[Senate Report 108-258]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
Calendar No. 499
108th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 108-258
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TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT, AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
May 5, 2004.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Roberts, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2386]
The Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI or Committee),
having considered the original bill (S. 2386), to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System, and for other purposes reports an original bill without
amendment favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do
pass.
CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The classified nature of United States intelligence
activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of details of
its budgetary recommendations in this Report. The Committee has
prepared a classified supplement to this Report which contains
(a) the Classified Annex to this Report and (b) the classified
Schedule of Authorizations which is incorporated by reference
in the Act and has the same legal status as public law. The
Classified Annex to this Report explains the full scope and
intent of the Committee's action as set forth in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations. Reports required by the Classified
Annex and this Report have been incorporated by reference in
Section 105 of the Bill. In addition, the Committee expects the
Intelligence Community to comply with any other directions as
requirements contained therein as it would any other statutory
requirement.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for appropriate distribution within the
executive branch.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
The following is a section-by-section summary of the fiscal
year 2005 Intelligence Authorization Act. Following the
section-by-section analysis there are general Committee
comments on other matters.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for fiscal year 2005.
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2005 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2005 to authorize
employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel
ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence
Community under section 102 by an amount not to exceed two
percent of the total of the ceilings applicableunder section
102. The DCI may exercise this authority only if necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this
authority must be reported to the intelligence committees of the
Congress.
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (CMA) of the DCI and sets the
personnel end-strength for the Intelligence Community
Management Staff for fiscal year 2005.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $342,995,000
for fiscal year 2005 for the activities of the CMA of the DCI.
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced
research and development to remain available for 2 years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 310 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2005 and provides that
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations and permits the additional funding amount to
remain available through September 30, 2006.
Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in section
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from
another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed to an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis,
except that for temporary functions such personnel may be
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis for periods of less than 1
year.
Subsection (e) authorizes $34,911,000 of the amount
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e)
requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of
the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act.
Section 105 incorporates into the Act by reference each
requirement to submit a report contained in the joint
explanatory statement to accompany the conference report or in
the associated classified annex to the conference report.
Section 106 authorizes, solely for the purposes of
reprogramming under Section 504(a)(3) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)), those funds appropriated for
an intelligence or intelligence-related activity in fiscal year
2004 in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations that accompanied H.R.
2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
(H.R. Report 108-381).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$239,400,000 for fiscal year 2005 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
removing the ``unforeseen requirements'' criterion from section
504(a)(3) of the Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) (relating to the
funding of certain intelligence activities by reprogramming).
The amendment ensures that the IntelligenceCommunity, in
cooperation with the Committees, can react more quickly to confront
higher-priority needs, by eliminating unnecessary and time-consuming
legal debates with respect to proposed reprogrammings. Elimination of
the unforeseen requirements criterion will permit reprogrammings to be
reviewed on the basis of relative needs and priorities.
Section 304 amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) of 1978 by expanding the definition of an ``agent of
a foreign power'' to include ``any person, other than a United
States person, who * * * engages in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor.'' This provision is
identical to Section 1 of S. 113 as passed by the Senate on May
8, 2003.
Since FISA's enactment in 1978, the targets of intelligence
collection and their means of communication have changed
dramatically. Intelligence Community collection efforts are
increasingly challenged by enhancements in communications
technology and by the changing nature of intelligence targets.
This provision permits the Government to apply for a FISA
warrant to monitor a foreign person--i.e., not a citizen or
lawful permanent resident of the United States--engaged in or
preparing to commit terrorist activities, even if it is not
known whether the foreign person is connected to a group
engaged in or preparing to commit similar activities. If the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court grants a FISA order,
the Government will be able to monitor the activities of the
foreign person via electronic surveillance or physical
searches, as authorized by FISA. This amendment takes better
account of current operational realities without damaging
important privacy interests of U.S. persons.
Finally, this section also contains a sunset provision tied
to the existing sunset provision in section 224 of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295).
Section 305 contains an additional FISA reporting
requirement. This section is identical to Section 2 of S. 113,
as passed by the Senate on May 8, 2003.
