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[Senate Hearing 110-839]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-839
INTELLIGENCE REFORM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
January 23, 2007
January 25, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JOHN WARNER, Virginia
RON WYDEN, Oregon CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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Hearing held in Washington, DC, January 23,
2007
Opening Statements:
Rockefeller, Hon. John D.; Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West
Virginia................................................... 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S.; Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri................................................... 7
Witness Statement:
Graham, Mary Margaret; Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Collection................................ 9
Prepared Statement, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence........................................... 13
Additional Materials:
Letter from Kathleen Turner (Office of the DNI) dated April
12, 2007 transmitting responses to QFRs Hearing held in
Washington, DC, January 23, 2007........................... 40
Hearing held in Washington, DC, January 25,
2007
Opening Statements:
Rockefeller, Hon. John D.; Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West
Virginia................................................... 73
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher S. Bond; Vice
Chairman; Statement for the record......................... 76
Witness Statements:
Pistole, John S.; Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 79
Allen, Charles E.; Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.......................................... 87
Lanier, Cathy L.; Acting Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police
Department of the District of Columbia..................... 120
Spears, James W.; West Virginia Homeland Security Advisor and
Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of
Military Affairs and Public Safety......................... 125
Gannon, John C.; Former Staff Director, Homeland Security
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, and former
Chairman, National Intelligence Council.................... 136
Additional Materials:
Responses to QFRs submitted by Stephen Dove, Department of
Homeland Security for hearing held January 25, 2007........ 148
HEARING ON PROGRESS OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM: OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay
Rockefeller (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein,
Wyden, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, Hagel, Chambliss,
Snowe, and Burr.
Chairman Rockefeller. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very
much, and the absence of all but the two most distinguished
members of the Committee should not deter you. It's simply that
we have, in the ways of the Senate, a vote at 2:45, and Kit
Bond has graciously agreed to wait there, so when I go down to
vote, he will come back and we will be, as they say, seamless.
So be tolerant of the institution to which you are speaking.
I'll give my statement and then I'll go and Senator Bond
will do it when he comes back.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Just over two years ago, Congress passed and the President
signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,
which was a big deal for us. A lot of people had a lot of
different ideas. It was finally cobbled together in the
Government Affairs Committee, and I thought they did a very,
very good job of it--Susan Collins and Joe Lieberman. This was
historic legislation, adopted in response to recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission, and influenced in no small measure by the
findings of this Committee's investigation into flawed
intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
The legislation was intended to strengthen the management
of the U.S. intelligence community by putting in place a
Director of National Intelligence separate from the management
of the Central Intelligence Agency, who, with enhanced
authorities, would bring about a new unity of effort and
purpose against threats to our national interest and homeland
security.
After two years, it is appropriate that the Senate
Intelligence Committee take stock of the implementation of the
Intelligence Reform Act. We need to understand what has been
accomplished, what remains to be accomplished, and what changes
to the law are warranted in light of the experience of the past
two years. This is an open hearing, and it's an open hearing
because it should be.
The central question before us today is whether the promise
of intelligence reform has been fully realized. Intelligence is
our first line of defense against threats to our national
interest. I can hear those words coming out of John Warner's
mouth. You really can't do much of anything these days without
the right intelligence. And, as the Committee's worldwide
threat hearing on January 11th made very plain, the threats we
face now as a Nation are serious, persistent, complex, and
growing.
Today, we are focusing on the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence itself, and an examination of the
consolidated budget and personnel authorities we vested in the
Director position. On Thursday we will hold a second open
hearing devoted to the examination of the implementation and
reforms at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Homeland Security.
In addition to the administration witnesses today, we will
on Thursday receive testimony from outside experts and examine
whether we have made progress since 9/11 in strengthening our
domestic security programs and sharing information with state
and local law enforcement and security officials.
While Ambassador Negroponte is unable to appear,
understandably, at today's hearing, I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses--senior officers--all with long careers in
public service who have been personally responsible for the
developing and carrying out of DNI initiatives in the areas of
collection, analysis, information sharing, and management.
I believe it is fair to say that the Committee recognizes
the implementation of the Intelligence Reform Act, and reform
in general, is a work in progress. After that short amount of
time, how could it be anything other than that, taking place
during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with a multi-menu of
threats from elsewhere, and the continued global efforts
against al-Qa'ida and other terrorist threats. Yet even as some
reforms may take years to come to fruition, we will be asking
our witnesses to address whether the pace of reform reflects
the urgency with which we were called to action two years ago.
We also acknowledge that the Congress and the President did
not give the DNI monolithic powers, or place him in charge of
an intelligence department, but we will explore whether the DNI
has used the powers assigned to the office as vigorously as the
law allows, and if not, why not. As I say, we are prepared to
look at everything and to act wisely. That was, after all, a
bill that came out rather quickly. We're not always a font of
wisdom in the Congress about all matters that are going to
confront us, and therefore we need to be open to your ideas and
our ideas of what could make it better.
In addition, while progress has been made to develop
strategies and set uniform intelligence standards, there is a
concern on the Committee that these high-level efforts have not
yet made a difference at the agency or field level. We will
want to identify what obstacles exist to achieving reform, and
how best to fix them.
Finally, the fiscal 2008 budget that is about to come up to
Congress will be the first that the Director of National
Intelligence has had a chance to build from scratch. We look
forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the Director's
office carried out the budget formulation process, and in what
ways the end products reflect his priorities.
I do not now turn to Chairman Bond for any statement he
would care to make, because I'm going to go down and vote. And
John Warner, the distinguished former chair, and only most
recently ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and
Diane Feinstein who is on all committees involved in all
matters, may have things they wish to say. And if they wish to,
they are free to do so. I will depart.
Senator Warner. I would like to avail myself of this
opportunity to propound some questions. But first off, I want
to thank each of you for your extraordinary public service. You
labor quietly without, hopefully, as much spotlight as you can
possibly avoid, and I think you do a very effective job.
I've known Ambassador Negroponte for many years. We've been
personal friends and colleagues in the professional world. I
think he's done an extraordinarily fine job, and while I'm
pleased that he's going to take on this post at the State
Department, I do wish he'd had a little longer to sort of lay a
firmer foundation which he has started, but I guess as yet has
not completed.
I'd like to ask the following questions. I was intrigued
over the Sunday talk shows when Speaker Gingrich got up and--
Chairman Rockefeller. Senator, if I could be so rude, would
it be possible to save questions until after the statements
have been given?
Senator Warner. Well, I didn't know we were all making
statements. I thought the Chairman and the Ranking made them.
Chairman Rockefeller. That's all. That's all, but then
because you two are here, I thought it would be fine to have
you make statements. But I think questions ought to be reserved
until the entire Committee can hear them.
Senator Warner. Well then, Mr. Chairman, I'll just have to
submit these questions for the record.
Chairman Rockefeller. No, no. Oh, you can't stay?
Senator Warner. No, I cannot stay, regrettably. So, I'll do
whatever the chair wishes, but it seems to me--
Chairman Rockefeller. Well, why don't you read them--why
don't you read them into the record so they can be thinking
about them?
Senator Warner. Well, that's, in my 29 years, a new first,
but here we go.
Speaker Gingrich said that he felt that perhaps the
progress thus far of your organization had achieved but 10
percent. The record will show accurately what he said. He
further stated that the intelligence reform must be centered on
the performance metrics that should be used to define success.
So my question to you is, when the office of DNI began the
process of reform two years ago, what metrics or benchmarks did
or did you not establish as markers of success or failure to
reach your goals?
Has the ODNI identified benchmarks that must be achieved by
individual intelligence agencies? If so, what are those
benchmarks in the areas of HUMINT and SIGINT and analysis?
How far toward achieving those benchmarks have you come in
these years in your judgment? And do the same benchmarks remain
relevant, or do you need to adjust for the years ahead?
Now, to the national HUMINT manager. A key figure of the
intelligence reform bill was the separation of the head of the
intelligence community from the management of CIA. Congress
recognized the wisdom of the 9/11 commission when it said that,
``the CIA will be one among several claimants for funds in
setting national priorities. The national intelligence director
should not be both one of the advocates and the judge of them
all.''
This principle would seem to apply to the adjudication of
HUMINT issues and conflicts in the intelligence community if
the CIA remains both the national HUMINT manager and one of
several HUMINT collectors. My question, particularly, would be
to our distinguished witness, Mrs. Graham. What is the division
of labor between your responsibility as Deputy Director of
National Intelligence for Collection and the responsibilities
of the Director of CIA as the national HUMINT manager? How are
you able to ensure that HUMINT issues, such as information
access, are being adjudicated fairly and in the best interests
of the Nation, not in the parochial interests of one agency?
How has the establishment of the National Clandestine
Service, with the CIA as national HUMINT manager, improved the
collection and sharing of human intelligence?
Now, to the intelligence community's support to the
President's Iraq plan. The ultimate goal of the 9/11 commission
recommendations, the WMD Commission recommendations, and the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act is to provide
the best possible intelligence to policymakers so that the
President and members of Congress can make informed foreign
policy and national security decisions. Since the President
announced his Iraq plan early this month, that was on the 10th
of January, I've taken the opportunity during numerous
briefings and hearings, both at the White House and here in the
Congress, and I commend the President for the hard work that he
and his various agencies and departments put in to devising the
plan which he announced on the 10th of January.
I respectfully have some differences with that plan. Those
differences were put into the record last night by way of a
resolution, which I feel is not confrontational, but I put it
in because the President specifically said on 10 January, if
members of Congress had their ideas, they would be considered.
It's in the record, exactly what he said.
So the question I have--I believe important strides have
been made toward intelligence reform, but it's incumbent upon
the intelligence community to provide its best assessment of
the Maliki government chances for success under this program.
It is the central, core issue, in many respects, of this
program. And I would hope that we could get some public
testimony on that today.
Now I further understand, and I repeatedly advised my
colleagues and the Armed Services Committee some four, five, or
six months ago in its authorization bill specifically requested
that the intelligence community perform a current national
estimate, an NIE--National Intelligence Estimate--on the
situation in Iraq. And here we are with the President's
programs laid down. We're about to go into a considerable
debate, which I think is important for the Nation, and yet this
document is continuing to be worked on and in all probability
will come out after the Congress has finished its debate and
the Congress may or may not--I'm not here to predict--vote on
one or more resolutions without the benefit of having seen that
very key document.
And the last question. In its December 2006 report, the
Iraq Study Group said that our intelligence community does not
have a good strategic understanding of the Iraq insurgency or
the role of the militias. As our Nation debates the best
strategy to achieve a stable and secure Iraq, the Iraq Study
Group's assertion is of concern to me. We must have solid
intelligence, both tactical and strategic, if any plan is to
succeed in Iraq. The ISG, that's the Iraq Study Group,
recommended that the DNI devote greater analytic resources to
these issues. I wanted to give you an opportunity today to
comment on the Iraq Study Group's assertion here, and let the
Senate have the benefit of that response as it is on the verge
of these historic debates.
Those are my questions.
Chairman Rockefeller. And Senator Warner, I will commit to
you that I will ask at least one of those, perhaps more, and my
first choice would be the Maliki one. But I will ask that on
your behalf.
Senator Warner. All right.
The vote is under way, so you best get on your way.
Chairman Rockefeller. I'd best get on the way.
Senator Feinstein. If I might--
Chairman Rockefeller. No questions.
Senator Feinstein. I would, if I could, Mr. Chairman, like
to make just a few brief remarks. There are three of us that
also sit on Defense Appropriations--Senator Bond, Senator
Mikulski, and myself. Presently, Intelligence Committee staff
have no access to the intelligence budget as it goes through
defense approps. What we get is essentially a one-page black
budget. It is really inadequate.
