madam Chair, and to
Mr. Carlin and General Taylor, I join the chair in welcoming
you to this Committee and congratulating you on your nomination
by the President.
Mr. Carlin, since Congress created the National Security
Division as part of the post-9/11 effort to tear down the walls
between the criminal and national security worlds, NSD has
taken on a key role in our nation's intelligence collection
activities. In the wake of the Snowden leaks, I understand the
administration may be making some changes, especially to
section 702 of FISA that will negatively impact how our
intelligence agencies collect and retain information.
When Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act, we were
careful to not put up walls or prohibit lawfully collected
information from being used. I hope you'll be a strong voice
against any policies that try to undo the intent behind the FAA
and that make it harder for our intelligence agencies to do
their jobs.
When you and I met in my office, we had a good discussion
about this administration's ongoing failure to come up with an
interrogation and detention policy that would allow for the
collection of real-time, actionable intelligence, without
defense attorneys, Miranda rights, or judicial deadlines.
As a prosecutor, you understand there is no requirement to
give a terror suspect Miranda rights. It just means you can't
use his statements at trial. Captured terrorists can be gold
mines for information that we should need, and therefore we
should not treat them like ordinary criminals.
Unless we can get good intelligence from these detainees,
we could fall behind the curve in preventing future attacks.
That's the risk that should not be acceptable to anyone,
regardless of any campaign promise.
NSD is also at the forefront of terrorism and
counterintelligence investigations throughout the country.
While the criminal justice system clearly plays an important
role in national security thesis, I believe we should do more
to make our military commission system a success. Now is not
the time to bring dangerous criminals, dangerous terrorists,
into the United States and give them the benefits of our
criminal justice system. There is simply too much uncertainty
following an acquittal, as we recently saw with the
unsuccessful prosecution of the Somali pirate in federal court,
here in the district.
General Taylor, we thank you for returning to government to
take on this new assignment: one that promises to be as
difficult as any in your career, as you and I discussed a
little earlier. Census creation, nearly a decade ago, DHS I&A,
has struggled to find an organizational identity to fit in with
the Intelligence Community and to attain the level of
professional competence that the American people are entitled
to expect in their government.
For some time now, Members of Congress, on both the House
and the Senate, and on both sides of the aisle, have questioned
the very existence of I&A and the work that it does. Their
questions about the quality and necessity of much of INA's
analysis, concerns about INA's ability to process and share
information, questions about the size of the workforce in
relationship to its level of production, and concerns about the
potential for DHS to safeguard cyber and critical
infrastructure. All of these questions come at a time when I&A
is still clinging to a corporate notion that it is a new
organization.
My comments are not intended to disparage the professional
men and women who work for DHS. There are an awful lot of very
capable, very professional individuals involved there, many of
whom have begun to ask these same questions. Rather, my concern
lies with the inability of I&A as a whole to routinely
demonstrate a unique contribution to the national security of
the United States.
General, if confirmed, you may be the last, best hope for
the future of DHS I&A. It's unlikely you will be able to keep
I&A aloft by maintaining the current course in hitting, so I
would like your candid thoughts about what you plan to do over
the next 12 months to fix I&A for the long term.
I have great confidence in Secretary Johnson. Secretary
Johnson has great confidence in you. Therefore, I transfer that
confidence, myself, to you. I look forward to our discussion
today, and working with both of you in the future, and I thank
you Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Gentlemen, would you stand and I'll administer the oath?
[Witnesses comply.]
Chairman Feinstein. Please affirm when I finish reading.
Do you solemnly swear that you will give this Committee the
truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
[Witnesses respond affirmatively.]
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, you may be seated.
And just a couple of questions--this is pro forma. Please
answer yes or no.
Do you both agree to appear before the Committee here or in
other venues when invited?
[Witnesses respond affirmatively.]
Chairman Feinstein. Do you both agree to send officials
from your respective offices to appear before the Committee and
designated staff when requested?
[Witnesses respond affirmatively.]
Chairman Feinstein. Do you both agree to provide documents
or any other materials requested by the Committee in order for
it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
[Witnesses respond affirmatively.]
Chairman Feinstein. Will you both ensure that your
respected offices and its staff provide such material to the
Committee when requested?
[Witnesses respond affirmatively.]
Chairman Feinstein. Do you both agree to inform and fully
brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of this
Committee, of intelligence activities and covert actions,
rather than only the chairman and vice chairman?
[Witnesses respond affirmatively.]
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. And if you would
proceed and make your statements, and introduce your family or
whomever you'd like to introduce in general, I'll go to
seniority and ask you to speak first.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, NOMINEE FOR
UNDERSECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
ANALYSIS
General Taylor. I'm honored and extraordinarily humbled to
appear before you today as the President's nominee for the
undersecretary for intelligence analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security. With me today is my elder son Jacquis,
sitting behind me, representing our family. My wife is now in
London visiting our daughter, who is studying to be a
solicitor, and could not join us--she had already had this trip
planned. So she's with us in spirit. I talked to her this
morning.
During my last period of government service, I was
privileged to have the opportunity to work with Governor Ridge
and his team as they endeavored to establish this new
department in 2003. The department has come a long way since
those early days, especially I&A, as its mission and
responsibilities have continued to evolve.
This position, and the team that I would be privileged to
lead if confirmed, is a crucial link between the federal
government and the Intelligence Community, with our state,
local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as the private
sector that are on the front lines every day to protect our
country and our citizens from an ever-evolving threat.
As we learned in the aftermath of 9/11, security of this
nation requires effective collaboration at every level of our
country. Sharing information, both from the federal government
as well as from our local partners to the federal government
provides clear understanding of the nature of the threats that
we face, and allow all levels to be on the same sheet of music.
