Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, June 16, 2016 - 9:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 114-598]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-598
OPEN HEARING WITH HON. JOHN O. BRENNAN,
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon
DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK WARNER, Virginia
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Desiree Thompson Sayle, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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JUNE 16, 2016
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
California..................................................... 2
WITNESS
Brennan, Hon. John O., Director, Central Intelligence Agency..... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
OPEN HEARING WITH HON. JOHN O. BRENNAN,
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Feinstein, Risch,
Coats, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Warner, Heinrich, King,
and Hirono.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'm going to call this hearing to order. I'd
like to welcome our witness today, Central Intelligence Agency
Director John Brennan.
John, you appropriately note in your opening statement that
this hearing takes place against a backdrop of a heinous act of
violence, perpetrated by a troubled and evil person. The
committee has been in consistent contact with the FBI from the
early morning hours on Sunday and it's been provided a great
deal of information on the status of the investigation. I know
that your team, along with your intelligence community
partners, are also working to determine if the killer had any
connections to a foreign terrorist group like ISIL.
Let me thank your officers for what they do and for the
long hours that they are likely putting in to understand this
tragedy, while also focusing on a wide range of threats facing
our Nation.
Mr. Director, I know your organization understands the
threat posed by ISIL and there's been much public discussion
about progress the U.S.-led coalition has made to contain ISIL
geographically, to degrade its finance and media operations,
and to remove its fighters from the battlefield.
However, while progress may have been made against those
goals, you note in your statement that our efforts have not
reduced the group's terrorism capability and global reach. That
assessment is significant.
I want to take this moment to speak not only to you, but
also to the American people. We live in an open society, one
that values freedoms and diversity. The Islamic State is
recruiting individuals by leveraging that freedom and taking
advantage of misguided hate to attack us, and in doing so to
divide us.
ISIL's global battlefield now includes the United States
and we cannot stand idly by. We must take the fight to them. We
must attack them where they raise money, where they plan, where
they recruit, and we must deny them a safe haven.
We cannot negotiate with extremists who seek only to kill,
and I don't think we will. I'm not willing to accept the events
of San Bernardino and Orlando as the new normal, nor should
anyone. We should be able to live securely in a free society
and I think we will. And we're not alone. Our friends in
Europe, Asia, and across the world should be able to go to
sporting events, concerts, dance clubs, and experience life
with their families in safety.
We will unite as a Nation and as a coalition to confront
ISIL and deny them safe haven. But we can only do so with a
realistic, proactive, aggressive, and well-defined strategy.
And, frankly, we have to own it and embrace it.
Now is not the time to pay lip service to these threats.
The sooner we as a Nation realize that there is only one path
for us to take at this juncture, the sooner we will destroy
ISIL's capabilities and ensure the continued safety of our
Nation.
John, I don't make these comments lightly and I'm confident
we will highlight during your testimony these and other threats
to our Nation. But before I turn to the Vice Chairman, I would
ask you to relay something to your entire organization: our
thanks and our appreciation for their work. Your officers work
in the shadows, often in austere and dangerous environments,
day in and day out, to keep us safe. Their selfless dedication
to their fellow citizens should be commended and we are in debt
for that service.
Mr. Director, I thank you for being here today and I now
turn to the Vice Chairman for any comments she might have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I
don't want to repeat what you said. I think you've said it very
well and I'm very strongly in agreement with it. But I'd like
to talk about a slightly different dimension.
I think it's becoming apparent that the tragedy of the last
weekend in Orlando highlights one of the great difficulties
this Nation faces with the rise of the Islamic State. This
enemy is very different from past adversaries like Al Qaida,
because ISIL not only seeks to control territory in several
countries, but is taking advantage of technology and social
media to recruit fighters and inspire terrorist attacks far
from the battlefield.
This trend concerns me greatly. According to the President
and the FBI Director, the killer in Orlando was inspired at a
minimum, influenced by on-line terrorist material. Similar on-
line propaganda played important roles in the shootings in San
Bernardino, Chattanooga, Garland, Texas, as well as Fort Hood,
Texas, and other attacks.
So, Director Brennan, I hope you can assure this committee
and the American people, because this is an opportunity to do
so, that the CIA is doing everything in its power to understand
how these foreign organizations work and operate. I think such
knowledge is essential to help policymakers shape laws and
counter ISIL's on-line efforts, so that we stop them from
incessantly preying on at-risk individuals and radicalizing
them to conduct such heinous crimes.
I'd like to ask that you update us on CIA's understanding
of the extent and reach of ISIL and the implications for those
of us here at home and for our friends and allies overseas. I
think there's been some important progress lately and I think
it's important to share that progress with the people. On
Tuesday, the President publicly listed some of the senior
leaders of ISIL who have been killed, and I think that's
welcome news.
Secondly, we would like the CIA assessment on whether the
13,000 coalition air strikes against ISIL have been effective
and what sorts of targets have most set back ISIL's efforts.
We know that Iraqi forces have surrounded Fallujah and
begun to move into the city. Iraqi forces have recently
liberated the strategic town of Hit and broke the ISIL siege of
Haditha. ISIL has now lost nearly half the populated territory
it once controlled in Iraq. ISIL continues to lost ground in
Syria as well. A coalition of local forces is now pressuring
the key town of Manbij, which will cut ISIL's smuggling routes
into Turkey, hopefully, and put substantial pressure on the
capital of Raqqa.
In sum, I think it would be helpful for America to really
understand whether the anti-ISIL coalition that the United
States has put together is making progress; if so, how and
where?
In addition to ISIL, I would be very interested in hearing
from you on other global threats to the United States and the
challenges that you believe we face. In particular, I think all
of us are concerned about the recent behavior of North Korea,
the aggressiveness of Russia, China's actions in the South
China Sea, and the instability in North Africa in particular.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and
I really look forward to the discussion.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
Mr. Director, we're going to be joined by a lot of members.
As is evident, they really don't care what Dianne and I say,
but when they see that you're on----
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Speak for yourself.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Burr [continuing]. They will be here quickly.
We again thank you for being here. We thank you for what
the Agency does day in and day out, and the floor is now yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Director Brennan. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Burr
and Vice Chairman Feinstein and members of the committee. Thank
you for inviting me to speak to you today in an open hearing
about the Central Intelligence Agency, an Agency and a
workforce that I am enormously proud to be part of. I am
privileged every day to lead the women and men of CIA as they
work around the clock and around the world, often in difficult
and dangerous locations, to help keep our company strong and
free and our fellow citizens safe and secure.
Our hearing today, as you noted, takes place against the
backdrop of a heinous act of wanton violence that was
perpetrated against innocents in Orlando, Florida, last
weekend. We join the family and friends in mourning the loss of
their loved ones who were killed in the attack, and we extend
our best wishes for a full and speedy recovery of all those
injured. This act of violence was an assault on the values of
openness and tolerance that define us as a Nation.
In light of the events in Orlando, I would like to take
this opportunity to offer the committee our assessment of the
terrorist threat our Nation and citizens face, especially from
the so-called ``Islamic State of Iraq and Levant,'' or
``ISIL.'' On the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, the U.S.-led
coalition has made important progress against ISIL. The group
appears to be a long way from realizing the vision that Abu
Bakr Al-Baghdadi, its leader, laid out when he declared the
caliphate two years ago in Mosul.
Several notable indicators are trending in the right
direction. ISIL has lost large stretches of territory in both
Syria and Iraq. Its finance and media operations have been
squeezed, and it has struggled to replenish the ranks of its
fighters, in part because fewer foreign fighters are now able
to travel to Syria. Moreover, some reports suggest that a
growing number of ISIL members are becoming disillusioned with
the group and are eager to follow in the footsteps of members
who have already defected.
The anti-ISIL coalition is taking steps to exploit these
vulnerabilities. In addition to efforts under way to liberate
cities like Fallujah and Manbij, the coalition is also removing
ISIL leaders from the battlefield, thereby reducing the group's
capabilities and its will to fight. Last month, for example, a
U.S. air strike killed an influential ISIL leader in Al-Anbar.
ISIL, however, is a formidable, resilient, and largely
cohesive enemy, and we anticipate that the group will adjust
its strategy and tactics in an effort to regain momentum. In
the coming months we can expect ISIL to probe the front lines
of its adversaries on the battlefield for weaknesses, to harass
the forces that are holding the cities it previously
controlled, and to conduct terror attacks against its enemies
inside Iraq and Syria.
To compensate for territorial losses, ISIL will probably
rely more on guerilla tactics, including high-profile attacks
outside the territory in Syria and Iraq that it currently
holds. A steady stream of attacks in Baghdad and Damascus
demonstrates the group's ability to penetrate deep inside enemy
strongholds.
Beyond its losses on the battlefield, ISIL's finances are
also taking a hit. Coalition efforts have reduced the group's
ability to generate revenue and have forced it to cut costs and
to reallocate funds. Yet, ISIL is adapting to the coalition's
efforts and it continues to generate at least tens of millions
of dollars in revenue per month, primarily from taxation in
those areas that it controls and from crude oil sales on the
black and gray markets inside of Syria and Iraq.