Senator Bond and I have been making a request that we be
able to have our staff have access to the budget. I think it's
important. I think the Intelligence Committee's views on the
budget are relevant. That's one point I would like to make.
Second, I have been very disappointed in the DNI--and not
the individual, but in the exercise of the position. I was one
of the very first to propose legislation, when Senator Graham
was Chairman of this Committee, for a DNI. And the way I
envisioned it was one person who would be able to bring
together periodically all of the chiefs of all of the different
departments and divisions, to really develop a sense of team.
And as it became so critical and so evident in the Iraq NIE,
the faultiness of the Iraq NIE to really take a look from the
top, at the analytical aspects of how this intelligence was
done, see that the changes were made and report regularly to
this Committee.
I have been very disappointed that the DNI has not been
really available and present and around. And that--I'm just
going to say it--was certainly not my view of what a DNI should
be. I happen to believe it was a mistake to prohibit co-
location of the DNI's office in the authorization bill, and I
will seek to change that. I believe to have a DNI out at
Bolling makes no sense. The DNI should be close to the
agencies--able to inter-relate with the agencies.
And I think because there's not a lot of territorial
imperative in all this right now--we have a new head of service
in terms of General Hayden, General Alexander, General Clapper,
other things that are happening--that we have the opportunity
now to make some of those changes. But I don't think we can
have a DNI that is essentially isolated from the day-to-day
operations of the community. Thank you.
Senator Wyden. As you can all tell, we have a hectic
schedule, and you are going to have senators coming back and
forth. But there were two points that I wanted to make before I
ran off, and I want to pick up on comments made by both Senator
Warner and Senator Feinstein.
I think if you look back at NIEs, when the administration
wants to get them up here, in 2002 there was a National
Intelligence Estimate that was put together in something like 3
weeks. It was done quickly and it was done before there was a
key vote. What is so troubling to all of us now is we are not
going to get a relevant new National Intelligence Estimate
until well after the United States Senate casts critically
important votes. That is not acceptable. To have the maximum
value of the intelligence that is furnished to us, it has got
to be made available in a timely kind of way, and I have just
cited my concern with a specific example.
One other point that I hope that the Committee will be able
to get into with you is yesterday the Congressional Quarterly
reported that the chief of the CIA's Baghdad station ``presides
over hundreds of operatives who cannot speak the local language
or go anywhere.'' Now I know in an open session it is not
possible to go into a full-fledged response with respect to
every aspect of an article like this, but I do think that it is
critical that this office lay out for this Committee what the
various intelligence agencies are doing to hire people who
possess the essential language capabilities, technology
knowledge, and key kinds of skills.
And I have heard all about strategic plans and the like,
but it doesn't seem to be happening. And to have authoritative
publications say that they don't have people there who can
speak the local language is exceptionally troubling. I mean,
that is a real wakeup call to have someone make that comment,
and we need to know how the DNI is addressing it.
Mr. Chairman, we are going back and forth so we're glad
you're here.
Vice Chairman Bond [presiding]. Thank you very much,
Senator Wyden. Sometimes even the best-laid organization does
not work properly. I had understood that Chairman Rockefeller
was going to start it off and we were going to play a tag team.
I know you haven't given your opening statements, but for
better or for worse, I'm going to give an opening statement,
and then call on our witness who is to give an opening
statement, and then we may get back into a regular flow because
I'm sure that Chairman Rockefeller and others will be back.
This is a very important hearing. I'm delighted that it has
been called for today.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
You know, looking back on the history of this for a minute,
Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 in response
to the devastating attacks on Pearl Harbor and the numerous
operational issues in World War II. Within a decade, it was
apparent that the reform had not solved the problems, and
Congress passed a series of reforms in the 1947 Act in 1958.
Then on the military side, problems in inter-service
coordination in Vietnam, the failed Iranian rescue mission in
1980, and the problems that surfaced in the 1983 operations in
Grenada, led Congress to enact the 1986 reforms known as
Goldwater-Nichols. It took nearly 40 years from the original
passage of the National Security Act to adjust its organizing
legislation to facilitate operations to meet the challenges of
the times.
Unfortunately, we did not apply the same rigorous analysis
to the difficulties within the Intelligence Community during
that time period, and I believe there was a fundamental reason
for this. During the Cold War, the primary responsibility for
the IC was to provide the U.S. with strategic warning against
the Soviet Union with 20,000 nuclear warheads. The tragic
events of 9/11, however, combined with proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction to rogue and perhaps non-state actors has
changed this forever. We just don't have the luxury of 40 years
to get it right.
Ambassador Negroponte spoke recently in a meeting of
several remaining challenges--more diverse recruitment in the
workforce, increased foreign language training and education in
foreign language, improved data collection and collaboration
between analysts and collectors, and continued improvement
through community integration.
I agree 100 percent, but I would add more. First is
improved human intelligence. It doesn't necessarily mean more
human intelligence, but it certainly has to be better. The
Committee's Iraq WMD report, as well as the WMD Commission's
report, described the role that poor HUMINT played in the Iraqi
intelligence failures--including lack of collection, over-
reliance on liaison, and other country services, lack of trade
craft standards, and lack of information sharing.
We have to improve our HUMINT by bringing in more people
who are able to fit in and speak the language of target
countries. We need to improve their cover mechanisms. And we
need to have better utilization of commercial operations.
Frankly, I don't believe the establishment of the National
Clandestine Service has solved these problems. The sharing of
source information has only marginally improved, it appears to
us, and largely only to those analysts who work for the CIA.
Testimony that we have received from National Clandestine
Service officers suggest there is no intent to expand access to
certain information to analysts outside the CIA. That has to
change, friends. The IC's best analytic judgment will only come
from analysts who have immediate access to all information they
need. But better information sharing alone won't guarantee
correct access. Better analytic tradecraft, combined with a
willingness to challenge assumptions rigorously must be the
norm rather than the exception.
Now, analysts have worked hard in past years to make sure
the Iraqi WMD mistakes are not repeated. I commend them for
their efforts. We are talking not about failure of the many
dedicated people who have worked in the IC; we are talking
about improving the system so that it works better. But
everybody in the community must continue to question and
challenge the community's analytic products and briefings.
And yet at the same time, analysts must be fully supported
when they speak truth to power.
Our analysts must take into account the ideological war
that we are in today, and focus on understanding the beliefs
that undergird militants--analyzing how and why individuals
turn militant so that recommendations can be made for
countering that process.
I believe, as so many people have said, that the battle
against an ideological foe is 20 percent kinetic and 80 percent
ideological, and I think we're doing the kinetic part pretty
well; we need to do it better, but we also need to focus on the
80 percent that is ideological.
I'm also concerned about the community's financial
management. In 1990, Congress passed the Chief Financial
Officers Act, which set out the goal of all departments and
agencies having auditable financial statements. It is 2007,
and, as best we know, not one, none, zero, of the IC agencies
can give us an unqualified financial statement. If I'm wrong,
please inform me; I would love to be proven wrong. In other
words, they can't tell us where the money goes after we give it
to you. I think the taxpayers want us to fix that.
Finally, let me focus on the problem of leaks. While it is
not a reform issue, we all know that leaks cost us dearly.
Probably the most succinct statement on the leaks that have
occurred recently came from the now Director of CIA, General
Michael Hayden, when he came before this Committee. And I asked
him about the leaks, and that was before the leak of the
terrorist financing tracking system came out. And he said, ``We
are now applying the Darwinian theory to terrorists; we are
only catching the dumb ones.''
Well, it's imperative we take steps to reduce the incentive
for people to provide classified materials to those who have no
need to have it. I would like to see people in orange
jumpsuits, but at the very least, there needs to be a change in
the culture that it is no longer acceptable to take classified
information, leak it, and then move to some post in the outside
world where one can profit from it.
With that, if nobody has objection, I would like to
introduce our witnesses: Mrs. Mary Margaret Graham, Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Collection; Ambassador
Patrick Kennedy, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
Management; Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Analysis; and General Dale Meyerrose, Chief
Information Officer for the intelligence community; Mr. Mark
Ewing, Deputy to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Requirements; Mrs. Susan Reingold, Deputy Program Manager
of the Information Sharing Environment.
And with that, I assume that you have a batting order that
you would like to follow, and I would invite you to follow that
order, and offer your comments.
Ms. Graham. Mr. Vice Chairman, there is just one opening
statement.
Vice Chairman Bond. Just one? Well, O.K., thank you.
STATEMENT OF MARY MARGARET GRAHAM, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR COLLECTION
Ms. Graham. Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond,
members of the Committee, you know the Director would have
liked to have been here today, but unavoidably could not, so he
sent the six of us.
It is our pleasure to speak to you today about the progress
the United States intelligence community has made during the
two years since the Congress enacted and the President signed
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
or as we call it, IRTPA.
Over the last two years, the Intelligence Community has
achieved good results through a concerted effort to integrate
itself more tightly, share information more freely, coordinate
actions more efficiently, define priorities more clearly, and
align resource expenditures against those priorities more
strategically.
The ODNI has led the IC to improve the security of the
United States and to advance important national interests by
implementing both IRTPA and the recommendations of the WMD
Commission that were accepted by the President. The work of the
ODNI has enhanced the intelligence community's ability to
support policymakers, diplomats, warfighters, and even law
enforcement officers. We will ensure this progress continues,
but, candidly, what you'll hear is reform in action, and more
time will be needed to fully achieve the goals of IRTPA.
This reality provides the context for understanding the
developments I would like to briefly discuss today. To frame
our assessment of intelligence reform, we would like to focus
on structural change, on analysis, on collection, on
management, on requirements, on science and technology and the
information enterprise.
Let me begin with structural change, a great deal of which
has occurred within the IC during the past two years. We have
taken IRTPA's call for a strong national counterterrorism
center and made it a reality. The NCTC stands today at the
center of the intelligence contribution to the war on terror.
It draws on and shares information from thirty different
intelligence networks, including foreign and domestic threat
information. It convenes coordination meetings across the
government three times a day on terrorist threats. It guides
the counterterrorism analytic workload across the IC.
Finally, when events mandate, it becomes a hub for critical
intelligence support to our Nation's leader, as they did last
summer when the British thwarted the civil aviation plot in
London.
IRPTA also focused on the FBI's contribution to national
intelligence. The FBI's senior leadership, under Director
Muller, has embraced this mandate in the establishment of the
National Security Branch to bring together under one umbrella
the FBI's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, WMD, and
intelligence programs.
The WMD Commission also emphasized--as you have--the
critical contribution HUMINT plays in preserving national
security, and called for increased interagency HUMINT
coordination, better and more uniform tradecraft standards, and
increased joint training. This led to another major structural
change in U.S. intelligence, as the CIA was directed by the
President to establish the National Clandestine Service. These
two changes--the NCS and the NSB--were major events,
strengthening our human intelligence effort both at home and
abroad.
Additional structural innovations include the creation of
the National Counterproliferation Center, the appointment of a
MASINT Community Executive, and the establishment of the DNI's
Open Source Center under the executive agency of CIA.
Let me now turn to collection and analysis. Virtually every
observer of the intelligence community has emphasized the
critical interdependence of collection and analysis, as well as
the need to continuously improve finished intelligence products
through better methodology, more outreach, more alternative
analysis, and more transparent sourcing.
If we are going to solve the most difficult intelligence
challenges, our analysts and collectors must work hand-in-
glove. And they are doing that, precisely in terms of attacking
the priority hard targets--for example, Iran and North Korea,
just to name two.
As Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection,
my task is to rebalance, integrate and optimize collection
capabilities to meet current and future customer and analytic
priorities. Collection is by far the most expensive activity
undertaken by the intelligence community, but I would suggest
to you it is also what gives the IC its comparative advantage
in protecting the Nation.
To enhance this collection enterprise, we initiated a
process to develop a capability-based, integrated collection
architecture, which will guide future investment decisions and
address shortfalls in the Nation's current intelligence
capabilities. We have begun to identify these shortfalls as
well as areas of emphasis and de-emphasis, as you will see
addressed in the President's budget.
By the same token, under the leadership of my colleague,
the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, we
have taken many steps to bring analysts closer together. Among
many other things, we established the Analyst Resource Catalog,
otherwise known as the analyst yellow pages. We established a
long-range analysis unit to stimulate focus on over-the-horizon
issues. We have launched several initiatives to strengthen the
quality and ensure the integrity of IC-wide analytic practices.
And we are establishing activities to ensure that the rich
diversity of expertise resident both within and outside the
community is brought to bear on our analytic product.
Let me add one final word on collectors and analysts
working together. We are pleased with a new model we've
developed to assess and then task the agencies of the IC lift
and shift collection and analytic resources when we are faced
with new and emerging crises.
We used this process effectively for the first time last
summer during Lebanon's crisis, and we are using it today
against both crises in Darfur and Somalia.
Let me now turn to management. The Deputy Director of
National Intelligence for Management supervises activities that
ensure the ODNI and the IC have the tools and the guidance they
need to do the work. This begins with the National Intelligence
Strategy.
The principle underlying the first-ever National
Intelligence Strategy is the transformation of the community
through the integration of its functions. The strategy's five
mission objectives and ten enterprise objectives have been
translated into strategic implementation plans, which the DNI
approved in July of 2006, and now into program and budget
decisions.
The ODNI is making frequent use of the new budgetary and
acquisition powers granted by the IRTPA to manage and shape the
community. Indeed, the Fiscal Year 2008 program build is
critical. As you have noted, it marks the first one that the
DNI has led at all steps of the process.
The DDNI/M's remit also includes security, training, and
human capital, all of which are vital to the success of the IC
of the future. We have made strides toward making the community
one that not only wins the war for talent while making the most
of America's diversity, but grows and retains a corps of
motivated, collaborative, and expert professionals.
Working closely with agencies and departments across the
IC, our Chief Human Capital Officer has, for example, completed
the first strategic plan for human capital for the IC,
completed policy that will make joint duty a prerequisite for
promotion to senior levels of the IC, and promoted development
of modern, performance-based compensation policies for civilian
employees of the IC that will be completed over the next two
years.
Now let me speak briefly about the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence for Requirements, who is responsible for
ensuring the IC--and all of us--understands and is working to
address the full range of customer needs. Working closely with
the National Security Council, we have revamped the national
intelligence priorities process to be effective in conveying to
the community the Nation's highest priority national
intelligence needs. Updated semi-annually by the NSC and
approved by the President, the national intelligence priorities
better focus the IC's collection and analytical effort than in
the past. There is close, continuous, and more formal
interaction with senior customers to better understand their
needs and ensure those needs drive the community's priorities.
Requirements also completed the first-ever inventory of all
U.S. intelligence foreign liaison relationships, and we are
using this knowledge to maximize the reach of the community to
benefit the Nation and the community as a whole.
Finally, Requirements also partners with the private sector
to gain a hands-on perspective on the international environment
that often is unavailable anywhere else. A number of respective
groups are working with us to sponsor private sector firms'
participation in unclassified fora to discuss foreign matters
of interest.
Science and Technology. In the age that we live in of
globalization that closely reflects developments in science and
technology, intelligence reform would have dim prospects of
success if it did not ensure our competitive advantage in the
realm of S&T. As in all of our reforms, S&T change cannot be
effected overnight, but that is precisely why our Associate
Director for S&T has chosen speed as the first of his cardinal
values--the other two being surprise and synergy.
Speed is exemplified by agile, flexible, proactive, and
rapid responses to new threats and opportunities, and at low
cost. Surprise includes new sources and methods, disruptive
technologies, counter-denial and deception, and revolutionary
approaches. We have laid the groundwork for an IC version of
DARPA, which we are calling IARPA, to nurture good ideas for
sharing and growing S&T expertise within the community.
Synergy means connecting the dots, forming informal
networks and finding innovation at the crossroads of
technologies. It is an understatement to say that the fastest
way to increase the value of intelligence is to share it for
collaboration and make it accessible for action.
Each IC agency and department, as you know, operates on
legacy systems that were planned and, in many cases, deployed
long before the Internet age. Enabling these systems to
communicate has proved daunting. Solutions in the information-
sharing field involve policy changes to enable sharing
information, not only internal to the community, but with non-
Federal partners and the private sector.
Two senior officials--the DNI's CIO and the Program Manager
for Information Sharing--have accomplished a great deal toward
both of these ends. Under their leadership, we have implemented
a classified information sharing initiative with key U.S.
allies. This was stuck for a long time. We got it unstuck
through some hard work by both of these people.
We've developed and rolled out an electronic directory
service--a virtual phone book for terrorism information for
those that have counterterrorism responsibilities across the
U.S. government.
We've released the Information Sharing Environment
Implementation Plan and Presidential Guidelines on Information
Sharing. These two documents provide the vision and the road
map for better information sharing within the Intelligence
Community with our Federal, state, local, and tribal
counterparts, as well as with the private sector.
We've insisted that all significant IT deployments in the
community be consistent with a common IC enterprise
architecture. We've established a joint office with the
Department of Defense CIO for managing the development and
provision of cross-domain solutions that enable the national
security systems to move information between networks operating
at different security classifications.
These are just a few examples of the relentless problem-
solving approach to information sharing and access that
empowers everyone in the IC and everyone with whom the IC
shares goals, objectives and information.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
we have done much to make America safer from the very real
threats that menace our fellow Americans, our values, and our
friends and allies around the world. The intelligence community
and the ODNI have embraced the reforms of the past two years
and are implementing them, resulting in improvements across the
enterprise that is the U.S. intelligence community.
By its nature, reform and the integration of the IC will be
a long process--that's why I said what you are seeing is reform
in action--but its benefits are already being realized and
creating increased support among agencies and their customers
to continue efforts accelerating the pace of reform.
With that, we would be pleased to take any questions that
you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Graham follows:]
Prepeared Statement, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Chairman Rockefeller, Vice-Chairman Bond, Members of the Committee,
it is our pleasure to speak to you today about the progress the United
States Intelligence Community has made during the two years since the
Congress enacted and the President signed the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).
Over the last two years, the Intelligence Community has achieved
good results through a concerted effort to integrate itself more
tightly, share information more freely, coordinate its actions more
efficiently, define its priorities more clearly, and align its resource
expenditures against those priorities more strategically.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has
assumed responsibility for strategic leadership of the IC, but the ODNI
has attempted to do this in concert with its IC colleagues, relying on
the individual agencies to execute their missions fully and completely.
There's no other way for such a large, complex Community to succeed. In
a true community, leadership in its fullness is a shared mandate; it
extends across bureaucratic divisions and up and down the chain of
command. Everyone has to feel responsible and be accountable for the
effectiveness of his or her agency, programs, office, and personal
actions.
We in ODNI have helped the Intelligence Community protect the
security of the United States and advance important national interests
in implementing the IRTPA and the recommendations of the President's
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the WMD Commission). The work of
the ODNI has enhanced the Intelligence Community's ability to support
policymakers, senior leaders, diplomats, warfighters, and law
enforcement officers. We strive to ensure this progress continues, but
several more years will be needed to fully achieve the goals of the
IRTPA and other proposals.
This reality provides the context for understanding the
developments discussed below. To frame our assessment of intelligence
reform, we would like to focus on structural change, analysis,
collection, management, requirements, the information enterprise, and
science and technology. We shall also emphasize the ways in which the
ODNI has helped the intelligence reform process.
Structural Change
A great deal of structural change has occurred within the IC during
the past two years in response both to our past failures and pressing
threats.
We have taken the IRPTA's call for a strong National
Counterterrorism Center and made it a reality. The NCTC stands at the
center of the intelligence contribution to the War on Terror.
NCTC is led by an official who has been designated as the
mission manager for counterterrorism.
It comprises officers representing all the relevant
federal departments.
It draws on and shares information from thirty different
intelligence networks, including foreign and domestic threat
information.
It convenes coordination meetings across the government
three times a day.
It guides the counterterrorism analytic workload across
the IC.
Finally, when events mandate, it becomes a hub for
critical intelligence support to our Nation's leaders. NCTC played an
important role last summer when the British thwarted the civil aviation
plot in London.
IRPTA also focused on the FBI's contribution to national
intelligence. The FBI's senior leadership has embraced this mandate and
has shown a great commitment to integration within the IC. The Bureau
has established the National Security Branch to bring together under
one umbrella its counterterrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass
destruction, and intelligence programs.
As you know, the WMD Commission emphasized the critical
contribution HUMINT plays in preserving national security. The
Commission called for increased interagency HUMINT coordination, better
and more uniform tradecraft standards, and increased joint training for
operators. This led to another major structural change in U.S.
intelligence: the CIA received the President's approval to establish
the National Clandestine Service.
These two changes--the NCS and the NSB--were major events,
strengthening our human intelligence effort at home and abroad. In
coordination with the National Clandestine Service, the FBI, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military Services are improving
the training, tradecraft, and integration of their case officers and
operations.
Additional innovations have followed: the creation of the National
Counterproliferation Center, and the appointment of a MASINT Community
Executive, for example. The DNI's Open Source Center, under the
executive agency of the CIA, is enhancing its collection and analysis
to complement technical collection in a cost-effective manner.
Meanwhile, institutions of longstanding assumed important new
responsibilities. NSA has been vital in helping support the Global War
on Terror. DHS has made great strides in integrating homeland security
intelligence. And NGA stepped ``out of the box'' to help our Nation
assess and mitigate the terrible impact of Hurricane Katrina.
We also worked side-by-side with the Department of Defense on
establishing Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) at Combatant
Commands around the world and a Departmental JIOC at the DIA. JIOCs
will improve coordination and access to information between national
intelligence managers and DoD operators in-the-field through embedded
personnel and enhanced horizontal integration. This will improve
overall corporate situational awareness and adds value/granularity to
knowledge bases throughout the entire Intelligence Community.
Collection and Analysis: Working Together
Virtually all observers of the Intelligence Community have
emphasized the critical interdependence of collection and analysis, as
well as the need to continuously improve finished intelligence products
through better methodology, more outreach, more alternative analysis,
and more transparent sourcing.
If we are going to solve the most difficult intelligence
challenges, our analysts and collectors must work hand-in-glove. And
they are doing that, precisely in terms of attacking the priority hard
targets. For instance, the new North Korea and Iran Mission Managers
have already begun promoting Community-wide integration and providing
policymakers with briefings drawing on Community-wide expertise. Also,
a founding principle in DoD JIOC establishment is better integration of
analysts and collectors to enable more agile operations in support of
the long war.
In support of collection/analysis collaboration, we also initiated
the Integrated Collection Architecture process to develop an objective
architecture and implementation roadmap that will be flexible in
meeting analysts' needs, to guide future collection investment
decisions, address shortfalls in current collection capabilities, and
help us close gaps in the Intelligence Community's understanding of
critical targets. In so doing, we have begun to identify capability
shortfalls and areas of emphasis and de-emphasis to be addressed in the
President's Budget.
The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection seeks
to re-balance, integrate, and optimize collection capabilities to meet
current and future customer and analytic priorities. Collection is by
far the most expensive activity undertaken by the Intelligence
Community, but it is also what gives the IC its ``competitive
advantage'' in protecting the United States and its interests.
