Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, February 7, 2013 - 2:30pm
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 113-31]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-31
NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2013
MARCH 5, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS KING, Maine
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
FEBRUARY 7, 2013
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 20
Warner, Hon. Mark, a U.S. Senator from Virginia.................. 21
WITNESS
Brennan, John O., Nominee to be Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency............................................ 23
Prepared statement........................................... 28
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Letter dated January 25, 2013, from James R. Clapper to Senator
Dianne Feinstein and Senator Saxby Chambliss................... 3
Letter dated January 8, 2013, from David S. Kris to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence............................... 4
Letter dated January 22, 2013, from Sarah Cleveland, Gregory
Craig, William Dodge, Jeh Johnson, David Kris, David Martin,
Daniel Meltzer and Trevor Morrison to Senator Dianne Feinstein. 5
Letter dated January 8, 2013, from Officers and Board Members of
Victims of Pan Am 103, Inc..................................... 7
Letter dated January 31, 2013, from retired professional
intelligence experts and interrogators......................... 9
Letter from representatives of various faith-based communities... 13
Letter dated January 8, 2013, from Act! for America to Senator
Dianne Feinstein and Senator Saxby Chambliss................... 15
Letter dated February 4, 2013, from various organizations to
Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator Saxby Chambliss........... 17
Joint Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator Carl
Levin, April 27, 2012.......................................... 85
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 92
Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 108
Questions for the Record......................................... 136
Letter dated February 4, 2013, from the Office of Government
Ethics to Senator Dianne Feinstein............................. 166
----------
MARCH 5, 2013
OPENING STATEMENT
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 88
NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Rockefeller, Burr, Wyden, Risch, Mikulski, Coats, Udall, Rubio,
Warner, Collins, Heinrich, King, and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. We will begin this hearing. And let me
say right up front that the process is that people are
respectful; that they don't cheer, they don't hiss, they don't
show signs; that this is to listen. If that's a problem for
anybody, I ask you to leave the room now because what we will
do is remove you from the room--let there be no doubt.
So, if I may, I would like to begin. The Committee meets
today in open session to consider the nomination of John
Brennan to be the 21st director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the first director to have risen through the
Agency's ranks since Bob Gates.
Mr. Brennan, congratulations on your nomination. I see
Senator Warner has come in. Senator, I will make opening
comments, the Vice Chairman will make opening comments, and
then we will turn to you for your introduction, if that's
agreeable.
Mr. Brennan, congratulations on your nomination. As you can
see, it's going to be lively. I'd like to welcome your family,
as well, and hope you'll introduce them so the Committee can
give them its thanks.
This is the first opportunity, also, to welcome our new
Members--Senator Heinrich, who is on my right; Senator King,
who is due any moment; Senator Collins, who is on my left; and
Senator Coburn, who is not here at the moment, but will be, who
is returning to the Committee. And we have a new Ex-Officio
Member, Senator Inhofe. So, welcome to all of you.
The director of the CIA is among the most critical national
security positions in the United States Government, both
because of the role the CIA plays in collecting and analyzing
intelligence relevant to every national security challenge we
face, and because of the added importance of having steady
leadership at an organization that conducts most of its
business outside of the public arena.
Intelligence is critical to the successful drawdown in
Afghanistan; to the brutal war going on within Syria's borders,
across North Africa, where the attacks in Benghazi and the
hostage situation in Algeria threaten to spread into the next
front against al-Qa'ida and its affiliated groups; for
counterterrorism operations around the world; in the efforts by
the United States and others to prevent the gain and spread of
weapons of mass destruction in Iran, North Korea, and other
states; and in addressing emerging threats in space,
cyberspace, and elsewhere around the globe.
To confront these challenges, and to lead the CIA through a
difficult budgetary period after a decade of major budget
increases, President Obama nominated John Brennan, his closest
advisor on intelligence and counterterrorism matters for the
past four years.
Mr. Brennan is, without a doubt, qualified for this
position. He served at the CIA for 25 years in analytic,
operational, and managerial capacities. He has seen the Agency
from just about every angle--as a line analyst, as chief of
station, as chief of staff to the director, and as the deputy
executive director--among many others.
People who have worked closely with him regularly cite his
work ethic, his integrity, and his determination. In nominating
John Brennan, President Obama spoke of his ``commitment to the
values that define us as Americans.'' DNI Clapper, in a letter
of support, noted his ``impeccable integrity'' and that ``his
dedication to country is second to none.''
So, with that, with unanimous consent, I would like to
insert into the record the letters the Committee has received
in regard to Mr. Brennan's nomination.
[Letters received by the Committee regarding the nomination
of Mr. Brennan follow:]
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Chairman Feinstein. John Brennan, by all accounts, will be
a strong leader, guided firmly by the law and his strong
ethical code. He has assured the Committee, in his response to
pre-hearing questions, that he will be independent from
political influence; he will seek only to provide the
President, the Congress, and other leaders with his best
analysis and advice.
His responses to the Committee's questions are available on
the Committee's website, at www.intelligence.senate.gov. Of
course, the Committee must conduct its due diligence on such an
important nominee, so Members are going to have questions in a
range of topics, including his plans for directing the Agency,
major national security challenges we face, and positions and
actions he has taken in his current and past jobs.
Also of interest will be Mr. Brennan's views on the use of
targeted lethal force in counterterrorism operations. Mr.
Brennan has been one of the few administration officials able
to speak publicly about such issues; Members will certainly
want to understand his views on this, to include the importance
of Congress receiving all of the relevant legal analyses from
the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
While the disclosure earlier this week of a 16-page
unclassified White Paper on the government's legal analysis of
the use of targeted force against a United States citizen, who
was a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida--there is finally
more information available to the public.
I have been calling, and others have been calling--the Vice
Chairman and I--for increased transparency on the use of
targeted force for over a year, including the circumstances in
which such force is directed against U.S. citizens and
noncitizens alike. I have also been attempting to speak
publicly about the very low number of civilian casualties that
result from such strikes; I have been limited in my ability to
do so.
But for the past several years, this Committee has done
significant oversight of the government's conduct of targeted
strikes and the figures we have obtained from the Executive
Branch--which we have done our utmost to verify--confirm that
the number of civilian casualties that have resulted from such
strikes each year has typically been in the single digits.
When I ask to give out the actual numbers, I'm told, ``You
can't.'' And I say, ``Why not?'' ``Because it's classified,''
``It's a covert program,'' ``For the public, it doesn't
exist.'' Well, I think that rationale, Mr. Brennan, is long
gone, and I'm going to talk to you in my questions a little bit
about that, because I think it's very important that we share
this data with people.
This Committee will continue to perform significant
oversight of targeted strikes. We received, this morning, an
Office of Legal Counsel opinion on the topic. Actually, we
received a short one and a long one. And while I was there, I
was delighted to see Senator Wyden reading, Senator King in the
room, and Senator Udall came in the room. And I'm hopeful that
every Member will avail of themselves of this opportunity to
review those OLC opinions.
I also intend to review proposals for legislation to ensure
that drone strikes are carried out in a manner consistent with
our values, and the proposal to create an analogue of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review the conduct
of such strikes.
Finally, I will want to know how the nominee intends to
lead an agency that's had four directors since DCI Tenet
resigned in July of '04, now in a budget downturn, and what he
sees as the major challenges before the CIA.
For the information of Members, we will have rounds of
questions of eight minutes each, and Members will be recognized
by seniority, alternating between the sides.
Members have requested the opportunity to ask Mr. Brennan
questions that will require classified answers, as well, so we
have the ability to move to a classified session following this
hearing, if it is timely and we're able to do so. So my
suggestion is that we play that ear by ear, Mr. Vice Chairman,
and see if it's possible to do so. If it isn't, we will have
our closed session on Tuesday at our next hearing.
Finally, before turning to the Vice Chairman, I'd like to
conclude my remarks the same way I did at the confirmation for
General Petraeus. Again this time, the transition between CIA
directors has been managed by acting director Michael Morell.
I'd like to thank Mr. Morell for keeping the Agency on firm
footing and for his agreement to remain as deputy director
after the confirmation process. He continues to be a top notch
CIA officer, a friend of the Committee, and I'm sure he will be
an excellent deputy, Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Vice Chairman, please proceed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And Mr. Brennan, I join the Chair in congratulating you on
your nomination and welcoming you to the Committee today. And I
don't have to remind you--because you are a career individual--
of the importance of your nomination to head the Central
Intelligence Agency. I also want to welcome your family and
thank them for their support of you during your years of
commitment to our government.
Also, I want to just say, as the Chairman did, how much we
appreciate Mike Morell. And I'm very pleased to see in your
prepared statement that you mention Mike and his contribution
to the Central Intelligence Agency, and that you intend to keep
Mike in place. He is a very valued public servant, and a guy
who has stepped into a very difficult situation now twice and
has led with great commitment and has provided the kind of
leadership the Agency has needed.
Mr. Brennan, if confirmed as the next director, it will be
your responsibility to lead the CIA as our nation continues to
face significant national security challenges. While we've
heard a lot in recent months about al-Qa'ida being decimated
and on the run, it is by no means destroyed, and the threat of
terrorism from its affiliates, especially in Yemen and North
Africa, remains very real.
Just in the past few months, terrorist attacks in Algeria
and Benghazi have claimed American lives, so it is clear that
our vigilance must not waver. At the same time, our attention
focused beyond these threats posed by al-Qa'ida and other
terrorist organizations, from Iran to North Korea to Venezuela.
From nuclear proliferation, to cyber intrusions, to
counterintelligence, the challenges are constant and immense,
and the CIA is at the point of the spear.
As your predecessors faced similar challenges, they
recognized the importance of working hand in hand with
Congress, especially the Congressional intelligence committees.
I appreciated your commitment to me to be open and transparent
with this Committee, if you are in fact confirmed as the next
director.
I expect this commitment to actually be born out and
practiced, regardless of political pressures, and not just
become words spoken during the confirmation process. Far too
often, the Committee is facing unnecessary and, frankly,
legally-questionable obstacles, in receiving needed oversight
information from the Intelligence Community.
As we hear from you this afternoon, I also believe it is
important for you to set the record straight on a few matters
relating to detention policy and the CIA's detention and
interrogation program. We know that the 2009 Executive Order
removed the CIA from the detention business. But the current
framework is simply not working to get real-time access to
intelligence from terrorist detainees.
I reviewed elements of the 9/11 Commission report in
preparation for this hearing, and I am concerned that the
administration is making the same mistakes that were made
before 9/11, when the CIA missed vital information on KSM, the
mastermind of the attacks, and decided to forego a capture
operation of Osama bin Laden. The Commission cited the
administration's focus on using the Article 3 court process as
factors in both instances.
You and I also discussed the Committee's report on the
CIA's detention and interrogation program, which was approved
in December by a slim majority. You told me that you had
completed your review of the report's Executive Summary, and
the Findings and Conclusions, and you'll have an opportunity to
express your observations and the concerns that you expressed
to me with the rest of the Committee today.
Mr. Brennan, I thank you once again for your dedication and
your service to our country, and we look forward to your
testimony and to your response to questions submitted by the
Committee.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
And now we will turn to the distinguished senator from
Virginia, Senator Mark Warner.
OPENING STATEMENT OF MARK WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice
Chairman Chambliss, and colleagues. It's my honor to introduce
John Brennan as the President's nominee to be the next director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Like so many thousands of other professionals in the United
States Intelligence Community, John now calls Virginia home. It
has been my privilege, as a Member of this Committee for the
last two years, to represent many of the thousands of men and
women in our intelligence agencies who also call Virginia home.
I would also make mention of the fact, very briefly, since
we don't get this many opportunities in front of this kind of
public audience, to recognize an action that Senator Mikulski
and I took last Congress that many of you joined with us on
that we will reintroduce this year--a joint resolution to mark
U.S. Intelligence Professionals Day--to bring respectful
attention to these quiet professionals who keep our nation safe
every day. And I, again, look forward to working with all of
you to make sure that we do this resolution again.
These same qualities--dedication, selflessness,
intelligence, and patriotism--are well represented in John
Brennan, whom the men and women of the CIA will find a
dedicated leader in public service, should he be confirmed.
While I have not had the opportunity to work with Mr. Brennan
as much as some of the other Members, I've enjoyed our meeting
together. And as the Chairman has already indicated, John
Brennan's long career of public service and his record have
prepared him to be director of the CIA.
He served for 25 years at the Agency in the field and at
Headquarters, including as deputy executive director in Saudi
Arabia, and as briefer to two presidents since 9/11. He's been
on the front lines in the fight against al-Qa'ida, including
standing up the National Counterterrorism Center. He has
enormous appreciation for the men and women of the CIA and the
work they do--often in the shadows--to keep our nation safe.
One thing that I was also impressed in our meeting was that
Mr. Brennan has been an advocate for greater transparency in
our counterterrorism policy and for adherence to the rule of
law. As a Member and a new Member of this oversight committee,
I appreciate that.
As the President said, the imperative to secure the nation
must not come at the sacrifice of our laws or ideals. This
needs never be an either/or choice. We can protect the nation
and stay true to our principles. As has been raised by the
Chair and the Vice Chair, I think it is also important--and
these are questions that I'll be asking, as well--to ensure
that while we look at the programs of the CIA, that these
programs' effectiveness be measured objectively and not simply
by those who are charged with implementing them.
So, the Chairman has already gone through other parts of
your background; I again want to congratulate you on this
nomination, the service you've provided to our nation so far,
and, in the aftermath of this hearing, hopefully the service
that you'll provide on a going-forward basis.
With that, Madam Chairman, I'll come back to the dais and
look forward to my chance to ask the nominee questions, as
well.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Mr. Brennan, please stand, raise your right hand, and I'll
administer the oath.
``I, John Brennan, do solemnly swear--''
Mr. Brennan. I, John Brennan, do solemnly swear----
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. ``That I will give this
Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help me God.''
Mr. Brennan [continuing]. That I will give this Committee
the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
me God.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. And we look
forward to hearing your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN O. BRENNAN, NOMINEE FOR DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Brennan. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss,
Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you
today as the President's nominee----
[Disruption by a protestor in the audience.]
Chairman Feinstein. Would you hold, please?
I will ask the Capitol Police officers to please remove
this woman.
[Protest continues.]
Chairman Feinstein. Please remove----
[Protestor is removed from the Hearing Room.]
Chairman Feinstein. I'm going to say, once again, that we
welcome everyone here; that we expect no clapping, we expect no
hissing, we expect no demonstration in this room. This is a
very serious hearing. I will stop the hearing and I will ask
the room to be cleared, so know that.
Please continue, Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Chairman. I am honored to appear
before you today as the President's nominee to lead the Central
Intelligence Agency. I am deeply grateful to President Obama
for the confidence he has placed in me by sending my name
forward to the Senate for consideration.
Senator Warner, thank you for your generous introduction,
for your service to our nation, and for your strong support for
those who defend it. This includes the extraordinary men and
women of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, so many of
whom, like me, call Virginia home, and call you our Senator.
I would not be here today without the love and support of
my wife, Kathy, who has been my life partner for 34 years, and
who, like the spouses of many other public servants and
intelligence professionals----
[Disruption by another protestor in the audience.]
Mr. Brennan [continuing]. Has made numerous sacrifices over
the years.
Chairman Feinstein. Would you--would you pause, Mr.
Brennan?
If you would remove that individual, please, as quickly as
you can. Thank you.
[Protestor is removed from the Hearing Room.]
Chairman Feinstein. Mr. Brennan, please proceed.
Mr. Brennan [continuing]. My wife, Kathy, who, like the
spouses of many other public servants and intelligence
professionals, has made numerous sacrifices over the years,
bearing the brunt of family responsibilities because of my
chosen profession.
Similarly, I would like to pay tribute to my three
children, who, like the children of many CIA officers and other
national security professionals, have had to deal with the
disappointments associated with an absentee parent far more
often than they should.
And I'm very pleased to be joined today by my wife, Kathy,
and my brother, Tom.
[Disruption by another protestor in the audience.]
Chairman Feinstein. All right, we will stop again.
Please remove that woman.
[Protest continues.]
Chairman Feinstein. If you could please expedite the
removal----
[Protest continues.]
[Protestor is removed from the Hearing Room.]
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Please proceed, Mr.
Brennan. The next time, we're going to clear the chamber and
bring people back in one by one. This witness is entitled to be
heard, ladies and gentlemen. So please give him that
opportunity.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you. A heartfelt ``thank you'' also goes
to my family in New Jersey, especially my 91-year-old mother,
Dorothy, and my 92-year-old father, Owen, who emigrated from
Ireland nearly 65 years ago----
[Disruption by another protestor in the audience.]
Chairman Feinstein. All right, I'm going to ask--we're
going to halt the hearing. I'm going to ask that the room be
cleared and that the CODEPINK associates not be permitted to
come back in. We've done this five times now, and five times
are enough. So, we will recess for a few minutes.
[Protest continues.]
Chairman Feinstein. Ladies and gentlemen, if you would mind
leaving, we will then have you come back in, but it's the only
way I think we're going to stop this. We will recess for a few
minutes.
[Whereupon, the Committee recessed briefly.]
Chairman Feinstein. Okay, we will reconvene the hearing. If
the press would please take their places----
Mr. Brennan, please proceed.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein.
I was talking about my parents, my 91-year-old mother,
Dorothy, and my 92-year-old father, Owen, who emigrated to this
country 65 years ago and who, together, raised my sister, my
brother, and I to cherish the opportunity known as America.
As I appear before you today, I would additionally like to
extend a special salute to David Petraeus, a patriot who
remains--as do all former directors--one of the staunchest
advocates of the Agency's mission and workforce.
I want to express my admiration for my close friend and
colleague, Michael Morell, who has twice guided the CIA as
acting director, with a steady hand, integrity, and exceptional
skill. If confirmed, it would be a distinct privilege for me to
work side by side with Michael--my friend, and the epitome of
an intelligence professional--in the months and years ahead.
It also would be a tremendous privilege to serve with the
Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, who has
mentored literally legions of intelligence professionals ever
since his service in Vietnam.
As the President's principal intelligence advisor and the
head of the Intelligence Community, Jim is a person of
longstanding and deep experience and integrity. He and I share
identical views on the role of intelligence and the importance
of giving current and future generations of intelligence
professionals the support they need and that they so richly
deserve.
It would be the greatest honor of my professional life to
lead the women and men of the Central Intelligence Agency--the
Agency where I started my career nearly 33 years ago and where
I served for a quarter-century. A 24-year-old fresh out of
graduate school, I arrived at Langley in August 1980 as a GS-9
career trainee, determined to do my part for national security
as one of this nation's intelligence officers.
When I joined the CIA in August 1980, world events were
unsettled. Our Embassy in Tehran had been overrun the year
before, and 52 Americans were still being held hostage by a
radical new government in Iran. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was less than a year old, and the next decade would
witness the slow but steady crumbling of the Soviet Union.
Nuclear proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction were a constant concern. And U.S. officials were
hard at work around the globe, trying to prevent regional
tensions and animosities from turning into full-scale wars.
And, ominously, the United States was about to face an
upsurge in terrorist attacks that would claim hundreds of
American lives in Lebanon, including a 49-year-old CIA officer
named Bob Ames, who was killed during a brief visit to our
Embassy in Beirut, and who, at the time, was my boss at CIA.
During my 25-year career at CIA, I watched up close, and
even participated, in history being made in far off corners of
the world, as CIA fulfilled its critical intelligence roles--
collecting intelligence, uncovering secrets, identifying
threats, partnering with foreign intelligence and security
services, analyzing opaque and complicated developments abroad,
carrying out covert action, and attempting to forecast events
yet to happen--all in an effort to protect our people and to
strengthen America's national security.
And throughout my career, I had the great fortune to
experience first-hand, as well as witness, what it means to be
a CIA officer: such as an analyst, who has the daunting task
and tremendous responsibility to take incomplete and frequently
contradictory information and advise the senior-most policy-
makers of our government about foreign political, military, and
economic developments.
Or an operations officer, whose job it is to find and
obtain those elusive secrets that provide advanced warning of
strategic surprise, political turbulence, terrorist plots,
impending violence, cyber attacks, and persistent threats such
as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation.
Or a technical expert, who seeks new and creative ways to
find nuggets of intelligence in tremendous volumes of data,
provides secure, and even stealthy, intelligence collection and
communication systems, and counters the latest technological
threats to our nation.
Or a support officer or manager with the responsibility to
ensure that the core missions of the Agency--collecting
intelligence, providing all source analysis, and, when directed
by the President, conducting covert action--are carried out
with the requisite skill, speed, agility, and proficiency.
From the Middle East to the Central Caucasus; from Sub-
Saharan Africa to Central and South America; from the vast
expanses of Asia to the great cities of Europe, and all
countries and regions in between, CIA officers were there--
sometimes in force, and sometimes virtually standing alone. And
for those 25 years, it was a great honor for me to be a CIA
officer, as I knew that the Agency's contributions to this
country's security were as invaluable as they were innumerable.
Following my retirement from the CIA in 2005, I had the
good fortune to experience other professional opportunities.