Unfortunately, despite all our progress against ISIL on the
battlefield and in the financial realm, our efforts have not
reduced the group's terrorism capability and global reach. The
resources needed for terrorism are very modest, and the group
would have to suffer even heavier losses on territory,
manpower, and money for its terrorist capacity to decline
significantly.
Moreover, the group's foreign branches and global networks
can help preserve its capacity for terrorism regardless of
events in Iraq and Syria. In fact, as the pressure mounts on
ISIL we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign
to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.
Since at least 2014, ISIL has been working to build an
apparatus to direct and inspire attacks against its foreign
enemies, resulting in hundreds of casualties. The most
prominent examples are the attacks in Paris and Brussels, which
we assess were directed by ISIL's leadership.
We judge that ISIL is training and attempting to deploy
operatives for further attacks. ISIL has a large cadre of
Western fighters who could potentially serve as operatives for
attacks in the West, and the group is probably exploring a
variety of means for infiltrating operatives into the West,
including in refugee flows, smuggling routes, and legitimate
methods of travel.
Furthermore, as we have seen in Orlando, San Bernardino,
and elsewhere, ISIL is attempting to inspire attacks by
sympathizers who have no direct links to the group. Last month,
for example, a senior ISIL figure publicly urged the group's
followers to conduct attacks in their home countries if they
were unable to travel to Syria and Iraq.
At the same time, ISIL is gradually cultivating its global
network of branches into a more interconnected global
organization. The branch in Libya is probably the most
developed and the most dangerous. We assess that it is trying
to necessary its influence in Africa and to plot attacks in the
region and in Europe.
Meanwhile, ISIL's Sinai branch in Egypt has established
itself as the most active and capable terrorist group in all of
Egypt. The branch focuses its attacks on Egyptian military and
government targets, but it has also targeted foreigners and
tourists, as we saw with the downing of a Russian passenger jet
last October.
Other branches worldwide, while also a concern, have
struggled to gain traction. The Yemen branch, for instance, has
been riven with factionalism, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan
branch has struggled to maintain its cohesion, in part because
of competition with the Taliban.
Finally, on the propaganda front, the coalition is working
to counter ISIL's expansive propaganda machine. ISIL paints a
carefully crafted image to the outside world, lauding its own
military efforts, portraying its so-called ``caliphate'' as a
thriving state, and alleging that the group is expanding
globally even as it faces setbacks locally.
ISIL releases a multitude of media products on a variety of
platforms, including social media, mobile applications, radio,
and hard copy medium. To disseminate its official on-line
propaganda, the group primarily uses Twitter, Telegram, and
Tumblr, and it relies on a global network of sympathizers to
further spread its messages.
In sum, ISIL remains a formidable adversary, but the United
States and our global partners have succeeded in putting the
group on the defensive, forcing it to devote more time and
energy to try to hold territory and to protect its vital
infrastructure inside of Syria and Iraq. Though this will be a
long and difficult fight, there is broad agreement in the
international community on the seriousness of the threats and
on the need to meet it collectively and decisively.
It also dominates my conversations with my intelligence and
security counterparts globally worldwide. I frequently engage
with them about what we need to do together in terms of
information-sharing, joint operational activity, and being able
to complement our respective strengths and capabilities so that
we can destroy ISIL thoroughly.
Now, as you well know, CIA is not just a counter-terrorism
agency. We are a comprehensive intelligence service with a
global charter, and we are called upon to address the full
range of 21st century threats. As I often tell young officers
at CIA, I have never seen a time when our country faced such a
wide variety of threats to our national security.
If you run your fingers along almost any portion of the map
from Asia-Pacific to North Africa, you will quickly find a
flash point with global implications. China is modernizing its
military and extending its reach in the South China Sea. North
Korea is expanding its nuclear weapons program. Russia is
threatening its neighbors and aggressively reasserting itself
on the global stage.
Then there is the cyber domain, where states and sub-
national actors are threatening financial systems,
transportation networks, and organizations of every stripe
inside government and out. I particularly appreciate the work
of this committee to try to come to grips and to address the
cyber threats we face as a Nation.
In the face of these many daunting challenges, our Nation
depends on CIA and our intelligence community partners to help
keep our company strong and secure. Indeed, in today's volatile
and complex world policymakers depend on CIA more than ever for
intelligence, insight, and options.
If we are to meet the national security challenges that
confront us, we must constantly adapt and innovate. That is why
we announced a comprehensive effort last year to modernize our
Agency for the future. Since launching our modernization
program just over 15 months ago, we have taken important steps
to ensure that our Agency fully adapts to the challenges of our
time.
Now, we still have work to do, and in some respects we
always will. That's because modernization is about more than
lines and boxes on an organizational chart. It is also about a
mindset, a commitment to innovate constantly so we can keep up
with an ever-changing world.
A key part of this mind set is our commitment to making our
work force as diverse as the world we cover. Just last week,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a
report showing that the intelligence community is significantly
less diverse than the rest of the federal workforce. This is a
report that forces those of us in the intelligence community to
confront some hard truths about who we are and how we are
performing our mission.
As this committee knows, CIA recently unveiled a landmark
effort to make sure that our workforce reflects in our
attitudes, our backgrounds, our ethnicities, and our
perspectives the Nation we work so hard to defend. This is both
a moral and a mission imperative. I truly believe that the
business case for diversity is stronger for CIA than it is for
any other organization in the U.S. Government. Diversity not
only gives us the cultural understanding we need to operate in
any corner of the globe; it also helps us avoid group-think,
ensuring we bring to bear a range of perspectives on the
complex challenges that are inherent to intelligence work.
Again, I would like to thank the committee for its support
for the CIA and for our intelligence community partners through
the course of the year, and I look forward to addressing your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Mr. Director, thank you for that testimony.
Note to members: We will do five-minute rounds based upon
seniority.
Mr. Director, you lead an organization with unique insight
into global events, unprecedented access to the entire world,
and highly trained officers who possess a wide range of talents
and skills. To the extent that you can discuss in this setting,
do you believe that you have all the authorities you need to
accomplish your mission?
Director Brennan. Senator, I believe that we have a great
deal of authorities and very important and solemn authorities
to carry out our mission, and we try to do it to the best of
our ability. The one area when I look to the future that
concerns me is in that digital domain, which is why we set up a
fifth directorate--the first time in 50 years we set up a new
directorate--so that we're able to understand all of the
implications, the vulnerabilities, and the opportunities that
that digital domain presents.
As I know this committee and others here in the Congress
are grappling with the issue about the role of government in
that digital domain, law enforcement, intelligence, and
security organizations, I do wonder whether or not we as a
government have the ability to be able to monitor that domain
from the standpoint of identifying those threats to national
security that we need, just the way we have within the physical
domain, the maritime domain, the aviation domain, the consensus
about how the government has an obligation to protect its
citizens in those various domains.
The digital domain is a new domain. It is the network
frontier. I do not believe our legal frameworks, as well as our
organizational structures and our capabilities, are yet at the
point of being able to deal with the challenges in that digital
domain that we need to have in the future.
So this is the one area that I encourage the committee, the
Congress, this Administration, the next administration, to
continue to work on, particularly as this country is going to
be part of the Internet of Things, where virtually every type
of electronic and mobile device is going to be connected to
this Internet. That interconnectedness gives us tremendous
convenience in our lives, but it also creates inherent
vulnerabilities that our adversaries, whether they be nation-
states or individual actors or groups, will take advantage of.
So that's the area that I'm concerned that the authorities,
not just of CIA but of FBI and NSA, really need to be looked at
very carefully.
Chairman Burr. As you know, the committee is extremely
engaged in that side and our hope is that we can continue to
make progress at understanding what the structure should be in
the future.
You note in your opening statement that the CIA is not just
a counter-terrorism agency, but an intelligence service with a
global charter. Do you believe your organization focuses too
much of its time and resources on the terrorist threat?
Director Brennan. I think, as this committee knows very
well, that the terrorist threat has loomed large since 9-11. It
has presented a serious threat, not just to our national
security interests worldwide, but also to our beloved homeland,
which is why the CIA has been called upon to help to lead this
fight and to take the fight to terrorist organizations so we
can defeat them abroad so they're not able to carry out their
wanton, depraved acts here in our homeland.
CIA has multiple missions. We have the clandestine
collection mission, both human and technical. We have the all-
source analytic mission, so that we can provide our
policymakers in Congress with the insights that they need. We
have a counter-intelligence mission to make sure that we
protect ourselves from those adversaries who are trying to
steal our secrets.
We also have a covert action mission, which involves a
paramilitary dimension. Given our roots in the Office of
Strategic Services during World War II, since our birth in 1947
every administration has taken advantage of CIA's tremendous
capabilities in that covert action paramilitary realm.
As we fight terrorists on the battlefields of Syria and
Iraq and Yemen and Libya and other areas, I think CIA's
formidable capabilities in this area are going to be called
upon increasingly in the future.