By the same token, under the leadership of the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence for Analysis, we have taken many steps to bring
analysts closer together. Among many other things,
We established the Analytic Resources Catalog.
We established a Long-Range Analysis Unit to stimulate
intra-IC focus on ``over-the-horizon'' issues.
We have brought IC staff and contributions into the
President's Daily Brief beyond the traditional (and still strong) CIA
input.
We have launched several initiatives to strengthen the
quality, and ensure the integrity, of IC-wide analytic practice.
We are establishing activities to ensure that the rich
diversity of expertise--resident within and outside of the Community--
is brought to bear on our analytic product.
Let me add one final word on collectors and analysts working
together: we are pleased that we have developed a new model for
assessing and then tasking IC organizations to prepare Community
seniors to ``lift and shift'' collection resources in response to
emerging crises.
Application of this process in support of intelligence
efforts during the recent Lebanon crisis proved effective in focusing
Community efforts and delivering important new intelligence.
The same model is being used against the ongoing Darfur
crisis and in Somalia.
All of this is being undertaken to provide the best possible
support to our policy and military communities. While we have met with
substantial success, forging a close-knit, collaborative Intelligence
Community remains a significant challenge, but it is one we are
committed to pursuing with vigor.
Management
The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Management (DDNI/
M) supervises activities that ensure the ODNI and the IC have the tools
and guidance they need to do their work. This begins with strategy.
The principle underlying the first-ever National Intelligence
Strategy (NIS) is the transformation of the Community through the
integration of its functions. Its five mission objectives and ten
enterprise objectives have been translated into strategic
implementation plans (approved by the DNI in July 2006) and into
program and budget decisions. The ODNI has revised the National
Intelligence Program (NIP) budget structure, for instance, to improve
transparency and consistency across all NIP programs, to facilitate a
``performance budget,'' and to facilitate analysis of how well the
individual NIP programs are supporting the NIS.
The ODNI is making frequent use of the new budgetary and
acquisition powers granted by the Intelligence Reform Act to manage and
shape the Community. Indeed, the Fiscal Year 2008 program build is
critical; it marks the first one that the DNI will lead at all steps of
the process. The meshing of budgets, programs, plans, acquisition, and
strategy has created a powerful effect on IC elements, several of which
are now modeling their own internal governance processes on the ODNI
pattern.
The DDNI/M's writ also includes security, training, and human
capital, which are vital to the success of the IC of the future, and we
are making strides toward making the Community one that not only wins
the war for talent but grows and retains a corps of motivated,
collaborative, and expert professionals. Indeed, nothing is more
important to the IC's future than its workforce, which includes
replenishing its ranks of analysts and human collectors, attracting
specialists in S&T and WMD, and making the most of America's natural
diversity.
Working closely with agencies and departments across the Community,
our Chief Human Capital Officer has:
Completed the first Strategic Human Capital Plan for the
IC.
Developed competencies for analysts and managers across
the Community.
Mandated individual Personal Performance Agreements for
agency heads and senior IC executives.
Completed policies that will make joint duty a
prerequisite for promotion to senior levels of the IC.
Promoted development of modern, performance-based
compensation policies for civilian employees that will be completed
over the next two years.
These are just a few of the policy initiatives in the area of human
capital that we are monitoring closely with our annual surveys of the
IC workforce, a reminder to senior management that our colleagues'
opinions, desires, and morale are vital elements of a strong Community.
And this is just one of a number of initiatives well under way in the
management area.
Requirements
The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Requirements is
responsible for ensuring the IC understands and is working to address
the full range of customer needs for national intelligence.
Working closely with the National Security Council (NSC), we have
revamped the national intelligence priorities process. It is considered
very effective in conveying to the IC the Nation's highest priority
national intelligence needs. Updated semi-annually by the NSC and
approved by the President, the national intelligence priorities better
focus the IC's collection and analytical effort than in the past. There
is close, continuous, and more formal interaction with senior customers
to better understand their needs and ensure those needs drive the
Community's priorities.
Requirements also completed the first-ever inventory of all U.S.
intelligence liaison relationships, and is using the knowledge gained
to maximize our reach and minimize the real and potential costs of
working with foreign partners. Its Foreign Relations Coordination
Council (which includes members from throughout the IC) will help in
this task.
Finally, Requirements partnered with the private sector to gain a
``hands on'' perspective of the international environment that often is
unavailable anywhere else. A number of respected groups, including the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Intelligence and
National Security Alliance, the Business Roundtable, and the Chamber of
Commerce, work with the ODNI to sponsor private sector firms'
participation in unclassified ODNI forums to discuss foreign matters of
mutual interest.
Science & Technology
In an age of globalization that closely reflects developments in
science and technology, intelligence reform would have dim prospects of
success if it did not ensure our competitive advantage in the realm of
S&T. As in all of our reforms, S&T change cannot be effected overnight,
but that is precisely why our Associate Director for S&T has chosen
``Speed'' as the first of his cardinal values, the other two being
``Synergy'' and ``Surprise.''
Speed is exemplified by agile, flexible, proactive, and rapid
responses to new threats and opportunities--and at low cost. We have
launched the Rapid Technology Transition Initiative, for instance, to
accelerate the transition of innovative technology to operations by
funding 13 programs in FY07.
Surprise includes new sources and methods, disruptive technologies,
counter-denial and deception, and revolutionary approaches. We have
laid the groundwork for an IC's version of DARPA, which we are calling
IARPA--the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity--to nurture
good ideas for sharing and growing S&T expertise.
Synergy means connecting the dots, forming informal networks, and
finding innovation at the crossroads of technologies. We have developed
a unified IC S&T Strategy and Plan that identifies and addresses IC-
wide technology gaps, establishes new joint S&T programs against high-
value, hard targets, and institutes new joint duty programs such as the
ODNI S&T Ambassadors initiative.
Information Sharing and Enterprise Architecture
The fastest way to increase the value of intelligence is to share
it for collaborative critiques and make it accessible for authorized
action. Sharing information is an issue much bigger than the
Information Technology field. Each agency and department runs legacy
systems that were planned and in many cases deployed long before the
Internet age; making them communicate (to create a common IC
identification badge, for example) has proved daunting. Solutions in
the information-sharing field will have to involve policy changes as
well, including sharing information with non-Federal partners and the
private sector.
Two senior officials--our DNI Chief Information Officer (CIO) and
the Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment--have
accomplished a great deal toward both of these ends. Under their
leadership we have:
Implemented a classified information sharing initiative
with key U.S. allies. This was ``stuck'' for a long time. We got it
``unstuck.''
Developed and rolled out the Electronic Directory
Services, a ``virtual phone book'' for terrorism information and those
that have counterterrorism responsibilities in the U.S. government.
Released the Information Sharing Environment
Implementation Plan and Presidential Guidelines on Information Sharing.
These two documents provide the vision and road map for better
information sharing within the Intelligence Community and with our
Federal, state, local, and tribal counterparts, as well as with the
private sector. Implementation of both is well underway.
Worked improved information sharing within the DoD
through implementation of the JIOC construct worldwide.
These are just a few examples of a relentless ``problem solving''
approach to information sharing and access that empowers everyone in
the IC and everyone with whom the IC shares common goals and
objectives. The DNI CIO is insisting that all significant IT
deployments in the Community be consistent with a common IC enterprise
architecture consistent with the Federal Enterprise architecture.
As part of this, the DNI CIO has inventoried the IC
architecture with an eye to pointing the way for IC members to
modernize in compatible ways.
In addition, the DNI CIO established a joint office with
the Department of Defense CIO for managing the development and
provision of cross-domain solutions that enable the national security
systems to move information between networks operating at different
security classifications, thereby improving collaboration and sharing.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, we have
done much to make America safer against the very real threats that
menace our fellow Americans, our values, and our friends and allies
around the world. The Intelligence Community and the ODNI have embraced
the reforms of the past two years and are implementing them, resulting
in improvements to all aspects of the IC. Integration is not just a
process between agencies; it is also a process within the agencies as
we try to coordinate the insights and work of the various intelligence
disciplines and processes. By its nature, this integration will be a
long process, but its benefits are already being realized and creating
increased support among the agencies and their customers for continuing
the efforts at an accelerated pace. We are also seeing more clearly
where the true challenges lie--and building the trust with the IC that
will be necessary to address them. We would be pleased to take any
questions that you might have.
Chairman Rockefeller [presiding]. Thank you very much
indeed, and I apologize for the comings and goings, but that
should be all for the time being.
I want to address this to Ambassador Kennedy and other DDNI
management. One of the greatest challenges facing Congress in
this past year in drafting the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act was how to in fact balance
successfully the establishment of a unified intelligence effort
within the DNI, but that also included those within the
Department of Defense. That was touchy; a lot of arguments
ensued--all of this with the continuing requirement that the
combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of
their military commanders.
Now I myself think it worked out rather well, but I don't
know how you feel. First of all, does the Director of National
Intelligence need stronger budget and personnel authorities
than those granted to him in the reform act?
Ambassador Kennedy. Well, sir, I don't believe that in the
budget and personnel arena that we need stronger authorities.
You have given and it's written into the legislation that the
Director of National Intelligence determines the national
intelligence budget, and I believe that he has done so for FY
2007 and that the budget that will be sent up here on the 5th
of February will reflect his determinations of what the budget
should be.
In the personnel arena, I believe his authorities to move
personnel, his authorities to establish policies and standards
and procedures are sufficient, and the steps we've already
taken, such as in the area of joint duty, I think reflect that.
Chairman Rockefeller. I thank you. Secondly, how is the
DNI's office balanced--how have they balanced the separate
requirements of the military and the national consumers of
intelligence in terms of building budgets, tasking collection
systems and providing analytical supports? That's more of a
technical question, but it's an important one.
Ambassador Kennedy. I think, first, we have built, over the
course of the existence of the DNI, a very, very close and
positive working relationship with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. My office on the budget side regularly interrelates
with the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence's office,
and we work on NIP issues that are of interest to the
warfighter, and we also have significant input into what DOD
puts into its military intelligence budget.
We have a regular series of meetings, but since the
question then morphs into the area of tasking analysis, let me
ask my two colleagues, Ms. Graham and Mr. Fingar, who deal with
the issues of collection and analysis to add and amplify, if
that's permissible.
Chairman Rockefeller. Please.
Ms. Graham. Senator, I'd give you two examples from a
collection standpoint.
The building of what I referred to as the integrated
collection architecture, when that thought came to be laid on
the table last year, Dr. Cambone and I spent a lot of time
talking about the theory behind identifying the needs of the
Nation for intelligence capabilities. That resulted in that
process being done collectively--NIP programs and MIP programs,
capabilities that the Nation needed no matter the war fighter
or the diplomat. And so that picture of integrating, I would
give us a B+ in our first year of effort at that.
Another: When Dr. Cambone and the former Secretary decided
to establish Joint Intelligence Operations Centers--JIOCs--one
of the issues for the defense JIOC which resides here in
Washington, it is a single floor where you can make collection
decisions. So it was intuitive to me and it made complete sense
that why wouldn't you want to hook up the national, the
military, the foreign and the domestic collection systems on
the same floor?
And so we have begun to do that by having the back room of
my collection strategy piece linked up with the defense JIOC so
when we, in a crisis situation--take the North Korean things of
last summer--when we need to make decisions, we can make them
with the total of the national capability in a single place.
So those are two examples I would give you of how I think
we are making good progress. We have more to go in laying the
road, but we're making progress.