Section 306(a) repeals the eight-year limit on continuous
service on the Select Committee on Intelligence. The limit was
included nearly 30 years ago in Senate Resolution 400 (1976)
which established the Committee. The need for sustained
oversight of the Intelligence Community, including over
difficult technical and budgetary issues, has persuaded many
informed observers that term limits arbitrarily deprive the
Senate of the experience gained from extended service on the
Committee.
Section 306(b) makes clear that this amendment is an
exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate, and that it is
within the constitutional right of the Senate to make any
future change in the Resolution by action of the Senate alone
in a simple resolution or in such other measure as the Senate
may select.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401 amends the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Voluntary Separation Pay Act (VSPA) by repealing the otherwise
applicable September 30, 2005 termination date for CIA's
authority under that statute and by eliminating the 15 percent
fee previously required to be paid by the CIA pursuant to
section 2(i) of the VSPA. The CIA has used its Voluntary
Separation Incentive Program (VSIP) authority over the past
five years to restructure its workforce to support the DCI's
Strategic Direction. The changes in the workforce required to
support the DCI's direction affect a number of areas within the
Agency. Authority to offer incentives to targeted groups of
employees to encourage separation from employment, therefore,
remains important to the success of the Agency's restructuring.
Security considerations also support vesting the CIA with
permanent authority to administer a CIA-specific VSIP for all
CIA officers and employees, whether in the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, the Civil Service
Retirement System, or the Federal Employee Retirement System.
Section 401 also amends the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act
(FWRA) of 1994 by deleting payments made under VSPA from the
definition of voluntary separation incentive payments in the
FWRA.
Section 402 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 by adding a new section that enhances the cover of certain
CIA employees. This new section provides that, notwithstanding
any other provisions of law, the DCI, in order to protect
intelligence operations and sources and methods, may: pay
salaries, allowances, retirement,insurance, and other benefits
to CIA employees under non-official cover in a manner consistent with
their cover; exempt a category of CIA employees from certain U.S.
Government rules and regulations; allow certain CIA employees to claim
and receive the same Federal and state tax treatment available to
individuals in the private sector; and, allow certain CIA employees to
receive Social Security benefits based on the Social Security
contributions made.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501 removes the sunset provision associated with
Department of Defense authority to conduct commercial
activities necessary to provide security for intelligence
collection activities abroad. This authority was first granted
in 1991 (Public Law 102-88, Sec. 504) with a sunset date of
December 31, 1995. Since enactment in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, the authority has been
extended on four occasions (Public Law 104-93, Public Law 105-
272, Public Law 106-398, and Public Law 107-314). Given these
four previous extensions and the importance of the authority to
Department of Defense intelligence activities, this provision
permanently extends the authority and the associated
requirements for the conduct of these activities.
Section 502 provides a necessary Defense intelligence
exemption to a provision of the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a).
Section 552a(e)(3) of Title 5, United States Code, requires
each agency that maintains a system of records to inform each
individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form
which it uses to collect the information or on a separate form
that can be retained by the individual, of:
(A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by
executive order of the President) which authorizes the
solicitation of the information and whether disclosure
of such information is mandatory or voluntary;
(B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the
information is intended to be used;
(C) the routine uses which may be made of the
information * * *; and
(D) the effects on [the individual], if any, of not
providing all or any part of the requested information.
To improve the ability of intelligence personnel of the
Department of Defense to recruit sources, it is necessary for
Defense intelligence personnel, without having to divulge their
affiliation with the Department or the U.S. Government, to
approach potential sources and collect personal information
from them to determine their suitability and willingness to
become intelligence sources.
The DCI has recognized that compliance with the
requirements of Section 552a(e)(3) has the potential to
threaten operational relationships, compromise the safety of
intelligence officers, and jeopardize intelligence sources and
methods. Pursuant to Section 552a(j)(1), the DCI has exempted
all systems of records maintained by CIA from the requirements
of Section 552a(e)(3). See 32 C.F.R. 1901.62(b). Section
552a(j)(2) grants a similar exemption to law enforcement
personnel. Compliance with Section 552a(e)(3) poses similar
risks to Defense intelligence personnel and to the Defense
Department's human intelligence mission.