I also would add one other component to those missions, and
that's on the liaison front, our partners. We need to make sure
that we develop the partnerships that we need so that we can
leverage their capabilities, because, as good as CIA is, we are
not able to confront all these challenges globally
simultaneously.
At the same time, we need to develop the professionalism of
these other services. We want to make sure that they're able to
fulfil their obligations of intelligence organizations and
they're not subject to the whims of maybe corrupt political
masters who are going to try to use them for their own
political agendas. So as we develop these partnerships, we're
trying to develop their professionalism as well.
Chairman Burr. John, a last question. You've been at the
helm of the CIA for roughly three years now. The world's
changed dramatically during those three short years. While this
is not the appropriate venue in which to go into great detail
in discussion of sources and methods, it's a good opportunity
for you to speak to the American people to educate them about
the CIA and in some sense humanize what is a very opaque
organization to most.
How has your view of CIA as an organization changed during
the last three years?
Director Brennan. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. In your
opening remarks you talked about how CIA officers frequently
work in the shadows and without the accolades that I think they
certainly deserve. I first raised my hand and swore allegiance
to this country on August 5th of 1980 as a young CIA officer
and worked at CIA for 25 years. During those 25 years and in
subsequent years, to include the last three years that I've had
the pleasure and honor to lead the CIA, I am always impressed
with the expertise, the capabilities, the dedication of
Americans from every state in this Union who come to CIA
recognizing that they're frequently going to be maligned
unfairly because of misrepresentations of their work. But they
recognize that the work they do is absolutely essential to keep
their families, their neighbors, their friends, their fellow
citizens, safe.
So I truly believe that the Agency is core and essential to
keeping this country safe and secure from the growing threats
we face around the globe. Coming back to CIA and being able to
spend every day with CIA officers, I am just amazed at what it
is that they're willing to do on behalf of their country.
I presided over our annual memorial ceremony last month in
CIA's lobby in front of our Wall of Honor, where 117 stars
grace that wall and represent CIA men and women who have given
their lives to this country. They do it, again, without seeking
praise, public acclamation, but they do it silently,
selflessly, with great sacrifice to themselves and their
family. So I am honored to be part of this organization.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Director.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I hope to get in three questions, Director. The first is,
in listening to your remarks, which I think were a lot of broad
strokes and very interesting, I wanted to ask you about a
couple of things that you said. You said that Libya is the most
dangerous country and the Sinai the most active. You mentioned
military and governmental targets. Could you explain a little
bit more about that, please?
Director Brennan. I talked about Libya, the country where
there is the most dangerous branch of ISIL outside of Syria and
Iraq. They have several thousands of individuals who have
pledged allegiance to ISIL. They now control a portion of the
Libyan coast around the city of Sirte, where they're able to
train, develop, and to consolidate their position inside of
Libya, as well as to use Libya as a potential springboard for
carrying out operations abroad.
They've attracted a number of individuals from African
countries inside of Libya. So therefore I am concerned about
the growth of Libya as another area that could serve as a basis
for ISIL to carry out attacks inside of Europe and other
locations. That is very concerning, particularly since Libya is
right across from Europe on the Mediterranean, with the refugee
flows that are going there.
There's a group within the Sinai, ISIL. It used to be an
Egyptian terrorist group, Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis, which was
basically consumed by ISIL, and that group pledged allegiance
to ISIL. So they already had a capability. They already had a
number of individuals who were trained and were ready to carry
out attacks. We do attribute the downing of that Russian
airliner to this group that was able to get on board that
aircraft an IED and to bring it down.
The great concern about how ISIL has been able to rapidly
develop capabilities in other countries. In some areas they
were able to coopt and acquire groups that were already in
existence. Nigeria is another country, where Boko Haram is now
the Islamic State of West Africa, where you have several
thousand individuals who are also on the march, waving the ISIL
banner.
I was just out in Singapore last week, where I talked to my
Asian counterparts, concerned about what we might see in
Southeast Asia as various terrorist organizations there are
increasing interaction and connections with ISIL.
So this is a global challenge. The numbers of ISIL fighters
now far exceeds what Al Qaida had at its height. We're talking
about tens of thousands of individuals.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Can you estimate the number?
Director Brennan. Right now we estimate within the Syria-
Iraq area, I think it's between 18,000 and 22,000 fighters, and
that's down significantly from our estimates last year, where
we estimated they may have had as many as 33,000 or so
fighters.
In Libya, the numbers range between 5 to 8,000 or so.
Inside of Egypt, there are several hundreds, if not over a
thousand hard-core fighters inside of the Sinai that are a
combination of individuals who were formerly of Ansar Bayt Al-
Maqdis as well as others who have joined.
Inside of Yemen, you have several hundred. In Afghanistan-
Pakistan, it's in the hundreds. So the numbers are significant
in Iraq-Syria, in Libya. In Nigeria I'd say you probably have
maybe 7,000 or so. Again, there are hard-core fighters, there
are adherents, there are logistics specialists, facilitators,
and others. But the numbers are significant.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. I want to get in one other thing.
You said they proselytize by using Twitter, Telegram, and
Tumblr, that those are the most used. Explain a little bit? I
fight this huge personal privacy, that you have to keep
everything private. And yet, when you have the electronic world
being used as the propaganda mechanism to fuel the lone wolves,
to goad on the lone wolves, to--and I use the word--inspire the
lone wolf, for the United States that's a big security problem.
What do you recommend from an intelligence point of view? I
know it's on the spot, but we're trying to discuss a bill on
encryption, using court orders to ask companies to cooperate in
cases of national security as well as major, major crimes. It's
just very difficult. Yet we see this propaganda. I read those
magazines. I see what's happening, and the enormous
frustration.
It's not like you go to a library and find something in the
stacks. This is a few clicks and you pull up all this material.
What do you think the responsibility of the technical
sector should be?
Director Brennan. Well, Senator, I think you put your
finger on two major issues here. One is that you're absolutely
right, ISIL has made extensive and sophisticated use of the
various technological innovations that we have witnessed over
the past decade, taking full advantage of social media.
A large part of the ISIL cadre are young individuals who
have grown up, whether it be in the Middle East, Europe, or
other places, in an era of great technological development. So
using these mediums comes naturally to them, and they gravitate
toward them. But they also are very aware of what mediums
provide them the greatest security and the greatest protection
from government insight and oversight of that, and they
recognize that a lot of these apps provide them the ability to
communicate with end-to-end encryption and also provide
impediments to governments to be able to gain access to content
of their information.
So I will harken back to what I said earlier. I do believe
that this committee and others really need to continue to have
the discussion, that is going to be a national discussion,
about the appropriate role for the government in an area where
the private sector owns and operates the worldwide Internet. We
know that the Internet does not respect sovereign borders, so
it's not just a question of what the United States is able to
do; it's what the norms and standards are going to be across
the globe.
I do not believe that there is a national consensus right
now, even within the Congress or the Executive Branch, about
what that appropriate role is for law enforcement, for
intelligence agencies, in terms of being able to have the basis
and the foundation to be able to protect their fellow citizens
from what can happen in that digital domain, whether it's with
the propagation of propaganda that these organizations are
involved in, or whether or not they're actually directing and
training and inciting individuals.
But also the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure,
as well as our way of life here, to disabling and destructive
malware that can be deployed by nation-states or organizations
that have that capability and the intent, is something that we
need to come to grips with. We don't want to face the
equivalent of a 9-11 in that cyber domain.
So it is a very important and worthwhile debate, and there
are arguments on all sides about what the government's role
should be. But when I think about the government's inability to
be able to follow up on a court order and a warrant that grants
the government access to some type of device that holds a lot
of documents that could be inculpatory or exculpatory about an
investigation, as well as provide investigative leads to
prevent the next attack, there is something that this
government has to come to grips with in terms of what is the
authority, the responsibility, and the role of the government
in making sure that this country is kept safe from those who
want to do us harm using that digital domain.
Chairman Burr. Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Director, you talked about the territorial
gains we've had against ISIL in both Iraq and in Syria. But I'd
like to get an intelligence assessment, the Agency's
assessment, of what it would look like in Syria, what the
challenges are, what the intelligence shows the complexity--you
know, it's a mixed cocktail of opposition groups and so forth.
So if ISIL is defeated, what are we facing, what are we
continuing to face, in Syria?
Whether Assad stays or whether he goes, there is going to
be significant questions raised as to what we're going to be
facing. I think there's maybe some people coming to the
conclusion that all we have to do is defeat ISIS in Syria and
in Iraq and then everything will be fine. We know that they've
metastasized to a number of other nations. But my question is,
what is Syria going to look like if that happens, if and when
that happens, and what kind of challenges are we going to have?
Director Brennan. You're absolutely right, Senator. Syria
is a virulent cocktail of actors, many of which are in violent
conflict with one another. There are two principal terrorist
organizations that operate inside of Syria. One is ISIL, that
we've talked about. The other is Jabhat Al-Nusra, which is Al
Qaida in Syria, that also has formidable capabilities and a
presence throughout the country of several thousands of
fighters, some of them just engaged in the battlefield against
President Assad, but also some who are plotting to carry out
terrorist attacks outside of Syria.
