Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, July 20, 2021 - 2:45pm
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 117-83]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-83
OPEN HEARING: NOMINATIONS OF
STACEY A. DIXON
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;
THOMAS A. MONHEIM
TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; AND
MATTHEW G. OLSEN
TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-490 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS KING, Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas
BOB CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
JULY 20, 2021
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia............... 1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida................... 3
WITNESSES
Gordon, Sue, former Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence................................................... 4
Dixon, Stacey A., Nominated to be Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence.......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Monheim, Thomas A., Nominated to be Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community......................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Olsen, Matthew G., Nominated to be Assistant Attorney General for
National Security.............................................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Nomination material for Stacey A. Dixon
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 38
Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 55
Post-Hearing Questions....................................... 82
Nomination material for Thomas A. Monheim
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 85
Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 101
Nomination material for Matthew G. Olsen
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 125
Additional Pre-Hearing Questions............................. 158
Post-Hearing Questions....................................... 193
OPEN HEARING: NOMINATIONS OF
STACEY A. DIXON
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;
THOMAS A. MONHEIM
TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; AND
MATTHEW G. OLSEN
TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:46 p.m., in
Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R.
Warner (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Feinstein, Wyden,
Heinrich, King, Bennet, Gillibrand, Burr, and Blunt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
VIRGINIA
Chairman Warner. I'd like to call this hearing to order and
welcome to our nominees: Dr. Stacey Dixon, Thomas Monheim, and
Matt Olsen. Congratulations on your nominations to be the
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or PPDNI;
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, IC IG; and
Matt, just the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security. You don't have an acronym yet. Welcome to your
families and those who are both here and watching from home.
Dr. Dixon, I had a brief moment to meet your parents,
Herbert and Phoebe Dixon. Mr. and Mrs. Dixon, I know you must
be very proud of your daughter's accomplished record.
Tom, I understand your family is watching remotely so want
to welcome your wife Cathy, your children, Zach and Kristen, as
well as your parents and sister.
Matt, it's great to see you again and welcome to your
family, who are also joining remotely, although I understand
your son from UVA is here. So that is some home points with me.
I may even vote for you now.
I also want to welcome back to this Committee, someone who
has been a good friend, the Former Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence--as well as positions at NGA, CIA, and a
host of other wonderful positions--Sue Gordon. Sue will be
making an introduction in a few minutes.
Thank you for your service to our country and as I
indicated, I always sing Sue Gordon's praises--with the one
exception that she did not finish security clearance reform.
Dr. Dixon that will now fall to your plate, unfortunately.
All three of you have been nominated to key positions in
the Intelligence Community. Obviously, when we face enormous
challenges, I think you are all incredibly accomplished and I
look forward to supporting all three.
Dr. Dixon, you've obviously been nominated to be the number
two at ODNI, and as I previously said to Director Haines, we
have to make sure that our Intelligence Community continues
that top imperative, which is always to speak truth to power
without fear of political retribution.
And I know in our meeting you have made that clear, and
it's something that is terribly important. And as we also
talked, as we discussed with your capable predecessors, not
just Sue Gordon, but Stephanie O'Sullivan, I will look to you
to provide leadership across a range of critical issues that
sometimes don't get appropriate attention. Security clearance
reform, we've already talked about. We talked about overhead
space architecture. Another area that we were trying, and we
made some progress, is IT reform and bringing some greater
efficiencies to the various IC's 18 different components. And
obviously, your previous roles at the ODNI, CIA, NRO, director
of IARPA, and Deputy Director of NGA will serve you well, and I
know you'll hit the ground running.
Mr. Monheim, as we saw over the last few years, the job of
IC IG is critical. Should you be confirmed, you will hold one
of the most vital roles in the Intelligence Community because
independent and impartial Inspectors General help to ensure
that there's appropriate oversight of the IC. We want to again
make sure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. We want to
make sure that the IC is conducting their activities within the
rule and spirit of the law. And I know that Senator Heinrich,
and if Senator Wyden joins us, this Committee strongly stands
behind, and my colleagues on the minority side as well,
protecting whistleblowers. So, all terribly important and again
you have brought enormous experience, General Counsel of NGA,
the Deputy General Counsel of the ODNI, and your other roles
throughout the IC and military.
Finally, Matt, it's always good to see you and it's good to
reconnect. I do think many of us probably have asked questions
in private which we may not ask in public.
You know you had a great career at Uber and a series of
other private sector firms. We're glad you're willing to come
back to the public sector as Assistant A.G. for the National
Security Division. You're going to be a key link between DOJ
and the Intelligence Community.
Your role will be not only to oversee counterterrorism,
including domestic violent extremists, but as we discussed
yesterday, one of the challenges of this Committee, FISA 702,
which will come back up in a couple of years--how we maintain
that tool but appropriately protect Americans' privacy. How
we're going to make sure we continue to monitor China's malign
activity, whether it's IP theft, traditional espionage, or
strategic investments in critical technology.
And I do think as we discussed yesterday, it's terribly
important--and I'll ask you about this--when we talk about
China, we make clear that our beef is with the Communist Party
of China and Xi Jinping's leadership. It is not about the
Chinese people in China or Chinese-Americans, Asian-Americans,
and I think some of that bias will obviously potentially fall
into the DVE category.
Again, you are very familiar to this Committee from your
previous service at DOJ, General Counsel of NSA, and as NCTC
Director.
So I commend all of you. The Vice Chairman will now make a
statement, followed by an introduction by Deputy Director
Gordon, and then the Members' questions will be for five
minutes in order of seniority.
I now recognize the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
for being here and willing to do this. You all have previous
service, you know what you're getting into, and we're glad
you're coming back--and we're grateful to you for your
willingness to do it.
You know, it strikes me--and I'll be very brief--one of the
things that we don't often say enough is it's hard for
democracies and open societies to conduct intelligence
activities. It's hard for them to conduct espionage, because we
are open societies and yet the nature of the work that we do in
order to protect our country requires secrecy and not because
you're trying to keep things from people, but because you don't
want our adversaries to learn about how we learn things and
what we know--for obvious reasons.
And all three of you play a very important role in that.
The American people have very little insight, for obvious
reasons--they have insight into almost every other agency of
government except those charged with our National Security and
Intelligence. And so, they trust two things. One, obviously the
oversight of Congress to play its proper role; and the other is
the people we put in many of the positions you're about to
fill. Dr. Dixon, you know to ensure that, as the Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, that as I guess the
deputy leader of the orchestra, that all the instruments are
playing the right music--that we're focused on the right
targets, that we're not wasting resources. That people have
confidence that we have the right target and the right focus
because they don't know: they have to trust you and the
oversight we conduct.
On the Inspector General side, obviously both our workforce
and our country needs to know that intelligence is not being
abused. And that the employees within these agencies are not
being mistreated. It hurts morale, it hurts our ability to
recruit people and keep them, but it also allows wrongdoing to
go on. And so, the independence of that office is critical for
that sort of trust.
And Mr. Olsen, at the National Security Division of the
Attorney General's office is twofold. The first obviously is
they have to know that we have a robust effort to keep our
country safe from threats that come from abroad and that exist
from within. But they also need to know that our intelligence
capabilities are not being weaponized against our own people.
We have had in our history, unfortunately, bipartisan examples
of abuses of our intelligence agencies in the past; that's when
they've been at their worst.
These are really important jobs. The world has changed a
little bit since some of you have been in government service.
But the basics of what it takes to maintain the confidence of
the American people and our system of intelligence gathering
and analysis, the bar remains as high and the environment is
more challenging. So, we welcome your willingness to serve once
again.
And we look forward to your testimony here today. Thank
you.
Chairman Warner. I'd now like to call on former Principal
Deputy Director Sue Gordon to make an introduction.