For three years, I served as President and Chief Executive
Officer of a private-sector company, where I learned, first-
hand, some very important lessons about fiduciary
responsibility and sound business practices. And for the past
four years I've had the privilege to serve as the President's
principal policy advisor on Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism.
In that role, I have had the opportunity to work daily with
some of the finest Americans I have ever met from the
intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement, and
diplomatic communities, who have dedicated their lives to the
safety and security of their fellow Americans. It is because of
the work of those Americans--serving domestically, and
especially, those serving in dangerous places abroad--that we
are able to experience the freedom and security that are the
hallmarks of our nation.
I believe my CIA background and my other professional
experiences have prepared me well for the challenge of leading
the world's premier intelligence agency at this moment in
history, which is as dynamic and consequential as any in recent
decades, and will continue to be in the years ahead. Simply
stated, the need for accurate intelligence and prescient
analysis from CIA has never been greater than it is in 2013 or
than it will be in the coming years.
Historic political, economic, and social transformations
continue to sweep through the Middle East and North Africa,
with major implications for our interests, Israel's security,
our Arab partners, and the prospects for peace and stability
throughout the region. We remain at war with al-Qa'ida and its
associated forces, which, despite the substantial progress we
have made against them, still seek to carry out deadly strikes
against our homeland and our citizens, and against our friends
and allies.
U.S. computer networks and databases are under daily cyber
attack by nation states, international criminal organizations,
sub-national groups, and individual hackers. And the regimes in
Tehran and Pyongyang remain bent on pursuing nuclear weapons
and intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems, rather
than fulfilling their international obligations or even meeting
the basic needs of their people.
Yes, the CIA's mission is as important to our nation's
security today as at any time in our nation's history. In
carrying out their mission, the men and women of the CIA are
frequently asked to undertake challenging, perilous, and, yes,
controversial actions, on behalf of the American people. The
CIA is not immune from scrutiny of these efforts, and I welcome
a discussion of CIA's past and present activities.
If I am confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be
the Committee's lengthy report on the CIA's former rendition,
detention, and interrogation program that involved now-banned
interrogation techniques. I have read the Findings and
Executive Summary of the 6,000-page report, which raises a
number of very serious issues. Given the gravity and importance
of this subject, I would look forward to further dialogue with
Members of the Committee on the report and its Findings, if I
am confirmed.
In addition, some of our government's current
counterterrorism policies and operations have sparked
widespread debate--domestically, internationally, and in this
room. I have publicly acknowledged that our fight against al-
Qa'ida and associated forces have sometimes involved the use of
lethal force outside the hot battlefield of Afghanistan.
Accordingly, it is understandable that there is great
interest in the legal basis, as well as the thresholds,
criteria, processes, procedures, approvals, and reviews of such
actions. I have strongly promoted such public discussions with
the Congress and with the American people, as I believe that
our system of government and our commitment to transparency
demands nothing less.
As the elected representatives of the American people and
as Members of this Committee, you have the obligation to
oversee the activities of the CIA and the other elements of the
Intelligence Community to ensure that they are being carried
out effectively, lawfully, successfully, and without regard to
partisanship. If confirmed, I would endeavor to keep this
Committee fully and currently informed, not only because it is
required by law, but because you can neither perform your
oversight function nor support the mission of the CIA if you
are kept in the dark.
And I know that irrespective of the fullness of that
dialogue, there will be occasions when we disagree, just as you
disagree among yourselves at times, on aspects of past,
current, and future activities of the CIA. Such disagreement is
healthy, and is a necessary part of our democratic process. But
such disagreements should never prevent us from carrying out
our national security and intelligence responsibilities, as a
failure to do so could have devastating consequences for the
safety and security of all Americans.
During my courtesy calls with many of you, I also heard
repeated references to a ``trust deficit'' that has, at times,
existed between this Committee and the CIA. If I am confirmed,
a trust deficit between the Committee and the CIA would be
wholly unacceptable to me, and I would make it my goal on Day
One of my tenure, and every day thereafter, to strengthen the
trust between us.
I have a reputation for speaking my mind, and, at times,
doing so in a rather direct manner, which some attribute to my
New Jersey roots. I like to think that my candor and bluntness
will reassure you that you will get straight answers from me--
maybe not always the ones you like, but you will get answers,
and they will reflect my honest views. That's the commitment I
made to you.
I would like to finish by saying a few words about the
importance of taking care of the women and men who serve in the
CIA. Because of the secrecy that intelligence work requires,
few Americans will ever know the extraordinary sacrifices that
these professionals and their families make every day. Many of
them risk their lives and, at times, have given their lives to
keep us safe.
If confirmed, I would make it my mission, in partnership
with the Congress, to ensure that the men and women have the
training, tradecraft, linguistic skills, technical tools,
guidance, supervision, and leadership they need to do their
jobs. They also need assurance that we will do all we can to
protect our nation's secrets and prevent leaks of classified
information. These leaks damage our national security--
sometimes gravely--putting these CIA employees at risk and
making their missions much more difficult.
The men and women of the CIA are a national treasure, and I
will consider it one of my most important responsibilities to
take care of them, just as others took care of me when I first
arrived at Langley as a young trainee in 1980.
Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee, as
you well know, when you arrive at CIA Headquarters in Langley
and enter the main lobby, you immediately see the marble
Memorial Wall. On it are stars--each one representing a Member
of the CIA family who gave his or her life in the service of
this nation. Today, there are 103 stars on that wall.
To me, and to everyone in the CIA, they are not simply
stars, nor are they only visible remembrances of dearly
departed colleagues and friends. The stars represent heroic and
unsung patriots; Americans who lived their lives loving this
country and who died protecting it.
That Memorial Wall means something very special to me and
to every other American who has proudly served at the Agency. I
want all CIA employees always to be proud of the organization
to which they belong, and to be proud of its activities.
And if given the honor to serve as the 21st director of the
CIA, I would take it as a sacred obligation to do everything in
my ability to make sure the Central Intelligence Agency is the
absolute best intelligence service it can be, and one that
makes all Americans proud.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan follows:]
Statement of John O. Brennan, Nomination Hearing to be Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency
Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, Members of the
Committee--I am honored to appear before you today as the President's
nominee to lead the Central Intelligence Agency. I am deeply grateful
to President Obama for the confidence he has placed in me by sending my
name forward to the Senate for consideration.
Senator Warner, thank you for your generous introduction, for your
service to our Nation, and for your strong support of those who defend
it. This includes the extraordinary men and women of the CIA and our
Intelligence Community, so many of whom, like me, call Virginia home
and call you our Senator.
I would not be here today without the love and support of my wife
Kathy, who has been my life partner for more than 34 years and who,
like the spouses of many other public servants and intelligence
professionals, has made numerous sacrifices over the years, bearing the
brunt of family responsibilities because of my chosen profession.
Similarly, I would like to pay tribute to my three children, who, like
the children of many CIA officers and other national security
professionals, have had to deal with the disappointments associated
with an absentee parent far more often than they should.
A heartfelt ``thank you'' also goes to my family in New Jersey,
especially my 91-year-old mother Dorothy and my 92-year-old father
Owen--who emigrated from Ireland nearly 65 years ago--and who,
together, raised my sister, brother, and me to cherish the opportunity
that is America.
As I appear before you today, I would additionally like to extend a
special salute to David Petraeus, a patriot who remains as do all
former Directors--one of the staunchest advocates of the Agency's
mission and workforce.
I want to express my admiration for my close friend and colleague,
Michael Morell, who has twice guided the CIA as Acting Director with a
steady hand, integrity, and exceptional skill. If confirmed, it would
be a distinct privilege for me to work side-by-side with Michael in the
months and years ahead.
It also would be a tremendous privilege to serve with Director of
National Intelligence Jim Clapper, who has mentored literally legions
of intelligence professionals ever since his service in Vietnam. As the
President's principal intelligence advisor and head of the Intelligence
Community, Jim is a person of longstanding and deep experience and
integrity. He and I share identical views on the role of intelligence
and on the importance of giving current and future generations of
intelligence professionals the support they need and so richly deserve.
It would be the greatest honor of my professional life to lead the
women and men of the Central Intelligence Agency--the Agency where I
started my career nearly 33 years ago and where I served for a quarter
century. A 24-year-old fresh out of graduate school, I arrived at
Langley in August 1980 as a GS-9 ``career trainee,'' determined to do
my part for national security as one of this Nation's intelligence
officers.
When I joined the CIA in August 1980, world events were unsettled.
Our Embassy in Tehran had been overrun the year before, and 52
Americans were still being held hostage by a radical new government in
Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was less than a year old, and
the next decade would witness the slow but steady crumbling of the
Soviet Union. Nuclear proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction were a constant concern, and U.S. officials were hard at
work around the globe trying to prevent regional tensions and
animosities from turning into full-scale wars. And, ominously, the
United States was about to face an upsurge in terrorist attacks that
would claim hundreds of American lives in Lebanon, including a 49-year-
old CIA officer named Bob Ames, who was killed during a brief visit to
our Embassy in Beirut and who, at the time, was my boss at CIA.
During my 25-year career at CIA, I watched up close and even
participated in history being made in far-off corners of the world, as
CIA fulfilled its critical intelligence roles--collecting intelligence,
uncovering secrets, identifying threats, partnering with foreign
intelligence and security services, analyzing opaque and complicated
developments abroad, carrying out covert action, and attempting to
forecast events yet to happen--all in an effort to protect our people
and strengthen America's national security.
And throughout my career, I had the great fortune to experience
firsthand as well as to witness what it means to be a CIA officer.
Such as an analyst, who has the daunting task and
tremendous responsibility to take incomplete and frequently
contradictory information and advise the senior most policymakers of
our government about foreign political, military, and economic
developments.
Or an operations officer, whose job it is to find and
obtain those elusive secrets that provide advance warning of strategic
surprise; political turbulence; terrorist plots; impending violence;
cyber attacks; and persistent threats such as nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons proliferation.
Or a technical expert, who seeks new and creative ways to
find nuggets of intelligence in tremendous volumes of data, provide
secure and even stealthy intelligence collection and communications
systems, and counter the latest technological threats to our Nation.
Or a support officer or manager with the responsibility
to ensure that the core missions of the Agency--collecting
intelligence, providing all-source analysis, and, when directed by the
President, conducting covert action--are carried out with the requisite
skill, speed, agility, and proficiency.
From the Middle East to the central Caucuses, from sub-Saharan
Africa to Central and South America, from the vast expanses of Asia to
the great cities of Europe, and all countries and regions in between,
CIA officers were there . . . sometimes in force and sometimes
virtually standing alone.
And for those 25 years, it was a great honor for me to be an
officer of the CIA, as I knew that the Agency's contributions to this
country's security were as invaluable as they were innumerable.
Following my retirement from CIA in 2005, I had the good fortune to
experience other professional opportunities. For three years, I served
as President and Chief Executive Officer of a private sector company,
where I learned firsthand some very important lessons about fiduciary
responsibility and sound business practices. And for the past four
years, I have had the privilege to serve as the President's principal
policy advisor on homeland security and counterterrorism. In that role,
I have had the opportunity to work daily with some of the finest
Americans I have ever met--from the intelligence, military, homeland
security, law enforcement, and diplomatic communities--who have
dedicated their lives to the safety and security of their fellow
Americans. It is because of the work of those Americans--serving
domestically and especially in dangerous places abroad--that we are
able to experience the freedom and security that are the hallmarks of
our Nation.
I believe my CIA background and my other professional experiences
have prepared me well for the challenge of leading the world's premier
intelligence agency at this moment in history, which is as dynamic and
consequential as any in recent decades, and will continue to be in the
years ahead. Simply stated, the need for accurate intelligence and
prescient analysis from CIA has never been greater than it is in 2013--
or than it will be in the coming years.
Historic political, economic, and social transformations
continue to sweep through the Middle East and North Africa, with major
implications for our interests, Israel's security, our Arab partners,
and the prospects for peace and stability throughout the region.
We remain at war with al-Qa'ida and its associated
forces, which--despite the substantial progress we have made against
them--still seek to carry out deadly strikes against our homeland and
our citizens, as well as against our friends.
U.S. computer networks and databases are under daily
cyber attack by nation states, international criminal organizations,
subnational groups, and individual hackers.
And regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang remain bent on
pursuing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile
delivery systems rather than fulfilling their international obligations
or even meeting the basic needs of their people.
Yes, the CIA's mission is as important to our Nation's security
today as at any time in our Nation's history.
In carrying out their mission, the men and women of the CIA are
frequently asked to undertake challenging, perilous, and controversial
actions on behalf of the American people. The CIA is not immune from
scrutiny of these efforts, and I welcome a discussion of CIA's past and
current activities. If I am confirmed, one of my highest priorities
would be the Committee's lengthy report on the CIA's former rendition,
detention, and interrogation program that involved now-banned
interrogation techniques. I have read the findings and executive
summary of the 6,000 page report, which raise a number of very serious
issues. Given the gravity and importance of the subject, I would look
forward to further dialogue with Members of the Committee on the report
and its findings, if I am confirmed.
In addition, some of our government's current counterterrorism
policies and operations have sparked widespread debate, domestically
and internationally. I have publicly acknowledged that our fight
against al-Qa'ida and associated forces has sometimes involved the use
of lethal force outside the ``hot battlefield'' of Afghanistan.
Accordingly, it is understandable that there is great interest in the
legal basis as well as the thresholds, criteria, processes, procedures,
approvals, and reviews of such actions. I have strongly promoted such
public discussion, with the Congress and with the American people, as I
believe that our system of government and our commitment to
transparency demand nothing less.
As the elected representatives of the American people and as
Members of the Committee, you have the obligation to oversee the
activities of the CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community
to ensure that they are being carried out effectively, lawfully,
successfully, and without regard to partisanship.
If confirmed, I would endeavor to keep this Committee fully and
currently informed, not only because it is required by law, but because
you can neither perform your oversight function nor support the mission
of CIA if you are kept in the dark. And I know that irrespective of the
fullness of that dialogue, there will be occasions when we disagree,
just as you disagree among yourselves at times on aspects of past,
current, and future activities of the CIA. Such disagreement is healthy
and is a necessary part of our democratic process. But such
disagreement should never prevent us from carrying out our national
security and intelligence responsibilities, as a failure to do so could
have devastating consequences for the safety and security of all
Americans.
During my courtesy calls with many of you, I also heard repeated
reference to a ``trust deficit'' that has, at times, existed between
this Committee and the CIA. If I am confirmed, a trust deficit between
the Committee and the CIA would be wholly unacceptable to me, and I
would make it my goal on Day One of my tenure--and every day
thereafter--to strengthen the trust between us. I have a reputation for
speaking my mind and, at times, doing so in a rather direct manner,
which some attribute to my New Jersey roots. I like to think that my
candor and bluntness will reassure you that you will get straight
answers from me--maybe not always the ones you like, but you will get
answers, and they will reflect my honest views. That's the commitment I
make to you.
I would like to finish by saying a few words about the importance
of taking care of the women and men who serve in the CIA. Because of
the secrecy that intelligence work requires, few Americans will ever
know the extraordinary sacrifices that these professionals--and their
families--make every day. Many of them risk their lives and, at times,
have given their lives, to keep us safe.
If confirmed, I would make it my mission--in partnership with the
Congress--to ensure that the men and women of the CIA have the
training, tradecraft, linguistic skills, technical tools, guidance,
supervision, and leadership they need to do their jobs. They also need
assurance that we will do all we can to protect our Nation's secrets
and prevent leaks of classified information. These leaks damage our
national security, sometimes gravely, putting these CIA employees at
risk and making their missions more difficult. The men and women of the
CIA are a national treasure, and I will consider it one of my most
important responsibilities to take care of them, just as others took
care of me when I first arrived at Langley as a young trainee in 1980.
Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee, as you well
know, when you arrive at CIA Headquarters in Langley and enter the main
lobby, you immediately see the marble Memorial Wall. On it are stars--
each one representing a member of the CIA family who gave his or her
life in service to our Nation. Today, there are 103 stars on that wall.
To me, and everyone in the CIA, they are not simply stars, nor are they
only visible remembrances of dearly departed colleagues and friends.
The stars represent heroic and unsung patriots--Americans who lived
their lives loving this country, and who died protecting it.
That Memorial Wall means something very special to me and to every
other American who has proudly served at the Agency. I want all CIA
employees always to be proud of the organization to which they belong
and to be proud of all of its activities. And if given the honor to
serve as the 21st Director of the CIA, I would take it as a sacred
obligation to do everything in my ability to make sure the Central
Intelligence Agency is the absolute best intelligence service it can be
and one that makes all Americans proud.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking your questions.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Brennan.
I have five short questions that we traditionally ask; if
you would just answer them yes or no.
Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in
other venues when invited?
Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the
CIA and designated staff when invited?
Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or
any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Brennan. Yes; all documents that come under my
authority as director of CIA, I absolutely would.
Chairman Feinstein. We'll talk to you more about that in a
minute.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that the CIA and its
officials provide such material to the Committee when
requested?
Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to inform and fully brief,
to the fullest extent possible, all Members of this Committee,
of intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only
the Chairman and Vice Chairman?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, I will endeavor to do that.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Now, let me--we are now
going to go into eight-minute rounds. And we'll do it by
seniority, and alternate from side to side.
I wanted to talk about, just for a moment, the provision of
documents; Senator Wyden and others have had much to do about
this. But our job is to provide oversight to try to see that
the CIA and Intelligence communities operate legally. In order
to do that, it is really necessary to understand what the
official legal interpretation is, so the Office of Legal
Counsel opinions become very important.
We began during the Bush administration, with Mr. Bradbury,
to ask for OLC opinions. Up until last night, when the
President called the Vice Chairman, Senator Wyden, and myself,
and said that they were providing the OLC opinions, we had not
been able to get them. It makes our job--to interpret what is
legal or not legal--much more difficult if we do not have those
opinions.
The staff has asked for eight additional opinions. What I
want to know is will you become our advocate with the
administration, so that we can obtain those opinions?
Mr. Brennan. The National Security Act, as amended,
requires that the heads of intelligence agencies provide the
Committee with the appropriate legal documentation to support
covert actions. I would certainly be an advocate of making sure
that this Committee has the documentation it needs in order to
perform its oversight functions. I have been an advocate of
that position; I will continue to be.
Chairman Feinstein. I take that as a yes, and I'm counting
on you to provide eight OLC opinions.
Second question on this: when the opinion came over, our
staff were banned from seeing it--this morning. We have
lawyers. We have very good staff. This is upsetting to a number
of Members. We depend on our staff, because you can't take
material home, you can't take notes with you. So the staff
becomes very important.
Do you happen to know the reason why our staff are not
permitted, when we are permitted, to see an OLC?
Mr. Brennan. Senator--Chairman, I understand fully your
interest in having your staff have access to this
documentation; fully understandable. The reason for providing
information just to Committee Members at times is to ensure
that it is kept in a limited basis.
It is rather exceptional, as I think you know, that the
Office of Legal Counsel opinions, or advice, would be shared
directly with you. And this, I think, was determined because of
the rather exceptional nature of the issue and in a genuine
effort to try to meet the Committee's requirements. I
understand your interest in having the staff access to it----
Chairman Feinstein. If you would relay the request,
officially----
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. We'd appreciate it very
much.
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely; I will.
Chairman Feinstein. Second thing, when I spoke with you in
my office, we talked about our report on detention and
interrogation--the 6,000-page report you mentioned. I asked you
if you would please read it; you said you would--you said you
would, for sure, read the 300-page summary. Have you done so?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, Chairman, I have read the first volume,
which is 300 pages.
Chairman Feinstein. Then, let me ask you this question:
Were the EITs key to the takedown of Osama bin Laden?
Mr. Brennan. Chairman, the report right now still remains
classified. And the report has been provided to the Agency and
Executive Branch for comments.
There clearly were a number of things, many things, that I
read in that report that were very concerning and disturbing to
me, and ones that I would want to look into immediately, if I
were to be confirmed as CIA director.
It talked about mismanagement of the program,
misrepresentations of the information, providing inaccurate
information. And it was rather damning in a lot of its
language, as far as the nature of these activities that were
carried out.
I am eager to see the Agency's response to that report. I
read those 300 pages; I look forward, if confirmed, to reading
the entire 6,000-page volume, because it is of such gravity and
importance.
But, Chairman, I do not yet--and nor has the CIA finished
its review of this information. The Committee's report was
done, obviously, over an extended period of time; a tremendous
amount of work that's gone into it. Based on the review of the
documentary information that was available--the documents,
there were not interviews conducted with CIA officers.
I very much look forward to hearing from the CIA on that
and then coming back to this Committee and giving you my full
and honest views.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, thank you. You will have that
opportunity, I assure you.
I'd like to ask you about the status of the
administration's efforts to institutionalize rules and
procedures for the conduct of drone strikes; in particular, how
you see your role as CIA director in that approval process.
Mr. Brennan. Chairman, as this Committee knows--and I'm
sure wants to continue to protect certain covert action
activities--but let me talk, generally, about the
counterterrorism program and the role of CIA, and this effort
to try to institutionalize and to ensure we have as rigorous a
process as possible, that we feel that we're taking the
appropriate actions at the appropriate time.