So what we want to do is to be able to destroy those two
terrorist organizations. As you well know, the U.S. Government
supports the moderate Syrian opposition, represented on the
battlefield by the Free Syrian Army. So if we're able to
eliminate those terrorist groups, there's still a long ways to
go, though, in order to address some of the outstanding issues
inside of Syria.
The Syrian opposition was generated because of concerns
that the Sunni majority had against the Bashar Assad regime
that was abusing its authorities and its powers. So there needs
to be some resolution of outstanding confessional tensions
between Shia and Sunni. You have Christians, you have Druze,
you have others inside of Syria.
This is where we believe that Bashar Assad needs to depart
the Syrian political scene so there can be a more
representative and legitimate government that's able to preside
over the Syrian country. But in addition to that, you have
tensions between the Syrian Kurds in the northern part of Syria
and the Arabs in the rest of the country.
So there is a lot of tensions. It's very similar in some
respects to that cocktail that exists within Lebanon, where the
multi-confessional nature of the country really has been a
serious impediment for Lebanon to have a functional political
system. So we have a long way to go, but the important thing is
to destroy the terrorist organizations there, bring the
conflict down, stop the bloodshed, bring in the humanitarian
assistance that the Syrian people so richly deserve and need,
and then be able to make sure that we're able to develop a
governance structure that is going to be representative of the
Syrian people and be able to address the reconstruction of the
country, which is going to cost billions upon billions of
dollars.
Senator Coats. Given the Russian involvement in Syria now
and whatever decisions they make relative to either Assad
remaining or Assad leaving, how does that complicate the
resolution for some kind of a settlement, ceasefire, or
whatever?
Director Brennan. Well, as you know, Russia brought its
military force to bear last September in Syria with aircraft,
artillery, and personnel, as a way to prevent what they saw as
an imminent collapse of the Bashar Assad regime. They have
bolstered the regime forces and they are involved right now in
carrying out strikes against the opposition.
We work very closely and talk with the Russians about how
to bring this conflict down. We work with them to try to see
what we can do on the counterterrorism front. But I have been
disappointed that the Russians have not played a more
constructive role in terms of leveraging its influence inside
of Syria to bring the Syrian regime and military forces down in
terms of their engagement and to be more helpful as far as a
negotiating track.
This problem of Syria is not going to be resolved on the
battlefield. It has to be resolved on the political front.
Secretary Kerry has been working very hard and long to try to
stimulate some traction there. The Russians I believe can do
more, both in terms of the restraint that they can put on the
Syrian forces, but also more constructive engagement on the
political front.
Senator Coats. Is Assad stronger today or less, weaker,
today than he was a year ago?
Director Brennan. A year ago, he was on his back foot as
the opposition forces were carrying out operations that really
were degrading the Syrian military. As a result of the Russian
military intervention, he is in a stronger position than he was
in June of last year.
Senator Coats. Does that enhance the ability to reach a
diplomatic solution or does it lessen the ability to do that?
Director Brennan. Again, it depends on how Russia decides
to exercise its influence. But right now the strengthened
Syrian military and Russian unwillingness to use the leverage
that it has has made it I think more difficult.
Senator Coats. It sounds like the Russians have put
themselves in a position which we hoped they'd never be in.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Director, just a quick comment on encryption since it
has come up. It's important to remember that if encryption is
restricted in the United States, it will still be very easy to
download strong encryption from hundreds of sources overseas.
In my judgment, requiring companies to build back doors in
their products, to weaken strong encryption, will put the
personal safety of Americans at risk at a dangerous time. I
want to make it clear I will fight such a policy with
everything I have.
Now, with respect to my first question, Mr. Director, I
want to talk about accountability at the CIA. The Agency's 2013
response to the very important report on torture stated that
the Agency agreed that there were--and I quote here--
``significant shortcomings in CIA's handling of accountability
for problems in the conduct and management of CIA activities.''
The document goes on to state that--and I quote here--``The
CIA must ensure that accountability adequately extends to those
responsible for any broader systemic or management failures.''
It has now been three years since the CIA said that. Is it
still the case that no one has been held accountable for the
systemic failures that the Agency has acknowledged?
Director Brennan. First of all, Senator, I want to say that
I respectfully disagree with your opening comments. First of
all, U.S. companies dominate the international market as far as
encryption technologies that are available through these
various apps, and I think will continue to dominate them. So,
although you are right that there's the theoretical ability of
foreign companies to be able to have those encryption
capabilities that'll be available to others, I do believe that
this country and this private sector is integral to addressing
these issues, and I encourage this committee to continue to
work on it.
The Agency over the course of the last several years took
actions to address the shortcomings that we have fully
acknowledged in the detention and interrogation program. There
was individual accountability that was taken, as well as
accountability for some of those management and systemic
failures. We'll be happy to address in a different setting the
details of those accountability steps that I think the
committee is aware of.
Senator Wyden. I want to make sure I heard that right. I
believe you said that individuals have been held accountable
for systemic failures. If that's the case, I certainly think
that's constructive. I will say we will await your classified
response so we have more details on that. But I heard you say
there has been individual accountability and I'd like to see
the details on that.
Director Brennan. Right. Any type of systemic failure is
going to be related to the individual's failure to either
provide the type of management and oversight or the
performance. So there is a combination of factors that
contribute to systemic shortcomings.
Senator Wyden. Were individuals held accountable? It's a
yes or no answer.
Director Brennan. Yes.
Senator Wyden. Okay. I will look forward to getting that
response and I appreciate that because I think that's very
important.
Let me wrap up with a question about an upcoming policy
that we're all going to be tackling here on the committee.
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is up
for renewal or expiration next year. The Office of the Director
of National Intelligence has disclosed that under Section 702
the CIA routinely conducts warrantless searches for the emails
and other communications of specific Americans, and in the year
before the CIA conducted nearly 2,000 of these warrantless
searches.
In my judgment, if there's evidence that an American is
involved with terrorism or espionage, the government ought to
pursue that lead aggressively. Agencies can get a warrant to
read the person's emails and in emergency situations, which I
strongly back, they can even obtain the communications right
away and get judicial review afterwards.
My question is: If there was a rule that said the CIA could
only search for Americans' communications under Section 702 if
the Justice Department has obtained a warrant, with the
exception for the emergency situation or when a person is in
danger, would the CIA be able to comply with that rule?
Director Brennan. I will have to get back to you. That's a
complicated issue and I don't want to give you an off-the-cuff
response. I want to make sure that you get the answer that that
question deserves.
Senator Wyden. Fair enough. I would like that in writing.
Could we have that, say, within two weeks?
Director Brennan. We will do our best to do that,
absolutely.
Senator Wyden. I think two weeks ought to be sufficient,
Mr. Director, and I appreciate the fact that in both areas
you're going to get back to me. We'll look at what part of the
response has to be classified and what part can be discussed in
public. But both with respect to individual accountability on
torture and this question of 702, I look forward to your
response.
Director Brennan. Thank you, Senator.
I should point out also, I think something that you would
be appreciative of is that the Agency has appointed a privacy
and civil liberties officer that is a full member of our senior
staff, that we want to make sure is going to be fully involved
in all of the activities that the CIA is engaged in, to make
sure that we are appropriately protecting the privacy and civil
liberties of our citizens.
Senator Wyden. I look forward to meeting that individual.
Has the person been appointed? Are they available to meet with
members now?
Director Brennan. The person's been appointed and is
operating within the CIA. This is his second or third week.
Senator Wyden. Please ask that person to make an
appointment at a time of his convenience with me.
Director Brennan. Surely.
Senator Wyden. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Director Brennan, thank you for being here
with us today. We get to see you often. Seldom do we get to see
you in a public session like this. In public comments, our
military leaders, the Director of National Intelligence, and
others say over and over again that they feel we're facing more
threat from more directions than ever before. Do you share that
assessment?
Director Brennan. Yes, I do.
Senator Blunt. And what kinds of things has the CIA done to
be more agile in dealing with more threats from more directions
than ever before?
Director Brennan. As I noted earlier, we embarked on this
modernization effort to try to make sure that we're able to
take full advantage, optimal advantage, of the great expertise
and capabilities that we have within the organization. I am a
very strong proponent of integrating capabilities so that we're
not attacking these problems in individual streams. That's why
we set up our mission centers, where we have our regional and
functional mission centers, where we can bring to bear not just
our clandestine collection capabilities and our all-source
analytic capabilities, but our open source capabilities and
insights, our technical innovation, our ability to bring these
different skill sets and expertise together, because, as you
noted, I think that the array of challenges we face--
proliferation with North Korea, the cyber domain, terrorism
that is plaguing so many countries and that threatens us,
instability that is wracking these countries--I have never in
my 36 years of national security service seen a time when there
is such a dizzying array of issues of national security
consequence.
I am constantly going down to the White House,
participating in National Security Council meetings,
principals' committee meetings, so that we're able to address
these issues. That's why I want to make sure that I take full
advantage of the resources that you have provided to our Agency
so that we optimize the contributions of Agency officers around
the globe.