STATEMENT OF SUE GORDON, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director Gordon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much
for your too kind words earlier. Thank you to Vice Chairman
Rubio and to the distinguished Members of the Committee. It is
so wonderful to see you and it is an honor for me to be here
today to introduce my colleague and friend, Dr. Stacey Dixon,
as President Biden's nominee for the position of Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
I also note that you will be considering for confirmation
two other outstanding former colleagues of mine: Tom Monheim
and Matt Olsen. This is indeed a great day for America.
Now I remember my great honor sitting before you four years
and one day ago at my confirmation hearing for the same
position for which you're considering Stacey. I remember hoping
that I would be worthy--worthy of the President's nomination
and your confidence in me; worthy of the moment; worthy of the
position; worthy of the standard set by my predecessor; and
mostly worthy of the women and men who I would be graced to
lead.
I sit before you today knowing--knowing--that the woman I
get to introduce to you to is worthy of all those things.
Stacey is remarkable. Her biography from an education that
could only be better if she had managed to fit in a degree from
a really prestigious university, like Duke, to the range of
positions she has held, demonstrates excellence and experience
relevant for a dynamic, disproportionately technical world. And
as you've had a chance to meet with her, you have surely
noticed that she is special in the combination of intellect,
drive, thoughtfulness, humor, and humanity that she exudes
simply by entering a room.
And I can feel her family nodding their agreement with me
as I sit here.
But Stacey is far more than potential energy. Because I've
had the wonderful opportunity to know her, to be her boss on
several occasions, and to get to watch her perform in a
position I've held, I know the impact, her accomplishments, and
who she is as a leader. I can assure you she will both do
things and do things right. She has been responsible for
identifying and delivering technology that made a difference to
mission outcome. She has forged the type of partnerships both
within and without government that were the cornerstone of
lasting accomplishment. She's been the catalyst for disparate
groups with disparate agendas coming together for shared
quests.
She has had the range of leadership opportunities from
creation to transformation and from leading tens to tens of
thousands. And perhaps most importantly, she has been a quiet,
present beacon of hope for those who want to believe in their
leaders and who need someone to aspire to be.
Now you all know that these are remarkable times where the
challenges seem daunting, where the opportunities hang in the
air, and where new solutions must be found. We need an
Intelligence Community that is true to the unique role it plays
in national security, that is underpinned by sound tradecraft,
that is relevant in a digital connected world of new threats,
that honors the trust the American people place in us, and that
inspires its own women and men to accomplish great heights.
Stacey is designed for this. Her ability, wisdom, courage,
integrity and devotion will certainly carry the day. Now, I
need no crystal ball nor keen analytic abilities to tell you
that should she be confirmed, Stacey will be a great
substantive leader for all 18 agencies and organizations of the
IC, a fantastic partner for Director Avril Haines--another
remarkable leader and human, and that you will find no better
ally in performing your vital oversight functions. I have seen
her in action. I know the extent of the job she will be
stepping into, and it makes me smile to think of how lucky we
will all be to have her in place.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to introduce
this exceptional nominee for the exceptional position of
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Ms. Gordon, and again I speak
on behalf of all of our Members, thank you for your service and
it's great to see you again and please don't be a stranger.
I now ask for unanimous consent that letters of support
from the nominees received by the Committee will be entered
into the record.
With that, we will proceed to administering of the oath.
Will the witnesses please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses stand and raise their right hand.]
Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the
full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God?
[Chorus of I Do.]
Please be seated.
Before we move to your opening statements, I'll ask you
each to answer the five standard questions the Committee poses
to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a
simple yes or no for the record.
First, do you agree to appear before the Committee, here or
in other venues, when invited?
[Chorus of Yes.]
If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your
office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when
invited?
[Chorus of Yes.]
Do you agree to provide documents, or any other materials
requested by the Committee, in order for it to carry out its
oversight and legislative responsibilities?
[Chorus of Yes.]
Will you ensure that your office and your staff provide
such materials to the Committee when requested?
[Chorus of Yes.]
Chairman Warner. Matt, you are saying yes on this as well,
aren't you?
Mr. Olsen. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Okay.
Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest
extent possible all Members of this Committee of intelligence
activities and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and
Vice Chairman?
[Chorus of Yes.]
Chairman Warner. Again, we'll have the witnesses' testimony
and then we'll recognize Members by seniority up to five
minutes each. We're trying to do that at the time of the gavel.
Dr. Dixon, are you going to go first, please?
STATEMENT OF STACEY A. DIXON, NOMINEE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Dr. Dixon. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to
appear before you today as the nominee for Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence. I am grateful to President
Biden for the nomination and to Director Haines for her
recommendation. I would also like to thank Sue Gordon for her
kind words and support.
To borrow a geospatial term, Sue has been a North Star for
many of us in the Intelligence Community, and I appreciate her
leadership and her mentorship. There's also no way that I would
be here before you today without the encouragement and support
of my family and friends. I would like to recognize and thank
my parents--my father, a retired judge, and my mother, a
retired telecommunications vice president; my brother and
sister-in-law, an engineer and scientist respectively; my
Intelligence Community colleagues; and members of Delta Sigma
Theta Sorority. Family, friends, colleagues and classmates are
the village that lifts me up, grounds me, prays for me
regularly. And I am grateful for their constant presence and
support.
I'm a testament to the fact that encouragement matters. My
parents taught me not to limit myself or constrain what I
thought I could accomplish. My teachers had high expectations
of me and challenged me to excel; my bosses gave me
opportunities to learn, to take risks, and to grow; and my
peers, they give me regular feedback that inspires me to grow
as a leader.
To give you some insight into my journey, I joined the
Intelligence Community during the recession of 2002. What I
needed most at the time was a job. My post-doctoral fellowship
ended at a time when employment offers were scarce, even for a
Ph.D. in mechanical engineering. What I received is a nearly
20-year career full of opportunity, excitement, and service.
I learned early on that being an intelligence officer is
more than a job. I value the opportunity to serve my country,
support national security, and work with some of the most
talented women and men in government, industry, and academia.
My colleagues, the intelligence officers who serve our
country, embody the IC core values of excellence, courage,
respect, and integrity.
During my career, I've had the privilege of serving in both
the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. Within the
Legislative Branch, I worked for the U.S. House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as a
professional staff member, and then was budget director. There,
in partnership with this Committee, I learned the importance of
oversight, of authorization and appropriation, and of taking
and considering the Community as a whole rather than just
individual agencies.
Within the Executive Branch, I gained direct experience
working for four of the 18 elements of the Intelligence
Community: CIA, NRO, NGA, and ODNI. I learned how to turn
mission needs into technical specifications, and then validate
the results. I learned the importance of communicating at all
levels, especially during a crisis. I saw how research and
development solves hard technical challenges, and in my current
role as NGA's Deputy Director, I see daily that it is the
people and our partners that allow us to succeed in today's
mission while preparing for tomorrow's mission.
I am so proud to help lead the women and men of the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. I know there are
equally talented women and men in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as well as in all the other departments
and agencies in the IC.
The challenges and threats that Director Haines discussed
during the annual threat assessment hearing require more than
ever an integrated Community approach. The IC's mission is to
collect, process, analyze, exploit, and disseminate
information. To do that well as a Community, we will have to
embrace new approaches to enable our mission, while also
protecting privacy and civil liberties. The IC will have to
further harness accelerating technological change, from
wherever it originates, to keep pace and evolve.
There are increasingly sophisticated threats and the nature
of our conflicts continue to shift. We must identify those gaps
in our understanding and bring to bear all of the Intelligence
Community's expertise against the current threats, while also
being mindful of the emerging disruptive trends and posturing
the Nation to be competitive against them in the future.