I remain haunted by the fact that at least one of the 9/11
hijackers were engaged by local law enforcement before the
attack, and their potential action against that person could
not be accomplished.
That is why we strive to create--that I will strive to
create, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen and improve the
process of how this partnership works to identify and act on
potential threats to our country and our citizens. If
confirmed, I believe my 43 years of law enforcement, security
intelligence, and crisis management experience provides the
right skills to build on the significant work of my talented
and dedicated predecessors.
I've had the distinct honor to serve our country as a
leader of two global investigative and security organizations,
as a U.S. ambassador directing diplomatic counterterrorism
efforts, and diplomatic security operations. I also had the
privilege of serving as the chief security officer for a
Fortune 10 global U.S. conglomerate, the General Electric
Company. In each of these roles, I have been responsible for
mission execution and mission success, and I believe my record
indicates consistent successful results in these very different
roles. I've had both line and staff roles, worked in policy,
developed, and executed budgets at every level, and led
operational activity to mitigate risk to our country both in
the U.S. and abroad and, as well, to an American economic
giant.
I understand that the I&A mission is different from any of
the--of my past responsibilities, and that I will have to
endeavor to learn the organization, its customer requirements,
its successes, and its opportunities for improvement. The good
news is that my initial assessment after a week of briefings is
very positive about where the organization is in its
development, and that there will be a firm foundation upon
which for me to build.
I think there are three areas where we must focus. First,
enabling the fusion centers to reach their potential with
effective information sharing and from this--to and from this
important institution. Sustaining DHS's contribution to the
Intelligence Community with information analysis derived from
state, local, and tribal partners, and from a unique D.H.
information sources. And finally, to aggressively eliminate
duplicative analysis that can more effectively be done by other
federal organizations.
In my view, what makes I&A unique in the Intelligence
Community is its mission to link the U.S. Intelligence
Community with first responders in our country. State and
locally owned and operated fusion centers are critical to
bringing the 18,000 police entities across our great country
into the national counterterrorism fight. Caryn Wagner, as well
as the current I&A leadership team, began that process with the
aggressive deployment of I&A personnel to the fusion centers
and the development of a program of analysis that will guide
the future production of our analytical products.
If confirmed, I will work relentlessly on executing these
plans to ensure all understand the critical aspect of the I&A
mission is the nature and effectiveness of how we support our
state, local, tribal, and public sector partners. Finally, I am
acutely aware that no organization can live on its reputation
or hide behind its mission statement. Organizations must
continue to evolve and improve to meet changing environment
that they must operate in. Mission assessment, the development
of clear objectives, and rigorous metrics will help I&A stay
focused on the present and the future. In my initial briefings,
again, I am impressed by what I have seen as a baseline to set
expectations and measure effectiveness.
If confirmed, I plan to sustain these efforts and use these
results as a basis for adjustments to the organization and
mission execution. Madam Chairman, I'd like to submit the rest
of my statement for the record and would conclude with those
thoughts.
[The prepared statement of General Taylor follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Feinstein. Excellent. Thank you, General Taylor.
Mr. Carlin.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. CARLIN, NOMINEE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman
Chambliss, and distinguished Members of this Committee. It's an
honor to appear before you today, and I thank you for
considering my nomination. I'd like to thank the President for
his confidence in nominating me, and the Attorney General for
his support.
Chairman Feinstein. Could you please introduce your family
to us, because, there's one little girl that's through (ph)
with expectation.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carlin. She is. Thank you. I'd like to introduce them,
and thank them for their love and support over the years--a few
years, in one case: My wife Sarah and our daughter Sylvie; my
parents, Roy and Patricia, who traveled here from New York
City; and my mother in-law, Jura Newman.
I also want to thank my wife for her countless sacrifices
to allow me to pursue a career in public service; and to thank
my parents who always taught my sister and me, both by lesson
and by example, the importance of dedication, discipline and
always doing what's right.
With the support of all of my family and their
selflessness, I've been able to choose the path that's led me
here today. And I'd like to thank the people from the National
Security Division in the department who've come here, along
with friends, to show their support today.
It's been a true privilege to spend my entire legal career
with the Department of Justice and to witness a time of
enormous transformation after the terrible events of September
11th. As with so many Americans, I and my family recall vividly
the events of that day--the horror of senseless murder and the
dark cloud of ash that hovered over New York City.
My brother-in-law was across the street from the twin
towers and my father was in the subway underneath. And I
remember as our family called each other to determine that we
were safe. We were lucky.
Our core mission at the National Security Division is
clear: to prevent future terrorist attacks, while preserving
our civil liberties. And it's a special honor and privilege to
be considered for a position charged with leading the division
that Congress, and this Committee in particular, created to
unite all the Department of Justice's national security
elements to bring all tools to bear in the fight against
terrorism and other threats to national security.
Serving as the acting assistant attorney general for
national security for approximately the last 11 months, I've
been both humbled and driven by the responsibilities and
mission entrusted to this position. For more than a decade,
I've learned from and worked alongside some legendary public
servants as the United States undertook fundamental changes in
our approach to combating the threat of terrorism and other
emerging national security challenges.
In particular, working with FBI Director Bob Mueller as a
special counsel, and later as his chief of staff, to help the
bureau evolve from a law enforcement agency into a threat-based
intelligence-driven national security organization. Here at
NSD, we must apply and are applying those lessons, both to meet
the growing national security cyber-threat and to continue to
evolve to meet other changing national security threats.