Dr. Fingar. Just very briefly, and it's along the same
lines of integration of effort, within the analytic sphere, the
guiding principle has been to ensure that we have the
appropriate expertise to address all of the various missions
that are supported by the intelligence community--military
missions, diplomatic missions, those of the Treasury
Department, Homeland Security and so forth.
What we have attempted to do, with a reasonable degree of
success, is to forge a community of analysts such that if there
was a task, a question, a problem, that I have the capability
to treat analysts across the community in all 16 agencies as
available for deployment against that task, not by moving them
but by tapping their expertise. Two examples I think will
illustrate how we have done that.
In responding to a series of requests and requirements from
Baghdad, from MNFI, those have come in either through DOD, DIA,
where they have come to the National Intelligence Council. The
starting point has been to reach out to those with the most
expertise on the subject wherever they are and bring them
together.
The related aspect of this gets into tradecraft and
capability, such that if a question is assigned to one of the
components of the community, that the other components and the
requestor can have confidence that the answer will be of high
quality and focused on their needs rather than a dear-
boxholder-fits-nobody response which was common in the past.
Chairman Rockefeller. I thank you, Mr. Fingar, and I now go
on to Vice Chairman Bond.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm
just going to comment on some discussion that occurred before I
arrived. I understand the DNI is co-located with the Defense
Intelligence Agency. Secondly, as far as rushing an NIE to meet
a timetable on Capitol Hill, we learned the hard way in the
2002 Iraq WMD National Intelligence Estimate, which was
produced in a few short weeks, that if you want it bad, you may
get it bad, and I'm sure you are going to give us the best
possible Iraq NIE in a timely fashion. If there's any comment
on that, I would welcome comment.
Dr. Fingar. Senator, I would be happy to comment on that.
Three points.
One is I remind myself regularly that the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence might not exist were it not
for that Iraq WMD estimate, which crystallized the number of
problems. And therefore, under my hat as chairman of the NIC, I
have accorded highest priority to ensuring that the quality of
coordinated community products is of the highest standard we
can attain for estimates and for all other products.
Estimates are special, but what makes them special beyond
the longer time frame of most of them is that they are approved
by the heads of agencies. It was as the deputy of INR that I
sat on the NFIB that approved that Iraq WMD estimate. So I am
particularly conscious--
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you.
I had a couple of other questions before my time runs out,
but let me clear the air. I did not vote for the intelligence
reform bill. I thought it gave the DNI a tremendous amount of
responsibility without the authority to get the job done. I
commend Ambassador Negroponte and you for playing what I think
is a weak hand as best as possible. What we're trying to do
here is make sure that you not only have the responsibility but
you have the authority to make sure that information is shared,
that there are no more stovepipes. Unfortunately, there are
several examples that I could cite you, but not in an open
hearing.
I will try a different tack and ask if any of you see that
the problems with the 2002 NIE and the problems that were
frankly endemic within the community still need additional
legislative authority or clarification, or is it just executive
action needed? And I would start with Ms. Graham and then
others who may have specific areas of concern on which we can
focus. I'd like to do that. Otherwise we will save some of the
examples for closed session.
Ms. Graham?
Ms. Graham. Senator, I would--and I'll let my colleagues
speak further to this, but what I would say to you is that one
of the things the DNI has done as we've gone through this first
now 21 months is be mindful of what more could be done to
enhance the authorities of the IRTPA. There is some work on
that that has been done, and I think, without speaking for him,
his decision was to come to you and to let Admiral McConnell,
if confirmed, the next DNI, come to you with the benefit of all
that. But I will speak for myself, for collections.
Vice Chairman Bond. Please.
Ms. Graham. I don't believe that in the collection realm--
because so much of this is, number one, about collaboration,
number two about information sharing, and number three about
culture, that there are legislative fixes needed to empower
what I'm trying to do.
Vice Chairman Bond. Once you get the collection to the
analysis stage, I still hear concerns that some agencies are
not sharing.
Dr. Fingar. The problem has not been solved completely.
We've taken a number of steps--three specifically.
One is the IRTPA does give the DNI sole authority on
dissemination, so that that is an authority that we have.
We have already put in place measures that make available
to analysts across the community ORCON materials, which
previously restricted dissemination to analysts and indeed to
whole agencies or access to databanks if there was one ORCON
document in it. I'll General Meyerrose speak to the
certification of systems which will allow us to move others
more freely.
The third way in which we have tackled this are the
compartmented materials, with a process now that will shift the
responsibility and authority for determining access from the
producer of the report to need-to-know determined by Mary
Margaret and myself.
I'll stop there.
Vice Chairman Bond. We'll come back. Ambassador Kennedy
wants to make a brief comment.
Ambassador Kennedy. I would just say, as I responded to the
chair a few minutes ago, I think in the area of budget and
personnel, in the macro sense, we have the authorities we need.
You may well see in the FY 2008 authorization bill discussion
some fine tuning and tweaking of small matters. But you've
given us solid authorities and we may ask for, you know, a
comma here or a clause there, but nothing--nothing that I'm
finding that is a major shortcoming.
General Meyerrose. If I could add to Dr. Fingar's points
about allowing innovation into our information sharing, that's
been something that we've been working on for almost a year.
The policy that's in place took three years to write, four
years to coordinate, and we've not touched it in five. And so
clearly there is room for changing a paradigm which says that
we avoid risk to one we manage risk, and we're working that
very hard with the Department of Defense and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, and are about to come
out with a series of proposals which winds us up for
reciprocity, for using common criteria and those kinds of
things, which I think will allow us to bring innovation into
our systems to overcome issues of information sharing.
But I would add that the major information sharing issues
that we have managed to solve over the past year are more of
process and policy than they have been of technology. I'll give
you one very brief example. Other parts of the government came
to us and asked us to set up portals for pandemic planning at
top secret, secret and unclassified levels, which we did. An
interesting thing occurred. In setting up the top secret
portal, it took us a matter of two or three days; in setting up
the secret portal it took us a matter of a little less than a
week; and setting up the unclassified portal took us a matter
of 8 weeks.
And the reason was because of the procedural labels and
headings that people put on information generated by
organizations which prevented the sharing. It had nothing to do
with technology, it had nothing to do with external policy or
the bringing together of various organizations; it had to do
with each organization's internal policies and process. And we
did manage to overcome it. We in fact run an information
sharing pandemic planning environment that services over 40,000
folks in the federal government at all three levels of
classification, and it's an example of most of the information
sharing issues we face are cultural and process rather than
technology.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Does the present DNI have a regular process whereby the
heads of the agencies meet?
Ambassador Kennedy. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. And when do those meetings take place,
Mr. Kennedy?
Ambassador Kennedy. The DNI has regular one-on-one sessions
on a rotating basis with all--
Senator Feinstein. That's not what I'm referring to. What
I'm referring to is meet as a group to build a team that
crosses the smokestacks.
Ambassador Kennedy. Every Monday at 2:00, the heads of the
six or seven largest intelligence community organizations sit
down together, and with the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence and the rest of the team, every Monday.
All 16 agencies get together every 8 weeks, meeting at the DNI.
And that is complemented by a huge series--breakfast sessions,
budget sessions that I held. And then plus all the CFOs of the
community are now meeting together. All the chief human capital
officers meet together. All the CIOs get together.
In other words, we have tasked, in effect, each one of the
titled, if I might use that word, officials in the DNI to reach
out and have regular get-togethers, regular sessions to
exchange information, knowledge and requirements with their
counterparts throughout the entire community.
Senator Feinstein. And what is the current staff level of
the DNI?
Ambassador Kennedy. The current staff level authorized in
the last authorization bill was 1,579.
Senator Feinstein. And that doesn't include--at that time,
didn't it include the counterterrorism unit?
Ambassador Kennedy. That includes the National
Counterterrorism Center, Ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. And that is, what, 350, 400?
Ambassador Kennedy. It's about 400, yes.
Senator Feinstein. Four-hundred, O.K.. So, net, it's about
1,100.
Ambassador Kennedy. Of the 1,579, about two-thirds of those
were inherited from prior Director of Central Intelligence
agencies, and force of law transferred 1,000, roughly, of the
1,579 positions to the DNI in the IRTPA. And then the IRTPA
also said we authorize 500 additional positions. And so we've
been using the transfers plus the 500 to build the DNI.
Senator Feinstein. What many of us--and I'm speaking for a
long time ago now--when this was first contemplated, we didn't
look at the DNI as a bureaucrat; we really looked at him as a
facilitator. And I guess one of the things that has concerned
me is the huge staff that exists over there and whether in fact
that is necessary. It may even be an impediment. Could you
comment?
Ambassador Kennedy. Yes. As a bureaucrat, I don't think
it's a bureaucracy for three essential reasons.
The first is that if you're going to have the kind of
leadership in the intelligence community that I believe that
the Congress intended for it, it is essential that you
coordinate.
So therefore you have to have coordination leaders in the
analytical field, which puts a small staff with Dr. Fingar. You
have to have a group in the collection arena, under Mary
Margaret Graham to coordinate the multi tens of thousands of
personnel who do collection. You have to have a small CIO staff
in order to burst through the barriers that General Meyerrose
was outlining when we were building the influenza pandemic
websites. And the same is true if we want to make sure that we
have all of the requirements that the civilian and the military
community need from the intelligence community.
And then when you add in the mandatory items such as the
National Intelligence Council, the National Counterintelligence
Executive, as you just said, the National Counterterrorism
Center, which consumes almost a third of that total number, I
see the DNI is actually a very, very small number, and in an
overhead in small single digits in terms of the entire
community which it is managing.
Senator Feinstein. All I can say is--and perhaps the
leadership of the Committee is different--let me just speak as
a rank-in-file member. I don't see the DNI leadership. I don't
hear about the leadership. And what I see--and I try to do my
homework and I try to read the intelligence--is the growth of a
bureaucracy over there. And I have got to tell you--and you
don't need to answer this--it concerns me very much.
I would like to ask, if I might, Ms. Reingold, a question.
I think it has been the conventional wisdom since 9/11 that
information sharing was one of the key impediments to
preventing terrorist attacks. The intelligence reform
legislation, which we enacted in December 2004, created the
information sharing environment, and called for an
implementation plan in a year. I believe that was received on
November 15th of last year. It also called for a progress
report beginning in December of 2006, which has not been
presented. So I would like to ask for that progress report.
Let me ask this question. How in practice is the DNI
getting actionable intelligence to law enforcement and Homeland
Security officials at the state and local level? I have
complaints everywhere I go in California, from local law
enforcement, from mayors. I took the opportunity to get the
mayor of Los Angeles together with Ambassador Negroponte, but
everybody tells me, if you're not in a taskforce, there is
still a fractured system.
Ms. Reingold. Okay, if I could address your first issue
about the implementation plan and a progress report, in the
implementation plan, we made a recommendation. The
implementation plan essentially gave a status, a progress
report on where we are with ISC implementation, and then
recommended that in June of every year thereafter, which would
be this coming June 2007, that we provide an annual progress
report. I would certainly be happy to update anything since the
implementation plan came out and provide that to you. I just
wanted to let you know in terms of timing.
Senator Feinstein. I appreciate that.
Ms. Reingold. The question about actionable intelligence,
there have actually been some very important accomplishments
that have occurred most recently. The President actually asked
the program manager and the interagency to come up with a
framework to improve information sharing between federal,
state, local, tribal, and private-sector partners.
And there was an acknowledgment that actionable
information, not only from the federal level to our state and
local and private sector partners, but also information that
resides at the local and community level, to try to make that
information also more available, in particular to the
intelligence community--so very specific activity that we're in
the process of pulling together an implementation plan is part
of this federal, state, local framework.