During her confirmation hearing, Director Haines outlined
three priorities: strengthen the institution, align work and
resources to the major threats, and build partnerships. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Director Haines and
this Committee to implement those priorities. And to that end,
I will leverage my background and experience to help integrate
the IC's efforts and drive collaboration, innovation, agility,
and diversity and inclusion.
The PDDNI's role is more than a manager and more than a
leader: it is a bridge builder and a problem solver. There's
great strength in the intelligence disciplines coming together
to solve enduring problems and encounter the threats we face.
And if confirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve with
the women and men of the Intelligence Community--and the larger
national security enterprise, which includes academia,
industry, international partners, the American public, and
Congress.
I look forward to focusing our efforts on protecting and
preserving our Nation's prosperity, influence, and those
universal values articulated in our Constitution. I am
confident that my experiences have prepared me to assist the
Director in leading the Intelligence Community; and if
confirmed, I will gratefully continue serving my country.
It is truly an honor to appear before you today. I
appreciate your consideration of my nomination and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dixon follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Dixon. Mr. Monheim?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. MONHEIM, NOMINEE TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Mr. Monheim. Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, Members
of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to appear before
you today as you consider my nomination to be the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community. I feel privileged to
appear before the Senate, especially alongside my distinguished
co-panelists Dr. Stacey Dixon and Hon. Matt Olsen.
I'm honored to have been nominated by President Biden and
grateful for the endorsement of Director of National
Intelligence Haines. I also appreciate the various letters of
support submitted by career government officials and political
appointees from both parties. I believe this nonpartisan and
bipartisan support is especially important for apolitical
positions such as Inspectors General.
I want to thank the IC IG team and others who supported me
while I was the Acting Inspector General during the current and
former Administrations. I also want to thank the many
colleagues and friends who have helped me during this
nomination and confirmation process and throughout my career.
Most importantly, I want to express my profound gratitude
for the unconditional love and support of my family, including
my wife Cathy, my daughter Kristin, my son Zachary, my father
Tom, my mother Cathy, and my sister Melissa.
I hope my qualifications are evident from my performance in
this position for more than a year, my answers to prehearing
questions, and the letters of support. In the interest of time,
I will not repeat that information here. I would, however, like
to briefly highlight three key themes I believe will give you a
better sense of who I am as a person and a professional.
Those are values, people, and partnerships.
The first and foundational theme is values. My parents
taught me by their words and their actions the importance of
treating everyone with respect, working hard, choosing right
over wrong, being accountable, having integrity, and selflessly
serving others. After following in my father's footsteps and
joining the Air Force, I spent 27 years striving to model the
Air Force core values of integrity first, service before self,
and excellence in all we do. During my civilian service, I've
associated myself with organizations whose values align with my
own. The IC IG core values of integrity, independence,
transparency, accountability, and diversity resonate with me,
inspire me, and if confirmed, will continue to guide me and the
IC IG team.
The second key theme is people. People are an
organization's greatest asset and leaders must take good care
of the people we're entrusted to lead so that together we can
better accomplish the mission. My highest priority during the
pandemic was to protect the health and safety of the IC IG team
while accomplishing our mission as soon as we reasonably and
responsibly could do so. The team was resilient and I'm proud
of how well they responded to the challenges we faced.
Another top leadership priority was to recruit, develop,
and retain a premier workforce. I'm pleased we made progress in
several areas despite the pandemic, and I believe IC IG is on a
positive trajectory. Throughout my career, I've been willing to
tell the people I lead and the people we served what I believe
they needed to hear and not just what they wanted to hear.
The third key theme is partnerships. I have long believed
that working closely and collaboratively with others can
enhance efficiency and effectiveness. And I've frequently done
so with interagency, intergovernmental, international, and
other partners to achieve better results and promote the
greater good. Inspectors General and Congressional Oversight
Committees have a particularly important partnership. Congress
and IGs have a shared responsibility to help promote good
government and be the eyes and ears of the American people,
because full transparency is not possible given the often-
secret nature of the Intelligence Community's work.
During my time as Acting Inspector General, I demonstrated
my understanding of the importance of congressional oversight
by actively engaging with congressional committees on multiple
occasions on a range of important topics. I have close,
collaborative, and productive partnerships with other members
of the IC IG Forum, the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency, the Department of Justice, the
Government Accountability Office, and Five Eyes intelligence
oversight counterparts. If confirmed, I look forward to further
fostering and strengthening all these partnerships.
In sum, I'm a values-based, people-focused, collaborative
partner, and dedicated patriot. I first solemnly swore the
Constitutional oath when I was commissioned as an Air Force
officer more than 30 years ago. And I have renewed that oath
many times during my military and civilian career spanning
seven different Presidents.
If privileged to be confirmed as the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community, I would proudly take that oath
again and do my level best to ensure that Congress and the
American people have the trust and confidence that their
Intelligence Community operates efficiently, effectively, and
lawfully in service to our great Nation.
Thank you again for your consideration and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Monheim follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Olsen?
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Olsen. Thank you, Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio,
Members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you
today as the nominee to be the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security. I'm grateful to the President for his
confidence in nominating me to this important position. I'm
joined today by Members of my family: my son Nate, my sisters
Jennifer and Susan, and my three nephews Sam, Charlie, and
Henry.
I'd also like to just take a moment to remember my parents,
Van and Myrna. I was born in North Dakota. My father and my
family, we moved here when I was a young boy so that my dad
could take a job with a Member of Congress from North Dakota.
My mom was a school nurse. In my family, public service was
always the highest ideal.
Ten years ago, just about to the day, I sat before this
Committee as the nominee to be the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center. Today, as we approach the twentieth
anniversary of 9/11, the work of protecting the Nation remains
as demanding and as urgent as ever. We now face a dynamic
landscape of threats and adversaries that poses new challenges
and complexities combating domestic and international
terrorism, countering malicious cyber-activity by foreign
adversaries, including China and Russia, and ensuring the
confidence of the American people in the use of our
intelligence tools.
Congress created the National Security Division to take on
these challenges, to lead the Justice Department's highest
priority protecting our national security. I believe that my
experience has prepared me for this responsibility, and if
confirmed, I look forward to leading the National Security
Division's extraordinary workforce, its career public servants.
They are dedicated to securing our Nation with fidelity to our
founding values.
I began my career almost 30 years ago at the Justice
Department in the Civil Rights Division as a trial attorney. I
then served for about a decade as a Federal prosecutor here in
Washington, DC. The terrorist attacks on September 11th changed
the course of my career. I became a special counsel to Director
Mueller at the FBI and helped support the transformation of the
FBI. In 2006, I returned to main Justice at the beginning of
the National Security Division as the Senior Deputy Assistant
Attorney General. My job was to oversee the intelligence
activities of the division and in part I was responsible for
implementing the landmark changes that Congress passed to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I served as the General
Counsel of the National Security Agency. And then from 2011 to
2014, I was the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center. And since leaving government, then I have served in the
private sector working on cybersecurity issues.
I know from all of this experience that the National
Security Division works on a number of fronts to help protect
the Nation. I'll touch on a few.
First, terrorism. We know that the threat of terrorism from
domestic violent extremists is on the rise. Combating this
threat, domestic terrorism threat, as well as international
terrorist threat is a top priority for the Department of
Justice. And if confirmed, I will remain vigilant against all
terrorism threats regardless of ideology.
Next, the National Security Division plays a crucial role
in safeguarding our critical infrastructure and data networks
against cyberattacks from our adversaries, especially nation-
states like China and Russia. And if confirmed, I will work
alongside my partners in government as well as with the private
sector to deter, disrupt, and prosecute those responsible for
these types of attacks.
The Division has also played an important responsibility in
preserving our national security tools. It is imperative that
the government maintain the trust of the Congress, the FISA
court, and the American people in the integrity of how these
tools are used, particularly the FISA process. And if
confirmed, I will work to ensure that our intelligence
activities are carried out on behalf of the American public and
that they are carried out in a manner that's consistent with
our Constitution, our laws, and our values.