Section 503 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359) granted Defense
intelligence personnel a very limited exemption from Section
552a(e)(3), i.e., the exemption is limited to a single
``initial assessment contact outside the United States.''
Current counterterrorism operations highlight the need for
greater latitude for assessing potential intelligence sources,
both overseas and within the United States. Amending the
Privacy Act to give Defense intelligence officers the same
protection enjoyed by CIA when assessing and recruiting sources
should serve to protect these officers and shield their
operations. This should improve the Defense Department's
ability to conduct successful human intelligence operations.
Section 503 allows funds available for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities to be used to support a unified
campaign against drug traffickers and terrorist organizations
in Colombia. It is identical to section 502 of Public Law 108-
177, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
COMMITTEE COMMENTS
A. Intelligence Community Reform
The Committee's examination of our government's handling of
the events leading to the September 11th attacks and the
Intelligence Community's prewar assessments concerning Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs have and will highlight a
number of problems with our intelligence processes. The
findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (``the 9/11 Commission'') have only added to
a growing concern that changes must be made to address these
problems. Although Congress and the President have acknowledged
publicly the need for Intelligence Community reform, there is
not yet a consensus on when and how to enact such reform.
There will likely never be an ideal time for Intelligence
Community reform. Change is always difficult, especially in the
middle of a war. The threats our nation faces, however, show no
signs of abating. While we have made much progress, in some
areas the threat appears to be increasing. Therefore, the
Committee believes that the process of reform must begin.
The Committee will undertake a deliberate and comprehensive
review of the full range of options for modernizing the
Intelligence Community. Individual committee members have
identified specific areas for reform including organizational
structure, accountability, alternative analysis, security
clearance procedures, and others. Other members of Congress
have offered reform proposals, as well. We strongly believe
that all options are on the table.
As the Committee embarks on this process, we will be guided
by an important principle: first, do no harm. Congress must
resist the impulse to make quick, politically expedient
changes. Our actions should address identifiable problems and
ensure that change is institutionalized as a continuous process
in the Intelligence Community. The Committee must leave in
place a system that will continue to adapt to new priorities
and threats without waiting for yet another act of Congress.
The Committee intends to hold a number of hearings focusing
specifically on the findings of the Joint Inquiry Into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission,
and the initial report of this Committee on the Intelligence
Community's prewar assessments concerning Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction. In addition, the Committee will hold open
hearings in the coming weeks to consider the relative merits of
a variety of reform proposals.
The Committee will also be informed by other studies and
reports on intelligence activities of the United States
prepared over the past two decades. As we consider various
courses of action, we intend to work closely with other
Committees of jurisdiction and the executive branch. The
Committee retains the option of seeking the enactment of
reforms during the present session, either in this Act, as it
works its way through the legislative process, or in a separate
measure.
B. Reporting Requirement--Management of the Intelligence Community as
an Information Enterprise
The U.S. Government must fundamentally reexamine the manner
in which the Intelligence Community manages intelligence
information. In many instances, the intelligence failures that
preceded the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were
marked by an insistence--whether historically or legally
grounded--that intelligence information must be tightly
controlled by the intelligence collector. Often, this position
was based on a mistaken predicate, namely that an agency
``owned'' information that it had collected.
In the aftermath of September 11, this Committee, the Joint
Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, the
9/11 Commission, and various commentators have decried the
``wall'' between Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal and
intelligence investigators, the inability of analysts to access
crucial operational information on human intelligence sources,
the lack of access by intelligence analysts to Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act and other signals intelligence
data, and a lack of commitment to the provision of threat
information to State and local officials. In fact, one of the
important intelligence reforms in the USA PATRIOT Act (Public
Law 107-56) was the dismantling of the ``wall'' between law
enforcement and intelligence. Nevertheless, restrictions on
data access byintelligence analysts--some real and some
perceived--have been brought to the attention of this Committee on
numerous occasions during the course of our continuing oversight of the
Intelligence Community.