The President has insisted that any actions we take will be
legally grounded, will be thoroughly anchored in intelligence,
will have the appropriate review process, approval process,
before any action is contemplated, including those actions that
might involve the use of lethal force.
The different parts of the government that are involved in
this process are involved in the interagency, and my role as
the President's counterterrorism advisor was to help to
orchestrate this effort over the past four years to ensure,
again, that any actions we take fully comport with our law and
meet the standards that I think this Committee and the American
people expect of us, as far as taking actions we need to
protect the American people, but at the same time ensuring that
we do everything possible before we need to resort to lethal
force.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
Mr. Brennan, the 9/11 Commission report describes a
canceled 1998 CIA operation to capture Osama bin Laden using
tribal groups in Afghanistan.
The former head of CIA's bin Laden Unit told staff that you
convinced Director Tenet to cancel that operation. He says that
following a meeting you had in Riyadh with Director Tenet, the
bin Laden Unit chief, and others, that you cabled National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger, saying the operation should be
canceled in favor of a different approach, described by the 9/
11 Commission as ``an all-out secret effort to persuade the
Taliban to expel bin Laden.''
Now, as we know, bin Laden was not expelled. Three months
later, the bin Laden wrath was unleashed with the attack on our
embassies. Did you advise Director Tenet and National Security
Advisor Berger against this operation; and if so, why?
Mr. Brennan. I had conversation with George Tenet at the
time. But I must point out, Senator, that every single CIA
manager--George Tenet, his deputy, the head of the Directorate
of Operations at the time, and other individuals--the Chief of
the Counterterrorism Center--argued against that operation, as
well, because it was not well grounded in intelligence and its
chances of success were minimal. And it was likely that other
individuals were going to be killed.
And so, when I was involved in those discussions, I
provided the director and others my professional advice about
whether or not I thought that that operation should go forward.
I also was engaged in discussions with the Saudi government at
the time and encouraged certain actions to be taken so that we
could put pressure on the Taliban, as well as on bin Laden.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. So, I'm taking it that your answer
to my question is you did advise against--in favor of the
cancellation of that operation?
Mr. Brennan. Based on what I had known at the time, I
didn't think that it was a worthwhile operation and it didn't
have a chance of success.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. The 9/11 Commission reported that
no capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level
of detail and preparation; do you have any second thoughts
about your recommendation to the director to cancel that
operation?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I have no second thoughts whatsoever
about my advice, which was to look carefully at this operation
because the chances of success were minimal. I was not in the
chain of command at that time. I was serving abroad as chief of
station.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. As deputy executive director, you
received the daily updates from the time of Abu Zubaydah's
capture throughout his interrogation, including the analysis of
the lawfulness of the techniques, putting you in a position to
express any concerns you had about the program before any of
the most controversial techniques, including waterboarding,
were ever used.
Now, we found a minimum of 50 memos in the documents within
the 6,000 pages, on which you were copied. What steps did you
take to stop the CIA from moving to these techniques you now
say you found objectionable at the time?
Mr. Brennan. I did not take steps to stop the CIA's use of
those techniques. I was not in the chain of command of that
program. I served as deputy executive director at the time. I
had responsibility for overseeing the management of the Agency
and all of its various functions. And I was aware of the
program; I was cc'd on some of those documents, but I had no
oversight of it. I wasn't involved in its creation.
I had expressed my personal objections and views to some
Agency colleagues about certain of those IETs, such as
waterboarding, nudity, and others, where I professed my
personal objections to it, but I did not try to stop it,
because it was, you know, something that was being done in a
different part of the Agency under the authority of others, and
it was something that was directed by the administration at the
time.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Now, you say you expressed your
objection to other colleagues; did you ever express any concern
to Director Tenet, to John McLaughlin, Executive Director
Krongard, or any other of the CIA leaders?
Mr. Brennan. I had a number of conversations with my Agency
colleagues on a broad range of issues during that period of
time--not just on this program, but other ones. We would have
personal conversations on that.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Well, my reason, particularly, for
naming those individuals, Mr. Brennan, is that they were the
ones directly above you. Mr. McLaughlin has been quoted in the
press as saying he never heard from you; he doesn't doubt that
you did this, but he says he never heard from you. And we just
have not seen anybody who has come forward and said they ever
heard any objections from you with respect to these programs.
Moving on--Mr. Krongard, your boss at the CIA, told the
Wall Street Journal that you had a role in setting the
parameters of the program, and I quote, ``Helping to seek
Justice Department approval for the techniques.'' He went on to
say that ``John would have been part and parcel of that
process.'' How does that comport with your response to the
Committee that you played no role in the program's--and I quote
again, your answer--its ``creation, execution, or oversight''?
Mr. Brennan. I respectfully disagree with my former
colleague, Buzzy Krongard. I was not involved in establishing
the parameters of that program. I think in that same Wall
Street Journal article, he goes on to say, in fact, that I was
not involved in a lot of elements of that program.
But I was not involved in the establishment of that
program. Again, I had awareness that the Agency was being asked
to do this; I had awareness that the Agency was going forward
on it. I had some visibility into some of the activities there,
but I was not part of any type of management structure or aware
of most of the details.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. That being the case, why would you
be the recipient of a minimum of 50 e-mails, Mr. Brennan, on
the progress of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, including
the techniques used in that interrogation?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, that was probably a standard e-mail
distribution. I was on thousands upon thousands of e-mail
distributions, as deputy executive director. I think I was just
cc'd on them; I wasn't an action officer on it. I know of no
action I took at the Agency that in any way authorized or
reprogrammed funds, or anything along those lines.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Executive Director Krongard is
said to have been an advocate of using SERE techniques. Did he
discuss with you a proposal to move to SERE techniques with Abu
Zubaydah; and if so, did you raise any objection?
Mr. Brennan. I don't recall a conversation with Mr.
Krongard about that particular issue.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. When you reviewed the intelligence
that the CIA was getting on Abu Zubaydah after the use of EITs,
did you think the information was valuable?
Mr. Brennan. The reports that I was getting subsequent to
that, and in the years after that, it was clearly my impression
that there was valuable information that was coming out.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. In a November 2007 interview, you
said that information from the interrogation techniques, quote,
``saved lives.'' But you also say that CIA should be out of the
detention business.
The main benefit that I saw in CIA's program was the
ability to hold and question individuals about whom there was
significant intelligence that they were terrorists, but not
necessarily evidence that could be used in a court of law.
Your view seems to be that even if we could save American
lives by detaining more terrorists, using only traditional
techniques, it would be better to kill them with a drone or let
them go free rather than detain them. Can you explain the logic
in that argument?
Mr. Brennan. I respectfully disagree, Senator. I never
believe it's better to kill a terrorist than to detain him. We
want to detain as many terrorists as possible so we can elicit
the intelligence from them in the inappropriate manner so that
we can disrupt follow-on terrorist attacks. So, I'm a strong
proponent of doing everything possible short of killing
terrorists, bringing them to justice, and getting that
intelligence from them.
I clearly had the impression, as you said, when I was
quoted in 2007, that there was valuable intelligence that came
out from those interrogation sessions. That's why I did say
that they save lives. I must tell you, Senator, that reading
this report from the Committee raises serious questions about
the information that I was given at the time, and the
impression I had at the time.
Now I have to determine, based on that information, as well
as what CIA says, what the truth is. And at this point,
Senator, I do not know what the truth is.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. How many high value targets have
been captured during your service with the administration?
Mr. Brennan. There have been a number of individuals who
have been captured, arrested, detained, interrogated,
debriefed, and put away by our partners overseas, which is--we
have given them the capacity now, we have provided them the
intelligence. And, unlike in the immediate aftermath of 9/11
when a lot of these countries were both unwilling and unable to
do it, we have given them that opportunity. And so, that's
where we're working with our partners.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. How many high-value targets have
been arrested and detained, and interrogated by the United
States, during your four years with the administration?
Mr. Brennan. I'll be happy to get that information to you,
in terms of those high-value targets that have been captured
with U.S. intelligence support.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. I submit to you the answer to that
is one. And it's Warsame, who was put on a ship for 60 days and
interrogated.
Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
I want to point out that I'm going to try and enforce the
eight minutes. If you hear a tapping, it is not personal.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Welcome, Mr. Brennan. And if confirmed, you're going to
lead an extraordinary agency with extraordinary people who
perform extraordinary services, most of them totally unknown by
the American people. Most people don't think about that--what
it is to do a life of public service and never have anything
known. Those of us who sit up here do a life of public service
and want everything that we do to be known. It's how we get
elected. It's a very different ethic in the Central
Intelligence Agency and all intelligence agencies, and I
respect it very much.
I want to go to the EITC--sorry; that's Earned Income Tax
Credit--to the enhanced interrogation techniques. Well, I'm for
both. Well, I'm not for the second, but for the first.
You talk about the 6,000 pages. What I want to say, and
when the second round comes, I will, I'm going to pour out my
frustration on dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency,
and dealing with various administrations, about trying to get
information.
Why was it that they felt that we were so unworthy of being
trusted? Why was it they were willing to talk to Pat Roberts
and me, or Saxby Chambliss and Dianne Feinstein, but not
anybody else, until we literally bludgeoned them--Kit Bond and
I--into agreeing to include everybody? Like, Carl Levin's not
trustworthy? You know? I mean, it's amazing.
And I pursue Dianne Feinstein's point about staff. When you
go and you have, under the previous administration, a briefing
with the President or the Vice President, or the head of the
CIA, or others, you're not allowed to--I can remember driving
with Pat Roberts, when he was Chairman and I was Vice Chairman,
and we weren't allowed to talk to each other driving up or
driving back. You weren't allowed to do that.
Staff were a part of nothing. You have to understand that
you're surrounded by people who work with you and fill you in--
people who are experts. We are, too. But they've got to be part
of this. They've got to be part of--when the OLC comes, it
should come to them, also. I strongly support the Chairwoman's
view on that.
Now, in the enhanced interrogation techniques matter, a
handful of former senior CIA officials who were personally
invested--and are personally invested--in defending the CIA's
detention and interrogation program, largely because their
professional reputations depend on it, depend on it.
[Inaudible] to speak for the CIA and its workforce on this
issue, and I think it does all a great disservice. In my
office, you and I discussed the Committee's landmark report on
this program. You do understand that this took six years to
write--not just 6,000 pages, but six years to write, perhaps
longer--23,000, 30,000 footnotes. Why did we do this? We did
this because we heard nothing from the Intelligence Agency. We
had no way of being briefed. They would not tell us what was
going on. So we had to do our own investigation, and we're
pretty good at it.
And when you read those first 350 pages, you told me that
you were shocked at some of what you read. You did not know
that. And that, to me, is shocking--but not to condemn anybody;
simply says that has to be fixed, and changed forever. There
never can be that kind of situation again, where we have to
tell you what's going wrong in your Agency, and thus
demoralizing some of the people in your Agency who want to be
relieved of the burden and the taint of bad techniques in
interrogation. They suffer from that.
And yet, nobody would talk with us about that. We had to
get that information on our own. It's a magnificent piece of
work, and I think it's a piece of history; it'll go down in
history because it will define the separation of powers as
between the intelligence committees of the House and Senate,
and the Agency and others that relate to it.
I'm also very aware that this is all crucial to the
President's authority. Not just on the more modern question of
the day about drones. But, you know, that determination is made
by one person and one person alone. And if there is a breakdown
in protocol, if there is a breakdown in line of command in
reacting, therefore, into something which is not good, where
there's too much collateral damage, I think, for the most part,
I would agree with the Chairwoman--I believe she said this--
that the work of the drone had been fairly safe. However, any
collateral damage is unacceptable. And that has to be the
purpose of the Agency.
And therefore, this detention and interrogation program,
I've got to say, it was--the people who ran it were ignorant of
the topic; executed by personnel without relevant experience,
managed incompetently by senior officials who did not pay
attention to crucial details, and corrupted by personnel with
pecuniary conflicts of interest. It was sold to the
policymakers and lawyers of the White House, the Department of
Justice, and Congress with grossly-inflated claims of
professionalism and effectiveness; so-called ``lives saved.''
It was a low point in our history. And this document, this
book, should change that forever. I would hope very much that
you would, if you are confirmed, which I hope you will be, that
you will make parts of this at your discretion, required
reading for your senior personnel so they can go through the
same experience that you went through. Are you willing to do
that?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, Senator. I am looking forward to taking
advantage of whatever lessons come out of this chapter in our
history and this Committee's report.
Senator Rockefeller. How do you cross-reference--and tell
me when I'm out of time.
Chairman Feinstein. Eight seconds. No, a minute and eight
seconds.
Senator Rockefeller. A minute and eight seconds, yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Right; a long time.
Senator Rockefeller. The cross-referencing of the EIT
disaster and the future of the drone, and the decisions that--
only the President, of course, can authorize that--but the
decision sometimes is passed down, and it has to be passed down
in a very accurate manner. And there have to be a protocol,
which is exact--more exact, even, than the interrogation
techniques, because I think that's probably been put to bed
just a bit; it's beginning to get straightened out.
But the drones are going to grow. There's going to be more
and more of that warfare--not just by us, but by other
countries, including, perhaps, by people from within our own
country. So the protocol of that, insofar as it would refer to
a particular agency, is going to have to be exact, and
directed, and of particular excellence and exactitude. How will
that happen?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, you make an excellent point, and
that's what I'm most interested in--is finding out what went
wrong. If this report is, as stated, accurate, what went wrong
in the system where there were systemic failures; where there
was mismanagement or inaccurate information that was put
forward?
Because there are covert activities that are taking place,
you know, today, under the direction and management of the CIA.
And I would have the obligation to make sure I could say to
this Committee that all of those covert action programs are
being run effectively, they're being well managed, they're
being overseen, and that the measures of effectiveness, the
results of those programs, are an accurate and fair
representation of what actually is happening.
This report raises serious questions about whether or not
there are serious systemic issues that are at play here. I
would need to get my arms around that, and that would be one of
my highest priorities, if I were to go to the Agency.
Senator Rockefeller. I thank you. Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Chair.
Mr. Brennan, welcome. Thank you for your long history of
public service; and more importantly, to your family--thank you
for your willingness to put up with his hobby.
Most, if not all, of the intelligence that our Committee
receives is the finished analysis that's derived from source
reports and other raw intelligence materials that we don't
see--and I might say, we don't need to see--all of.
In order to ensure that we can perform our oversight duties
of the Intelligence Committee, would you agree that the
Committee should be able to review all analytical product, if
requested?
Mr. Brennan. On the face of that question, yes. My answer
would be yes. However, I would have to take a look at the
issues it involved in terms of, you know, what are we talking
about, in terms of access to that analytic product--whether
it's all staff, all Committee Members, whatever.
I just can't make a commitment to that. But your intention,
and what I think your objective is, I fully support, in terms
of making sure this Committee has the breadth of analytic
expertise available from the Agency.
Senator Burr. As we go forward, there may be times that the
Committee will need the raw intelligence to judge the accuracy
of analytical product that we're provided. If confirmed, will
you provide the raw intelligence on those occasions when the
Committee requests it?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I would give every request from this
Committee for access to that information full consideration.
That's my commitment to you.
Senator Burr. Do you agree that it's a function of this
Committee's oversight that occasionally we would need to look
at it?
Mr. Brennan. I would agree that it is probably a function
of your oversight that you would have interest in doing that,
and it would be my obligation, I think, as director of CIA, to
try to be as accommodating as possible to that interest, while
at the same time trying to respect whatever considerations need
to be taken into account as we do that.
Senator Burr. Mr. Brennan, as you know, the Committee is
conducting a thorough inquiry into the attacks in Benghazi,
Libya. In the course of this investigation, the CIA has
repeatedly delayed, and in some cases, flatly refused, to
provide documents to this Committee. If confirmed, will you
assure this Committee that this refusal will never happen
again?
Mr. Brennan. I can commit to you, Senator, that I would do
everything in my ability and my authority to be able to reach
an accommodation with this Committee that requests documents,
because an impasse between the Executive Branch and the
Legislative Branch on issues of such importance is not in the
interest of the United States Government. And so, it would be
my objective to see if we could meet those interests.
At the same time, our founding fathers did, sort of,
separate the branches of government--Judicial, Legislative, and
Executive. And so, I want to be mindful of that separation, but
at the same time, meet your legitimate interests.
Senator Burr. They also gave us the ``power of the purse.''
Mr. Brennan. They certainly did, Senator; I'm fully aware
of that.
Senator Burr. I would suggest that that's the only tool,
and it's one we hate to use.
Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Senator Burr. Do you think that there's any situation where
it's legal to disclose to the media, or to the public, details
of covert action programs?
Mr. Brennan. I do not think it is ever appropriate to
improperly disclose classified information to anybody who does
not have legitimate access to it and has the clearances for it.
Senator Burr. Let me clarify. I didn't ask for classified
information. I specifically said ``covert action programs.''
Mr. Brennan. By definition, covert action programs are
classified, Senator.
Senator Burr. I realize that.
Mr. Brennan. Right. So, I do not believe it is appropriate
to improperly disclose any of those details related to covert
action programs.
Senator Burr. Let me point out that in the Committee pre-
hearing questions, you didn't really answer a question that
dealt with specific instances where you were authorized to
disclose classified information to a reporter. So, could you
provide for the Committee any times that you were given the
authority to release classified information?
Mr. Brennan. I have never provided classified information
to reporters. I engaged in discussions with reporters about
classified issues that they might have had access to because of
unfortunate leaks of classified information, and I frequently
work with reporters, if not editors, of newspapers, to keep out
of the public domain some of this country's most important
secrets.
And so I engage with them on those issues. But after
working in the intelligence profession for 30 years and being
at the CIA for 25 years, I know the importance of keeping those
secrets secret.
Senator Burr. Have any of your conversations with those
reporters or media consultants about intelligence matters been
recorded, or were there transcriptions of it?
Mr. Brennan. I believe there have been. I've been on news
network shows, and I have been, you know, engaged in
conversations on the telephone and other things that I
presume--and I know--that they have been recorded on occasion.
Senator Burr. Have you specifically asked for them not to
be recorded?
Mr. Brennan. Whenever I talk to reporters, I do so at the
request of the White House Press Office, and there are ground
rules that are established there. And I'm not the one to
establish those ground rules about whether or not they would be
recorded or not.
Senator Burr. You said in your responses to pre-hearing
questions that in exceptional circumstances, it may be
necessary to acknowledge classified information to a member of
the media.
Did you tell media commentators that the United States had,
and I quote, ``inside control'' or ``inside information'' on
the AQAP bomb plot in May of last year?
Mr. Brennan. I think what you're referring to, Senator, is
when I had a teleconference with some individuals, former
government officials from previous administrations, who were
going to be out on talk shows on the night that an IED was
intercepted.
And so, I discussed with them that some of the aspects of
that--because I was going on the news network shows the
following day--I wanted to make sure they understood the nature
of the threat, and what it was, and what it wasn't.
And so, what I said at the time--because I said I couldn't
talk about any operational details, and this was shortly after
the anniversary of the bin Laden takedown--I said there was
never a threat to the American public as we had said so
publicly, because we had inside control of the plot, and the
device was never a threat to the American public.
Senator Burr. Did you think that that comment actually
exposed sources or methods?
Mr. Brennan. No, Senator, I did not. And there is an
ongoing investigation, I must say, right now about the
unfortunate leak of information that was very, very damaging.
And I voluntarily cooperated with the Department of Justice on
that and have been interviewed on it.
Senator Burr. Well, let me just say, as one that was
overseas shortly after that, I certainly had, on numerous
occasions, U.S. officials who expressed to me the challenges
they've gone through to try to make apologies to our partners.
And I personally sat down in London to have that apology
conversation, and it was very disruptive.
Very quickly--did you provide any classified or otherwise
sensitive information to reporters or media consultants
regarding the details of the Abbottabad raid?
Mr. Brennan. No, I did not, Senator.
Senator Burr. Then, do you know who disclosed information
that prompted the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, to advise
the White House to tell people to shut up?
Mr. Brennan. You would have to ask Secretary Gates what he
was referring to at that time, because I don't know.
Senator Burr. In conclusion, let me just go back to the
initial questions that the Chair referred to. And in that, I
think you might have taken her request on documents to be the
documents that we've got outstanding right now; I think she was
referring to the future.
But let me just say I hope that you take the opportunity,
if you haven't already, to take back to the administration that
it is absolutely essential that the documents this Committee
has requested on Benghazi be supplied before the confirmation
moves forward. I realize--I'm not saying that you were part of
it, but it is absolutely essential that we get those documents
before we begin a new administration at the CIA. And I hope you
will deliver that message. I thank you.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Mr. Brennan,
thank you for our discussions and for the joint meeting that
you had with several of us on the Committee last week.
As we discussed then, I believe the issues before us really
have nothing to do with political party, and have everything to
do with the checks and balances that make our system of
government so special.
Taking the fight to al-Qa'ida is something every Member of
this Committee feels strongly about. It's the idea of giving
any president unfettered power to kill an American without
checks and balances that's so troubling. Every American has the
right to know when their government believes it's allowed to
kill them.