Chairman, this Committee plays a critical role in
intelligence oversight, in preserving the trust of the American
people, and in advancing the security of our Nation. If
confirmed, I pledge to be a true partner to Congress and to
this Committee.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Well, thank you all and for planning
purposes, any Members of the Committee who wish to submit
questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by
5 p.m. this Thursday, July 23.
Let me also note, I think all three of the witnesses are
extraordinarily qualified and I look forward to supporting
them.
I'm going to ask a brief line of questions and then I will
move to Vice Chair Rubio and he will take over the hearing. I
apologize to the nominees and their families. There is some of
the stuff that's popping in the news that requires my attention
in about 20 minutes.
Dr. Dixon, you know we've raised this. Given that the DNI
is the government security executive agent, how do you see your
role in leading the trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, ensuring
that transformative security clearance reform remains a top
priority for the IC and Administration?
We discussed this, but I want to get you on the record.
Dr. Dixon. Thank you for that question. Certainly, how we
bring the new employees into the Community is extremely
important, making sure that there is not a long delay before we
can bring in this new talent, because we know they have many
other opportunities that they're also considering. We have seen
some progress in reducing the backlogs for some of the returned
background investigations for our current employees. We've also
seen decreases in the timelines for new employees coming in. If
I'm confirmed, I certainly look forward to further reducing the
timelines, but also committing to the larger government-wide
efforts that you mentioned: Trusted Workforce 2.0. We've seen
some great examples of being able to do continuous vetting. So,
letting the technology help us move our investigations more
quickly and I look forward to continuing to further that into
the next levels of maturing those particular programs.
Chairman Warner. Well the next level--and this is something
that we were hoping to get done--is reciprocity. We still have
enormous challenges where somebody goes through a security
clearance process in one part of the IC; that clearance is not
honored by another part. Matter of fact, we saw even within DHS
where people couldn't move from one project inside DHS to
another project, sometimes with up to a 100-day delay.
It's inefficient for the workforce, it costs more money for
the taxpayer, and we are not attracting and maintaining that
best and brightest diverse workforce if young people have to
wait a year or two before they get clearance. So, I look
forward to working with you on that.
Mr. Monheim. Listen, again a topic we touched on, we've got
to make sure that--we discussed this in our private session--
but please explain how you'd come to Congress to inform us of
an important issue in your purview? And how do you see your
obligations to keep the Congress and specifically SSCI
currently informed?
Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time
we were able to spend in your office. And as I indicated there,
I do believe that keeping Congress and the DNI fully and
currently informed are among my most important legal
responsibilities. And I take those very seriously.
I think in my year as the Acting Inspector General, I
demonstrated not only a commitment to provide this Committee
with everything required to do so by law, but exercising my
discretion to provide information about problems, deficiencies,
corrective actions beyond what was legally required because I
thought it was important that you know that information in
order to do your important oversight role. And if confirmed, I
commit to take that same approach, and as I indicated, be a
trusted partner to ensure that you have the trust and
confidence, and the American people have the trust and
confidence, that the IG is doing this important job.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Sir.
Mr. Olsen, two quick questions for you. One, we touched on
briefly yesterday. Every Senator on this dais and most of the
Members of this Committee--almost everyone--with the exception,
I think, of one or two--are working together in a broad
bipartisan way and introducing the legislation today that would
have some level of mandatory incident reporting of cyber-
incidents to some public-private panel, with appropriate
immunity protections and confidentiality protections for those
entities that report.
Do you believe that this type of legislation would be
useful as we try to deal with the enormous threat that cyber
poses, that suddenly the American public, I think, has come to
realize?
Mr. Olsen. Chairman, I certainly have seen firsthand the
challenge that we face in cyber, both from my work at the
National Security Agency and the Department of Justice now 10
years ago, when the threat was not as great as it is today. And
in the private sector, I've seen firsthand, in particular, the
threat that we face from the most sophisticated adversaries,
which are nation-states, particularly China and Russia, and you
can see this in the news on a daily basis.
I don't know the precise terms of the legislation that is
being proposed. I certainly think that whatever we can do to
work together to improve the ecosystem that companies face and
that the government faces--because really, we're all in this
together, we need to take steps to improve the ecosystem, and I
do believe that there's an opportunity for the public sector
and the private sector to work together--and potentially with
new laws and new authorities--to improve our ability to defend
ourselves.
Chairman Warner. I appreciate that. We look forward to
working with you. I thank Senator Rubio and all the Members of
the Committee for putting together what I think is a very, very
good first product.
And finally, I just want to come back to the topic I raised
in our meeting yesterday and in my opening comments. I think
the threat of our time is China: it poses a strategic threat
and economic threat, a technology threat. But I think it's
really important as we and China vie in so many ways that we
make clear that our beef is with the Communist Party of China
and their policies, not with the Chinese people. And that is
not by any means a license for the unfortunate kind of anti-
Chinese-American, anti-Asian-American rhetoric that we see too
often.
We've heard reports in the past, frankly, not even under
the Trump Administration, under the Obama Administration, where
there was a failure of the Justice Department to even meet with
the Chinese-American community on a regular basis. And this
needs to be rectified. These American citizens need to have
their rights protected, but they need to be part of this. They
realize the challenges in a more visceral way many times and we
need to make sure that we know who the opponent is, which is
the Communist Party of China; and we talked about that. I'd
like you to speak to that for a few seconds.
Mr. Olsen. Absolutely, and thank you for the opportunity to
address that issue and to meet with you yesterday. No doubt
about it, China presents the greatest strategic threat to the
United States of any country in the world, from economic
espionage to theft of trade secrets, human rights violations,
competition, and technology. It is the case, and I learned this
when I was at the National Counterterrorism Center, that we
need to speak precisely and carefully when we talk about the
nature of that threat. And I agree completely with you that
that threat emanates from the Chinese government, from the
Chinese Communist Party and its leadership, not from the
Chinese people, not certainly from Chinese-Americans.
And we need to be very careful when we talk about this
threat because we all have been horrified to see the rise of
anti-Asian-American violence. I began my career in the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department. I care deeply about
discrimination and fairness. I think we just need to be very
careful in how we talk about this threat.
So, we have our eyes on where that threat emanates from and
that's the Chinese government.
Chairman Warner. Thank you all very much. Again, appreciate
that Vice Chairman Rubio, continuing to chair that hearing.
Senator Rubio.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
Let me just start, Mr. Olsen, by giving you an opportunity
to address something that came up. I'm sure you're aware during
the questionnaire, the initial questionnaire, you said you had
never represented in any capacity, a foreign government and you
also answered no when asked if you'd ever received any
compensation from or had been involved in any financial or
business transactions with a foreign government, or any entity
controlled by foreign government.
Then in additional prehearing questions that asked
specifically about consulting work, you noted that you were a
part-time consultant for two firms, Fairfax National Security
Solutions and Booz Allen Hamilton, and worked on matters
involving advice for or to the Saudi Arabian government. So I
just want to give you an opportunity to address why you
answered about your work for Saudi Arabia through these
consulting firms in the follow-up prehearing questions but did
not address in the initial questionnaire. I want to give you an
opportunity to address it.
Mr. Olsen. I appreciate that very much Vice Chairman. I
interpreted the questions about representing foreign
governments, I suppose as a lawyer, strictly. Did I represent
those governments? The answer to that is no.
I did disclose in the other form that I did a limited
amount of work for two firms, Booz Allen and Fairfax National
Security Solutions, that was in support of two initiatives
involving the Saudi government. One was their interest in
building a national counterterrorism center of their own and
the other was defensive cyber protections. So, if I
misunderstood, I apologize. My goal was to answer the question
as directly as possible.