Although sources and methods must be protected from
unauthorized disclosure, the Intelligence Community continues
to constrain its analysts through outdated restrictions on
information access and a stubborn refusal to revisit legal
interpretations and policy decisions that predate the
asymmetric threats that now confront the United States. Given
the evolving nature of the challenges confronting the United
States, the agencies that comprise the intelligence collection
and analysis branches of the U.S. Government must begin using
information like a Community--not a loose affiliation of
agencies.
The Intelligence Community must be managed as an
information enterprise. Pilot programs, ad hoc memoranda of
understanding, and ``fixes'' based on the crisis of the moment
are insufficient responses to an endemic problem. Although
efforts have been made to surmount restrictions, some
information sharing limitations have reemerged in the very
programs that were designed to address them. The operations of
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) are a prime
example of this transfer of limitations. Although TTIC was
established to bring intelligence data from across the
Intelligence Community together at one location, many analysts
at TTIC are still burdened by the same information restrictions
that inhibited their work at their parent agency--working under
a collage of minimization procedures, parent organization legal
authorities and policy barriers, and perceived limitations that
still inhibit real all-source intelligence analysis.
This Committee is impatient for real reforms in information
sharing and data access. Intelligence data that is collected by
the U.S. Government belongs to the U.S. Government--not the
intelligence agency that happened to collect it. By making
intelligence data available to a Community of all-source
intelligence analysts and by providing intelligence
information, in classified or unclassified form, to appropriate
State and local officials, the United States will be in a
better position to address the threat environment confronting
the nation. Recognizing the fundamental protections afforded by
the Constitution, the nation must reassess legal
interpretations, policy directives, and other limitations in
statute, Executive order, and regulation that prevent
intelligence analysts from accessing the intelligence data they
need to complete their important work.
In response to several reporting requirements in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law
108-177), the Intelligence Community Deputies Committee
approved the establishment of an ``Information Sharing Working
Group'' (ISWG). Among other things, the ISWG was assigned the
task of identifying impediments to information sharing through
an analysis of all existing Intelligence Community and
Department of Defense policies and laws. As evidenced by
Section 354 in the Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization
Act, Congress has a direct interest in a comprehensive
examination of these topics. To that end, the Committee directs
the Director of Central Intelligence, to coordinate with the
Attorney General and Secretary of Defense, in completing the
ISWG review.
The ISWG should include in its review all applicable
statutes, Executive orders, regulations, policies, and legal
interpretations that inhibit all-source analysis by
Intelligence Community analysts. This review should be a zero-
based assessment of intelligence collection and analysis
authorities and the effect these authorities and their
interpretations have on all-source analysis. The review should
include a fundamental analysis of the protections afforded U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and foreign nationals
under the Constitution and the impact these protections have on
intelligence analysis. It should include a list of all
identified inhibitors, as well as an analysis of the statutory,
regulatory, legal, or policy bases for such restrictions. Given
the difficulties associated with this comprehensive task, the
Committee directs that the ISWG report on these issues be
provided to the Committee no later than February 1, 2005.
Based on the analysis contained in the ISWG report, the
Committee requests that the President inform the Committee of
recommendations for overcoming the restrictions outlined in the
report. The Committee is particularly interested in
recommendations that include a reexamination of existing legal
authorities, the creation of an Intelligence Community-wide
procedure for minimizing all types of intelligence data to
protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons, and the
modification of existing agency authoritiesthat restrict all-
source analysis, whether in statute, Executive order, regulation, or
policy.
C. Intelligence Community Compliance With Federal Financial Accounting
Standards
For several years, the Committee has been concerned with
the Intelligence Community's financial management practices. In
the report accompanying S. 1428 (S. Rpt. 107-63), the Committee
instructed the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that the National Security
Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) receive an audit of their financial
statements no later than March 1, 2005, to be performed by a
statutory Inspector General or a qualified independent public
accountant.
Reports issued by the Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA
Inspectors General in 2002 indicated that NSA, DIA, NGA, and
CIA were unable to produce auditable financial statements.
Unfortunately, this remains the case. In contrast to these
agencies, NRO received an unqualified (clean) opinion for its
Fiscal Year 2003 financial statements.