Senator Blunt. And how much is--all of those, all of those
threats from all those directions, how much is that complicated
by what appears to be the new addition of substantial self-
radicalization in the country?
Director Brennan. These so-called ``lone wolves,'' the ones
who operate as a result of the incitement, encouragement, and
exhortations of these terrorist organizations, it is an
exceptionally challenging issue for the intelligence community,
security, and law enforcement to deal with.
The tragic attack in Orlando, we have not been able to
uncover any direct link between that individual, Mateen, and a
foreign terrorist organization. But that inspiration can lead
someone to embark on this path of destruction and start to
acquire the capability, the expertise, maybe do the
surveillance, and carry out an attack, without triggering any
of those traditional signatures that we might see as a foreign
terrorist organization tries to deploy operatives here.
So those individual actors, either acting alone or in
concert with some cohorts, it really presents a serious
challenge. We're working very closely with FBI, Department of
Homeland Security, and others to give them whatever
intelligence we have that might help them identify some of
these individuals.
Senator Blunt. I think you've been asked this particular
question already today, but let me just say again that I think
we're eager to hear from you the kinds of things you need to
better deal with this really unique and hard to penetrate self-
radicalization, because you don't have the other contacts that
all your other sources may come across.
Let me ask one additional question about China and cyber
attacks. Last year the President announced a common
understanding with China's leadership that neither country
would conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of
intellectual property for commercial advantage. In your view,
does that mean that cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property by people from China has ended?
Director Brennan. No.
Senator Blunt. Do you see any good-faith effort on the part
of the Chinese government to crack down on this?
Director Brennan. I see some effort by the Chinese
government to follow through on some of the commitments they've
provided in political channels. There are a lot of entities,
people, organizations, inside of China, some of them operating
as part of the Chinese government, some parastatals, some
working basically on contract. Therefore, we are exceptionally
vigilant about all the different attack vectors that
individuals or countries could attempt to use in order to
penetrate our systems and networks and databases, whether they
be government systems or private sector, to steal intellectual
property.
So I continue to be concerned about the cyber capabilities
that reside within China, as well as the actions that some
continue to undertake.
Director Brennan. Thank you, Director, and thank you,
Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Director Brennan, it's good to see you again.
I want to reiterate once again personal thanks for you and all
the intelligence professionals who serve day in and day out
without necessarily the recognition they deserve.
Senator Blunt and I are leading efforts to recognize some
of that service in terms of an OSS Congressional recognition.
We do small things like the Intelligence Professionals Days.
But I'm blessed to have a lot of the intelligence community in
Virginia, and I hope you will relay to folks at the Agency how
grateful we are for what you do day in and day out, number one.
Number two, I do want to raise some concern in terms of
your response to Senator Wyden. I think the issue around
digital security is one of the most complex I've ever been
engaged with. Encryption, just a small component part of that.
I think public press has indicated that the terrorists in
France used Telegram, a Belgian encrypted technology, a Belgian
encrypted company. Two thousand apps a day are added to the
iPhone Store. Over half of those are foreign-based entities.
And to renegotiate or relitigate the idea of whether encryption
is here or not--encryption makes us safer.
Now, we have legitimate challenges and issues on how we
work through a way within our legal structure to get at
information. I personally believe it would make America less
safe and do great economic as well as national security harm
for us to litigate or to mandate in any way a solution set that
would simply push the bad guys onto foreign-based hardware and
software.
As complex as this issue is, it's going to only
exponentially get more complex as we move into the so-called
Internet of Things, as we think about sensors on our
refrigerators and our cars. Something came to my attention
recently: Think about our kids' toys, which are now
interactive; 6.4 million information of children were hacked
into last year. This is only going to grow larger.
My approach has been to put experts in the room beyond,
frankly, the capability of some of our individual members, to
try to help guide us to a solution set. Chairman McCaul and I
have an approach that way. I still think it is the best one.
Staff corrected me quickly that Telegram is based in
Germany, not in Belgium. But the point being that this is an
international problem. It is not a problem that can be solved
by America only. It is going to require enormous collaboration.
What I am so concerned about is that we are--while this
issue has perhaps disappeared from the newspapers on a daily
basis, we could see some other event using encrypted technology
that would then lead us into a quick solution set rather than a
thoughtful solution set, and getting this wrong would do
enormous harm to our security and to our I think economic
preeminence.
I wanted to raise one issue. Chairman Burr and a number of
members and I had a trip recently. I think I had--I don't want
to speak for all the members--some concerns about the ability
of our European allies in terms of information-sharing. We
obviously saw the horrific attack in Brussels.
But as our Nation grieved this week over the killings in
Orlando, there was also, as you're well aware, that brutal
attack on a French police officer and wife in front of a child,
videoed and then exploited outrageously.
Can you comment on post-Belgium and now post again this
incident in France, growing collaboration, cooperation,
information-sharing amongst the Europeans, and in particular
some concerns I have with our German allies?
Director Brennan. First of all, thank you for your
comments, Senator, about the Agency's workforce. I want to
thank all the Senators who visit Agency officers overseas when
you travel. It sends a very strong message, powerful message,
to them that they have the support of their authorizing
committee here in the Senate.
We have engaged extensively with our European partners,
particularly since the Paris and Belgium attacks. But we have
had longstanding relationships with them on the
counterterrorism front for many, many years.
Over the past two months, myself and other senior leaders
of the intelligence community have traveled out to Europe and
we've sat down with the heads of the internal and external
services to talk about our experiences here in the United
States since 9-11 in terms of how we have been able to bring
together different capabilities, organizational structures,
information-sharing mechanisms, IT architectures, in order to
take advantage of data that's available.
As challenging as it was here in the United States, we were
still one government and so we were able to operate within one
legal system. The challenge for Europe, as you know, is that
there are 28 countries in the EU, with 28 legal structures, and
then within each of those countries they have sometimes several
intelligence and security services. They do not have the
interconnectivity, either from a mission and legal perspective
or from an IT perspective.
So we have talked to them about some mechanisms that we can
use to better facilitate information-sharing among them,
because that's the key, is being able to take information, a
bit of data, and be able to operationalize it at a border,
security point, or the cop on the street so that he can take
action.
So, for example, we, CIA, we share counterterrorism
information with what's called the Counterterrorism Group--it's
the CTG; this falls within the EU; it has the EU members as
well as Norway and Switzerland--so that we're able to push out
to those 30 countries simultaneously information related to
terrorism, so that they have the same information, but then
they know that they can talk to one another about it.
We have talked to them about different mechanisms that they
could use to set up some type of system, whether it's EU-based
or Schengen system based. But they have still I think a ways to
go. They've made some important progress. There are some of the
countries in Europe that are much better able to share
information within their governments and systems, as well as
across the sovereign borders.
But this is something that the Europeans are going to have
to work on, because it's not just a technical or IT solution.
It is also an issue of how are they going to protect the
privacy of their individual citizens as they share information,
what is the threshold for putting in individuals' name and
biographic data into a database, putting them on a watch list?
So they're working their way through that, and we are trying to
provide as much assistance and support as we can.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you.
I appreciate the question and the answer, because I think
this is very important. It struck me when we were there that
the political rivalries and the ancient relationships between
these countries was going to make it very difficult for them to
exchange directly with one another. Therefore, some neutral
Europol or, as I think CTG, it seems to me that's got to be the
answer. I encourage you to continue to encourage them, because
unless they get a handle on this they're going to only be as
strong as their weakest link, particularly when you have a
situation of open borders and not sharing. That's a disaster
waiting to happen. In fact, it has happened several times.
You mentioned that you're a great believer in integrating
the CIA's capabilities and the reorganization. I support that,
that concept. But, as you know, I have concerns about possible
loss of analytic integrity when you combine operations, put
operations and analysis in the same box.
Could you update us on efforts to ensure the analytic
integrity of the intelligence as part of this reorganization?
Director Brennan. It's a legitimate concern, and it's one
that the Agency has had to deal with over the course of many
years, because the Counterterrorism Mission Center has its
roots in the Counterterrorism Center that was established in
the 1980s, where analysts and operations officers were
commingled in the same area.
I headed up the analytic effort inside of CTC back in the
early 1990s and I was aware that we needed to make sure that we
maintained that objectivity and integrity. Those safeguards and
some of the techniques that we used to make sure that there
maintains that objectivity and integrity is part of the
instruction in our career analyst program, the CAP training
program that all analysts go through.
We also want to make sure that we have the senior analysts
and senior managers mindful about the respective
responsibilities of analysts. The rubric ``analysis'' covers
many different areas. Analysis drives a lot of covert action.
It drives a lot of clandestine collection.
Senator King. I just don't want the covert action to drive
the analysis.
Director Brennan. That's right, and there needs to be that
separation in terms of the independence. I must say that the
analysts that I know are very, very--they jealously guard that
analytic integrity, as well they should. So we want to make
sure that it's built into the system. So there is an issue, but
I have been satisfied that we've been able to maintain that
objectivity and integrity while also getting the benefits of
that collocation.