Vice Chairman Rubio. The nature of your work was advice.
You provided them advice and insight as to how to set up the
counterterrorism center and the defensive cyber?
Mr. Olsen. Yes.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Through these agents, through these
entities?
Mr. Olsen. Through Booz Allen Hamilton and Fairfax National
Security Solutions. It was very limited.
Vice Chairman Rubio. I think that the follow-up question
that I think bears asking is have you provided any other advice
like that to any other foreign governments?
Mr. Olsen. No.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Mr. Monheim, let me ask you how you
would handle--I think I brought this up when we spoke--an
instance in which your legal analysis and conclusion as the IC
IG would differ from the CIA's Inspector General or from the
ODNI's legal counsel. The Committee confronted that at one
point either last year or late the year before.
How would you handle those instances in which your legal
analysis and conclusion are different from what the IG at the
Agency or at CIA or the legal counsel at the ODNI?
Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Vice Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to talk to you yesterday and I appreciate this
question on this important matter. I think it raises very good
questions of the respective roles and responsibilities and
authorities of a variety of senior leaders in the Agency and
the Community. I think that the overall shared objective of all
of those positions is to ensure that Congress is fully and
currently informed, and I'm confident that you would get the
information that you needed to do your job.
I think part of the independence that is built into the
Inspector General system is that I have my own counsel to the
Inspector General that does not go through the Office of
General Counsel. So, in terms of being provided legal advice, I
have my own counsel to have that independent legal advice.
I will say in my time as Acting IG, I worked very closely
and collaboratively with the ODNI Office of General Counsel and
never had an issue where we disagreed such that it mattered in
terms of the DNI's performance of their duties or Congress. But
if that did arise, and if confirmed, in the future if that
arose, I would work closely and collaboratively to try to
address those issues. But at the end of the day, I think I have
an independent duty to ensure Congress is fully and currently
informed, and I would commit to do that.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Dr. Dixon, finally. With the
exception--putting aside the FBI for a moment and its law
enforcement role and its domestic obligations--and this is not
a trick question. It's more of something that's really
important and it's important for people as part of the whole
confidence building in our Intelligence Community. But would
you agree that there has to be a foreign threat nexus for our
intelligence agencies to collect and analyze on the activities
of a U.S. person, separate from a law enforcement function,
which is looking at crimes that someone may or may not be
committing. But when it comes to the intelligence agencies of
the U.S. Government, or even the intelligence roles of
individual agencies, for us to unleash the power of the
Intelligence Community to be used to collect and analyze on
what an American is doing--a U.S. citizen, U.S. person is
doing, do you agree that there has to be a foreign threat
nexus?
Dr. Dixon. Vice Chairman Rubio, yes. I do agree that there
has to be a foreign nexus.
Vice Chairman Rubio. OK, thank you. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
This Committee has been working to push the IC to get to
the bottom of the traumatic brain injuries known as Havana
Syndrome, which apparently have been sustained by some State
Department and Intelligence Community personnel around the
world. And I'm concerned that these attacks appear to be
increasing.
Just this morning, NBC reported, and I quote, that as many
as 200 Americans have come forward to describe possible
symptoms of directed-energy attacks. Additionally, ``The New
Yorker'' also reported last week that roughly two dozen
possible new cases have been reported in Vienna. So, my
question--and perhaps I could start with Dr. Dixon--is what
would you plan to do about this, and what have you found thus
far?
Dr. Dixon. Senator Feinstein, thank you for that question
and I really appreciate this Committee's leadership on this
issue. The impact to the employees in the Intelligence
Community makes this the number one priority for the agencies.
What we are doing now is literally coming together, both the
State Department, the Department of Defense and the
Intelligence Community to one, make sure that we are taking
care of individuals who are afflicted by whatever it is that's
causing this. Second, that we're also looking to figure out
where it's happening, why it's happening, and who is
responsible for it so that we can bring to bear all of the
capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect on it so
that we can actually better answer the question. Because right
now, directed-energy is a theory. We do not know what's causing
this.
Senator Feinstein. Well, let me ask one quick follow-up.
Are the people that have come to you from one area or are they
from a mix of areas, and if so, what are the areas?
Dr. Dixon. Ma'am, I can't say the areas beyond what's
already been reported. So right now, you know Cuba of course,
as well as Vienna that you mentioned in the news report.
Senator Feinstein. How many people have come to you or have
come to the Agency?
Dr. Dixon. I can only speak on behalf of NGA, and we're
actually still holding that. That is sensitive information with
respect to my own workforce.
I cannot speak to how many have come forward for the entire
Community.
Senator Feinstein. You are saying that that information is
classified?
Dr. Dixon. I'm saying at this point in time, because we are
still going through the process of identifying whether
individuals actually have been debriefed and we've gotten the
information from them, it's not complete.
Senator Feinstein. Let me ask another question. Is what is
being reported in the press correct and sustained by what
you're finding?
Dr. Dixon. I can't speak specifically about the numbers
that the press was reporting, but the symptoms that the press
is reporting are correct. The locations that they've released,
those two locations they've mentioned, are correct as well.
Senator Feinstein. Can you tell us how many cases?
Dr. Dixon. Ma'am, I cannot at this point in time, but if
I'm confirmed, and I have access to all of the information
across the Community, I certainly would have a better
understanding and be able to bring that back to the Committee.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, this is the second time I've mentioned it and
it really bothers me that something like this is going on. I
would just like to ask that the Committee get involved and seek
some information. I understand it will be classified, but I
think it's very important and I think we should know if
something serious is going on.
Vice Chairman Rubio. I agree. I'm going to scream at Mark
Warner about it tonight. I agree 100 percent, you know. That's
an issue that I think everyone on this Committee has expressed
a deep interest in this.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sue Gordon. Good to
see you.
Welcome to our three nominees. I'm not sure I can remember
a panel of nominees more qualified for the jobs that they've
been nominated for than what I see before us today. And I echo
the Chairman's comments. I hope we will expeditiously go
through the confirmation process.
Having said that, I've got a question for each one of you.
Stacey, my question for you is how do you plan to assess
whether or not the ODNI itself has in fact gotten too large to
function effectively current company excepted?
Tom, how do you plan to recruit and retain the best talent
you can to ensure your Office can fulfill its vital mission to
keep the IC free from waste, fraud, and abuse, given that
you're not going to be the most popular guy in the
organization?
And Matt, do you have a plan to work with Director Wray to
address the compliance issues FBI has had with their vital
authorities?
I'll start with Stacey.
Dr. Dixon. Senator Burr, thank you very much. I enjoyed our
conversation on this very topic. I am a firm believer that the
ODNI plays a huge role in helping to bring the Community
together; that it also has a number of duties that have been
assigned to it through legislation. I don't currently believe
that that I have information to suggest that it is too large.
I believe that we will take a look at it, and if I'm
confirmed, I would certainly be interested in looking from the
inside--and I know that Director Haines has been looking at the
organization--but to make sure that we are resourced to
actually do all the things Congress is expecting us to do. It's
something that we have to continue to look at because the
situations change, the threats change, and the organization has
to change. And I look forward to being part of the review of
what size it needs to be to be able to accomplish those things
that you're expecting us to be able to accomplish.
Senator Burr. Thank you.
Tom?
Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator, and I appreciate the time
we had in your office to discuss a variety of matters,
including the importance of getting talent in an office to help
ensure we can perform our vital functions.
To the point about popularity, I certainly understand that
popularity is not a good metric for success for an Inspector
General. I would also note that was also true during my time as
a lawyer and as a leader generally. Fortunately, I think that
the Intelligence Community broadly, and the Inspector General
community, currently has and will continue to attract people
who are drawn to the mission. The mission matters. It's a great
team of people. We have the opportunity to strengthen the
Intelligence Community, and in turn, strengthen the Nation. And
so, for our part, you know, we go and recruit. We have people
who model the type of service that one could be drawn to, and
for the variety of certain matter expertise and a variety of
experiences to come.