If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I look forward
both to continuing this important evolution and to working with
this Committee in its essential oversight role.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and for your consideration, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carlin follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you both very much.
We will proceed in our usual order, which is early bird
regardless of party.
Mr. Carlin, in your answers to the Committee's pre-hearing
questions, you wrote the DOJ's National Security Division,
quote, ``oversees all electronic surveillance and other
activities conducted under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.'' So I know you have direct experience with
DOJ oversight provided to FISA activities. Based on that
experience, I'd like you to run through and explain, so the
public understands, the various layers of oversight that the
programs authorized by FISA, such as sections 215 and 702 data
collection programs are subject to.
Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And there are different layers. I'll try to walk through
the different functions that are performed.
First, at the agency that performs the collection activity,
there will be supervisory oversight and Office of Compliance.
Next, there will be the general counsel of that agency who will
be informed of what the rules are, depending on the applicable
authority, and be responsible for teaching and enforcing those
rules.
Then there will be the inspector general for the particular
agency involved. There will also be the inspector general for
the Intelligence Community writ large, and the Office of the
General Counsel for the director of national intelligence.
The National Security Division plays an oversight role as
well, conducting review of the use of the authority and,
depending on the particular incidents of the use of the
authority, overseeing the application to another oversight
element, which is that of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court.
Those are judges--just the same judges I appeared before
literally in some cases when I appeared in criminal court, that
have been tapped to appear in their Article III role, in
addition to their normal duties as part of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.
And finally, there is this Committee in particular, and the
intelligence committees in Congress who have a particular
oversight role in these areas and are kept current--currently
and fully informed of the activities under the FISA Act.
Chairman Feinstein. OK. It's my understanding that NSD does
not generally conduct oversight of CIA human intelligence
activities; covert action; three, DOD military activities; or
four, NSA intelligence collection outside of FISA. As I
understand it, within the Department of Justice, only the
Office of Legal Counsel weighs in on these matters and then
even only when they're asked.
So here's the question. Should NSD play a role in reviewing
the legality of intelligence collection outside of FISA by CIA,
NSA and others?
Mr. Carlin. Thank you. I--the division does not have the,
as you have stated, Madam Chairman, a formal oversight role for
other particular authorities. But we were created to serve as a
bridge between the Intelligence Community on the one hand, and
the Department of Justice and the law enforcement elements on
the other, to ensure that the wall came down in terms of
sharing of information and that there was visibility into the
activities of the Intelligence Community.
There are areas where we have a particular expertise, such
as FISA. We're also assigned a role in terms of the attorney
general's approval of attorney general guidelines that would
get issued by the relevant agency, but then to the Department
of Justice for approval. And there, our role would be in
particular protecting the rights and privacies of U.S. persons.
So, I'd be happy to work with this Committee on areas where
our expertise fits in, as we've discussed, to the general
layers of oversight that otherwise exist within the Community,
including inspectors general and general counsels.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. We will take you up on that.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
General Taylor, you have said that one of your top
priorities is to enhance the level of service that I&A provides
to its unique customers in the private sector and at state and
local levels. I&A has had historically low analytic production.
For example, in 2012, it produced fewer analytic products than
its total number of employees. How do you plan to increase the
number of high-quality analytic products that are available for
INA's customers without being redundant with other Intelligence
Community efforts?
General Taylor. Senator, thank you for that question. I
think it's not simple, but it's kind of focusing on what's the
mission of I&A. And the mission of I&A is to collect
information from our state and local partners and turn that
into intelligence that can be used in the Intelligence
Community; to work specifically with the Intelligence Community
to get information back to our state and local and private
sector partners.
But I think also to use the unique information within the
department to produce intelligence. That is where we're going
to focus. It's my view that that's not all happening as much
today as it needs to happen going forward. But I intend to
focus on those products that meet those kinds of needs.
I would also add that the analytical products that I think
the Committee has seen in the past are not the only products
that we get asked--that I&A is asked to deliver. So one of the
metrics that I'm thinking of looking at is what is the totality
of the product base that I&A delivers? Where does it go? What
are the customers saying about it? And then coming back to the
Committee with a better understanding, or better picture of the
totality of the work done by I&A, except--rather than just
analytical products.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. As we all know, CIA has
jurisdiction of intelligence collection outside the United
States. FBI has jurisdiction of intelligence collection within
the United States' borders. The relationship between I&A and
the FBI has not been what it really should be. I understand
you're a friend of Director Comey, who is starting off
certainly in the right direction at the FBI. He's had vast
experience at the Department of Justice.
Can you talk about how you expect to develop that
relationship between I&A and the FBI to make sure that we're
doing the best job we can within the borders of the United
States to not only collect intelligence, but also provide the
right analysis of that intelligence?
General Taylor. Yes, sir. I--in my 43 years of government
service have worked closely with the FBI at every level. I
would tell you that I am not a person that believes in
competitive--working to compete against an agency. I believe in
building partnerships that look to the strength of each agency
in performing the mission.
So I commit to you that I will work with Director Comey and
his team to make sure that what I&A is doing is complementing
what he's doing, and we're complementing what the FBI is doing
in a synergistic fashion. There's just far too much for us to
do to be competing with each other. We should be able to work
collectively for the best interests of our country and for
collecting intelligence that defends America.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Mr. Carlin, a number of groups and
organizations have been making recommendations on how to fix
FISA in response to Edward Snowden's leaks of classified
information. Some of these recommendations have been good, but
a lot of them seem to be unworkable, both from a legal as well
as a practical standpoint, and would in fact damage our
national security collection efforts.