And ensuring that the Congress has the documents and
information it needs to conduct robust oversight is central to
our democracy. In fact, the Committee was actually created, in
large part, in response to lax oversight of programs that
involved targeted killings.
So it was encouraging last night when the President called
and indicated that, effective immediately, he would release the
documents necessary for Senators to understand the full legal
analysis of the President's authority to conduct the targeted
killing of an American. What the President said is a good first
step towards ensuring the openness and accountability that's
important, and you heard that reaffirmed in the Chair's strong
words right now.
Since last night, however, I have become concerned that the
Department of Justice is not following through with the
President's commitment just yet. Eleven United States Senators
asked to see any and all legal opinions, but when I went to
read the opinions this morning, it is not clear that that is
what was provided.
And moreover on this point, with respect to lawyers, I
think the concern is that there's a double standard. As the
National Security Advisor--you volunteered, to your credit, you
weren't a lawyer--you ask your lawyers and your experts to help
you. And we're trying to figure out how to wade through all
these documents, and one of the reasons why I'm concerned that
it's not yet clear that what the President committed to has
actually been provided.
And finally on this point, the Committee has been just
stonewalled on several other requests, particularly with
respect to secret law. And I'm going to leave this point simply
by saying I hope you'll go back to the White House and convey
to them the message that the Justice Department is not yet
following through on the President's commitment. Will you
convey that message?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, I will, Senator.
Senator Wyden. Very good.
Let me now move to the public side of oversight--making
sure that the public's right to know is respected. One part of
oversight is Congressional oversight, and our doing our work
here. The other is making sure that the American people are
brought into these debates; just like James Madison said--this
is what you need to preserve a republic.
And I want to start with the drone issue. In a speech last
year, the President instructed you to be more open with the
public about the use of drones to conduct targeted killings of
al-Qa'ida members.
So, my question is what should be done next, to ensure
public conversation about drones, so that the American people
are brought into this debate and have a full understanding of
what rules the government is going to observe when it conducts
targeted killings?
Mr. Brennan. Well, I think this hearing is one of the
things that can be done, because I think this type of discourse
between the Executive and the Legislative Branch is critically
important.
I believe that there needs to be continued speeches that
are going to be given by the Executive Branch to explain our
counterterrorism programs. I think there is a misimpression on
the part of some of the American people who believe that we
take strikes to punish terrorists for past transgressions--
nothing could be further from the truth. We only take such
actions as a last resort to save lives when there's no other
alternative to taking an action that's going to mitigate that
threat.
So we will need to make sure that there is an
understanding. And the people that were standing up here today,
I think they really have a misunderstanding of what we do as a
government, and the care that we take, and the agony that we go
through to make sure that we do not have any collateral
injuries or deaths.
And as the Chairman said earlier, the need to be able to go
out and say that publicly and openly, I think, is critically
important, because people are reacting to a lot of falsehoods
that are out there. And I do see it as part of my obligation,
and I think it's the obligation of this Committee, to make sure
the truth is known to the American public and to the world.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Brennan, I'm also convinced there are
parts of drone policy that can be declassified consistent with
national security. And I hope that you will work with me on
that if you are confirmed.
Let me ask you several other questions with respect to the
President's authority to kill Americans. I've asked you how
much evidence the President needs to decide that a particular
American can be lawfully killed, and whether the administration
believes that the President can use this authority inside the
United States. In my judgment, both the Congress and the public
needs to understand the answers to these kinds of fundamental
questions.
What do you think needs to be done to ensure that members
of the public understand more about when the government thinks
it's allowed to kill them, particularly with respect to those
two issues--the question of evidence, and the authority to use
this power within the United States?
Mr. Brennan. I have been a strong proponent of trying to be
as open as possible with these programs as far as our
explaining what we're doing. What we need to do is optimize
transparency on these issues, but at the same time, optimize
secrecy and the protection of our national security. I don't
think that it's one or the other; it's trying to optimize both
of them.
And so, what we need to do is make sure we explain to the
American people: what are the thresholds for action; what are
the procedures, the practices, the processes, the approvals,
the reviews.
The Office of Legal Counsel advice establishes the legal
boundaries within which we can operate. It doesn't mean that we
operate at those outer boundaries. And, in fact, I think the
American people would be quite pleased to know that we've been
very disciplined and very judicious, and we only use these
authorities and these capabilities as a last resort.
Senator Wyden. One other point with respect to public
oversight: if the Executive Branch makes a mistake and kills
the wrong person or a group of the wrong people, how should the
government acknowledge that?
Mr. Brennan. I believe we need to acknowledge it. I believe
we need to it knowledge it to our foreign partners. We need to
acknowledge it publicly.
There are certain circumstances where there are
considerations to be taken into account, but as far as I'm
concerned, if there is this type of action that takes place, in
the interest of transparency, I believe the United States
Government should acknowledge it.
Senator Wyden. And acknowledge it publicly?
Mr. Brennan. That would be ideal, and that would be the
objective of the program.
Senator Wyden. One last question if I might: in my letter
to you three weeks ago, I noted that I've been asking for over
a year to receive the names of any and all countries where the
Intelligence Community has used its lethal authorities.
If confirmed, would you provide the full list of countries
to the Members of this Committee and our staff?
Mr. Brennan. I know that this is an outstanding request on
your part. During our courtesy call, we discussed it. If I were
to be confirmed as director of CIA, I would get back to you,
and it would be my intention to do everything possible to meet
this Committee's legitimate interests and requests.
Senator Wyden. Well, I'm going to wrap up just with one
sentence on this point, Chair Feinstein.
It's a matter of public record, Mr. Brennan, that the raid
that killed Osama bin Laden was carried out under the authority
of CIA Director Leon Panetta. So that tells you right there
that the Intelligence Community's lethal authorities have been
used in at least one country.
I want to hear you say that if these authorities have been
used in any other countries, that you'll provide this Committee
with the full list. Now, will you give us that assurance?
Mr. Brennan. You're talking about a historical list; are
you not, Senator Wyden--as far as anytime, anywhere, that the
CIA was involved in such a lethal provision?
Senator Wyden. Yes.
Mr. Brennan. I would have to go back and take a look at
that request. Certainly, anything that--if I were to go to CIA,
and the CIA was involved in any type of lethal activity, I
would damn well make sure that this Committee had that
information; absolutely.
Senator Wyden. That's a good start.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, thank you for your service over the years.
I want to follow up on a conversation you and I had in my
office, and it touches on what Senator Burr asked you about a
little bit, and that is the question of leaks.
I was glad to hear you acknowledge in your opening
statement how important it is that we avoid leaks of any kind,
because they are dangerous, they endanger the lives of
Americans, and they can't be tolerated in the business that
we're in. And you agree with that, I gather?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Risch. Okay. Well, I want to talk to you about a
person who I believe, and I think you acknowledge, is one of
the most dangerous people on the planet, and that's Ibrahim al-
Asiri. And the conversation that you had with Senator Burr was
referring to the interview that you gave that talked about the
plot that was uncovered that involved him. Do you recall that
conversation with Senator Burr?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, I do, Senator.
Senator Risch. Okay. And I have in front of me the Reuters
article that's dated May 18, 2012, describing your engagement
with the media regarding Mr. Asiri and the plot; you're
familiar with that article, I would assume?
Mr. Brennan. I have read many articles, so I presume I read
that one.
Senator Risch. Well, this particular one is one that's
similar, I think, as far as the leak itself and how we got to
where we are on this.
I want to quote from the article. It says, ``At about 5:45
p.m., Eastern Daylight Time, on Monday, May 7, just before the
evening newscasts, John Brennan, President Barack Obama's top
White House advisor on counterterrorism, held a small, private
teleconference to brief former counterterrorism advisors who
have become frequent commentators on TV news shows.''
Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Brennan. That is an accurate statement, Senator. Yes.
Senator Risch. And can you tell me--who was involved in
that conversation; who was involved in that interview?
Mr. Brennan. I believe that the people who were on that
phone included one of my predecessors, Fran Townsend; Roger
Cressey; Juan Zarate; Richard Clarke. I think these are
individuals who have served in the government and are
counterterrorism professionals.
Senator Risch. Any others you can think of?
Mr. Brennan. I do not remember the others.
Senator Risch. Do you have notes from that conversation?
Mr. Brennan. There are notes, yes--that people took at
that, yes.
Senator Risch. Have those been turned over to the Justice
Department?
Mr. Brennan. The Justice Department--as I said, I
voluntarily and eagerly engaged in that investigation, and they
have----
Senator Risch. That wasn't the question. Were those notes
turned over?
Mr. Brennan. Everything that was available on that has been
turned over to the Department of Justice; absolutely, Senator.
Senator Risch. Did you turn those notes over?
Mr. Brennan. My office turned over everything that was
available about that, yes.
Senator Risch. Who took those notes?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I was not taking notes at the time.
There were people, also, from the White House, who were on that
conversation, as we do with all of these types of engagements.
Senator Risch. And who were the people that were involved
in that conversation?
Mr. Brennan. Aside from the reporters? There was somebody
from the White House Press Office and someone from the
Counterterrorism directorate.
Senator Risch. You don't know the peoples' names?
Mr. Brennan. I do. They were Nick Rasmussen and Caitlin
Hayden.
Senator Risch. Those are the two people from the White
House that were involved; is that----
Mr. Brennan. That's my recollection of who was involved in
that conference call, yes.
Senator Risch. May 7th was the date that the incident
occurred; is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. The date of the conversation with those
reports?
Senator Risch. Excuse me--the date of the underlying event
that you were talking about involving Mr. Asiri.
Mr. Brennan. Now you're talking about Mr. Asiri--in terms
of being the person who was responsible for putting together
the IED?
Senator Risch. Correct.
Mr. Brennan. I believe May 7th was about the right date,
yes.
Senator Risch. And can you tell me why you felt compelled
to release that information to these people on May 7, 2012?
Mr. Brennan. Well, as I explained on the network news the
following morning, and as we said publicly, that device was not
a threat to the American public at the time of the bin Laden
anniversary----
Senator Risch. I don't want to cut you off, but that's not
the question.
Mr. Brennan. I thought it was, Senator. But go ahead.
Senator Risch. No. The question was why did you feel
compelled to hold this press conference and divulge that
information at that time on that day?
Mr. Brennan. It wasn't a press conference; it was a
teleconference with these individuals. And I know they were
going out on TV that evening and I wanted to make sure that
these individuals with that background on counterterrorism were
able to explain appropriately to the American people as we've
been talking about--the importance of making sure the American
people were aware of the threat environment and what we're
doing on the counterterrorism front.
Senator Risch. And they were going to go on TV that evening
to discuss this event?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, because it had already broken. The news
reports had broken that afternoon, Senator, and so there was a
flurry of activity and press reporting that was going on. These
individuals reached out to us, as they normally do. So this was
just a routine engagement with the press, as we normally do
when these things are made public.
Senator Risch. The next paragraph says, ``According to five
people familiar with the call, Brennan stressed that the plot
was never a threat to the U.S. public or air safety because
Washington had inside control over it.''
Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Brennan. Inside control of the plot, yes, that's
exactly right.
Senator Risch. Okay. So, based on that, one would know that
we had something inside; is that a fair statement?
Mr. Brennan. From that statement, it is known that that
IED, at the time, was not a threat to the traveling public,
because we had said publicly that there was no active plot at
the time of the bin Laden anniversary. That's correct.
Senator Risch. Would you agree with me that that disclosure
resulted in the outing of an asset that shouldn't have been
outed?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely not, Senator. I do not agree with
you, whatsoever.
Senator Risch. Well, how can you say that?
Mr. Brennan. What I'm saying is that we were explaining to
the American public why that IED was not, in fact, a threat at
the time that it was in the control of individuals. When we say
``positive control,'' ``inside control,'' that means that we
have, in fact, that operation, either environmentally or any
number of ways. It did not in any way reveal any type of
classified information.
And I told those individuals--and there are transcripts
that are available of that conversation--``I cannot talk to you
about the operational details of this, whatsoever.''
Senator Risch. Having used the words that you used of
``inside control,'' it isn't much of a leap to determine that
somehow you had a handle on it.
Mr. Brennan. It's not much of a leap to know that if in
fact we said this IED was, in fact, obtained, and it was not a
threat at the time, that there was some type of inside control.
It is almost a truism.
Senator Risch. Well, having said that, it seems to me that
the leak that the Justice Department is looking for is right
here in front of us. And you disagree with that?
Mr. Brennan. I disagree with you vehemently, Senator. And
I've talked to the Department of Justice. As I said, I
conducted interviews with them. And, you know, I am a witness
in that, as many other people are. And as you know, there's
witness and subject and target. I'm not a subject. I'm not a
target. I am a witness. Because I want to make sure whoever
leaked this information that got out to the press and that
seriously did disrupt some very sensitive operational equities
on the part of some of our international partners--that never
should have happened.
Senator Risch. And you're in agreement with that--that this
was a serious flaw in what should have happened; is that
correct?
Mr. Brennan. It's a serious flaw that it got out to the
press before that operation was, in fact, concluded;
absolutely. And my discussion with those individuals that
night, it already was out in the press.
Senator Risch. You would agree with me that on the day that
we get Mr. Asiri, it's going to be either a very, very good
day, or, if he gets us first, it's going to be a very, very bad
day for the American people, and particularly for anyone who
was involved in a leak concerning him.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I live this every day and night.
Senator Risch. I understand.
Mr. Brennan. I go to bed at night worrying that I didn't do
enough that day to make sure I could protect the American
people. So, when Mr. Asiri is brought to justice, one way or
another, it will be because of the work that's been done over
the past number of years by some very brave Americans in CIA
and other places.
So, believe me, I am focused as a laser on the issue of the
IED threat, AQAP, and Mr. al-Asiri.
Senator Risch. I have more, but my time is up.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Mikulski.
Before you start, Senator, a vote is due to start at four.
It's now five after four. Senator Chambliss went to vote; as
soon as he returns, I will go. And we will just keep this
going. So, Members, be guided by that.
The vote just started. Please go ahead.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Brennan, first of all, welcome to the
Committee. And in the short time I have--you mentioned your
wife, Kathy; could you introduce us to her?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, this is my wonderful, beautiful wife,
Kathy, who's been my spouse for 34 years and my partner in my
work. And my brother, Thomas, also is here, from New Jersey.
Senator Mikulski. Well, we'd like to welcome you. And we
know that not only will you serve, but your entire family has
served, and will continue to serve. And I'm going to echo the
remarks of my colleague, Senator Warner, thanking the people of
the Central Intelligence Agency for what they do every day in
every way, working often in a way that is not known, not
recognized, and quite frankly, not always appreciated.
So, let me get to my questions. I have been concerned for
some time that there is a changing nature of the CIA, and that
instead of it being America's top human spy agency to make sure
that we have no strategic surprises, that it has become, more
and more, executing paramilitary operations.
And I've discussed this with you in our conversation. How
do you see this? I see this as mission-creep. I see this as
overriding the original mission of the CIA, for which you're so
well versed, and more a function of the Special Operations
Command.
Could you share with me how you see the CIA and what you
think about this militarization of the CIA that's going on?
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator, and thank you----
Senator Mikulski. You might disagree with me, and I welcome
your disagreement is you so do so.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, the principal missions of the Agency
is to collect intelligence, uncover those secrets, as you say,
to prevent those strategic surprises, and to be the best
analytic component within the U.S. Government, to do the all-
source analysis that CIA has done so well for many, many years.
At times, the President asks and directs the CIA to do
covert action. That covert action can take any number of forms,
to include paramilitary. And, as we've discussed here today on
the counterterrorism front, there are things that the Agency
has been involved in since 9/11 that, in fact, have been a bit
of an aberration from its traditional role.
One of the things that I would do if I would go back to the
Agency is to take a look at that allocation of mission within
CIA--the resources that are dedicated to this, and, as we had
the discussion when I paid my courtesy call, I am concerned
that looking at the world, which is a very big place, we need
to make sure we have the best intelligence collection
capabilities possible and the best analytic capabilities
possible. And the CIA should not be doing traditional military
activities and operations.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I appreciate that and look forward
to working with you on this to really identify what's up with
the CIA, and to DoD, which then takes me to the issue of cyber
threat.
Both Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and so on--and we,
in your current role at the White House--have talked about the
cyber threat. You were a big help in trying to help us get the
cyber legislation passed.
Now, tell us what you think is the role of the CIA in
dealing with the cyber threat in the area of human intelligence
with the CIA? You have a unique insight into it. We know what
NSA does; we know what Homeland Security is supposed to do;
tell us where you see the CIA in this.
Mr. Brennan. Well, first of all, the cyber threat that this
country faces is one of the most insidious and one of the most
consequential to our national security, and one that I think
that our government as a whole and this body, the Congress,
really needs to be focused on and do everything possible to
prevent a devastating attack against this country because of
our vulnerabilities on the cyber front.
CIA's traditional mission on the collection front is to try
to determine the plans and intentions of foreign governments,
foreign groups, sub-national groups, and others.
Learning about those plans and intentions, and the
development of capabilities in the cyber world, is something
that CIA, I think, is best placed to do, so that we have an
understanding of what foreign countries are doing, what
organized criminal organizations are doing, what sub-national
groups are doing, and the nature of the threat to us.
Then, in addition, the analysts at CIA can take that
information, working with the rest of the Community, to make
sure that policymakers have a good sense of the nature of the
threat and some potential mitigation strategies. And then,
working with NSA, Department of Homeland Security, and others,
put together that structure that's going to make this country
resistant and resilient to those attacks.
Senator Mikulski. Well, Mr. Brennan, I really look forward
to working with you on this, because this cuts across all the
agencies--those that have responsibility for work outside of
this country, inside this country, and yet, we all have to be
doing--what we're--to use the Marine Corp saying--the best that
we're best at and best that we're most needed for.
I consider this one of the greatest threats and one of the
greatest vulnerabilities, because we failed to pass the
legislation ourselves. We can't stop what foreign predators
want to do. I mean, we can divert; identify an attack. But we
are making ourselves vulnerable.
Now, I want to get to the job of the CIA director. I'm
going to be blunt--and this will be no surprise to you, sir--
but I've been on this Committee for more than 10 years, and
with the exception of Mr. Panetta, I feel I've been jerked
around by every CIA director. I've either been misled,
misrepresented, had to pull information out--often at the most
minimal kind of way; from Tenet, with his little aluminum rods,
to tell us that we had weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, to
Porter Goss--not forthcoming.
You know the problems we've had with torture. The Chair has
spoken eloquently about it, all the way. And quite frankly,
during those questions, they were evaded; they were distorted,
et cetera.
So, my question to you is: knowing your background, knowing
your Jesuit education, knowing what I think your values are,
can I have your word that you're going to be very forthcoming
with this Committee, to speak truth to power, to speak truth
about power, even when it's uncomfortable, or where we're going
to have to probe in a way that is not an easy way to go?
Mr. Brennan. Honesty, truthfulness, was a value that was
inculcated in me in my home in New Jersey, from my parents,
Owen and Dorothy. It still is to this day.
Honesty is the best policy. None of us are perfect beings.
I'm far from perfect. But, Senator, I would commit that I would
be honest with this Committee and do everything possible to
meet your legitimate needs and requirements. As I think I've
told you before, I know that you are a very proud senator of
one of the jewels in the Intelligence Community, NSA, which
resides in Maryland, but it would be my objective to make CIA
your favorite intelligence agency and push Keith Alexander
aside.
[Laughter.]
Senator Mikulski. Well, I think you're pushing your luck
now.
Thank you very much.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you for your willingness to serve here, Mr. Brennan.
You've said publicly that you believe waterboarding is
inconsistent with American values; it's something that should
be prohibited, and it goes beyond the bounds of what a
civilized society should employ.
My question is this: in your opinion, does waterboarding
constitute torture?
Mr. Brennan. The attorney general has referred to
waterboarding as torture. Many people have referred to it as
torture. The attorney general, premiere of law enforcement
officer and lawyer of this country. And as you well know, and
as we've had the discussion, Senator, the term ``torture'' has
a lot of legal and political implications. It is something that
should have been banned long ago. It never should have taken
place in my view. And, therefore, if I were to go to CIA, it
would never, in fact, be brought back.
Senator Levin. Do you have a personal opinion as to whether
waterboarding is torture?
Mr. Brennan. I have a personal opinion that waterboarding
is reprehensible, and it's something that should not be done.
And, again, I am not a lawyer, Senator, and I can't address
that question.
Senator Levin. Well, you've read opinions as to whether or
not waterboarding is torture. And I'm just--do you accept those
opinions of the attorney general? That's my question.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, you know, I've read a lot of legal
opinions. I've read an Office of Legal Counsel opinion in the
previous administration that said in fact waterboarding could
be used. So, from the standpoint of that, you know, I cannot
point to a single legal document on this issue.
But, as far as I'm concerned, waterboarding is something
that never should have been employed, and, as far as I'm
concerned, never will be, if I have anything to do with it.
Senator Levin. Is waterboarding banned by the Geneva
Conventions?