And although we've had some staffing challenges at points,
as I mentioned, I believe IC IG is on a positive trajectory and
especially post pandemic. I think we will continue to be able
to aggressively address some of those staffing challenges and
continue to retain and develop and recruit a premier workforce
to ensure our job gets done.
Senator Burr. Thank you.
Matt?
Mr. Olsen. Senator, thanks for that question.
Restoring and maintaining trust in the FISA process is an
absolutely critical priority for me. And I know it is for the
Department of Justice, the National Security Division, the
Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General, as well as
the leadership of the FBI.
I was very concerned by the information in the Inspector
General's report on the FISA process, identifying a number of
critical errors. I was at the National Security Division at its
founding in 2006 and the oversight of the FISA process was one
of the reasons the National Security Division was formed. And I
know that there are a number of committed, dedicated lawyers at
the Justice Department, as well as at the FBI, who've already
started to work to implement the changes that flow from the
IG's report.
So, my plan in response to your question would be to meet
with Director Wray, with the general counsel of the FBI, my
colleagues at the Justice Department, if I'm confirmed, and to
ensure that we continue on the path to maintaining and
restoring the confidence that's necessary in the integrity of
that process.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Matt.
Based on my back-of-the-envelope calculation, I think
between the three of you collectively there's been service in
90 percent of the IC just from the three of you and that's
great to have that experience and knowledge concentrated here.
Stacey, you've attended more universities in America than
most people. Let me assure you, not having Duke on your list is
not a disqualifier, but we would like to see a North Carolina
school in there at some point. But I think on your bucket list,
since you didn't have one, I'll add that just one degree from a
school in North Carolina would be perfect. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Moving on from our IC continuing
education requirements. Dr. Dixon, you spent the last eight
years at NGA, culminating in your service as Deputy Director.
What did you learn from your time at NGA that you intend to
take with you to ODNI?
Dr. Dixon. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I learned about the importance of not only having great
people with the talents that are needed to move us forward, but
really providing that supportive environment and being leaders
that they can trust and look up to. It's really important for
them to understand their mission and to have the resources
necessary to get that mission done.
It's also important for them to reach across, outside of
their agency, and work with the other agencies and other
elements of the Intelligence Community. And all of that, I
would bring if I'm confirmed to this next position. I think the
strength really is in having each of us come forward with those
particular authorities and expertise to try to solve those
really hard problems that we've attempted to solve on our own,
but we really are unable to do so.
So, I look forward to strengthening the support of all the
people across the entire Intelligence Community and making sure
that we're working together to solve those really hard
problems.
Senator Heinrich. Dr. Dixon, you wrote that the IC needs to
be more flexible and agile to ensure state-of-the-art
breakthroughs are actually fielded expeditiously, and that that
may require different approaches, especially to acquisition and
contracting.
Talk to me a little bit about what specifically you may
have in mind, and then try to touch on the balance between
buying things and building things that exist within the IC.
Dr. Dixon. Certainly, Sir, two things. One is the ability
to move things from say, research and development or from
acquisition straight into operations. That has been something
that's challenged many in the Community. Having worked in R&D,
I see it acutely. There are things that we know are ready to go
out there, but there's extra testing and then there's the
budget cycle, which isn't always aligned. So, making sure that
we can align the budgets so that we can actually have less time
between something being proven and something actually being put
in operations.
With respect to building and buying--it really is. So,
things are built within the Intelligence Community, within the
agencies, but those also do rely on having great contractors on
staff that are helping us do that.
I think increasingly because there are so many great small,
and even large companies, out there willing to provide
capabilities to help us solve our mission, to satisfy our
mission, we need to be able to bring them in more quickly. Some
of them are not as used to working with large government
agencies and there's a way to work with government agencies.
So, figuring out how to reduce some of the bureaucracy so some
of the smaller companies who are on that sort of faster cycle
who, really, if they don't get that contract, they're probably
going to go away in a year. Figuring out how to decrease the
timeline so that we can work with them more successfully.
Senator Heinrich. Do you see cultural challenges to moving
some of those things from R&D--that things become fieldable--
but then you have to explain to people that they are ready for
prime time and getting through that time cycle as well and get
it out to the people who need it the most.
Dr. Dixon. What I've seen work really well is being able to
bring the partners, the future partners, in from the
beginning--letting them know what you're trying to develop and
deliver and having them see along the way as you press past
those hurdles, as you pass those tests. That way, they also
know when you're attempting to have it complete, and hopefully
they can then budget that in. So, there are ways to do it
better than I think we've done it historically. But those
partnerships between the end user and the developers need to be
really, really strong from the beginning of a project.
Senator Heinrich. Kind of building in the buy-in from the
start.
Dr. Dixon. Exactly.
Mr. Monheim, you became Acting IC IG in April 2020, and you
became acting under relatively difficult circumstances after
your predecessor, Michael Atkinson, was unceremoniously fired
for doing his job to protect a key whistleblower and to get
information to Congress.
What's your general view of the IC IG's role with regard to
whistleblowers? And are there any steps that you would take
should you be confirmed to ensure that IC employees are
protected from reprisal for disclosing information to the IC
IG?
Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator. With respect to the
removal of my predecessor, I was not involved in that other
than to simply answer the call to serve my country as I've done
many times before.
With respect to whistleblower programs, I completely agree
with and appreciate the support of this Committee about the
importance of the whistleblower program that goes back, of
course, to the Continental Congress passing a law that it's the
duty of all people in public service to report allegations of
wrongdoing.
For my part, during the time I was the Acting Inspector
General, during that year I issued a message of support to
reiterate my commitment to protecting whistleblowers and their
rights and the importance of that program. I asked Director of
National Intelligence Haines when she was confirmed to issue a
similar report and she did very soon in her tenure. I issued an
instruction about external review panels to update and codify
the processes by which IGs would review allegations of reprisal
against whistleblowers. We submitted a report to this Committee
to talk about possible efforts and made six recommendations to
harmonize some of the laws and policies to further strengthen
the program. I appreciate this Committee's staff working with
the IC IG team to consider specific proposals. And I
established an intake action committee to ensure that our
hotline program analysts are working closely with our counsel
and our investigators to give each matter the serious attention
it deserves. I dedicated additional resources to the program
and, if confirmed, I would do everything that I can do to
continue the positive trajectory that I believe that important
program is on.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman, and again let me join
everybody else in welcoming this panel. You are so well-
prepared. I look forward to not just what happens after today,
but the relationship we have working with you after today.
Dr. Dixon, one of the challenges the Intelligence Community
faces is making all the investments we have out there work:
artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing,
cyber. If confirmed, what's your vision of how we maximize the
moment we're in and make those things work together in the most
effective way?
Dr. Dixon. Thank you, Senator Blunt. And you've named many,
many of the challenges that we are all in the Community facing
and focusing on. I think one of the things that I've seen work
well within the Community is when we talk about and we expose
to each other's agencies, the types of things we're working on.
We can come up with a shared plan for how to go forward
together. That is more efficient and more effective, I think,
than each individual agency going forward by itself. So, I look
forward to harnessing the same experiences that I've had when I
was in research and development organizations and we were
trying to do that but doing that on a global scale. So, it's
both R&D as well as operational systems.
We need better insight into how each other is approaching
the hard challenges that, I think, we will need to come
together to face. And I look forward to, if I'm confirmed,
helping the Community come together when those discussions.
Senator Blunt. Well, I think we're not going to have less
information to deal with all the time. We're going to have more
information to deal with and how we get that narrowed down to
where a set of human eyes ought to get on it is going to be
really important, and I think you're well prepared for that.