The Committee previously acknowledged that NSA, DIA, and
NGA may be affected by DOD plans to implement a Department-wide
Financial Management Modernization Program, which is not
expected to be completed before 2007. The Committee notes that
in testimony before a Senate Armed Services subcommittee in
March 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
indicated that DOD plans to earn a clean opinion for its Fiscal
Year 2007 financial statements, even though its Modernization
Program will not yet be complete.
In recognition of the challenges presented by the
difficulties in acquiring the systems necessary to produce
financial statements, the Committee indicated in Senate Report
108-44, accompanying S. 1025, the Senate-passed Fiscal Year
2004 Intelligence Authorization Act, that it would consider an
extension of the auditable financial statement due date,
provided that the relevant agencies offered evidence of
significant progress in this area.
Information furnished by the agencies within the last year
has revealed numerous positive developments. For example, NGA
planned to triple its accounting staff and move to a single
accounting system. DIA created a Chief Financial Executive
position reporting directly to its Director, and it was rated
third among thirty DoD agencies for the quality of its internal
controls. NSA received a DoD exemption to purchase financial
system software in March 2003 that will assist in modernizing
its financial management systems and has developed a detailed
implementation plan for the new system. This should allow NSA
and, in turn, DIA (which uses portions of the NSA's accounting
system) to produce auditable statements by 2007.
Based on this and other information provided by the
agencies, the Committee is satisfied that meaningful measures
have been devoted to producing auditable financial statements.
Substantial obstacles remain, however, and the Committee
believes that maintaining the original March 1, 2005, deadline
would be counterproductive in that it would require audits that
would divert resources from actual financial system
improvements.
Accordingly, the Committee has decided that it would not,
and does not, object to extending the due date set in the
report accompanying S. 1428 (S. Rpt. 107-63), for NSA, DIA, and
NIMA/NGA to March 1, 2007, to allow for audits of the Fiscal
Year 2006 financial statements. This change does not affect
CIA, which is required by Public Law 107-289 to submit audited
financial statements for Fiscal Year 2004.
Although obtaining unqualified opinions by March 2007 will
be a formidable task, the Committee believes that these efforts
are an essential part of bringing further accountability to the
Intelligence Community's financial management practices. The
need for sound financial management practices has grown in
importance with the large amount of supplemental funding
received by these agencies in the last several years.
The Committee expects Agency heads to continue to monitor
these efforts closely and provide annual progress reports by
December 1 of each year preceding the audit requirement.
D. Supplemental Funding of Counterterrorism
The Committee notes a shortfall in Intelligence Community
counterterrorism funding in the Administration's Fiscal Year
2005 baseline submission. While the Committee has been advised
that additional funding for Intelligence Community
counterterrorism activities will be forthcoming in the form of
supplemental funds within the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense
Appropriations Bill, we are increasingly concerned about the
continuing practice of funding known operational requirements
through supplemental funding vehicles.
While the practice of funding baseline expenditures using
supplemental vehicles has become more prevalent in the past 10
years, the Committee believes that it is time to rein in this
practice. The global war on terrorism has been underway for
almost 3 years. The Administration and Congress have
acknowledged that this conflict will continue for the
foreseeable future. The funding requirements for this effort no
longer qualify as emergency funding. With respect to the
Intelligence Community, these requirements are, and will remain
for some time to come, day-to-day operational costs of doing
business.
Reliance on supplemental funding requests to fund
reasonably predictable baseline requirements complicates
unnecessarily the execution of new and ongoing operations. The
Congress has recently funded supplemental requests and will,
more than likely, continue to do so. Nonetheless, operators in
the field deserve a greater degree of certainty when it comes
to questions of resources--the operators' life-blood. The
Committee believes that the global war on terrorism is no
longer an emergency funding issue, but rather a long-term
reality to which the nation must adapt.
Consequently, the Administration should make a concerted
effort to develop reasonable cost estimates for
counterterrorism-related intelligence activities over the
Future Years Defense Plan or some other acceptable time period.
These costs should be included in the future baseline funding
requests of the Intelligence Community agencies.