Mr. Brennan. I believe the attorney general also has said
that it's contrary, in contravention, of the Geneva Convention.
Again, I am not a lawyer, or a legal scholar, to make a
determination about what is in violation of an international
convention.
Senator Levin. Mr. Rodriguez, the former CIA deputy
director for operations, was asked about his personal moral or
ethical perspective on these enhanced interrogation techniques,
including waterboarding.
He said that he knew of--and these are his words--``I know
that many of these procedures were applied to our own
servicemen. Tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers had gone through
this.''
Now, as we investigated, at Senate Armed Services
Committee, in our 2008 report, these so-called ``Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape''--or ``SERE''--techniques
referred to by Mr. Rodriguez were used to train members of our
military. They were never intended to be used by U.S.
interrogators.
These techniques were based on Chinese Communist
interrogation techniques used during the Korean War to elicit
confessions, were developed to expose U.S.--and the use of or
the training of U.S. personnel and exposing of them for a few
moments to these techniques which helped to--was meant to help
them survive in the event they were captured and the event they
were subjected to these techniques.
My question to you is this: is there any comparability
between a friendly trainer in the United States exposing our
troops to abuses--these SERE techniques, including
waterboarding--for a few moments under close supervision; is
there any possible comparability to that to using these
techniques on an enemy in an effort to extract intelligence?
Mr. Brennan. They are for completely different purposes and
intentions. I do not see any comparability there.
Senator Levin. Now, the Chairman and I issued a report, or
made a statement, on April 27, 2012. This also began with a
statement of Mr. Rodriguez.
And here's what he said: ``Information provided by CIA
detainees Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about
bin Laden's courier being the lead information that eventually
led to the location of bin Laden's compound and the operation
that led to his death.''
That's what Rodriguez said. We said that statement is
wrong. The original lead information had no connection to CIA
detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier
that was collected from a variety of classified sources. While
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used against
KSM and al-Libbi, the pair provided false and misleading
information during their time in CIA custody.
Now, my question to you is: are you aware of any
intelligence information that supports Mr. Rodriguez's claim
that the lead information on the courier came from KSM and al-
Libbi?
Mr. Brennan. I have not reviewed the intelligence
thoroughly, but I am unaware of any.
Senator Levin. Next, Michael Hayden, former CIA director,
on May 3, 2011, said that ``What we got, the original lead
information, began with information from CIA detainees at black
sites.''
The Chairman and I issued, in the same statement, the
following--that the statement of the former attorney general,
Michael Mukasey, was wrong. Do you have any information to
disagree with our statement?
Mr. Brennan. I do not.
Senator Levin. The third statement that we quoted in our
report--out of Michael Hayden, former CIA director: ``What we
got, the original lead information, began with''--excuse me;
that was Mr. Hayden that I was asking you about, not Mr.
Mukasey. Your answer is the same, I assume?
Mr. Brennan. Yeah, I do not know. I'm unaware.
Senator Levin. You don't have any information to the
contrary?
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Levin. Now Michael Mukasey, former attorney
general, Wall Street Journal: ``Consider how the intelligence
that led to bin Laden came to hand: it began with a disclosure
from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who broke like a dam under
pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included
waterboarding. He released a torrent of information, including
eventually the name''--the name - ``of a trusted courier of bin
Laden.''
Our statement--that of the Chairman and myself--is that
that statement is wrong. Do you have any information to the
contrary?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, my impression earlier on was that
there was information that was provided that was useful and
valuable, but, as I said, I've read now the first volume of
your report, which raises questions about whether any of that
information was accurate.
Senator Levin. But I'm now referring not to the report, but
to the statement that Chairman Feinstein and I issued on April
27, 2012. We flat-out say that those statements are wrong.
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Levin. Do you have any basis to disagree with us?
Mr. Brennan. I do not.
Senator Levin. Will you, when you become the CIA director,
assuming you are confirmed, take the statement that we have
issued and tell us whether or not you disagree with any of
these statements that we have made about those statements of
those three men; will you do that if you are confirmed?
Mr. Brennan. I will look and consider that request,
Senator. As I said, the report that this Committee has put
together, I need to take a look at what CIA's response is to
it. And that report raises serious questions about whether any
worthwhile intelligence came from these individuals.
Senator Levin. Will you include, in your review, a review
of our joint statement and tell us whether, after your review,
you disagree with anything that we've said; will you do that?
Mr. Brennan. I would be happy to.
Senator Levin. Now, there's one final point, and that has
to do with a very famous document. And that has to do with a
cable that came in that relates to the so-called ``Atta''
matter. Are you familiar with that issue?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, I am, Senator.
Senator Levin. The issue here is whether or not there ever
was a meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, who is one of
the people who attacked the Trade Center, and the Iraqi
Intelligence.
The cable that came in has been classified by the CIA, even
though the report of--this is what the CIA did to the cable.
(Holds up a piece of paper containing text that has mostly been
redacted.)
Now, will you check with the Czechs for the source of this
cable and see if they have any objection to the release of this
cable relative to the report of that meeting?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, Senator. And since our courtesy call, I
have looked into this issue, and I know that you and Director
Petraeus were involved in a discussion on this. And I would be
happy to follow up on it. But there does seem to be some
concerns about release of the cable.
Senator Levin. The unclassified report of the Intelligence
Committee--which was not classified; was not redacted by the
CIA--made at least four references to the Czech Intelligence
Service providing the CIA with reporting, based on a single
source, about this alleged meeting, which never took place. We
knew it never took place. And yet, repeatedly--particularly the
Vice President--made reference that there was a report of a
meeting between these two.
Now, it's very significant for the historical record here.
We went to war based on allegations that there was a
relationship between Iraq and the attackers--the 9/11
attackers. It's very important that this cable be declassified.
The only reason to keep it redacted and classified, frankly, is
to protect an administration, not to protect sources and
methods, because the sources and methods--if you will check
with the Czechs, I'm sure they will tell you they have no
objection to the release of that cable.
My question to you is will you check with the Czechs, if
you are confirmed, and determine whether they have any
objection to the release of the cable, which makes reference to
them?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely, Senator; I will.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, we acknowledge your experience, and I think
that experience is important to have for the position that, if
confirmed, you will occupy. I acknowledge your service to the
country and your experience in this field. I think the
President used that as one of the criteria, of course.
You and I, when we talked earlier in a private talk, talked
about the relationship that you want to have with this
Committee--not just with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman,
but with all the Committee Members. And I appreciate your
answers on that, and you addressed it again today, in terms of
a potential trust deficit or--you said that that's ``wholly
unacceptable'' and that you would give straight answers and be
blunt and candid.
And you've been that today. It's not a prerequisite to be
Mr. Congeniality to occupy the position of director of CIA, so
I don't hold that as--in fact, it would be probably a red flag
for me if somebody did have that award and wanted your
position.
The kind of issues that you have to deal with require
straight talk, straight answers, and getting to the chase real
quick. You said it's the ``New Jersey'' way. I'll accept that;
it's bipartisan. Governor Christie exhibits the same kind of
responses and has a pretty high approval rating.
So, we will go forward with taking you at your word that
we'll have the kind of relationship that we can have a blunt,
straightforward, fully disclosed, working relationship. I think
it's critical to our ability to provide oversight, our ability
to have the right kind of relationship with the Agency so we
know where each other is and can move forward together in terms
of what needs to be done to provide the intelligence necessary
to protect the American people.
So, I wanted to say that. I'd like to follow up a little
bit more on the leaks question because I have a few more
questions. I was going to delve into that in more detail, but
it's already been discussed by Senator Risch and others. But
let me just ask a couple of other questions to clear some
things up in my mind.
My understanding is that the Associated Press had
information relative to the intercept of a planned operation
that perhaps had something to do with airlines and explosive
devices; that apparently they had that for a few days and then
either were about to or had gone ahead and released it. I'm
assuming that your then calling the conference call was in
response to what they had just released; is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. Yes. A number of news networks have put out
information about this. Yes.
Senator Coats. And you expressly arranged this
teleconference for what exact purpose?
Mr. Brennan. There were a number of people who were going
to be going out on the news shows that night who were asking
about the reports about this intercepted IED and wanted to get
some context, as far as the nature of the threat, and also were
asking questions about--``Well, you said, and the U.S.
Government said, that there was no threat during the
anniversary of the bin Laden take-down, so how could there not
have been a threat if, in fact, this IED was out there?''
Senator Coats. The question I have is this--because based
on what you said and what we have learned, you then, in that
teleconference, talked about the fact that, in answering the
question, ``How do we know this?''--I think the quote that came
across from Richard Clarke was, ``never came close, because
they had insider information, insider control.'' And you had
referenced that you had said that to the group.
Mr. Brennan. No, what I said was inside control of the
plot, and that the device was never a threat.
Senator Coats. Okay, ``insider control.''
Mr. Brennan. No, I said ``inside control''--not
``insider.''
Senator Coats. Okay, ``inside control.'' The Associated
Press never made any mention about inside control. Why was it
necessary, then, to add that? Why couldn't you have just simply
said, ``We've intercepted a plot--it's been a successful
interception''? Because once the word ``inside control'' got
out, then all the speculation--and correct--was that that
``inside control'' was interpreted as meaning ``we've got
somebody inside.''
And the result of that was the covert action operation had
to be dissolved because the control agent, the inside person,
was--well, essentially, the plot was exposed, and therefore,
the whole operation had to be dissolved.
Mr. Brennan. Well, Senator, I must caution that there are
still elements of this event that remain classified and that we
cannot talk about in public. There was a lot of information
that came out immediately after AP broke that story.
Unfortunately, there was a hemorrhaging of information and
leaks.
Again, what I said was that there was inside control,
because what I needed to do, and what I said to the American
public in open networks the following morning, is that during
the anniversary period of the bin Laden take-down, when we said
to the American public that there were no active plots, no
threat to the American public, that we were aware of, that was
specific and credible.
Well, why was not this IED that we had intercepted--why
wasn't that a threat? Well, because we had inside control of
the plot, which means any number of things--in terms of
environmentally, working with partners, whatever else. It did
not reveal any classified information. And as I said, we have
to be careful here because there are still operational elements
of this that remain classified.
Senator Coats. And that's appropriate, but, you know, it
was just a couple weeks later when Reuters reported publicly,
and I quote, ``As a result of the news leaks, U.S. and allied
officials told Reuters that they were forced to end an
operation which they had hoped could have continued for weeks
or longer.''
Mr. Brennan. There were a lot of things that were reported
by the press--accurate, inaccurate--a whole bunch of stuff,
Senator. So I would not put stock in the types of things that
you might be reading there. I know that I engaged for an
extended period of time both before that leak and afterward to
make sure we were able to mitigate any damage from that initial
leak, and the subsequent leaks, of classified information.
Senator Coats. So, you're essentially saying that this
Reuters report may or may not be accurate, but had no link to
what was disclosed to Mr. Clarke and then what he said shortly
thereafter on ABC News?
Mr. Brennan. What I'm saying, Senator, is that I'm very
comfortable with what I did and what I said at that time to
make sure that we were able to deal with the unfortunate leak
of classified information.
Senator Coats. How frequently did you have to pull groups
like this together in order to, in a sense, put out authorized,
or at least what you think is appropriate, news for the correct
purposes?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, frequently, if there is some type of
event, or if there's a disrupted terrorist attack, whether it's
some ``underwear bomber'' or a disrupted IED, or a printer
bomb, or whatever else, we will engage with the American
public. We'll engage with the press. We'll engage with
individuals who are experienced professional counterterrorism
experts who will go out and talk to the American public.
We want to make sure that there are not misrepresentations,
in fact, of the facts, but at the same time, do it in a way
that we're able to maintain control over classified material.
Senator Coats. Now, it does occur, I assume, or it is
possible, to put out an authorized leak; is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. No. Those are oxymorons: ``authorized leak.''
It is something that would have to be declassified, disclosed,
and done in a proper manner.
Senator Coats. And this, in no way, fell into that
category?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely not. I was asked to engage with
these individuals by the White House Press Office. I talked
with them about the interception. No, it was not.
Senator Coats. There is a provision in last year's
Intelligence Authorization Bill that requires a report to this
Committee of any authorized leak; so, you are aware of that?
Mr. Brennan. I'm aware of the provision, yes, that's been
put forward.
Senator Coats. And no report has come forward, so I assume
there haven't been any authorized leaks in the past year?
Mr. Brennan. I think, you know, what we want to do is to
make sure if there's going to be any disclosures of classified
information, that this Committee is going to be informed about
that. So we will adhere to the provision that was in that Intel
Authorization Bill.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Good afternoon, Mr. Brennan. I can't help but--observing
that Senator Coats talked about being governor of New Jersey, I
think being governor of Jersey is a piece of cake compared to
being the director of the CIA.
I hope Governor Christie won't take that in the wrong way,
by the way, because I have great respect for him.
Mr. Brennan. I have no plans to run against Governor
Christie.
[Laughter]
Senator Udall. Thank you for your service. Thank you for
your willingness to continue serving as the head of the CIA. I
have some comments I'd like to share with you, and then of
course I'll direct some questions your way.
You've said that President Obama believes that, done
carefully, deliberately, and responsibly, we can be more
transparent and still ensure our nation's security. I
absolutely agree. The American people have the right to know
what their government does on their behalf.
Consistent with our national security, the presumption of
transparency should be the rule, not the exception, and the
government should make as much information available to the
American public as possible.
So when we, on the Committee, and we, as Members of
Congress, push hard for access to the legal analysis justifying
the authority of the Executive Branch to lethally target
Americans using drones, for instance, it erodes the
government's credibility of the American people.
I want to tell you I'm grateful to the President for
allowing Members of this Committee to briefly use some of the
legal opinions on targeting American citizens. This is an
important first step. But I want to tell you, I think there's
much more to be done in that regard. And you've heard that from
my colleagues here today.
I've long believed that our government also has an
obligation to the American people to face its mistakes
transparently, help the public understand the nature of those
mistakes, and correct them. The next director of the CIA has an
important task ahead in this regard.
Mr. Brennan, I know you're familiar with the mistakes that
I'm referring to. We've already discussed those here today to
some extent. They're outlined in the Committee's 6,000-page
report on the CIA's detention and interrogation program, based
on a documentary view of over 6 million pages of CIA and other
records, and including 35,000 footnotes.
I believe that this program was severely flawed. It was
mismanaged. The enhanced interrogation techniques were brutal,
and, perhaps most importantly, it did not work. Nonetheless, it
was portrayed to the White House, the Department of Justice,
the Congress, and the media as a program that resulted in
unique information that saved lives.
And I appreciate the comments you made earlier about the
misinformation that may have flowed from those who were in
charge of this program to people like yourself. Acknowledging
the flaws of this program is essential for the CIA's long-term
institutional integrity, as well as for the legitimacy of
ongoing sensitive programs. The findings of this report
directly relate to how other CIA programs are managed today.
As you said in your opening remarks, and you so powerfully
referenced the Memorial Wall, all CIA employees should be proud
of where they work, and of all the CIA's activities. I think
the best way to ensure that they're proud is for you to lead in
correcting the false record, and instituting the necessary
reforms that will restore the CIA's reputation for integrity
and analytical rigor. The CIA cannot be its best until the
leadership faces the serious and grievous mistakes of this
program.
So, if I might, let me turn to my first question.
Inaccurate information on the management operation
effectiveness of the CIA's detention and interrogation program
was provided by the CIA to the White House, the DoJ, Congress,
and the public. Some of this information is regularly and
publicly repeated today by former CIA officials, either
knowingly or unknowingly.
And although we now know this information is incorrect, the
accurate information remains classified, while inaccurate
information has been declassified and regularly repeated.
And the Committee will take up the matter of this report's
declassification separately. But there's an important role I
think the CIA can play in the interim: CIA has a responsibility
to correct any inaccurate information that was provided to the
previous White House, Department of Justice, Congress, and the
public, regarding the detention and interrogation program.
So, here's my question: do you agree that the CIA has this
responsibility? And I'd appreciate a yes or no answer.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, Senator.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that. Again, yes or no--will
you commit to working with the Committee to correct the public
and internal record regarding the detention and interrogation
program within the next 90 days?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I think it's only fair of me to say
that I am looking forward to CIA's response to that report so
that we're assured that we have both the Committee's report, as
well as CIA's comments on it. And I will be getting back to
you, yes.
Senator Udall. I can understand you want to make sure you
have accurate time. I understand, as well, that the CIA will
finish their analysis by the middle of February. And so, I hope
we can work within that time frame.
And I know that in your answers to the Committee in
preparing for this hearing, you wrote that ``the CIA, in all
instances, should convey accurate information to Congress. When
an inaccurate statement is made and the CIA is aware of the
inaccuracy, it must immediately correct the record. And
certainly, I would do so, if I were director.''
So, I take your answer in the spirit of the written
testimony you provided to the Committee. Let me turn to the
report and its eventual declassification, if I might.
I don't think it has to be difficult--that is, the
declassification--for these reasons: the identities of the most
important detainees have already been declassified; the
interrogation techniques themselves have been declassified; the
application of techniques to detainees has been declassified to
some extent, with a partial declassification of the inspector
general report; and the intelligence was declassified to a
significant extent when the Bush administration described plots
it claimed were thwarted as a result of the program.
So long as the report does not identify any undercover
officers, or perhaps the names of certain countries, can you
think of any reason why the report could not be declassified
with the appropriate number of redactions? Can you answer yes
or no to that question?
Mr. Brennan. I would have to take that declassification
request under serious consideration, obviously. That's a very
weighty decision, in terms of declassifying that report, and I
would give it due consideration. But there are a lot of
considerations that go into such decisions.
Senator Udall. I want to, again, underline that I think
this would strengthen the CIA. It would strengthen our standing
in the world. America is at its best, as we discussed earlier
today, when it acknowledges its mistakes, and learns from those
mistakes.
And I want to quote Howard Baker, who I think we all admire
in this room. He spoke about the Church Committee, which he,
you know, was an important effort on the part of this Congress.
And there was much broader criticism of the CIA in that Church
Committee process. And the CIA came out of that stronger and
more poised to do what it's supposed to do.
So I want to quote Howard Baker. He wrote: ``In all candor,
however, one must recognize that an investigation such as this
one''--he's referencing the Church Committee, but I think it
could apply to what this Committee has done, as well--``of
necessity, will cause some short-term damage to our
intelligence apparatus. A responsible inquiry, as this has
been, will, in the long run, result in a stronger and more
efficient Intelligence Community.
``Such short-term inquiry will be outweighed by the long-
term benefits gained from the restructuring of the Intelligence
Community with more efficient utilization of our intelligence
resources.''
So, again, Mr. Brennan, I look forward to working with you
to complete these tasks that we've outlined here today. In the
long run, I have faith in the CIA like you have faith in the
CIA that it will come out of this study stronger and poised to
meet the 21st Century intelligence challenges that are in front
of us. Thank you again for your willingness to serve.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Brennan, for being
here with us today, and congratulations on your nomination.
I wanted to ask, in the 2007 CBS interview, you said that
information obtained in interrogations have saved lives. In
September of 2011, you said in a speech at Harvard, that
whenever possible, the preference of the administration is to
take custody of individuals so that we could obtain information
which is, quote, ``vital to the safety and security of the
American people.''
So, obviously, you believe that interrogations of
terrorists can give us information that could prevent attacks
in the future?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely agree.
Senator Rubio. But you don't believe the CIA should be in
the business of detention, correct?
Mr. Brennan. I agree.
Senator Rubio. So, who should be?
Mr. Brennan. Well, there are a number of options--U.S.
military, which maintains an active interrogation program,
detention program; the FBI, as part of its efforts on
counterterrorism; and our international partners, and working
with them. And that's where, in fact, most of the
interrogations are taking place of terrorists who have been
taken off of the battlefields in many different countries.
Senator Rubio. So there are active interrogations
occurring?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely, every day.
Senator Rubio. Okay. About the foreign partners that you
talk about, have you talked to folks in the CIA about their
impressions of the quality of information we're getting from
our foreign partners?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, on a regular basis.
Senator Rubio. Would it surprise you to know that some of
them have indicated to us repeatedly, over the last couple of
years that I've been here, that the information we get directly
is much better than anything we get from our foreign partners
on some of these issues?
Mr. Brennan. Right. And that's why we work with our foreign
partners so that we can have direct access to these individuals
that have been detained.
Senator Rubio. Well, I'll tell you why I'm concerned. Ali
Ani al-Harzi--I think is how I pronounce his name--he's a
suspect in the Benghazi attack, and the Tunisians detained him,
correct?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, he was taken into custody by the
Tunisians.
Senator Rubio. Did we not ask for access to him, to be able
to interrogate him and find out information?
Mr. Brennan. Yes. And the Tunisians did not have a basis in
their law to hold him.
Senator Rubio. So they released him?
Mr. Brennan. They did.
Senator Rubio. Where is he? We don't know?
Mr. Brennan. He's still in Tunisia.
Senator Rubio. That doesn't sound like a good system of
working with our foreign partners.
Mr. Brennan. No, it shows that the Tunisians are working
with their rule of law, as well--just the way we do.