Mr. Olsen, you've had great private sector experience,
great experience in counterterrorism as well. From your
counterterrorism experience, can you comment on the value of
things like FISA and the danger of what happens if we don't
treat the FISA process in the right way?
Mr. Olsen. Yes, Senator.
FISA, along with other intelligence tools, but in
particular FISA, has proven to be an indispensable tool for the
collection of foreign intelligence in the counterterrorism
context. Going back to my experience at the FBI and then at the
Department of Justice over 10 years ago, FISA led to a number
of operational successes for the government. And it is
imperative that we maintain that tool. The Inspector General's
report recently that disclosed a number of failings on the part
of the Justice Department, including the FBI, in preserving the
integrity of that process to ensure that the applications were
complete and accurate is a significant concern.
One, it wasn't consistent with the expectations of the FISA
court, wasn't consistent with the expectations of this
Committee and Congress, and it certainly wasn't consistent with
the expectations and trust that the American people have placed
in the FBI and the Justice Department. So, it would be a
priority for me, if confirmed, to work with the FBI and to
ensure that the steps that I understand are currently underway
to improve that process are carried through. And to see if
there are other steps that we need to take in working with this
Committee to ensure that that process is one that the American
people can have full confidence in.
Senator Blunt. Well, I think if we see any inconsistency
there, as you pointed out, that puts the whole program at great
risk and it's the kind of thing if we do it right, has great
value. And if we do it wrong, we could easily, easily lose it.
Mr. Monheim, we had a chance yesterday to talk a little bit
about whistleblowers and the role they play in the government.
Give me an idea of how the IG best relates to whistleblowers
and what the proper role for the IG is in insisting that the
right processes be followed there.
Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator and I appreciated the time
you took yesterday to discuss this and other matters with me.
With respect to the Inspector General's role in the current
legal framework that Congress provided is that an Intelligence
Community employee can come to the Inspector General to provide
evidence of wrongdoing and other concerns. And there's a
structure in place by which we determine a number of things. Is
it credible? Is it urgent? Does the whistleblower intend to
communicate this information to Congress? And such things. And
then we have specific responsibilities to forward that
information to the Director of National Intelligence, and to
the Congress in certain circumstances. And we take that program
very seriously. We dedicate a number of resources to it. And as
I indicated in a prior answer, I remain committed to that
program.
With respect to the roles and responsibilities of others
involved, the Office of General Counsel at ODNI has a role, the
Director of National Intelligence has a role. But again, for
the Inspector General's part, we are committed to do that
again, not just for what is legally required, but as was the
case when I was the Acting Inspector General, I exercised my
discretion to forward some complaints even if I did not find
them credible and to state an urgent concern as legally
required, simply because I thought it would be important for
this Committee to have the benefit of information and to do
your important job
Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Chairman Rubio. And first of all,
it's great to see Ms. Sue Gordon. Sue Gordon always gives
public service a good name and it is just very good to see you,
Ms. Gordon.
My first question for our nominees is: last year the
Committee directed the IC to report on what can be done to
protect our country from commercial spyware, the kind of threat
that is now being reported at the top of the news across the
Nation.
So, my question to you, Ms. Dixon and Mr. Olsen, is how
seriously do you take this threat and what should the
Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice be doing
about it?
Let me start with you, Mr. Olsen, and then you, Ms. Dixon.
Mr. Olsen. Senator, I believe I share your concern from the
headlines of the past couple of days on this issue. One initial
thought is to emphasize the point that when it comes to the
United States and its collection activities, the Intelligence
Community must adhere to the Constitution, the laws, the
regulations, the court orders that apply to those activities
regardless of the tools that may be available.
So that is an imperative that would be partly my
responsibility to enforce, if I'm confirmed as the head of the
National Security Division. I think the threat that you
mentioned from these tools goes outside of this country to
where the concern is that other countries can use these tools
in a way that would have human rights concerns or violations.
And that's an area where I think we have work to do, myself at
the Justice Department along with the Intelligence Community
and this Committee.
Senator Wyden. Ms. Dixon.
Dr. Dixon. Thank you, Senator Wyden, and I also share your
concern.
I think, in addition to what Mr. Olsen said, I think it's a
good reminder of the larger cybersecurity challenge that we
face, right? Spyware, malware. These are all things that can
infiltrate not only our cell phones, but computer networks more
broadly. We need to have a better whole of government approach
to dealing with things like this. I think the challenge that we
face, of course, is that we've got industry, we have
government, we have academia, we have all sorts of different
rules and regulations that are keeping us from having the
conversations that--well not necessarily rules and regulations.
We're not having all the conversations that we need to be
having. I would like to see us be more forthcoming in terms of
who is experiencing attacks from other places and how we can
better provide and secure their networks as well as the cell
phones that we have.
Senator Wyden. We're going to have more conversations about
it, but I'll just let you all know that I think there's got to
be some accountability for spies for hire and that is going to
be a central part of this discussion.
Let me go now to the whistleblower issue. I want to make
sure that our nominees agree that the law is clear: that a
whistleblower complaint that an Inspector General determines is
an urgent concern has to be submitted to the Congress.
And this is a yes or no for our three nominees.
Mr. Olsen?
Mr. Olsen. Yes.
Senator Wyden. Ms. Dixon?
Dr. Dixon. Yes.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Monheim?
Mr. Monheim. Yes.
Senator Wyden. Good. With respect to the previous
Administration, we were finally able to extract from them some
commitments about civil liberties and transparency. And I want
to make sure that there's no backsliding.
Last November, Director Ratcliffe informed me that the IC
considered Internet searches to be content, meaning that they
would not collect them under the warrantless authorities of the
Patriot Act.
Do you agree with that, Mr. Olsen?
Mr. Olsen. Senator, I will repeat an answer I gave earlier,
which is to say that it is imperative that all of these
activities take place consistent with the Constitution and
statutes. The precise letter of Director Ratcliffe, I'm not
familiar with the context of that statement. Certainly, I
appreciate that the collection of search terms or browser
history raises serious privacy concerns. And I would certainly
look to understand better how that information may be collected
under various authorities, if I'm confirmed.
Senator Wyden. I would like a written answer to that one,
Mr. Olsen, because, look, through no fault of their own because
of the virus, millions of Americans were home. And Senator
Daines and I, on a bipartisan basis, tried to get protection
for browser content. We failed just because a couple of
Senators were absent.
So, I would like a written response to that question. All
right, can you get that to us quickly?
Mr. Olsen. Yes.
Senator Wyden. Okay. The previous Administration also
stated that in light of the Supreme Court's ``Carpenter'' case,
it would not collect cell site or GPS information under Section
215 of the Patriot Act, which didn't require a warrant.
Mr. Olsen, if you're confirmed, and Section 215 were to be
reauthorized, would you continue this position?
Mr. Olsen. Senator, I am not in government now. I need to
understand how ``Carpenter'' is being interpreted. It's
certainly a significant decision on the Fourth Amendment in the
context of the collection of digital information. It applies to
cell site location information, the breadth of that decision,
how it's being interpreted--I know that prosecutors and
investigators need guidance on that question. If I'm confirmed,
I'll have the opportunity to engage in understanding how it's
being interpreted and to support the guidance that's given to
folks in the field.
Senator Wyden. I'm over my time and Chairman Rubio is being
gracious.
One last question.
Mr. Olsen, do you agree that the public deserves to know
whether and to what extent the various entities of the IC
believe ``Carpenter'' applies to them?
Mr. Olsen. I believe that the public deserves to know the
frameworks around which or upon which we collect information on
behalf of the Intelligence Community or in the law enforcement
context. I think it's important that to the extent we can, we
disclose the legal framework that supports the collection of
this type of information.