Number one, do you believe NSA's telephone bulk metadata
collection program fully complies with U.S. law?
Mr. Carlin. I do.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Three of the five members of the
privacy and civil liberties oversight board have said that the
plain text of FISA business records statute does not authorize
this bulk collection--bulk meta data collection program.
What aspects of their legal analysis do you find to be
problematic?
Mr. Carlin. Just say--Senator that--do believe that it is
the correct interpretation of the statute and that it is
Constitutional as have 15 FISA court judges and now two
district court judges. There is one judge who has found to the
contrary. We have taken that case--the Department has taken
that case up on appeal and it's being litigated in the court
system.
Senator King. Well, all right I'll leave your answer at
that then. Very loose answer though, Jim (ph).
Let me just lastly--quickly ask you, in your experience
with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court do you think
it's been anywhere--anything like a rubber stamp?
Mr. Carlin. I--no sir. I have not. It's--as I've said,
today--but these are some of the same district court judges
that I appear before in the criminal court. And they are
respected jurists. They put us to our paces when I was a
government lawyer appearing before them then. And they put us
to our paces when they perform the same role in front of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
And I think some of the opinions in this unprecedented year
of de-classifying thousands of pages of documents, I think some
of the court opinions have shown the type of rigor that they've
applied to their analysis.
Senator King. OK, thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Carlin I enjoyed very much visiting with you and as I
indicated, if you're confirmed, you're gonna be responsible for
overseeing a range of government surveillance activities and to
be blunt, you're gonna have a lot of cleaning up to do.
For years, the Justice Department has allowed the executive
branch to rely on a secret body of surveillance law that was
inconsistent with the plain meaning of public statutes in the
Constitution. This reliance on secret law gave rise to a
pervasive culture of information in which senior officials
repeatedly made misleading statements to the Congress, the
public and the courts about domestic surveillance.
For example, officials from the National Security Division
testified on multiple occasions that Section 215 of the PATRIOT
Act was analogous to grand jury subpoena authority, which of
course involves individual suspicion.
The public can now see that this claim was extraordinarily
misleading and the National Security Division's credibility has
been damaged as a result.
If you're confirmed to head the National Security Division,
what are you going to do to end this culture of misinformation
and ensure that statements made to the public, the Congress and
the courts by the Department are accurate?
Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Senator.
I think it is of the utmost importance--and the attorneys
I've worked with at the National Security Divisions share this
view--that when we testify, whether it's before Congress or
provide information to the courts or in other settings that we
do our utmost to provide the full and complete and accurate
information.
If I may on the issue that arises in terms of 215 and grand
jury subpoenas, it is of course in the statute itself the
provision that the records that one can obtain through 215 need
to be those records--similar to those records that one could
obtain by a grand jury subpoena as it says in the statute or
other court process.
Two-fifteen is different than the issuance of a grand jury
subpoena in part because of--one needs to apply to a judge
prior to being able to obtain the authority. And I know that
lawyers at the National Security Division and the department
and elsewhere work to make sure that those portions at the time
that were classified in terms of the applications of 215 were
provided not just to this Committee as would be the normal
course of business, but to ensure that, that interpretation of
the law was made available to all Members of the Senate prior
to the consideration of the 215.
I--inclusion again, I believe it's very important to try to
provide as accurate information, as complete information as
possible to this Committee and to this body whether in
classified or unclassified...
Senator Wyden. If you're confirmed, I hope that will be
accurate in the future, because I know when people heard those
words, that this was analogous to a grand jury subpoena
process, they said those kinds of processes involve individual
suspicion. And, frankly, I don't know of any other grand jury
subpoena that allow the government to collect records on this
kind of scale.
So I'm gonna move on.
You've indicated that you are going to make a priority
insuring that statements that are made, if you're confirmed,
are accurate. In my view, that was not the case in the past.
Let me ask you one other question, if I might.
As the arguments in favor of bulk phone records collection
have been crumbling, executive branch officials most recently
have claimed that bulk collection allows the government to
review phone records more quickly than would otherwise be
possible.
One official recently testified that it allows the
government to do in minutes what would otherwise take hours.
However, the Justice Department inspector general's January
2010 report, on requests for phone records, describes an
arrangement in which communications companies were able to
respond to requests immediately and provide records in a format
that could be immediately uploaded onto FBI databases.
While the inspector general found some problems with the--
with this particular arrangement, speed was not one of them. In
fact, the report goes on to note that the FBI's
counterterrorism division described this arrangement as
providing near real time servicing of phone record requests.
Would it be fair to say that this report--a Justice
Department report--indicates that phone companies are actually
capable of responding to individual record requests very
quickly?
Mr. Carlin. Senator, I'm not totally familiar with the
details of that inspector general report or whether that
arrangement still exists at the FBI.
But it has certainly been my experience, in the context of
some particular cases--investigations that I can recall with a
particular telecommunications companies that we have served
particular requests on the company and that they have been able
to respond very, very quickly to the FBI. And that, that speed
has been critical in having that national security
investigations hold people to account or to prevent future
terrorist attacks, and that speed is critical.
Senator Wyden. Well I share your view that speed is
critical, but what we have is a FBI in effect Justice
Department inspector general report indicating that it's
possible to get that speed that we need with the kind of
approach with respect to phone records without collecting other
kinds of--without other kinds of processes, and that's my
point, is that we're told that without metadata collection,
we're not going to get it in a timely way. This report
indicates that it is possible to get it in a timely way.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
[Cross talk.]
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon, General Taylor.
Good afternoon, Mr. Carlin.
Mr. Carlin, let me turn to you for a series of questions.