Senator Rubio. Well, we have someone who was a suspect in
the potential in the attack on Benghazi. They didn't give us
access to him and we don't have any information from him.
Mr. Brennan. We work with our partners across the board,
and when they are able to detain individuals, according to
their laws, we work to see if we can have the ability to ask
them questions--sometimes indirectly and sometimes directly.
Senator Rubio. So your point is that Tunisian law did not
allow them to hold him, and therefore they let him go before we
could get there to talk to him?
Mr. Brennan. And we didn't have anything on him, either,
because if we did, then we would've made a point to the
Tunisians to turn him over to us. We didn't have that.
Senator Rubio. What role should the CIA play in
interrogations?
Mr. Brennan. The CIA should be able to lend its full
expertise, as it does right now, in terms of--in support of
military interrogations, FBI debriefings and interrogations,
and our foreign partner debriefings. And they do that on a
regular basis.
Senator Rubio. And so, what's the best setting to do that
in? For example, if a suspected terrorist is captured, and we
think we can obtain information from them, where would they go?
Where do you suggest that they be taken, for example; what's
the right setting for it?
Mr. Brennan. There are many different options, as far as
where they go. Sometimes it is with--foreign partners, they put
the individuals in their jails and in their detention
facilities according to their laws, and people can access that.
We take people, as we've done in the past, and put them on
naval vessels and interrogate them for an extended period of
time.
Senator Rubio. Okay. So you think that's the best setting--
the naval vessel?
Mr. Brennan. No, I think----
Senator Rubio [continuing]. From our perspective, leaving
aside the foreign partners for a second--for us.
Mr. Brennan [continuing]. I think each case requires a very
unique and tailored response. And that's what we've done.
Whether somebody is picked up by a foreign partner, whether
somebody is picked up on the high seas, or anywhere else, what
we need to do is see what the conditions are, what we have as
far as the basis for that interrogation, what type of legal
basis we have for that. So it's very much tailored to the
circumstances.
Senator Rubio. When we detain a suspected terrorist, the
purpose of the interrogation--and I think you'd agree with this
statement--the purpose of an interrogation is to develop
information that could be used to disrupt terrorist activities
and prevent attacks, correct?
Mr. Brennan. Without a doubt.
Senator Rubio. It's not to lay the case for a criminal
conviction.
Mr. Brennan. Well, I think, you know, you want to take the
person off the battlefield. You also want to get as much
intelligence as possible. You don't just want to get the
information from somebody and then send them off. You need to
be able to do something with them. And we've put people away
for 99 years--for life--so that, in fact, they're not able to
hurt Americans ever again.
So, what you want to do is get that intelligence, but also,
at the same time, put them away so that justice can be done.
Senator Rubio. I understand. But the number one priority,
initially, is not necessarily to protect the record for a
criminal prosecution; it's to obtain timely information----
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely right.
Senator Rubio [continuing]. So we can act correctly----
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely right.
Senator Rubio. Priority number two is to take them off the
battlefield to ensure they can't attack us in the future.
Mr. Brennan. Right. It's not an either-or, but I agree with
you.
Senator Rubio. Why shouldn't we have places where we
interrogate people; for example, Guantanamo? Why shouldn't we
have a place to take people that we obtain? Because is it not
an incentive to kill them rather than to capture them, if we
don't have a----
Mr. Brennan. No, it's never an incentive to kill them. And
any time that we have encountered somebody, we have come up
with, in fact, the route for them to take in order to be
interrogated, debriefed, as well as prosecuted.
Senator Rubio. So, where would we--but why is it a bad idea
to have a place that we can take them to?
Mr. Brennan. It's not a bad idea. We need to have those
places.
And again, sometimes it might be overseas, sometimes it
might be a naval vessel, a lot of times it's back here in the
States, where we bring someone back because we, in fact, have a
complaint on them or an indictment on them, and then we bring
them into an Article 3 process. And so we can elicit
information from them and put them away behind bars.
Senator Rubio. Is the Article 3 process, in your mind, an
ideal way to develop this kind of information, or aren't there
limitations in the Article 3 process?
Mr. Brennan. I'm very proud of our system of laws here and
the Article 3 process. Our track record is exceptionally strong
over the past dozen years, couple dozen years; that so many
terrorists have been, in fact, successfully prosecuted and will
not----
Senator Rubio. No, I understand, but in terms of--our first
priority is to develop information----
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely; the FBI does a great job.
Senator Rubio. But an Article 3 setting is not the most
conducive to that.
Mr. Brennan. I would disagree with that.
Senator Rubio. Well, they're immediately advised about not
cooperating and turning over information that would incriminate
them.
Mr. Brennan. No. Again, it's tailored to the circumstances.
Sometimes an individual will be Mirandized. Sometimes they will
not be Mirandized right away. Mirandizing an individual means
only that the information that they give before then cannot be
used in Article 3 court.
But, in fact, the FBI do a great job, as far as listing
information after they're Mirandizing them, and so they can get
information as part of that type of negotiation with them, let
them know they can in fact languish forever, or we can in fact
have a dialogue about it intelligently.
Senator Rubio. Just one last point, and I'm not going to
use all my--I only have a minute left.
This Harzi case that I talked about--you're fully
comfortable with this notion that because the Tunisians
concluded that they didn't have a legal basis to hold him, we
now lost the opportunity to interrogate someone that could've
provided us some significant information on the attack in
Benghazi?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, you know, this country of America
really needs to make sure that we are setting a standard and an
example for the world, as far as the basis that we're going to,
in fact, interrogate somebody, debrief somebody. We want to
make sure we're doing it in conjunction with our international
partners.
We also want to make sure that we have the basis to do it,
so that we don't have to face, in the future, challenges about
how we, in fact, obtained the----
Senator Rubio. What is that law? You keep on talking about
the basis of our law; what law exactly are you talking about in
terms of the basis of detaining someone? When you say that we
want to make sure that we have a basis to--because you said
that----
Mr. Brennan. Well, that's right.
Senator Rubio. Based on what? Which law are we talking
about?
Mr. Brennan. Well, it all depends on the circumstance. Are
we talking about law of war detention authority, which the U.S.
military has? Are you talking about Article 3 authority that
the FBI has?
Senator Rubio. Right.
Mr. Brennan. The CIA does not have, by statute, any type of
detention authority.
Senator Rubio. The point I'm trying to get at is we don't--
the truth of the matter is we don't know Harzi knew anything
about the Benghazi attack.
We don't know if he knew about future attacks that were
being planned by the same people, because we never got to talk
to him because Tunisia said their laws wouldn't let them hold
him, which is an excuse we've heard in other parts of the
world, as well.
And that doesn't concern you, that we don't--that we
weren't able to obtain this information?
Mr. Brennan. We press our partners and foreign governments
to hold individuals and to allow us access to it. Sometimes
their laws do not allow that to happen. I think the United
States government has to respect these governments' right to,
in fact, enforce their laws appropriately.
What we don't want to do is to have these individuals being
held in some type of custody that's extrajudicial.
Senator Rubio. Okay, thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you,
again, Mr. Brennan, for your testimony today.
One of the things that I think we've heard from a number of
my colleagues, and we had this discussion when we discussed the
Committee's study on detention and interrogation, is, should
you be confirmed, how do we ensure that the CIA director is
always going to be well-informed?
And particularly, to a--we've questioned you today about a
number of key sensitive programs. The nature of the Agency's
work is that a lot of these programs are disparate, varied. And
there needs to be some ability to measure objectively the
success of these programs; not simply by those individuals that
are implementing the programs.
And while this is not the setting to talk about any
individual of these programs, I guess what I'm interested in is
pursuing the conversation we started about how you might set up
systems so that, to the best extent possible, as the CIA
director, you're going to make sure what's going on, get an
accurate, objective review, and not simply have the information
that simply bucks up through the system?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, that's an excellent point, Senator--one
that I'm very concerned about. In order to have objective
measures of effectiveness, the metrics that you want to be able
to evaluate the worth of a program, you cannot have the
individuals who are responsible for carrying it out. As hard as
they might try, they cannot help, I think, view the program and
the results in a certain way. They become witting or unwitting
advocates for it.
So what we need to do is to set up some type of system
where you can have confidence that those measures of
effectiveness are being done in the most independent and
objective way. And that's one of the things that I want to make
sure I take a look at, if I were to go to the Agency.
Senator Warner. Again, the nature of so many programs--all
very sensitive in nature; you have to have almost, as we
discussed, probably not an IG type vehicle, something that is
more run out of the director's office, but you've got to have
some kind of red team that's going to be able to check this
information out to make sure you've--so that you hear
colleagues here press on what you have done, or could have
done, or should have done, or if you had that oversight, you've
got to have that objective information to start with.
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely. I tend to have a reputation for
being a detailed person. And having been an analyst in an
intelligence office for many years, I need to see the data. I
cannot rely just on some interpretation of it. So, I do very
much look forward to finding a way that the director's office
can have this ability to independently evaluate these programs
so that I can fairly and accurately represent them to you. I
need to be able to have confidence, myself.
Senator Warner. As you know--and we all know--our country
is grappling with enormous fiscal challenges. And that means,
well, national security remains our most essential requirement
for our national government. Everything's going to have to able
to be done in a fiscally constrained period.
You know, how are you going to think about thinking through
those challenges on where cuts, changes need to be made? And if
you can specifically outline--one of the concerns that I have
is, kind of, division of labor and appropriate roles between
the CIA and the DoD SOCOM operations, fields where that kind of
potential build-up in that capacity is--how do we get that done
in these tight budget times?
If you could address both of those, I'd appreciate it.
Mr. Brennan. In a fiscally constrained environment, we have
to make sure, more than ever, that every single dollar that's
dedicated to intelligence is going to be optimized. And in
fact, if sequestration kicks in, what I wouldn't want to do as
CIA director is do the salami-slicing, which is, you know, five
percent off the top of gross, all programs, because all the
programs are not----
Senator Warner. One of the reasons why we need to make sure
sequestration----
Mr. Brennan. That's absolutely right, because it's going to
have a devastating impact on the national security of this
country.
And so, I would want to make sure, even if it doesn't
happen in a fiscally constrained environment, that I look at
the programs and prioritize. And we really have to take a look
at what are those programs that we really need to resource
appropriately.
As we're going to have--and we've had--some benefits from
pulling folks out of Iraq, and with the continued draw down of
forces in Afghanistan, there's going to be some resource and
assets that we're going to have to reallocate there. So I'll
look carefully at that.
So what I want to do is to make sure that if I go to CIA, I
have an understanding about exactly how these monies are being
spent. Then, as you point out, there is quite a bit of
intelligence capability within the Defense Department, and I
know there's been recent press reports about the Clandestine
HUMINT Service--Defense Clandestine Service--and its work with,
in fact, CIA.
I want to make sure these efforts are not redundant
whatsoever. And I've had these conversations with Mike Morell,
as well as with General Flynn over at DIA, to make sure that
these efforts are going to truly be integrated and
complementary, because we cannot have unnecessarily redundant
capabilities in this government, particularly in an environment
that we have right now on the fiscal front.
Senator Warner. I think this is an area that's going to
need a lot of attention and a lot of oversight. I get concerned
at times that the IC, on one hand, and the DoD on the other
hand, think they're coming from separate originators of
funding, and ultimately, they still have to be within the
greater budget constraints.
Let me--I know my time is running down. Your background,
and most of your expertise, has been on the CT side. Clearly,
the challenge we've got is we see emerging threats in parts of
the world that we're not on the front line, as we see
disruptions particularly through the Middle East, where,
perhaps in retrospect, we didn't have the right kind of
coverage on social media and on to the streets.
How do we make sure we're going to get within the kind of
fiscal constraints, that we don't go complete CT; that we make
sure we've got the coverage we need, the capabilities we need,
and the worldwide coverage we need, with your approach,
particularly with your background; if you could address that.
Mr. Brennan. Well, clearly, counterterrorism is going to be
a priority area for the Intelligence Community and for CIA for
many years to come. Just like weapons proliferation is, as
well. Those are enduring challenges. And since 9/11, the CIA
has dedicated a lot of effort, and very successfully; they've
done a tremendous job to mitigate that terrorist threat.
At the same time, though, they do have this responsibility
on global coverage. And so, what I need to take a look at is
whether or not there has been too much of an emphasis of the CT
front. As good as it is, we have to make sure we're not going
to be surprised on the strategic front and some of these other
areas; to make sure we're dedicating the collection
capabilities, the operations officers, the all-source analysts,
social media, as you said, the so-called ``Arab Spring'' that
swept through the Middle East. It didn't lend itself to
traditional types of intelligence collection.
There were things that were happening in a populist way,
that, you know, having somebody, you know, well positioned
somewhere, who can provide us information, is not going to give
us that insight, social media, other types of things.
So I want to see if we can expand beyond the soda straw
collection capabilities, which have served us very well, and
see what else we need to do in order to take into account the
changing nature of the global environment right now, the
changing nature of the communication systems that exist
worldwide.
Senator Warner. Thank you for that. I just would, again--
back to my first point, and my time's about out--I think,
should you be confirmed, that trying to make sure you've got
that objective oversight, the ability to make sure that you
have the best knowledge and best metrics possible so that when
future challenges arise, you can come to this Committee and
others and make sure that the President and this Committee is
informed with the best information possible.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Brennan, so you can be advised, we are not going to do
the classified hearing following this. We will do it Tuesday at
2:30. We will, however, do another round just with five minutes
per senator, so people can wrap up whatever it is they want to
ask. I hope that is okay with you.
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Brennan, I want to follow up on an issue that several
of my colleagues have raised on the issue of capturing a
terrorist versus targeted killing of a terrorist.
In a recent speech that you gave at the Wilson Center, you
said: ``Our unqualified preference is to only undertake lethal
force when we believe that capturing the individual is not
feasible.''
Yet, a study by The New American Foundation, as well as
numerous press reports, indicates that in the first two years
of President Obama's administration, there were four times the
number of targeted killings, than in eight years of President
Bush's administration. Is your testimony today that the huge
increase in number of lethal strikes has no connection to the
change in the Obama administration's detention policy?
Because obviously, if we're capturing a terrorist, we have
the opportunity to interrogate that individual and perhaps
learn about ongoing plots; but if the strike is done, that
opportunity is lost. Are you saying today that it is totally
unconnected to the Obama administration's shift in its detainee
policy?
Mr. Brennan. I can say unequivocally, Senator, that there's
never been occasion, that I'm aware of, where we had the
opportunity to capture a terrorist and we didn't, and we
decided to take a lethal strike. So, certainly, there is no
correlation there as far as any type of termination of the
CIA's detention and interrogation program and that increase in
strikes.
Now, I will say that if you look out over the last four
years, what happened in a number of places, such as Yemen, and
other areas, was that there was, in fact, a growth of al-
Qa'ida, quite unfortunately.
And so, what we were trying to do, in this administration,
is to take every measure possible to protect the lives of
American citizens, whether it be abroad or in the United
States, as well as a maturation of capabilities and insight
into those intelligence plots as a result of the investment
that was made in the previous administration that allowed us,
in this administration, to take appropriate actions.
Senator Collins. Well, let's talk further about the
targeted killings. When the targeted killings began several
years ago, the first-order effect of these operations was the
elimination of the senior operational leadership of al-Qa'ida,
many of the core leaders. Obviously, that is a critical
priority.
We have heard both former CIA Director Michael Hayden, in
an interview on CNN, and General McChrystal say that it is now
changed, and that the impact of those strikes is creating a
backlash.
For example, General McChrystal said, ``The resentment
created by American use of unmanned strikes is much greater
than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a
visceral level, even by people who have never seen one or seen
the effects of one.''
He added that the targeted killings by remotely piloted
aircraft add to the perception of American arrogance that says,
``Well, we can fly where we want; we can shoot where we want,
because we can.''
And General Hayden has also expressed concerns, that now
that the strikes are being used at the lower levels, arguably,
that they are creating a backlash that is undermining the
credibility of governments and creating new terrorists when a
neighbor or family member is killed in the course of the
operations.
Do you agree with General McChrystal and Director Hayden
about the potential backlash from the strikes, from the
targeted killings, at this point? I'm not talking about the
initial strikes.
Mr. Brennan. I think that is something that we have to be
very mindful of, in terms of what the reaction is to any type
of U.S. counterterrorism activities that involve the dropping
of ordnance anywhere in the world; absolutely. Whether it's a
remotely piloted aircraft or whether it's a manned aircraft, I
think we have to take that into account.
But I would not agree with some of the statements that you
had quoted there, because what we, in fact, have found in many
areas is that the people are being held hostage to al-Qa'ida in
these areas and have welcomed the work that the U.S. Government
has done with their governments to rid them of the al-Qa'ida
cancer that exists.
Senator Collins. Finally, today, this Committee received
the OLC memos describing the legal justifications that many of
us, particularly those who have been on the Committee far
longer than I, have been seeking for some time. And I, too,
spent a large part of this morning reading them.
Yet the Obama administration within months of taking office
released several OLC memos describing the legal justification
for the treatment of terrorist detainees that were held in U.S.
custody.
Do you think it was appropriate that a different standard
was applied to the release of the memos from the Bush
administration than those produced by the Obama administration?
Mr. Brennan. Well, respectfully, Senator, I don't think it
was a different standard. Not being a----
Senator Collins. Well----
Mr. Brennan [continuing]. A lawyer----
Senator Collins. Well, one was released within four
months----
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Collins [continuing]. Of the Obama administration
taking office.
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Collins. The other had been requested for a very
long--much longer time.
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Collins. And released only today.
Mr. Brennan. I'm not a lawyer. I've come to learn the term
sui generis, which means that, you know, it has obviously
unique circumstances surrounding it.
The OLC memos that were released shortly after the
President came into office--they were released because the
program was terminated. It was no longer in existence. OLC--
Office of Legal Counsel--opinions that deal with ongoing
activities, ongoing programs--it's a different animal.
And, therefore, I think those decisions were looked at in a
much, sort of, different way because of those sui generis
circumstances.
Senator Collins. Well, I would say to you that both are
absolutely essential to the ability of Congress to carry out
its oversight responsibilities.
Finally, the Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, with which you're very familiar, and of
which I was a co-author, requires the Director of National
Intelligence to recommend who the CIA director should be to the
President of the United States.
I'm aware of General Clapper--the DNI's letter endorsing
your nomination, but that's different from his actually
recommending to the President that you be chosen. To your
knowledge, did General Clapper recommend to the President that
you be nominated for this position?
Mr. Brennan. I know for certain that he made a
recommendation to the President, but I would defer to General
Clapper to tell you what that recommendation is.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Brennan, let me join my colleagues in thanking you for
your service to your country and welcoming you to the
Committee. And should you be confirmed, I'd like to start by
just inviting you to visit New Mexico at some point, and in
particular, Sandia and Los Alamos National Labs. Because, while
you often don't hear about the contributions that they make to
our Intelligence Community, I can assure you that that support
is vital to keeping our nation safe.
I've got a few questions, and please forgive me if some of
these return to some of the things you've heard from other
senators. I want to start with your November 2007 interview
with CBS News, where you said: ``There has been a lot of
information that has come out of these interrogation procedures
that the Agency has, in fact, used, against the real hard-core
terrorists. It has saved lives.''
Other intelligence officials went a lot further than that
in defending the use of so-called ``enhanced interrogation
techniques'' at the time, and some still do.
If your review of the Committee study convinces you that
these techniques did not, in fact, save lives, I'd like to
ask--will you be as public in condemning the program as you
were in its defense; in other words, will you set the record
straight?
Mr. Brennan. I will do whatever possible to make sure that
the record is straight and that I speak fully and honestly on
it.
Senator Heinrich. I want to return to a question that Mr.
Udall asked you. Would you object--and if so, why--to a public
release of a truly declassified version of the Committee's
report?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I would give such a request for
declassification every due consideration. There is a lot of
information and material in those volumes with a lot of
potential consequences, as far as its public release. And at
the same time that we have a commitment to transparency, we
also, though, have a tremendous commitment to making sure that
we keep this country safe by protecting its secrets.
There are a lot of equities as far as liaison partners,
other types of things, operational activities, maybe source and
method, so it has to be looked at very, very carefully.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I would just say I agree with you
that sources and methods, and many of the operational details,
absolutely should never be declassified, but there's some basic
principles, I think, in that report that I think it's going to
be very important for history to be able to judge. And I would
urge you to look closely at that.
Senator Levin asked about waterboarding. Let me follow up a
little bit. In November 2007 interview with CBS News, you were
asked if waterboarding was torture, and you said, ``I think it
is certainly subjecting an individual to severe pain and
suffering, which is the classic definition of torture. And I
believe, quite frankly, it's inconsistent with American values
and it's something that should be prohibited.'' Is that still
your view?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you. Do you believe that all
agencies of the United States Government should be held to the
interrogation standards that are laid out in the Army Field
Manual, as currently required by Executive Order 13491? And do
you support efforts to codify those requirements into law?
Mr. Brennan. The Army Field Manual certainly should govern
the U.S. military's detention and interrogation of individuals.
The FBI has its own processes and procedures and laws that
govern its activities. So, what I wanted to do is to make sure
that, you know, appropriate sort of attention is paid to FBI as
opposed to the military.