There are two pieces to it. One is to create an interagency
threat assessment coordination group located at the NCTC that
can produce federally-coordinated information--very important--
and this was all done with our state and local partners in
terms of all of the implementation and this whole framework And
we are in the process of setting up that implementation team,
and working with state and local representation from the law
enforcement and the Homeland Security communities to put
together a process to improve getting that actionable
information to the state and local level.
Senator Feinstein. Are mayors included?
Ms. Reingold. Mayors are included from the standpoint of
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, all of the associations that
represent state and local officials, National Governors
Association. We have had representatives from these
organizations.
Senator Feinstein. That is not my question.
Ms. Reingold. Oh, you mean in terms of--
Senator Feinstein. The high-risk areas--are mayors told and
informed of the risks?
Ms. Reingold. Yes, part of all of this is that at the state
and local level, mayors as well as governors have begun setting
up what they call information fusion centers in a lot of the
urban areas, as well as at the state level. And those fusion
centers are there to inform their local leadership at the--
again, at the local, as well as the state level. So part of
this whole framework is to help ensure that there is a national
network of fusion centers that can receive the information that
is coming from the federal government.
Senator Feinstein. Sorry, what is a fusion center?
Ms. Reingold. A fusion center is an entity that has
actually been established not by the federal government by
either a major city or the state level to actually do something
very similar to what we do at the federal level at the National
Counterterrorism Center, at the NCTC. It is for them to
literally pull together at their level all hazards, all threat
information that they collect from the community so that they
can paint a picture, whatever they need at their level, to
assess what the threat is to their community and to their
region.
So we are trying to link what we are doing through the
intelligence community and through the broader homeland-
security and law-enforcement communities at the federal level
with this effort at the state in major urban area level. And
the framework that recommendations are made to the President
and that we are moving forward with is to pull together these
fusion centers that I am referring to. There have been federal
funds that have come from the Department of Homeland Security
and Department of Justice to support these centers. And as a
matter of fact, you can follow up on Thursday when you have
both the FBI and DHS. And I'm sure that they will be talking a
little bit about this effort as well.
Senator Feinstein. But if I ask--
Chairman Rockefeller. If I may interrupt at this point, we
are going on over 12 minutes on this question, and I need to
call on Senator Burr.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our panel.
As I have sat here and listened to the exchange, I have
thought, with the process changes that are under way and,
Ambassador, with your description of the directive on pandemic
flu, and the actions that you had to take, I am somewhat
concerned--and I say this in the form of a statement versus a
question--that we not lose focus on our strategic long-term
threats that exist, and our ability to look over the horizon,
which is what is unique about U.S. intelligence.
Ms. Graham, I think in your testimony you have covered very
well that collection is better today. After five years, we have
gotten better, and I applaud all of the agencies for that. But
intel is a difficult thing to measure. And I would ask you,
have we really tried to measure the product? Have you compared
raw collection and finished analysis to see if in fact we have
really improved our capabilities?
Ms. Graham. I will be the first to tell you that metrics is
a work in progress. How do you measure this? We must measure
it, first of all, but how do you. So I want to tell you--and I
think Tom can complete this story--the anecdote about analysis
informing collection.
There are so many things out there, both strategic, long-
term, tactical, near-term, that we need our intelligence
community to do, that we must point them in the right
direction.
You will hear it said that there are requirements out
there, that there is requirements creep, where basically every
analyst who has a question puts it into the requirement system,
writ large. What that does to the collectors, be they HUMINTers
or any of the technical intelligence, SIGINT, imagery, it
allows them to perhaps diffuse their attention. So by having
the analysts say to us, this is the most important gap, these
are the most important questions that will fill this gap, you
are able to direct the collection agencies to the most
important fruit of collection.
We have had last summer, like it or not, some practice
exercising what we had put in place. First we had the Taepo
Dong II flight in North Korea. Then right after that, we had
the problem in Lebanon, which has not gone away. Then we had a
North Korean test of a nuclear weapon. Now we have Sudan and
the Darfur, and Somalia. And I could go on and on. And that is
on top of Iraq, Afghanistan.
So the ability to focus the collectors, I believe we can
demonstrate--not measure the way I would like to--but
demonstrate that the collection is further refined to answer
the analytic questions. And with that, I'll turn it over to Tom
to answer the rest of the question.
Senator Burr. Quickly if we can.
Dr. Fingar. Very quickly. The old model was the analyst
with the best rolodex and fastest finger could sort of guide
collection. What we are doing now is convening the analysts
from across the community, sitting them down, and say, you
collectively decide what are the most important questions we
need to answer, and what is the information that we need, and
where are you likely to get it. And we set very small numbers--
three, four; not laundry lists of topics to be handed over to
the collectors--and leave it to Mary Margaret's people to
decide how to do that.
The feedback loop on a lot of this is pretty short. And as
we begin to work the new information into the analytic
products, the sourcing that we now require makes very clear
what information is most useful, what might be very expensive
but is not used by the analysts. We have got a much better
picture now than we did before.
Senator Burr. Wonderful. Ambassador Kennedy, the DNI has
the ability to reprogram up to $150 million, and 5 percent of
one of the recipients. Has that been used by the DNI, and is
$150 million and the 5-percent threshold overly restrictive?
Ambassador Kennedy. The DNI has used that authority,
Senator, and I would be glad to give you or your staff
representative examples offline.
Senator Burr. Thank you.
Ambassador Kennedy. And to date, we have had no major
problems that could not have been addressed within that figure,
and I think that figure is sufficient.
Senator Burr. The reform act also allowed the DNI to
withhold money to a recipient if in fact they had not complied
with the DNI's priorities. Has any agency failed to comply and
were funds withheld?
Ambassador Kennedy. No, sir. We have engaged in an
extensive education process in what I call the footnote
process. When we issue their allotments to them, we specify
what the funds are to be used for, and that has the force of
the Anti-Deficiency Act passed by the Congress. And so we are
achieving very, very good compliance.
Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. It is my
understanding at this time no one in the government can share
with us definitely how many contractors are employed by the
intel community, or for that fact, how many contractors are
employed by the DNI. I hope at some early date in the future
that, one, if that information is incorrect, Ambassador, please
share it with me. If it's not, I hope at the earliest possible
time, we would know what the extent of contractor usage is.
Ambassador Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, may I have five seconds?
Chairman Rockefeller. Provided that you answer tomorrow.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Kennedy. We have just completed that exact
survey knowing that this is something that the DNI felt very
specifically that we needed to have to engage in solid
management and prepare our budget submissions. I have lots of
raw data, Senator, and as soon as that data is in shape that I
can come and make an intelligent presentation, first, to your
staff, then to you, we will be getting that information up,
because I think it is important to know, and important to see
if we are using contractors in the right way. Are there things
that should be contracted out that are not now? Or things that
are contracted out now, where the taxpayer would be better off
if they were brought in house.
Senator Burr. I thank you, and I thank the indulgence of
the chair.
Chairman Rockefeller. No, that was an excellent question.
That was an excellent question.
Senator Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Graham, in the Director's speech on Friday and the
ODNI's testimony today, there's a reference to ``lift and
shift'' collection resources in response to emerging crises.
And one of the examples it cited is Somalia. Are you satisfied
with the level of coordination this effort has had with the
Department of Defense?
Ms. Graham. Yes, sir, Senator, I am. I'd be happy to talk
to you about the details of that, but they're not at the level
that we're at in this room. But yes, I am.
Senator Feingold. So we could follow up in a classified
setting?
Ms. Graham. Absolutely.
Senator Feingold. Well, let me say that I fully support the
ODNI's effort to shift collection resources to Darfur and
Somalia. However, a year ago, I asked Director Negroponte at
the Committee's open hearing whether sufficient resources were
being devoted to Somalia. And the Director responded that,
``while you can never quite do enough,'' he believed that the
resources devoted to Somalia were about right, ``in the order
of priorities that we've got.''
But that is precisely the problem. Places like Somalia
should be intelligence priorities long before they appear on
the front page. Now, how can the ODNI help set new priorities
and implement them?
Ms. Graham. Senator, let me start that, and then I'll let
my colleagues. I think the development of the national
intelligence priorities framework lays out priorities for the
intelligence community. But a part of the answer to your
question is the need to get the intelligence community back to
what I grew up calling global reach.
We don't have that today. I think you could probably tell
me why we don't have that. But, it is because of the period of
time we are in, the post-9/11 world, the demands on the
intelligence community that exist today have grown
exponentially since that day. So our challenge is, until we
reach that point--with your help--of getting back to a place
where we can do global reach and pay attention to places that
are not perhaps, high on the list today, until they become a
problem--the way Somalia is today--then we have to be able to,
from a mission management point of view between the two of us,
we have got to be able to have processes in place that allow us
to lift and shift our resources when we need to. Speaking for
myself, I don't see any other answer until we are able to
satisfactorily have the global reach that we want.
Senator Feingold. I'm very pleased to hear your comments
about the need for the global reach. Mr. Fingar.
Dr. Fingar. Well, it's very much the same situation with
respect to analysts--that the kinds of questions we are asked,
the kinds of problems on which our expertise is sought require
deep knowledge. And we need to be both global in coverage and
to have real fire extinguisher depth on subjects, and at the
same time, need to have sort of pre-positioned and exercise
links to expertise outside of the intelligence community that
can be tapped very quickly.
I'm happy to describe with you and your staff the steps we
have taken to do that, but we are coming off a period of
downsizing and also shifting resources to higher priorities
that has left many gaps.
Senator Feingold. The next question may seem a little
ironic because my whole concern has been that we don't have the
global reach. In fact, our policy has become so Iraq-centric,
that we haven't had the opportunity to put the resources around
the world that we need. But I do want to talk about Iraq in
this context. It's highly likely that the U.S. military forces
will withdraw from Iraq prior to the establishment of stability
and the elimination of terrorism there, so doesn't it make some
sense for the intelligence community to have strategies in hand
to deal with the challenges of Iraq as and after we re-deploy
our troops from there?
Ms. Graham. Senator, I'll speak for the collection side of
the business. I think there has been development of those
strategies. Again, this is something we would be happy to talk
to you about in as much detail as you or your staff would like
in a classified session.
Senator Feingold. I think my time is about over. Let me
just say that I look forward to that, and I hope that when I
learn about those things it will show that today's political
policies are not dictating the long-term strategic thinking of
the intelligence community, particularly in this area. I do
hope it gets back to the kind of perspective that you talked
about as your understanding of what intelligence is supposed to
be about. And I think that we have a great opportunity to at
least get that right if we get out ahead of it, so I look
forward to learning more about it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rockefeller. Ambassador Kennedy, there has been no
nomination to fulfill the position of the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence since General Hayden's
departure last May. Why?
Ambassador Kennedy. I think the answer to that, sir, is
that the Director and the White House have been engaged in a
very, very intensive search for the right individual for such
an important position. And now, obviously, with the change in
the Director of National Intelligence, assuming favorable
action by the Senate in both cases, that the new Director,
should he be so confirmed, would wish to have an input in that
as well.
Chairman Rockefeller. I hear you. I'm not sure if I
understand the answer completely, but I hear you.
Senator Warner had to leave, and he asked four questions,
and I promised that I would ask one of them. So this is his
question. The ultimate goal of the 9/11 Commission and others
is to provide the best possible intelligence to policymakers so
that the President and members of Congress can make informed
foreign policy and national security decisions. Since the
President announced his Iraq plan early this month, I've taken
the opportunity during numerous briefings and hearings to ask
members of the intelligence community about their assessment of
the Maliki government's ability to achieve the benchmarks
necessary for this plan to succeed.
And his question is: I believe important strides have been
made towards intelligence reform, but if the intelligence
community cannot provide an assessment of the Maliki
government's chance for success, one of the most important
questions facing policymakers today, how can we be satisfied
with the pace of reform?