Last May, the White House formally announced that if a lethal
operation will be considered against a U.S. person, that the
Department of Justice--and I want to quote here--``will conduct
an additional legal analysis to ensure that such action may be
conducted against the individual, consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.''
Two questions: What's the role of the NSD in that kind of a
review? And who in the DOJ is responsible for ensuring that the
facts supporting the department's legal analysis are accurate?
Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Senator.
In--there's a process set up that involves input from each
of the departments and agencies now, before such a decision of
that magnitude is made. That's the policy process that's been
set up by the President.
In terms of the extra legal analysis might occur, a
decision of that magnitude would be made at the highest level
of the department. And I would expect that before such a
decision would be made, that the National Security Division,
among other components, would be consulted.
On the second question, in terms of the accuracy of the
information that's provided, the accuracy of the information is
usually determined by the departments and agencies providing
it. So there's the collectors and the analysts. And they would
provide, then, that information to the department and that
would be the basis for a legal review.
Senator Udall. Over time, I'm going to want to drill more
into those questions. Because this is, as you know, a life-and-
death kind of process. But let me--let me turn to another
question that's about accuracy.
You wrote in your responses to the Committee that the
decision to submit intelligence activities for legal review by
the OLC is typically made by the Intelligence Community
component that engages in that activity. Yet you also wrote
that the NSD has the responsibility to ensure that the
department's representations in court are accurate, and that,
quote, ``the NSD attorneys must work diligently to understand
the facts of intelligence activities and other national
security- related matters that may be at issue in litigation or
other matters for which they're responsible.''
Now, to me, those statements appear to conflict with each
other. So in your view, how is the Justice Department supposed
to ensure the accuracy of representations to the courts in
criminal cases or FOIA litigation, I should say, and so on,
without an independent review of the accuracy of Intelligence
Community representations?
And I ask that question in light of what former CIA General
Counsel Stephen Preston's responses to my questions last year
about the CIA's detention and interrogation program, where--and
he wrote that the DOJ does not always have accurate information
about the detention and interrogation program and that the
actual conduct of that program was not always consistent with
the way the program had been described to the DOJ, and that
further, CIA's efforts fell well short of our current practices
when it comes to providing information relevant to the OLC's
legal analysis.
Mr. Carlin. Thank you, Senator.
Your question is important and it's important as officers
of the court. And any attorney for the National Security
Division when making a representation does everything that they
can to assure that the representation is accurate.
And also if they were to learn or discover that information
is inaccurate or misleading, to take steps with the relevant
agency in order to correct the record.
There were several different decision-making processes that
you've alluded to, some of which are more involved with than
others. So in terms of representations before the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, that is one where our
attorneys would be working to make the representations; would
be working with the relevant elements of the Intelligence
Community in order to provide the necessary facts to the court.
And as I described earlier to the chairman, there are a
variety of mechanisms, including the attorneys, to try to
ensure that accuracy, including the Office of General Counsel,
the component of various inspectors general, and our oversight
role and section.
Senator Udall. I'm going to stay involved with you on this,
as I am with the Intelligence Community itself. Let me--one
last question. I want to talk about executive order 12333, with
which you're familiar. I understand that the collection,
retention or dissemination of information about U.S. persons is
prohibited under executive order 12333, except under certain
procedures approved by the attorney general. But this doesn't
mean that U.S.-person information isn't mistakenly collected,
retained and then disseminated outside of these procedures.
So take this example. Let's say the NSA is conducting what
it believes to be foreign collection under E.O. 12333, but
discovers in the course of this collection that it also
incidentally collected a vast trove of U.S.-person information.
That U.S.-person collection should not have FISA protections.
What role does the NSD have in overseeing any collection,
retention or dissemination of U.S.-person information that
might occur under that executive order?
Mr. Carlin. Senator, so generally, the intelligence
activities that NSA would conduct pursuant to its authorities
under 12333 would be done pursuant to a series of guidelines
that were approved by the attorney general, and then ultimately
implemented through additional policies and procedures by NSA.
But the collection activities that occur pursuant to 12333,
if there was incidental collection, would be handled through a
different set of oversight mechanisms than the department's by
the Office of Compliance, the inspector general there, the
general counsel there, and the inspector general and general
counsel's office for the Intelligence Community writ large, as
well as reporting to these committees as appropriate.
Senator Udall. So you don't see a direct role for the NSD
in ensuring that that data is protected under FISA?
Mr. Carlin. Under FISA, no. Under FISA, we would have a
direct role. So if it was under--if it was collection that was
pursuant to the FISA statutes, so collection targeted at U.S.
persons, for example, or collection targeted at certain non-
U.S. persons overseas that was collected domestically, such as
pursuant to the 702 collection program, that would fall within
the scope of the National Security Division.
That's information that--and oversight that we conduct
through our oversight section, in conjunction with the
agencies. And we would have the responsibility in terms of
informing--working with them to inform the court if there were
any compliance incidents and making sure that those compliance
incidents were addressed.
Senator Udall. Thank you. My time is obviously expired. But
I think you understand where I'm coming from here. One is to
make sure that DOJ and you in your capacity have the most
accurate information so that you can represent the United
States of America and our citizens in the best possible way.
And secondly, that you have a role to play in providing
additional oversight. Those are all tied to having information
that's factual, based on what happened.
And again, I'm going to continue to look for every way
possible to make sure that that's what does happen, whether
it's under the auspices of the IC or the DOJ. You all have a
joint responsibility to protect the Bill of Rights.
Thank you.
[Cross talk.]
Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Taylor, I spent many years as either the chair or
the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee. And my
greatest disappointment in the last Congress is that we did not
enact a cyber security bill since I believe we're extremely
vulnerable to attacks. And indeed, we know that every day,
nation-states like China, Russia, Iran are probing our
computers, leaving behind malware. Transnational criminal gangs
also are invading our--our computer systems, and terrorist
groups also have that as a goal.
I know that you served as chief security officer at General
Electric. I'm interested in what you believe I&A, which has the
special responsibility to share information with the private
sector, to be the recipient of information from the private
sector, and disseminate that to governments at all levels.
What particular improvements would you like to see when it
comes to information sharing?
General Taylor. Thank you, Senator Collins.
I would say that in my eight-and-a-half years at GE, I was
not always happy with the quality and the consistency of
information I received on threats that would impact our company
writ large, and particularly cyber issues. I think that has
begun to improve.
And my focus will be on ensuring that--I think I--well, two
things. I think the department plays a critical role from NPPD
in reaching out to the private sector. And indeed, many
companies have now joined in partnership with DHS around the
NPPD and critical infrastructure protection and exchanging
information on a continuous basis. I think that has to
continue.
But I think we've got to do a better job on the I&A side of
developing the intelligence that helps companies--and not--
companies the size of GE have the resources to kind of look
into these things more thoroughly than many, many other
American companies. Those are the companies that need to
understand what the risk is; understand how they're being had.
And I think we can give them that through analysis from I&A,
both from the IC and from our components within DOD--within
DHS.
Senator Collins. Well, I hope we'll see more analytical
reports, as the ranking member pointed out. There's something
really wrong when there are more employees and contractors than
there are--there are analytical reports being issued.
I am very impressed with what is going on at the NCIC and I
hope that you'll invite Members of this Committee, as well as
the Homeland Security Committee, to come out and let them see
the real-time monitoring that's done of government computers
because that's an important vulnerability as well.
But the fact that we still are not sharing critical threat
information, particularly with the owners and operators of
critical infrastructure, is just unacceptable in this day and
age. And I hope that should you be confirmed, that you will
make that a priority.
General Taylor. Senator, if confirmed, that will be a top
priority for me. I lived that for eight-and-a-half years and
want to see what I can do to help us close that gap.
Senator Collins. Mr. Carlin, according to news reports, the
charges against Ali Mohamed Ali for his alleged role in a 2008
pirate attack near Yemen have been dropped after he was
partially acquitted by a jury last year. This raises the whole
dispute once again of how foreigners who are brought to this
country or arrested here should be handled, and whether it
should be in military tribunals or in regular criminal courts.
We now have the bizarre situation where the failure to
successfully prosecute a suspected terrorist, pirate in federal
court has now resulted in his seeking asylum so that he can
stay in this country. What's your reaction to this case? And
what does it say as far as our ability to ensure that those who
pose a threat to this country--foreigners who pose a threat to
this country should be handled--prosecuted in federal courts
versus military tribunals?
Mr. Carlin. Well, Senator, without commenting on a
particular individual's application, that as you say that was a
piracy case. After the increased incidence of piracy in 2011,
there were a number of prosecutions of pirates. I think we did
obtain convictions in 25 or 26 of those cases, and that piracy,
not just due to that effort, but other international efforts,
has decreased in that region, but continues to be a threat.
In general, we need to use an all-tools approach where the
Article III option is one of the tools in the toolkit, but that
we look at all tools whenever we face a particular case. And we
look first to obtain the maximum amount of intelligence,
speaking now not so much about piracy, though it's true there,
particular in terrorist acts or terrorist cases, and to look to
gain--obtain intelligence first, to try to prevent terrorist
attacks. That needs to be our first priority.
And we also need to look to deter and disable the threat
that a particular individual or group may pose. And if
confirmed, I will advocate and attempt to provide as many
options as possible when we're trying to make those decisions.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
[Cross talk.]
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Taylor, first of all, most people don't know you
didn't have to do this. And the fact that you're coming back to
serve again is highly admirable, and I want to thank you for
that.
You said you'd read the report that Senator Levin and I put
out on fusion centers. And I have to agree with a lot of what
Senator Chambliss had to say.
My assessment when I talked to the people receiving the
analysis from I&A and homeland security is it's not on time,
it's not late, and it's not accurate. And half the time, it's
old information that was collected not through the Intelligence
Community, but is published data. And so the quality of the
work in many instances actually is very, very poor. And so,
when you--when you go and talk to people who receive them, they
don't even read them. Because they think they have no value.
There's no incremental increase in the value of what is being
put out.
So, given that, as you look at this and see whether or not
there's a capability there that we really need, I don't
disagree with you about sharing threats downward. I have yet to
see much information come from any fusion center into I&A, and
that then comes that is both timely and accurate and not
repetitive. So, I guess my question is, is if it is seen by
you, after looking at this, that it's redundant and irrelevant,
would you agree that maybe it ought to be minimized to where
it's mainly a conduit down, and when we do get some information
that needs to be forward, we can do that, rather than duplicate
what's already going on?
General Taylor. Senator, first of all, thank you for your
comments about my service. You may know that I began my career
at Tinker (ph) Air Force Base in Oklahoma, some 43 years ago,
and that was a--quite a launch place to get me here. So, I'm
excited to be here to be able to serve again.
I read the report. I have heard from our stakeholders, both
at the state and local level, and within the IC, and within the
department. What I would commit, sir, is to a thorough analysis
of what the mission is. Because I think there's some confusion
in terms of the elements of I&A, in terms of what the actual
mission is with regard to the fusion centers. I think it is our
core responsibility. No one else in the government has this
responsibility to link the locals to the IC. So, I'd like to
evaluate that, develop the metrics around what we're supposed
to be producing, and then, if we are able to produce those
things, come back to the--to you, sir, and to the SSCI and
present those results.