Senator Heinrich. I understand. Back in 2006, you were part
of an online discussion with The Washington Post, and you
suggested at that time that the director of the CIA should have
a set five-year term, like the FBI director, to guarantee ``the
absolute need for independence, integrity, and objectivity in
the senior ranks of our Intelligence Community.''
Given that you will instead serve at the pleasure of the
President, how do you maintain your independence?
Mr. Brennan. Having grown up in the intelligence business
for 25 years, I truly understand the importance and value of
maintaining independence, subjectivity, and integrity of the
intelligence process.
I know when I've sat in the White House Situation Room and
when I've looked to the intelligence briefer, that if they were
to advocate in any way a policy preference, it really calls
into question the independence, subjectivity, and basis of that
intelligence. I want them to give me the facts as it is,
irrespective of what their policy leanings or preferences might
be, because policymakers need to do that.
So, in order for me to maintain my integrity as an
intelligence professional, as I would go to the President or
the Secretaries of State or Defense, or into the National
Security Council meetings, I would need to make sure I can say
it straight, give it straight, and let the policymakers
determine exactly the best course of action.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
One last question: I believe it was during that same online
discussion with Washington Post, you said, quote, ``I think
that there is an effort underway to get the CIA to adapt to the
new realities of the Intelligence Community. The CIA has
resisted many of these changes, which has been a problem. It's
time to move forward.''
What exactly did you mean, and has the CIA made progress in
that direction?
Mr. Brennan. Well, Senator, a credit to you and your staff
for pulling up that Washington Post online interview because I
had not, you know, read that or thought about that in a while.
And I must say that having grown up in the Agency for 25 years,
as I said in my testimony, I have tremendous respect for that
organization. It is exceptionally capable; competent.
But almost by dint of the nature of its work, it also at
times is insular. And it has not interacted and interoperated
the way it needs to with the rest of the Intelligence
Community, the rest of the U.S. Government. At times, that is
to protect source and methods and to protect the secrets that
it has.
But given the changes in the environment, given the changes
in the nature of our government, the CIA needs to play a part
in this larger role. And so, now, the head of the CIA does not
sit on top of the Intelligence Community; it is part of a
larger Intelligence Community that is led by the Director of
National Intelligence.
So, my objective would be to make sure CIA's capabilities
are truly going to be leveraged and empower the--the
responsibilities, the missions of the rest of the government.
The Department of Homeland Security is a new creation. They
need intelligence just like others do as well.
So, what I think I was conveying there is that, you know
there was resistance at the time of the IRTPA, as we well know,
that they didn't want to sort of break some of the past
practices. Well, I think a lot of that resistance is overcome
and now I think CIA sees the benefits of having somebody that
can sit on top of the Community, and not have to sit on top of
the Agency, as well.
Senator Heinrich. That's very helpful. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you for your testimony and your stamina
today.
First, I should tell you that in an earlier hearing today,
Secretary Panetta was testifying before the Armed Services
Committee. And, in answer to a question, he strongly endorsed
your nomination. And I think the record should show that--that
Secretary Panetta was very complimentary of your capabilities
and experience.
Secondly--and this isn't really a question--it's incredibly
important for the CIA to be totally open with this Committee.
The reason is that there's no one else watching. Typically in
our country, the public is involved. The press is involved.
There are a lot of people that have access to information of
what the Department of Commerce is doing, or the Department of
State.
This is a unique situation, where this Committee and a
comparable committee in the House are the only places that are
really paying attention, in terms of our separation of powers.
So it's not just nice to have that kind of openness; I think
it's critically important. And I hope you subscribe to that
view.
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely; I do, Senator.
Senator King. Just briefly, and I think Senator Warner
touched on this--going forward, there needs to be some serious
discussion with the Department of Defense about where the CIA
ends and the Department of Defense starts, in terms of
counterterrorism activities and operations.
And I don't need to pursue that, but I think Senator Warner
raised an important point, because in this day and age, we just
can't be duplicating a whole set of capabilities and priorities
and officers and procedures and everything else.
I take it you subscribe to that?
Mr. Brennan. I do agree, Senator, and I look forward, in a
closed session, to talking to you about some specific areas
where I really do believe that Defense-CIA relationship and
integration of effort is critically important to the safety and
security of this nation.
So again, redundant--mindful of not having any type of
redundant capabilities or waste resources, we need to make sure
that we can leverage the capabilities that exist in both
organizations for the good of this country.
Senator King. And the area I want to spend a little bit of
time on is the drone policy, and particularly as it relates to
American citizens. There's a lot of law and history involved in
our system of checks and balances. James Madison famously, in
the 51st Federalist, said: ``If people were angels, we wouldn't
need a government, and if the government was run by angels, we
wouldn't need checks and balances.''
He concluded that angels were in as short supply then as
they are today. And therefore, we need these kinds of checks
and balances.
The Fifth Amendment is pretty clear: no deprivation of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. And we're
depriving American citizens of their life when we target them
with a drone attack. Now, I understand that it's under military
circumstances; these are enemy combatants and all of those
kinds of things. But I would like to suggest to you that you
consider--and Madam Chairman, I'd like to suggest to the
Committee that we consider--a FISA court-type process where an
American citizen is going to be targeted for a lethal strike.
And I understand you can't have co-commanders in chief, but
having the Executive being the prosecutor, the judge, the jury,
and the executioner, all in one, is very contrary to the
traditions and the laws of this country, and particularly in a
situation where there's time. If--a soldier on a battlefield
doesn't have time to go to court, but if you're planning a
strike over a matter of days, weeks or months, there is an
opportunity to at least go to something outside of the
Executive Branch body, like the FISA court, in a confidential
and top-secret way, make the case that this American citizen is
an enemy combatant, and at least that would be--that would be
some check on the activities of the Executive.
I have great confidence in you. I have great confidence in
President Obama. But all the lessons of history is it shouldn't
matter who's in charge, because we should have procedures and
processes in place that will protect us no matter who the
people are that are in the particular positions.
How do you react to this suggestion?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I think it's certainly worthy of
discussion. Our tradition--our judicial tradition is that a
court of law is used to determine one's guilt or innocence for
past actions, which is very different from the decisions that
are made on the battlefield, as well as actions that are taken
against terrorists, because none of those actions are to
determine past guilt for those actions that they took.
The decisions that are made are to take action so that we
prevent a future action, so we protect American lives. That is
an inherently Executive Branch function to determine, and the
Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Executive has the
responsibility to protect the welfare, well-being of American
citizens.
So the concept I understand and we have wrestled with this
in terms of whether there can be a FISA-like court, whatever--a
FISA-like court is to determine exactly whether or not there
should be a warrant for, you know, certain types of activities.
You know----
Senator King. It's analogous to going to a court for a
warrant--probable cause----
Mr. Brennan. Right, exactly. But the actions that we take
on the counterterrorism front, again, are to take actions
against individuals where we believe that the intelligence base
is so strong and the nature of the threat is so grave and
serious, as well as imminent, that we have no recourse except
to take this action that may involve a lethal strike.
Senator King. I completely agree with you, and I understand
the dilemma. And I'm not trying to suggest anything that would
limit our ability to take action on behalf of American
citizens. I would just feel more comfortable if somebody other
than a Member of the Executive said, ``Yes, we agree that the
evidence is so strong,'' et cetera, as you stated it.
In the Hamdi decision, Sandra Day O'Connor had a wonderful
statement: ``A state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the nation's
citizens.''
Mr. Brennan. Right. And that's why I do think it's worthy
of discussion. And the point particularly about due process
really needs to be taken into account because there's not a
different standard as far as if a U.S. citizen joins al-Qa'ida,
you know, in terms of the intelligence base or whatever. But
American citizens by definition are due much greater due
process than anybody else by dint of their citizenship.
So I think this is a very worthwhile discussion. I look
forward to talking to the Committee and others about it. What's
that appropriate balance between Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Branch responsibilities in this area?
Senator King. I appreciate your consideration and, again,
appreciate your testimony today. And thank you for your service
to the country.
Madam Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
We'll do another quick round. I think one of the problems
is now that the drone program is so public, and one American
citizen is killed, people don't know much about this one
American citizen--so-called. They don't know what he's been
doing. They don't know what he's connected to. They don't know
the incitement that he has stirred up.
And I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about Mr.
al-Awlaki and what he had been doing?
Mr. Brennan. Well, Senator, I'm not going to talk about any
particular operation or responsibility on the part of the U.S.
Government for anything----
Chairman Feinstein. See, that's the problem. That's the
problem. I think when people hear ``American citizen,'' they
think somebody who's upstanding; this man was not upstanding,
by a long shot. And now, maybe you cannot discuss it here, but
I've read enough to know that he was a real problem.
Mr. Brennan. Well, I can talk about Mr. al-Awlaki.
Chairman Feinstein. And if you were in jeopardy; that's
right.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, and before he died he was intimately
involved in activities that were designed to kill innocent men,
women, and children, and mostly Americans. He was determined to
do that. He was not just a propagandist. He was, in fact, part
of the operational effort that is known as al-Qa'ida in the
Arabian Peninsula and had key responsibilities in that regard.
Chairman Feinstein. Can I ask you some questions about him?
Mr. Brennan. You're the Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. You don't have to answer. Did he have a
connection to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to
explode a device on one of our planes over Detroit?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, he did.
Chairman Feinstein. Could you tell us what condition it
was?
Mr. Brennan. I would prefer not to at this time, Senator.
I'm not prepared to.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Did he have a connection to the
Fort Hood attack?
Mr. Brennan. That is al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
has--a variety of means of communicating and inciting
individuals, whether that be websites, or e-mails, or other
types of things. And so there are a number of occasions where
individuals, including Mr. al-Awlaki, have been in touch with
individuals. And so, Senator, again, I'm not prepared to
address the specifics of these, but suffice it to say----
Chairman Feinstein. I'll just ask you a couple questions.
Did Faisal Shahzad, who pled guilty to the 2010 Times Square
car bombing attempt, tell interrogators in 2010 that he was
inspired by al-Awlaki?
Mr. Brennan. I believe that's correct, yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Last October, al-Awlaki--did he have a
direct role in supervising and directing AQAP's failed attempt,
well, to bring down two United States cargo aircraft by
detonating explosives concealed inside two packages, as a
matter of fact, inside a computer printer cartridge?
Mr. Brennan. Mr. al-Awlaki was involved in overseeing a
number of these activities. Yes, there was a relationship
there.
Chairman Feinstein. And was it true that they were so
concealed that the first attempt to find and did not reveal
them? It took an asset coming back with--to say, ``Go again,
look at this,'' to find it?
Mr. Brennan. Yes the concealment method that was used in
that was one of the best we had ever encountered.
Chairman Feinstein. So, Mr. al-Awlaki is not, by far, an
American citizen of whom anyone in America would be proud?
Mr. Brennan. Mr. al-Awlaki was part of al-Qa'ida, and we're
at war with al-Qa'ida, and it was his strong determination to
kill Americans on behalf of al-Qa'ida.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Is it true that in the last four years, the FBI has
arrested 100 people, either planning, conspiring, or trying to
commit a terrorist attack on this nation?
Mr. Brennan. I don't know the exact number, Chairman, but
yes--they have arrested a lot of people.
Chairman Feinstein. It's over 100, but they have arrested a
lot of people, and that's because of good, sound intelligence.
I think--and this is just me--what people forget is that
they will kill us if they can, and it's extraordinarily
difficult if you can't get in to where they were hiding. Would
it have been possible to have arrested Mr. al-Awlaki where he
was, in Yemen?
Mr. Brennan. It is--there are parts of Yemen that are
ungoverned and beyond the reach of the Yemeni government
security and intelligence services. And we work very closely
with the Yemenis to see if we can arrest, detain, individuals.
Whenever we can, we want to do that, because it's very valuable
for us.
Any actions that are taken in concert with the Yemeni
government are done--in terms of any type of strikes that we
might engage there with them--are done only because we do not
have the ability to bring those individuals into custody.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Chambliss.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
In 2002, what was your knowledge of interrogation
videotapes about Abu Zubaydah, and did you seek any information
about an Office of General Counsel review of them in 2002?
Mr. Brennan. I don't have a recollection of that, Senator.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Of the tapes, or that request?
Mr. Brennan. At the time, in 2002, I do not know what my
involvement or knowledge was at the time of the tapes. I
believe that they--I was aware of the Abu Zubaydah debriefings
and interrogation sessions being taped.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Okay, it should be no surprise
that many Members have been dissatisfied with the
administration's cooperation on the Benghazi inquiries.
For example, Senator Graham asked Director Clapper, in a
hearing, if he was aware of the series of attacks in Benghazi,
in the summer of 2012, and asked if he had informed the
President about those attacks. Now, that seemed like a
perfectly reasonable question, and the DNI said he would get us
an answer.
When we got answers back from the DNI's office, there was a
notation next to this particular question that Senator Graham
asked, and here's what it said, and I quote, ``Per NSS''--
that's the National Security Staff--``No response required.''
Mr. Brennan, that's your shop; do you have any knowledge
about why Senator Graham's question was not to be answered?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I think there's a longstanding
tradition, understanding, of respecting the executive privilege
that exists in the Office of the Presidency, and in terms of
what information is provided to the President, or advice,
counsel, to him.
So it's--I would suspect, then, that that question gets
into this issue of the executive privilege, which I think,
again, has been a longstanding tradition.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Now, are you sure that's the
answer, or you think that's probably what it was?
Mr. Brennan. I don't know, firsthand, because that would
not been a request coming to me.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. And I understand that, so my
direction to you--what I'll ask of you--is that you go back and
review that; we'll get you notation if necessary, and if you
could just give us a written response to that, if possible.
Mr. Brennan. You deserve a response, certainly.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. This weekend, Secretary Panetta
confirmed that information that led to bin Laden came from
detainees and the CIA's EIT program. His account comports with
information we were provided immediately after the raid, and in
months to follow, from the CIA analyst who actually tracked
down bin Laden. These analysts told us it was detainee
information that was key to them finding the courier and,
ultimately, bin Laden.
Now, were you briefed by any of the analysts who tracked
down bin Laden?
Mr. Brennan. Before the operation?
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Yes.
Mr. Brennan. Oh, absolutely; I was engaged with them.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Okay. And is that the information
that was given to you--that it came from interrogation of
detainees on whom EITs had been used?
Mr. Brennan. I don't recall if I was given that information
specifically. They talked about the chain of, sort of,
collection that took place that was related to some of the
information coming from the detainees. Yes, so, there was some
there.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Do you agree with Secretary
Panetta's comments?
Mr. Brennan. That there was some information that came out
from there?
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Yes, that led to the courier.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I now, again, looking at this
document from SSCI, this report, I don't know what the facts
are, or the truth is. So I really need to look at that
carefully and see what CIA's response is because the SSCI
report calls into question whether or not any of the
information was unique and led to it.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Fair enough. Suffice it to say,
Secretary Panetta's comments are in direct conflict with the
report that came out of this Committee recently. And you know I
have serious concerns about that interrogation study that was
voted out by Committee.
Now, you told me a couple of days ago when we met that the
study ``was not objective,'' and it was ``a prosecutor's brief,
written with an eye toward finding problems.'' And you went on
to say that you're withholding judgment on the merits and
action until you read the response.
And it's my understanding, from what you've said, that
that's what you're going to do. Suppose the CIA takes the
position that the study's findings and conclusions are wrong? I
think I know John Brennan well enough to know that you're going
to stand up and say whatever's on your mind, and whatever you
conclude. And I'm not going to ask you for a response to that,
but I know you'll review it with an open mind and give us your
thoughts and your opinions about the CIA's response to it and
how we move forward with this.
Mr. Brennan. I assure you, Senator, I will do that.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Oh, excuse me--Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I was just making a comment to the Chair, Mr. Brennan, that
I've been through a whole lot of confirmation hearings in 28
years here--and including quite a few CIA directors--and I
quite honestly do not recall anybody who was more forthright,
more direct, more accommodating, without violating who you are,
more open to the possibility of working with this Committee in
a way that will do two things: one, that will give the folks at
CIA, who probably constantly worry about what is the next awful
thing that we're going to say about them--but that's not our
intention, because we're into the business of problem-solving,
and if we have to write a 6,000-page thing, it isn't fun for
us; we're trying to solve a problem.
I have a feeling you understand that. I have a feeling that
you feel that the CIA, if they felt that they were working in--
you know, with some contention with the oversight committee in
the Senate, but, nevertheless, that the Senate was involved,
was informed, was interested; that this would be something that
they would welcome; that there are a lot of people who've been
at the CIA for quite a while who may be sort of stuck in that
mid-rank crisis, et cetera, who are looking for an open, fresh,
strong leader.
I happen to think you are that leader. I've felt that since
our conversation. I felt that from before our conversation. And
we haven't had our secret meeting yet, so I always--but I'm not
going to--I'm sure I'm not going to change my mind.
I just think you've done an extraordinary job of patience,
of courtesy, of wisdom, of being able to--the only question
that you couldn't answer that I'm aware of was who was it that
took notes at some meeting that you had, teleconference that
you had 20 years ago. But I find it in my heart to forgive you
for that.
So, to me, I think you're a terrific leader, and I'll look
forward to Tuesday. But I think you're the guy for the job--and
the only guy for the job.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator, for those very kind words.
And I haven't lived up to them yet. And if I were to go to CIA,
as I think some people have said--some Senators have said, you
want to hear not just words, but you want to actually see the
actions.
It's a daunting task to go over to CIA. I want every Member
of this Committee to be an ardent advocate, proponent, and
defender of the men and women of the Central Intelligence
Agency. And I see it as my obligation to represent them to you
on their behalf, so that when times get tough, and when people
are going to be criticizing and complaining about the CIA, I
have all of you to say you knew about what the CIA was doing,
you supported it, and you will defend it.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Chairman.
I'm going to try to be brief because I've noticed you're on
your fourth glass of water, and I don't want to be accused of
waterboarding you.
[Laughter]
Senator Burr. Mr. Brennan, with the exception of our
request for the Presidential Daily Briefs around the time of
Benghazi, for which there was executive privilege claimed, do
you know of any other claim of executive privilege on any of
the documents that this Committee's waiting on right now?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I know that there are requests for
some e-mails that might have taken place between the
Intelligence Community and the White House, whatever, and so
there are a number of, sort of, elements that I think people
are looking at. So----
Senator Burr. But none that executive privilege have been
claimed on. Correct?
Mr. Brennan. Well, I am not in a position to say that,
Senator, and I would defer to those individuals--the White
House counsel and others--to make those determinations about
what they want to----
Senator Burr. Well, let me say it from this end. They have
not justified not producing those documents based upon
executive privilege. So I assume if they're going to claim it,
then they need to claim it quick.
On January 13th of this year, the President signed into law
the 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires
congressional notification of any authorized disclosure of
national intelligence.
Now, we've not received any notifications of authorized
disclosures. Have there been any authorized disclosures, to
your knowledge?
Mr. Brennan. I would like to say that since you haven't
received any notifications, there haven't been.
Senator Burr. Would you consider the information reported
in the press about the counterterrorism playbook an authorized
disclosure?
Mr. Brennan. I don't know which piece you're talking about.
There's been a lot of discussion out there in the media and in
the newspapers about this.
And so I don't know specifically about any classified
information. The fact that the administration may be going
through a process to try to institutionalize, codify, make as
rigorous as possible our processes and procedures in and of
itself is not a classified issue.
So those details that are classified, I don't know of any
that came out in some of those reports.
Senator Burr. Well, if there is classified information
that's out there, and it was not authorized, was there a crime
report filed relative to the playbook?
Mr. Brennan. Presumably there was, Senator. Those
decisions, as far as initiating criminal investigations, are
done by those departments and agencies that have stewardship of
that classified information and in discussions with the
Department of Justice to make a determination whether or not in
light of the fact that maybe so many people have access to it,
how they can proceed with some type of criminal investigations.
Senator Burr. As we prepare for the closed hearing on
Tuesday--this is not a question--I'll ask you today that you be
prepared to provide for the Committee any specific discussions
that you had where you were authorized to reveal classified
information or to talk about information on covert action.
Again, not something I'd like to do today. The answer may
be zero. If there are things, Tuesday would be an opportunity
for you to provide. That was a pre-hearing question from the
Committee that was unanswered.
My last question is this: I'm still not clear on whether
you think the information from CIA interrogations saved lives.
Have you ever made a representation to a court, including the
FISA court, about the type and importance of information
learned from detainees, including detainees in the CIA
detention and interrogation program?
Mr. Brennan. First of all, on the first part of your
question, that you're not sure whether or not I believe that
there has been misinformation, I don't know----
Senator Burr. I said I wasn't clear whether I understood,
whether I was clear.
Mr. Brennan. And I'm not clear at this time, either,
because I've read a report that calls into question a lot of
the information that I was provided earlier on my impressions.
When I was in the government as the head of National
Counterterrorism Center, I know that I had signed out a number
of affirmations related to the continuation of certain programs
based on the analysis and intelligence that was available to
analysts. And I don't know exactly what it was at the time, but
we can look at that.