Senator King. A quick question: How does the intelligence
community and the CIA in particular assess the Iranians'
compliance with the JCPOA thus far?
Director Brennan. So far, so good. So far, so good.
Senator King. Another question about organization of the
CIA. It seems to me we have to distinguish between effort and
effectiveness. Do you have a standard procedure that measures
effectiveness of programs, after-action reviews, assessments?
We've got to understand what's working. My question is is there
some systematic way within the Agency of assessing what is
working and how it's working?
Director Brennan. A number of ways, Senator. One is that
our Inspector General has a regular review of a number of our
programs to see how they're operating, make sure they're
consistent with the law. But also inherent in those reviews are
looking at how effective they've been.
But in the area that usually generates the most concern and
controversy, which is in covert action, we have set up last
year a new office called the Covert Action Measures of
Effectiveness Office, where we have senior officers working and
reviewing all of those covert action programs to make sure that
we understand what's the efficacy of the program, not just
whether or not we have reached the milestones that have been
established for these programs, but how effective and
efficacious has it been in terms of realizing objectives that
have been set out.
So a number of ways that we have established these reviews
and metrics. We'd be happy to provide you additional
information.
Senator King. I appreciate that. One of my mottoes in life
is: Does it work, and how do you know? I appreciate your
attention to that.
Finally, there hasn't been an IG at the CIA for 17 months
or so. Why the delay? Is there a nomination forthcoming? I
think this is a very important, one of the most important
positions in government, particularly in the intelligence
agencies, which don't have the oversight that other more public
agencies do.
When are we going to get an IG nomination?
Director Brennan. The Inspector General of CIA is one of
three officers within CIA who are presidentially appointed and
Senate-confirmed, and so therefore is the prerogative of the
President, the White House. So we have had an acting IG, the
deputy, who is presiding over that office. I'd like to think
that I would be seen as prescient today if I were to say that
such a nomination may be forthcoming soon.
Senator King. I hope you will convey back to the
Administration the importance that this committee puts on that
position and that we believe an appointment in the immediate
future is appropriate.
Director Brennan. I will do my best to do that.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Director Brennan, it's good to have you here again. I
apologize, I have not been present in person. I've been in the
Intelligence Committee's equivalent of a makeshift daycare and
I've been listening intently. Chairman Burr and I discussed
letting him babysit my son so I could come out and ask
questions, but we were afraid it would land both of us in child
protective services.
I did, however, hear his opening statements and many of the
other statements of members of the committee, thanking you on
behalf of all the men and women who serve at the CIA, and I
want to associate myself with those comments. In many cases,
they face even more hardships and risks than do our troops and,
while our troops get recognition appropriately at ball games or
when they walk through airports and people buy them beers or
meals, obviously your officers do not, and they deserve all the
recognition that our troops get as well.
I want to discuss cooperation with our intelligence
community from Silicon Valley, specifically Twitter and a
company called DataMiner. According to the Wall Street Journal
from May 8, as well as some other media reports, DataMiner,
which is owned in part by Twitter and is the only company
authorized to access the full real-time stream of public tweets
that Twitter has, recently cooperated with the CIA, but just a
few weeks ago ended that cooperation. So our intelligence
community no longer has access to DataMiner's information.
Could you comment on these reports?
Director Brennan. It appears as though DataMiner was
directed to not provide its service to CIA and the intelligence
community, and so therefore we need to be able to leverage
other capabilities in order to make sure that we have the
insight that we need to protect this country.
Senator Cotton. So those reports are correct?
Director Brennan. I am not going to dispute them.
Senator Cotton. The Wall Street Journal also reported that
the CEO of Twitter, Jack Dorsey, directed DataMiner to stop the
contract because he was worried about, quote, ``the optics,''
end quote, of helping intelligence agencies. Do you believe
that to be accurate?
Director Brennan. I do not know his motivation for any
corporate decision he may have made. But I have no basis to
dispute that.
Senator Cotton. The Wall Street Journal also reports that
among customers of DataMiner remains RT, Russia Today, a
propaganda outlet of Vladimir Putin's government, which Putin
has said is, quote, ``trying to break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly
on global information streams,'' end quote.
To your knowledge, is Russia Today a client of DataMiner?
Director Brennan. I believe so. I'm not certain of that,
but I don't have any information that they have been excluded
from their services.
Senator Cotton. Is it disappointing to you that an American
company would sell its product to Russia Today, a propaganda
arm of the government of Russia, yet not cooperate with the
United States intelligence community?
Director Brennan. I'm disappointed that there is not more
active cooperation consistent with our legal authorities that
may be available from the U.S. private sector.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I want to turn now to the Open Skies Treaty. The STRATCOM
commander, Admiral Haney, has testified that the Open Skies
Treaty, quote, ``has become a critical component of Russia's
intelligence collection capability directed at the United
States,'' end quote. Do you agree with that statement from
Admiral Haney?
Director Brennan. Admiral Haney would be best positioned to
make a public comment like that, and I'd be happy to look into
it and get back to you separately.
Senator Cotton. DIA Director General Stewart has testified:
``The Open Skies construct was designed for a different era and
I'm very concerned about how it's applied today.'' He further
said: ``The things that you can see, the amount of data you can
collect, the things you can do with post-processing, allows
Russia in my opinion to get incredible foundational
intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of
our facilities. So from my perspective it gives them a
significant advantage.'' End quote.
Can Russia use post-processing analysis to enhance their
Open Skies collection, as General Stewart has suggested?
Director Brennan. There have been tremendous technological
advancements since Open Skies was first established, and
therefore I'm sure that Russia and others take advantage of
those technological developments in order to advance their
intelligence collection capabilities.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that these processes and
procedures on digital images and the advances in technology
might allow Russia to exceed the limits imposed by the Open
Skies Treaty?
Director Brennan. I would have to take a look into how
those capabilities could be used to exceed those limits.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you
again for your appearance today.
Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Welcome, Director Brennan. You talked a little bit in your
opening statement, you outlined the sort of disconnect between
the real progress that has been made with ISIL in terms of
kinetic progress, in terms of limiting their financial
resources, and the reality of inspired terrorist attacks that
have global reach, including here in the homeland, as we've
seen this week.
What progress is being made in degrading ISIL's ability to
inspire terrorist acts through the digital or even traditional
media, and how--have we learned how to measure that progress?
Director Brennan. Well, what we're trying to do is to go
upstream and find out who is responsible for spewing this
information into the Internet that inspires individuals to
carry out these attacks. So, working with our military
partners, we are trying to make sure that the appropriate
actions are taken in Syria and Iraq, where a lot of this
emanates from.
In addition, we are trying to share information with as
many of our global partners as possible so that they can be
attuned to individuals who may be involved in these activities,
because there's not just the upstream activity; there is the
downstream propagation of this.
But it also gets to issues that we were talking earlier
about, which is what is the government's role as far as being
able to limit this type of material, both in terms of what its
legal authorities are as well as what its technical
capabilities are to prevent this type of propagation of this
poison that's coming out from them.
Senator Heinrich. Do you feel like you have good
cooperation from our Arab allies on this front?
Director Brennan. We have very strong cooperation from a
number of Arab states and partners that we are actively working
with in this area, yes.
Senator Heinrich. Director, you and the Vice Chair noted
the inherent security challenge of surveillance and the kind of
work that you do in an age of ubiquitous encryption. One of the
challenges is the encryption horse has left the barn. Nothing
we can do at this point can take access to that technology away
from our enemies, away from ISIL, or, for that matter, anyone
else in the world, when you can simply go on line and download
Telegraph onto your phone or your device anywhere in the world.
But if we're not careful about how we address these
challenges, we could certainly mandate weakness into our own
digital systems, potentially putting the personal and financial
records of Americans at risk from hostile actions both from
state-level actors and from criminal actors. I think if we
mandate sort of a 19th century solution to a 21st century
problem, we could also see a number of real economic activity,
real jobs, migrate overseas to avoid those perceived solutions.
So it's clear to both myself and a number of my colleagues
that we need to have continued conversations around this. They
need to be technologically grounded. I know Senator Warner
wrote and I've co-sponsored a bill that seeks to set up a
commission that would include perspectives from intelligence,
law enforcement, and the business and technology communities.
Do you have a perspective on that legislation?
Director Brennan. First of all, let me say that I strongly
support encryption as a capability that protects our way of
life, our prosperity, our national security. But at the same
time, I fully agree with both you, Senator Warner, Senator
Wyden, and others that we need to have the opportunity to deal
with this new environment of the digital domain, so that the
government can appropriately safeguard its interests, its
citizens, its future. And that requires the experts to be able
to get together the legal, the technical, the practitioners, to
find some way that is not going to be perceived as a back door,
but it's going to allow the government to legitimately carry
out its responsibilities while not compromising the great
benefits that accrue to encryption.
I don't know whether or not as an Executive Branch officer
I'm allowed to sort of endorse a piece of a legislative
initiative, but I have talked to other members of the Congress.