I think there is value, here, but I haven't had enough time
to really get my arms around it, but I--if confirmed, I would
expect, in very short order, to be able to do that and come
back with a plan of action to implement the mission we've been
assigned. And if it's not there, to not do it. And to come with
that recommendation based on the facts that we find in--in a
mission analysis.
Senator Coburn. Well, I appreciate, and I have a lot of
confidence that you're the right man for this job at this time,
and my hope is that we get some clarity as to what can be done
and effectively done. One of the things that's happening, we're
seeing some improvement in homeland security in a lot of areas,
and like Senator Collins, we need a cyber-security bill. We
know that. I think the President did a good job in terms of his
executive order, but we still have a ways to go there, and it's
important that the intelligence and analysis that's carried out
has value, because--and the problem maybe, right now, it may be
improving in value, but nobody's paying any attention to it
because it hadn't had any value in the past.
So, my hope is, is that you'll have Godspeed in making that
assessment and truly using metrics, your customers, of whether
or not it has value.
General Taylor. Senator, you have just outlined my
leadership philosophy, and that's how I've approached every
mission I've been given, and I also believe it's important that
as we take this journey, that we're in lockstep with this
Committee in terms of what the expectations are, so I intend to
spend a significant amount of time with the staff and with the
Members to get feedback on what we're doing. I believe in full
transparency. I believe in metrics, and if the facts take us in
a way that we don't like, the facts are the facts, and we'll
have to make decisions from this.
Senator Coburn. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Coburn.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you Madam Chairman. Mr. Carlin,
General Taylor, welcome to you both. Mr. Carlin, you and I had
the opportunity to talk a little bit last December, and I just
wanted to follow up on one of the issues that we talked about
when you came to my office.
As you know, in October of 2013, after months and months of
discussion and debate in which you and the NSD were involved,
DOJ adopted a new policy by which federal prosecutors would
inform defendants when they were intended to--when they
intended to offer evidence informed, obtained, or derived from
intelligence collected under 702 of FISA. And when you and I
met in December, you informed me that that policy had not yet
been reduced to a formal written policy, and so, Mr. Carlin, I
wanted to ask: is that process done yet, and has that policy
been finalized, and if so, has it been disseminated in--in a
written form?
Mr. Carlin. Thank you Senator, and thank you for having
taken the time to meet prior to this hearing. Just in terms of
the question. I--it is my understanding that it was the
practice of the policy of the department to inform a defendant
in a criminal case and give notice if there was 702 information
that was going to be used against them prior to--prior to this
change in practice.
The change in practice had to do with a particular set of
circumstances when there was an instance where information
obtained from one prong of the FISA statute 702 was used and
led to information that led to another prong of FISA, Title I
FISA, being used, and that when the notice was given to the
defendant, that notice was referring to one type of FISA but
not both types of FISA, and that is the practice that we
reviewed and changed, so that now, defendants are receiving
notice in those instances of both types of FISA.
The review of cases affected like that--affected by that,
continues, but we have filed such notice, now, I believe in
three criminal matters, including the case of Muhamad Muhamad
(ph), the individual convicted by a jury of attempting to use
an explosive device on the Christmas tree lighting ceremony. In
reference to that case, we have now filed--there's a filing in
that case that we should provide to your staff while we lay out
what our practice is, and I will ensure--I will ensure that
filing is distributed to U.S. attorneys' offices across the
country so they know exactly what our position is on that
issue.
Senator Heinrich. That's helpful. And so you'll share
with--that with the Committee as well?
Mr. Carlin. Yes sir.
Senator Heinrich. Great. Let's move on then to
declassification real quick. I have a quick question on that
front. And, in your response to Committee questions, you
indicated that you and others within NSD meet regularly with
ODNI personnel on multiple issues, and among those that you
listed were classification - sorry, declassification and
transparency matters. On December 29th of 2009, the President
signed Executive Order 13526, which directs, among other
things, that in no case shall information be classified,
continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be
declassified in order to conceal violations of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error, prevent embarrassment to
a person, organization, or agencies, or prevent or delay the
release of information that does not require protection in the
interest of national security. What's NSD's role and
responsibility in determining whether something is properly
declassified--sorry, properly classified, particularly as it
relates to that Executive Order 13526?
Mr. Carlin. Thank you Senator. NSD really does not play a
role in that executive order in determining whether the
information is properly classified in the first instance. That
would be a decision that's made by the relevant agency or
department would have expertise with the particular sources and
methods and would be reviewed. Assume, ultimately, if there was
a dispute by their general council or inspector general, we
have played and do play a role in the ongoing review in terms
of coordinating the declassification, particularly of FISA
related pleadings or court opinions, and we've been playing an
ongoing role in that review that has led to the
declassification by the director of national intelligence and
thousands of pages of documents, and I would expect we would
continue to play a role in that if confirmed.
Senator Heinrich. That's very helpful, Mr. Carlin, and I
want to thank you both for being here today. Thank you
Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Heinrich
Senator King. Our wrap-up questioner.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Carlin, the President made a speech on January 17th on
national security policy. He called for the creation of panels
of advocates to assist the FISA court. This Committee passed an
amendment as part of our bill that created an opportunity for
the court to appoint amicus assistants in that process. Do you
have any insight on what the President had in mind in that
statement, and was what we did along the lines of what the
President intends?