Senator Burr. But the Committee can assume that you had
faith--if you make that claim to a court, including the FISA
court--you had faith in the documents and in the information
that was supplied you to make that declaration?
Mr. Brennan. Absolutely. At the time when, if I made any
such affirmation, I would have had faith that the information I
was provided was an accurate representation.
Senator Burr. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
We have talked for several hours now about the question of
targeted killings of Americans, and you've heard it from a
number of Senators. And I'd like to get your reaction on one
point in particular. And that is this question, particularly in
the context that you've given, that you've tried to focus in
areas where the evidence is substantial, the threat is
imminent, where there is a particularly persuasive case that
the targeted killing of an American is warranted.
In that kind of case, do you believe that the President
should provide an individual American with the opportunity to
surrender before killing them?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I haven't spoken about any specific
operations----
Senator Wyden. I'm talking about the concept----
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Wyden [continuing]. Because you talk about the
concept.
Mr. Brennan. Right. Absolutely.
Senator Wyden. You said imminent threats, serious evidence,
grave concern; certainly words that strike a chord with me. And
that's why I'd be interested in your thoughts on whether, in
those kind of instances, the President ought to give--should
give--an individual American the opportunity to surrender.
Mr. Brennan. Right. I think in those instances, and right
now, let's use the example of al-Qa'ida, because if an American
were to join al-Qa'ida, we have routinely said--openly,
publicly, and repeatedly--that we're at war with al-Qa'ida. We
have repeatedly said that al-Qa'ida is in fact trying to kill
Americans, and that we are going to do everything possible to
protect the lives of American citizens from these murderous
attacks from al-Qa'ida.
We have signaled this worldwide. We have repeatedly said it
openly and publicly. Any American who joins al-Qa'ida will know
full well that they have joined an organization that is at war
with the United States and that has killed thousands upon
thousands of individuals, many, many of them who are Americans.
So I think any American who did that should know well that
they, in fact, are part of an enemy against us, and that the
United States will do everything possible to destroy that enemy
to save American lives.
Senator Wyden. And I certainly--and I said this at the very
beginning--I certainly want to be part of that effort to fight
al-Qa'ida on all of these key fronts. I just want to have some
answers--and I'll give you another chance--whether you think
the President should give an individual American the
opportunity to surrender.
I think that Senator King, for example, talked about the
idea of a new court, and there are going to be colleagues that
are going to talk about a whole host of ideas. And I commend
you for saying that you're open to hearing about that.
This is something that can be set in motion, I think, in a
straightforward way, as a general principle. We're not talking
about any one individual. And I think you've answered the
question, and I won't go any further, unless you want to add
anything to it.
The only other point I'd say is we've covered a lot of
ground today. And as far as I'm concerned, we've got a lot of
ground still to cover. I've made it clear that we've got to see
any and all of those legal opinions, the ones that the
bipartisan group of senators asked for, before the vote. And to
your credit, you said you'd take the message back to the White
House.
Because what it really goes to, Mr. Brennan, is this
question of checks and balances--and we probably didn't use
that word enough this afternoon--because I think that's really
what this is all about. Our Constitution fortunately gives the
President significant power to protect our country in dangerous
times.
But it is not unfettered power; it's power that is balanced
through this special system that ensures congressional
oversight and public oversight. And so that's why these
questions that I and others have been trying to get at, in
terms of congressional oversight, being able to get all of the
opinions that are relevant to the legal analysis for targeting
Americans, and then to learn more about how you're going to
bring the public into the discussion.
And certainly you've been patient this afternoon, and I
want you to know I think we've covered a lot of ground, but I
think we've got a lot to go. And I'd be happy to give you the
last word. I've got a little more time if you want it.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator. First of all, any member
of al-Qa'ida, whether a U.S. citizen or non-U.S. citizen, needs
to know that they have the ability to surrender, the right to
surrender, anytime, anywhere throughout the world. And they can
do so before the organization is destroyed. We will destroy
that organization. And again, out there in al-Qa'ida, U.S.
citizens and others, they can surrender anytime, turn
themselves in.
Senator Wyden. Just on that point, I don't take a backseat
to anybody, in terms of fighting al-Qa'ida. That was why I came
out with it right at the outset. But I asked you a different
question, and on the question of what kind of evidence ought to
be applied, whether there ought to be geographic limits, the
question of whether an individual should be allowed to
surrender. For--for example, there is I think also a question
whether the obligation changes if, you know, a valid target has
not been publicly reported.
So there are issues, you know, here. And I think we're
going to have to continue those--those discussions.
And Madam Chair, I thank you for this extra round.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
John, I want to just say, and I'm not going to go into it
here--I think it may be better held for further discussion next
week in a classified room--but this whole idea of leaks--
nothing upsets me more on this Committee, and we've had a raft
of these in the last couple of years, than to see something
that was discussed in classified area written up the next day
in the newspapers or on the part of the media. It drives some
of us crazy. It does me, anyway.
And so, maybe I'm a little paranoid about all this, and so
forth. I just can't totally get my hands around this AQAP
situation that we discussed earlier. But I'm going to defer
that until Tuesday so we can discuss it in more detail.
Let me just ask you one question here. You said--I don't
have the date--``The al-Qa'ida core has been decimated in the
FATA.'' And we're aware of the significant efforts we've made
and the progress we've made in that regard. But we see this
thing metastasizing now across northern Africa and other parts.
What's your, you know, latest assessment of al-Qa'ida, in
terms of its control and operation of these smaller efforts
that are popping up like a whack-a-mole machine in different
parts of the Middle East and North Africa?
Mr. Brennan. Well, Senator, you used the exact right term
when you said al-Qa'ida has been metastasizing in different
parts of the world. We have the al-Qa'ida core that, in the
past, I think exerted quite a bit of orchestration or order
over a number of these franchises that have developed.
Now, as a result of the decimation of the core, and our
ability to interrupt a lot of the interaction and communication
between them, a lot of these different elements, like al-Qa'ida
in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and
other elements, have grown up and developed as a result of the
domestic and local sort of environment.
And so they're all sort of, you know, unique unto
themselves. They have different features and characteristics.
We need to make sure that we're able to work with the
governments and the intelligence and security services in the
area so that we can put as much pressure on them as possible.
A number of them have, you know, local agendas. Some of
them have local agendas as well as international agendas. Al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen has a very determined
insurgency effort underway in side of Yemen to try to, you
know, bring that government down. And the government has done a
great job, you know, fighting back.
There are other elements--al-Qa'ida in Islamic Maghreb. You
know, they're counter-narcotics--they're narcotics smugglers.
They're human traffickers. They involve quite a bit in
kidnapping and ransoms, and also involve in tourist attacks.
So, what we need to do is to take into account what the
environment is, who we can work with, and how we're going to
put pressure on them. But any element that is associated with
al-Qa'ida has, as part of its agenda, death, and destruction.
And so, I fully agree what we need to do is be mindful of the
metastasization of the al-Qa'ida cancer.
Senator Coats. But in relationship to some kind of
centralized control over all these things, having said that,
the core is decimated.
Mr. Brennan. It really varies, you know. We do see al-
Qa'ida core trying to exert some control over some of these
elements. There's a lot of independence of effort, you know,
autonomous efforts that are underway. And I'd be happy to be
able to talk in, you know, closed session about the particular
relationships that exist between al-Qa'ida and some of these
other elements.
Senator Coats. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Collins. Last, but far from least.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, I want to follow up on the point that Senator
Coats just raised with you, because if you looked at a map back
in 2001, you would see that al-Qa'ida was mainly in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. And if you look at a map today, you would see al-
Qa'ida in all sorts of countries.
That's not to say that there weren't cells in other
countries back in 2001, but it raises the question in my mind
of whether, even though we've been successful in taking out
some of the core of al-Qa'ida and some high-level leaders,
whether our strategy is working. If the cancer of al-Qa'ida is
metastasizing, do we need a new treatment?
Mr. Brennan. What we've tried to do, Senator, over the past
decade and longer, is to be able to treat this real cancer in a
number of ways: sometimes it takes lethal force, sometimes it
takes military might, sometimes it takes working with our
partners in a variety of ways, sometimes it takes addressing
some of the infrastructural, institutional, and other
deficiencies that exist in these countries that al-Qa'ida takes
advantage of.
If you look at the geographic map, you know, in the area
from South Asia over to the Middle East and North Africa, there
has been tremendous political turbulence in that area over the
past decade, and particularly in the last couple years. There
are a lot of spaces--ungoverned spaces--that al-Qa'ida has
taken advantage of. We've been able to make some significant
progress in certain areas.
Somalia is, in fact, a good example of a place where we
have worked with neighboring countries, we've worked with the
local government, and we've worked with AMISOM, a multilateral
element within Africa, to try to suppress the efforts of Al
Shabaab and al-Qa'ida in East Africa; good progress we made
there. Because it has to be comprehensive; it's not just a
kinetic solution to this by any means.
Now, as we look at the Sahel, and the area in Mali, and
other areas, these are tremendous expanses of territory where
al-Qa'ida can put down roots beyond the reach of local
governments. And so they've been able to put down roots, and
they've been--it's been unattended because of the difficulties
that these countries have even feeding their people, much less
putting in place a system of laws and the intelligence and
security capability.
So, is it a different strategy; it has to be a
comprehensive one. But al-Qa'ida and this--you know, the forces
of Islamic extremists, that have really corrupted and perverted
Islam, are making some progress in areas that give me real
concern. That's why I look at a place like Syria right now, and
what is going on in that country; we cannot allow vast areas to
be exploited by al-Qa'ida and these extremist forces, because
it will be to our peril.
Senator Collins. I certainly agree with you on that, and in
our classified or closed hearing next week I'm going to be
asking you about Syria, and also the Iranian threat. But I
don't think those are appropriate in open session.
Just two final questions: one has to do with priorities
that you would set as director if you are confirmed. In recent
years, paramilitary operations obviously had consumed a lot of
resources, expertise, time, energy, and effort at the CIA; do
you believe this has been at the expense of traditional CIA
responsibilities--collection, analysis, all source?
Mr. Brennan. Well, certainly, there have been opportunity
costs because of the dedication of those resources. What I
would need to do, if I were to go to CIA, is to inventory
exactly how our resources are being dedicated against the wide
variety of strategic priorities to protect our country.
In terms of operational collection activities worldwide, in
terms of the all source analysis being done, what are we doing
in these other areas? Cyber, you know, weapons proliferation,
political turbulence--there are so many different areas.
Counterterrorism is an important one. There is also an
intersection between counterterrorism and a lot of these other
areas, counter-proliferation, international organized crime,
other things.
So we really want to optimize those resources so that we
can, in fact, leverage the capabilities we have, in order to
deal with these very challenging issues across a very large
globe.
Senator Collins. Mr. Brennan, you have devoted a great deal
of your life to public service, for which I thank you. And you
obviously understand the world of intelligence in a way that
few people do. You've been an intelligence professional for
much of your professional life.
In the last four years, you have held a political position
at the White House. And I have been talking to people at the
CIA, whom I respect, and one intelligence official told me that
a key question for the men and women of the CIA is which John
Brennan are they going to get? Are they going to get John
Brennan who's been the right-hand advisor of President Obama in
a political White House--and by the nature of the position--I
don't say that critically; that's the position--or are they
going to get John Brennan who was a career CIA officer, who
worked his way up in the ranks?
And the concern is that they want to hear that you are
going to be the CIA's representative to the White House, not
the White House's representative to the CIA. And I just want to
give you the opportunity today to respond to that concern.
I would note that I also heard very good comments from
people with whom I talked, but I think it's important, when
someone's coming from a political role, to make clear that
you're going to be the leader of the Agency and not the White
House's agent within the Agency.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator. I think if I were to be
fortunate, privileged, and honored to go out to CIA, the CIA
would get the John Brennan who is neither a Democrat nor
Republican, nor has ever been; a John Brennan who has a deep
appreciation and respect for the intelligence profession, one
who has been fortunate to have lived it for 25 years; a John
Brennan who has had the great fortune to be in the White House
the past four years, watching and understanding how
intelligence is used in support of our national security. CIA
would get a John Brennan who has been working national security
issues for my life.
They would get a John Brennan who really understands that
the value of intelligence, the importance of intelligence, is
not to tell the President what he wants to hear, not to tell
this Committee what it wants to hear, but to tell the
policymakers, the Congressional overseers, what they need to
hear--what the Intelligence Community, with all its great
capability and expertise, has been able to uncover and
understand about world events that fundamentally affect the
lives of not just this generation of Americans, but of future
generations of Americans.
And so, if I had the great privilege to lead the men and
women of the CIA, it would be the biggest honor of my life, and
I would understand just how important and weighty that would
be. And if I ever dishonored that responsibility, I couldn't
look myself in the mirror. I couldn't look my parents, my
family in the mirror. I couldn't look you in the face, and that
is something that is very important to me.
So, I guess the proof will be in the pudding, the tasting
of the pudding, and if I do have that opportunity, it would be
my intention to make sure I did everything possible to live up
to the trust and confidence that this Congress, this Senate,
and this President might place in me.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
If there are no further questions, John, I would like to
associate myself with what Senator Rockefeller said. I've sat
through a number of these hearings; I don't think I've ever
heard anyone more forthright or more honest or more direct. You
really didn't hedge. You said what you thought. And I want you
to know that that's very much appreciated.
And I actually think you are going to be a fine and strong
leader for the CIA, and, you know, I can't help but say I am
really fully supportive of this and will do everything I
possibly can to see that our Committee works with you closely
and honestly.
We will have a classified hearing. I am specifically going
to just warn you that I would like to have you respond in
detail to what I perceive as a difficult, evolving situation in
North Africa now, with Tunisia, with Libya, with all these
countries, and certainly with Mali, and how you plan to direct
the Agency to deal with this evolving momentum that's taking
place in Northern Africa.
So that will be for Tuesday. And at the request of Senator
Levin, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a Joint
Statement that he and I made on April 27, 2012.
[The Joint Statement of Senators Feinstein and Levin, dated
April 27, 2012, follows:]
Joint statement from Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Chairman,
Senate Intelligence Committee, and Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.),
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
We are deeply troubled by the claims of the CIA's former Deputy
Director of Operations Jose Rodriguez regarding the effectiveness of
the CIA's coercive interrogation techniques.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will soon complete a
comprehensive review of the CIA's former Detention and Interrogation
Program. Committee staff has reviewed more than 6 million pages of
records and the Committee's final report, which we expect to exceed
5000 pages, will provide a detailed, factual description of how
interrogation techniques were used, the conditions under which
detainees were held, and the intelligence that was--or wasn't--gained
from the program.
Statements made by Mr. Rodriguez and other former senior government
officials about the role of the CIA interrogation program in locating
Usama bin Laden (UBL) are inconsistent with CIA records. We are
disappointed that Mr. Rodriguez and others, who left government
positions prior to the UBL operation and are not privy to all of the
intelligence that led to the raid, continue to insist that the CIA's
so-called ``enhanced interrogation techniques'' used many years ago
were a central component of our success. This view is misguided and
misinformed.
The roots of the UBL operation stretch back nearly a decade and
involve hundreds, perhaps thousands, of intelligence professionals who
worked non-stop to connect and analyze many fragments of information,
eventually leading the United States to Usama bin Laden's location in
Abbottabad, Pakistan. The suggestion that the operation was carried out
based on information gained through the harsh treatment of CIA
detainees is not only inaccurate, it trivializes the work of
individuals across multiple U.S. agencies that led to UBL and the
eventual operation.
We are also troubled by Mr. Rodriguez's statements justifying the
destruction of video tapes documenting the use of coercive
interrogation techniques as ``just getting rid of some ugly visuals.''
His decision to order the destruction of the tapes was in violation of
instructions from CIA and White House lawyers, illustrates a blatant
disregard for the law, and unnecessarily caused damage to the CIA's
reputation.
Further, it's worth repeating, as discussed in the Senate Armed
Services Committee's 2008 report, the SERE techniques used in the CIA's
interrogation program were never intended to be used by U.S.
interrogators. Rather, the techniques--which are based on Communist
Chinese interrogation techniques used during the Korean War to elicit
false confessions--were developed to expose U.S. soldiers to the
abusive treatment they might be subjected to if captured by our
enemies. An overwhelming number of experts agree, the SERE techniques
are not an effective means to illicit accurate information.
Misinformation Relating to the UBL Operation
Statement of Jose Rodriguez, former CIA Deputy Director for
Operations, Time Magazine, May 4, 2011:
``Information provided by [CIA detainees] KSM and Abu Faraj al-
Libbi about bin Laden's courier was the lead information that
eventually led to the location of [bin Laden's] compound and
the operation that led to his death.''
This statement is wrong. The original lead information had no
connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on
the courier that was collected from a variety of classified sources.
While the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used against KSM
and al-Libbi, the pair provided false and misleading information during
their time in CIA custody. This information will be detailed in the
Intelligence Committee's report.
Statement of Michael Hayden, former CIA Director, Scott Hennen
Show, May 3, 2011:
``[W]hat we got, the original lead information--and frankly it
was incomplete identity information on the couriers--began with
information from CIA detainees at the black sites.''
This statement is wrong. The original information had no connection
to CIA detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier
that was collected from a variety of classified sources. This
information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee's report.
Statement of Michael Mukasey, former Attorney General, Wall Street
Journal, May 6, 2011:
``Consider how the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to
hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Shiekh Mohammed
(KSM) who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh
interrogation techniques--that included waterboarding. He
loosed a torrent of information--including eventually the name
of a trusted courier of bin Laden Another of those gathered up
later in this harvest, Abu Faraj al-Libi, also was subjected to
certain of these harsh techniques and disclosed further details
about bin Laden's couriers that helped last weekend's
achievement.''
This statement is wrong. There is nothing in CIA intelligence
records to corroborate this statement.
Other press reports have suggested that a third CIA detainee
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided
significant information on the courier and his relationship with al-
Qa'ida. While this third detainee did provide relevant information, he
did so the day before he was interrogated by the CIA using their
coercive interrogation techniques. This information will be detailed in
the Intelligence Committee's report.
The Facts:
CIA did not first learn about the existence of the UBL
courier from detainees subjected to coercive interrogation techniques.
Nor did the agency discover the courier's identity from detainees
subjected to coercive techniques. No detainee reported on the courier's
full name or specific whereabouts, and no detainee identified the
compound in which UBL was hidden. Instead, the CIA learned of the
existence of the courier, his true name and location through means
unrelated to the CIA detention and interrogation program.
Information to support this operation was obtained from a
wide variety of intelligence sources and methods. CIA officers and
their colleagues throughout the Intelligence Community sifted through
massive amounts of information, identified possible leads, tracked them
down, and made considered judgments based on all of the available
intelligence.
The CIA detainee who provided the most significant
information about the courier provided the information prior to being
subjected to coercive interrogation techniques.
The three detainees subjected to waterboarding provided
no new information about the courier. In fact, the CIA detainees who
were subjected to coercive techniques downplayed the courier's
significance, with some of those detainees denying they knew him at
all, in the face of significant evidence to the contrary.
Detainees whom the CIA believed to have information on
UBL's location provided no locational information, even after
significant use of the CIA's coercive interrogation techniques.
Chairman Feinstein. And secondly, in order to have Mr.
Brennan's answers to questions for the record by the time he
returns before us in closed session, I ask Members to the right
questions for the record by 5 o'clock p.m. tomorrow--that's
Friday, February the 8th--so we have them for you as soon as
possible so that you can respond to them Tuesday.
I want to thank you and your family for being here, and I
wish you well.
Thank you, and the hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
COMMITTEE BUSINESS MEETING TO VOTE ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN
TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
Room SH-219, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Rockefeller, Burr, Wyden, Mikulski, Coats, Rubio, Heinrich,
Collins, King, and Coburn.
Committee Staff Members Present: David Grannis, Staff
Director; Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director;
Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk; Jennifer Barrett, Randy Bookout,
Michael Buchwald, James Catella, Christian Cook, John Dickas,
Richard Girven, Lorenzo Goco, Tressa Guenov, Tom Hawkins
(Minority Ldr's Office), Neal Higgins, Clete Johnson, Ryan
Kaldahl, Andrew Kerr, Jack Livingston, Eric Losick, Paul
Matulic, Hayden Milberg, Brian Miller, Michael Pevzner, Tommy
Ross (Majority Ldr's Office), Jacqueline Russell, Kelly Shaw,
Tyler Stephens, Chad Tanner, Ryan Tully, Brian Walsh, and James
Wolfe.
Chairman Feinstein. Will the Clerk please call the roll?
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Ms. Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Udall.
Chairman Feinstein. Aye by proxy.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Warner.
Chairman Feinstein. Aye by proxy.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. King.
Senator King. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Burr.
Senator Burr. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Risch.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. No by proxy.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Coats.
Senator Coats. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Ms. Collins.
Senator Collins. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Coburn.
Senator Coburn. No.
Mrs. McGhee. Mr. Chambliss.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. No.
Mrs. McGhee. Mrs. Feinstein.
Chairman Feinstein. Aye.
Mrs. McGhee. Twelve ayes, three nays.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]