Senator Wyden. I think the response to that one has got to
be a yes and you got pretty close. So, we will continue the
discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A general comment about the issue that Senator Wyden raised
about the spyware is certainly concerning and I'm sure we're
going to have discussions about that subject. On the other
hand, my first thought was that we all have to be careful about
what we put on these devices. One of the 10 points in my high
school graduation speech is: Don't write anything into
cyberspace you don't want your grandmother to read on the front
page of the ``Bangor Daily News.'' And I think we all need to
think about that, that there's no such thing as perfect
security. That doesn't mean we don't have to deal with this
issue that's arisen. But cyber protection starts at the device
level.
Dr. Dixon, I just want to underline a point that the
Chairman started with.
This security clearance problem is a serious problem. It's
a national security issue because in my view the biggest
problem is lost opportunity. People we lose because they can't
wait. So, I hope you will continue to follow the good example
of Sue Gordon and others who have made such progress on this
and not--. I'm afraid if it's not attended to aggressively, we
will backslide and we'll end up back with 700,000 or 800,000
people in a backlog.
So, I hope you will commit to continuing that project.
Dr. Dixon. I will, Sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
One of the unusual things about the history that we're in
right now is that we have to reimagine conflict. We've all
thought of conflict over a thousand years as armies against
armies, navies against navies. But now with the advent of cyber
warfare, the private sector is the front line. They're the
target and so I believe one of your missions has to be--and
this also goes for the national cyber director, for you, for
Avril Haines, for others to form new kinds of relationships
with the private sector. We can't have this arm's length. We
don't--you know, we don't trust the government. We're not going
to share information and successfully meet the cyber challenge.
Do you agree with that proposition?
Dr. Dixon. I absolutely agree with the proposition. Without
having that trust between the two of us, we're not going to be
able to deal with the threats that we're facing effectively. I
look forward to forging those partnerships if I'm confirmed.
Senator King. Thank you. And one other thing and I'm
loading tasks on you. But from the point of view of the
Director of National Intelligence, it's got to be concerning to
us as representatives of the taxpayers and the public that we
have 17 agencies. And the specter of duplication and excessive
cost is always there.
So, it seems to me that one of the roles of the DNI should
be to constantly be on the alert to how do we do these things
more efficiently. And we just can't have duplicated cyber
agencies, for example, within each. I mean they have to be
cyber protection within each agency, but there's also a role to
be had for some kind of central, efficient administration.
Dr. Dixon. Sir, I would agree with you completely. I think
that avoiding duplication is number one, but finding
efficiencies and sharing the way that we're approaching things
and just coming up with better solutions by working together is
the priority that I will put in place if I'm confirmed.
Senator King. Thank you and you're going to work with and
for an outstanding leader. I think the team that the President
has put in place at the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is outstanding.
Mr. Monheim, you and I have talked about the role of IG as
an incredibly important role, a very unusual role when we
essentially hire people within the government to report on the
malfeasance of the government. As you point out, it goes back
to 1778, prior to the actual adoption of the Constitution with
the Colonial Congress, Continental Congress, but particularly
important in the Intelligence Community because it's a secret
agency. So, I understand your commitment and I hope--. I guess
my question is would you be willing to be fired if the
executive didn't like the fact that you released what you
thought was a valid and urgent whistleblower's report?
Mr. Monheim. Thank you, Senator. I've repeatedly risked my
life for this country and I am certainly willing to be risking
my job for it.
Senator King. There could not possibly be better answer.
Thank you.
I said that once about one of my state troopers. I said, I
trust my life to this guy and then I said, as a matter of fact,
I did.
Mr. Olsen, one of the issues that I think has been brought
to the fore by the SolarWinds attack is the fact that our very
powerful intelligence agencies like the NSA and the CIA stop at
the water's edge. They're not allowed to work within the United
States. So, the SolarWinds hacker, they're based in Russia.
They go through a server in New Jersey and all of a sudden, we
have a gap in our coverage, if you will. I don't expect you to
provide an answer to this, but do you believe that this is
something that needs to be addressed? Bearing in mind that we
don't really want to be spying on Americans, but we've also got
to protect Americans. That's the tension inherent in the
system.
Mr. Olsen. Yes, Senator. And I agree that your question
really goes to the heart of one of the great challenges that we
face when it comes to defending the country against
cyberattacks. I would commend you and your colleagues for the
work on the Solarium Commission report on cyber security. I
think the recommendations in that report are excellent.
And I do think you have individuals who are in office now,
a really strong team who understands the challenge that your
question raises. We have a great deal of authority and
information through the work of the Intelligence Community on
threats we face in cyber. But the private sector inside the
United States is the primary victim of these attacks. And we
need to bridge that divide between what the government knows
and what the private sector faces when it comes to
cyberattacks. I think the Justice Department and the National
Security Division, particularly over the past few years, has
really upped its game in supporting the work of the
Intelligence Community and working with industry to help to
bridge that divide. But there's certainly more work to do.
Senator King. Thank you very much. Thanks to all of you for
your willingness to serve in these important positions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Senator Bennet.
Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll echo my
colleague from Maine's observation about how grateful all of us
are for your willingness to serve in these positions. I only
have one question today.
And Dr. Dixon, it won't surprise you to know that it's
about space. Maintaining our superiority in space and
protecting space as a peaceful and secure domain is critical to
our competition with China. In its annual threat assessment
from earlier this year, the Intelligence Community wrote,
quote, Beijing is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities
in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits
that Washington has accrued from space leadership.
The Intelligence Committee also wrote that, quote, China
has counter-space weapons capabilities intended to target U.S.
and allied satellites. With respect to Russia, the U.S. Space
Command said in December that it concluded that Russia
conducted a test of a direct ascent anti-satellite missile
which if tested on an actual satellite or used operationally
could cause a large debris field that could endanger commercial
satellites and pollute the space domain.
You spent time at NGA, which is responsible for developing
the requirements for geospatial intelligence space
capabilities, including commercial imagery. Do you believe our
processes for acquisition are keeping pace with the threat and
with innovation and the innovation that's occurring in the
private sector?
How can we improve the requirements process for things like
commercial imagery so we're effectively capturing advancements
in innovation?
Dr. Dixon. Senator Bennett, thank you for that question.
Space has definitely been something that I've been spending
much of my career on from the very beginning. A couple of
things. I'll start at the end of your question with respect to
working with commercial industry.
We do need to be able to move faster than we have in the
past. I think working with the NGA and the NRO working
together, we have a very good understanding of both the current
space capabilities that are out there by U.S. companies as well
as what's coming in the future. I'm looking forward to seeing
the role that commercial space will continue to play as we try
to satisfy our missions. But we do need to figure out how to
bring to bear the new capabilities that they're developing more
efficiently and more effectively than we have in the past. It's
not about big, large contracts of one particular vendor. It's
about really being able to take advantage of all the
capabilities and the diversity there.
With respect to the other side of it, the protections in
space also are extremely important and you mentioned some of
the threats that we're facing now, and we do have strategic
competitors that are trying to be better than we are in space.
We feel that very acutely at NGA. We need to maintain that sort
of superiority, not only in the underlying understanding of the
science behind getting things to move around in space, but the
capabilities that are out there and what we need to keep the
society going We have so many dependencies on space that it
will take all of us working together--defense, Intelligence
Community, and really society writ large--to really be able to
protect the capabilities and continue to leverage space in the
way that it's in fact impacting our world in a very positive
way.
Senator Bennet. I think the only thing I would add is I
think this Committee stands ready to be helpful if we can. So,
to the extent that you detect barriers or ways in which
existing law is compromising our ability to come together in a
unified way, intelligence and defense, I think people here are
going to want to hear about that so that we can try to improve
the ecosystem and keep that edge that we need to keep.
So, thank you again for your willingness to serve and
everybody else. I'm very grateful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rubio. All right, anything else? Thank you
for your time, and with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 4:07 p.m.]
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