I think a Congressional commission on this issue is something
that really could do a great service, because this is not just
a government-only issue. It is largely a private sector issue,
and there needs to be an understanding between the private
sector and the government about what our respective roles and
responsibilities are going to be, to be able to find some type
of solution that's able to optimize what it is that we're all
trying to achieve, which is security, privacy, liberty,
prosperity, in a technologically rich world that is going to
continue to evolve.
So I encourage you to continue to tackle this issue and
also to educate the American people about what it is, so that
they don't fear the government's role, which is what happens
right now because they don't understand it. Then we need to
make sure that they understand that that frontier is just like
the physical domain and the maritime domain; we have an
obligation to protect our people.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you for your perspective on that.
Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Director Brennan, thanks for being here
again. You helped lead or did lead, when President Obama was
President-Elect Obama in 2008, the intelligence transition team
as part of your responsibility to be able to brief the future
President at that time on some of the issues that were blinking
red, I think the term was used, on the intelligence community.
If you were helping organize for that next transition,
because we'll have a new President next year, what are the key
things you could articulate right now are blinking red for the
new President?
Director Brennan. Cyber certainly. That individual, whoever
is elected, will need to use their all four or eight years in
order to tackle this issue, because it's going to take time in
order to come up with the types of understandings that are
necessary.
Terrorism is going to continue to plague us. That's related
to the cyber issue and how we're going to make sure that FBI
and NSA and CIA and others are able to do their job to protect
this country.
Proliferation is something that we cannot forget about and
which is brought into stark relief by the activities of North
Korea and Kim Jong Eun and the continued development of his
nuclear program and ballistic missile capability, that is a
threat, not just to the region, but also to us.
Instability in a number of countries in the Middle East and
Africa and the lack of governance capabilities within these
countries, so that they are unable to tackle the political, the
economic, the societal, the cultural challenges. I am really
worried about how instability is going to continue to erode and
corrode some of the foundations of governance and how more and
more individuals, because of their feelings of being
disenfranchised from their governments, are now identifying
with sub-national groups, whether it be with an ISIL or a Nusra
or a Boko Haram or others. They're not identifying themselves
as Somalis, Nigerians, or Yemenis. They're identifying
themselves as part of a confessional group or a terrorist
organization.
That is a very, very disturbing trend that I believe that
this country can play a role in trying to help address. We
cannot solve it on our own.
Senator Lankford. Do you think that we would have less
proliferation of ISIL and ISIS, whatever you want to call them
today, we would have less of the movement of terrorism
worldwide, if there was not a safe haven in Syria and Iraq?
Director Brennan. That is a big, big part of it. We need to
take away their safe haven, because it gives them the
opportunity to use these lands to train and to fight, but also
to gain revenue. Their control of large cities like Mosul and
Raqqa and these population centers, as well as oil fields, it
generates revenue, not just to keep their fighters on the
battlefield, but also to try to support some of these terrorist
operations.
Senator Lankford. Are there strike possibilities that are
out there that could reduce the amount of money that is flowing
to ISIS right now that we are not taking or that should be at a
higher tempo?
Director Brennan. I think the U.S.-led coalition has done a
good job going after some of these bulk cash sites, as well as
the oil infrastructure and refining capabilities. It's
intermingled with a lot of the local and civilians who are
trying to eke out an existence. So I think the military has
done a very good job. There's more work to be done. That's
where intelligence is so important, so we can give them the
insights into what they can do.
Senator Lankford. So help me understand the tempo of the
pro-Syrian forces, including the Russians and others, in their
air strike tempo compared to our air strike tempo?
Director Brennan. Unfortunately, they're directing a lot of
their air strikes and artillery barrages against the Free
Syrian Army that is trying to unseat Bashar Assad. Just looking
out over the past two weeks, the amount of air strikes in the
Aleppo area, where many of the Syrian moderate opposition
operate, has exceeded the pre-cessation of hostilities totals.
So yes, the Russians and Syrians have gone after ISIL as
well as Jabhat al-Nusra, but a large proportion of their
strikes are directed against what we consider to be the
legitimate Syrian opposition that are trying to save their
country from Bashar Assad.
Senator Lankford. And you anticipate at this point that the
number of strikes that are out there exceed the cessation of
hostilities, which seems to be a piece of paper at this point?
It doesn't seem to be an actual cessation of hostilities.
Director Brennan. It is holding by a thread, particularly
in the areas of Aleppo, Latakia, also in the Damascus
countryside.
Senator Lankford. Let me ask on the intelligence agreements
that we have, Open Skies, other things, that we hold to so
strongly to the letter and the spirit of it. Do the Russians
also hold to the letter and the spirit of those agreements?
Director Brennan. We'll have to get back to you in another
setting on that.
Senator Lankford. All right. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Burr. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Director Brennan, for being
here.
You mentioned in your remarks about CIA modernization and
the desire to diversify the CIA to be reflective of the
diversity, not only in our own country, but of course all the
countries that we deal with in the world. Can you very briefly
go over what you're doing to increase diversity in the CIA?
Director Brennan. Over the past three years, we have had an
initiative--it was called the Director's Advisory Group; it was
initiated in fact by General Petraeus, my predecessor--on
trying to advance women in leadership within the Agency. So we
have had implementation teams that have been working over the
last three years to make sure that the objectives and goals of
this study are being operationalized in our promotion and
assignment panels and other types of programs that we have
inside the Agency.
I asked Vernon Jordan, who is a member of our External
Advisory Board, to spearhead an effort on diversity in
leadership in CIA, that took a look at all the different facets
of the Agency in terms of representation and leadership, our
recruitment efforts, our training and development of officers,
and why we have fallen short of even federal standards of what
our diversity composition should look like.
It was a hard-hitting report and it came up with a number
of recommendations. We have put together action teams on that
as well. I have a lead officer who is involved in it. I have
made mandatory training for my senior leadership team. In fact,
just about three weeks ago we had several hours of diversity in
leadership training for the seniormost officers of the Agency.
They need to be heavily involved in it.
We think we have fallen short over the past years because
we've been so driven by crises that we have not paid attention
to some of these strategic imperatives that we need to. That's
why we need to have our leaders actively involved in these
efforts, from development, mentoring, sponsoring, to
recruitment efforts. I go out to schools, I talk to various
groups.
Senator Hirono. That's great. You must have a time frame
for when you'd like to see some of the results of these kinds
of efforts. What would that time frame be?
Director Brennan. Yesterday is the first one. I want to
make sure that we're able to look at the milestones that we
need. And it's not just the numbers. I want to make sure that
we have instituted some of the programs that are going to
sustain these efforts. It's putting in place the foundational
elements of this.
I think then the numbers that we're going to be looking at
in terms of representation are going to increase over time, but
I'm most interested in institutionalizing some of these
changes, so it's not just a study that is forgotten about.
Senator Hirono. I think that's important.
You also said in a number of ways during your responses
that there is the question of what is the role of government
with regard to encryption as we see entities such as ISIL using
every means to spread their propaganda and encouraging lone
wolf acts, not just in our country, but all throughout the
world. You seemed to indicate that in order for us to determine
what the appropriate governmental role should be, that one
approach to addressing the issue of encryption would be a
commission. I think that's what Senator Warner's bill is, to
create a commission to enable us to figure out what
government's role should be, along with input from a lot of
other folks like you.
Would you say that is the best way for us? Because you have
said that the role of government is one that we haven't quite
figured out.
Director Brennan. I don't know what the best way is, but I
just know that it has to be an effort undertaken by the
government and the private sector, in a very thoughtful manner,
that looks at the various dimensions of the problem and is
going to come forward with a number of options,
recommendations, about how to optimize what we're trying to do
on the national security, privacy, civil liberties front that
protects this country and not cede this environment to the
terrorists and those who want to do us harm.
I do believe that with the tremendous technological
advances, like encryption and other things, they are taking
advantage of the liberties that we have fought so hard to
defend.
Senator Hirono. And I think right now, although other
people have talked about the need to figure out what we're
going to be doing in this cyber space, I don't think we've put
in place any kind of a cohesive or coherent process.
Let me turn to China. The Hague is expected to rule about
China's claims in the South China Sea soon and it is
anticipated that the ruling will support the Philippines' case
that China has made excessive claims about its maritime
sovereignty. Can you just briefly discuss your assessment of
what China's response might be to such a ruling, and could the
expected ruling be a trigger for further escalation by China?
Director Brennan. Well, in the recent conference, the
Shangri-La conference in Singapore, the Chinese representative,
Admiral Sun, made very clear that they don't recognize the
legitimacy of the arbitration tribunal, nor I think will accede
to its findings.
So Secretary Carter made very clear that we certainly do
recognize that there needs to be this type of arbitration,
given that there are a number of claimants to some of these
features in the sea, and it's not just the Philippines; it's
other countries as well. So there needs to be an agreed-upon
mechanism that will be able to resolve these outstanding
disputes.
I think the United States has made very clear the
importance of protecting freedom of navigation in that part of
the world and will continue to take steps to make sure that
people understand the United States is committed to freedom of
navigation worldwide.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator.
Do any Senators seek additional questions? Senator Wyden
has asked for one.
[No response.]