Ambassador Kennedy. I think if I could ask my colleague,
Tom Fingar, to address that Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Fingar. It's a fair standard to which to hold us
accountable that I think the Estimate that we still plan to
finish by the end of the month, as promised, we'll provide some
in-depth look at intelligence community thinking. This is
thinking that has evolved and been shared, and shared with the
Hill in many products, and been shaped and shared with the
review that led to the President's policy decision.
The very shorthand is, it would be very difficult for the
Maliki government to do this, but not impossible. And the logic
that we have applied looks at the importance of security--
security as an impediment to reconciliation, as an impediment
to good governments, and an impediment to reconstruction.
We judge that Maliki does not wish to fail in his role. He
does not wish to preside over the disintegration of Iraq. He
has some, but not all, of the obvious requirements for success.
The judgment is that gains in stability could open a window for
gains in reconciliation among and between sectarian groups and
could open possibilities for a moderate coalition in the
legislature that could permit better governments. There's a lot
of conditional statements in this analysis. But that it is not
impossible, though very difficult.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you. Ambassador Kennedy, if I
could just come back to you for a moment, I understand that
General Hayden left a while ago, but there's something about
the whole concept of Deputy for DNI, or person for DNI, being
left empty--that position being left empty simply because of
his departure--and simply because there may be some
conversation between the potential new person, who was not
named long ago, and whatever other elements are concerned is
not impressive to me. What is impressive to me is that the
United States and the DNI would go for any period of time
without somebody responsible for that--an acting or whatever.
So I can't find your answer satisfactory.
Ambassador Kennedy. If I might, Mr. Chairman. We have had
an acting for the greatest majority of the period after General
Hayden left--Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, U.S. Army, who
was the Deputy Director of National Intelligence--one of the
four deputies other than the Principal Deputy. Ron Burgess was
the acting Principal Deputy Director for National
Intelligence--filled that function completely, took on all the
responsibilities and duties permitted that Mike Hayden
undertook--chaired meetings, met with various groups. So, Ron
Burgess filled Mike Hayden's shoes, and if I might humbly say,
very ably, during this period of time, sir.
Chairman Rockefeller. That answers my question and I thank
you.
Vice Chairman Bond?
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just
a couple of comments on things that have been said--talking
about getting the analysts together and getting the collectors
together. We understand from what we learned about the Iraqi
Survey Group that when the analysts and the collectors work
together, and in other examples in the field where they work
together, they settle these things. And the collectors talking
to the analysts tell them what they can do, and the analysts
have to be realistic.
Now, there's a great imperative because that's probably the
best way they can keep from getting killed if they're in the
field. Here, there's not that same imperative, and I wonder why
that model is not used more often here, away from the
battlefield, to get the analysts to talk to the collectors.
Ms. Graham. Senator, when I travel and have been out to the
war zones or to other places, what we're trying to do here in
Washington you see there. You're exactly correct. I would say,
though, that looking back at the 21 months, where we are
beginning to see and we can identify that same kind of
collaboration, is in this concept that we call mission
management, or the six mission managers.
Vice Chairman Bond. Okay.
Ms. Graham. One of the ways that you know and, of course
NCTC is the largest and the biggest of those--even on Iran and
North Korea, discrete but very hard problems, you are seeing
the analysts and the collectors work together in communities of
interest where they are sharing information. So, we're not a
hundred percent there yet in the Washington world.
Vice Chairman Bond. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Graham.
I wanted to follow up on some questions that had been
raised previously about, number one, if we pull out what chance
does the al-Maliki government have of succeeding. I believe
that the community was unanimous in their last open session in
saying that a premature pullout would cause chaos, increase
killing of Iraqis, provide safe haven for al-Qa'ida and
possible major conflicts among countries as well as sects in
the region.
And what General Hayden told us in public, and followed up
by the further briefings that we had, that while it is by no
means sure, providing assistance to al-Maliki's government now,
with the commitment he's made and with the assistance perhaps
of other friendly countries in the area, is not guaranteed, but
it is the best hope for stability in Iraq. Is that a fair
characterization of the position of the community?
Dr. Fingar. Yes it is, Senator.
Vice Chairman Bond. Has the intelligence community been
pulled off its tasks that in the professional judgment of the
intelligence professionals would be better utilization of their
collection and analytical assets in order to perform a
political task rather than to focus on the threats that the
intelligence professionals believe to be the top priority. Has
that happened? If so, when?
Dr. Fingar. No, Senator. The community is arrayed against
the threats that were described in the testimony presented by
the DNI and the other intelligence community leaders to this
Committee last week.
Vice Chairman Bond. And those are threats that are not
dictated by Congress or the executive, but are the threats that
are perceived as such by the community?
Dr. Fingar. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. So there's no question about that.
Let me ask Ambassador Kennedy--I'm still concerned about
the budget. In the Imagery Way Ahead, General Hayden told the
Committee that the DNI wanted to terminate a major program and
continue another. What worked out was that the one that he
wanted killed is still being funded, and the one he wanted to
continue got terminated.
How is this determining the budget? You're going to have to
guess what I'm talking about, but I think you could.
Ambassador Kennedy. I'm with you. I'm not sure that I can
give you a fulsome answer in this venue, except to say that
when the DNI, in consultation with other senior leaders in the
intelligence community, looked at what is the essential,
fundamental, base, national technical means that were needed,
we made decisions on what should be funded in the national
intelligence programs based upon those fundamental
requirements, those baseline requirements. And, we made the
determination that it is essential to meet baseline needs, and
we have done that.
Vice Chairman Bond. Okay. Mr. Chairman, we may want to
follow up with this in a closed hearing, I think. Thank you
very much.
Chairman Rockefeller. Okay. Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are
expecting a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in the not-
too-distant future. And this is my first go at this, so I want
to get a bit of an understanding of the procedure involved.
How did the preparation of the National Intelligence
Estimate, which I think is pretty close to completion and
delivery, relate to the discussions that have taken place
recently with the intelligence community and the White House
with respect to the determinations that have been made in Iraq?
And very specifically, did the office of the President or the
Vice President provide input to any of you on the desired
timing or content of the NIE?
Dr. Fingar. The answer on both the timing and content is
no.
Senator Whitehouse. Good. And what is the preparation
process related to the consultations that took place over the
past months?
Dr. Fingar. Well, we began the preparation of the estimate
in the fall. Estimates, by their nature, require the input of
the most experienced analysts that we have in the community.
And even on Iran, where we have a large number of analysts
relative to most other subjects, the number of analysts that
are really very good is small. And in the course of preparing
the Estimate, we were asked to prepare a number of assessments
that fed into the President's policy review, to prepare a
number of briefings, a number of responses to requests from
Baghdad, MNFI particularly.
Given the importance of the subject, we felt it imperative
to put our best analysts on it. So there was, in one sense, a
competition for time of the most skilled analysts. However, the
processes were all interlinked--that the work being done on the
estimate informed the input that the community was making in
Baghdad and to the reconsideration of policy here. So they were
moving in parallel. They don't differ from one another in their
judgments, so the specific set of questions we address is the
same set of questions that we began addressing, but the
production schedule for the Estimate has slipped because task
one got in the way of task two in this. As I said earlier, we
expect to have this completed by the end of the month, but as
we speak, the community is in coordination on a draft.
Senator Whitehouse. Now, looking at that situation, I see a
world community that is taking a very meager role in helping us
to resolve the conflict in Iraq. I see a regional community
that I would also view as taking a very meager role,
particularly considering the stakes at hand if Iraq were to
spark off a pan-Arabic, Sunni-Shi'ite conflict that would
engage Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other nations. They're
very directly interested in what is going on there. And there
also seems to be widespread skepticism about the real will and
capacity of the Maliki administration to be able to manage some
form of resolution among the different factions in Iraq.
And with respect to all of those three--the hesitance of
the world community, the lack of appropriate, given the risks
involved, response by nearby Arab nations, and the either
hesitancy or truculence of the Iraq factions at finding an
accommodation--what is the role of the U.S. presence with
respect to those different characteristics of this dispute?
Dr. Fingar. Senator, my starting point is the very high
expectations that others around the world and certainly in the
region have of the United States.
Senator Whitehouse. That's a nice way of saying it.
Dr. Fingar. Perhaps unrealistically high expectations. But
many of the states around Iraq have relied to a greater or
lesser degree for their security on their relationship with the
United States--political, economic, and military. The U.S.
presence in the region is a part of the provision of that
security. Iraq is unquestionably a very difficult environment
at the moment. That reticence of neighbors to become engaged is
one part the unappealing character of the conflict, one part
the expectation that they are going to have to make
accommodation with whatever emerges in Baghdad and in Iraq,
more broadly.
They don't believe they have a great deal of ability to
influence that situation. They worry that they will become
tainted by attempting to intervene on behalf of one of the
factions or parties or groups or another. It is a situation
that, if we could roll the clock back decades rather than a few
years, one could imagine things evolving differently. But we're
working with the situation sort of as it is.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator. Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
the panel as well.
Obviously, with the departure of Director Negroponte, it's
raised a number of questions about the true extent of the
authority of the DNI. And it is deeply troubling that obviously
we not only have the departure of Director Negroponte, but also
the Deputy. It was a long-standing vacancy at a time in which
we're trying to ground this department in gathering
intelligence and centralizing and consolidating intelligence
authority. I know that, Ambassador Kennedy, you recently stated
that DOD and the DNI had been able to resolve any differences
and that DNI has not had to surrender any authority.
But yet, when you look at the statute, obviously that was
one of the central questions during the course of this debate
in the creation of this department as to what extent the DNI
would have concentrated authority overseeing the 16
intelligence agencies' budget.
Now, the language in the statute is he has the authority to
determine the budget authority. And yet, as we know, DOD
administers 85 percent of the budget and the personnel within
those agencies. Do you think that, first, the statute now
should be changed? I mean, because the perception in all of the
comments, if you read a number of articles, it's clear that the
perception is that the Director really has very ambiguous
authority. And it's essential for anybody who is sitting atop a
large agency as the DNI is has to have that authority or
literally has no control.
And so, I think that's one of the issues that we have to
grapple with. I mean, you know, certainly, the question about
the Director's departure could be central to the issue that he
lacked that authority. And we have to get to the heart of that
question. Now, some might say it's premature to address any
statutory changes, but sooner rather than later if we're going
to get this right.
Ambassador Kennedy. Senator, I believe that in terms of the
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to determine
the budget, he has that authority and he has exercised it. If I
might take a second, we receive what is called the IPBS--the
budget request from the 16 agencies. The analysis of those
programs is run by people who work for me, in conjunction with
representatives from analysis, collection, requirements,
technology, the CIO, everyone. We scrub those budgets.
Then they come to me; I make a recommendation to myself, in
effect, consult with the other deputies, and then take that
package and sit down with the Director and say, this is what I
believe should be allocated to the agencies on the basis of
what they have requested. Cut this; add here; shift that.
The Director then makes that determination and that goes
over to OMB, and then it goes into the President's budget. It
is submitted to the Congress, and after you make the
authorization and appropriation decisions that you make, the
money then comes back to the DNI, and we issue what are called
advisive allotments. We say to agency X, you are hereby on the
basis of congressional action given $50. And we put footnotes
if there is any doubt on that advisive allotment that says,
spend $35 on this, $10 on this, et cetera, et cetera. And those
footnotes carry the force of law--the Anti-Deficiency Act.
So the analysis is done within the ODNI; the Director makes
the decision; and the way we've set up the process, the
agencies follow that decision. They have followed those
decisions at the end of 2005, 2006--we're now in 2007--because
A, they respect the process, but B, you have given us
sufficient force of law to ensure that they have to, should
they not want to.