Mr. Carlin. Not sure, Senator, I can speak ultimately to
where the administration position is, but I have stated before
that I think it would be helpful in certain instances if the
FISA court needed additional assistance or briefing on a
complicated interpretation, that they'd be able to tap such a
panel, and your bill would provide the ability for them to do
so, and to hear that amicus--amicus view.
Senator King. Thank you.
I understand that one of the responsibilities that you all
have at the division is oversight, and that you're developing a
training program for IC personnel. Could you tell us where that
stands? Is it happening? Will it--is it mandatory for all IC
personnel? Does it deal with the Fourth Amendment and those
kinds of principles? What's the nature of that program?
Mr. Carlin. I'm not sure I'm familiar with this specific
program that you're referencing, but we do work with, for
instance, the NSA in the development of training programs,
particularly those programs that are on the procedures, the
compliance procedures that would be ordered by the court, such
as minimization procedures. We would help in the development of
that curriculum. And then I know our attorneys also go and
train, in particular, on those issues. And we also help provide
similar training, I know, to the FBI.
Senator King. Does the IC personnel generally regularly,
routinely receive training that reflects the values embodied in
the First Amendment? Because this is--the business that they're
in is finding that right balance on a day-to-day basis. Is this
part of the entry process for somebody coming into the NSA or
the FBI or the CIA?
Mr. Carlin. I'm not sure I'd have the expertise to speak
writ large as to the training programs for every element of the
Intelligence Community. Having spent time at the FBI, I know
for the FBI, that is part of their training programs. And I
know it's--these issues and issues in terms of privacy and
protection of U.S. persons are definitely a part of the
training program at the NSA. And I expect that each who is
subject to attorney general-approved guidelines in terms of the
protection and handling of U.S. person information would
receive training as part of the curriculum on those protected
procedures.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Taylor, you have a very important responsibility.
And I, like Senator Coburn, appreciate your willingness to step
forward once again, and undertake service to your country.
We spend approximately $75 billion a year on intelligence
between military and civilian. That is a lot of money. And it's
increased dramatically, as you know, since September 11th. So,
the role of communicating and sharing, but at the same time,
not duplicating, is really essential. And I hope that you will
take seriously the comments and questions of Senator Coburn.
And I want to associate myself with them. And here's my
question.
If you, who are starting with a blank sheet of paper to set
up a system to share information among intelligence and law
enforcement, would you--what would you come up with? Would it
be the fusion centers, or would it be some other--some other
kind of entity?
General Taylor. Well, thank you, Senator, for your comments
about my returning to service. I am looking forward to working
with this Committee, and certainly with our colleagues at DHS.
My sense, Senator, is--the institutions exist. It's
connecting the institutions appropriately. So, I wouldn't start
with a blank slate. I'd figure out where the nexus (ph) are
between the institutions that are currently working these
issues.
Take fusion centers, for instance. Governors--adjutant
generals love them because it's all source, all hazard. And so,
why not use that capacity? It's already looking at all source,
all hazards to help inform the Intelligence Community, which is
really the sweet spot for I&A.
And if we--if we do our job properly, we won't be
duplicating any work that's done by the FBI and the JTTF. We
don't do investigations, we don't do overt--we don't do
clandestine collection of intelligence, we take information
from our partners and try to turn it into information that's
useful. And also, take information from the IC (ph) just to
send it back. I should say I&A does.
If confirmed, I will be a part of that great team. But I
think it's making sure that the mission is clear, the
objectives are linked, and the outcomes meet the expectations
of our customers and partners, as opposed to kind of doing what
we were--what we did before we came to the--to I&A, for
instance. When we came out of the IC, (ph) we did it a certain
way. If we came out of the FBI, we did it another way.
Senator King. Well, I understand the IG is looking at some
of the activities and at the GAO report. And I hope--I think
you used the term--this term, Senator Coburn, and that is
``value,'' and determine the value achieved versus the cost--
what the proper cost-sharing relationship should be with the
states and localities. Because--you know, every hearing I go to
is--we've partially removed the cloud of sequestration for a
year or so, but it's not gone. And I think it's safe to say,
we're going to be in a budget-constrained attitude for some
period of years. And therefore we have to constantly be
thinking about how do we achieve the same or greater value at
the same or lesser cost?
So, I commend that mission to you, sir.
General Taylor. Yes, sir. Well, one of my marching orders
from the secretary is to do just that--to eliminate duplication
where it exists, and to improve the efficiency of our mission
execution within I&A. And I intend, if confirmed, to follow
those instructions, as well as your instructions, sir.
Senator King. Well, if you are successful in eliminating
some duplication around here, I'll put in a bill to build a
statue of you in the courtyard.
[Laughter.]
Thank you very much, General.
General Taylor. Yes, sir, thank you.
Senator King. I appreciate it.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator King. It
looks like we will be able to make this vote.
I just want to say one thing to both of our nominees. You
both occupy points of great interest to this Committee. And I
will hope that you will be coming before us singly within the
nest six-month period.
I think, General Taylor, we really want to delve into more
detail on your mission as you see it--the reduction of
contractors within your organization, and the increase of
fresh, bright, new intelligence. So we will do that.
Mr. Carlin, your division is very important to this
Committee. It is a very vital part of the oversight role. And I
think you, too, might want to give some additional thought to
it, and come before the Committee. And I think we should talk a
little bit about it.
And I see a very beautiful young lady I happen to have some
Senate lollipops for in the front row.
So, I'm going to say one thing about questions from the
Members. We'd like to have them in by close of business on
Friday so that we can move--take our vote and move these
nominees as soon as possible. If we get them in, we'll schedule
the vote for next week.
So, thank you both. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. And
the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
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