The Vice Chairman also asked me, Director, to ask you a
couple of questions. She had to leave for an Appropriations
meeting at 10:30.
What's your assessment of North Korea's cyber capabilities
and intentions?
Director Brennan. I think that the North Koreans have
developed a cyber capability, as we've seen; some recent
incidents over the last year or two where it has been employed.
I think it is something that we need to be concerned about,
given Kim Jong Un's penchant to use whatever capabilities he
might have to cause problems.
So we can get back to the Vice Chairman a more detailed
answer about their capabilities as well as potential
intentions.
Chairman Burr. Great. One last question from the Vice
Chairman. ISIL's getting all the attention today. They're not
the only terrorist organization out there. What are we doing
and how concerned are you on AQAP and other potential
organizations?
Director Brennan. The Vice Chairman is absolutely right,
there are a number of terrorist organizations. Al Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula continues to be very active inside of Yemen
and has several thousand adherents and fighters. There have
been recent efforts, collaborative efforts, between the United
States along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia and Yemen, to
dislodge AQAP from the port city of Mukalla. It was successful;
it drove them out.
But there is an active effort under way to continue to
dismantle and destroy that organization. But also there is the
organizations in the Af-Pak area, led by the Taliban, the
Haqqanis, that continue to engage in terrorist attacks; Lashkar
e-Taiba. We work very closely with the services in the area,
including the Indians and others, to try to guard against their
ability to carry out those attacks.
So this is something that we continue to have to dedicate a
lot of resources to. As you know, Ayman Zawahiri, the head of
Al Qaida, still is out there and continues to put out audio
statements and other things exhorting his followers. So this is
a continued challenge for us.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden for a question.
Senator Wyden. Just a quick comment and a fast question. On
this encryption issue, Director, you have been clear that you
think that there's a government role here. You got me at
``hello'' on that. There's no question that there are ways that
government can strengthen the personal safety of Americans in a
dangerous time. I, for example, think it makes sense to hire
people with extensive experience in science and technology,
like we have, for example, in Oregon's Silicon Forest. I can
give you plenty of names.
What I don't want to do, though, is I don't want to go
backwards on digital security, which is what's going to happen
if the government, if the Congress, requires that back doors
are built into the products of this country.
So we will continue that debate. I just want to make that
clear as we wrap up.
Senator Lankford asked an appropriate question with respect
to briefing a new President, or what would you say to a new
President. I think I've heard you touch on this, but I'd like
to get it formally for the record. Director Brennan, if the
next President of the United States directs the Agency, directs
the CIA, to resume the use of coercive interrogation
techniques, how would you respond?
Director Brennan. I have said publicly that I do not
believe such aggressive, coercive techniques are necessary. As
you know, the CIA's detention-interrogation program was
disbanded, and I certainly while I am Director of CIA have no
intention of bringing such a program back and would not engage
in EIT's such as waterboarding and other things, ever.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. A quick question about ISIL in Libya. Any
chance they're going to get a hold of any of Libya's oil
capabilities? Because that's where a lot of their revenues have
come from in Syria and Iraq. How do you assess the security of
the oil assets in Syria--I mean, in Libya.
Director Brennan. I don't think anything in Libya is overly
secure. There have been attempts made and assaults upon some of
those oil facilities, but to date ISIL has not been able to
gain control of them. I'll have to get back and see whether or
not there are sort of pockets of areas where ISIL's been able
to encroach. But there are some challenges there and there are
a number of security militias and firms that are in that area
that have prevented ISIL from taking over. But we'll get you a
more thorough response.
Senator King. I know I said it was my final question, but--
--
Chairman Burr. I knew better.
Senator King. My wife says I say ``finally'' too much; it
gets people's hopes up.
Chairman Burr. She's a smart woman.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Afghanistan, we haven't talked about
Afghanistan at all. What's your assessment of the security
situation in Afghanistan? There's a proposed drawdown of our
troops which has to start some time in the early fall if it's
going to achieve the 5,000 troop number in January.
Give us an assessment of the situation? Is there--I guess
the short question is: Does the government have a chance or is
Taliban just waiting and they're going to take back over?
Director Brennan. We're near the height of the fighting
season. The number of casualties on both sides in terms of the
ANSF, the Afghan National Security Forces and the Taliban, I
think are greater this year than we have seen in a long, long
time, because of the number of engagements. Which means that I
think the Afghan forces are stepping up and engaging in the
fight more as U.S. forces have drawn down. But also I think it
reflects the intensity of the Taliban efforts. They're really
trying to erode the government hold in a number of areas.
We have worked very closely with the Afghans, we the U.S.
Government, to have them better consolidate their forces so
that they can protect the critical infrastructure in the cities
and transit routes. But the Taliban is determined, working with
the Haqqanis, a sub-group of the Taliban. So there is continued
concern about the Taliban's ability to carry out these attacks,
both in some of the outlying areas, but also as they try to go
after the provincial capitals as well as Kabul.
So it is still uncertain in my mind whether or not the
Taliban is going to continue to make incremental progress. We
are providing support to our Afghan intelligence partners so
that they have the capabilities that they need. But there is
still a long, hard fight ahead in Afghanistan for the Afghan
government.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King.
Director, thank you. Two takeaways from your testimony that
I certainly heard that are relevant to today: There'll be an
increase in global terrorism as more pressure is applied in the
battle space, and I think that's something that we certainly
have seen up to this point. There's no reason to expect that
that doesn't increase. And ISIL has become a global
organization, and I think sometimes we treat them in a very
small geographical footprint, but they have very quickly and
quietly grown to be that global organization.
Now I'd like to give a closing statement. I'm not sure that
I've done that before, but I feel compelled. I'm not going to
speak for the Vice Chairman, but I think she would probably
associate with most of what I'll say.
This feud between the tech companies and the intelligence
community and law enforcement has to stop. Encryption is the
issue that we describe it as, but this is much more. Technology
is going to drive the United States economy for the next 50
years and the global economy as well. It is the secret sauce
for our children and our grandchildren to have unlimited
opportunities, not success but opportunities.
When the Vice Chairman and I committed to at least lay on
the table a solution to encryption, it was not with the belief
that we were smarter than anybody else. It's we understood what
was at stake and we were willing to take the heat. And, as you
know, Director, we've taken a lot of it. And I don't regret it,
because I think what we had hoped was that we would start a
national debate in this country about what the appropriate role
of government is; that for the American people to understand
that for our agencies to prevent and protect them, that that
comes with a price; and that this debate is about what that
cost might be and what we're willing to accept.
We can't separate the world based upon who's domained
domestically and who is domained in foreign countries. That's
the beauty of the Internet. It really doesn't matter. But if it
wasn't important to locate in the United States, we'd probably
have very little manufacturing because most of their customers
are overseas. But they're here, and they're here for an
important reason. They're here because we have in our
foundational structure things that they find important. At the
top of the list is the rule of law.
I point to what one tech leader said as the Vice Chair and
I launched the encryption debate to the level it is today: We
can't trust a judge on the bench to hear from the intelligence
community or law enforcement and understand whether somebody's
met the threshold that they need to reach to access
communications or data. Well, let me say today: If we've gotten
to a point where we don't trust a judge on the bench, we have
just gutted the rule of law in the United States.
This to me is about so much more than encryption. This is
about whether the United States is going to be the innovator of
the world for the next 50 years. It's about what the next
generation has as opportunities and, oh yes, freedoms,
protection of personal data, and prevention of terrorist acts.
If we can't prosecute criminals by a district attorney or
by a U.S. attorney because they can't gather the information
they need to make a case in court, then, talking about Orlando,
we'll talk about crime in every community across this country,
because we're going to have individuals that commit it that
walk and live next door to us every day.
So I used the platform today. I don't think I find
disagreement from you or from others in law enforcement, either
nationally or locally, because we've heard from a lot of them.
But I really believe that we need to take at heart that what we
do affects the intersection of the rule of law and technology
in the future, and we're much better off to have that debate
today than we are to wait until something happens and we need
it and the pendulum swings too far, a la post-9/11. We did some
things then that we thought were right. Today, looking back, we
wouldn't do them again. We all agree.
This is an opportunity to get this one right, not to go too
far, but to go to the right place, the right point.
So, Director, I want to thank you for your testimony. I
want to thank you for the resolve of your workforce.
I also want to highlight the professional staff of this
committee. I think they are incredibly talented, incredibly
dedicated. They travel to very unpopular spots where your
officers are, on a regular basis. They do it not to gain
mileage points; they do it to live up to the mission of this
committee, which is oversight of your Agency and the rest of
the intelligence community. On behalf of 85 other members of
the United States Senate and, oh, by the way, for the American
people, we are the ones that testify and certify that you do
things within the letter of the law or a presidential directive
and that we don't overstep those bounds, and when we do it's
this committee's responsibility to report it and pull it in. So
they deserve credit, because they don't get that credit very
often.
Please pass to your employees our sincere gratitude for the
job they do. We look forward to your next visit with us. It
probably won't be open and there will be some disappointed
souls in the audience, but we will do it in a much more
productive way.
Thank you, Mr. Director.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]