Senator Snowe. So you think that the common perception
about the lack of authority is not real and that in actuality,
that it works and in practice, it works?
Ambassador Kennedy. There are some minor tweaks that we
will be submitting in the 2008 discussions, but in the area of
the budget, I believe we have an absolutely solid foundation
and it doesn't matter whether the agency involved in the 16 is
in another cabinet agency or not. The process that you have
given to us enables us to be solid and make those
determinations and see that they are executed.
Senator Snowe. And that was true in the preparation of the
2008 budget? I mean, were there any challenges there?
Ambassador Kennedy. There were lots of challenges, but not
challenges from the--obviously, any budget preparation process
has an element of triage in it. You wanted perfect security,
you'd never get there because the cost curve would go vertical.
So we make decisions, but we believe that there will be
sufficient funds in the President's budget that you will
receive on the 5th of February to meet our national needs, and
we believe also that we will present to you an allocation
spread across the 16 agencies that is the best decision that
the Director can come to.
Senator Snowe. So you think he has considerable authority
then?
Ambassador Kennedy. Yes, ma'am, I do.
Senator Snowe. Well, you know, it's troubling then, because
I think that there seems to be a gap at least in perception in
terms of whether or not the DNI does have real authority. And I
think that is a real question, because I think ultimately it
undermines the department in terms of making sure that it does
have that authority to do what it is required to do and what it
has been asked to do.
Ambassador Kennedy. The only other example, Senator, that I
could offer in this regard is that if you had been party to the
internal deliberations within the ODNI, you would have seen the
DNI's decisions to move funds from one agency to another, and
move funds from a program within one agency to another program
within that agency. And those decisions of the DNI were
sustained and those decisions will be before you on February
5th.
Senator Snowe. Well, I guess also it's a question of
whether or not it works well in one instance; it may not work
well in another instance, because you don't have the grounding
in statute in terms of a clear and concise authority.
Ambassador Kennedy. I believe we did the same thing in FY
2007 and we did almost the same thing in FY 2006, which is the
first budget that DNI had any responsibility for. And so, we
now have a track record of 2006, 2007, and now the submission
to you, Senator, of 2008.
Senator Snowe. And how has the balance occurred between the
military and strategic requirements in terms of intelligence?
Has it shifted from tactical to strategic or more to tactical
rather than strategic?
Ambassador Kennedy. I believe that--and I can ask my
colleagues for assistance on this--that is, the National
Intelligence Budget--the NIB, as opposed to the Military
Intelligence Budget, the MIB, which is under DOD, but which we
play an advisory role on--that the focus of the NIB is solidly
on the national and the strategic, and the focus on the MIB is
on the tactical.
Senator Snowe. So you're comfortable with the balance?
Ms. Graham. Senator, one of the pieces of putting ourselves
through having the agencies develop with us, the capabilities--
the intelligence capabilities that the Nation needs from a
collection point of view--when you look at those capabilities
and how you array them, things like you want your systems to be
survivable perhaps, you want your systems to provide you
persistence, you want your systems to provide you with
leadership--there are strategic, leadership, persistence,
survivable, and there are tactical.
So when Ambassador Kennedy described that basis, the way I
would describe it is in the NIP, in looking at the capabilities
across the NIP, you find the strategic capabilities, which may
be the same as the tactical capabilities. But the spending in
the MIP on tactical capabilities, for example, urban things
that they have to do in Baghdad--that they are doing in Baghdad
today to find and fix--those are more in the tactical. But some
of those same systems are using some of the same things that
you use in your strategic systems.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Snowe. Ambassador
Kennedy, I'm going to pick a bone with you. And I think this is
not unimportant, because it gets to the very relationship of
the way the congressional branch of government and the
executive branch of government talk with each other. We have to
be candid and forthright.
I asked you about an absence in Michael Hayden's position
when he took over the CIA. You indicated that General Burgess
was filling in on that and that everything was O.K.. I receded
into a state of temporary satisfaction until my chief of staff
launched at my chair and pointed out some very important
things, which I think you need to think about in terms of the
way you and I talk in the future.
Number one is that he had two jobs. He was Acting Deputy
Director of National Intelligence. He was also the Deputy
Director for Requirements. So he was being asked to do two jobs
at once. You did not tell me that. No, I'm not finished.
And then, he ended his one job--two jobs--whatever you
want--2 weeks ago. So my question stands. You cannot tell me in
something as important as what we are responsible for from an
oversight position that everything was just fine when in fact
it wasn't.
You can say he was a superperson and therefore could do the
two jobs at once. But I'm not inclined to believe that. So now,
I want you to correct the record for me and tell me whether
there has been a deputy in General Hayden's position. There
certainly has not been for the last 2 weeks, and there
certainly was not, in my judgment, for the previous period of
time. And those were very, very important times at which Iran
and all kinds of things reared their head.
Ambassador Kennedy. Absolutely, Senator. And I apologize
for something I didn't add. During the period of time that
General Burgess was acting as the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence, he stepped out of his job as the Deputy
Director for Requirements, and Mr. Mark Ewing stepped into his
job as the Acting Director of Requirements. And so I apologize
for failing to add that to the point in my presentation, sir. I
apologize for leaving that off.
But, General Burgess was not occupying and doing the two
jobs at the same time. He was filling in. He moved out of his
office--literally, physically moved out of his office as the
Deputy Director for Requirements--and moved into the Principal
Deputy's office--a different office adjacent to Director
Negroponte's.
Chairman Rockefeller. I will give you an advantage on
facts. I will not give you an advantage on the principle of
discourse between the executive branch and the congressional
branch.
Ambassador Kennedy. Again, I apologize for any misstatement
I may have made, but I thought I was honestly trying to outline
that General Burgess had shifted and had taken over as the
Acting Deputy.
Chairman Rockefeller. But you didn't.
Ambassador Kennedy. For the President's designation.
Chairman Rockefeller. But you didn't.
Ambassador Kennedy. I apologize.
Chairman Rockefeller. Who is Deputy now?
Ambassador Kennedy. The job is vacant because the Vacancies
Act time has expired, as I indicated.
Chairman Rockefeller. And then you referred obliquely to
not tensions but discussions. And all of that interests me. All
I'm saying is that when you and I converse, let it be open; let
it be forthright; and let it be accurate. Our business is
intelligence. Yours is intelligence. So let's at least deal
with each other fairly.
Vice Chairman Bond has a matter.
Vice Chairman Bond. Just a couple of quick ones. I don't
believe I recall getting a response to my question whether the
IC has any auditable statement. Is there any auditable
statement in any entity in the IC?
Ambassador Kennedy. Senator, there is no auditable
statement without exception. Two agencies have presented
auditable financial statements. However, exceptions were taken
in the area of plants and equipment--i.e. inventories.
Vice Chairman Bond. What were the two that made the hurdle?
Ambassador Kennedy. Can I provide that to you offline, sir?
Vice Chairman Bond. Yes, provide that to us. And when are
you going to get the rest of them controlled?
Ambassador Kennedy. For the last year, we have been working
with DOD and with OMB on this. We have a very difficult problem
that we're facing in that the majority of the funding for
several of these agencies runs through the Department of
Defense and the Defense finance and accounting system. The
Defense finance and accounting system does not have an
auditable financial statement, which is beyond the control of
the intelligence community, and until we are able to achieve
changes in that relationship, we are going to have a problem.
So I have commissioned a team composed of the deputy chief
financial officer, and he is working with representatives from
OMB and from the Department of Defense to find out how we can
resolve those problems so that the agencies who are all working
independently with us can have their individual finance
statements auditable, and that we are able to reconcile things
such as funds balances at Treasury and others, to make this
happen.
Vice Chairman Bond. I have had discussions with Admiral
McConnell about establishing strong CFO positions and
developing a career track for people within the IC with a
strong financial management background, and we look forward to
following up with you.
The other thing I would add, following on a discussion that
Senator Feinstein had with you before we were here, the 9/11
Commission pointed out that there was a lack of coordination or
involvement by the intelligence authorizing committees in the
appropriations process. Senators Feinstein, Mikulski, and I
serve on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. We have
presented proposals to ensure that this Committee can have some
meaningful input to that appropriations committee, which I hope
will satisfy the goals of the 9/11 Commission, though maybe not
perhaps the precise structure.
So we will look forward to working with you to the fullest
extent possible on the budgetary issues because one way or the
other, we are going to be deeply--at least some of us are going
to be deeply involved in the appropriations process.
Ambassador Kennedy. If I might, Mr. Vice Chairman, I can
assure you that on February 5th that we deliver to this
Committee a complete set of the classified congressional budget
justification documents--
Vice Chairman Bond. And when you are asked--
Ambassador Kennedy. If I have to do it personally.
Vice Chairman Bond. And when you are asked for further
information, I hope you will share that with my Committee and
the SAC/D, and similarly, if we ask for something, I would
assume you would keep both Committees fully involved as if both
of us have an interest in the budgetary decisions, which we do.
Ambassador Kennedy. I and my staff are at your disposal on
any budgetary question at any time.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, sir, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Rockefeller. And I thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman,
and I will have one more question.
Should something arise of a moderately important level in
the field of intelligence, how would it get handled? There is
no acting deputy director.
Ambassador Kennedy. I believe, Senator, that it would come
to one of the four deputies for collection, analysis,
requirements or management, and we would take that--or the CIO.
And we would take that matter, if we could not resolve it
ourselves, since we do handle large numbers of issues every day
with the agencies, we would immediately take that matter to the
Director of National Intelligence, sir.
Chairman Rockefeller. And when would you expect that person
to be named?
Ambassador Kennedy. Senator, I can't speculate on that. I
am assuming that, subject to the will of the Senate, that is
something that Admiral McConnell will be taking up immediately.
But I can only surmise. I can't give you a clear answer.
Chairman Rockefeller. I know. In the meantime, Ms. Graham,
we are depending upon you.
Ms. Graham. Senator, I know this isn't going to scratch the
itch, but can I give you a little bit of the inside baseball of
how we have been working for the past 21 months?
Chairman Rockefeller. I am very good at inside baseball,
and so is Kit Bond.
Ms. Graham. All right, when we--
Vice Chairman Bond. Ours was a little better than the
Braves.
Ms. Graham. Well, you have got a Yankees fan here, so I'm
sorry.
When we stood up in May of 2005, and the four of us
arrived, you will recall that the Ambassador and General Hayden
were downtown in the new executive office building. The other
four of us were out then at Langley. And one of the things that
we had started then, with the Ambassador's full encouragement,
was a meeting on a daily basis. So my other half doesn't work
in the Government; he works in corporate America.
Think of us, the four of us, on a daily basis, with the
acting PDDNI or the PDDNI, and the Ambassador acting as a
corporate team. And every morning still, we sit down, and we
walk through the issues. Now, your point about there not being
a Principal Deputy I certainly don't quarrel with. But the
management of the intelligence community, I don't think, has
been lacking because of the structure that the Ambassador put
in place in those very early days, whether it be speaking,
whether it be participating in the job that we are here to do,
whether it be participating in deputies committee meetings on
any given issue that impacts intelligence. It's not perfect,
but I think--and I'll speak for myself--I think it has worked
in the management of the community.
Tom.
Dr. Fingar. I would absolutely agree with that, that we are
all generally knowledgeable about one another's working, but
even more importantly, I think we have grown to have absolute
trust in one another's judgment, and if I hand something off to
one of my colleagues, I don't worry about it being done
properly. It will be done properly.
Chairman Rockefeller. I'll leave it at that. Thank you very
much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]